8/2/2014: Irish Mortgages Crisis: More of a crisis, less of a solution

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from January 19, 2014.



With Dublin property prices and rental rates on the rise optimism about bricks and mortar is gradually re-infecting our living rooms and feeding through to the government and banks' expectations concerning the mortgages arrears.

The good news is that, per latest data, there has been a decline in the arrears reported by the Department of Finance. Across the six main lenders tracked by the department, mortgages in arrears were down by 1,903 in November 2013, compared to September.

The bad news, however, is that the very same figures show that the banks continue to focus on largely cosmetic debt relief measures. In many cases such restructuring tools are potentially pushing distressed borrowers deeper into debt. The fact that Official Ireland lauds such measures as 'permanent' also indicates a lack of serious consideration of the risks faced by the distressed borrowers in the future.


Let's take a look at the latest mortgages numbers, reported by the Department of Finance. To caveat the discussion below, these numbers exclude smaller, predominantly sub-prime lenders, whose borrowers are currently nearly all in arrears.

As of November 2013, there were 116,481 principal residences mortgages accounts in arrears, comprising 17 percent of all principal residences accounts. Counting in buy-to-lets, 148,727 accounts were behind on their contractual repayments, which represents 18 percent of all mortgages. The Department does not report the amounts of mortgages or actual cumulated arrears involved, but based on the data from the Central Bank of Ireland, at the end of Q3 2013, mortgages in arrears amounted to 26 percent of all housing loans.

Of the above, 20,325 principal residences mortgages in arrears over 90 days have been restructured representing just over a quarter of all arrears in this category of mortgages. This number is only 1,812 higher than in September 2013, and is down 89 on August 2013.

We do not know what exactly happened to the mortgages that were reclassified as no longer in arrears nor restructured. The omens are not great, however. Based on the Central Bank data, around half of all previously restructured mortgages relapse into arrears. Some properties have probably gone into repossessions or were voluntarily surrendered.

This lack of clarity signals a deep state of denial by our policymakers and civil servants of the true causes and extent of the crisis. Overall, figures supplied by the Department of Finance classify mortgages into ‘permanently restructured’ and ‘temporarily restructured’. There is no methodological clarity as to what these designations mean. The data reported is not audited and the process of restructuring to-date is not being independently tested by anyone. A systematic registry of various solutions applied by the banks simply does not exist and no one can see the models used in structuring these solutions and their underlying assumptions. The fog of secrecy surrounding mortgages arrears resolution process is thick.

Everyone involved in the process of mortgages arrears resolution knows that the real problem faced by distressed borrowers is the level of debt they carry. But restructuring data reported by the Department of Finance tells us nothing about total debt levels of the households before and after restructuring. Adding insult to the injury, our data excludes unsecured debt – a major barrier to mortgages sustainability and a huge obstacle to banks offering borrowers forbearance. No secured lender can be expected to agree a debt reduction plan for a mortgage, when unsecured lenders are expecting to be made whole.

The official data also separates principal residences from buy-to-lets, despite the fact that a large number of households with arrears on the latter also face difficulties funding the former. Are risks being shifted from one side of the household balancesheet to another?

We are living through a debt crisis of historically unprecedented proportions and yet we are still refusing to threat household debt in a holistic approach. Instead, the overarching belief in the system is that once a mortgage account is restructured, the borrower is no longer at risk. To achieve such an outcome, the bank can offer a household anything between extending temporary interest-only arrangement to offering a split mortgage.  A term extension, or arrears capitalisation, or a fixed repayments scheme in excess of interest-only repayments, or a hybrid of all of the above, is all that is officially available.

The strategy for dealing with distressed borrowers, therefore, is to roll the arrears into either a top-up to the existent mortgage or set up a future claim against the property, and forget the problem ever existed. In medical terms, the analogy is to removing a person off the hospital patients’ list, once she is transferred out of the emergency.

This treatment is problematic because it assumes that the distressed borrowers who went into the arrears will be able to service their new mortgages until full repayment. It further assumes that any future shocks to household finances and to the economy can be covered under the new arrangements.

None of these assumptions have been tested by the independent analysts. All of these assumptions can raise significant questions, when one considers what sort of arrears resolution deals are being offered by the banks.

Suppose a bank makes a mistake in its risk assessment of the proposed solution and, after years of making due payments, the household slips into financial difficulties once again. There is nothing in the system to address such a risk. The household will face the cost of the new crisis, plus the residual cost of the current one, plus the loss on all payments made between now and the moment the new crisis materialises.  In contrast, the bank faces lower cost. The officials responsible for the present system face, of course, no risks at all.

How likely is the above scenario? Per official data, 60 percent of all 'permanent' restructurings involved rolling up accrued arrears and/or stretching out repayments over longer time horizon. In other words, including interest payable, the debt levels associated with such restructurings are greater than those incurred under the original mortgage. This begs a question – how will these households deal with higher future interest rates that are likely to materialise given the longer horizons and larger life-cycle debts of their restructured mortgages? Another question worth asking is how can capitalisation of arrears address the original causes of the financial distress that has led to arrears accumulation?

At most, less than one in six of all mortgages in arrears have been ‘permanently’ restructured without risking an increase in the overall life-time debt levels. Only one in twenty five of all defaulting mortgages were modified on the basis of some risk sharing between the banks and the borrowers. The vast majority of Ireland’s distressed borrowers are expected to pay the full price of their own and bank’s errors. Instead of restoring debt sustainability to Irish households’ finances, the system appears to be aiming to provide only a temporary cash-flow relief.


The key stumbling blocks to the successful resolution of mortgages arrears are, unfortunately, the cornerstones of the personal insolvency regime reforms and of policies aimed at dealing with distressed borrowers.

These include the fact that Irish homeowners are facing the full cost of dealing with the banks without any support from the state. This stands in contrast to the UK model where these costs are usually in part or fully covered by the banks. High costs and cumbersome bureaucracy deter many homeowners from engaging with the banks and from seeking professional and independent advice in restructuring their debts. So far, only one bank, the AIB Group, has voluntarily committed to helping its distressed borrowers to access independent support. The rest of the Irish banking system, including the regulators, are happy to make borrowers pay.

The pilot scheme designed by the Central Bank to deal with the problem of unsecured debt has now run its course. There is a complete silence across the official channels about its successes or failures, or about its potential renewal. Which suggests that the scheme was a flop. Meanwhile, the banks are refusing debt reductions to mortgages arrears, often citing lack of cooperation from unsecured lenders. We will never know how many of the 59,620 ‘permanently’ restructured borrowers could have availed of some debt relief but were failed by the dysfunctional system.

More ominously, we have effectively no regulation over the resolution schemes advanced by various banks. For example, through November 2013, there were 6,090 split mortgages solutions extended. Vast majority of these involve lower cost of borrowing offset by a delay in debt claim realisation. In contrast, one of the major banks currently is in the process of developing a split mortgage product that will offer borrowers an option of converting the capitalised portion of the split back into normal mortgage at some point in the future. In exchange, the borrowers will be offered a sizeable debt write-off for a portion of their mortgage.  Such a product is vastly superior to all other split mortgage arrangements in place, but it will be treated as identical to them in future reports.

The latest data on mortgage arrears resolutions clearly shows that the Irish State is unwilling to forgive those who fell into debt distress under the hardship of the Great Recession.  Instead of helping families to overcome the debt problem, our system is designed to help the debt problem to gain control over the debtor.

