Showing posts with label Markets. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Markets. Show all posts

Monday, June 8, 2020

8/6/20: 30 years of Financial Markets Manipulation


Students in my course Applied Investment and Trading in TCD would be familiar with the market impact of the differential bid-ask spreads in intraday trading. For those who might have forgotten, and those who did not take my course, here is the reminder: early in the day (at and around market opening times), spreads are wide and depths of the market are thin (liquidity is low); late in the trading day (closer to market close), spreads are narrow and depths are thick (liquidity is higher). Hence, a trading order placed near market open times tends to have stronger impact by moving the securities prices more; in contrast, an equally-sized order placed near market close will have lower impact.

Now, you will also remember that, in general, investment returns arise from two sources: 
  1. Round-trip trading gains that arise from buying a security at P(1) and selling it one period later at P(2), net of costs of buy and sell orders execution; and 
  2. Mark-to-market capital gains that arise from changes in the market-quoted price for security between times P(1) and P(2+).
The long-running 'Strategy' used by some institutional investors is, therefore as follows: 
Here is the illustration of the 'Strategy' via Bruce Knuteson paper "Celebrating Three Decades of Worldwide Stock Market Manipulation", available here: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1912.01708.pdf.
  • Step 1: Accumulate a large long portfolio of assets;
  • Step 2: At the start of the day, buy some more assets dominating your portfolio at P(1) - generating larger impact of your buy orders, even if you are carrying a larger cost adverse to your trade;
  • Step 3: At the end of the day, sell at P(2) - generating lower impact from your sell orders, again carrying the cost.

On a daily basis, you generate losses in trading account, as you are paying higher costs of buy and sell orders (due to buy-sell asymmetry and intraday bid-ask spreads differences), but you are also generating positive impact of buy trades, net of sell trades, so you are triggering positive mark-to-market gains on your original portfolio at the start of the day.

Knuteson shows that, over the last 30 years, overnight returns in the markets vastly outstrip intraday returns. 



Per author, "The obvious, mechanical explanation of the highly suspicious return patterns shown in Figures 2 and 3 is someone trading in a way that pushes prices up before or at market open, thus causing the blue curve, and then trading in a way that pushes prices down between market open (not including market open) and market close (including market close), thus causing the green curve. The consistency with which this is done points to the actions of a few quantitative trading firms rather than
the uncoordinated, manual trading of millions of people."

Sounds bad? It is. Again, per Knuteson: "The tens of trillions of dollars your use of the Strategy has created out of thin air have mostly gone to the already-wealthy: 
  • Company executives and existing shareholders benefi tting directly from rising stock prices; 
  • Owners of private companies and other assets, including real estate, whose values tend to rise and fall with the stock market; and 
  • Those in the financial industry and elsewhere with opportunities to privatize the gains and socialize the losses."

These gains to capital over the last three decades have contributed directly and signi ficantly to the current level of wealth inequality in the United States and elsewhere. As a general matter, widespread mispricing leads to misallocation of capital and human effort, and widespread inequality negatively a effects our social structure and the perceived social contract."

Wednesday, May 6, 2020

6/5/20: S&P500 and Fundamentals: What should matter, doesn't


S&P500 and earnings per share: what should matter, doesn't


We are now in extreme territory of the markets ignoring basic corporate fundamentals.

6/5/20: 1Q 2020 US GDP:


From Factset: "The decrease in first-quarter real GDP was largely driven by the 7.6% decline in consumer spending, which subtracted 5.3% from the total GDP number. Investment was also a drag on growth, while an improvement in the trade deficit partially offset these negatives. We may see downward revisions to these numbers with the next two data revisions, and second-quarter growth is expected to be far worse. Analysts surveyed by FactSet are currently expecting a 29.9% contraction in Q2."


Yeeks!

6/5/20: S&P500 Earnings and Revenues Growth 1Q 2020


With early effects of COVID19 pandemic in:



Both charts via Factset.

