30/12/2014: Who Owns Government Debt?

An interesting chart via DB, mapping sovereign debt holdings across the advanced economies:

As the chart clearly shows, Irish Government debt is disproportionately held in the Central Bank. Other countries with similar proportion of CB-held debt - UK, US and Japan - all deployed direct QE. Ireland, of course, deployed virtually the same QE-like stimulus predominantly to the IBRC.

Another interesting feature is the share of Government debt held by foreign agencies: roughly 20% of the total, or 11th lowest in the sample of 21 countries. That is pretty low, given the amount of PR-talk the Government has been deploying around foreign buyers of Irish bonds.

In contrast, predictably, we rank the third after Greece and Portugal in the share of Government debt held by foreign official sector. This will decline once the IMF 'repayment' is finalised. Domestic banks' holdings of Irish debt are third lowest in the sample, and domestic non-banks holdings are 5th lowest. This is unlikely to change, given the sheer quantum of Government debt outstanding, relative to the overall economy's capacity and demand, and given the low yields on Government debt being generated.

The kicker of all of this is that owing to years of mismanaged bailouts, we are now saddled with the legacy of rescuing private debt holders in the banks. This legacy is simple: instead of private debt we have official debt, held predominantly by official sectors and our own CB, guaranteed by the Irish State. In other words, more of our debt is now super-senior in both rights and default terms.

8/2/2014: Irish Mortgages Crisis: More of a crisis, less of a solution

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from January 19, 2014.



With Dublin property prices and rental rates on the rise optimism about bricks and mortar is gradually re-infecting our living rooms and feeding through to the government and banks' expectations concerning the mortgages arrears.

The good news is that, per latest data, there has been a decline in the arrears reported by the Department of Finance. Across the six main lenders tracked by the department, mortgages in arrears were down by 1,903 in November 2013, compared to September.

The bad news, however, is that the very same figures show that the banks continue to focus on largely cosmetic debt relief measures. In many cases such restructuring tools are potentially pushing distressed borrowers deeper into debt. The fact that Official Ireland lauds such measures as 'permanent' also indicates a lack of serious consideration of the risks faced by the distressed borrowers in the future.


Let's take a look at the latest mortgages numbers, reported by the Department of Finance. To caveat the discussion below, these numbers exclude smaller, predominantly sub-prime lenders, whose borrowers are currently nearly all in arrears.

As of November 2013, there were 116,481 principal residences mortgages accounts in arrears, comprising 17 percent of all principal residences accounts. Counting in buy-to-lets, 148,727 accounts were behind on their contractual repayments, which represents 18 percent of all mortgages. The Department does not report the amounts of mortgages or actual cumulated arrears involved, but based on the data from the Central Bank of Ireland, at the end of Q3 2013, mortgages in arrears amounted to 26 percent of all housing loans.

Of the above, 20,325 principal residences mortgages in arrears over 90 days have been restructured representing just over a quarter of all arrears in this category of mortgages. This number is only 1,812 higher than in September 2013, and is down 89 on August 2013.

We do not know what exactly happened to the mortgages that were reclassified as no longer in arrears nor restructured. The omens are not great, however. Based on the Central Bank data, around half of all previously restructured mortgages relapse into arrears. Some properties have probably gone into repossessions or were voluntarily surrendered.

This lack of clarity signals a deep state of denial by our policymakers and civil servants of the true causes and extent of the crisis. Overall, figures supplied by the Department of Finance classify mortgages into ‘permanently restructured’ and ‘temporarily restructured’. There is no methodological clarity as to what these designations mean. The data reported is not audited and the process of restructuring to-date is not being independently tested by anyone. A systematic registry of various solutions applied by the banks simply does not exist and no one can see the models used in structuring these solutions and their underlying assumptions. The fog of secrecy surrounding mortgages arrears resolution process is thick.

Everyone involved in the process of mortgages arrears resolution knows that the real problem faced by distressed borrowers is the level of debt they carry. But restructuring data reported by the Department of Finance tells us nothing about total debt levels of the households before and after restructuring. Adding insult to the injury, our data excludes unsecured debt – a major barrier to mortgages sustainability and a huge obstacle to banks offering borrowers forbearance. No secured lender can be expected to agree a debt reduction plan for a mortgage, when unsecured lenders are expecting to be made whole.

The official data also separates principal residences from buy-to-lets, despite the fact that a large number of households with arrears on the latter also face difficulties funding the former. Are risks being shifted from one side of the household balancesheet to another?

We are living through a debt crisis of historically unprecedented proportions and yet we are still refusing to threat household debt in a holistic approach. Instead, the overarching belief in the system is that once a mortgage account is restructured, the borrower is no longer at risk. To achieve such an outcome, the bank can offer a household anything between extending temporary interest-only arrangement to offering a split mortgage.  A term extension, or arrears capitalisation, or a fixed repayments scheme in excess of interest-only repayments, or a hybrid of all of the above, is all that is officially available.

The strategy for dealing with distressed borrowers, therefore, is to roll the arrears into either a top-up to the existent mortgage or set up a future claim against the property, and forget the problem ever existed. In medical terms, the analogy is to removing a person off the hospital patients’ list, once she is transferred out of the emergency.

This treatment is problematic because it assumes that the distressed borrowers who went into the arrears will be able to service their new mortgages until full repayment. It further assumes that any future shocks to household finances and to the economy can be covered under the new arrangements.

None of these assumptions have been tested by the independent analysts. All of these assumptions can raise significant questions, when one considers what sort of arrears resolution deals are being offered by the banks.

Suppose a bank makes a mistake in its risk assessment of the proposed solution and, after years of making due payments, the household slips into financial difficulties once again. There is nothing in the system to address such a risk. The household will face the cost of the new crisis, plus the residual cost of the current one, plus the loss on all payments made between now and the moment the new crisis materialises.  In contrast, the bank faces lower cost. The officials responsible for the present system face, of course, no risks at all.

