2/4/20: US Record in Covid Response To-Date

Much of the rhetoric coming out of the Washington on COVID19 pandemic is centred around the claims that the U.S. response to the pandemic has been adequately scaled up, with some claims even referencing allegedly 'highest rates of testing' in the world. Here are two charts putting the U.S. Covid pandemic responses to comparatives:

Now, most current data:

Not only the U.S. number of cases has now exceeded double that of Italy, but the U.S. death toll is currently on track to exceed Italy's massive death tool within 4 days, should the trend to-date persist.

'World class' track record this is...

15/2/19: Euro area is sliding toward recession

Based on the latest data through January 2019, Eurozone’s economic problems are getting worse. In 4Q 2018, Euro area posted real GDP growth of just 0,.2% q/q - matching the print for 3Q 2018. Meanwhile, inflation has fallen from 1.7% in December 2018 to 1.6% in January 2018. And Eurocoin - a leading growth indicator for euro area GDP expansion slipped from 0.42 in December 2018 to 0.31 in January 2019. This marked the third consecutive month of decline in Eurocoin, and the steepest fall in 8 months. Worse, July 23016 was the last time Eurocoin was at this level.

Within the last 12 months, Eurozone growth has officially fallen from 0,.7% q/q in 4Q 2017 to 0.2% in 4Q 2018, HICP effectively stayed the same, with inflation at 1.6% in January 2018 agains 1.5% in January 2018. And forward growth indicator has collapsed from 0.95 in January 2018 to 0.31 in January 2019.

Euro area is heading backward when it comes to economic activity, fast.

Germany just narrowly escaped an official recession, with 4Q growth at zero, and 3Q growth at -0.2%

Italy is in official recession, with 3Q 2018 GDP growth of -0.1% followed by 4Q 2018 growth of -0.2%.

Industrial goods production is now down two consecutive months in the Euro area as a whole, with latest print for December 2018 sitting at - 4.2% decline, following a -3.0% y/y fall in November 2018.

Worse, capital goods industrial production - a signal of forward capacity investment, is now down even more sharply: from -4.4% in November 2018 to -5.5% in December 2018.

5/2/19: The Myth of the Euro: Economic Convergence

The last eight years of Euro's 20 years in existence have been a disaster for the thesis of economic convergence - the idea that the common currency is a necessary condition for delivering economic growth to the 'peripheral' euro area economies in the need of 'convergence' with the more advanced economies levels of economic development.

The chart below plots annual rates of GDP growth for the original Eurozone 12 economies, broken into two groups: the more advanced EA8 economies and the so-called Club Med or the 'peripheral' economies.

It is clear from the chart that in  growth terms, using annual rates or the averages over each decade, the Euro creation did not sustain significant enough convergence of the 'peripheral' economies of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain with the EA8 more advanced economies of the original euro 12 states. Worse, since the Global Financial Crisis onset, we are witnessing a massive divergence in economic activity.

To highlight the compounding effects of these annual growth rates dynamics, consider an index of real GDP levels set at 100 for 1990 levels for both the EA8 and the 'peripheral' states:

Not only the divergence is dramatic, but the euro area 'peripheral' economies have not fully recovered from the 2008-2013 crisis, with their total real GDP sitting still 3.2 percentage points below the pre-crisis peak (attained in 2007), marking 2018 as the eleventh year of the crisis for these economies.  With Italy now in a technical recession - posting two consecutive quarters of negative growth in 3Q and 4Q 2018 based on preliminary data, and that recession accelerating (from -0.1% contraction in 3Q to -0.2% drop in 4Q) we are unlikely to see any fabled 'Euro-induced convergence' between the lower income states of the so-called Euro 'periphery' and the Euro area 8 states.

18/08/18: Euromoney on Italian Banking Risks and Turkey Crisis

Euromoney article on the latent Italian crisis, relative to the ongoing Turkish one: https://www.euromoney.com/article/b19k3zjb7v811r/italian-banks-a-bigger-risk-than-turkey.

29/6/18: Can, Foot, Road: EU 'Agreement' on Migration Crisis

The EU27 have a new 'deal'. This time, on revamping the block's migration strategies in the face of continued relentless wave of refugees fleeing to Europe from Syria and North Africa, propelled or aided to take desperate actions by the regime change doctrine of Washington. Migration numbers are down roughly 90 percent from their peak in 2015, and fell 45 percent y/y in the first half of 2018. But, voter revolt against the system that is perceived as "open borders" is still fuelling rise in political opportunism and extremism across Europe. The latest catalysts for the negotiations have been: (1) the rise of anti-immigrant parties in Germany that now threatens the uneasy governing coalition in Berlin, and (2) the arrival to power of the new, anti-immigration coalition in Italy. To be more precise, Italian Government has been asking for the EU to take "concrete steps" to share burden of accepting refugees with Italy for some time now. Other  catalysts have been governments of Hungary and the Czech Republic, where current political leadership has been opposing the EU policy of imposing automatic quotas for accepting migrants.

