Economics 27/8/10: The path & cost of banks bailouts

On the foot of today's comment in the Financial Times, here are few quick estimates as to the extent to which current policy on banks recapitalization is bleeding the economy dry.

As estimated by myself (comfortably within the S&P projections), Ireland will stand to lose net:

• Nama - net loss of (mid-range) €12-19bn;
• Banks - net losses are €50-55.6bn.

These are mid-range estimates.

My estimates translate into:

• Anglo Irish Bank expected supports are likely to exceed the overall decline in our GDP by a factor of more than 1.5 times (constant prices GDP fell €20.26bn between 2007-2009). Thus Anglo alone will cost Irish economy more than the entire Great Recession;
  
• The bailout will cost us €23,422-34,880 per each person in our labour force as of Q1 2010. Mid range estimate loss is €27,121. Note, labour force includes both employed and unemployed.
• The entire bailout of the banking system can end up costing Ireland in excess of x3 times the total economic loss incurred during this Great Recession.
• Anglo alone will cost us the equivalent of providing unemployment benefits for 2 years to over 1.25 million Irish workers.
• Anglo bailout would cover current Live Register costs for more than 6 years
• The banking bailout would have covered over one half of all outstanding mortgages in the nation once we adjust for interest accruals (a note to our FR: that's one hell of a real moral hazard, Mr Elderfield, much more real than any aid to mortgage holders you can ever fathom)
• The cost of bailout risks running at over €69,000 per family of 2 able-bodied adults either employed or unemployed
• 'Repairing' the banks Government-way can cost 35% of constant prices 2010 GDP or 43.2% of 2010 Gross Disposable National Income, using mid-range estimates for the expected bailout
  

Lastly, let me note that the alternatives to this 'blank cheque' recapitalization approach always existed and were known to the Government: see links here & here. Members of the cabinet were briefed as to the above-linked proposal and were provided with full cost estimates of these proposal. In at least one case, one cabinet member sought analysis/appraisal of the above proposal from official advisers, with evaluation returning 'no objections to the numbers cited' according to my source. In other words - they couldn't find anything wrong with it at least on the basis of quick evaluation.

Economics 20/7/10: Is Zombie Nama propping up Mummified Irish Banks?

As the independents – Brian Lucey, Karl Whelan, Peter Mathews and myself – have warned (actively denied by the Government and its backyard ‘experts’), Nama Tranche II turned out to be yet another unmitigated disaster.

Nama paid €2.7bn for loans that its experts valued at €5.2bn. Of course, these ‘experts’ include many who were responsible for some of the most disastrous valuations of the Celtic Tiger era and are now ‘entrusted’ as being ‘experienced’ with re-valuing their own errors, while collecting a handsome pay packet courtesy of the Irish taxpayers. The implied average discount these folks put on the loans this time around is 48%. Anglo failed to transfer its loans – some €7-8bn worth – due to delays caused, per what I am hearing, by a rather shoddy documentation quality.

Per RTE: “The biggest discount on the second batch of loans was for those from Irish Nationwide. NAMA paid the society just €163m for loans of €591m, a discount of 72% [an increase of 14% on Tranche 1]. The figures for AIB and EBS were 48.5% [on €2.73bn marking a 6.5% increase on Tranche 1], and 46.5% [on €35.9mln and an increase of 9% on Tranche 1] respectively, while the Bank of Ireland discount was 37.8% [on €1.82bn - an increase of 2.8% on T1].” Overall, Nama now has in its vaults €20.5bn worth of loans (or rather largely worthless paper few years ago labeled as loans) for which it paid at a discount of 50.7%.

The loans are concentrated - related to just 23 property developers who are deemed to be 'second tier' aka less flamboyant than those in Tranche 1 and most likely, less experienced too.

It makes me laugh when I recall how our stock brokerage 'analysts' were chirping a year ago that a 20-25% haircut would be warranted by market valuations of these loans.

However, the real problem with all of these numbers is that while the discounts might sound impressive, they are not reflective of any reality. Instead, they are now fully bootstrapped to the capital commitments issued to the banks by Brian Lenihan. You see, as we warned from the start – and this too was vigorously denied by the Government – the heavier the haircut, the greater will be banks’ demand for capital, the greater will be the share of bank equity owned by the taxpayers. Mindful not to take too much stake in BofI – for that would produce poor optics internationally – Brian Lenihan is content to oversee a 38% discount on its loans. Having pumped capital up to 50% of risk-weighted assets transfers to Nama for AIB, the Minister is equally happy not to impose heavier haircuts on AIB Tranche 2 transfers than 50%. Hence the ‘magic’ 48.5% figure. Ditto for EBS. Sounds precise – not 49%, nor 48%. But in the end – the number is most likely utterly bogus.

To put some fluff in the air about ‘Nama is a tough player with the banks’, Tranche 2 hammered INBS and most likely will hammer Anglo. Unless, that is, Anglo fatigue has finally reached Upper Merrion Street buildings. In this case, a discount can be less than that for INBS. Not because Anglo loans have miraculously become sterling in quality, but because the DofF might be just slightly concerned that the bank will come with a fresh capital demand.

So instead of pricing the loans to market, Nama now appears to be pricing them to keep required post-Nama recapitalizations at the levels consistent with earlier Government capital commitments.

In the end, however, a 48% average discount is still a gross overpayment on these loans. Let’s do a back of the envelope calculation here.

25% of Nama loans are ‘cash generative’ – i.e. paying some sort of an interest repayment on interest due. Suppose – just for the sake of making an assumption – that 50% of those cash generative loans are paying full interest due and 50% are paying ½ interest due. Assuming average interest rate on the loan of 8% (a generous assumption, given that banks were lending at lower rates than that) and cost of refinancing banks funds at 3% (well below current yields on banks bonds, even way lower than the latest Exchequer yields of 5.25%, but let’s be generous), if the cost of managing loans at 1% (consistent with Irish banks’ margins), then:

• 75% of Nama loans are losing have a negative yield of 12% (annual loss on interest alone);
• 12.5% of Nama loans are losing 2% pa in net costs, plus 8% rolled up interest, implying their negative yield of 10% pa;
• 12.5% of Nama loans are losing net 8% pa.
  

Expected average annual loss on Nama overall portfolio is therefore 11.25% pa. Value this at x3 revenue flow. Nama portoflia of loans would have a negative, yes, negative, - 34% break-even valuation in the market. Just on the back of interest and costs alone, the value of Nama purchased portfolio of loans should be no more than 66 cents on the euro of face value.

Next, subtract the percentage of loans that are unsecured – while allowing for the expected recovery, subject to the risk. Suppose that 20% of loans taken on by Nama are unsecured (again, likely to be conservative assumption). Suppose these are distributed across the same 12.5%, 12.5% and 75% sub-portoflia following a uniform distribution (again, this is a generous assumption as lower quality loans are more likely to be less secured in the real world). The value of the entire package of loans is now worth only 59 cents on the euro.