How likely is the above scenario? Per official data, 60 percent of all 'permanent' restructurings involved rolling up accrued arrears and/or stretching out repayments over longer time horizon. In other words, including interest payable, the debt levels associated with such restructurings are greater than those incurred under the original mortgage. This begs a question – how will these households deal with higher future interest rates that are likely to materialise given the longer horizons and larger life-cycle debts of their restructured mortgages? Another question worth asking is how can capitalisation of arrears address the original causes of the financial distress that has led to arrears accumulation?

At most, less than one in six of all mortgages in arrears have been ‘permanently’ restructured without risking an increase in the overall life-time debt levels. Only one in twenty five of all defaulting mortgages were modified on the basis of some risk sharing between the banks and the borrowers. The vast majority of Ireland’s distressed borrowers are expected to pay the full price of their own and bank’s errors. Instead of restoring debt sustainability to Irish households’ finances, the system appears to be aiming to provide only a temporary cash-flow relief.


The key stumbling blocks to the successful resolution of mortgages arrears are, unfortunately, the cornerstones of the personal insolvency regime reforms and of policies aimed at dealing with distressed borrowers.

These include the fact that Irish homeowners are facing the full cost of dealing with the banks without any support from the state. This stands in contrast to the UK model where these costs are usually in part or fully covered by the banks. High costs and cumbersome bureaucracy deter many homeowners from engaging with the banks and from seeking professional and independent advice in restructuring their debts. So far, only one bank, the AIB Group, has voluntarily committed to helping its distressed borrowers to access independent support. The rest of the Irish banking system, including the regulators, are happy to make borrowers pay.

The pilot scheme designed by the Central Bank to deal with the problem of unsecured debt has now run its course. There is a complete silence across the official channels about its successes or failures, or about its potential renewal. Which suggests that the scheme was a flop. Meanwhile, the banks are refusing debt reductions to mortgages arrears, often citing lack of cooperation from unsecured lenders. We will never know how many of the 59,620 ‘permanently’ restructured borrowers could have availed of some debt relief but were failed by the dysfunctional system.

More ominously, we have effectively no regulation over the resolution schemes advanced by various banks. For example, through November 2013, there were 6,090 split mortgages solutions extended. Vast majority of these involve lower cost of borrowing offset by a delay in debt claim realisation. In contrast, one of the major banks currently is in the process of developing a split mortgage product that will offer borrowers an option of converting the capitalised portion of the split back into normal mortgage at some point in the future. In exchange, the borrowers will be offered a sizeable debt write-off for a portion of their mortgage.  Such a product is vastly superior to all other split mortgage arrangements in place, but it will be treated as identical to them in future reports.

The latest data on mortgage arrears resolutions clearly shows that the Irish State is unwilling to forgive those who fell into debt distress under the hardship of the Great Recession.  Instead of helping families to overcome the debt problem, our system is designed to help the debt problem to gain control over the debtor.

Box-out:

With the first issue of post-Troika Irish bonds safely away, it is time to reflect on the NTMA's opening gambit in the markets. Whatever one might say about the agency, its timing of this month's sale was impeccable. In the global markets, investment funds have been migrating out of fixed income (bond markets) and into equity markets pretty much throughout most of 2013. This trend is now accelerating. Usual bulk buyers of sovereign bonds are also starting to slow their appetite. Sovereign Wealth Funds, especially those located in Asia and the BRICS, are facing slowing domestic economic activity, reduced funding inflows from their exchequers and increased political pressures to reinvest domestically. Euro area banks, other large buyers of government bonds, are continuing to repay ECB-borrowed funds. They too are unlikely to demand significant amounts of Government bonds. And, looming on the horizon, large euro area issuers are about to swamp the market with fresh supply. Spain and Italy alone are planning to sell some EUR712 billion worth of new bonds to fund maturing debt and new deficits. All of this suggests that both supply and demand pressures later in 2014 can make it tougher for smaller euro area countries to tap the markets. Which makes NTMA's this month's timing so much wiser.

18/1/2014: Ireland's Credit Upgrade: Some Background

Moody's upgraded Irish sovereign debt ratings last night. My analysis is here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/01/1812014-moodys-upgrade-for-ireland.html

Couple additional of points in relation to the upgrade.

Here's the current Western Europe league table in the Euromoney Country Risk Survey, placing Ireland at the top of the peripherals:

This is a consensus view across ECR group of economists and analysts and the core downward risk source for the ratings is Economic Assessment. Ratings upgrade will most likely translate into a higher score on Credit Rating, pushing us closer to France into the 2nd tier.

The upgrade was predictable and overdue. Two weeks ago I run the analysis of CDS spreads over 2012-2013 period (here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/01/512013-euro-periphery-in-cds-markets.html) and the core conclusion relevant to today's news is in the last bullet point of the post.

• Irish CDS since the beginning of 2012 are carrying heavier weighting on probability of default estimates: in the last two charts, our CPD is priced along the mid envelope of (CDS, CPD) quotes, while Greece implies underpricing of the probability of default (along the lower envelope). Our probability of default is slightly over-estimated compared to Portugal and Spain, but is in line with Italy. This potentially relates to the point raised above in relation to speed of our CPD declines over 2013: we might be experiencing an over-due repricing (very slight) in the relationship between the CDS levels and implied estimates of the probability of default.

In other words, the CDS pricing was signalling lower probability of default for Ireland. And it was predictable on the basis of core fundamentals as well. Here's from the post back in March 2013:
http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/03/1532013-irish-banks-still-second.html "my view is that we are due an upgrade, but a single notch one, to reflect economic decoupling from the peripherals".

So to reiterate: the upgrade was

1. Overdue
2. Expected
3. About right on the side of the change in the rating
4. A good net positive on expected markets impact, and
5. Enhancing stability of our debt, with medium-term expectation for lower borrowing costs (this will not play out right away, as Ireland's debt maturity profile is long-dated).