Earlier today, following almost nine hours of negotiations, the EU27 finally hammered out a compromise deal, immediately labeled in the media as 'political fudge' - something the EU has been very skilled at achieving for a good part of the last 20 years.

To prevent Italy from exercising a veto on the deal, the EU agreed to redistribute arriving migrants away from the country of their original landing to "control centres" spread across the EU. Centres locations are to be specified later. "Control centres", funded out of unspecified funds, but presumably payable by the joint resources of the EU, will de facto trade 'local jobs and euros' for communities accepting large scale migrants detention centres. This model works well with military bases and jails, and can be attractive to some poorer Eastern European countries, as well as countries like Greece and Italy. The key to this is that the detention centres will only be located in countries that volunteer to accept them. In simple terms, immigration policy is now a part of fiscal redistribution scheme, just what Italy wanted.

"Control centres" will function as a triage point, with “rapid and secure processing” separating economic migrants from those with a potentially legitimate claim to the asylum. Thereafter, successfully pre-screened asylum seekers will be distributed under the principle of solidarity (quotas), although, in a bow to Czech and Hungarian governments, solidarity principle will apparently be voluntary too. In other words, "rapid" processing will likely end up being a 'lengthy detention' in "control centres", as many Governments will simply refuse to take in asylum seekers, while other Governments will end up being swamped with applicants.

To restrict the numbers of those reaching the EU borders in the first place, the EU meeting agreed to provide more funds for Turkey and Morocco to act as buffers for refugees. Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Niger and Tunisia are to get funding for setting up 'processing centres'. Or, put differently, the EU will be paying more to warehouse migrants offshore, something that is likely to lead to lengthy detention in questionable conditions.

As a support for embattled Angela Merkel, the agreement also states that the nation states can “take all necessary internal legislative and administrative measures” to stop refugees and migrants crossing Europe’s internal borders. Whatever this means for the Schengen agreement and borderless travel, time will tell.


My view: The migration agreement is nothing more than another kick to the proverbial can that was stuck in the cracks on the proverbial road toward addressing the migration crisis. It fails to address actual modalities of asylum process, the key being the length of the process, lack of alternatives to highly costly and questionable (in ethical and even international law terms) deportations of failed seekers, and the lack of clarity of rules and resources for allocating successful asylum seekers. It also failed in effectively dealing with migrants inflows: a 'buffer zone' on the southern shores of the Mediterranean simply increases costs of making the crossing, and thus increases the risk of crossing to migrants. It does not remove the incentives for making the journey. In the case of Libya and Egypt, there are questions about these states' capacity actually control their borders, primarily arising from the nature of the Government regimes in both countries. In case of Syria, ability to seal off inflows of refugees from the country hinges on stabilisation of the Assad regime, as no other participant in the Syrian civil war has any interest in controlling Syria's Mediterranean coast. In effect, the EU agreement does not tackle the main issue at hand: how to reduce the inflows of both economic migrants and refugees into Europe. Likewise, the EU agreement does not even touch upon the need to structure effective measures (legal and institutional) to improve integration of the successful migrants into the European societies.

In short, we will be back to this issue soon. Mark my words.

4/6/18: Italy is a TBTF/TBTS Problem for ECB

In my previous post, I talked about the Too-Big-To-Fail Euro state, #Italy - a country with massive debt baggage that is systemic in nature.

Here is Project Syndicate view from Carmen Reinhart: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/italy-sovereign-debt-restructuring-by-carmen-reinhart-2018-05.

An interesting graph, charting a combination of the official Government debt and Target 2 deficits accumulated by Italy:

Quote: "With many investors pulling out of Italian assets, capital flight in the more recent data is bound to show up as an even bigger Target2 hole. This debt, unlike pre-1999, pre-euro Italian debt, cannot be inflated away. In this regard, it is much like emerging markets’ dollar-denominated debts: it is either repaid or restructured."

The problem, of course, is the ECB position, as mentioned in my article linked above. It is more than a reputational issue. Restructuring central bank liabilities is easy and relatively painless when it comes to a one-off event within a large system, like the ECB. So no issue with simply ignoring these imbalances from the monetary policy perspective. However, the ECB is a creature of German comfort, and this makes any restructuring (or ignoring) of the Target 2 imbalances a tricky issue for ECB's ability to continue accumulating them vis-a-vis all other debtor states of the euro area. Should a new crisis emerge, the ECB needs stable (non-imploding) Target 2 balance sheet to continue making an argument for sustaining debtor nations. This means not ignoring Italian problem.