Secured loans are also subject to a recovery risk. In general, risk of recovery implies that over 70% for loans in arrears will be non-recoverable, ca 50% for loans under stress (e.g. failing to pay principal when it is due) and 20-25% for loans that are fully performing (e.g. those that are repaying principal and interest to the full amount). These are numbers consistent with the 1990s experiences in Sweden and UK. Translating these into our valuation, adjusted for risk of recovery implies the value of Nama-bound loans around 30-32 cents on the euro.

Other risks can be priced as well, but let us stop here.

Even with relatively rosy assumptions, the value of the loans being purchased by Nama should be at maximum 32 cents on the euro.

Allowing for assets appreciation of 10% over 3 years would imply a valuation of no more than 37 cents on the euro without applying a PDV adjustment.

We are told that Nama is being a tough buyer, paying 52 cents on the euro. Who’s fooling who here?

Incidentally, 30 cents on the euro is what independent banking expert Peter Mathews has estimated as recoverable for all development and property loans held by the banks. It is also the number that myself and Brian Lucey have arrived at in our previous estimates of required haircuts, which were based on analysis of underlying property markets.

What is now clear is that 24 months since the crisis fully exploded in our faces and 15 months after the independent analysts started telling the Government that it is committing a grave error in pushing forward the solution that, under the original name TARP was rejected in the US two weeks after it was put in place, the Irish Government remains hell-bent on pursuing this wrong approach to banks recovery. More egregiously, with Tranche II loans in, there is a strong enough reason to suspect that Nama has turned into nothing more than a façade for delaying even more capital demands from the banks until the end of 2010. The reason for this, one might speculate, is to keep our 2010 public deficit from exploding to beyond 20% of GDP.

A zombie institution (Nama) now is fully in charge of our mummified banking system. What can they do next to make things even more dynamic than that?

Economics 7/7/10: Nama New Business Plan

Nama New Business Plan (NBP) was published and it took me some time to dust out my old models and run through the numbers.

Let’s put it in simple terms – Nama’s latest installment in its own version of the hall of mirrors is so distorting, when it comes to representing the reality, that even a person with no education in finance would see that it simply a cover up for a scam.

Here are some points worth mentioning before we depart on the journey through numbers

1. NBP contains no Profit & Loss or cash flow projections. For an undertaking committing between €38.5-40.5 billion of taxpayers cash, this is simply remarkable (arrogance? Or negligence? You decide
2. NBP contains even fewer financial details than its old plan. The only relevant piece of new information it contains that has not been disclosed before is in the table 4 on page 25, which, given that no specific cash flow estimates linked to annual operation is provided, is a complete hearsay – or in scientific terms – an unfalsifiable conjecture. In common terms, it is known as bullsh*t
3. NBP states (then rolls this statement into core assumption) that 25% of loans taken over in Tranche 1 are ‘income producing’. It does not explain the extent of this ‘income’ being generated in relation to the value of the loans. Let me explain – suppose I take out a loan for €100mln at 5% per annum. My payment on interest should be €5mln per annum. Barring capital repayment, if I pay my bank €4,999,999 a year, I am in arrears and the loan is not performing. But if I pay Nama €1.00, it is an ‘income producing’ loan. Get my example? In other words, it is a leap of faith to assume that 25% ‘income producing’ loans is the same as 25% ‘performing loans’
4. NBP states: “the actual LTV ratios that have become evident during the Tranche 1 due diligence process have been higher than those indicated by institutions last autumn”, but never explains by how much. This is critical, since LTVs underpin the expected recovery rate in case of asset liquidation. Suppose Nama takes on a loan for €100mln that is secured against a property worth (at the time of loan issuance) €120mln to LTV of 83%. Suppose that underlying asset deteriorated in value by 60% since loan issuance and that in the long run, it is expected to appreciate by 20% to LTEV of €57.6mln. Foreclosing on this loan will mean a recovery rate of 57.6%. However, were the LTV at loan issuance at 90%, the recovery rate drops to 52.8%.
5. NBP omits any provisions for rolled up interest on the developers’ loans. At €81 billion face value, and taking average retail interest rates for 2004-2007 reported by the CB, we are looking at €18.8 billion of foregone interest – a direct subsidy from taxpayers to developers. In arriving at this number, I used loans depreciation schedule provided in Nama new plan page 10, the average charged rate of 4.7% (assume static over 2011-2018, despite the fact that one can safely assume that this cost of capital is (a) too low, given Irish Exchequer is borrowing currently at 5.4% and (b) is likely to rise in time with upward sloping yield curve).
6. Nama makes an implicit assumption that it can dispose of all properties held by it at the peak of their Long Term Economic Value. This requires something that no one in the world, short of God, possesses: (a) perfect foresight, (b) ability to fully control disposal markets and (c) incur no cost of disposal. Clearly, this assumption is simply a sign of deeply rooted inability of Nama staff and directors to think straight through their own effective costs and valuations
7. NBP makes no provision – at all – for the cost of ECB-linked financing of the bonds, which will have to incur the cost of at least 1% in monetization. This will add up, for the life time of Nama (again, using Nama own depreciation schedule mentioned above) to the total subsidy to the banks from taxpayers to the tune of €2.4 billion.
8. “The fees that NAMA will pay over its expected ten-year life amount to about €1.6 billion. A breakdown of the 2011 budget shows that a significant proportion of these fees will be incurred as payment to the participating institutions to administer loan assets on NAMA’s behalf. It is likely that there will also be significant fees incurred arising from enforcement.” Yet, in the actual estimates on page 25, Nama plan allows for just €2.5bn, in the worst case scenario, in total for the costs of its own operations, banks’ fees on administration of loans, for all legal fees to be incurred by it and all other expenses. This rises to €4.8bn in the best-case scenario. Nama already employs almost 90 officers, not counting various board members and an army of consultants. These alone will be swallowing around €250mln in salaries and perks. Legal costs can be safely put to equal about 2.5% of the loans incurred – a double of the relatively standard closing & operations legal costs, taking up over €2bn. Toss in the fees of €1.6bn provisioned and you have sums that do not add up.
9. There are repeated claims that Nama will pursue debtors to the full extent of the loans. This warrants understanding of Table 4 estimates as the full recovery scenarios, implying that in Scenario A, combined recovery rate on all loans is 55.2%, Scenario B 60.7% and Scenario C 49.6% relative to the €81bn face value of the loans. But these are massively exaggerated numbers. Practice in the UK in the 1990s and in Ireland in the 1980s suggests that real gross recovery cannot be greater than 40% of the face value of the loans. And this is before we take into account the present value discounts and rolled up interest (prior to Nama acquisition of the loans and after).
10. Page 20 of the NBP states: “Derivative transactions with a nominal value of €14bn (principally interest rate swaps) will also be transferred. A substantial number of these derivatives are nonperforming and NAMA will pay nil consideration to acquire them.” If these derivatives are nil value, then why are they a problem on the balance sheet of the banks? Answer: because they are nil value today, but have a non-zero probability of exploding in the future. This is why they are being transferred to Nama. What does this mean? If you are on a wrong side of an interest rate swap, your potential liability is unlimited (as in infinite). This is also why in the current market place, the cost of unwinding these swaps today will be around 10-20% of their face value or €1.4-2.8bn. This, of course, is an approximation, but Nama is now stuck, courtesy of taking on these derivatives, with a liability between €1.4-2.8bn at the very least and an unlimited loss at the worst. A picture of iceberg peacefully floating in the path of Titanic comes to mind. Yet, no provision for unwinding these derivatives was made in the NBP.
11. NBP does not address any of the concern about non-transparent governance of the core Credit, Audit and Risk Committees of Nama, which still contain no provisions for external members presence on them. Neither does it address the issues of full and automatic disclosure of all properties held, development applications lodged and funding disbursed, as should be required of such a massive public undertaking.

