"€3bn a month or more – the cost of offsetting the Covid-19 shock" my article for @thecurrency on the size of the fiscal/monetary stimulus required for Ireland. Available atr: https://www.thecurrency.news/articles/12547/e3bn-a-month-or-more-the-cost-of-offsetting-the-covid-19-shock.
Showing posts with label Stimulus. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Stimulus. Show all posts
Wednesday, March 25, 2020
25/3/20: More than €3bn: The Need for Stimulus in Ireland
"€3bn a month or more – the cost of offsetting the Covid-19 shock" my article for @thecurrency on the size of the fiscal/monetary stimulus required for Ireland. Available atr: https://www.thecurrency.news/articles/12547/e3bn-a-month-or-more-the-cost-of-offsetting-the-covid-19-shock.
Tuesday, June 18, 2013
18/7/2013: QE or Not-QE... spot the difference?
My recent exchange with @LISwires on the issue of risks involved in both continued QE and pursuing an exit strategy.
The tweet the started it: "Both are… RT @LISwires: QE is "Treacherous" RT @livesquawk: Roubini: Fed Exit Strategy Will Be 'Treacherous' fw.to/gWL3DCg @CNBC"
Explaining my view that QE & Exit strategies are both consistent with structural and grave risks are:
[Both QE and exit is] like being between a rock and a hard place... inside an iron pipe… Exit = QE = non-QE = stimulus = austerity = disaster. The whole point of a structural depression is EXACTLY that!
In a normal recession, one half of the economy's 'cart' gets stuck in the 'mud'. In a structural depression, the entire cart is in the middle of a quick sand trap.
The ONLY thing that would've worked was direct injection of funds to write down household & corporate debts, & in some cases - restructure sovereign debt too. We missed the boat on this by engaging in LTROs/OMT/ESM/EFSF/ESF/EBU/EMU… stupidity of tinkering along the edges. Hence [having engaged in wasting resources on marginal solutions], from here on - it is vast pain over long term. The choice was made by our 'leaders' in ECB/EU/IMF/National Governments/NCBs.
The real failure of economists/economics is NOT our inability to forecast disasters. It is in our inability to see the size & nature of disaster AFTER it hits.
Note: my reference to the direct recapitalisation solution can be traced to this: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2010/05/economics-16052010-eu-on-brink.html
The tweet the started it: "Both are… RT @LISwires: QE is "Treacherous" RT @livesquawk: Roubini: Fed Exit Strategy Will Be 'Treacherous' fw.to/gWL3DCg @CNBC"
Explaining my view that QE & Exit strategies are both consistent with structural and grave risks are:
[Both QE and exit is] like being between a rock and a hard place... inside an iron pipe… Exit = QE = non-QE = stimulus = austerity = disaster. The whole point of a structural depression is EXACTLY that!
In a normal recession, one half of the economy's 'cart' gets stuck in the 'mud'. In a structural depression, the entire cart is in the middle of a quick sand trap.
The ONLY thing that would've worked was direct injection of funds to write down household & corporate debts, & in some cases - restructure sovereign debt too. We missed the boat on this by engaging in LTROs/OMT/ESM/EFSF/ESF/EBU/EMU… stupidity of tinkering along the edges. Hence [having engaged in wasting resources on marginal solutions], from here on - it is vast pain over long term. The choice was made by our 'leaders' in ECB/EU/IMF/National Governments/NCBs.
The real failure of economists/economics is NOT our inability to forecast disasters. It is in our inability to see the size & nature of disaster AFTER it hits.
Note: my reference to the direct recapitalisation solution can be traced to this: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2010/05/economics-16052010-eu-on-brink.html
Tuesday, May 28, 2013
28/5/2013: EU Looks Into Bending Rules... Again...
Spiegel [http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/vorschlag-der-eu-kommission-deutschland-kaempft-um-den-sparkurs-a-902198.html] reports that the EU Commission, as a part of a planned shift in the policy focus from austerity to structural reforms, will consider altering accounting rules per classification of fiscal deficits. The idea is that member states will be allowed to exempting certain types of government spending from the deficit calculations.