Here is the picture mapping out the problem:

Source: http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/servlet/desis?node=1000004859

Reinhart warns, in my opinion correctly, "In the mildest of scenarios, only Italy’s official debt – held by other governments or international organizations – would be restructured, somewhat limiting the disruptions to financial markets. Yet restructuring official debt may not prove sufficient. Unlike Greece (post-2010), where official creditors held the lion’s share of the debt stock, domestic residents hold most of Italy’s public debt. This places a premium on a strategy that minimizes capital flight (which probably cannot be avoided altogether)."

In other words, as I noted years ago, Italy is a 'Too-Big-To-Fail' and a 'Too-Big-To-Save' or TBTF/TBTS problem for the euro area.

4/6/18: Italy's Problem is Europe's Problem

My article on Italian (and Spanish and Dutsche Bank) mess in Sunday Business Post: https://www.businesspost.ie/business/italys-problem-europes-problem-417945.

Unedited version of the article here:

This fortnight has been a real roller-coaster for the European markets and politics. Only two weeks ago, I wrote about the problems of rising political populism in Italy and Spain as the signals of a broader trend across the block’s member states. This week, in Spain a no confidence motion in Mariano Rajoy’s rule played a side show to Rome’s drama.

The timeline of events in Italy provides the background to this week’s lessons.

The country has been governed by a lame-duck executive since mid-2016. Fed up with Rome’s gridlock, in March 2018 general election, Italians endorsed a parliament split between the populist-Left M5S and the far-Right group of parties led by the League. Month and a half of League-M5S negotiations have produced a shared policies platform, replete with radical proposals for reshaping country’s Byzantine tax and social welfare systems. The platform also contained highly controversial proposals to force the ECB to write down EUR250 billion worth of Government debt, a plan for restructuring fiscal rules to allow the country to run larger fiscal deficits, and a call for immigration system reforms.

On Monday, the President of the Italian Republic, Sergio Mattarella, a loyal Euro supporter, vetoed the League-M5S candidate for the economy ministry, Eurosceptic Paolo Savona. The result was resignation of the League-M5S Prime Minister-designate, Giuseppe Conte, and a threat of an appointment of the unpopular technocrat, Carlo Cottarelli, an ex-IMF economist nicknamed Mr. Scissors for his staunch support for austerity, as a caretaker Prime Minister. By Thursday night, Conte was back in the saddle, with a new coalition Government agreed and set to be sworn in on Friday.

Crisis avoided? Not so fast.

Risk Blow Out

The markets followed the political turns and twists of the drama. On Tuesday, Italian bonds posted their worst daily performance in over 20 years. The spike in the 2-year bond yield was spectacular, going from 0.3 percent on Monday morning to 2.73 percent on Tuesday, before slipping back to 1.26 percent on Thursday. The 10-year Italian bond yield leaped from 2.37 percent to 3.18 percent within the first two days, falling to 2.84 percent a day after.

Source: FT

To put these bond yields’ movements into perspective, at the week’s peak yields, the cost of funding Italian EUR2.256 trillion mountain of Government debt would have risen by EUR45 billion per annum - more than the forecast deficit increases under the reforms proposed in the League-M5S programme.

Thus, despite the immediate crisis yielding to the new Coalition, a heavy cloud of uncertainty still hangs over the Euro area’s third largest member state. Should the new Government fail to deliver on a unified platform built by an inherently unstable coalition, the new election will be on offer. This will likely turn into a plebiscite on Italy’s membership in the Euro. And it will also raise a specter of another markets meltdown.


The Italian Contagion Problem

The lessons from this week’s spike in political uncertainty are three-fold. All are bad for Italy and for the entire euro area. Firstly, after years of QE-induced amnesia, the investment markets are now ready to force huge volatility and rapid risk-repricing into sovereign bonds valuations. Secondly, despite all the talk in Brussels and Rome about the robustness of post-2011 reforms, the Italian economy remains stagnant, incapable of withstanding any significant uptick in the historically-low borrowing costs that prevailed over recent years, with its financial system still vulnerable to shocks. Thirdly, the feared contagion from Italy to the rest of the Eurozone is not a distant echo of the crises past, but a very present danger.

Italy’s debt mountain is the powder keg, ready to explode. The IMF forecasts from April this year envision Italian debt-to-GDP ratio dropping from 131.5 percent at the end of 2017 to 116.6 percent in 2023. However, should the average cost of debt rise just 200 basis points on IMF’s central scenario, hitting 4 percent, the debt ratio is set to rise to 137 percent. This Wednesday bond auction achieved a gross yield of 3 percent on 10-year bonds. In other words, Italy’s fiscal and economic dynamics are unsustainable under a combination of higher risk premia, and the ECB monetary policy normalisation. The risk of the former was playing out this week and will remain in place into 2019. The latter is expected to start around November-December and accelerate thereafter.