Box-out:

With the first issue of post-Troika Irish bonds safely away, it is time to reflect on the NTMA's opening gambit in the markets. Whatever one might say about the agency, its timing of this month's sale was impeccable. In the global markets, investment funds have been migrating out of fixed income (bond markets) and into equity markets pretty much throughout most of 2013. This trend is now accelerating. Usual bulk buyers of sovereign bonds are also starting to slow their appetite. Sovereign Wealth Funds, especially those located in Asia and the BRICS, are facing slowing domestic economic activity, reduced funding inflows from their exchequers and increased political pressures to reinvest domestically. Euro area banks, other large buyers of government bonds, are continuing to repay ECB-borrowed funds. They too are unlikely to demand significant amounts of Government bonds. And, looming on the horizon, large euro area issuers are about to swamp the market with fresh supply. Spain and Italy alone are planning to sell some EUR712 billion worth of new bonds to fund maturing debt and new deficits. All of this suggests that both supply and demand pressures later in 2014 can make it tougher for smaller euro area countries to tap the markets. Which makes NTMA's this month's timing so much wiser.

20/7/2012: European Corporatism comes full circle

A very important analysis from Edmund Phelps in today's FT (link here) of the roots and core causes of the euro area crisis.

Some major points of interest:

"The difficulties of many European countries derive from their corporatism: state projects serving cronies and vast social protection programmes, both run by elites. These surged in the 1970s and 1980s. The prospect of a lifetime of such benefits – sweet contracts, soft loans, early pensions and the rest – created something new: social wealth."


On the money. And


"As increases in benefits outpaced increases in taxes, households saved some of the gains in disposable income. So households saw their private wealth rising alongside the social wealth."


Also on the money. Even more so because 1) taxes were already high so there was no room to increase them by much, and 2) lowering of taxes was used strategically to strengthen corporatist re-distribution of income & wealth from the more productive to the less productive activities (a combination of corporate and social welfare state).


"In both Italy and France, the ratio of household net private wealth to household disposable income soared, rising by one-fifth from 2000 to 2007. (The increase was one-sixth in Germany, negative in the US.)" 


Now, note: what does the European (and Irish) Left wanted and still wants? Higher income taxes. Which, of course, will mean wealth/income ratio would have been / will be even higher! This is exactly what I said during my recent appearance on TV3 Vincent Browne's show. 


The role of banks and debt in all of this charade? To cover the widening gap in wealth/income ratio and public deficits, "So it was a relief that the Basel I agreement, which went into effect in 1990, lowered to zero banks’ capital requirement on sovereign debt – no matter how risky." In other words, European sovereigns financed their corrupt corporatist regimes via leveraging private deposits to fund government bonds purchases by the banks - privatizing public waste first. 


So two lessons or questions from above are:

1. Does transfer of private banks debts to public purses in Europe constitute the return of previously privatized public debts? And if it does, the effect is that the state has twice colluded with the banks to defraud the people of Europe - first as savers and consumers, second as taxpayers.
2. Does the ongoing process of increasing government bonds holdings in domestic banks and investment and pensions funds actively promoted by the European and national authorities (see for example ECB LTROs and Irish NTMA latest plans) not constitute exactly the replay of the road to the crisis? 

19/7/2012: Minister Noonan's 'valuations' & NTMA's latest scheme

An interesting - and potentially revealing - contribution from Minister Noonan on the prospective ESM involvement in purchasing Irish banks assets held by the Government - see full link here (H/T to Owen Callan of Danske Markets).

Here are some interesting bits (from my pov - note, emphasis in quotes is mine):

"...if Europe's new rescue fund takes over the government's stakes in its banks, it would need to do so at prices significantly above their current low valuations."

So what should be the prices benchmark to be paid by ESM for Irish banks?

We know what Minister Noonan thinks what they should not be:
"We wouldn't think we were being assisted or treated fairly if we were only offered the terms we could get from a willing hedge fund who wanted to purchase the stake the Irish government has in the banks," Noonan told a news conference"

Ok, a willing hedge fund is mentioned as a benchmark floor. What willing hedge fund? 1) Have there been approaches that set out some valuation? 2) Have these approaches involved sufficient depth of discussion to show the actual price the fund was willing to pay, other than the low-ball first bid? 3) Have these approaches been systematic or random?

Now, suppose there has been a series of approaches and the hedge funds' willing price is €X million. Suppose Minister Noonan insists on ESM paying a minimum price of €Y million that is above €X million, which means there is a positive premium to be paid by ESM.

What principle should guide this premium valuation? "The valuation will be an issue for negotiation but before we could agree, they would need to be significantly in advance of those figures," Noonan added, referring to figures showing that investments by the country's National Pension Reserve Fund (NPRF) in its top two banks were now worth 8.1 billion euros."

Is Minister Noonan seriously suggesting ESM should pay Irish Government more than €8.1 billion? Since NPRF valuations of the banks stakes are make-believe stuff with absolutely no proven testability in the actual markets, will ESM be buying into a loss then? Ex ante?!



Another interesting comment in the article cited above is the following one:

"The NTMA also confirmed plans to diversify its sources of funding later this year with its first sovereign issuance of annuity bonds to Irish-based pension funds and inflation-linked bonds also aimed at domestic investors.

Corrigan said it was not inconceivable that it could raise 3 to 5 billion euros over the next 18 months from the two new instruments.

"International investors don't owe us a living, they don't have to buy our paper, and if the local investors don't have the confidence to invest in the market and aren't seen to have that confidence, it's going to be very difficult to get international investors back," he said."

Which, of course is all reasonably fine but for two matters:

1. Domestic pension funds will be acting against normal practice and investing in low-rated (high risk) government securities within the very same economy in which they face future liabilities (reducing risk diversification). In other words, Irish insurance funds will have to be compelled to undertake such investment in violation of acceptable international standards. Have the Government now also taken over the pensions industry to add to their banking sector portfolio?
2. If foreign investors 'won't owe Irish Government a living' why should domestic investors owe Irish Government anything? By treating two investors differently rhetorically, does Mr Corrigan explicitly differentiate treatment of domestic investors from foreign investors? It appears to be exactly so because the products he references are not going to be offered to foreign investors. Which begs the third question:
3. Will NTMA create sub-category of seniority for Irish pension funds and 'domestic investors' to effectively load even more risk onto them compared to foreign investors? After all, he seems to suggest domestic investor owe him something that foreign investors don't?

3/7/2012: Curb your enthusiasms?

So, the NTMA have issued a (welcome) note that Ireland is to resume auctions of T-bills. The note states that "on Thursday 5 July 2012. The NTMA will offer €500 million of Treasury Bills with a three-month maturity in its first such auction since September 2010." 

The details of the auction on 5 July are as follows: 

• Auction size: €500 million. 

• Maturity: 15 October 2012. 

• Auction opens: 9:30 a.m. 

• Auction closes: 10:30 a.m. 

• Settlement date: 9 July 2012. 

This is potentially (pending results of sale, namely yield, volume and percentage allocation to non-captive banks and funds) a minor positive for Ireland. Minor, because:

1. Bills are NOT bonds - bills are short-term instruments, traditionally under 12 months maturity (bonds are over 1 year maturity).
2. Bills issued currently fall to mature within the period of existent EFSF funding programme, so in effect there will always be funds to cover these, short of a catastrophic collapse of the euro during the duration of the bills.
3. Issuance of bills has nothing to do in terms of signaling the state of public finances health or economic conditions health of the issuer, as both Greece (see here) and Portugal (here) have issued these during their tenure in the rescue programmes.
4. Portugal issuance (linked above) covered 18-mos bills, which would constitute a stronger positive signal than that of planned Irish sale, if there was any whatsoever informational content to these auctions.
5. Ireland has issued T-bills back in September 2010, and then it was NOT a signal of any confidence in Ireland's financial health.

The media statements that this sale shows that 'Ireland is back to bond markets' is fully incorrect. T-bills market is not the same as bond market. And T-bill instruments are distinct from the bonds. For example, T-bills were not covered by PSI default in Greece, unlike bonds.

Funding public spending via T-Bills is a (marginally?) riskier undertaking for the Exchequer because it implies transfer of any potential maturity mismatch risk onto the Exchequer. Maturity mismatch risk arises when the Government uses short-term debt to finance longer-term spending commitments.

