26/4/21: What Low Corporate Insolvencies Figures Aren't Telling Us

 

One of the key features of the Covid19 pandemic to-date has been a relatively low level of corporate insolvencies. In fact, if anything, we are witnessing virtually dissipation of the insolvencies proceedings in the advanced economies, and a simultaneous investment boom in the IPOs markets. 

The problem, of course, is that official statistics - in this case - lie. And they lie to the tune of at least 50 percent. Consider two charts:

And

The chart from the IMF is pretty scary. 18 percent of companies are expected to experience liquidity-related financial distress and 16 percent are expected to experience insolvency risk. The data covers Europe and Asia-Pacific. Which omits a wide range of economies, including those with more heavily leveraged corporate sectors, and cheaper insolvency procedures e.g. the U.S. The estimates also assume that companies that run into financial distress in 2020 will exit the markets in 2020-2021. In other words, the 16 percentage insolvency risk estimate is not covering firms that run into liquidity problems in 2021. Presumably, they will go to the wall in 2022. 

The second chart puts into perspective the IPO investment boom. Vast majority of IPOs in 2020-2021 have been SPACs (aka, vehicles for swapping ownership of prior investments, as opposed to generating new investments). The remainder of IPOs include DPOs (Direct Public Offerings, e.g. Coinbase) which (1) do not raise any new investment capital and (2) swap founders and insiders equity out and retail investors' equity in. 

The data above isn't giving me a lot of hope, to be honest of a genuine investment boom. 

We are living through the period of fully financialized economy: the U.S. government monetary and fiscal injections in 2020 totaled some $12.3 trillion. That is more than 1/2 of the entire annual GDP. Since then, we've added another $2.2 trillion. Much of these money went either directly (monetary policy) or indirectly (Robinhooders' effect) into the Wall Street and the Crypto Alley. In other words, little of it went to sustain real investment in productive capital. Fewer dollars went to sustain skills upgrading or new development. Less still went to support basic or fundamental research. 

In this environment, it is hard to see how global recovery can support higher productivity growth to bring us back to pre-pandemic growth path. What the recovery will support is and accelerated transfer of wealth:

• From lower income households that saved - so far  - their stimulus cash, and are now eager to throw it at pandemic-deferred consumption; 
• To Wall Street (via corporate earnings and inflation) and the State (via inflation-linked taxes).

In the short run, there will be headlines screaming 'recovery boom'. In the long run, there will be more structural unemployment, less jobs creation and greater financial polarization in the society. Low - to-date - corporate insolvencies figures and booming financial markets are masking all of this in the fog of the pandemic-induced confusion. 

26/10/20: ifo Institute: German Economic Conditions Deteriorated in October

ifo Institute's latest Business Climate survey data for Germany is pointing to continued weakness in the recovery momentum:

Notably, all four sectors covered remain under water:

Current conditions are deteriorating month-on-month in two sectors, expectations have deteriorated in all four sectors.

4/10/20: Technological Deepening Is Coming for Our Jobs

 

In my recent article for The Currency (link here: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2020/09/my-recent-article-on-potential-long.html), I argued that COVID19 will act as an accelerator of technological capital deepening in the modern economies, with a resulting faster displacement of workers (including highly skilled ones) by technology. 

McKinsey survey of the developing trends in businesses strategic responses to the pandemic confirms my hypothesis:

Per above, across all sectors, and (peer charts below) across specific sectors, businesses are planning to prioritize deployment of technology in addressing long-term change in response to the current pandemic. 

McKinsey state that "Fifty-five percent of leaders anticipate that at least half of their organization’s workforce will be fully or partially remote postcrisis. While the expectations vary widely by industry—from 69 percent predicting this level of remote work in technology, telecommunications, and media to 43 percent in advanced industries—even in the industries where manufacturing, patient care, and sales transactions often require people at offices, stores, plants, and other company facilities, a significant portion of the workforce may be partially or fully remote." Source: https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/organization/our-insights/the-need-for-speed-in-the-post-covid-19-era-and-how-to-achieve-it. And "Our survey results show that executives are focused on three courses of action ... making good decisions more quickly, improving communication and collaboration, and making greater use of technology."

26/9/20: Workers Should Brace Themselves for the post-COVID19 New World

 

My recent article on potential long-term impacts of COVID19 pandemic on corporate development and investment strategies for The Currency: https://www.thecurrency.news/articles/24259/workers-should-brace-themselves-things-will-only-get-worse. 