Saturday, March 21, 2020

21/3/20: Updated: Markets Impact of #Covid19


Updated markets impact: DJIA
% change on close, down% change on close, up
19/10/1987-22.61%13/10/200811.08%
16/03/2020-12.93%28/10/200810.88%
12/03/2020-9.99%21/10/198710.15%
26/10/1987-8.04%13/03/20209.36%
15/10/2008-7.87%23/03/20096.84%
09/03/2020-7.79%13/11/20086.67%
01/12/2008-7.70%21/11/20086.54%
09/10/2008-7.33%24/07/20026.35%
27/10/1997-7.18%20/10/19875.88%
17/09/2001-7.13%10/03/20095.80%
29/09/2008-6.98%29/07/20025.41%
13/10/1989-6.91%17/03/20205.20%
08/01/1988-6.85%02/03/20205.09%
31/08/1998-6.37%26/12/20184.98%
18/03/2020-6.30%08/09/19984.98%
11/03/2020-5.86%29/10/19874.96%
22/10/2008-5.69%24/11/20084.93%
14/04/2000-5.66%16/03/20004.93%
20/11/2008-5.56%10/03/20204.89%
08/08/2011-5.55%15/10/20024.80%
07/10/2008-5.11%28/10/19974.71%
19/11/2008-5.07%30/09/20084.68%
05/11/2008-5.05%16/10/20084.68%
06/11/2008-4.85%20/10/20084.67%
14/04/1988-4.82%01/10/20024.57%
12/11/2008-4.73%17/01/19914.57%
19/07/2002-4.64%04/03/20204.53%
10/08/2011-4.62%24/09/20014.47%
10/02/2009-4.62%30/11/20114.24%
11/09/1986-4.61%05/04/20014.23%
05/02/2018-4.60%11/10/20024.20%
16/10/1987-4.60%16/12/20084.20%
20/03/2020-4.55%15/10/19984.15%
27/02/2020-4.42%09/08/20113.98%
15/09/2008-4.42%26/08/20153.95%
20/09/2001-4.37%11/08/20113.95%
04/08/2011-4.31%04/01/19883.94%
02/03/2009-4.24%18/04/20013.91%
27/08/1998-4.19%10/05/20103.90%
08/02/2018-4.15%18/09/20083.86%
03/09/2002-4.10%01/09/19983.82%
12/03/2001-4.10%31/05/19883.82%
05/03/2009-4.09%17/03/20033.59%
17/09/2008-4.06%05/07/20023.58%
30/11/1987-4.03%13/03/20033.57%
20/01/2009-4.01%11/03/20083.55%
15/11/1991-3.93%14/12/19873.53%
03/12/1987-3.92%18/03/20083.51%
14/11/2008-3.82%21/01/20093.51%
22/10/1987-3.82%08/12/20083.46%

Wednesday, March 18, 2020

Tuesday, February 25, 2020

25/2/2020: No, 2019-nCov did not push forward PE ratios to 2002 levels


Markets are having a conniption these days and coronavirus is all the rage in the news flow.  Here is the 5 days chart for the major indices:

And it sure does look like a massive selloff.

Still, hysteria aside, no one is considering the simple fact: the markets have been so irrationally priced for months now, that even with the earnings being superficially inflated on per share basis by the years of rampant buybacks and non-GAAP artistry, the PE ratios are screaming 'bubble' from any angle you look at them.

Here is the Factset latest 20 years comparative chart for forward PEs:


You really don't need a PhD in Balck Swannery Studies to get the idea: we are trending at the levels last seen in 1H 2002. Every sector, save for energy and healthcare, is now in above 20 year average territory.  Factset folks say it as it is: "One year prior (February 20, 2019), the forward 12-month P/E ratio was 16.2. Over the following 12 months (February 20, 2019 to February 19, 2020), the price of the S&P 500 increased by 21.6%, while the forward 12-month EPS estimate increased by 4.1%. Thus, the increase in the “P” has been the main driver of the increase in the P/E ratio over the past 12 months."

So, about that 'Dow is 5.8% down in just five days' panic: the real Black Swan is that it takes a coronavirus to point to the absurdity of our markets expectations.

Friday, February 14, 2020

14/2/20: Pandemics, Panics and the Markets


In my recent article for The Currency I wrote about the expected market effects of the 2019-nCov coronavirus outbreak: https://www.thecurrency.news/articles/8490/constantin-gurdgiev-pandemics-panics-and-the-markets.