Meanwhile, this week's Euromoney ECR note on FY2013 credit risks shows continued drag on ratings in the euro area:

The full analysis (restricted access) is here. My quote on the above is about the general sense of complacency at the euro area 'leadership' level:

My full comment given to ECR on the 2013 results is here:

Euro area:

Euro area remained the weakest economic region globally, over the entire 2013, with a number of countries struggling with high unemployment, recessionary macroeconomic conditions, extremely low and near-deflationary price pressures and operating in the monetary environment still characterised by anaemic growth in money supply and tight credit markets. Based on the latest data, euro area is the only region world wide that is expected to post negative real GDP growth in 2013. 

The fact that this abysmal performance comes alongside relatively benign output gap, compared to other regions, and amidst overall improved global economic outlook, signals structural nature of the Great Recession in the euro area. In addition to the weak macroeconomic performance, euro area continued to suffer from acute leadership deficit - a fact that did not go unnoticed by the analysts. 

In 2013, eurozone's leadership effectively shifted from the risk-management mode that underpinned relatively rapid and robust rhetorical responses to the crisis in 2012, to a navel-gazing mode. Few of the policy proposals tabled over 2012 in response to the sovereign debt and banking sector crises were implemented or fully structured in 2013. The monetary policy, while remaining  relatively accommodative, continued to deploy the very same measures used in previous years, with little improvement in the credit supply conditions on the ground, at the level of the real economy. Thus, monetary growth was subdued and retail interest rates margins over the policy rate continued to rise, making credit to euro area enterprises and households both less available and more expensive.

Sub-regional:

The focal point of the euro area adverse news flow over 2013 has shifted from the so-called PIIGS to the relative newcomers to the crisis-stricken periphery: Cyprus and Slovenia. With Cyprus' depositors bail-ins setting a new benchmark for private sector burden sharing that will serve as a template for the euro area future crisis resolution measures, Slovenia has been desperately attempting to avoid a formal Troika bailout of its weak banking system. As the result, the country saw significant deterioration in macroeconomic environment over 2013. 

In the second half of 2013, with growth starting to return to core euro area economies, the centre of gravity in the Great Recession moved to economically weak Italy and France and away from the recovery-bound Ireland and Spain. In fact, 2013 macroeconomic and fiscal performance by the former warrants significant improvements in its credit scores, while the latter is starting to gain ground in terms of stabilising external trading conditions, while lagging on fiscal side. The expectation, therefore, is for continued decoupling of Ireland from the weaker peripherals sub-group as signalled by the CDS spreads and bond yields to-date.

Overall, Italy remains the weakest large euro area economy, member of the Big 4 countries of the eurozone, with virtually no growth and no reforms compounded by the risk of renewed political instability. Current expectation is for the real GDP contraction of 1.8% in 2013 following a 2.37% decline in 2012. Italy is also the only large euro area economy that is expected to post a fall in overall exports of goods and services in 2013 and, along side Spain, reduction in levels of employment across the economy. As the result of its poor growth performance, Italy is likely to post the only increase in the net government deficit for 2013 of all big euro area states, leading to an increase in the country debt/GDP ratio to 132.3%. The key to the country deteriorating credit risk scores, however, rests with the general markets perception that Italian political leadership remains incapable to deliver any meaningful structural reforms. 

Meanwhile, France is showing all the signs of deepening deterioration in manufacturing and core services activity since the onset of Q4 2013. French economy is currently once again on the edge of another recessionary dip and unemployment is poised to post further increases in Q4 2013-Q1 2014. At the same time, like Italy, French leadership appears to be stuck in 'neutral' when it comes to fiscal and structural reforms - a situation that is likely to spillover into a twin crisis of anaemic growth conditions and renewed industrial unrest in early 2014 (in 2013, French unemployment rate exceeded that recorded in Italy in 2012). With nearly zero structural adjustment underway, France's current account remains in deficit (-1.6% of GDP in 2013), while general government gross debt is now at around 93.5% of GDP, up on 90.2% in 2012, and heading higher in 2014. France also has second largest primary deficit of all larger euro area economies, as well as overall Government deficit that is in excess of that recorded in Italy. With public and household finances in tatters, France is likely to finish 2013 with lowest end-of-year inflation of all big euro area economies, pushing the country closer to deflation.

18/1/2014: Moody's Upgrade for Ireland

Moody's Investor Services upgraded Irish sovereign ratings tonight in a move that was expected by the analysts (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/09/2092013-irelands-credit-risk-scores.html) and was overdue.

Moody's release on this is here: https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-upgrades-Irelands-sovereign-ratings-to-Baa3P-3-outlook-changed--PR_290559?WT.mc_id=%40moodysratings

Key takeaways from the release:

1. Rationale for the upgrade: "The two main drivers for the upgrade are: (1) The growth potential of the Irish economy, which together with ongoing fiscal consolidation is expected to bring government debt ratios down from their recent peak; (2) The Irish government's exit from its EU/IMF support programme on schedule, with improved solvency and restored market access.
2. On growth potential: "Moody's expects a stronger expansion of net exports in the next few years as the negative impact lessens from the expiry of key pharmaceutical patents and as Ireland's major trading partners register more robust growth. Improved competitiveness ...since the 2009 recession, contributing to the shift from large current account deficits before the crisis to the current surpluses. Moreover, there are signs of a revival in domestic demand as household savings rates come down from historic highs. Foreign direct investment also remains extremely strong, attracted by Ireland's innovative and flexible labour force, and the housing sector appears to have stabilized."
3. On fiscal side: "The second driver of the upgrade is the Irish government's exit from its three-year economic adjustment programme in mid-December 2013. Its ability to do so without a precautionary credit line reflects that the government's reform agenda stayed largely on track throughout the programme, despite weaker than expected domestic and external economic conditions. The government regularly outperformed quantitative fiscal goals, which helped it regain and retain market confidence. Similarly, Moody's expects that Ireland will be able to address its excessive deficit (i.e. bringing it sustainably below 3% of GDP) by 2015."