With the government crisis unfolding, the probability of Italy leaving the Euro within 12 months, measured by Sentix Italexit index jumped from 3.6 percent at the end of the last week to 12.3 percent this Tuesday before moderating to 11 percent at the end of Thursday. This puts at risk not only Italian Government bonds, but the private sector debt as well, amounting to close to EUR2 trillion. A rise in the cost of this debt, in line with Government debt risk scenarios, will literally sink economy into a recession.

As Italian Government bonds spreads shot up, other European markets started feeling the pain. Based on the data from Deutsche Bank Research, at the start of 2018, foreign banks, non-bank investors and official sector, including the Euro system, held ca 48 percent of the Italian Government debt.  In Spain and Portugal, this number was closer to 65 percent. In other words, the risk of falling bonds prices is both material and broadly distributed across the European financial system for all ‘peripheral’ Euro states.

Source: DB Research

As a part of its quantitative easing program, the ECB has purchased some EUR250 billion worth of Italian bonds. A significant uptick in risk of Italy’s default on these bonds will put political pressure on ECB. Going forward, Frankfurt will face greater political uncertainty in dealing with the future financial and fiscal crises.

Research from the Bank for International Settlements puts Italian banks’ holdings of Government bonds at roughly EUR 450 billion. Ten largest Italian banks have sovereign-debt exposures that exceed their Tier-1 capital. As the value of these bonds plunges, the solvency risks rise too. Not surprisingly, over the last two weeks, shares of the large Italian banks fell 10-20 percent. These declines in equity prices, in turn, are driving solvency risks even higher.

Beyond the Italian banks, French financial institutions held some EUR44 billion worth of Italian bonds, while Spanish banks were exposed to EUR29 billion, according to the European Banking Authority.

The second order effects of the Italian risk contagion play through the other ‘peripheral’ euro area bonds. As events of this week unfolded, in line with Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece have experienced relatively sharp drops in their bonds values. All three are also subject to elevated political uncertainty at home, made more robust by the Italian crisis.

Thus, if the Italian government bond yields head up, banks’ balance sheets risks mount through both, direct exposures to the Italian Government bonds, and indirect effects from Italian contagion on the broader government debt markets, as well as to the private sector lending.

At the end of this week, all indication are that the Italian contagion crisis is receding. The new risk triggers are shifting out into late 2018 and early 2019. The uneasy coalition between two populist moments, the M5S and the League, is unlikely to survive the onslaught of voter dissatisfaction with the state of the economy and continued immigration crisis. At the same time, the coalition will be facing a highly skeptical EU, hell-bent on assuring that M5S-League Government does not achieve much progress on its reforms. All in, the new Government has between six and twelve months to run before we see a new election looming on the horizon.

The Italian crisis might be easing, but it is not going away any time soon. Neither the Spanish one. Oh, and with a major credit downgrade from the Standard & Poor’s and the U.S. Fed, here goes the systemic behemoth of European finance, the Deutsche Bank.

21/5/18: Italian Sovereign Risks Are Blowing Up

As I noted in my comment to ECR / Euromoney and in my article for Sunday Business Post (see links here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2018/05/21518-risk-experts-take-flight-over.html and http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2018/05/21528-trouble-is-brewing-in-euro.html), the ongoing process of Government formation in Italy represents a fallout from the substantial VUCA events arising from the recent elections, and as such warrants a significant (albeit delayed) repricing of country sovereign risks. This process is now underway:

Source: Holger Zschaepitz @Schuldensuehner

Per chart above, Italy's 10 year bonds risk premium over Germany jumped to 181 bps on markets concerns with respect to fiscal dynamics implied by the new Government formation. This, however, is just a minor side show compared to the VUCA environment created by the broader dynamics of political populism and opportunism. And in this respect, Italy is just another European country exposed to these risks. In fact, as the latest data from the Timbro's Authoritarian Populism Index, Europe-wide, political populism is on the rise:

21/5/18: Risk experts take flight over Italy's political risk

Euromoney and ECR are covering the story of Italian political risk, with my comments on the rise of populism in Italy and its effects on sovereign risk with respect to the Italian Government formation negotiations: https://www.euromoney.com/article/b187w50chyvhbl/risk-experts-take-flight-over-italys-political-shock

21/5/28: Trouble is brewing in the Euro paradise

My article for the Sunday Business Post on the continued risk/VUCA from politics of populism to the Euro area reforms and stability: https://www.businesspost.ie/business/trouble-brewing-euro-paradise-416876.

5/2/18: Italy Smacks into VUCA Wall

VUCA wins. In Italy.