Now to the numbers. I took the very assumptions contained in the Nama New Business Plan and added one more scenario, with following additional assumptions to cover the holes in Nama own statements:

Loans taken on board:
(Typo corrected, hat tip to Anonymous). Note: the above estimated recovery is the basis for price appreciation in the following table.

Nama NBP scenarios reproduction and my estimates:

Assumptions, in addition to those in Nama NBP are: property uplift over the lifetime of Nama is 15% (this is 50% higher than Nama optimistic scenario of 10% uplift, thus allowing for a greater margin of error in estimates); 1% ECB discount window financing on bonds plus 25bps charge; €5bn in additional investment by Nama drawn in 2015, reducing overall cost of financing to 5 years. Net present value excludes in my scenario excludes rolled up interest on developers’ loans and discounting to present value (Nama claims that it is discounting its NPV at 5%).

All of this means that my estimated loss for Nama of €14.6bn is extremely conservative, allowing for any errors in other figures and assumptions.

Adjusting for NPV at 5% discount, as in Nama plan produces the following summary estimate:

As a reader of this blog remarked on the topic of Nama new BP, “The effortless miscalculations, the assured non-sequiturs, the lofty indifference to facts: all reveal [the new Plan] as a master copy of what Princeton philosopher Harry Frankfurt defined succinctly in his 1986 paper, On Bullshit.” I couldn’t have said it better. Thanks, Patrick.

Economics 25/05/2010: Looking at the Financial sector

As of now, both BofI and AIB are trading below 52-weeks lows. The financials are continuing to experience pressures. But a look back at the overall sector is warranted. Here are some stats:
Let's start from a far: dramatic or not, but the current market conditions are in line with the long term time trend in Irish financials. If anything, per almost 11 years of data, we are currently above the long run trend line. Guess there's more room for downward pressures, should long run dynamics matter.

Zooming in:
Note the chart above - this shows the totality of value destruction since the beginning of the credit crunch back in July/August 2007.

To see some more dynamics, consider the snapshot from the peak to today:
The chart above shows the entire extent of the crisis, with the medium term (through crisis) trend pointing to consistent positioning of the current market valuations. In other words, per trend, nothing dramatic is happening in the markets right now. I also posted some key dates that mark our policy and opinion makers' ability to track markets and predict the future.

Lastly, chart above shows the dynamics in Irish financials over the span of the 'rebirth of optimism' - the last 12 months during which various Government officials and politicians have made a score of statements to the effect that:

• Ireland has turned the corner on recession
• Irish banks are now in a stronger position than before
• Irish Government has made right decisions and these are now evident in the markets' approval, etc.
  

Revealing, isn't it?

Economics 13/05/2010: AIB's IMS blues

AIB released its Q1 2010 IMS statement:

• It will issue 198m shares to the Government in lieu of a €280m preference coupon it will not be paying (remember the stockbrokers and the Government argued that this coupon payment will be a handsome return on our ‘investment’ in AIB?).
• AIB, subsequently will be in for an 18.6% Government stake in the bank.
• Some analysts are saying that the lack of dividend is due to AIB being precluded from paying cash dividends on debt instruments while its business case was under review at the EU.
• I would say that this represents a convenient excuse. In reality, AIB simply cannot afford a €280 million pay out, given its funding conditions and given its capital requirements.
  

There is more farcical stuff in the IMS. AIB claims that while trading conditions remain challenging in Ireland, its UK (ex Northern Ireland), Polish and Capital Markets operations are booming. Ooops, the very family silver that AIB is going to sell to cover its bad loans in the Republic is still the only set of assets that have any positive value in AIB.

IMS confirmed that AIB will need €7.4bn in new capital, and that this based on Nama discount expected to average 45%. As AIB is shifting €23bn of the bad and the outright ugly loans to Nama, this discount might change. So no speculation here…

Aside from speculation, if AIB is hoping to get some dosh for its 22% stake in the US M&T, worth estimated $2.3bn. If this target is achieved (a big if, given that large placements like these would probably attract some discount) the sale can deliver new capital of €900mln. The target for capital raising then moves to €6.5bn. Selling Polish holdings will provide maximum of €2.4-2.6bn, assuming euro holds against zloty and assuming a discount of no more of 10% on block sales, inclusive of commissions. Of course, this means that AIB will have to write down its book value on the asset side, so that the net gain is likely to be around €1.2-1.4bn to capital side.

Which leaves us with a hole of €5.1-5.4bn to plug. The UK side of business is a sick puppy, unlikely to yield any net gain on risk-weighted assets side, but let’s be generous and give it €500mln of value. On the other hand, AIB investors are raking the dosh in… well, not really. I would expect the bank to be able to sell something to the tune of €1.2bn worth of equity at the most (its current market cap is €1.22bn as of yesterday close price). Suppose this is the net (although discounts might imply much shallower rate of capital raising). Will the Exchequer be required to pump in another €3.4-3.7bn into AIB?

But wait, this is hardly a final number. Remember, so far AIB has been assuming (in its impairments provisions) that the 2009 performance will continue into 2010. It sounds conservative, until you actually pause and think. There are serious lags on some assets deterioration and on recognition of impairments. These lags are driven by two major factors:

1. On households and corporate loans side, impairments take time to build up. For example, an average unemployed person with job tenure of 6 years would have gotten around 36-42 weeks of redundancy (factoring in tax relief) when they lost their jobs back in the H1 2009. They might have had savings. At an average rate of saving of 5% of annual income over 6 years, that would add up to 30% annual income or another 16 weeks worth of income cushion. Again, net of tax the cushion rises to ca 19 weeks. This means that any serious distress on their mortgages will show up around 55-61 weeks after the layoffs. Guess that pushes the dateline for major stress on mortgages only starting to manifest itself to around May-July 2010.
2. Much of the non-Nama book of commercial and development lending that will remain with AIB has been rolled up, redrawn across covenants and so on. How long will it take for these to come up for another appraisal? I’d say on average 12-24 months. So look back at 2008-2009 loans that were non-performing then and were rolled over for 12-24 months. These will start flashing red once again sometime around 2010-2011.
   

Neither (1) nor (2) is provided for (as far as risk capital goes) under the current €7.4bn new capital requirement. By the time the demand on these hits, AIB will have no assets left to sell. Then what?

How I know that AIB is once again has its head stuck in the sand on future impairments? Well, this morning’s IMS tells me as much. For its non-NAMA loans, AIB is expecting bad debt charges to be matching 2009 rates. IMS says that bank’s €27bn residential loans book is continuing to perform “better” than the sector averages (as if there is any meaningful average here to be had). And significantly it says that residential bad debt charges are currently not significantly different from 2009. The non-NAMA exposure to property in Ireland will be €12bn of which €9 is investment and €3bn land and development. These are still material at this stage, as any further writedowns on this part of the book are going to hit capital base again.

