Saturday, August 23, 2014

23/8/2014: Labour Costs and Euro area's myth of 'productivity' gains


Looking back at July 2014 IMF Article 4 paper on Euro area (most of which I covered back when it was published), here is an interesting chart mapping changes in the euro area countries' unit labour costs.

The chart is complex, so let me point out few things in it:

Firstly: improvements in the unit labour costs (ULCs) is reflected in the vertical distance between the black dot (accumulated change in ULCs over 2000-2007 period: higher level of the dot reflects lower competitiveness or higher ULCs compared to EA17 levels) and the black bar (accumulated change in ULCs over 2008-Q3 2013 period).

  1. This shows that Ireland has delivered (a) the highest ULCs deterioration of the sample of countries reported over 2000-2007 period, and (b) since 2008, Ireland has delivered the largest improvement in competitiveness (ULCs drop) of the sample. 
  2. Second largest improvement in ULCs was recorded in Greece and it is comparable to, but modestly shallower than in Ireland; third and virtually indistinguishable from the second - in Spain and fourth in Portugal.
  3. The above two facts suggest that improvements in the ULCs are indeed related to the rates of increases in  unemployment: all countries with significant improvements have seen dramatic rises in unemployment. Jobs destruction 'helps' competitiveness.
Secondly, coloured bars show composition of gains over two periods. Here, the following points arise:
  1. Labour costs declines have been responsible for the lion's share of ULCs gains in Greece, followed by Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
  2. Labour costs declines are dramatic in the case of only two countries: Greece and Ireland.
  3. The above two facts suggests that jobs destruction impacted dramatically in the sectors that were employment/labour-intensive, allowing for substantial moderation of labour costs across the remaining economy on average. So 'concentrated' jobs destruction 'helps' improve competitiveness a lot.
  4. Meanwhile, productivity gains in economy were significant contributors to improved competitiveness in Spain, followed - by some margin of difference - by Ireland, and Portugal.
  5. Points 1-2 and 4 together strongly suggest that in Ireland and Spain (and to a lesser extent Portugal) gains in competitiveness came about not because the remaining working population suddenly became more productive, but because the new jobless were working in sectors that were less productive, plus because remaining workers got paid less on average.
One more point: of course, our (and other euro area 'peripherals') gains here are measured not in absolute terms, but against EA17 aggregate levels of competitiveness, so to a large extent, our gains in the chart above are also down to their (other euro area countries') losses in competitiveness. This is exactly what the above figure shows for Austria, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands.

That's happy times of productivity growth in the euro area 'periphery', then... down to throwing people off the employment bus and bragging about fabled improved productivity for the remaining passengers...

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