How this will work? Ok, insolvent state, like, say Greece, can borrow (somewhere) EUR X billion to use as a backing for its 50% share in matching EU Structural funds, thus raising EUR 2X billion for investment. The EU will then allow Greek Government to classify EUR X billion borrowings as aquarium fish and not deficit nor debt.
So
(1) EU thinks it is a grand idea to hide even more debt and deficit under the proverbial rug of 'accounting rules' bent to suit EU; and
(2) EU thinks that 'structural funds' deployment will be sufficient to 'stimulate' euro area economies out of structural balance sheet recession.
I suggest they (a) read up on why honesty and transparency matter in fiscal accounting and (b) read up on what happened in Japan where a stimulus ca 100 times larger than 'structural funds' one was applied to no avail.
Then again, the EU might also change the rules on reading, so the inconvenient reality does never interfere with the dreamy Enronising…
Saturday, July 21, 2012
21/7/2012: Sunday Times July 1, 2012 - Not a 'stimulus' again...
An unedited version of my Sunday Times article from July 1.
One of the points of contention in modern
economics is the role of fiscal spending shocks on economic growth. Various
empirical estimates suggest Irish fiscal multiplier at 0.3-0.4, implying that
for every euro of additional Government spending we should get a €1.30-€1.40 in
GDP uplift. However, these are based on models that do not take into the
account our current conditions. Despite this fact, Irish policymakers continue
talking about the need for Government to stimulate the economy, while various
think tanks continue to argue that Ireland should abandon fiscal stabilization
or more aggressively tax private incomes to deliver a boost to our spending.
International research on this matter is more
advanced, although it too leaves much room for a debate.
June 2012 IMF working paper titled “What
Determines Government Spending Multipliers?” by Giancarlo Corsetti, Andre Meier
and Gernot Muller (June 2012) studied the effects of government spending on the
economy under the variety of macroeconomic conditions.
What
IMF researchers did find is that the initial conditions for stimulus do matter
in determining its effectiveness – an issue generally ignored in the domestic
debates about the topic.
Under
a pegged exchange rate regime, similar to
Ireland’s but still allowing for some exchange rate and interest rates
adjustments, trade balance is likely to worsen in response to a fiscal
stimulus, while output can be expected to rise. Domestic investment and
consumption will decline in response to the positive stimulus shock. These
factors are likely to be even more pronounced in the case of Ireland’s currency
‘peg’ that permits no adjustment in real exchange rate except via domestic
inflation.
The role of weak public
finances in determining the effectiveness of fiscal spending stimulus is also
revealing. The study defines fiscally constrained conditions as the gross government debt exceeding 100
percent of GDP and/or government deficit in excess of 6 percent of GDP. Both of
these are present in the case of Ireland. On average, the study shows that
consumption response to fiscal stimulus is negative-to-zero following the
stimulus, but becomes positive in the medium term. Impact on output and investment
is negative. The core reasons for the adverse effects of fiscal expenditure on
economic performance are losses from stimulus through increased imports of
goods and services by the State, internal re-inflation of the economy through
inputs prices, plus the expectation from the private sector consumers and
producers of higher future taxes required to cover public spending increases.
In the case when financial
crisis is present, increase in Government spending results in a positive and
strong output expansion, rise in consumption and, with some delay, rise in
investment. However, net exports still fall sharply and the stimulus leads to
the inflationary loss of external competitiveness in the economy.
The problem with the above
results is that the IMF study still does not consider what happens to a fiscal
stimulus in a country like Ireland, combining a strict currency peg, exclusive
reliance on trade surplus for growth generation and characterized by
historically high levels of fiscal imbalances and financial system collapse. In
other words, even the IMF research as imprecise as it is, is far from
conclusive.