So what is the 'positive' then in NTMA news? For now - just a hope we do not get a complete rejection (which is highly unlikely, as NTMA has primed the market already). We need to see results of the auction to tell if things are positive or not - e.g. how high is the demand from outside Ireland? how expensive is the funding obtained compared to secondary bonds markets on shorter maturity end? etc.

H/T for some of the above to: Prof Karl Whelan, Prof Brian M Lucey, Owen Callan (Danske Markets)

Update:  There is a nagging question begs asking - why does Ireland need T-bill? Portugal and Greece might have used T-Bills to manage expenditure in the interim of disbursals of EFSF funds, which, especially for Greece this year, have been uncertain. Ireland is fully compliant with Troika requirements and is getting its money on schedule, with no uncertainty. In effect, therefore, either we are facing a shortfall on funding within the programme (unlikely in my view) or we are using T-bills (more expensive money raising) to finance that which we can finance at cheaper rates via Troika funds. The latter option is double-daft as the repayment of T-bills will be done out of the same Troika money. In this latter case, of course, the motivation can be to simply 'generate feel-good news' by the Government that 'Ireland is back to the (bond) markets'...

25/1/2012: Return to the Bond Markets

According to the report in FT Alphaville (link here) Ireland has 'returned' to the bond markets by carrying out a swap of a 4% coupon 2014-maturing bond for a 4.5% coupon 2015-maturing bond. This reduces 2014 outgoings on redemption of maturing bonds and forces more maturity into 2015, which has more benign profile. But the switch comes at a price - the coupon is up 12.5% on previous.

In effect, if this is less of an Ireland's 'return to the bond markets', more of Eddie 'The Eagle' Return to the Olympics type of an event. Much pomp (official announcements and Government statements to follow), no circumstance (Ireland still cannot fund itself outside the Troika agreement), and even less real substance (avoiding a total blowout in 2014 is now clearly an objective for policy measures). But hey, let it be a much needed 'green jerseying' distraction, as FT Alphaville suggests, to the gruesome reality of Ireland torching another €1.25 billion worth of taxpayers' funds on that pyre called IBRC/Anglo.

15/09/2011: Some observations on NTMA & NAMA statements to the Oireachtas Committee

I was going over the statements issued by NTMA and NAMA to the Oireachtas Committee last week and was struck by some rather interesting bits...

Let's start with the Statement by John Corrigan, Chief Executive NTMA, to the Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform, 9 September 2011:

"The banking stress tests carried out by the Central Bank in the first quarter of 2011 quantified the additional capital support required by the banking sector at €24 billion. The NTMA Banking Unit has worked very hard to minimise the amount of this additional capital to be provided by the taxpayer. Through initiatives like burden sharing with the junior bondholders and the sourcing of private capital for Bank of Ireland, the net amount of this capital provided by the State is now expected to be around €16.5 billion. The savings generated can be redirected to funding the day-to-day operation of the country."

Can Mr Corrigan explain this: as of August 1, 2011, the State has injected (under PCAR/PLAR allocations) €17.292bn (here) according to DofF note. That €792mln difference is not exactly a pittance...

Oh, and while we are on the issue of being accurate - PCAR/PLAR capital allocations are designed to deliver capital & liquidity cushions for the period 2011-2013. Not a trivial issue, mind you, especially since Mr Corrigan repeatedly relies on PCAR/PLAR recapitalization exercise as a definitive (aka permanent) line in the sand on banking crisis.

Now, as to the "savings can be redirected to funding the day-to-day operation of the country" - that is pure rhetoric, sir, isn't it? Mr Corrigan himself shows that it is (see marked with italics next quote below).

"In order to stabilise our debt/GDP ratio Ireland needs to get back to running a primary budget surplus (the budget balance excluding interest payments) as soon as possible. Indeed in the context of debt sustainability, this metric is far more important than the absolute level of debt per se. Ireland still has the biggest primary deficit of any eurozone country, a fact not lost on investors..."

So, wait a sec, Mr Corrigan. You said "savings [from PCAR/PLAR recaps] can be redirected to funding the day-to-day operation of the country". You also said that we need to run a primary surplus. You can't have your cake, Mr Corrigan, and eat it.

"The objective of the [banks] deleveraging process is to achieve a more prudent loan to deposit ratio for the institutions concerned through a reduction of their balance sheet assets of some €70 billion while avoiding sales at prices which absorb excessive capital."

Was Mr Corrigan trying to say that we need to deleverage the banks while minimizing the calls on the banks' capital for losses incurred in the process of deleveraging? Ok, that would imply selling good - aka performing - assets first. What would that do to the banks balancesheets, Mr Corrigan? It will undermine banks balancesheets, leaving them with poorer quality average assets. Is that Mr Corrigan's idea of restoring banking system to health? And is that covered by PCAR/PLAR definitive line in the sand? You know, Mr Corrigan, that it is not.



There was also Mr McDonagh speaking on the day...

Opening Statement by Mr. Brendan McDonagh, Chief Executive of NAMA, to the Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform Friday, 9th September 2011"

"We have now recruited over 190 staff with the specialist skills and experience required to manage a portfolio of property loans with balances in excess of €72 billion."

So NAMA chief thinks it is a great achievement of NAMA that it managed to hire 190 people. Boy, Mr McDonagh would do well in public sector where the metrics of spending are more important than those of earning...

But what is this about €72 billion portflio balances? NAMA valued the portoflio it purchased at €30.5bn gross (inclusive of the LTEV uplift). Banks, who sold NAMA that portfolio wrote down the losses realized, implying that NAMA end valuation in their view was a reasonable reflection of the value of portfolio NAMA bought. So is Mr McDonagh deploying Eugene Sheehy's approach to claiming balances on loans to be assets under management and refusing to write down the actual loans values to the publicly disclosed valuations that NAMA itself prepared?

And is Mr McDonagh conveniently forgetting that the book value of these assets has fallen since that LTEV was assessed and assets were valued? May be Mr McDonagh should consult his own annual report to see his organization taking charge against that loss?

Of course, Mr McDonagh is just pumping up NAMA's (aka his own) importance. NAMA, you see, is not managing €30.5 billion-valued undertaking, or an odd €25 billion actual undertaking (once we factor in at least some of the value losses on NAMA's portfolio), but a €72 billion portfolio. In a way, Mr McDonagh is like Montgomery Burns checking his old ticker for the price of his Federated Slaves Holdings plc...

I love Mr McDonagh's next statement:
"There is a third, small group of debtors ... with whom we could work but who are not co-operating adequately with the process and who appear to believe that, after all that has happened, the taxpayer somehow still owes them a living. We have been as fair, reasonable and patient with these people as any court could possibly expect us to be but, in the circumstances, it is likely that we will be left with no option but to instigate additional enforcement actions before the year is out. Above all else, ...the self-indulgent behaviour of a few has no place in resolving the national crisis with which, collectively, we are grappling."

Now, close your eyes, imagine a summer night, chirping of birds in the distance. From an open window dark woods staring into the room. Armchair. The house owner, with mustache, in military tunic, pipe in hand, explaining in deep Georgina accent to two smaller (in evident statue) men the rationale for dealing resolutely with a small group of dissidents who refuse to cooperate, betraying self-indulgent decadent behavior amidst the national crisis... Mr McDonagh's rhetoric is permeated with Joe Stalinesque tonalities, innuendos, juxtaposing reasonable (NAMA) against the decadent and asocial (developers), the 'few' against the 'many'. Himself positioned in a high priest fashion at the head of the judgment table, burdened with the duty of carrying NAMA's burden of justice to the few unwise dissenters. Why not visit Lubyanka Museum in Moscow on your next corporate outing, my dear NAMAnoids?

There's more of the same, pardon me self-indulgent and arrogant stuff in relation to the public allegedly asking politicians uninformed questions and some people (unknown to us) making uninformed statements about NAMA. "The accusation that NAMA is bureaucratic and slow in dealing with these approvals is unfair and unwarranted but, unfortunately, in the current environment, when it comes to NAMA, many seem to feel that they have no obligation to check the facts before making the accusation."