On the macro side of its balancesheet, AIB is still going to be a sick bank with loan to deposit ratio declining from a severely unhealthy 146% to a still unhealthy 124% post-Nama. And this is really rosy, folks. And the cost base and margins are unlikely to improve. Take for example deposits costs – AIB’s IMS highlighted the reality of high cost of attracting new deposits. Wait till Government starts hovering dosh from the punters through the new Post Office bonds. Supply of deposits will drop. And then, wait for the ECB to cut its discount window operations again, should things improve in the euro area funding markets. AIB, alongside BofI, is heavily dependent on being able to roll the collateralized borrowings from ECB. AIB’s term funding as a percentage of wholesale funding is massively up from 30% in December 2009 to 41% by end Q1 2010, reflecting a €6bn of issuance.

So can anyone explain just how on earth can AIB escape a de facto nationalization?

Economics 05/05/2010: Third Force's Burn-out Bench

The news stream is getting thicker and thicker with Irish financials and sovereign / fiscal debacles stories. Reuters is reporting (hat tip to Brian) (here) that the Third Force now looks more like a Burn-out Bench and that there is little prospect for growth or profitability for BofI and AIB.

All's fine, as far as the arguments go, except, there is that silly ending to the article putting blame for the crisis on 'too much competition' in the Irish banking sector. I'd say this pure rubbish. Here is an earlier note I wrote on that subject. In simple terms, it does not matter what profit margins could have been were we to have lower competition. Irish banking crisis was caused by excessive willingness to take risks, spurred on by the Government, the Regulator, the Central Bank and ECB. May be there was too much competition amongst the incompetent cooks in that kitchen?


Oh, and Nouriel Roubini puts a clear number on the fear of European contagion: "European banks hold claims of US$193 billion on Greece and more than US$1 trillion of further claims on Portugal, Ireland and Spain. It cannot be ruled out that the ECB will eventually have to resort to more aggressive measures such as buying government bonds in the secondary market in order to stop the contagion."

So the next stage of contagion can cost Germany (and make no mistake - Germany will be paying for this in the end) upwards of 5 times what the Greek bailout will cost.

Economics 29/04/2010: House prices peak to peak cycle

Back in October last year I did an estimate, based on the IMF model, of the peak-to-peak duration of the current housing slump. Now's time to do some updating on this matter.

Assumptions:

• Peak to trough correction in real prices of -40-43%;
• Growth rates - resuming in 2011: 2011-2013 +3.6% - in excess of the long-term growth rate estimate for Ireland in the current GFSR (2.6%), slowing to 3% in 2014-2016, then to 2.7% in 2017-2019 and 2.6% thereafter.

Using peak of Q2 2007 to assumed trough in Q3 2010, we have the full cycle duration of between 95 and 87 quarters, taking us back to 2007 peak by either 2029 or 2031.

If bottom hits at -48%, we get return to 2007 peak by 2034, with 107 quarters from peak to peak cycle.

Now, think Nama will run out in 2015? or 2020?

If Nama sets shut-off date in 2015, it is likely to get between 61 and 70 cents on the euro for each value underlying the loan. Assuming loans LTV of 70% and default rate of 30% on loans transferred to Nama (extremely conservative assumptions, but these allow a cushion on some interest collected), the value of Nama realized book will be 26 cents on the euro and 30 cents on the euro, or less than 50% of the post-discounted price paid!

If Nama shuts down in 2020, the above two figures will be 30 cents and 34 cents on the euro paid or just around 50% of the post-discounted price paid!

Now, that's what I would call overpaying for the loans.

Economics 19/04/2010: INBS - Titanic hits the ocean floor...

INBS has reported a €2.49bn loss for FY 2009 on the loan book just under €11bn, with roughly €8.5bn of this attributable to development and investment in property markets. Provisions amounted to €2.8bn, so in other words, the Kingdom of Irish Local Finance has managed to pile up an impressive 25.5% impairment charge on the book that has already taken a hit in 2008. Between 2008 and 2009, INBS has managed to post impairments of 30%.

Actually, here is a better view: 96% of all losses are on commercial development books, which means INBS has been lending money to folks whose default rates are currently running at more than 33% yoy! These are recognized default rates, which conceal the fact that many of the INBS' loans (just as in the case of other banks) would really be deep in red, were they not re-negotiated and switched into 'interest holiday' loans back in 2008-2009. Now, remember the numbers released by Nama? 2/3rds of the loans not paying interest. Apply that to the INBS books - the expected impairment charge for 2010-2012 will be around €5.7bn. And that's only for the non-householders' loans...

The numbers are truly outstanding by all possible measures.

INBS's administration expenses rose to €46mln from €45mln in 2008, and the bank has managed to accumulate €7 million in professional fees as one-off expenses, presumably relating to the management efforts to shore up the hull of a sinking boat.

Per Irish Times report, CEO Gerry McGinn said the greatest management challenges were in relation to the commercial loan portfolio. "The society has manifestly been seriously under-resourced in many areas of its business activities and support functions, but most especially in commercial lending," he siad.

Under-resourced? As if throwing more cash at staff and consultants would have prevented them from issuing so absurdly poorly priced and analyzed loans?

At this stage, especially given Mr McGinn's denial of the reality (that the INBS is a burnt-out force with not a modicum of decorum to pretend that it can act as a functional lender) any more taxpayers cash directed to the INBS would be a pure and gratuitous waste!

Economics 31/03/2010: Nama funding scheme - Maddoffian Risk Pyramid

The saga of Nama continues, folks. Ah, and no, I do not mean the dumping of €8.3 billion to the Anglo which miraculously declared losses of €12bn = €4bn injected by taxpayer in 2009 + €8.3bn injected today. Had the Exchequer given Anglo €15bn last night, the bank would have declared losses of €19bn. And not even the admission on the public airways, by our illustrious 'public interest' director soon-to-be-chief of Anglo, Alan Dukes, that Anglo will most likely need more than additional €10bn promised to it by overly-generous-with-other-people-money Mr Lenihan.

Oh no - the really worrying thing is contained in the notes from March 26th issued by Nama (available here) that detail the financing arrangements that Nama will undertake to cover the purchases of the loans from Irish banks.

Some time ago it was rumored that the Government was setting on the following scheme:

• Nama will issue 12 month bonds
• With interest rate rest at Euribor-Libor plus a margin every 6 months
• Which are to be fully unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by the state as ranking pari passu with the Nama other unsecured and unsubordinated debts.

At the time, myself and other analysts said that such a scheme would be a disaster. Now, per latest documentation from Nama - this is exactly the scheme chosen to finance Nama acquisitions.

Let me remind you what the problem with this scheme is.

Nama is buying long-term loans with work-out period stretched over 10-15 years. It will use short term financing to get these through. Problem 1: borrowing short to lend long is what got out banks into this mess in the first place. Now, Nama will have exactly the same risk-loaded funding structure as the worst of our banks. For example, at the peak of risk-loading, Anglo carried about 50% of its funding in short-term inter-banks loans. Nama will do the same for 100% of its funding requirement. Scared yet?