These are non-trivial problems
in the case of Ireland. Official estimates for fiscal policy multiplier in this
country range between 0.38 (European Commission) and 0.4 (Department of
Finance). These are based on relatively
simplistic models and are, therefore, likely to be challenged by the reality of
our current conditions. A more recent study from the Deutsche Bank cites Irish
fiscal multiplier of 0.3 without specifying the methodology used in deriving
it. Either way, no credible estimate known to me puts the fiscal multiplier
above 0.4 for Ireland.
In short, Government stimulus
is not exactly an effective means for raising output, even at the times when
the economy can take such stimulus without demolishing the Exchequer balancesheet.
And lacking precision in estimating the fiscal multiplier, the entire argument
in favor of fiscal stimulus is an item of faith, not of scientific analysis.
In my opinion, Ireland does
not need a Government expenditure boost. Instead we need a policy shift toward
stimulating domestic and international investment, plus the public expenditure
rebalancing away from current spending toward some additional capital
investment.
Quarterly National Accounts
clearly show that the problem with the Irish economy is not the fall off in
private or public consumption, but a dramatic collapse in private investment. While
private consumption expenditure in Ireland has declined 13.6% relative to the
economy’s peak in 2007, net expenditure by Government is down 12.0% (including
a decline in public investment). However, overall private investment in the
economy is down 67%. 2011 full year capital investment was, unadjusted for
inflation, at the level last seen in 1997, while consumption is down ‘only’ to 2005-2006
levels and Government spending is running at around 2006 levels. With nominal
GDP falling €33.5 billion between 2007 and 2011, our investment declined €32.6 billion
over the same period, personal consumption dropped €12.8 billion, while net
Government expenditure on goods and services is down a mere €3.4 billion. Between
2007 and 2011, total voted current expenditure by the Government rose 12%,
while total net voted capital expenditure fell 44%.
Adding a Government investment
stimulus of €2 billion would have an impact of raising net capital expenditure
by the Exchequer in 2012-2014 to the levels 22.4% below those in 2007 and will
lift our GDP by under 1.8% according to the EU measure of fiscal multiplier.
However, factoring in deterioration in the current account as estimated by the
IMF, the net effect might be closer to zero. Based on IMF model
re-parameterized to our current conditions, the net result can be as low as
0.1% increase in GDP.
Again, the problem here is the
effect of capital spending on our imports. As a highly open economy, Ireland
imports most of what it consumes. This includes Government and private capital
investment goods – machinery, materials and know-how relating to construction,
assembly, installation and operation of modern transport systems, energy and
ICT, etc. Some of these imports will continue well beyond the period of actual
investment. In other words, using fiscal stimulus to finance public capital
investment risks providing some short-term supports for lower skilled Irish
labour and few professionals with the lion’s share of expenditure going to the
multinational companies supplying capital goods and services into Ireland from
abroad.
The fiscal cost of such a
stimulus, however, would be exceptionally high. Between 2008 and 2011, Irish
Government has managed to cut €4.3 billion off the annual capital spending bill
while increasing current spending by €662 million. This resulted in total voted
spending reduction of only €3.6 billion. A stimulus of €2 billion on capital
investment side will throw the state back to 2009 levels of expenditure,
erasing two years worth of consolidation, unless it is financed out of cutting
current spending and transferring funds to capital programmes. The extra
capital spending will lead to further retrenchment in private consumption and
investment, as households and businesses will anticipate relatively rapid
uplift in tax burdens to recover the momentum to the fiscal consolidation.
This, coupled with already committed €8.6 billion in further fiscal adjustments
in the next three years, will further reduce growth effects of the stimulus and
shorten its positive effects duration.
Overall, the right course of
policies to pursue today requires restructuring of the debt burden carried by
the real economy, starting with household debts and stimulating, simultaneously
domestic and foreign investment into small and medium enterprises and
start-ups. Instead of focusing on the less labor-intensive MNCs’ investments,
we need to put in place tax and institutional incentives to increase inflow of
equity capital, not new debt, to Irish businesses. Such incentives must target
two areas of investment: investment into activities associated with new jobs
creation by the SMEs, plus investment into strategic repositioning and
restructuring of Irish SMEs to put them onto exporting path.