Ok, Mr McDonagh. I would like to make an informed observation. Where do I get the facts? From you? From NAMA? Who can assure me that the facts you &/or NAMA present are full, correct and not mis-represented?

Let's try the 'trust your NAMA' thingy. Here you say: "There has been much interest from the public (over 100,000 downloads) [in relation to NAMA list of properties under receivership] and in particular from younger people who are keen to use the current correction in property prices to purchase their own homes."

How do you know these are young people? I downloaded the list without any registration. Are you tracking my IP address and accessing, unbeknown to me my details? Are you acting legally in doing this? Or are you simply making a claim that cannot be verified? So much for 'trust your NAMA' proposition then.

And now to the conclusion: "It is our intention that NAMA will be a creative and dynamic force in the property market and, more generally, that it will contribute significantly to the economic resurgence of Ireland in the years ahead." Sorry, Mr McDonagh, but you are not getting it. NAMA has a defined - according to your own chairman and legislation establishing NAMA - mandate. That mandate does not envision NAMA becoming either 'creative' or 'dynamic', nor does it envision 'NAMA contributing to the economic resurgence of Ireland'. Your mandate is to:

1. Recover taxpayers' funds, and
2. Close the shop after doing so.

In case you weren't paying attention on September 9th, Mr Frank Daly said in his statement - made alongside your own: "...the objective that has been set for us by the legislature, under Section 10 of the NAMA Act, is to recover, at a minimum, that amount plus whatever additional funds we need to advance as working or development capital for projects." Mr Daly repeats this objective (in slightly different wording) twice in his statement. Mr Daly does refer to NAMA being "creative and flexible", but unlike Mr McDonagh, he limits this to the reference to properties that NAMA is working with, not to the entire property market and not to the economic resurgence of the whole country.

“Ἀπόδοτε οὖν τὰ Καίσαρος Καίσαρι καὶ τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ τῷ Θεῷ” (Matthew 22:21), Mr McDonagh. And please, extinguish that pipe and change the tunic... Being Uncle Joe is not only uncool, it is also, fortunately, infeasible for you.

Economics 21/9/10: This Little PIIGSy Went to the Market

So here we go again: NTMA went to the market, ECB came along, the results are suspiciously identical (save for obviously increased costs of borrowing) to those achieved in August.

We sold €500 million of 4 year debt due in 2014 at an average yield of 4.767%, compared with 3.627 percent at the previous auction on August 17. Cover on 4 year paper was We also sold €1 billion wort of 8 year paper due in 2018 a yield of 6.023%, up from 5.088% in a June sale.

Short term stuff first:
Cover support is clearly running well above average/trend, indicating potential engagement by the ECB. Price spread is down, suggesting that the yields achieved are reflective in the perceptions compression on behalf of bidders, which in turn might mean that the markets are getting more comfortable with higher risk pricing of Irish bonds.

Next up: yields and prices achieved:
The dynamics are crystal clear - we are heading for a new territory in terms of elevated yields and lower prices. Actually, setting historical record in both, despite likely ECB interventions.

Weighted average accepted price:
Boom! The curve is getting curvier.

On to longer term stuff:
Yield spread down as well - same reason - higher yields are now a 'normal' for the markets as average accepted yield shot up.
Cover slightly up, perhaps being pushed by the bidders flowing from the shorter term paper - crowded out by Jean Claude Trichet's boys. Price spread is down (see yield spread discussion above).

Predictably, longer-term accepted average price is testing historical lows:
Boom, redux!

And the maturity profile of debt is getting steeper for the folks who'll take over the Government in the next round, and our teenagers (that'll teach'em a lesson, for those, of course who'll stay on these shores):

Economics 23/8/10: ECB & IRL bonds

Per report today: "FRANKFURT, Aug 23 (Reuters) - The ECB said on Monday it bought and settled €338mln worth of bonds last week, the highest amount since early July and bolstering recent market talk it had ramped up purchases of Irish bonds. The amount is well above €10mln of purchases settled the previous week... It follows recent comments by market participants that the ECB bought 60 million euros of 2012 Irish government bonds just over a week ago, after spreads over German Bunds ballooned. The ECB has not given any details of its bond buying."

I speculated after last auction results were announced by the NTMA that extraordinary level of cover (x5.4) on 4 year bonds issue looked strange and that ECB buying might be the case. To remind you - NTMA sold €500mln of 4-year bonds. It now appears that the ECB did indeed engage in potentially substantial buying of Irish bonds. If so, such buying cold have

1. pushed other purchasers out of the shorter term paper into 10 year bonds; and/or
2. pushed yields on both shorter and longer term paper down.

€338mln figure includes trades executed between August 12 and August 14 - the auction of shorter term paper that is known to have involved ECB buying.

All in, we are clearly now in the yields zone where the markets are happy to watch us lean on ECB, the ECB is happy to watch us skip one-legged across budgetary deficit that keeps opening up wider and wider. Clearly, such an equilibrium is unlikely to be stable. Expect some fireworks once markets come back to full swing a week from now.

Economics 19/8/10: Irish bonds & our fndamentals

This is an unedited version of my article in the Irish Examiner from August 18, 2010.

The latest Irish bonds auction was perhaps the most eagerly anticipated event in the NTMA’s history. Its outcome was a small victory for NTMA, but a Pyrrhic victory for Ireland.

A quick guide to the results first. Facing svere headwinds from the markets, NTMA managed to sell 4 and 10 year bonds at average yields of 3.627% and 5.386% respectively.

This means that NTMA improved on July auction of 10 year bonds, but is still locked into what amounts to the third highest cost of borrowing over the last three years. A year ago the same bonds were placed at an average yield of 4.55% - which means that borrowing €1 billion today is now €8.4 million costlier than a year ago.

However, the NTMA results are hardly a reason to cheer, from the economy wide perspective.

Three events have triggered the extraordinary global attention to Irish bonds over the last few weeks. Firstly, there was a public relations flop when the ECB had to step in provide support for Irish bonds by directly buying the surplus paper out of the market. Second by Monday this week, Irish bond spreads over the benchmark German bunds rose to a stratospheric 300 basis points. At the same time, our CDS spreads hovering above 310 basis points benchmarks, were
signaling that markets anticipated a significant probability of Irish Government default on its sovereign debt.

All of these developments, especially set against much calmer changes in yields and CDS spreads in other Eurozone economies have indicated that the markets are changing not just in terms of the overall willingness of bond investors to underwrite risk in general, but in their attitudes to Irish debt in particular.

You see, during the first quarter of this year, sovereign debt crisis has engulfed the peripheral economies of Europe, collectively know as PIIGS (Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain). The crisis, of course, was triggered by the markets belated realisation that these countries economies cannot sustain massive debt and deficit financing liabilities they have taken on before and during the current Great Recession. That was the moment when Ireland was lumped together with the rest of the Eurozone’s sickest economies.

This time around, we are on our own. Over recent months, all of the PIIGS countries have unveiled a series of aggressive deficit reduction and austerity programmes aimed at significantly reducing their future borrowing requirements. All, that is, except for Ireland. Instead, Irish Government has spent the last 9 months waiting for the Trade Unions to vote on the Croke Park deal that actually limited our future ability to address deficits. On top of that, we staunchly resisted markets, the IMF and the EU Commission repeated calls for clarity on specific budgetary measures planned for the period of 2011-2014. Currently, the IMF forecasts Irish deficit to remain at over 5% of GDP in 2015.

In May 2010, before factoring in the latest funding allocations to banks, IMF Fiscal Monitor provided an estimate for Ireland’s borrowing requirements for 2010. These figures are strikingly different from the deficit numbers presented by our official framework. IMF forecast that Ireland will need to borrow at least 19.9% of its GDP in order to finance debt roll overs from previous years maturing in 2010, plus the deficit of -12.2% of GDP. In approximate terms, Ireland’s Government borrowing this year would amount to roughly €33bn before Anglo Irish Bank and INBS latest projections for new funding.