25/8/20: Germany's Economic Recovery: ifo Survey

ifo Institute's latest economic barometer for Germany is showing continued signs of recovery in the German economy, with remaining pressures in terms of current assessment of business conditions and more positive outlook forward (expectations):

Business expectations are now ahead of the same for December 2019 - February 2020 pre-pandemic period, which really says little about the levels of activity expected and more about the speed of adjustments to the expected activity. What matters more is the current climate perception. This is still some 11 points below the three months prior to the pandemic.

Given that German economy has largely moved past the stage of restricted activity, this is worrying, as it suggests the lack of domestic demand recovery in the medium term.

19/8/20: The VUCA World of World Trade

 

WTO projections for global merchandise trade by volume:

Let's take a closer look. Optimistic scenario is for a 13% y/y drop in merchandise trade flows. Pessimistic one is for a 30% drop. Swing is 17 percentage points. These are not forecasts, but are uncertain guesses. We are in a VUCA world, folks.

Let's take a second look: COVID19 shock will be permanent (new trend line post-recovery is permanently below old trendline and flatter) with a minor impact post-2022 that will compound over longer period of time. In pessimistic scenario, the impact appears to be also permanent, but seriously severe.

On a linear trend projection, pre-2008 consistent trend would have left us at around 155 index reading in 2022. 2009-2019 trend would have gotten us to around 122 index reading. Optimistic scenario would leave us around 119 in 2022; pessimistic - at around 95. Wait... optimistic gap for COVID19 and GFC impacts to no GFC and no COVID19 impact is... 33 points! One third of 2015 annual level of trade activity. GFC but no-COVID19 gap to pre-2008 is between 36 points and 60 points. 

And the final look: notice 2019 line... it is virtually flat. As WTO notes (see Chart 4 here: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr855_e.htm) there was, basically, no growth in trade in 2019, before the COVID19 hit. 

We are in a VUCA world, folks.

13/8/20: Federal Deficit Keeps Climbing in July

 

Federal fiscal position for July has been published (https://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/files/reports-statements/mts/mts0720.pdf) and the numbers are interesting. Remember, this year, July was personal income tax filing month, as opposed to the usual April. So, over April and July 2020, total Federal receipts were at USD 805.350 billion, which is up on USD 786.893 billion in April and July 2019. Sounds good and it improved significantly monthly contribution to the annual deficit, with Federal deficit in July coming in at USD62.99 billion, or USD223.3 billion worse than April 2019 (which registered a surplus). 

So here is where we stand:

Average cumulative per-term Federal deficit for Obama Administration was USD 3.523 trillion. The same for President Trump's tenure to-date (not yet a full term) is USD 5.078 trillion. Of this, USD 1.889 trillion. Hence, ex-COVID, President Trump's first term deficit currently is running at USD 3.190 trillion. There are still 3 months of the Federal Fiscal Year running and 5 months of the calendar year left. If we are to assume that Federal deficits in August-December were to remain on the levels of 2019 (stripping out effects of COVID19 pandemic), President Trump will end his last year in office with a cumulated per-term deficit of around USD 3.664 trillion, which is - and remember, this is excluding COVID19 effects - a higher deficit than accumulated, on average, across two terms of the Obama Administration. 

Now, back to those charts above: COVID19 related increases in deficits have been staggering. So far, from April 1, through July, these amount to around USD1.89 trillion. Non-COVID deficits have been equally staggering. 

Here is an interesting thing: while public health took out USD624 billion in 2020 from January through July, Pentagon took USD608 billion. Who is handling the pandemic in the U.S. is quite not as clear as who is spending the money like the proverbial drunken sailors.

Another interesting thing: net interest payouts by the Federal Government. These are defined as "Net interest consists of interest paid on Treasury securities and other interest that the government pays (for example, interest paid on late refunds issued by the Internal Revenue Service) minus the interest that it collects from various sources..." (https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56073). Which means there are lags in Fed remitting interest payments, but much of that is already in the numbers. So far, the U.S. has managed to rake in USD 309 billion worth of net interest expenditures in the FY2020. 

26/6/20: Longer-Term Impact of COVID19 on Growth

IMF published updated forecasts this week, and here the summary:

IMF has stopped doing 5 year forecasts this April, due to uncertainty induced by the COVID19 pandemic. 