While past pandemics are not a direct nor linear indicators of the future expected performance, the logic and the dynamics of the past events suggest that while the front end short term effects of pandemics on the economies and the markets can be significant, over time, rebounds post-pandemics tend to fully offset short run negative impacts.

Key conclusions from the article are:

  • "...The market appears to worry little about public health risks, after their impact becomes more visible, although the onset of a pandemic can be associated with elevated markets volatility. This volatility is higher the faster the evolution of the health scare, but so is the market rebound from each crisis lows."
  • "This is not say that investors have little to worry about in today’s markets. We are still trading in the heavily over-bought market, and concerns about global growth are not getting much of a reprieve from the newsflows. The good news is, to date, the latest global health crisis does not seem to be a trigger for a major and sustained sell off. The bad news is, we are yet to see its full impact."

Tuesday, January 21, 2020

21/1/20: Investor Fear and Uncertainty in Cryptocurrencies


Our paper on behavioral biases in cryptocurrencies trading is now published by the Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance volume 25, 2020:



We cover investor sentiment effects on pricing processes of 10 largest (by market capitalization) crypto-currencies, showing direct but non-linear impact of herding and anchoring biases in investor behavior. We also show that these biases are themselves anchored to the specific trends/direction of price movements. Our results provide direct links between investors' sentiment toward:

  1. Overall risky assets investment markets,
  2. Cryptocurrencies investment markets, and
  3. Macroeconomic conditions,
and market price dynamics for crypto-assets. We also show direct evidence that both markets uncertainty and investor fear sentiment drive price processes for crypto-assets.

Wednesday, January 15, 2020

15/1/20: What Trade Deal Phase 1/N Says About the Four Horsemen of Apocalypse


Phase 1 of N of the "Greatest Trade Deal" that is "easiest to achieve' by the 'stablest Genius' is hitting the newsflows today. Which brings us to two posts worth reading on the subject:

Post 1 via Global Macro Monitor: https://global-macro-monitor.com/2020/01/15/phase-1-of-potemkin-trade-deal-signed-sealed-and-yet-to-deliver/ is as always (from that source) excellent. Key takeaways are:

  • "We never believed for one moment that China would cave on any of the big issues, such as restructuring its economy and any deal would be just some token political salad dressing for the 2020 election."
  • "Moreover, much of the deal depends on whether the Chinese will abide by Soviet-style import quotas," or in more common parlance: limits on imports of goods into the country, which is is 'command and control' economics of central planning.
  • "We are thankful, however,  the economic hostilities have momentarily ratcheted down but the game is hardly over," with tariffs and trade restrictions/suppression being the "new paranormal".
  • "Seriously, after more than two years of negotiations, they couldn’t even agree on dog and cat food imports?"
  • "The [trade] environment remains very much in flux and a source of concern and challenge for investors".

My takeaways from Phase 1/N thingy: we are in a VUCA world. The current U.S. Presidential Administration is an automated plant for production of uncertainty and ambiguity, while the world economy is mired in unresolvable (see WTO's Appellate Body trials & tribulations) complexity. Beyond the White House, political cycle in the U.S. is driving even more uncertainty and more ambiguity into the system. The Four Horse(wo)men of the Apocalypse in charge today are, in order of their power to shift the geopolitical and macroeconomic risk balance, Xi, DNC leadership, Putin and Trump. None of them are, by definition, benign. 

The trade deal so far shows that Xi holds momentum over Trump. Putin's shake up of the Russian Cabinet today shows that he is positioning for some change in internal power balances into 2020, and this is likely to have some serious (unknown to-date) implications geopolitically. Putin's meeting with Angela Merkel earlier this week is a harbinger of a policy pivot to come for the EU and Russia and Lavrov's yesterday's statement about weaponization of the U.S. dollar and the need for de-dollarization of the global economy seems to be in line with the Russo-German New Alignment (both countries are interested in shifting more and more trade and investment outside the net of the U.S. sanctions raised against a number of countries, including Iran and Russia).