Nama will be loading up with short term debt as the yield curve for Libor and Euribor is pointing up. In other words, every progressive reset (6 months) and roll-over of the debt (12 months) will be more expensive to the State. My third year UCD undergrads last Fall knew that this is a bad risk. Nama, having paid millions to advisers and 'experienced' staff couldn't get it right! Trembling yet?

Nama will be rolling over bonds on an annual basis. This means annual transactions costs (making the entire borrowing much more expensive) and reliance on the ECB to re-collateralize the bonds (putting Frank Fahey's 'free lunch' funding out to new tender annually). Is anyone actually thinking about any of these risks out in the Treasury Building on Grand Canal Street?

Adding insult to injury - despite being issued by the agent different than the Sovereign, Nama bonds will be tax-exempt. In other words, issued at Euribor of, say 2.75%, the notes will effectively be priced at around 3.44%. Worse, the Guarantee statement obliges the Irish state to cover incidental and other expenses of the bond holders and exempts them from all and any taxes relating to the Guarantee. In other words, should the bond holders resell their Nama bonds at a profit (in part determined by the Guarantee), there will be no tax on such a resale.

In short, it appears that neither Nama, nor an army of its excruciatingly expensive advisers, nor DofF, nor the Government have any knowledge that normal interest yield curves are upward sloping - cost of borrowing, normally rises in time. Or may be they simply do not care. After all, its our money they are gambling with.

Economics 17/03/2010: Nama Estimation Procedures

Yesterday I finally got a few minutes to read through the latest Government documentation on Nama - "Determination of Long-Term Economic Value of Property and Bank Assets" regulations SINo88 of 2010 from March 5 (link here). This delightfully thin document is a treat for anyone who cares to study just how inept our authorities can be when it comes to measuring and assessing/pricing risk.

Timing

Paragraph 2 page 2 defined 'relevant period' - used in assessing long-term economic value - as 'the period that began on 1 January 1985 and ended on 31 December 2005'. Per para 5.ii page 3, this period will be used to estimate reference prices for land based on land hedonic (econometric) links to demographic variables (5.b.i), interest rates (5.b.ii) and GDP (5.b.iii).

The problem here is that there is no clear identification as to which time horizon (the full 21 years worth or some sub-set thereof) the Government will use. And this is crucial, as this period largely covers steadily rising market with almost no corrections. Which means that should Nama use dynamic trend for estimating the land prices, it would be rather accurate within the sample, but will be absolutely ad hoc outside the sample (per Lucas critique).

Of course, Nama won't take dynamic pricing - and as is clear from 5.(1).(a).(i) and (ii) it is going to take 'prices' and 'yields' - i.e. point estimates. Which most likely means some sort of an average. It is important, therefore, to have an exact idea as to within what sub-period of 1985-2005 is this average going to be taken. The note does not identify this exactly, leaving the door open for Nama to deal with the data as it sees appropriate.

Discount factors

There is an added complication to the entire valuations scheme. SSNo88 states in 5.(1).(a) that a discount (adjustment) factor for land located within the State will be based on a difference in price of land on valuation date (nearly absolutely unknown to Nama) and the Long Term (economic) Value (LTEV) price (also unknown to Nama). And this means that Nama will start its valuations process by applying an unknown discount factor to a risky asset it is buying. No data listed within SSNo88 as the basis for valuations allows Nama to escape this grim reality.

Discount Rates

There are other fundamental errors built into valuations process. For example, NAMA discount rates - equivalent to interest rates - on bank assets are (as listed in 2.(2).(a)-(b) on page 2: 4.54% for 3-year rate, 5.57% for 5-year rate, and 6.16% for 8-year rate. This presents a little bit of a conundrum. Firstly, are these rates annualized compounded or simple? Second, and even more important - why are these rates chosen for these maturities? What yield curve has been used to impute these? No clarity on this whatsoever.

ECB gives only two types of average retail rates for non-financial corporations loans: as of January 2010 (the latest), we have existent loans with rate fix up to 1 year are priced at 2.96% which, factoring in Government's 1.7% risk premium margin implies a rate of 4.66%, not 4.54%. Off the starting line, there is a built in subsidy from Nama.

And this subsidy is greater than 12bps spread between the above two rates. How I know this? Well, think - can assets we are buying into Nama attract any loans in the private sector? At any valuations? No. So what justifies that 1.7% risk premium the Government applies (per 2.(2).(a)-(c)) to all loans it will be buying? And why is the risk premium independent of maturity period? Surely it should be rising with maturity?

Let's take a look at what we have from the ECB: non-financial corporate overdraft rate as of January 2010 averaged in Ireland at 5.74%. Suppose this was the basis for our Nama valuations (I still think this is too low of a rate given the assets quality and given the fact that ECB reports 'offer' rates by the banks, not the actual rates on which loans were issued, but what the hell, let's use this as a base assumption).

With Government risk premium, this should imply a 3-year discount rate of 7.44% (still shy of corporate junk bonds, but much better than 4.54% built into Nama). This rate (per 7.(a)) will cover land-backed loans where land value has fallen just 10% below its LTEV - the high quality loans in Nama books. Now, using SSNo88-implied yield curve, 5-year discount rate consistent with our assumed base rate should be 2.08% and for 8-year rate, the risk margin should be 1.9%.

This means that if Nama were to use the riskiest loans rates we have - those for overdrafts by non-financial corporate sector, and use upward sloping risk margins (to reflect the fact that the longer the duration of the rate, the lower is the quality of assets to which it applies - per SSNo88 page 5 own admission), the rates of interest imputed on Nama assets should be:

• 3-year money - at 7.44%, not Nama-assumed 4.54% (a loss to the taxpayer or a subsidy to developers and banks of 2.9% per annum);
• 5-year money - at 9.13%, not Nama-assumed 5.57% (a loss to the taxpayer or a subsidy to developers and banks of 3.56% per annum); and
• 8-year money - at 9.67%, not Nama-assumed 6.16% (a loss to the taxpayer or a subsidy to developers and banks of 3.51% per annum).

Let me give you a look at the Nama interest rate pricing generosity from another angle. Irish Exchequer is currently borrowing at 5% interest rate in the markets. This, presumably does not include Mr Lenihan's 1.7% risk margin. Which means that if Nama was buying loans from borrowers who are as credit-worthy as the Irish Exchequer, it should be applying a rate of 6.7% to these loans. My estimate of 7.44% is much closer to that than SSNo88 statutory fixed rate of 4.54%.

Proposition: under Nama, effective interest rate subsidies for defaulting loans (accruing to banks and developers) will range between 2.9% and 3.56% per annum.

Proof: see two alternative arguments above.

Estimation process

Another issue, related to interest rates arises when the SSNo88 outlines 3 sets of variables Nama will use to impute LTEV based on 'correlation' (whatever this means in econometric terms, I have no idea): 'between land prices and interest rates in the State' (5.(1).(b).(ii)). Can someone explain to me which interest rates Nama has in mind? Central Bank rates? Retail rates? Retail rates for non-financial corporations loans?