Looking at the longer run effects of the pandemic, based on October 2019 (pre-Covid19 trends), and earlier growth trend before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) puts COVID19 pandemic into historical perspective:

The differences between the above trend lines are telling. 

Globally, GFC resulted in a permanent loss of real income that amounts to a cumulative decline of ca 17 percent over 17 years (2008-2024). COVID19 is forecast to result in additional permanent loss of 3.2 percent within 5 years 2020-2024.

Eurozone has been hit even harder. GFC resulted in a permanent loss of real income to the tune of 12.8 percent while COVID19 is currently set to yield a permanent additional loss of income to the tune of 7.1 percent over less than 1/3rd of the post-GFC trend line duration. 

The numbers above are rather 'indicative', in so far as any and all forecasts past 2020 are perilous at the very best. But you get the picture: we are witnessing two consecutive events that result in permanent deviation of economic activity away from the prior trends. And both events are sharp. Even with a 'V-shaped' recovery, we are in trouble (because a V-shaped recovery taking us into mid-2020 means recovering end-of-2019 levels of economic activity, while losing 1.5-2 years of growth momentum (recall, economy was slowing down in H2 2019 on its own, without COVID19). 

As we say... [ok, well, may we do not say it often, but...] this picture is f*ugly... 

26/5/20: COVID19 Impact on Travel and Consumer Demand

Some dire numbers from Factset on changes in consumer preferences / sentiment through March-April 2020:

• "According to The Conference Board, consumer confidence has weakened significantly with the overall index falling from 118.8 in March to 86.9 in April, the lowest reading since June 2014." 
• "... older Americans (aged 55 and over) are much less optimistic than survey respondents under 55. This poses a problem as we look to economic recovery... [as] households in which the head of household is 65 years old or older represent 22% of total household expenditures in the U.S. In addition, this age group dominates spending at full-service restaurants and travel and lodging."

Things are getting worse in travel and transport sectors:

• "According to the International Air Transport Association, global air travel was down 52.9% in March compared to a year earlier, hitting its lowest level since the Global Financial Crisis."
• "In the U.S., jobs in air transportation fell by 27.4% in April."
• "The four major U.S. airlines—American, Delta, United, and Southwest—are prohibited from laying off or furloughing workers until after September 30 as a condition of receiving billions in payroll assistance as part of the CARES Act. But these carriers have been asking employees to take voluntary unpaid or lower-paying leaves, reduced hours, and early retirement."

On travel sector:

• "The April consumer confidence survey shows that just 31.9% of respondents intend to take a vacation within the next six months. This down from 54.9% in February and is the lowest reading ever in the 42-year history of this survey question."
• "We only have monthly personal consumption data through March... In March, consumption on accommodations was down 43.3% compared to February while air transportation had dipped by 53.5%." 

21/5/20: How Pitchforks See the Greatest Economy in the World

Folks with pitchforks don't care for nuance of financial wizardry. Or for econophysics of data-rich markets. They like simple, somewhat stylized facts. So here is how the world of the last 12 years looks to them:

Nothing to add.

5/5/20: A V-Shaped Recovery? Ireland post-Covid

My article for The Currency on the post-Covid19 recovery and labour markets lessons from the pst recessions: https://www.thecurrency.news/articles/16215/the-fiction-of-a-v-shaped-recovery-hides-the-weaknesses-in-irelands-labour-market.

Key takeaways:
"Trends in employment recovery post-major recessions are worrying and point to long-term damage to the life-cycle income of those currently entering the workforce, those experiencing cyclical (as opposed to pandemic-related) unemployment risks, as well as those who are entering the peak of their earnings growth. This means a range of three generations of younger workers are being adversely and permanently impacted.

"All of the millennials, the older sub-cohorts of the GenZ, and the lower-to-middle classes of the GenX are all in trouble. Older millennials and the entire GenX are also likely to face permanently lower pensions savings, especially since both cohorts have now been hit with two systemic crises, the 2008-2014 Great Recession and the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic.

"These generations are the core of modern Ireland’s population pyramid, and their fates represent the likely direction of our society’s and economy’s evolution in decades to come."

9/4/20: Ifo Eurozone Forecast Q1-Q3 2020: Covid19 Impacts

Germany's ifo Institute joint forecasts for Eurozone growth are out today. Bleak reading. The forecasts below assume that Covid-19 restrictions will be gradually lifted over the summer 2020.