Lastly, if we really do want
to have a stimulus debate, the discussion should not be focusing on creating a
net increase in the public expenditure, but on the potential for reallocating
some of the funds from the current expenditure side of the Exchequer
balancesheet to capital investment.
Box-out:
The latest
Index of Failed States published this week ranks Ireland the 8th
best state in the world. Our overall score in the league table was helped by
extremely high performance in some specific indicators. Surprisingly, according
to the Index authors, we are having a jolly good time throughout the crisis. Allegedly,
Ireland’s problem in terms of emigration is relatively comparable to that found
in New Zealand and Germany. Our economy, heavily dominated by MNCs exports in
pharma, medical devices and ICT sectors ranks higher in terms of the balance of
economic development than majority of the advanced economies that have more diversified
and domestically anchored sources of growth. Our ‘balanced development’ model,
having led us into the current crisis, is allegedly more sustainable, according
to the Index, than that of Canada – a country that escaped the Great Recession.
In terms of poverty and economic decline we are better off than France, Japan
and New Zealand, which had a much less severe recession than Ireland over the
last 5 years. In quality of public services, we are better than Belgium and the
UK, and are ranked as highly as Canada. And our elites are less factionalized
than those in the vast majority of the states of the Euro area. In short,
according to the Foreign Policy, index
publisher, Ireland is a veritable safe haven within a tumultuous euro zone,
comparable to New Zealand, Luxembourg, Norway and Switzerland. We rank well
ahead of Canada, Australia, the UK and the US, as well as all other states that
currently receive tens of thousands of Irish emigrants.
Friday, July 8, 2011
08/07/2011: Effects of the spending stimulus on unemployment
An interesting study on the effectiveness of fiscal spending on unemployment was recently published in the CESifo working paper series. The full study can accessed here: Steinar Holden and Victoria Sparrman, "Do Government Purchases Affect Unemployment?" CESifo Working Paper No 3482, May 2011.
The study presents estimated effects of 1% increase in Government purchasing of goods and services on unemployment in 20 OECD countries for the period 1960-2007, controlling for a number of factors, including the size and the openness of the economy, the exchange rate regime and the economy position in the business cycle.
To summarize relevant results (found in Table 7) in the case of small open economies within the currency union, the effect of 1% increase in government purchases of goods and services translates into 0.37 decrease in unemployment rate. The effect can be as high as 0.47% decrease. Year after there is no net effect of jobs creation from the purchasing.
So what does this mean in the case of Ireland? Per latest QNA, Irish GDP in current market prices was €155,992 million in 2010. 1% of that spent on new purchases of goods and services amounts to €1,559,920,000. Q1 2011 unemployment, per QNHS, amounted to 295,700 and the unemployment rate stood at 14.1%. These are our inputs into the estimate.
Now, let's make an assumption concerning jobs created - suppose these pay €35,000 per annum in wages. Suppose that they pay €7,067 in income-related taxes (inclusive of USC etc), as consistent with single tax filer with no deductions. Suppose the social welfare benefits savings amount to €350 per week (note these are taken on purpose to be larger to account for other benefits that might be foregone) to the annual total of €18,200. Suppose that additional 30% is collected on income tax contributions due to higher consumption taxes contributions in employment - generating savings of additional €2,120 per annum.
So total savings per person moved off welfare into employment are roughly speaking €27,287. In other words, we assume that for each €35,000 job created, the Government get back almost €28,000 through various tax returns and savings.
Now on to the estimated impact of 1% increase in Government purchases of goods and services:
The study presents estimated effects of 1% increase in Government purchasing of goods and services on unemployment in 20 OECD countries for the period 1960-2007, controlling for a number of factors, including the size and the openness of the economy, the exchange rate regime and the economy position in the business cycle.
To summarize relevant results (found in Table 7) in the case of small open economies within the currency union, the effect of 1% increase in government purchases of goods and services translates into 0.37 decrease in unemployment rate. The effect can be as high as 0.47% decrease. Year after there is no net effect of jobs creation from the purchasing.