The same applies to paragraph (5.(1).(c)).

Valuations timing

The document SSNo88 was published in March 2010. Nama will not begin valuations before April and will not finish these before the end of 2010 (optimistic projections). So why are all valuations being made by Nama will take into account only market values of land prior to January 10, 2010? Surely, falling markets mean - and consensus forecast expects - at least 5%+ decline in house prices (what can one say about land!) over 2010. Is Nama going to ignore this reality and price the assets in buys in, say, November 2010 at prices valuations for January 2010?

Let me explain. In a year when I bought my house, within 11 months of my purchase, home prices fell roughly speaking 3%. Do I get to go to my bank and tell them - 'Folks, shave off 3% from my total original mortgage as Nama is doing for you?'

5% is a non-trivial number, adding up, over the loan book Nama id about to take up roughly €3.9 billion overvaluation, spread over 15 years with interest and market discounts accruing to it.

Use of GDP

SSNo88 applies to valuations of land and real estate assets. These are non-exportable. Why is then the Government planning to use the rates of growth in GDP, not GNP? Does our booming (1985-2005) pharma sector has anything to do with the fundamentals on which land prices are set? Using GDP for the estimation process instead of GNP introduces a distortion of between 12% and 18% depending on the range of years used. This distortion risks further overvaluing the LTEV for land.

Building in dreamy planning

Paragraph 5.1.d.ii states that Nama will use "existing and future transport planning and the associated supply and demand projections for land use" in its valuations of LTEV. What does this mean? Will Nama use full extent of NDP plans? Including the frozen and indefinitely postponed plans? There is significant divergence between what is planned and what is delivered. And in the next 10 or so years, this divergence will be in the direction of planned transport investment being well in excess of real investment. If Nama were to use the former as a basis for estimates, then there will be land with LTEV in excess of realizable value because its estimated LTEV will be based on excessively optimistic plans for transport investment.

At any rate - the current phrasing of the SSNo88 does not provide for a rigorous definition of what planned infrastructure will Nama actually factor in. This makes the LTEV estimation process outlined in LTEV completely undefinable under the current legislation.

Land based outside the State

The entire section 6 outlining the LTEV estimation process for land outside the State is simply a carbon copy of the valuation processes for LTEV within the State. This suggests that - given that assets being valued are different in nature (legal and economic), risk and geographies - the Minister has no idea how these different risks should be reflected in the estimation process.

The section does not even mention exchange rate risks or derivatives on Forex exposure attached to loans. There is no clear understanding as to what interest rates should apply and how to deal with the carry trades.

Operational costs

Section 8 of the note states that the assumed 'due diligence costs, incurred or likely to be incurred by Nama over its lifetime' is 0.25%. This is simply unrealistic. Industry average operating cost on performing loans - across all subheads - is equal to about 0.75-1% in times when operating conditions are deemed to be normal. As of the end of February 2010, Nama, reportedly already has blown through its entire 2010 legal budget. How can 25bps cover its due diligence cost over life time?


In short, SSNo88 is yet another document that shows just how exposed Nama remains to shoddy planning and poor estimation procedures, courtesy of the DofF that simply cannot deliver realistic and transparent operational guidelines.

Economics 02/03/2010: CBFSAI - in search of Art Consultants

As the country is grappling with the risk of banking sector collapse, lack of direction toward new regulatory environment for the financial services, unemployment, fiscal problems, need for reforming (and also lack of direction for such reforms) public sector, and so on, it is comforting to know that at least some of the policy / public management bottlenecks are being addressed...

The Central Bank of Ireland is looking for an Art Consultant - here - seriously (hat tip to Brian)!

There are precious pearls here (comments are mine):

"The CBFSAI maintains and refreshes its visual art collection, not only as an investment, but to enhance and enrich the working environment of its staff and as a means to encourage creativity and cultural diversity amongst employees and the wider community [apparently Central Bankers really need a working environment that encourages their creativity and cultural diversity].

We believe that our particular support for emerging artists, especially those in the early stages of their career, is a valuable conduit of encouragement, not only of individual artists, but of the artistic community in general [and encouraging artistic community is one of the functions of any Central Bank, one would presume]."

One, of course, is wondering if the new Art Consultant role will also be responsible for:

• managing Nama-led acquisition of art accumulated by our poorly performing banks (with some of poor performance likely attributable to poor regulation by, hmmm, ... would that be the Central Bank?)
• giving recognition to the artistic values of Irish banks creativity in the area of financial engineering (with some of the lending deals done at the height of Celtic Tiger clearly bearing resemblance to the post-Abstract Expressionist decompositions of the Barcelona School of Art), or
• providing advice on writing constructive press releases explaining the collapse of our banking system and subsequent taxpayer rescue of the 'art appreciating' financial sector in this country (after all, some of the PR produced on Nama, for example, borders on the best works of Eugene Ionesco and Luigi Pirandello), and
• commissioning and orchestrating the performance of Stockhausenesque compositions to depict the true extent of disorder in our banking balancesheets?

Hmmm... art consultants to the rescue, might be the CBFSAI's next motto...

Oh, and in case you thought our Central Bank is out of tune with the banks it regulates, here are few links: AIB and BofI are also keen on making sure their employees work in a rewarding atmosphere, surrounded by art and that they support arts in this country... sadly - both forgot to support proper risk pricing and responsible lending.

Then again, what is more important to an Irish (Central) Banker? Art appreciation classes or risk pricing?

Economics 26/01/2010: S&P Note on Irish Banks

Standard & Poor's has finally thrown in the towel and after having to “periodically increase” their “credit loss assumptions over the course of the current economic cycle” concluded “that Irish banks' asset quality and earnings will, in general, likely remain under significant pressure over the medium term”.

Anyone surprised so far?

“We have considered the implications for each rated Irish bank and lowered the ratings on some of them.” But even after that action, “the ratings on all Irish banks are currently uplifted because of our view of high systemic importance to Ireland and related government support, or their relationship with a higher-rated parent.”

We never would have guessed that if not for the State guarantee plus 11 billion worth of public capital, plus Nama’s countless billions of pledged support, the banks bonds would be junk. Wait, some of them actually would be ‘high risk junk’ as one Russian fund manager once described to me his own bonds (I ran away as fast as I could).

How junk? Take a load of honesty from S&P (with my emphasis added):

“We have lowered the ratings on Allied Irish Banks PLC (A-/Negative/A-2) by a notch. This reflects our view that the environment will remain challenging over the medium term, leading to high credit losses, and a weakened revenue base. We consider AIB to be of high systemic importance and the Irish government to have made a strong statement of support, as a result of which we have incorporated five notches of support into the ratings. The negative outlook reflects our view that AIB's anticipated recapitalization may not fully occur in 2010, and may be of an insufficient size to support an 'A-' rating, as well downside risk to our earnings expectations arising from the weak environment.”

Absent state support, AIB should be BB/Negative/C+. Errr, that is squarely in the junk bonds category.