Italian elections results are coming in and several key VUCA components are now clearly at play in Europe's third largest economy: https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2018/mar/05/italian-elections-2018-full-results-renzi-berlusconi.

Now, what does this mean?

Italian Parliament:
234 seats for M5S
122 seats for Lega
105 seats for PDs
96 seats for FI

Italian Senate:
115 seats for M5S
55 seats for Lega
53 seats for FI
50 seats for PD

M5S - the 'Five Star Movement' has consolidated and expanded its launching position of 2013, despite virtually all analysts declaring the party to be 'falling' in support, especially after 2017 local elections. Welcome to the world of VUCA, where the more 'accomplished' the analyst, the less accurate are her/his predictions, because our traditional analytical tools miss the C & A bits of VUCA (complexity & ambiguity).

Renzi & mainstream politics have lost. His PDs are decimated. They have only themselves to blame: centre-left ideology is of nil distinction from centre and centre-right these days. Not only in Italy, but elsewhere too: just observe the U.S. Democrats sparing with the U.S. Republicans on virtually everything, save actual policies. The squabbling that the lack of ideological core implies is intense within the centre-left in Italy. Just as it is intense elsewhere (e.g. the U.S., where the centre-left's only differentiation from the centre-right is who to blame for the country problems, save blaming themselves).

Centre-right (Berlusconi) failed to capture anyone's hearts and minds, so the Lega Nord has taken its votes. Which makes Lega a major winner in the election: the party went from its cyclical low of 4 percent in 2013 election to its historical peak of around 18 percent in this election. The change of leadership in 2013 (to Salvini) has paid off.

Key takeaway from all of this is that in the modern, highly volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous political environment, writing off populist parties at the extreme o political spectrum is a dangerous game. We think of these parties as being driven to successes and subsequent failures by individual personalities of their leaders. That does not appear to be the case. Complexity overrides trends.

Meanwhile, in Brussels, power-fixing mode was on. As reported in the Guardian: "The [EU] commission’s chief spokesman, Margaritis Schinas, told reporters its president, Jean-Claude Juncker, wanted to see a “stable government in Italy” and “regarding the potential impact and so on and so forth... ‘Keep calm and carry on’”. In other words, get Renzi back by all possible means and do not challenge centrism. That is just another manifestation of VUCA for you: the ossified elites dependent on status quo ante will only recognise VUCA effects after they drive the system to a point of no return.

22/10/17: Italian North: another chip off Europe's Nirvana

Having just written about the Czech electoral pivot toward populism last night, today brings yet another  news headline from the politically-hit Europe.

In a non-binding referendums in two wealthiest Italian regions, Veneto and Lombardia, the voters have given local governments strong mandates to push for greater autonomy from Rome and the Federal Government. Both regions are dominated by the politics of Lega Nord, a conservative, autonomy-minded party with legacy of euro scepticism, strong anti-immigration sentiment and the past promotion of outright independence for the Northern Italy.

In both referendums, turnout was relatively strong by Italian standards (58% projected for Veneto and over 40% for Lombardia). And in both, exit polls suggest that some 95% of voters have opted for stronger regional autonomy.

The referendums were not about outright independence, but about wrestling more controls over fiscal and financial resources from Rome. Both regions are net contributors to the Italian State and are full of long run resentment over the alleged waste of these resources. Both regions want more money to stay local.

In reality, however, the vote is about a combination of factors, namely the EU policies toward Italy, the monetary conditions in the euro area, the long-term stagnation of the Italian economy and the centuries-old failure of Italian Federal State to reform the economy and the society of the Southern Italian regions. Italy today is saddled with stagnation, huge youth unemployment, lack of business dynamism, weak entrepreneurship, dysfunctional financial institutions, high taxes, failing and extremely heterogenous public services, collapsed demographics and centuries-old divisions. Some of these problems are european in nature. But majority are Italian.

Greater autonomy for wealthier regions, in my view, is a part of the solution to the long running problems, because it will create a set of new, stronger incentives for the Southern regions to reform. But in the end, it is hard to imagine the state like Italy sustaining its membership in the euro area without an outright federalization of the EU.

In the nutshell, within a span of few weeks, the dormant political volcano of the Europe has gone from stone cold to erupting. Spain, Austria, Czech, & Italy are in flames. Late-stage lava flows have been pouring across Poland, Hungary and the UK, Slovakia and parts of the Baltics for months and years. Tremors in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, (especially Eastern Germany) and Finland, as well as occasional flares of populist/extremist activity in other parts of the Paradise are ongoing. And, it is only a matter of time before populism resurges in France.

All of this with a background of stronger economic growth and booming markets. So wait till the next crisis/recession/market correction hits...