Readers of this blog would know my views as to the risks associated with some aspects of the above assessments. However, the risks are unlikely to play out over the next 12 months horizon and are not carrying significant probability to derail overall low-growth recovery trend. So, in my view, Moody's is justified in shifting ratings up to Baa3 from Ba1.

On risks side, moody's cite: "That said, the clean-up of the banking system's non-performing loans is still in the early stages. In 2013, the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) used its increased powers to establish a schedule requiring banks to resolve mortgage and SME loan arrears on a sustainable basis. The CBI is also demanding that banks strengthen collection efforts from customers who are able to pay. In the meantime, however, these mortgage resolutions are likely to increase foreclosures, impairing profitability and potentially dampening the housing market recovery."

Agree with their view, though other risks also exist, beyond the mortgages resolution process and banking sector performance.

Nice bit about the upgrade - it comes after Moody's delayed any changes to Portugal's ratings last week, a move that was interpreted by some analysts as a signal that the agency could have left Ireland's debt ratings unchanged as well.

My view on the ratings is that Ireland is moving into the same category of debt as Belgium (aptly, along with Belgium's longer term growth trajectory of ca 1.5% pa and Belgium's long-term struggle of shifting out of the 100% debt/GDP ratio for sovereign debt). It is a net gain for us, given the scale of the crisis we are starting to recover from.

Note: a H/T & thanks to Conrad Bryan @conradbryan and Dave Ryan @MailPidgeon for alerting me to Moody's action this late at night.

22/4/2013: Who funds growth in Europe?..

There are charts and then there are Charts. One example of the latter is via IMF CR1371

The above shows a number of really interesting differences between the euro area and the US, as well as within euro area:

• Look at the share of overall funding accruing to the traditional (deposits) banks in the US (tiny) and the euro area (massive) - debt is the preferred form of funding for Europe
• Look at the share of equity in the US funding and in euro area, ex-Luxembourg - equity is not a preferred way for funding growth in Europe.
• Why the above matter? Simply put, debt - especially banks debt - is not challenging existent ownership of the firm raising funding. Which means that patriarchal structures of family-owned firms, with their inefficient and paternalistic hiring and promotions and management systems can be sustained more easily in the case of debt-funded firms than in the case of equity funded ones.
• Look at the role played in the US by the credit supplied by 'other financial institutions' - non-banks. Again, these would be more 'activist'-styled funding streams exerting more pressure on management and ownership structures.

What about Ireland? Look at the composition of funding sources in the country:

1. Strong reliance on corporate bonds markets is probably reflective of three factors: (a) concentrated loans issued during the building boom and related to construction, development & investment in land remain the legacy of the boom and rely on collateralized bonds issuance, (b) banks funding via collateralization, (c) concentrated nature of Irish listed plcs, (d) massive M&A spree undertaken by Irish plcs and larger private companies on foot of cheap leverage available in the 2000-2007 period, etc. The volume of bonds might be large, but their quality is most likely lower due to the above points.
2. Strong - actually second strongest in the sample after Cyprus - reliance on bank lending to fund economy.
3. Weak, extremely thin equity cushion. 

Now, keep in mind: equity is the best, most stable and most suitable for absorbing crisis impact form of funding.

30/3/2013: Euro area sovereign risk rises in March 2013

Here's an interesting bit of data (pertaining to analysts' survey): per Euromoney Country Risk survey:

"As of late March 2013, the survey indicates that 13 of the 17 single currency nations have succumbed to increased transfer risk [risk of government non-payment or non-repatriation of funds] since... two-and-a-half years ago." And the worst offenders are?.. Take a look at two charts (lower scores, higher risk):

Per definition of the transfer risk: "The risk of government non-payment/non-repatriation – a measure of the risk government policies and actions pose to financial transfers – is one of 15 indicators economists and other country risk experts are asked to evaluate each quarter. It is used to compile the country’s overall sovereign risk score, in combination with data concerning access to capital, credit ratings and debt indicators."

20/2/2013: Hungary's 'Return' to Bond Markets

Week ago, Friday, Hungary was downgrade to junk. This Tuesday, despite its newly-minted junk bond status from all three core agencies (Ba1/BB/BB+) Hungary went to the market with a plan to raise USD3bn worth of US Dollar-denominated bonds. 

Now, unlike Ireland, Hungary is NOT in the 'best-of-class' league in Europe when it comes to compliance with the Troika demands and in general. After all, Hungary went on to aggressively interfere with its Central Bank independence, broke off negotiations with the IMF on second 'rescue' package back in November 2012, and basically replaced the Governor of the Central Bank with dovish Monetary Council. The country economy is still in a tailspin based on IMF figures*, although its fiscal performance, external balance and unemployment are healthier than those of the 'best-in-class' country - Ireland: 

-- Hungarian GDP is estimated by the IMF to have fallen by -1.021% in 2012 (against Ireland's estimated increase of +0.353%), with 2013 forecast for a rise in Hungarian GDP of just 0.797% in real terms (Ireland's same period forecast is for a rise of 1.394%).

-- Hungary's unemployment rate is barely budging off the crisis high (11.243% in 2010 to 10.925% in 2012). Ireland's unemployment rate is at the crisis period high with 2012 estimate at 14.7-14.8% and expected to decline marginally to 14.41% in 2014.

-- Hungary's General Government Revenues are shrinking faster than the economy. In 2011, Hungary's Government collected 52.864% of GDP in revenues, which has fallen to 45.787 in 2012 and is expected to shrink to 45.054% in 2013. In the mean time, Ireland's Government Revenues are marginally up from 34.118% in 2011 to expected 34.542% in 2013.

-- General Government Total Expenditure in Hungary is slowly inching up: from 48.672% in 2011 to forecast 48.761% in 2013, against Ireland's contraction from 46.869% in 2011 to 42.065% projected for 2013.