Thus, in the last two weeks, the bond markets have finally began to re-price Irish sovereign debt as if the country is no longer the leader in the PIIGS pack in terms of expected future deficit
corrections.

In the end, the markets are right. Ireland is facing a massive debt and deficit overhang that is well in excess of any other advanced economy in the world. And contrary to official statements uttered on the matter this week, this twin problem is not a matter of one-off recapitalization of the Anglo Irish Bank. Instead, it is a long-term structural one.

Take first the banks. The recapitalization and balance sheets repair approach undertaken by the Government so far means that Nama alone can be expected to lose around €12 billion over the next 10 years. These losses will have to be underwritten by the Irish economy.

In addition, total losses by the Irish banks are likely to add up to between €49 and €53 billion over the next three-four years. These can be broken down to €33-36 billion that will be needed in the end for the zombie Anglo, €6bn for equally gravely sick INBS, at least €8 billion for AIB and up to €2 billion for the healthiest of all – Bank of Ireland.

These numbers are based on my own analysis and are confirmed by slightly more pessimistic estimates by the independent banking sector analyst Peter Mathews. Once again, Irish economy – or in other words all of us – can be expected to underwrite these. Thus, total bill for ‘repairing’ Irish banks via Government preferred approach of Nama, plus recapitalizations is likely to be €61-65 billion over the next decade.

Now, consider our current spending. Having slashed capital expenditure down to the bone, the Government has committed itself to preserving public sector pay and employment through 2014. Transfers – including welfare and subsidies – are pretty much a no-go area for serious
savings, given continued rises in unemployment, long term nature of new joblessness and political dynamics in the country. Between them, these two spending headlines account for over 1/3 of the entire deterioration in our public spending from 2008 to-date.

Budget 2010 forecasted that our debt to GDP ratio will peak at around 84% in 2012 and will slowly decline thereafter. This, of course, is clearly an underestimate, but even by that metric, we are looking at a debt mountain of over €152 billion.

All of this means that at the very least, Irish state debt will be well in excess of €210 billion by 2014-2015. Given yesterday’s auction results, the interest bill on this debt alone will total €11.3 billion annually – more than 1/3 of all tax revenue collected in 2009.

Let’s put this into more easily understood perspective. If Ireland were a household and its debt constituted its mortgage taken over 30 years, the ‘family’ will be spending more than half of its total gross income on interest and principal repayments.

Or put differently, the legacy of this crisis and systemically mistaken approach taken to repairing the banking sector will amount to over €111,000 in new debt dumped on the shoulders of every currently employed person in the country. To say, as our policymakers and official analysts do, that this figure doesn’t really matter because it is a ‘one-off measure’ is adding insult to the injury.

Economics 18/8/10: NTMA's foray into bond markets wilderness

As promised - a more in-depth analysis of today's data from NTMA auction.

"The Gruffalo said that no gruffalo should
Ever set foot
In the deep dark wood"

Clearly, bent on saving nation's face, the NTMA could not pass on going to the markets today.

First, let us take a look at the changes in averages from April 2009 first auction through today, against the same averages for the period excluding today's auction.
So today’s auctions have led to:

• a small increase in overall maturity profile of Irish debt (good news)
• a small increase in average coupon paid for all maturities (true future liabilities on debt)
• a modest rise in average cover (potentially due to massive overbidding by ECB, but this is a speculative remark at this moment in time)
• a drop in average price paid and a corresponding rise in the weighted average yield.

These effects were most discernible in the benchmark 10 year bonds issue, where:

• Average coupon rose by ca ½ basis point;
• Average cover dropped
• Weighted average price declined and weighted average yield rose (the latter by almost 0.7%)
• Average allocation amount rose.
  

Even more interesting stats are in the price and yield spreads:
Again, for across all issues averages spreads in prices rose significantly – by 8.3% and spreads in yields rose 7.85%. This is on the back of 10 year paper alone, suggesting the following two things:

1. Whatever was happening in the shorter term paper market (cover and lower yields) appears to be disconnected from what was going on in longer term paper markets (perhaps the rumoured ECB intervention on the shorter side was after all true?);
2. Since the prices and yields reflect bids by market makers – the widening of the spreads between max and min bids might be indicative of the markets inability to tightly price Irish sovereign risk. In other words, this might signal general markets uneasiness about the bonds.
   

Some charts illustrate more general trends.

Short term paper auctions first (5 years and less):
Average yield is still on the rising trend despite a clearly 'extraordinary' move down in today's auction. Even steeper upward trend for November 2009-present is still present. Yield spreads are on the upward move again once more signaling potential rise in overall market skepticism.
Price spread trends up predictably in line with yield spread trend. To see it in absolute terms:
Weighted average price achieved in the auctions:
Again, if ECB speculations play out to be true, the small uptick in price in last auction can be written off completely.

Now to longer maturity (10 years and above).
Average yield down, but still above long term trend. Yield spreads up, quite significantly. As I mentioned in the earlier post, latest auction produced yield spreads of 9.9bps - third highest spread since April 2009.
Price spreads are 75bps - second highest spread since April 2009. Cover down - lowest since February 2009 and is down year on year. Again, to highlight spreads in real terms:
Next, look at the price achieved:
This hardly constitutes any sort of 'success'. May be, just may be - some sort of a stabilization, with mean reversion still incomplete.

Now to the maturity profile of our debt:
We keep on loading the 2014 end of the spectrum - bang on for the year when we are supposed to reach 3% deficit. Of course, with already close to €5 billion in rollovers due in 2014, it's hard to imagine how this is going to help our fiscal position.

Economics 17/8/10: Another 'success' marks NTMA's foray into bond markets wilderness

Wall Street Journal blogs have beat me to the analysis of our NTMA results. Four reasons can explain this blogs tardiness:

1. I was doing Drivetime commentary on the results at 5:15pm today;
2. I was finishing my article on the topic for the Irish Examiner tomorrow;
3. Call of work duty had shifted me firmly for a few hours into a beautiful world of international macro data (oh, the place where there are no Anglos and INBSs... at least not after FDIC gone through their equivalents with a sledge hammer);
4. Last, but not least, my son gave me an even more important task of playing with him Garda and Helicopter rescue of a Big Black Spider.

To atone for this, this post precludes my deeper analysis of today' NTMA results. This post is a verbatim reply to Wall Street Journal blog post (linked here).

"Dear Richard,

I appreciate the short-term analysis span you deployed in your article on the latest Irish bonds auction.

However, several points worth raising in relation to the claimed 'success' of today's
NTMA placement.

1. the auction achieved price bid spreads of 75bps - 2nd highest in the last 2 years, suggesting that 'success' was based on a rather less consensus-driven pricing with market makers (traditionally most stable pricing players in the market) having shown significant differences in their ability to price Irish sovereign risk;
2. the weighted average yield achieved was the 3rd highest over the entire 2009-2010 period of issuance of 10 year bonds; and
3. cover achieved in 10 year paper auction was lower than a year ago (down to 2.4 from 2.7)
   

However, it is the longer term issues, that are certainly worth highlighting.

These involve the fact that even under Government own projections, factoring in expected Nama losses forecast by independent analysts, such as myself, Peter Mathews, Prof Brian Lucey and Prof Karl Whelan, by 2012 Ireland will be carrying over 210 billion worth of state (sovereign and quasi-sovereign) debt on its books. At 5.386% yield, this translates into ca €11.31 billion in interest payments alone or more than 1/3 of the entire tax revenue collected by the Irish Government in 2009.

It is naive to believe that 2010 gargantuan deficit in excess of 20% of GDP is a 'one-off' reflection of banks recapitalizations demand.

Again, based on balance sheet analysis, I expect 6 banks covered by the State Guarantee to incur loans losses of ca €50 billion between 2008 and 2012. Current provisions announced by the Irish Government and the banks cover roughly a half of these. The rest will have to be financed out of taxpayers funds in years to come.