7/6/17: European Policy Uncertainty: Still Above Pre-Crisis Averages

As noted in the previous post, covering the topic of continued mis-pricing by equity markets of policy uncertainties, much of the decline in the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index has been accounted for by a drop in European countries’ EPUIs. Here are some details:

In May 2017, EPU indices for France, Germany, Spain and the UK have dropped significantly, primarily on the news relating to French elections and the moderation in Brexit discussions (displaced, temporarily, by the domestic election). Further moderation was probably due to elevated level of news traffic relating to President Trump’s NATO visit. Italy’s index rose marginally.

Overall, European Index was down at 161.6 at the end of May, showing a significant drop from April 252.9 reading and down on cycle high of 393.0 recorded in November 2016. The index is now well below longer-term cycle trend line (chart below). 

However, latest drop is confirming overall extreme degree of uncertainty volatility over the last 18 months, and thus remains insufficient to reverse the upward trend in the ‘fourth’ regime period (chart below).

Despite post-election moderation, France continues to lead EPUI to the upside, while Germany and Italy remain two drivers of policy uncertainty moderation. This is confirmed by the period averages chart below:

Overall, levels of European policy uncertainty remain well-above pre-2009 averages, even following the latest index moderation.

28/4/17: Euromoney on Italian Risks

Euromoney article on the continued evolution of the Italian crisis: http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3712913/Country-risk-Italy-is-the-volcano-waiting-to-erupt.html, quoting - amongst others - myself.

12/4/17: European Economic Uncertainty Moderated in 1Q 2017

European Policy Uncertainty Index, an indicator of economic policy risks perception based on media references, has posted a significant moderation in the risk environment in the first quarter of 2017, falling from the 4Q 2016 average of 307.75 to 1Q 2017 average of 265.42, with the decline driven primarily by moderating uncertainty in the UK and Italy, against rising uncertainty in France and Spain. Germany's economic policy risks remained largely in line with 4Q 2016 readings. Despite the moderation, overall European policy uncertainty index in 1Q 2017 was still ahead of the levels recorded in 1Q 2016 (221.76).

• German economic policy uncertainty index averaged 247.19 in 1Q 2017, up on 239.57 in 4Q 2016, but down on the 12-months peak of 331.78 in 3Q 2016. However, German economic uncertainty remained above 1Q 2016 level of 192.15.
• Italian economic policy uncertainty index was running at 108.52 in 1Q 2017, down significantly from 157.31 reading in 4Q 2016 which also marked the peak for 12 months trailing period. Italian uncertainty index finished 1Q 2017 at virtually identical levels as in 1Q 2016 (106.92).
• UK economic policy uncertainty index was down sharply at 411.04 in 1Q 2017 from 609.78 in 4Q 2016, with 3Q 2016 marking the local (12 months trailing) peak at 800.14. Nonetheless, in 1Q 2017, the UK index remained well above 1Q 2016 reading of 347.11.
• French economic policy uncertainty rose sharply in 1Q 2017 to 454.65 from 371.16 in 4Q 2016. Latest quarterly average is the highest in the 12 months trailing period and is well above 273.05 reading for 1Q 2016.
• Spain's economic policy uncertainty index moderated from 179.80 in 4Q 2016 to 137.78 in 1Q 2017, with the latest reading being the lowest over the five recent quarters. A year ago, the index stood at 209.12.

Despite some encouraging changes and some moderation, economic policy uncertainty remains highly elevated across the European economy as shown in the chart and highlighted in the chart below:

Of the Big 4 European economies, only Italy shows more recent trends consistent with decline in uncertainty relative to 2012-2015 period and this moderation is rather fragile. In every other big European economy, economic uncertainty is higher during 2016-present period than in any other period on record. 

20/2/17: The Effect of GFC on Italian Non-Performing Loans Overhang

In yesterday’s post I covered some interesting current numbers relating to NPLs in the European banking sector. And sitting, subsequently, in the tin can of an airplane on my way back to California, I remembered about this pretty decent paper from Banca d’Italia, published in September 2016.

Titled “The evolution of bad debt in Italy during the global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis: a counterfactual analysis” and authored by Alessandro Notarpietro and Lisa Rodano (Banca d’Italia Occasional Paper Number 350 – September 2016), the paper looked at the evolution (dynamics) of Italian banks’ NPLs since the start of the Global Financial Crisis and the twin recessions that hit Italy since 2008. Actual data is compared against “the counterfactual simulations". "A ‘no-crises scenario’ is built for the period 2008-2015. The counterfactual dynamics” generate a comparative new bad debt rate, which “depends on macroeconomic conditions and borrowing costs.”

Per authors, “the analysis suggests that, in the absence of the two recessions – and of the economic policy decisions that were taken to combat their effects – non-financial corporations’ bad debts at the end of 2015 would have reached €52 billion, instead of €143 billion."