DNC leadership will hold the cards to 2020 Presidential Election in the U.S. My belief is that it currently has a 75:25 split on Biden vs Warren, with selection of the former yielding a 50:50 chance of a Trump 2.0 Administration, and selection of the latter yielding a 35:65 chance in favour of Warren. The electoral campaigning climate is so toxic right now, we have this take on the latest Presidential debate: https://twitter.com/TheDailyShow/status/1217431488439967744?s=20. Meanwhile, debate is being stifled already by the security agencies 'warnings' about Russian 'interference' via critical analysis of the candidates.

Mr. Trump has his Twitter Machine to rely upon in wrecking havoc, that, plus the pliant Pentagon Hawks, always ready to bomb something anywhere around the world. While that power is awesome in its destructiveness vis-a-vis smaller nations, it is tertiary to the political, geopolitical and economic powers of the other three Horse(wo)men, unless Mr. Trump gets VUCAed into a new war.

BoJo's UK as well as Japan, Canada, Australia et al, can just sit back and watch how the world will roll with the Four punchers. The only player that has a chance to dance closely with at least some of the geopolitical VUCA leaders is the EU (read: France and Germany, really). 

15/1/20: S&P500 Historical Performance


Via BAML and @tracyalloway, a chart plotting the distribution of annual returns on S&P500, 1872-2019:


The stylised nature of this plot allows us to see the right-skew in the distribution, across all 
'bins', especially for the last decade.

Tuesday, January 7, 2020

7/1/20: Tax cuts, trade and growth: The Trumponomics Effect


My article on U.S. economy and the implied risks to investors for Manning Financial and Cathedral:
https://cfc.ie/2019/12/10/tax-cuts-trade-and-growth-the-trumponomics-effect/.


#USEconomy #Economics #Markets #USgrowth #GlobalGrowth #GlobalEconomy #SecularStagnation @cathedrlfinance @sheehymanning 

7/1/20: Euromoney on 2020 Risk Outlook for the Eurozone







7/1/20: BRIC Services PMIs 4Q 2019


BRIC Services PMIs have been a mixed bag in 4Q 2019, beating overall Global Services PMI, but showing similar weaknesses and renewed volatility.

Brazil Services PMI slipped  in 4Q 2019, falling from 51.8 in 3Q 2019 to 51.0. Statistically, this level of activity is consistent with zero growth conditions. In the last four quarters, Brazil's services sector activity ranged between a high of 52.3 and a low of 48.6, showing lack of sustained growth momentum in the sector.

Russia Services sector posted a surprising, and contrary to Manufacturing, robust rise from 52.0 in 3Q 2019 to 54.8 in 4Q 2019, reaching the highest level in three quarters. Statistically, the index has been in an expansion territory in every quarter starting with 2Q 2016. 4Q 2019 almost tied for the highest reading in 2019 overall, with 1Q 2019 marginally higher at 54.9. For 2019 overall, Services PMI averaged 53.3, which is below 2018 average of 54.6 with the difference being statistically significant.

China Services PMI ended 4Q 2019 at 52.4 quarter average, up on 51.7 in 3Q 2019. Nonetheless, 4Q 2019 reading was the second weakest in 8 consecutive quarters. The level of 4Q 2019 activity, however, was statistically above the 50.0 zero growth line. In 2019, China Services PMI averaged 52.5 - a slight deterioration on 53.1 average for 2018, signalling slower growth in the sector last year compared to 2018.

India Services PMI averaged 51.7 in 4Q 2019, statistically identical to 51.6 in 3Q 2019. Over the last 4 quarters, the index averaged 51.5, which is effectively identical to 51.6 average for 2018 as a whole. Both readings are barely above the statistical upper bound for 50.0 line, suggesting weak growth conditions, overall.


As the chart above indicates, BRIC Services PMI - based on global GDP weightings for BRIC countries - was indistinguishable from the Global Services PMI. Both averaged 52.2 in 2019, with BRIC services index slipping from 52.6 in 2018 and Global services index falling from 53.8 in 2018. On a quarterly basis, BRIC services PMI averaged 52.3 in 4Q 2019, compared to 51.7 in 3Q 2019 - both statistically significantly above 50.0; for Global Services PMI, comparable figures were 52.0 in 3Q and 51.6 in 4Q 2019, again showing statistically significant growth.