-- General government net lending/borrowing in Hungary stood at a deficit of -2.909% of GDP in 2012 and is forecast to rise to -3.707% in 2013. This compares with the completely abysmal Irish performance at 8.301% GDP in 2012 to 7.523% in 2013 forecast.

-- Hungary's primary deficits are expected to be less than 1/2 of those of Ireland in 2013.

-- Hungary's Government debt is sitting at 74.2% of GDP forecast for 2013, down from 80.6% in 2011, while Ireland's debt is up from 106.5% in 2011 to 119.3% projected for 2013.

-- The Government is aiming to repay the IMF and EU of €3.65bn and €2.31bn in 2013, against Ireland's nil repayments.

-- Hungary's current account balances have been in excess of that for Ireland since 2009, although 2013 forecast is for the current account surplus of 2.69% in Hungary vs 2.71% in Ireland.

*Note: I am using WEO data for the comparatives, instead of individual countries assessments, so some of the data cited is slightly off the latests projections, although the actual comparatives are hardly off by much

In other words, Hungary is clearly more of a sovereign policy, economic environment and monetary policy risk to the investors than Ireland. And despite this, Hungarian Government 10-year bonds have fallen in terms of yields from 5.8% in August 2012 to around 4.7% currently.

And last Tuesday, Hungary has managed to place USD3.25billion worth of new 5- and 10-year bonds with the cover ratio at 12.5-to-3.25. Overall, Hungary had offers for USD5.5bn worth of 4.25% 2018 bond with USD1.25bn allocated, these were priced at 335bps over US Treasuries and 320bps over mid-swap bang on with where the 10-years (2011s) were traded in the secondary market. Last time it sold 10-year bonds back in 2011, these were priced at coupon of 6.375% or full 100bps above the current deal. It also booked USD7 billion book for 5.375% 2023 bond with USD2bn allocated, priced at 345bps over US Treasuries and 336bps over mid-swaps.

Hungarian Government planned to raise some USD4bn worth of bonds in 2013 in total and is now 81% at its target for the year. Geographic allocation of the placement was even more encouraging: US investors took 55% of the 10-year paper, UK and Europe investors took 21% each. Funds took 81%, hedge funds took 9% and banks and retail investors only 5%. The 5-year allocation was similarly spread.

All of this suggests that the markets have little interest, currently, in the underlying risk fundamentals. Instead, pretty much anything offering a yield above the G7 average is simply seen as a target worthy of consideration. While Governments are quick to show up at the sales announcements with proclamations of their policies successes, the reality of the market awash in liquidity and nothing to chase in terms of yield means that investors are rushing into the issues pushed through by the economies that hardly in rude health today or can be expected to return to such a state any time soon. 

23/1/2013: CDS markets in Q4 2012 - CMA report

CMA published Q4 2012 report on sovereign CDS markets and there are some interesting trends and stats highlighted.

First 25 top riskiest sovereigns (CPD referes to cumulative probability of default over 5 years):

Note that Ireland is no longer in top 10 riskiest states. Good news. A bit more on this below.


Per CMA: "Global CDS prices ended the year on a strong note, tightening 16% overall as Europe rallies strongly and Greece repurchases debt allaying fears of an exit from the Euro. Only Argentina and Egypt widen significantly on the quarter."

"Argentina CDS ended a volatile quarter as the most risky sovereign reaching a high of 4832bps at the end of November on concerns over USA debt guarantees, but rallied to finish on 1450bps. CDS spreads in Spain tightened from 384bps to 295bps as spreads in Western Europe as a whole tightened 19%."


Next, top 25 least riskiest states:

Note that only 3 euro afea states make it into top 10.

Per CMA:
"Sweden edged Norway off the top spot of the least risky table by 1bps, as the Scandinavian countries ended a strong quarter on the back of a good performance in Europe as a whole. The USA slipped two positions, as a solution to the “Fiscal Cliff” and debt ceiling concerns continue into year end. Austria and Netherlands enter the table with the spreads aligning with the strong economies of Germany and Switzerland." The latter rationale is most bizarre one I heard - the Netherlands are in a serious economic recession, deeper and longer than the rest of the euro area, so I have no idea what CMA are talking about.

Now, some interesting charts relating to Western Europe. Per CMA: "Western Europe continued on the rally from Q3 into Q4, with spreads tightening 19% overall and Greece looking more likely to stay in the Euro. Spreads in Portugal creeped over the 600bps level mid-November but ended the year at 436bps, 13%  tighter. Ireland tightened 31% closing the year at 218bps as the turnaround story continues. Spain and Italy, seen as the key economies in southern Europe, tightened 23% and 19% respectively."

Recall that European CDS overall tightened 19% in Q4 2012 and overall global momentum was very strongly on tightening side.

Note that Ireland experienced comparable (in levels) declines in CDS to all other peripheral countries excluding Cyprus (which saw an increase) and Portugal (where declines were more pronounced, when considered relative to peak reached in the Quarter. It is hard to tell - in this environment - whether Irish performance is driven by own fundamentals or by a combination of these said fundamentals and overall improved investor tolerance for risk.

In terms of percentages declines, we did perform stronger than other peripherals (ex-Portugal) and the Western Europe as a whole.

However, it is still too early to claim that Ireland - based on CDS valuations - is not a part of the 'peripheral' euro area group. Hopefully, more progress in near future will get us decoupled from this camp.

10/11/2012: Euro Area bonds supply - November 2012

Five weeks forward bonds supply calendar from Morgan Stanley:

And aggregates:

6/10/2012: Euro area bonds supply calendar for October 2012

Morgan Stanley October bonds supply calendar for euro zone sovereign bonds:

 

And summary of volumes for redemptions, coupons and new issuance:

Ireland's volumes above refer to coupon payments only.

3/7/2012: Curb your enthusiasms?

So, the NTMA have issued a (welcome) note that Ireland is to resume auctions of T-bills. The note states that "on Thursday 5 July 2012. The NTMA will offer €500 million of Treasury Bills with a three-month maturity in its first such auction since September 2010." 