Seasonally and working-day adjusted GDP growth:

From ifo forecast: "The economy in the euro area is expected to slide into a deep recession in the first half of 2020:

• GDP growth is forecast to be -2% in Q1 and -10% in Q2, followed by a recovery in Q3 with +8%. 
• Due to the lack of comparable events in the last decades and the unpredictable course of the pandemic, these estimates are subject to substantial uncertainty."
• "Gross fixed capital formation is also certain to decline, with -2% in Q1 and -10% in Q2, due to supply disruptions, planning uncertainty and a preference for liquidity."
• "Foreign demand is likely to contribute negatively to growth, as a result of the euro area’s exposure to recessive international trade and a struggling global economy."

Inflation environment:

Headwinds and risks: 

• "A more unfavorable course of the pandemic would require longer and possibly stricter containment measures...
• "Despite massive liquidity provision by governments and central banks, a prolonged downturn would then lead to liquidity strains in the economy. 
• Increased debt levels associated with low income flows and asset devaluations are likely to lead to solvency issues for thinly capitalized corporations and private households.
• An ensuing rise in loan defaults could in turn lead to problems in the banking sector." 
• "A resurgence of the European debt crisis on a large scale thus constitutes a non-negligible risk to the forecast."

25/3/20: More than €3bn: The Need for Stimulus in Ireland

"€3bn a month or more – the cost of offsetting the Covid-19 shock" my article for @thecurrency on the size of the fiscal/monetary stimulus required for Ireland. Available atr: https://www.thecurrency.news/articles/12547/e3bn-a-month-or-more-the-cost-of-offsetting-the-covid-19-shock.

14/2/20: Pandemics, Panics and the Markets

In my recent article for The Currency I wrote about the expected market effects of the 2019-nCov coronavirus outbreak: https://www.thecurrency.news/articles/8490/constantin-gurdgiev-pandemics-panics-and-the-markets.

While past pandemics are not a direct nor linear indicators of the future expected performance, the logic and the dynamics of the past events suggest that while the front end short term effects of pandemics on the economies and the markets can be significant, over time, rebounds post-pandemics tend to fully offset short run negative impacts.

Key conclusions from the article are:

• "...The market appears to worry little about public health risks, after their impact becomes more visible, although the onset of a pandemic can be associated with elevated markets volatility. This volatility is higher the faster the evolution of the health scare, but so is the market rebound from each crisis lows."
• "This is not say that investors have little to worry about in today’s markets. We are still trading in the heavily over-bought market, and concerns about global growth are not getting much of a reprieve from the newsflows. The good news is, to date, the latest global health crisis does not seem to be a trigger for a major and sustained sell off. The bad news is, we are yet to see its full impact."

9/9/19: Ireland and OECD: Income Tax Rates Comparatives

Based on the OECD data for 2018, Ireland is the second worst OECD country to earn income from work at the upper margin of earnings (167% of the average annual gross wage earnings of adult, full-time manual and non manual workers in the industry), compared to lower earners (67% of the average wage earnings). And although this story is not new (we were in the same position back in 2014), the gap in effective marginal taxes charged on the higher earners relative to lower earners is getting worse.

Here is the chart for 2014 data:

And a comparative 2018 data:

Back in 2014, nine of the OECD countries had zero or negative upper marginal tax rate penalty on higher wage earners. In 2018, the number rose to ten. In 2014, seven countries, including Ireland, had a tax rate penalty on higher wage earners in excess of 10 percentage points. In 2018, that number rose to eight. Ireland ranked second in terms of tax penalty on higher labour income tax burden relative to lower income in both 2014 and 2018. In 2014, our relative penalty stood at 18.961 percentage points, 2.753 percentage points below Sweden. In 2018, our relative penalty was 20.974 percent, 3.04 percentage points below Sweden. The OECD average penalty was 5.31 percentage points in 2018, down from 5.57 percentage points in 2014.