So what does this mean in the case of Ireland? Per latest QNA, Irish GDP in current market prices was €155,992 million in 2010. 1% of that spent on new purchases of goods and services amounts to €1,559,920,000. Q1 2011 unemployment, per QNHS, amounted to 295,700 and the unemployment rate stood at 14.1%. These are our inputs into the estimate.
Now, let's make an assumption concerning jobs created - suppose these pay €35,000 per annum in wages. Suppose that they pay €7,067 in income-related taxes (inclusive of USC etc), as consistent with single tax filer with no deductions. Suppose the social welfare benefits savings amount to €350 per week (note these are taken on purpose to be larger to account for other benefits that might be foregone) to the annual total of €18,200. Suppose that additional 30% is collected on income tax contributions due to higher consumption taxes contributions in employment - generating savings of additional €2,120 per annum.
So total savings per person moved off welfare into employment are roughly speaking €27,287. In other words, we assume that for each €35,000 job created, the Government get back almost €28,000 through various tax returns and savings.
Now on to the estimated impact of 1% increase in Government purchases of goods and services:
- Case 1: maximum effect of 0.47% reduction in unemployment rate will result in 9,857 jobs created with the total cost of €158,260 per job created. Net of Government returns and savings, this means net cost per each job created of €130,873. Total impact is to generate a loss of 0.84% of GDP due to 'stimulus'. If we are to assume that all of the jobs created remain for ever after the 'stimulus' (a very tall assumption, but let's be generous), while the Government finances the stimulus at a constant interest rate of 6%, it will take almost 7 years for the economy to recover the costs of the 'stimulus' (if the rate of borrowing is zero - e.g. by using NPRF or some other 'free' funding, the period to recovery shrinks to 5.8 years).
- Case 2: most likely effect of 0.37% reduction in unemployment rate will result in 7,760 jobs created with the total cost of €201,033 per job created. Net of Government returns and savings, this means net cost per each job created of €173,646. Total impact is to generate a loss of 0.88% of GDP due to 'stimulus'. If we are to assume that all of the jobs created remain for ever after the 'stimulus', while the Government finances the stimulus at a constant interest rate of 6%, it will take over 9 years for the economy to recover the costs of the 'stimulus' (if the rate of borrowing is zero, the period to recovery shrinks to 7.3 years).
Wednesday, March 11, 2009
A Patent Lie: Ireland's Capital Investment Stimulus
In its April 2008 review of Ireland's economy, seen by the Government some 5 months prior to its publication, OECD has identified two salient medium term problems linked to the twin crises we are currently experiencing:
Reforming the taxation of housing. "...the unusually favourable tax treatment increases the role of housing in the economy and adds to volatility in the housing market. There should be a gradual move towards a more neutral system of housing taxation," said OECD. Thus, even assuming its ignorance prior to the OECD report, the Government had at least 15 months since to design a functioning system of either land-value or property taxation, there by reducing the impact of the house prices slowdown.
Public spending needs to slow. "Fiscal performance has been strong in recent years but revenue growth has moderated as the economy, particularly the housing market, has weakened. Public expenditure is set to slow but it is important to avoid locking-in expensive commitments, particularly on public sector pay. As spending rises more slowly, improving public services will have to rely more on undertaking further reforms to public sector management and getting better value for money." Once again, nothing has been done in over 15 months to address these recommendations.
Chart below - taken from the OECD report, illustrates the extent of the problem.
However, a closer examination of the components of the public expenditure in Ireland show even more dramatic failure by the Irish Governments to stop the gravy train of wasteful expenditure.
Consider the following chart plotting actual net current expenditure against capital expenditure, incorporating my own forecast for fiscal consolidation in 2009-2010 and DofF January 2009 forecasts for the same period.
Two features can be glimpsed from the chart:
Chart below shows the net current and capital expenditures as a percentage of GDP.