The details of the auction on 5 July are as follows: 

• Auction size: €500 million. 

• Maturity: 15 October 2012. 

• Auction opens: 9:30 a.m. 

• Auction closes: 10:30 a.m. 

• Settlement date: 9 July 2012. 

This is potentially (pending results of sale, namely yield, volume and percentage allocation to non-captive banks and funds) a minor positive for Ireland. Minor, because:

1. Bills are NOT bonds - bills are short-term instruments, traditionally under 12 months maturity (bonds are over 1 year maturity).
2. Bills issued currently fall to mature within the period of existent EFSF funding programme, so in effect there will always be funds to cover these, short of a catastrophic collapse of the euro during the duration of the bills.
3. Issuance of bills has nothing to do in terms of signaling the state of public finances health or economic conditions health of the issuer, as both Greece (see here) and Portugal (here) have issued these during their tenure in the rescue programmes.
4. Portugal issuance (linked above) covered 18-mos bills, which would constitute a stronger positive signal than that of planned Irish sale, if there was any whatsoever informational content to these auctions.
5. Ireland has issued T-bills back in September 2010, and then it was NOT a signal of any confidence in Ireland's financial health.

The media statements that this sale shows that 'Ireland is back to bond markets' is fully incorrect. T-bills market is not the same as bond market. And T-bill instruments are distinct from the bonds. For example, T-bills were not covered by PSI default in Greece, unlike bonds.

Funding public spending via T-Bills is a (marginally?) riskier undertaking for the Exchequer because it implies transfer of any potential maturity mismatch risk onto the Exchequer. Maturity mismatch risk arises when the Government uses short-term debt to finance longer-term spending commitments.

So what is the 'positive' then in NTMA news? For now - just a hope we do not get a complete rejection (which is highly unlikely, as NTMA has primed the market already). We need to see results of the auction to tell if things are positive or not - e.g. how high is the demand from outside Ireland? how expensive is the funding obtained compared to secondary bonds markets on shorter maturity end? etc.

H/T for some of the above to: Prof Karl Whelan, Prof Brian M Lucey, Owen Callan (Danske Markets)

Update:  There is a nagging question begs asking - why does Ireland need T-bill? Portugal and Greece might have used T-Bills to manage expenditure in the interim of disbursals of EFSF funds, which, especially for Greece this year, have been uncertain. Ireland is fully compliant with Troika requirements and is getting its money on schedule, with no uncertainty. In effect, therefore, either we are facing a shortfall on funding within the programme (unlikely in my view) or we are using T-bills (more expensive money raising) to finance that which we can finance at cheaper rates via Troika funds. The latter option is double-daft as the repayment of T-bills will be done out of the same Troika money. In this latter case, of course, the motivation can be to simply 'generate feel-good news' by the Government that 'Ireland is back to the (bond) markets'...

22/4/2012: Irish Crisis Requires Drastic Action, but Not a Euro Exit

In light of Prof Paul Krugman's comments concerning the desirability of the GIIPS remaining in the euro earlier this week, the Sunday Independent has asked myself (amongst other commentators) to provide my opinion on Prof Krugman's proposed solution. Here is the link to the published article and below is an unedited version of my comment:

In his article, Paul Krugman puts forward what he terms an alternative solution to the current course of policies, chosen by the EU in dealing with the Sovereign debt and financial sector crises. The core of his argument boils down to the need for the EU ‘peripheral’ states, notably Greece, Spain, Portugal, and potentially Ireland, to exit the euro and restore national currencies.

In my view, such a course, undertaken in cooperation with the EU member states and the ECB is a correct one for Greece, and possibly Portugal, but is not an option for Ireland, and the rest of the periphery. The reason for this is that unlike Greece and Portugal, Spain and Ireland are suffering not so much from the Sovereign debt overhang, but from a private and banking debts crisis. Resolution of these latter crises will not be sufficiently helped by an exit from the euro, primarily because private debt deflation will not be feasible for debts already denominated in euro. In addition, exiting the euro will entail significant economic and reputational costs to an extremely open economy, like Ireland, reliant on FDI and high value-added euro-related services, such as IFSC.

Two years ago, prior to the completion of the contagion from banking debts to Sovereign debt, exiting the euro was a workable solution, albeit a disruptive and a costly one for Ireland. Today, such an exit will require default – most likely an unstructured and disorderly – on both Sovereign and private debts, with simultaneous collapsing of the Exchequer funding and the banking sector. This will lead, in my opinion, to a disorderly unwinding of the entire economy of Ireland.

Professor Krugman is correct in his analysis that “continuing on the present course, imposing ever-harsher austerity on countries that are already suffering depression-era unemployment, is what’s truly inconceivable”. He is also correct in stating, that, “if European leaders wanted to save the euro they would be looking for an alternative course.”

The new course that the European and Irish leaders must adopt is the course that will preserve and strengthen Irish participation in the Euro zone economy, not push Ireland out of the common currency. This course requires a number of steps to be taken by Irish and European authorities in close cooperation with each other.

The first step is to recognize that Ireland’s economy is suffering from a private (namely household) debt overhang and the incomplete nature of the banking sector restructuring here. This means making a choice: either Ireland continues down the current path, with economic adjustments to the crisis stretched over decades of pain, or we jointly, with our European ‘partners’, take real charge of the economic restructuring. The former path implies that Ireland will be sapping Euro area monetary and fiscal resources for many years to come, while being unable to implement deep reforms due to the lack of supportive economic growth and facing continued risks of a Sovereign default. The latter path means that we take a quick, sharp correction in our private debts and get back onto the growth path.

The second step is to devise a solution – most likely via the ECB (to avoid placing burden of our adjustment on European taxpayers) – to write down significant proportion of Irish mortgages and other household debts while simultaneously allowing the banks to deleverage out of the household debts. This can and should be achieved by the ECB canceling all of the Central Bank of Ireland ELA and a part of Irish banks borrowing from the ECB itself and using these cancellation proceeds to write down household debt. Delivering such a deleveraging will open up room for stabilizing Government finances, as reduced debt burden on private balancesheets will allow Ireland to divert resources to paying down Sovereign debt, while a new cycle of domestic investment and growth can commence, allowing for structural reforms in the economy (covering both private and public sectors).