Wednesday, July 10, 2019

10/7/19: Financialising Stagnant Growth: From Japanified Economy to Christine Lagarde


Monetary policy since the GFC of 2008 has been characterised by the near-zero (and even negative) policy rates, negative bank rates, negative Government debt yields and rampant asset price inflation. The result has been zombification of the advanced economies.

Here is the latest advanced estimate of the Eurozone real GDP growth based on the CEPR/Banca d'Italia Eurocoin indicator:
Current forecast for 2Q 2019 growth in the Eurozone, based on Eurocoin indicator is for 0.17% q/q expansion. June Eurocoin sits at 0.14%, the lowest since September 2013. The growth rate forecast has now been sub-0.25% (below 1% annual) in five months (through June 2019) and counting. Meanwhile, the link between growth and inflation has been weakening, as shown in the chart below:


Both, from the point of view of view of the current data relative to 1Q 2019 and to 2Q 2018 and to Q1 2018, growth rates are shrinking, per above. The ECB, however, remains stuck in the proverbial hard corner (chart next):

 Five years into zero policy rates, inflation is gradually creeping up (chart above), but growth is nowhere to be seen (chart next):

Worse, tangible fundamentals (captured by the models, like Eurocoin) of economic growth are becoming less and less consistent with actual growth outruns - a feature of the economy that is becoming dependent on things other than real investment and real demand for generating expansion in GDP. Both, the chart above and the chart below, highlight this troubling fact.
All of this suggests that we are in the period in economic development that is fully consistent with the secular stagnation thesis: traditional tools of monetary and fiscal policies are no longer sufficient in generating real economic growth. Instead, these tools help sustain economies overloaded with debt. It is an extend-and-pretend model of economic development: as long as corporates and households can be supported in carrying existent debt loads through monetary accommodation, the economy remains afloat (no recession, nor crisis blowout), but the levels of debt are so prohibitively high that no new debt can be accumulated to generate economic expansion.

The markets know as much. Investors know that zombie loans (loans with no capacity of servicing them should interest rates rise) mean zombie banks. Zombie banks mean zombie new borrowing markets. Zombie new borrowing markets mean zombie real investment by households and companies. Zombie investment means zombie demand. Zombie demand means deflationary supply. Rinse and repeat.

This knowledge in the markets is tangible. It takes a change in investors expectations (as in recent changes in outlook toward the reversal of the monetary tightening in the U.S. and Europe) to reprice assets. No actual value added growth enters the equation. Assets are no longer being priced on their productive capacity. And the markets are now fully finacialised. Which is to say, they are now fully monetary policy-driven.

Enter Christine Lagarde, the new head of the ECB. Lagarde's appointment is hardly an accident or a politically correct nod to women in leadership. It is the only logical choice of the financialised zombie economics of the monetary policy. To re-start borrowing or debt cycle, the EU is hoping for mutualisation of the sovereign debt markets. In other words, it is hoping to leverage the only unencumbered asset the EU still has: surplus countries' bonds. Lagarde's job at the ECB will be to run the creation of the eurobonds, bonds that will proportionally link euro area members' bonds into a single product to be monetised by the ECB as a support for market pricing. There is probably EUR 2-3 trillion worth of the international and monetary demand for these, opening up the room for more borrowing and more fiscal spending.

Sunday, July 7, 2019

7/7/19: Investment for growth is at record lows for S&P500


Interesting chart via @DavidSchawel showing changes over time in corporate (S&P500 companies) distribution of earnings:

In simple terms:

  1. Much discussed shares buybacks are still the rage: running at 31% of all cash distributions, second highest level after 34% in 2007. On a cumulated basis, and taking into the account already reduced free float in S&P 500 over the years, this is a massive level of buybacks.
  2. 'Investment for growth' - as defined - is at 51% - the lowest on record.
  3. Meaningful investment for growth (often opportunistic M&As) is at 38%, tied for the lowest with 2007 figure.
S&P 500 firms are clearly not in investment mode. Despite 'Trump incentives' - under the TCJA 2017 tax cuts act - actual capex is running tied to the second lowest levels for 2018 and 2019, at 26% of all cash distributions.