In a taste of things ahead, earlier today Governor of the Central Bank has stated that next stage
recapitalization of Irish Nationwide and EBS building societies will cost taxpayers not €3.5 billion earlier factored in by the Minister for Finance, but €4 billion. €500 mln discrepancy within 5 months is a pittance for the Exchequer burning deficits at 20% of GDP (or roughly a quarter of the real domestic economy), but... Independent estimates put the final figure at €7 billion.

So much for the 'one-off measures'.

Perhaps the most telling sign of what is really happening in the markets NTMA tapped today is the fact that having dropped 20bps, Irish bonds spreads over German 10-year bund have risen once again to within a hair of 300bps.

Some success, then..."

In addition, one can only speculate whether the 'spectacularly' large cover of 5.4 for shorter term 4 year paper is due to the much speculated about, but yet to be confirmed or denied, direct buying by the ECB. If so, then we might have a situation where ECB gross over-bidding in the shorter maturity paper placement drove buyers into longer term paper. this, in turn would imply that neither the 3.627% weighted average yield achieved in 4 year bonds nor the 5.386% average yield priced in 10 year bonds are to be trusted as market benchmarks.


A more detailed analysis of the bonds issuance follows in the next post, so stay tuned.

Economics 22/7/10: Irish bonds auctions - a Pyrrhic victory?

“Despite Moody’s downgrade on Ireland’s credit rating on Monday, the NTMA successfully borrowed €1.5bn yesterday. Yesterday’s auction showed increased demand from investors for Irish debt and now means that the NTMA has completed 90% of its 2010 long-term borrowing programme.”

That was the swan song from one of Irish stock brokerages.

Lex column in the FT was far less upbeat, saying Ireland “offers a not terribly encouraging example of how difficult it is to overcome a massive debt binge.”

NTMA might have pre-borrowed 90% of this year’s €20bn borrowing target . But two things are coming to mind when one hears this ‘bullish’ statement.

Firstly, the €20bn is a target, not the hard requirement. If banks come for more cash, Brian Lenihan will have to get more bonds printed.

Secondly, Irish spread over German bunds is now higher than it was at the peak of the crisis in early 2009.

Want see some pictures illustrating Irish borrowing ‘success story’?

Let us start on the shorter end of maturity spectrum – 5 years and under:

Chart 1Average yields are trending up over the entire crisis term and are soudly above their entire crisis trend line since June. More significantly, the trend is now broken. As yields declined in 2009, hitting bottom in October, since then, they have posted a firm reversion up and once again, June and July auctions came at yields above those for this dramatic sub-trend.

Worse than that – in complete refutation of ‘improved demand’ claim by the brokers – yield spreads are now elevated. This spread – the difference between highest yield allocated and lowest yield allocated – suggests that markets are having trouble calmly pricing Irish bonds issues. Success or psychosis?

Chart 2 below illustrates the same happening in terms of price spreads.

Chart 2Auctions cover for shorter term paper is still below the long term trend line, although the line is positively sloped.

Chart 3Chart 3 above shows just how dramatic was the price decline and yields rise in Q2 2010 and how this is continued to be the case in July.

Chart 4Chart 4 gives a snapshot on pricing.

Next, move on to longer term bonds (10 years and over). There has been only one issue of 15 year bonds, so it is clear that the NTMA is simply unwilling to currently issue anything above 10 year horizon because of prohibitive yields.

Chart 5Chart 5 above shows upward trend in yields and July relative underperformance compared to longer term trends. It also shows yield spreads – again posting some pretty impressive volatility in June and bang-on long-term average (or crisis-average) performance in July. If that’s the ‘good news’ I should join a circus.

Chart 6Weighted average price is not changing much over the crisis period, so no improvement is happening here. In fact, since May it is trending down below the long term trend line, suggesting significant and persistent deterioration. Cover is on the up-trending line, but came in below the trend in June and July.

Chart 7 below shows more details on max and min prices and yields.

Chart 7Chart 8Chart 8 above clearly shows how average price is now in the new sub0trend pattern since November 09 price peak. May-July prices achieved are clearly below long term trend line and even more importantly – below the sub-trend line.

Finally, chart 9 shows the maturity profile of auctioned bonds:

Chart 9Notice how before the 2014 deadline, the Exchequer is facing the need to roll over €6,381 million in bonds issued during the 2009-present auctions. If Ireland Inc were to issue more 3-year bonds, that number will rise. That should put some nasty spanners into Irish deficits-reduction machine. But hey, what’s to worry about – our kids will have to roll over some €21,264 million worth of our debts (and rising), assuming the Bearded Ones of Siptu/Ictu & Co don’t get their way into borrowing even more.

Let us summarize the ‘success story’ that our brokerage houses are keen on repeating:

Table 1In other words, we are now worse off in terms of the cost of borrowing than in January 2010 – despite the ‘target’ for new issuance remaining the same throughout the period. We are even worse off now than at the peak of the crisis in March-April 2009 in short-term borrowing costs, although, courtesy of the German bund performance since then, we are only slightly better off in terms of longer maturity borrowings.

The compression in yield term structure delivered in June-July this year is worrisome as well. It suggests that the markets are not willing to assume that Irish Government longer term position is that much different from its shorter term prospects.

So on the net, then, what 'success' are our stock brokers talking about then? The success, of course is that NTMA was able to get someone pick up the phone and place an order, at pretty much any price? Next time, they should try selling pizzas alongside the bonds - the cover might rise again and they might convince the Eurostat that pizza delivery services are not part of the public deficit...

Economics 02/02/2010: NTMA and the banks

Per RTE Business (here which so far cannot be confirmed by any official material published on the NTMA website):

The NTMA "will now hold talks on capital needs with the institutions covered by the NAMA legislation. Among the other responsibilities it is assuming, the NTMA will also hold discussions with financial institutions on their realignment or restructuring within the banking sector. It will manage the Minister for Finance's shareholding in the banks, advise on banking matters, and crisis prevention, management and resolution."

Here are the interesting aspects of this change that raise a multitude of questions:

1. How will NTMA manage the conflict of interest between its own objectives per above and Nama objectives?
2. How will the potential conflicts of interest be disclosed to the markets?
3. What does it mean that NTMA will hold discussions with financial institutions? Will these discussions be subject to usual market disclosure rules or will they risk constituting a price fixing behavior?
   
4. How can NTMA's direct interference with the banks be compatible with the rights of other shareholders?
5. How will NTMA advising on banking matters etc play out vis-a-vis the roles of the Financial Regulator and the Central Bank?
6. What does 'crisis prevention, management and resolution' refer to? Systemic banking crises? Specific institutions crisis? Will it also include industrial relations crises? How will this process be carried out while respecting the general rules of disclosure and non-collusion with the market?
7. With massive firepower and own objectives, how NTMA will assure that the rights and interests of minority shareholders in the banks are protected?

In effect - even the mere raising of these questions implies that there is a risk that NTMA will be engaged in interfering with the markets for shares and debt in Irish banks in markets-distorting fashion. Amazingly we have no details as to how the Government and NTMA/Nama plan to avoid these problems.


There is another issue at hand here. If, at least in theory, DofF is a publicly accountable institution, NTMA by its statues is a secret entity (with extremely secretive culture to boot). What transparency can we, banks customers, have and what assurance can we hold that NTMA will not act to undermine or violate our rights, the safety of our deposits or our ability to access these?


Lastly, I am rather surprised at the timing of this change. In my view, this statement coming before Nama begins transfers of loans suggests that the Government is preparing for taking up a majority stake in the banks - a majority stake that will require full state control of these institutions management and activities.

So is this statement a precursor to full nationalization of the banks?