It is worth noting that in Ireland, voluntary spending on healthcare (indirect tax) is roughly 50 percent higher than it is in Sweden (https://data.oecd.org/healthres/health-spending.htm). Ireland spends less than half what Sweden does on early childhood education per pupil, and about 60 percent of what Sweden spends on tertiary education per pupil (https://data.oecd.org/eduresource/education-spending.htm). In other words, higher taxes on higher earners in Sweden seem to be purchasing substantially more services for taxpayers than they do in Ireland. Sweden also has older demographics and a somewhat functional military. Ireland has younger (lower health spending) demographics and not much in terms of a military expenditure. Of course, Swedish parliamentarians earned EUR 6,269 per month salary in 2918, when their Irish counterparts were paid EUR 7,878, but that hardly explains the gaps in spending and taxation systems.

So where all this tax penalty or surcharge on the higher earners levied on Irish residents is being spent? Clearly not on better financed education or health services, and not on military.

Another interesting way of looking at the figures is by comparing the actual tax rates. For those on 67% of average labour income, Ireland's rate of taxation in 2014 was 37.7 percent or 3.92 percentage points below the OECD average,. This fell in Ireland to 35.72 percent in 2018, while the gap with OECD average rose to 6.29 percentage points. If you consider OECD average to be a realistic metric for tax burden on lower earners, Irish lower earners were more substantially undertaxed in 2018 than they were in 2014. For higher earners, disregarding the fact that Irish upper marginal tax rates kick in at an absurdly low level, for wage earners of 167% of the average wage, Irish tax rates were 56.66% and 56.70 percent in 2014 and 2018, respectively. This means that in 2014, Irish higher earners tax rates were 9.34 percentage points above the OECD average and in 2018 these were 9.38 percentage points above the OECD average. In both cases, higher earners were taxed more severely in Ireland when compared to the OECD average. The matters are similar if we were to run a comparative between Ireland and OECD median tax rates, so there is no point of arguing that OECD data includes 'outlier' countries.

On a personal note, I do not think comparatives between Sweden and Ireland paint the latter in any better terms than the former. However, if one were to look at the OECD figures as some objective measures of tax burdens, Irish lower and higher earners (labour income) are overtaxed by the OECD 'norms' (average and median). When one takes into the account a relatively scarce supply of services to the taxpayers as well as a relatively higher out-of-pocket costs of the services supplied, things appear to be even worse. This is not a value judgement. It simply down to the plain numbers.

2/7/19: Inverted Yield Curve

Inverting U.S. yield curve is one of the best early indicators of recessions. Or at least it used to be... before all the monetary policy shenanigans of the last 11 years. Regardless, the latest U.S. Treasury yields dynamics are quite disquieting:

3/6/19: Three Periods in labor Force Participation Rate Evolution and Secular Stagnations

The state of the global labor markets is reflected not only in the record lows in official unemployment statistics, but also in the low labor force participation rates:

In fact, chart above shows three distinct periods of evolution of the labor force participation rates in the advanced economies, three regimes: the 1970s into 1989 period that is marked by high participation rates, the period of 1990-2004 that is marked by the steadily declining participation rates, and the period since 2005 that is associated with low and steady participation rates.

This is hardly consistent with the story of the labor markets spectacular recovery that is presented by the official unemployment rates. In fact, the evidence in the above chart points to the continued importance of the twin secular stagnations hypothesis that I have been documenting on this blog.

18/8/18: Monopolization trends in Advanced Economies: my column for CFR

My column for the Cayman Financial Review on the topic of structural monopolization of the global economy and the declining competitiveness. https://www.caymanfinancialreview.com/2018/08/14/breaking-the-medici-vicious-circle-monopolization-trends-in-advanced-economies/.

8/4/18: Talent vs Luck: Differentiating Success from Failure

In their paper, "Talent vs Luck: the role of randomness in success and failure", A. Pluchino. A. E. Biondo, A. Rapisarda (25 Feb 2018: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.07068.pdf) tackle the mythology of the "dominant meritocratic paradigm of highly competitive Western cultures... rooted on the belief that success is due mainly, if not exclusively, to personal qualities such as talent, intelligence, skills, efforts or risk taking".

The authors note that, although "sometimes, we are willing to admit that a certain degree of luck could also play a role in achieving significant material success, ...it is rather common to underestimate the importance of external forces in individual successful stories".

Some priors first: "intelligence or talent exhibit a Gaussian distribution among the population, whereas the distribution of wealth - considered a proxy of success - follows typically a power law (Pareto law). Such a discrepancy between a Normal distribution of inputs, suggests that some hidden ingredient is at work behind the scenes."