The third step is to create a long-term warehousing facility – within the ESM – to roll over existent Government debt so Ireland will have a period of 10-15 years within which this debt can be reduced without the need to face uncertainty of market funding. This would be primarily a cash flow management exercise. ESM lending rates should be set around funding cost plus administrative margin, or in current terms around 3.0-3.2% per annum, saving Irish Exchequer up to €3.4 billion annually in interest repayments, which can be diverted to more rapid paying down of the national debt. Hardly a chop-change, under conservative assumptions, this approach will allow Ireland to save over €27 billion in funds from 2013 through 2020, reducing overall nominal debt levels by 11.6% by 2020 compared to status quo scenario.

Combined, these policy steps will be able to put Irish economy and Exchequer finances on the security platform from which structural and longer-term reforms can take place without undermining economic growth potential. In addition, good will extended by the EU to Ireland under such a co-operative and coordinated approach to the crisis will assure continued Irish support and participation within the EU. This, in turn, will assure that Ireland can play an active and positive role in the Euro area growth and sustainable development in years to come. Exiting the euro today is neither necessary, nor sufficient for restoring Irish economy to growth. Resolving our debt crisis is both feasible and the least-costly part of the solution to the broader Euro area crises. 

21/3/2012: Anglo's Promo Notes - perfect target for debt restructuring

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from March 18, 2012.

At last, courtesy of the years of economic and financial mess, Ireland is waking up to the problem of our debt overhang. For those of us who have consistently argued about the unsustainability of our fiscal and real economic debts predicament, this moment has been long coming. The restructuring of some of the debts carried by the Government directly or indirectly, on- or off-balancesheet is a matter of when, not if. Enter the debate concerning the Promissory Notes.

Per international research, State debt in excess of 90-95% of the real economic output is unsustainable. In real economics, as opposed to fiscal projections, debt becomes unsustainable when it exerts a long-term drag on future growth.

At the end of 2011, official Government debt in Ireland has reached 107% of our GDP or 130% of GNP, according to NTMA. The Irish economy is now operating in an environment of records-busting exports, current account surpluses, and healthy FDI inflows, and yet there is no real growth and unemployment remains sky-high. By comparatives, Irish economy is a well-tuned, functional car stuck in the quicksand – engine revving, power train working, wheels engaging, with no movement forward. This is a classic scenario of a debt overhang crisis – the very same crisis that Belgium has been struggling with since 1982, Italy – sicne 1988, Hungary – since 1991, and Japan – since 1995.

Something has to be done to deal with this problem in Ireland no matter what our Government and the EU say in public.

Uniquely for a euro area country, Ireland’s debt overhang did not arise solely from fiscal or structural economic shocks, but was strongly driven by the country response to the financial crisis rooted in a number of forces, including policy and regulatory errors by the EU and ECB. Also, Ireland has undergone the most severe adjustments in its fiscal position to-date compared to all other ‘peripheral’ economies, proving both our capability and commitment to reforms.

Lastly, in contrast with all other countries, Ireland’s economy is capable of getting back to sustainable levels of economic activity. Irish economy needs a supporting push out of the quicksand of banks-linked debt overhang to deliver on its sovereign debt commitments, and become once again a net contributor to the sustainable fiscal system within the euro area.

The IBRC Promissory Notes are a perfect focal point for such a push for a number of reasons.

First, the magnitude of the Promissory Notes allows for significant room to reduce Irish Government’s future liabilities, combining €28.1 billion of debt, plus 17 billion in interest repayments. These represent 29% of our GDP. Eliminating this liability will restore Ireland back onto sustainable fiscal and growth paths. Restructuring the Notes will not constitute a sovereign default. Although their value is counted in Irish Government debt, they are not traded in the markets. The Notes are, de facto, Irish Government IOUs to the Central Bank of Ireland with IBRC acting as an agent.

Second, Promissory Notes underwrite €28 billion of €42 billion IBRC debts to the ELA programme run by the Central Bank of Ireland. ELA funds are not borrowed by the Central Bank from the Eurosystem or the ECB, but are created by the Central Bank under its mandate. There is no offsetting physical liability the Central Bank needs to cancel by receipt of payments from the Government. The Notes also do not constitute Central Bank funding for the Government as they finance stabilization of the Irish (and thus European) banking system. Lastly, the ELA funding extended to the IBRC is already in the financial system. Removing requirement on the Irish state to monetize the Promissory Notes will not constitute an inflationary quantitative easing.

The Government is correct in focusing much of its firepower on the IBRC’s Promissory Notes. Alas, efforts to-date suggest that it is not setting its sights on the real solutions needed. This week, Minister Noonan has identified the direction in which the talks are progressing: restructuring the Promissory Notes repayment time schedule, plus possibly reducing the interest rate attached to the notes via converting the notes into ESM debt.

The problem with this approach is that a transfer of liabilities to ESM will convert Promissory Notes into a super-senior Government debt. This is likely to have a negative effect on Ireland’s ability to borrow funds from the markets in the future and make such borrowing more expensive.

In addition, lowering interest rate on the Promissory Notes carries two associated problems with it. The move can only have an appreciable effect on Exchequer finances after 2014, when interest on the notes ramps up to €1.8 billion from zero in 2012 and €500 million in 2013.

Delaying repayment of notes instead of reducing the principal amount owed on them will not provide significant relief to the Exchequer in the future and will make the period over which the debt overhang occurs even longer than 20 years envisioned under the current Notes structure. This will pose serious risks. History of business cycles suggests that between now and 2025 when Notes repayments will fall significantly, we are likely to face at least two ‘normal’ or cyclical recessions. During these recessions, Notes repayments will coincide with rising deficit pressures and national income contractions that will exacerbate the Promissory Notes already adverse impact on Irish economy. Extending the period of notes repayments risks compounding more recessionary cycles in the future.