According to this chart, the economically unproductive spending which is largely absorbed into public sector wages and social welfare subsidies (our current expenditure):
Should you wonder how high were the rates of growth in current and capital expenditure over the last decade, chart below shows that in 2000-2009, even by DofF own (excessively optimistic) projections for this year, cumulative capital investment's importance in overall economy will decline by 39%. In contrast, cumulative current expenditure growth will reach +27%.In short, the above figures show that:
Reforming the taxation of housing. "...the unusually favourable tax treatment increases the role of housing in the economy and adds to volatility in the housing market. There should be a gradual move towards a more neutral system of housing taxation," said OECD. Thus, even assuming its ignorance prior to the OECD report, the Government had at least 15 months since to design a functioning system of either land-value or property taxation, there by reducing the impact of the house prices slowdown.
Public spending needs to slow. "Fiscal performance has been strong in recent years but revenue growth has moderated as the economy, particularly the housing market, has weakened. Public expenditure is set to slow but it is important to avoid locking-in expensive commitments, particularly on public sector pay. As spending rises more slowly, improving public services will have to rely more on undertaking further reforms to public sector management and getting better value for money." Once again, nothing has been done in over 15 months to address these recommendations.
Chart below - taken from the OECD report, illustrates the extent of the problem.
However, a closer examination of the components of the public expenditure in Ireland show even more dramatic failure by the Irish Governments to stop the gravy train of wasteful expenditure.
Consider the following chart plotting actual net current expenditure against capital expenditure, incorporating my own forecast for fiscal consolidation in 2009-2010 and DofF January 2009 forecasts for the same period.
Two features can be glimpsed from the chart:
- Over the last decade, there has been a steady, unrelenting rise in the current expenditure - largely reflecting social welfare spending and the wage bill increases in the public service.
- Even before the mini-Budget this month, our capital expenditure has peaked in 2008. Recall that Brian Cowen and Mary Coughlan are endlessly repeating that in 2009-2010 NDP-linked capital investments will act as a stimulus to the economy. Either they have not seen their own Government projections, or cannot comprehend the reality. During the recessionary 2009-2010, Ireland Inc is planning to spend decreasing net amounts of funds on capital programmes. If the Government can think of the NDP (created two years ago) as a recession-busting stimulus, then it has fired virtually all of its ammunition in 2008. And, of course, that has made no difference to the recession, as we all know.
Chart below shows the net current and capital expenditures as a percentage of GDP.
According to this chart, the economically unproductive spending which is largely absorbed into public sector wages and social welfare subsidies (our current expenditure):
- has grown virtually exponentially as a share of economy, whilst the capital investment programmes have bounced along a declining trend, and
- has far outstripped capital investment in terms of its role in the economy.
Should you wonder how high were the rates of growth in current and capital expenditure over the last decade, chart below shows that in 2000-2009, even by DofF own (excessively optimistic) projections for this year, cumulative capital investment's importance in overall economy will decline by 39%. In contrast, cumulative current expenditure growth will reach +27%.In short, the above figures show that:
- Our leaders have deceived us about the importance of capital investment in the economy: between 2000 and 2009, capital expenditure share of GDP has actually fallen, while the current expenditure share of GDP has risen much faster than the GDP itself;
- Since 2000, our Governments have misled the public about the nature of Exchequer expenditure growth by stressing less rapidly expanding investment portion of the budget and downplaying a rampant expansion of payoffs to the public and social welfare sectors promoted by the Social Partners;
- Our current leadership is now deceiving the country and the markets by referring to a falling capital-spending programme as economic stimulus. That 'stimulus' applied to 2008 and not 2009-2010 and even in 2008 it was relatively small, compared to the current spending waste;
- Our Governments since at least 1999 have engaged in reckless and unsustainable increases in the current expenditure - in 2000-2009, current spending has grown in nominal terms by 138%, outstripping almost 2:1 the rate of growth in the nominal GDP (72%). Meanwhile capital expenditure has grown by 57% - over 2.5times slower than the current expenditure.
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