Wednesday, July 3, 2019

2/7/19: Factset: Negative EPS guidance hits the highest 2Q level since 2Q 2006


Bad news for the 'fundamentals are sound' crowd when it comes to justifying stock markets exuberance: based on data from Factset, to-date, the number of companies reporting negative earnings per share (EPS) guidance in 2Q 2019 has reached 87 - the highest number after 1Q 2016, and the highest number for any 2Q period since 2006. Total number of reporting companies to-date is 113, which means that so far in the reporting season, a whooping 77% of reporting companies are guiding negative EPS.


Technology sector leads negative EPS guidance issuance. Per Factset: "Information Technology sector, 26 companies have issued negative EPS guidance for the second quarter, which is above the five-year average for the sector of 20.4. If 26 is the final number for the quarter, it will tie the mark (with multiple quarters) for the second highest number of companies issuing negative EPS guidance in this sector since FactSet began tracking this data in 2006, trailing only Q4 2012 (27). At the industry level, the Semiconductor & Semiconductor Equipment (9) and Software (6) industries have the highest number of companies issuing negative EPS guidance in the sector." Which means the tech sector is singing the blues. Consumer discretionaries and Healthcare are the other two sectors showing underperformance relative to 5 year average.

Which is ugly. Uglier, yet, as we are not seeing any correction in the markets to reflect the deteriorating fundamentals. And uglier still when one considers the fact that the 'S' part of EPS has been gamed dramatically in recent years through rampant shares buybacks, while the 'E' bit has been gamed via opportunistic M&As.

Monday, June 3, 2019

3/6/19: Three Periods in labor Force Participation Rate Evolution and Secular Stagnations


The state of the global labor markets is reflected not only in the record lows in official unemployment statistics, but also in the low labor force participation rates:


In fact, chart above shows three distinct periods of evolution of the labor force participation rates in the advanced economies, three regimes: the 1970s into 1989 period that is marked by high participation rates, the period of 1990-2004 that is marked by the steadily declining participation rates, and the period since 2005 that is associated with low and steady participation rates.

This is hardly consistent with the story of the labor markets spectacular recovery that is presented by the official unemployment rates. In fact, the evidence in the above chart points to the continued importance of the twin secular stagnations hypothesis that I have been documenting on this blog.

Tuesday, April 23, 2019

23/4/19: Property, Property and More Property: U.S. Household Wealth Bubble


According to the St. Luis Fed, U.S. household wealth has reached a historical high of 535% of the U.S. GDP (see: https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2019-04-16/where-inflation-hiding-asset-prices).


There is a problem, however, with the above data: it reflects some dodgy ways of counting 'household wealth'. For two primary reasons: firstly, it ignores concentration risk arising from wealth inequality, and secondly, it ignores concentration risk arising from households' exposure to property markets. A good measure of liquidity risk controlled allocation of wealth is ownership of liquid equities (note: equities, of course, and are subject to Fed-funded bubble dynamics). The chart below - via https://www.topdowncharts.com/single-post/2019/04/22/Weekly-SP-500-ChartStorm---21-April-2019 shows a pretty dire state of equity markets (the source of returns on asset demand side being swamped over the last decade by shares buybacks and M&As), but it also shows that households did not benefit materially from the equities bubble.


In other words, controlling for liquidity risk, the Fed's meme of historically high household wealth is seriously challenged. And controlling for wealth inequality (distributional features of wealth), it is probably dubious overall.

So here's the chart showing just how absurdly property-dependent (households' home equity valuations in red line, index starting at 100 at the end of the Global Financial Crisis) the Fed 'wealth' figures (blue line, same starting index) are:


In fact, dynamically, rates of growth in household home equity have been far in excess of the rates of growth in other assets since 2012.  In that, the dynamics of the current 'sound economy' are identical (and actually more dramatic) to the 2000-2006 bubble: property, property and more property.