The authors show evidence that suggests that "such an [missing] ingredient is just randomness". Or, put differently, a chance.

The authors "show that, if it is true that some degree of talent is necessary to be successful in life, almost never the most talented people reach the highest peaks of success, being overtaken by mediocre but sensibly luckier individuals."

Two pictures are worth a 1000 words, each:

Figure 5 taken from the paper shows:

• In panel (a): Total number of lucky events and
• In panel (b): Total number of unlucky events 

Both are shown as "function of the capital/success of the agents"

Overall, "the plot shows the existence of a strong correlation between success and luck: the most successful individuals are also the luckiest ones, while the less successful are also the unluckiest ones."

Figure 7 shows:
In panel (a): Distribution of the final capital/success for a population with different random initial conditions, that follows a power law.
In panel (b): The final capital of the most successful individuals is "reported as function of their talent".

Overall, "people with a medium-high talent result to be, on average, more successful than people with low or medium-low talent, but very often the most successful individual is a moderately gifted agent and only rarely the most talented one.


Main conclusions on the paper are:

• "The model shows the importance, very frequently underestimated, of lucky events in determining the final level of individual success." 
• "Since rewards and resources are usually given to those that have already reached a high level of success, mistakenly considered as a measure of competence/talent, this result is even a more harmful disincentive, causing a lack of opportunities for the most talented ones."

The results are "a warning against the risks of what we call the ”naive meritocracy” which, underestimating the role of randomness among the determinants of success, often fail to give honors and rewards to the most competent people."

3/8/17: BRIC Composite PMIs: July

Having covered BRIC Manufacturing PMIs in the previous post (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2017/08/3817-bric-manufacturing-pmis-july.html), and Services PMIs (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2017/08/3817-bric-services-pmi-july.html), here is the analysis of the Composite PMIs.

Table below summaries current shorter term (monthly) trends in Composite PMIs:

Brazil has slipped into a new sub-50 Composite PMI trend in 2Q 2017 and, as of July, remains in the slump, although at 49.4, July Composite PMI reading signals much weaker rate of economic activity contraction than the June reading of 48.5. The problem for Latin America’s largest economy is that the hopes for an extremely weak recovery, set in 50.4 readings in April and May are now gone. In fact, 2Q 2017 average Composite PMI for Brazil stood at 49.8, which was stronger than July reading and marked the strongest performance for the economy since 3Q 2014. All in, July marked the start of the 14th consecutive quarter of Composite PMIs signalling economic recession.

Russia Composite PMI at the end of July stood at 53.4, a respectably strong number, signalling good growth prospects for the economy, but down from 54.8 in June and 56.0 in May. In fact, July reading was the lowest in 9 months. Given the economy’s performance in 1Q 2017, set against composite PMIs, the July and 1-2Q readings suggest that Russia is on track to record 1.0-1.5% growth this year, but not quite 2.0% or higher as expected by the Government. We will need to see 3Q and 4Q averages closer to 56-57 range to have a shot at above 1.5% growth.

China posted 2Q 2017 Composite PMI at 51.3, which is below July 51.9 reading. Still, July improvement is yet to be confirmed across the rest of 3Q 2017. China’s Composite PMI slowed from a recent peak of 53.1 in 4Q 2016 to 42.3 in  1Q 2017 and 51.3 in 2Q 2017.

India’s Composite PMI reflected wide-ranging weakening in the economy struck by both botched de-monetisation ‘reform’ and equally bizarre tax reforms. Sinking from appreciably strong 52.2 in 2Q 2017 to 46.0 in July, this fall marked the lowest PMI reading since 1Q 2009 and the second lowest reading on record. India’s economy has been in a weak state since 3Q 2016 when Composite PMI averaged 53.1. The PMI fell to 50.7 and 50.8 in 4Q 2016 and 1Q 2017 before recovering in 2Q 2017. This recovery is now in severe doubt. We will need to see August and September readings to confirm an outright PMI recession, but the signs from July reading are quite poor.

All in, in July, Russia was the only BRIC economy that came close (at 53.4) to Global Composite PMI reading of 53.5. Two BRIC economies posted a sub-50 reading. In 2Q 2017, Global Composite PMI was 53.7, with Russia Composite PMI at 55.4 being the only BRIC economy that supported global economic growth to the upside. In fact, Russia lead Global Composite PMIs in every quarter since  2Q 2016.