“We have also lowered the ratings on Bank of Ireland (A-/Stable/A-2) by a notch. This reflects our view that the environment will remain challenging over the medium term and BOI's financial profile will be weaker than we had previously expected, with capital expected to be only adequate by our measures and BOI continuing to make losses through 2011. We consider BOI to be of high systemic importance and the Irish government to have made a strong statement of support, as a result of which we have incorporated four notches of support into the ratings. The stable outlook reflects our expectation that the government will remain highly supportive of BOI, BOI's core Irish banking franchise will remain materially intact, and it will raise significant equity capital in 2010, from the market or the government or both.”

So absent support, BofI would be at BB+/Negative/BB-. Junk status as well.

“The ratings on Irish Life & Permanent PLC (ILP; BBB+/Stable/A-2) are unchanged. In our view, ILP faces continuing uncertainty around its strategic direction and desired business profile, in addition to the near-term pressure on the banking operations from weak earnings prospects and difficult wholesale funding conditions. Nevertheless, the ratings continue to benefit from the relative strength of the ILP group's life assurance operations. They also incorporate two notches of government support, reflecting our view of ILP's high systemic importance and our expectation that the Irish government would provide further support if required. The expectation of government support also underpins the stable outlook."

Absent state aid IL&P would be, then, at BBB-/Negative/B. Barely above water line.

Please, be mindful – S&P expects (and prices in) that the Irish state will be likely to buy equity in the banks. So we all can become investors in junk bonds-issuing institutions.


Very good, although bland, outlook statement:

“We consider the current operating conditions for the Irish banking industry to be weak, and expect that any recovery in earnings prospects will prove to be sluggish. In the coming year, we anticipate that many of the Irish banks may undergo operational and financial restructuring, which will likely lead to consolidation in the sector. Our overall assessment of the sector incorporates our opinions reflected in the following key points:

• The recovery in Irish economic performance appears likely to be gradual, with growth only consistently established in late 2010 at the earliest;
• Loan losses will likely be elevated between 2009-2011 and will likely peak in 2010; Wholesale funding conditions appear likely to remain pressurized, with strong competition for retail deposits...

"Under our base case, we expect loan losses on bank lending to the Irish private sector to peak at about 4.6% or EUR16 billion in 2010, and to total about 10.7% or EUR37 billion over the period from 2009 to 2011."

In country rankings analysis, S&P highlights that they expect the need for significant deleveraging by the banks in the future, reflective, presumably, of the lack thereof so far in the crisis – a risk I warned about consistently over time.

“The impact of the continuing challenging economic environment, which we view as weakening asset quality and earnings prospects” – presumably the S&P is on the same note as the rest of sane analysts: poor economy will drag banks down. Which means that Government logic – restore banks and see economy recover – is out of the window.


Next – a gem: “We have additionally revised our assessment of Gross Problematic Assets (GPAs) in the system to 15%-30% from 10%-20%. GPAs are our estimation of a country's potential problem loans to the private sector and nonfinancial public enterprises in a severe economic downturn, such as that being experienced in Ireland, and includes restructured and foreclosed assets, as well as overdue loans, and nonperforming loans sold to special-purpose vehicles.”

Oh yes – up to 30% GPA means that we can expect 45-50% of the loans to be stressed one way or the other at some point in time – some defaulting, some skipping couple of payments, some restructuring with various haircuts. That is, potentially, up to €200 billion in loans in various forms of distress for the 6 guaranteed banks alone.


With this sort of an outlook, not surprisingly, AIB's CDSs are now at around 650bps, BofI's at 250bps and virtually no action is taking place in bonds. Which, of course, does hint at the market reading Irish banks' bonds as being in effect a purely speculative bet on one probability - that of survival...

The share prices are yet to follow the same path of logic.

Economics: 15/01/2010: Bank levies

Per FT report today, the US administration is likely to impose a levy on the banking sector to recover. Per President Obama, "every dime" owed by the banks to TARP. The levy will aim to raise $90 billion from the 50 largest institutions in the US, including those with foreign operations in the country (a point that raises the issue of unfavourable treatment of the foreign banks which had no access to TARP and yet are expected to pay for it). 60% of the fee is expected to be generated from the top 10 institutions – another strange feature of the plan that skews the burden of the proposal toward larger banks despite the fact that there is no evidence they benefited disproportionately more from TARP funding. The levy – envisioned for 10 years period – is being set at 15 bps of all insured debt other than deposits and will apply to all institutions with assets over $50 billion. Of course the net effect of the levy will be a higher cost of banking for the end customer.

One can rationally expect the EU to follow the US suit and slap more charges on already stretched taxpayers/consumers.

Bashing the banks is a happy past-time for our commentators, politicos and regulators who have been calling for higher levies on the banks. But anyone with economic stability and growth on their mind should really think as to where the money for such levies will be coming at the end.

Irish banks are in no position to pay the Exchequer for any support out of earnings, so it is us – common banks customers and, co-incidentally the taxpayers – who will be tasked with paying DofF the going costs of banks guarantee scheme, Nama and any other levies the Government might impose on the banks.

As one cannot escape this charge on his/her account, it will be an involuntary transfer from the private economy to the state. Care to call it a new tax, then?

Economics 15/01/2010: Negative equity & entrepreneurship

There is an interesting piece of research relating to the issue of negative equity that sheds some light on potentially disastrous effects on the economy from our current crisis in house prices.

First, a quick synopsis of the paper (available here):

“In the absence of any correlation between wealth and entrepreneurial talent, initial net wealth should have an explanatory power in the decision to become an entrepreneur only for households that are financially constrained; its importance should decrease with wealth.”

In other words, if you believe that higher starting wealth does not make for a better entrepreneur further, then only households that have no capacity to borrow – no assets to borrow against – or that have insufficient income to take on the risk of becoming an entrepreneur should be constrained in their pursuit of entrepreneurship by wealth considerations. This means that as household wealth increases, the constraint of wealth on ability to take up entrepreneurship falls.

The paper tests this theoretical predictions for the Italy, showing that: “…household's initial wealth is indeed important in the decision to become an entrepreneur and its effect is lower for the richest households.” (Point 1)

“Furthermore, the effect of net wealth is stronger when legal enforcement of the loan contract is weaker...” Which, of course means that as the regulators, government, or lenders fail to enforce lending contracts, such lax enforcement increases the role that initial wealth plays in constraining entrepreneurship, making it harder for assets-poorer households to pursue business opportunities. (Point 2)

“Finally, conditional on becoming entrepreneurs, initial household wealth does not significantly affect the size of the business.” So that once a person becomes entrepreneur, the levels of their initial asset holdings do not act to determine the rate of their success in business. (Point 3)

“In summary, it seems that imperfections in capital markets can induce people to accumulate assets in order to facilitate the decision to become entrepreneurs.”

And so now, to interpreting these results for Ireland.

Majority of our households rely on house equity to act as their main life-cycle asset. As house equity is being destroyed by the negative equity, two things happen to household financial position:

1. Net wealth declines directly with increase in negative equity; and
2. Net future wealth declines directly with the gap between rental value of the property and the mortgage cost (in effect, people in negative equity are paying more for their property than it is worth, thus reducing disposable income available for other savings and investments.
   