Furthermore, delaying notes repayments can risk increasing the overall future demand for debt issuance by the state. Currently, Ireland is facing two debt-refinancing cliffs during the life of the Promissory Notes: €45.6 billion refinancing over 2013-2016 and €62.4 billion over 2017-2020. If Notes repayments are delayed, their financing will stretch further into post-2020 period, just when the subsequent roll-overs of Government bonds will be coming due.

In more simple terms, current proposals for Promissory Notes restructuring are equivalent to making quicksand pit shallower, but much wider.

Ireland needs and deserves a direct restructuring of the ELA. The most optimal outcome of such a restructuring would be de facto cancellation of ELA requirement for repayment of IBRC-borrowed €42 billion. Once again, such a move would have zero inflationary impact on the economy as on the net no new money will be created in the euro system over and above the amounts already present.

There remains, however, one sticky point. Allowing Ireland to restructure its ELA can, in theory, lead to other Central Banks following the suit. This problem of moral hazard can be easily mitigated by ECB by ring-fencing Irish ELA restructuring solely for the purpose of winding down IBRC. Making ELA writedown conditional on shutting down Anglo and INBS, plus potentially Permanent tsb will disincentives other countries from using their own ELAs to rescue solvent banks. Irish restructuring can be further isolated by tying ELA writedown to progress already achieved by Ireland in tackling fiscal deficits and restructuring its banking sector. Put simply, with such a proviso in place, no other Euro area country would want to dip into its National Central Bank vaults if the associated cost of doing this will amount to over 50% of its GDP.

Ireland’s crisis is unique in its nature and its resolution provided a buffer to cushion the credit crisis blow to the entire euro area banking sector. Ireland both deserves and needs a breakthrough on the debts assumed by taxpayers in relation to the insolvent IBRC. Even more importantly from Europe’s point of view, the ECB needs a positive example of a country emerging from the deep crisis within the euro system. Ireland is the only candidate for success it has.

Source: NTMA and author own calculations.

Note: In computing second round of rollovers, only Government bonds are included and taken at 95% of the principal amount. All other debts are excluded.

Box-out:

In the wake of last week’s Quarterly National Household Survey release, the Government was quick to point to the improvement in the number of employed on a seasonally adjusted basis as the evidence the employment policies success. Overall numbers in employment rose in Q4 2011 by 10,000 or 0.56% compared to Q3 2011, once seasonal adjustments were made. Furthermore, per seasonally adjusted data, full-time employment was up 8,700 – accounting for 87% of this jobs creation. Alas, this is not the entire picture of the job market health. Year on year, seasonally adjusted employment was down 17,800 or 0.97%. More ominously, unadjusted employment was up just 2,300 in Q4 2011 compared to Q3 2011 – an addition of statistically insignificant 0.1%. Interestingly, full-time unadjusted employment figure fell by 700 jobs (-0.1%), while part-time employment rose 3,000 (+0.7%). At the same time, number of part-time workers who are underemployed has jumped 5,800 in a quarter and 28,100 year on year. Two reasons can help explain the above disparities. First, Government training programmes have been aggressively taking people out of unemployment counts, increasing employment numbers. In the case of Job Bridge, for example, these are unpaid ‘internships’ with questionable rate of post-internship transition to work so far. Second, since Q1 2011, CSO has used a new model for seasonal adjustments, which may or may not have an effect on seasonally adjusted headline numbers. Lastly, seasonal adjustments can increase, not reduce quarterly data volatility at the times when trends change. Particularly, with flattening out of the employment figures after years of steep declines, seasonal adjustments can introduce a temporary bias into subsequent data. In short, making conclusions about the actual changes requires more careful reading of the numbers than a simplistic headline figure referencing. With all annual indicators pointing to a shallow decrease in employment, the Government would be best served to have some patience and see how subsequent quarters numbers play out before jumping to conclusions on the success of its policies.

12/3/2012: Summary of latest CDS moves

A neat summary from 9/3/2012 note by markit for 5-year CDS:

And let's leave it without a comment.

H/T to @EconBrothers 

8/2/2012: A more pleasant Sovereign arithmetic

And for a rather more pleasant sovereign arithmetic, here's an interesting table from the Global Macro Monitor (link here) summarizing yoy movements in 5 year CDS:

Frankly speaking, all of this suggest some severe overshooting in CDS and bonds markets on upward yield adjustments over time followed by repricing toward longer term equilibrium. What this doesn't tell us whether we have overshot equilibrium or not... Time will tell.

7/2/2012: An unpleasant risk arithmetic

Here's the guys Irish authorities trust so much on risk assessment, they contracted them to do banks stress tests - PCARs - back in 2010-2011. Note: this is a statement of fact, not an endorsement by me. The Blackrock folks produce quarterly report on sovereign risks and this the summary chart from the latest one - Q1 2012. Negative numbers refer to higher risks:

So Greece leads, Portugal follows, Egypt and Venezuela are in 3rd and 4th place worldwide of the riskiest nations league and then, in the fifth place is Ireland, followed by Italy. And here's the summary of the euro area ratings:

Yes, bond yields have been improving significantly, including due to both fundamentals and banks liquidity steroids, which is a good news. The bad news, yields have been declining for other countries as well and investors' relative sentiment is not improving as much as the absolute levels of yields declines suggest.

Today, one of the Irish Stuffbrokerages claimed in a note that: "The country’s success in meeting its targets under an EU/IMF bailout without social or political unrest and its export-focused economy has enabled it to dodge the recent Eurozone downgrades by S&P and Fitch and distance itself from fellow bailout recipients Greece and Portugal. " Distancing we might be, but the neighborhood we are lumped into is not changing as the result of this distancing. At least not for now.

Please note, the assessments above are consistent with CMA analysis based on CDS spreads, covered here.