Economics 07/01/2010: NTMA's end of year results

Here is an interesting one: NTMA published their End Year review. Per statement (page 3 top): “The National Pensions Reserve Fund Discretionary Investment Portfolio (the Fund excluding the preference shares in Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks held on the direction of the Minister for Finance) earned a return of 20.9 per cent in 2009. Since the Fund’s inception in 2001, the Investment Portfolio has delivered an annualised return of 2.6 per cent per annum. Including the bank preference shares and related warrants, which are held at cost and zero respectively, the Fund recorded a return of 11.6 per cent in 2009. At 31 December 2009 the total Fund’s value stood at €22.3 billion.”

If the state were to invest €7 billion it gave AIB and BofI for their preference shares in the Discretionary Fund, the returns on these investments would have been roughly €1.463 billion in 2009. Instead, we got zilch in risk-adjusted returns.


Ok, one would say that ‘investing’ in AIB and BofI is a sensible undertaking as the banks are market-determining entities for ISE. Nope, wrong. Page 4 of release states: “As a result, the Investment Portfolio had an elevated level of quoted equity investment of 80 per cent following completion of the recapitalisation in May compared with 57 per cent before the preference share investments were made. The Fund took advantage of the strong equity market rally to reduce its absolute risk and exposure to the equity markets through phased equity sales of €2.7 billion through the remainder of the year. The Investment Portfolio’s exposure to the quoted equity markets had been reduced to 63 per cent by year end.”

So as the result of AIB & BofI ‘investments’, NPRF is now more heavily geared toward equities as a class. Full stop. Now, give this a thought. We have a Pension fund with 63% exposure to equities that has been forced to sell equity on the basis of the need to re-gear toward banks shares in the economy where banks are the weakest point… Aggressive high risk investment strategy. What’s next? A highly geared derivative undertaking with taxpayers money? Ooops – we already got one, called NAMA SPV.

Back to page 3 stuff: “During 2009 the Minister for Finance directed the Fund to invest €7 billion in preference shares issued by Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks for the purposes of recapitalising these institutions. The terms of the deal, which was negotiated by the NTMA, include a non-cumulative fixed dividend of 8 per cent on the preference shares and warrants which give an option to purchase up to 25 per cent of the enlarged ordinary share capital of each bank following exercise of the warrants. The dividends payable on the preference shares are not recognised or accrued by the Fund until declaration by the bank concerned. These investments were funded by €4 billion from the Fund’s own resources and by €3 billion from a frontloading of the Exchequer contributions to the Fund for 2009 and 2010.”

Two points here:

1. 2009 thus saw a direct transfer of €3 billion to NPRF from the economy that has contracted by 10.5% (GNP). Since NPRF is a de facto piggy bank for public sector pensions only, this type of fiscal management, of course, has no precedent. It is equivalent to taking from the strained middle classes (taxpayers) to award future pay for public employees.
2. This reminds us as to just how outrageously overpriced the preference shares we bought were. AIB and BofI preference shares yielding 8%? Remember – these two banks have balancesheets weaker than those of the main UK banks. Yet, at the same time we were signing off on 8% return, the UK banks bonds were yielding 12-15%. What’s the opportunity cost of such a sweetheart deal for the banks from taxpayers’ perspective? 7% yield foregone, or in 2009 terms - €490 million.
   

Add the two bolded numbers: €1.953 billion is the opportunity cost to the taxpayers of the AIB and BofI capital injection in foregone earnings. This is more than double the amount of savings generated by the Exchequer through public sector wage ‘cuts’ in 2010 Budget.


Another interesting thingy – page 4: “NAMA will acquire loans with a nominal value of approximately €80 billion”. Hold on, folks – was it €77 billion or €80 billion? Or should we take it from the NTMA that +/-€3 billion in taxpayers funds exposure is simply pittance that can be rounded off? What’s next? February 2010 numbers rising to €85 billion, then to €90 billion by March? Why not just state ‘we’ll buy anything they throw at us’ and close off this Cossack Dance with the numbers?


Pages 5 (end) and 6 provide a small, but interesting insight into operational efficiencies of the State Claims Agency: “There has been a substantial decline in employer and public liability claim volumes associated with incidents that have occurred since the SCA was established. Since 2002 the number of employer liability claims has fallen by 71 per cent and the number of public liability claims has fallen by 19 per cent. The total number of active employer and public liability claims has fallen by 35 per cent in 2009 compared with 2008.”

Sounds like good news? All claims are down since 2002 and in particular between 2008 and 2009. Happy times? Not really: “During 2009 the SCA paid out a total of €64 million against all classes of claims. This compares with a total of €53 million in 2008.” So let me run this by you – cases numbers are down 35%, but payouts are up 20.8%! I guess the gravity of injuries in the public sector rose dramatically during the year.


Lastly, Appendix 1 lists bond issues for 2009. This is a nice summary of the fine work being done by the NTMA in placing our debt (although most of it has gone to the banks to be rolled into ECB). But the worrying thing is the time profile of these bonds. €14.53 billion of the bonds issued this year will mature (and will be rolled over) during or before 2014 - the deadline for our compliance with the Stability & Growth Pact ceilings on deficit and debt. Such a large amount, coming already on top of the billions in short/medium-term debt issued in 2008 doesn't do much to support markets confidence in Ireland actually delivering on 2014 commitment...

Economics 16/05/2009: NAMA Week & Irish Banks

Having been up to my ears in planning for next week’s trip to Moscow, I missed the excitement of the NAMA finally imploding on Thursday and Friday. So here is a recap (for those of you who are in the know already – my analysis is below).

This note is structured as follows: first, I cover Michael Somers' very revealing and honest testimony to the PAC, then I review Friday Davy note on NAMA, lastly, I provide complete estimates of expected losses for NAMA.

Michael Somers - some fresh air on NAMA
On Thursday NTMA ceo Michael Somers told the Public Accounts Committee that putting valuations of the bad loans will present “an enormous dilemma”. Of course in logic, ‘dilemma’ always leads to two undesirable alternatives – in other words, it cannot be resolved within the same logical reasoning chain that leads to it. In layman’s terms, this means that the only way to resolve NAMA problems is to dump the idea alltogether.

So what is this ‘dilemma’ that the country has learned about only this week?

It turns out to that "there will be arguments down the courts if we don’t get it right. The implications of this thing are enormous and the legislation will be very complex,” Mr Somers said. Hmmm… this is hardly new. This blog and many well publicised articles, some written or co-written by me plus a massive wave of media reports that certain big developers are preparing to challenge NAMA - all were well ahead of Mr Somers. But Mr Somers’ testimony is so news worthy now because it is no longer the dirty scoundrels in media and academia who are beating up Lenihan’s dream baby, but one of the Golden Public Circle’s own.

Mr Somers also said that he believed up to 5,000 officials in the main banks “were currently examining bad loans. …At the moment, we really have no feel for how Nama will operate. But my preference would be a core group of between 30-40 people.” Now, wait a second. 5,000 banks officials cannot get the loans right, but 30-40 NTMA/NAMA folks will? This is after Mr Somers admitted that NTMA has not experience in managing distressed assets whatsoever. Of course, Mr Somers was saying 30-40 NAMA officials on top of 5,000 banks officers already in place will manage NAMA, but in such a scecnario, any final cost of NAMA will have to include the cost of those 5,000 bankers as well...

Mr Somers said the NTMA paid its 170 staff a total of €19.4 million in 2008 – “an average of almost €90,000 per person” as Irish Times puts it. Well: 170 staff at €19.4mln is €114,118 per person in pay. Including secretaries and other auxiliary staff, NTMA is now the best paid state entity on the record – ahead of ESB. But hold on, further €8.9 million was paid out in expenses. So total compensation (inclusive of expenses) came to €166,471 per head.

The 30-40 people that Mr Somers would like to have for NAMA is about 20-times smaller than normally is required to run a €90bn fund. Now, given that NAMA will be a distressed assets fund with less active management, say 600-700 people specialising in asset management, portfolio structuring, risk pricing etc would suffice. If the NTMA wage bill were to apply (and there is absolutely no reason as to why it won’t) – we, the taxpayers, are looking at paying something to the tune of €100mln in wages and expenses for these ‘servants’ of the state annually.