So on the net, the twin effects of negative equity in Ireland have so far (during this crisis) meant that as property prices declined by ca 40-50% already, while rents have fallen over 15%, Irish households worst affected by the negative equity (home buyers in 2006-2007) have seen combined effect of falling wealth to the tune of 49-58%.

That is a serious chunk of wealth being destroyed, implying some adverse effects on future entrepreneurship rates. Since the rates of success in entrepreneurship do not suffer from initial wealth effects, we can assume that entrepreneurs lost due to negative equity are of average type. Which means some serious losses to the economy over the years to come.

But wait, there is more: Point 1 clearly suggests that the adverse impact of negative equity will be felt more by those would be entrepreneurs who come from lower wealth-holding groups of Irish population. No, not exactly the poor (although them as well), but from:

• Traditionally assets-poor younger households – so Ireland is now foregoing higher future rates of entrepreneurship from younger generations (also, incidentally, most adversely impacted by rising unemployment);
• Traditionally mortgages-heavy families – so Ireland is now potentially cutting into its business potential when it comes to families, thus adversely impacting future population growth rates as well;
• Lower middle class would-be-entrepreneurs – so that Irish society is now running a greater risk of reducing social class mobility, as entrepreneurship is often the only ticket out of lower middle class;
• And yes – the poor would-be-entrepreneurs: people who like many of our best business leaders today came from the poorer family backgrounds.
  

Points 2 & 3 go straight to NAMA. As NAMA in effect simply means a bailout clause for bankers, it undermines enforceability of lending contracts – for bankers directly, for developers indirectly via NAMA holiday clauses, and for households also indirectly via political manipulation of lending going on behind the scenes. Which means that overall, Ireland is moving, thanks to NAMA, toward a society where entrepreneurship will be even more polarized into the domain of the better-off. Yet another obstruction on that social mobility ladder that business ownership entails.

So here you go, to all those (like some of our economics commentators) who say that negative equity only matters when people want to move, I’d say – read real evidence, folks.

Economics 07/01/2010: NTMA's end of year results

Here is an interesting one: NTMA published their End Year review. Per statement (page 3 top): “The National Pensions Reserve Fund Discretionary Investment Portfolio (the Fund excluding the preference shares in Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks held on the direction of the Minister for Finance) earned a return of 20.9 per cent in 2009. Since the Fund’s inception in 2001, the Investment Portfolio has delivered an annualised return of 2.6 per cent per annum. Including the bank preference shares and related warrants, which are held at cost and zero respectively, the Fund recorded a return of 11.6 per cent in 2009. At 31 December 2009 the total Fund’s value stood at €22.3 billion.”

If the state were to invest €7 billion it gave AIB and BofI for their preference shares in the Discretionary Fund, the returns on these investments would have been roughly €1.463 billion in 2009. Instead, we got zilch in risk-adjusted returns.


Ok, one would say that ‘investing’ in AIB and BofI is a sensible undertaking as the banks are market-determining entities for ISE. Nope, wrong. Page 4 of release states: “As a result, the Investment Portfolio had an elevated level of quoted equity investment of 80 per cent following completion of the recapitalisation in May compared with 57 per cent before the preference share investments were made. The Fund took advantage of the strong equity market rally to reduce its absolute risk and exposure to the equity markets through phased equity sales of €2.7 billion through the remainder of the year. The Investment Portfolio’s exposure to the quoted equity markets had been reduced to 63 per cent by year end.”

So as the result of AIB & BofI ‘investments’, NPRF is now more heavily geared toward equities as a class. Full stop. Now, give this a thought. We have a Pension fund with 63% exposure to equities that has been forced to sell equity on the basis of the need to re-gear toward banks shares in the economy where banks are the weakest point… Aggressive high risk investment strategy. What’s next? A highly geared derivative undertaking with taxpayers money? Ooops – we already got one, called NAMA SPV.

Back to page 3 stuff: “During 2009 the Minister for Finance directed the Fund to invest €7 billion in preference shares issued by Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks for the purposes of recapitalising these institutions. The terms of the deal, which was negotiated by the NTMA, include a non-cumulative fixed dividend of 8 per cent on the preference shares and warrants which give an option to purchase up to 25 per cent of the enlarged ordinary share capital of each bank following exercise of the warrants. The dividends payable on the preference shares are not recognised or accrued by the Fund until declaration by the bank concerned. These investments were funded by €4 billion from the Fund’s own resources and by €3 billion from a frontloading of the Exchequer contributions to the Fund for 2009 and 2010.”

Two points here:

1. 2009 thus saw a direct transfer of €3 billion to NPRF from the economy that has contracted by 10.5% (GNP). Since NPRF is a de facto piggy bank for public sector pensions only, this type of fiscal management, of course, has no precedent. It is equivalent to taking from the strained middle classes (taxpayers) to award future pay for public employees.
2. This reminds us as to just how outrageously overpriced the preference shares we bought were. AIB and BofI preference shares yielding 8%? Remember – these two banks have balancesheets weaker than those of the main UK banks. Yet, at the same time we were signing off on 8% return, the UK banks bonds were yielding 12-15%. What’s the opportunity cost of such a sweetheart deal for the banks from taxpayers’ perspective? 7% yield foregone, or in 2009 terms - €490 million.
   

Add the two bolded numbers: €1.953 billion is the opportunity cost to the taxpayers of the AIB and BofI capital injection in foregone earnings. This is more than double the amount of savings generated by the Exchequer through public sector wage ‘cuts’ in 2010 Budget.


Another interesting thingy – page 4: “NAMA will acquire loans with a nominal value of approximately €80 billion”. Hold on, folks – was it €77 billion or €80 billion? Or should we take it from the NTMA that +/-€3 billion in taxpayers funds exposure is simply pittance that can be rounded off? What’s next? February 2010 numbers rising to €85 billion, then to €90 billion by March? Why not just state ‘we’ll buy anything they throw at us’ and close off this Cossack Dance with the numbers?


Pages 5 (end) and 6 provide a small, but interesting insight into operational efficiencies of the State Claims Agency: “There has been a substantial decline in employer and public liability claim volumes associated with incidents that have occurred since the SCA was established. Since 2002 the number of employer liability claims has fallen by 71 per cent and the number of public liability claims has fallen by 19 per cent. The total number of active employer and public liability claims has fallen by 35 per cent in 2009 compared with 2008.”

Sounds like good news? All claims are down since 2002 and in particular between 2008 and 2009. Happy times? Not really: “During 2009 the SCA paid out a total of €64 million against all classes of claims. This compares with a total of €53 million in 2008.” So let me run this by you – cases numbers are down 35%, but payouts are up 20.8%! I guess the gravity of injuries in the public sector rose dramatically during the year.


Lastly, Appendix 1 lists bond issues for 2009. This is a nice summary of the fine work being done by the NTMA in placing our debt (although most of it has gone to the banks to be rolled into ECB). But the worrying thing is the time profile of these bonds. €14.53 billion of the bonds issued this year will mature (and will be rolled over) during or before 2014 - the deadline for our compliance with the Stability & Growth Pact ceilings on deficit and debt. Such a large amount, coming already on top of the billions in short/medium-term debt issued in 2008 doesn't do much to support markets confidence in Ireland actually delivering on 2014 commitment...