Chart above plots the evolution of two time series of debt: actual and ex-crisis counterfactual, for non-financial corporates, showing the crisis-related debt overhang of around EUR 90 billion. More precisely: “In the absence of the two crises – and of the economic policy decisions that were taken to contrast their effects – the stock of non-financial corporations’ bad debts at the end of 2015 would have reached €52 billion, instead of €143billion. In the counterfactual scenario, the level at the end of 2015 is only 1.7 times larger than the one observed at the end of 2007; in actual data, the observed level was almost 5 times as large. As a share of total outstanding loans to non-financial corporations, bad debts rose at about 17.9 per cent at the end of 2015; had the two crises never occurred, it would have been around 5 per cent, roughly in line with the pre-crisis level.”

While the numbers may appear to be relatively small, given the size of the Italian real economic debt pile, provisioning on this bad debt overhang would amount to a serious dosh. Per the authors’ and previous estimates, roughly 13 percentage points was lost in Italian GDP (once public debt is accounted for). In other words,  through 2015, Italian economy has lost some 13.5 percent of GDP in potential output due to debt overhang. Of this, near 7 percentage points were lost due to sovereign debt-related losses and 6.5 percentage points due to corporate bad debt overhang.

28/10/16: Rising Risk Profile for Italy

Euromoney Country Risk on Italian referendum and rising risks relating to Euro area's third largest economy:

10/6/16: Italian Manufacturing Capacity post-crisis

A third paper on manufacturing capacity, also from Italy is by Libero Monteforte and Giordano Zevi, titled “An Inquiry into Manufacturing Capacity in Italy after the Double-Dip Recession” (January 21, 2016, Bank of Italy Occasional Paper No. 302: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2759786).

Here, the authors “…investigate the effects of the prolonged double-dip recession on the productive capacity of the Italian manufacturing sector”. The authors “…estimate that between 2007 and 2013 capacity contracted by 11–17%, depending on the method.”

In addition, the authors “…conduct an exercise to quantify the loss with respect to a counterfactual evolution of capacity in a ‘no-crisis’ scenario in which pre-2008 trends are extrapolated: in this case the loss is close to 20% for all methods.”

Summary of the results:

And here is decomposition of the potential output drop by factor of production:

Per authors: “In terms of factor determinants, about 60% of the cumulated drop of potential output in 2007-13 came from labour, while around 25% was attributable to the TFP (Chart above). The reason why the contribution of capital is comparatively small is twofold: first, the industrial
sector is characterized by a large wage share (close to 70%), therefore the contribution of K in the production function is limited; second, capital is a highly persistent variable and the fall in investments recorded during the two recessions, even if remarkably large, has not (so far)
resulted in a dramatic drop of the capital stock.”

The key lessons from all of this are: potential output in Italy fell precipitously across the manufacturing economy in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. Meanwhile, counterfactual extension of pre-crisis trends was strongly signalling to the upside in manufacturing.

Majority of metrics used suggest that productive capacity in Italy declined by 15-18 percent through 2013, while counterfactual estimates for pre-crisis trend would have implied an average rise of ca 5 percent.

Last, but not least, “Firms producing basic metals, fabricated metal products and machinery and equipment are found to be the ones that were most penalized by the crisis of the last six years; by contrast, sectors that were already shrinking before 2008, such as the manufacture of textiles, appear not to have performed significantly worse during the double-dip recessions than they had in the early 2000s.”

10/6/16: Italian Industrial Production: 2007-2013

Staying with the earlier theme of industrial / manufacturing sector trends, here is a paper from the Banca d’Italia, authored by Andrea Locatelli, Libero Monteforte, and Giordano Zevi, titled “Heterogeneous Fall in Productive Capacity in Italian Industry During the 2008-13 Double-Dip Recession” (January 21, 2016, Bank of Italy Occasional Paper No. 303: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2759788) looks at the two periods of shocks, separated by one period of brief recovery.

Per authors, “between 2008 and 2013 productive capacity was considerably downsized in the Italian manufacturing sector” based on micro data from the Bank of Italy surveys across “the whole 2008-13 period and in four sub-periods (pre-crisis 2001-07, first phase of the crisis 2008-09, recovery 2010-11, and second crisis 2012-13).”

The study main findings are:
i) “losses of productive capacity varied widely across manufacturing sub-sectors with differences in pre-crisis trends tending to persist in a few sub-sectors during the double-dip recession”;
ii) “large firms were more successful in avoiding major capacity losses, especially in the first phase of the crisis”;
iii) “the share of sales on foreign markets was negatively correlated with performance in 2008-09, but the correlation turned positive in 2012-13”;
iv) “among the Italian macro-regions, the Centre weathered the long recession better” (see charts below);
v) “subsidiaries underperformed firms not belonging to any group”; and
vi) “the negative effects on productive capacity of credit constraints, which discouraged investments, were felt by Italian firms particularly in 2012-13”.