Another dilemma, clearly of unresolvable variety, is that NAMA “is expected to pay for the bad loans through the issue of Government bonds to the lenders.” (Quote per Irish Times). Apart from not being new (first disclosed back in April) and being banal (the state has to borrow cash and issue bonds to pay for its day-to-day spending, let alone NAMA), this claim is rather sterile.

In reality, the Government hopes that it will be able to borrow directly and at reasonable terms, but of course, it might run into some tight spots asking the markets to lend money

• to a half-backed bad bank to be run by 30-40 inexperienced staff;
• mired up to its chin in the mud of court challenges in our notoriously costly and slow legal system;
  
• operating under the umbrella of our Guinness-serving bond issuing authority;
  
• in a country whose Government cannot balance its own books;
  
• with economy managed so poorly, that we are now presented internationally as the worst case scenario possible; and
• the Government so grossly clientelist that it can't even manage its own employees without having to run crying to the 'mommy' of the Social Partnership;
  
• add to it that NAMA has no popular or political support; and
  
• that the same Government is doing everything possible to make certain Irish private economy will not come out of this recession with any strength left
  

and you really have to ask a question: Are they eating some magic Amsterdam brownies in the land of NTMA/Irish Times/DofF and the rest of the ‘policy’ circle when they claim that this Government/NTMA will be able to borrow cheaply to finance NAMA? (see more on this below).

Irish Times also told us that “Profits from the eventual sale of the loans will be given to the state which may be used to service the €54.2 billion national debt.” Ok, what national debt do they have in mind? €90-110bn or more debt we will have once Mr Lenihan ends his current deficit financing of the public sector employees lifestyles? In fact, the same Irish Times reported as a comment from NTMA chief that he expects Irish debt to top 100% of our GDP in 2010 (see below). So, does anyone in the Times editorial have a calculator at hand?

It's all down to the cost of NAMA
“However if Nama makes a loss, the Government said it will apply a levy on banks to recoup the shortfall.” Ireland’s stockbrokers decidedly focused on this statement much more than on anything else that Mr Somers said. Why? Because this is the real unknown unknown for banks shareholders. This is, of course, ultimately the question of how big the loss will be.

So let’s do some counting of the beans… shall we?

First what the financial markets analysts say: per Davy note assumption, “costs for NAMA will be covered by interest income from the performing loans. Taking a conservative view that only 50% of the €30bn investment loans to be transferred are performing, this could generate initial income of c.€1.2bn as yields are currently at 8%. This would cover the coupon (assumed to be in line with the borrowing rate on ECB liquidity facility) of the bonds issued to the banks in return for their €80-90bn of loans transferred to NAMA. Income will likely be higher because the investment loans to be transferred to NAMA are not bad loans in themselves but are selected due to cross-collateralisation with development loans. An investigation of staff costs as a percentage of properties under management for large real estate trusts suggests that staff costs will be covered, especially given the greater operational leverage due to NAMA's size. Legal costs are less certain as the legality of the agency is one of the greatest obstacles to its performance.”

... And then, the pigs are soaring high in the sky…

Suppose that NTMA goes out to the markets with two suitcases worth of bonds – government bonds and NAMA bonds. Do you think they can price NAMA debt:

1. at a discount to current public debt issues (a scenario that Davy suggests); or
2. at a rate that is equivalent to Government bonds, say ca 4.5%; or
3. at a rate that is higher than Government bonds, say a premium of 20% to Government debt – for 5.4%, while the Government debt remains priced at 4.5%; or
4. as the markets look at two piles of paper, they tell NTMA: “Ok, we’ll take Government bonds at a premium to previous issues to account for vast number of these things being floated in the market – say 5%, and NAMA bonds at a 20% premium on that – at 6%”?
   

Reality check – NAMA will not borrow at ECB liquidity facility rates, so (1) is out of the window.
For (2): at 4.5% pa (a very optimistic scenario), buying €90bn worth of loans at 15% discount (as Davy suggest) on their face value will cost us €3.44bn annually in coupon payments. But wait, let’s also look at the downside scenarios: (3) implies €4.13bn price tag, and under scenario (4) the cost of annual NAMA financing alone rises to €4.59bn, or ca 15.3% of the entire Exchequer tax revenue in 2009...

Hmmm... back to that 'country whose Government cannot balance its own books' bullet point above, anyone?

Per debt financing assumptions, Somers said Ireland would be “lucky” to hold on to its sole remaining top AAA credit rating, as its low debt levels could surge to more than 100 per cent of GDP next year, from about 41 per cent in 2008, after the State completed the transfer of the banks’ bad loans. Hmmmm… remember that Irish Times statement that NAMA can be used to pay down €54.2bn debt quoted above? Apparently, NTMA chief expects the debt in excess of €170bn by the end of 2010 - somewhat higher than Irish Times journos do. And, apparently, he does not expect to price any debt (Government or NAMA-issued) at ECB discount facility rates (as Davy assume).

Of course, it is a trite statement to say that NAMA will be able to cover its staff costs, so no dwelling on this, but as far as legal costs uncertainty goes, despite Davy's rather neutered murmurs on this, there is no downside protection for the taxpayers. In other words, once committed to the transfer of a loan, NAMA implicitly assumes that no matter what the legal costs might be, the loan will be moved.

Somers was lethal on this last week: “I see great potential for arguments down in the courts if we don’t get this right,” saying further that he heard “people down in the courts were delighted” about the setting up of NAMA as they were in line for “a bonanza”. He said there would be “eating and drinking” at the committee for decades over the set-up of NAMA. But Davy folks didn't listen, apparently.

Davy goes on to pour more fuel on the NAMA pyre: “…the fear of the unknown has also led developers to call for consultation with the government over NAMA, with many saying that they can be part of the solution. Engagement with developers would arguably help reduce legal challenges and secure buy-in. The NTMA itself has stated that it lacks sufficient skills for setting up NAMA, but many developers will be both skilled and, more importantly, incentivised to work out their projects/loans under NAMA.”

Indeed, NAMA is at a severe risk of getting into bed with developers. Not because developers are ‘evil’ (I certainly do not believe this), but because NAMA should be independent from developers interests and free from their influences. And yet, Davy does not even see the lunacy of its own suggestion that NAMA should engage developers in the management process. This is really worrisome.

Doing the final sums on NAMA cost
Davy’s “simple NAMA model shows that taking our 15% haircut assumption for the sector and assuming no profits on disposal of NAMA assets across a 15-year work-out period implies a present value loss of €4bn. Apportioning this fee on an annual basis over 20 years (similar to Insurance Corporation of Ireland) implies that this fee would be only c.3-4% of normalised profits. However, given the long-term nature of the agency, there is every chance that it can turn a profit similar to that which we have seen in past banking crises such as in Sweden. A more positive outlook, with greater performance from investment assets under NAMA and a 5% profit in aggregate across asset disposals, would result in a present value profit on wind-up of €3bn to the taxpayer from NAMA.”

I do not have Davy’s model at hand to see what assumptions they force into it to get these numbers. Judging by their assumptions on pricing NAMA bonds (above), I have no confidence in any of their numbers. Their concluding scenario in the quote above is so far out there, that the aforementioned Amsterdam brownies come to mind again.

But my own simple model goes as follows (with my assumptions listed transparently for all of you to see and to challenge, unlike Davy):

So, net impact is a loss of €33-68bn.

Remember, Mr Somers said he was “aghast” at the scale of development loans advanced to a small number of borrowers which emerged after the NTMA reviewed the banks’ books. He called the review “a huge eye opener for us”. This is not a statement from a man who expect loans losses to be in 5% category (as my ‘Near Davy’ scenario above assumes).

So turning back to that original concern that investors should have about NAMA - what share of these losses can be recovered through a 3-4% shave on future profits of the banks?