Very interesting outrun by region, presented here in two charts:

Some beef on that point: “The decline in [productive capacity] was not evenly distributed across the Italian macro-regions. The macro-regions more exposed to foreign demand were severely hit by the global financial crisis, with [productive capacity] declining by 8.6% in the North West and 7.0% in the North East.” Now, here’s the irony: Italy was (barely) able to sustain long-term Government borrowing on foot of its extremely strong exporters. During the recent twin crises, this very strength of the Italian economy turned against it. Which sort of raises few eyebrows: strong exporting capacity of Italy led the country to experience sharper shock than in many other states. Yet, the core prescription for growth from across the EU members states is - export!; and core prescription for recovery from the status quo main stream economists is - beef up current ace t surpluses (aka, raise exports relative to imports). Italian evidence does not really sound that supportive of these two ‘solutions’…

“During the temporary recovery, the South under-performed the rest of the country, losing 4.0% of its [productive capacity], while [productive capacity] stagnated in the other macro-regions.”

“The sovereign debt crisis affected the entire country more evenly. As a result, between 2010 and 2013 the loss of [productive capacity] in the South (-8.0%) was roughly twice as large as that recorded in the rest of the country (-4.7%)… The gap reflects the within-country heterogeneity in firms’ characteristics : …South Italy has mainly small firms, with an average of 100 employees (roughly constant during the double-dip crisis). Average firm size is larger in the Centre, just below 150, and in the North East, around 180, and even more so in the North West (consistently above 200). …southern regions have smaller export shares (about 20%), which are higher everywhere else (around 35% at the beginning of the sample); the export share shows a positive trend in all macro-regions.” You can see these reflected in the charts above.

In summary, thus, “the degree of foreign exposure helps to explain why the North suffered more during the global financial crisis. Also, the continuing decline of [productive capacity] in the South since 2007 is consistent with the smaller firm size in that macro-area (discussed above) and the larger decline of domestic demand there”.


So the key lesson here is: in the current environment characterised by rising regionalisation of trade flows and weak global demand, the exports-led recovery is more likely to trigger a negative shock to the economy than support economic growth.

Unless you are talking about a country like Ireland, where exports are booming despite global demand slowdown. Which, of course, cannot be explained by anything other than beggar-thy-neighbour tax optimisation policies.

4/5/16: Canaries of Growth are Off to Disneyland of Debt

Kids and kiddies, the train has arrived. Next stop: that Disneyland of Financialized Growth Model where debt is free and debt is never too high…

Courtesy of Fitch:

Source: @soberlook

The above in the week when ECB’s balancehseet reached EUR3 trillion marker and the buying is still going on. And in the month when estimates for Japan’s debt/GDP ratio will hit 249.3% of GDP by year end

Source: IMF

And now we have big investors panicking about debt: http://www.businessinsider.com/druckenmiller-thinks-fed-is-setting-world-up-for-disaster-2016-5. So Stanley Druckenmiller, head of Duquesne Capital, thinks that “leverage is far too high, saying that central banks and China have allowed for these excesses to continue and it's setting us up for danger.”

What all of the above really is missing is one simple catalyst to tie it all together. That catalysts is the realisation that not only the Central Banks are to be blamed for ‘allowing the excesses of leverage’ to run amok, but that the entire economic policy space in the advanced economies - from the central banks to fiscal policy to financial regulation - has been one-track pony hell-bent on actively increasing leverage, not just allowing it.

Take Europe. In the EU, predominant source of funding for companies and entrepreneurs is debt - especially banks debt. And predominant source of funding for Government deficits is the banking and investment system. And in the EU everyone pays lip service to the need for less debt-fuelled growth. But, in the end, it is not the words, but the deeds that matter. So take EU’s Capital Markets Union - an idea that is centred on… debt. Here we have it: a policy directive that says ‘capital markets’ in the title and literally predominantly occupies itself with how the system of banks and bond markets can issue more debt and securitise more debt to issue yet more debt.

That Europe and the U.S. are not Japan is a legacy of past policies and institutions and a matter of the proverbial ‘yet’, given the path we are taking today.

So it’s Disneyland of Debt next, folks, where in a classic junkie-style we can get more loans and more assets and more loans backed by assets to buy more assets. Public, private, financial, financialised, instrumented, digitalised, intellectual, physical, dumb, smart, new economy, old economy, new normal, old normal etc etc etc. And in this world, stashing more cash into safes (as Japanese ‘investors’ are doing increasingly) or into banks vaults (as Munich Re and other insurers and pension funds have been doing increasingly) is now the latest form of insurance against the coming debt markets Disneyland-styled ‘investments’.