Showing posts with label Irish property bust. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Irish property bust. Show all posts

Friday, February 2, 2018

2/2/18: Irish Media and the Property Crisis: A New Paper


A new paper covering the history of the financial crisis in Ireland, from the media complacency perspective, has been published by the New Political Economy journal. "The Irish Newspapers and the Residential Property Price Boom" by Ciarán Michael Casey (see http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13563467.2018.1426562) references my warnings about the Irish property market in 2005 comment to the Irish Times.

For completeness of the record, here is my 2004 article for Business & Finance magazine stating my, then, view on the property market in Ireland: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/01/10116-my-2004-article-on-irish-property.html.

Wednesday, March 25, 2015

25/3/15: Irish Residential Property Prices Fell Marginally in February


The residential property price index from CSO covering Irish property markets has posted second monthly contraction in February, falling from 80.3 in January to 80.0 last month. With that, y/y on growth rate in Irish residential property prices has slowed from 15.54% in January to 14.94% in February, the first sub-15% reading since September 2014. In effect, property prices in Ireland have now fallen back to the levels between September and October 2014. Cumulated gains in property prices over the last 24 months are now totalling 24.22% or an annualised gain of 11.46%, outpacing growth in the economy by roughly 5-fold.

Based on Nama valuations formula, residential property prices are now somewhere 18.5% below Nama business model expectations.



Prices of all residential properties excluding Dublin  remained static in February at 74.8, same as in January and up 8.25% y/y, marking a slowdown in the y/y growth from 9.20% recorded in January.


The decline in national prices was driven by Dublin prices, which fell for the second month in a row from 82.2 in January to 81.6 in February. This is the lowest index reading since September 2014 and marks a slowdown in y/y growth rates to 21.43% - the slowest rate of growth since April 2014. Still, cumulated expansion in Dublin residential property prices over the last 24 months is blistering 37.6% (annualised rate of 17.3%).

Within Dublin segment:

  • Houses were the driver to the downside in overall property prices, with houses price index for Dublin standing at 86.0 in February 2015, down from 86.9 in January 2015 and back to the levels of September 2014. Y/y rate of growth in Dublin house prices fell from 21.7% in January to 21.1% in February, although over the last 24 months hose prices in Dublin are still up cumulatively 37.6% (+17.3% annualised). 
  • Apartments prices in Dublin rose in index terms to 72.2 in February from 70.8 in January, erasing the declines that took place during Q3-Q4 2014. Cumulated gains in Dublin apartments prices over the last 24 months stand at 37.5% (+17.3% annualised) and y/y prices are up 24.5% - the fastest growth rate in 3 months.
Few charts to illustrate the above trends:




 Lastly, summary of price changes on pre-crisis peak and y/y:


Despite all the talk about the new bubble in house prices in Ireland, three themes remain true:
  1. Property prices are still far below fundamentals-justified levels. In Dublin, undershooting of long-run (inflation-linked) prices is around 26-27%.
  2. Property price increases are worryingly high, especially in the Dublin segment, warranting some ongoing concern; and
  3. Moderation in property prices and downward correction over the last two months, driven by Dublin (but likely to translate into similar outside Dublin with a lag), predicted on this blog before, is a welcome change. However, I suspect we will see renewed increases in property prices later this year, albeit at rates more sustainable in the longer run.

Friday, August 23, 2013

23/8/2013: IMHO statement on Mortgages Arrears for Q2 2013

Irish Mortgage Holders Organisation (IMHO) issued opinion on today's mortgages arrears figures: https://www.mortgageholders.ie/another-false-start-in-resolving-mortgage-crisis/

My detailed analysis of the figures is here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/08/2382013-irish-mortgages-arrears-q2-2013.html

23/8/2013: Irish Mortgages Arrears: Q2 2013


Mortgages rears figures are out for Q2 2013 and guess what, things are (predictably) getting worse. I am sure the Government will say that 'getting worse today'='getting better in the future'. As such, we do live in the world where stabilisation = decline in the rate of decline, while a slight uplift on any time series is greeted as an indisputable 'gathering growth momentum'.

What do the numbers of mortgages arrears tell us, spin aside? I highlight main conclusions in bold.

In Q2 2013 there were 919,139 mortgages accounts outstanding (EUR139,883 million in total), of which 770,610 accounts were for primary residences (EUR109,147 million). Primary residences are referenced as PDH accounts in CBofI. The balance of 148,529 accounts  (EUR30,626 million) relate to Buy-to-lets, BTLs.

This means that over the year through the end of H1 2013, the number of mortgages accounts rose 0.4% and their outstanding volumes fell 2.41%. Deleveraging is very slow in the economy, given the crisis scope: number of primary mortgages accounts rose 0.7% and their volume shrunk 2.52%, while the number of BTLs fell 1.1% and their volume shrunk 2.01%. In fact, as the chart shows, deleveraging process so far is not helping the workout of arrears:


Total number of primary accounts in arrears of any duration is up 11.46% y/y, underlying volume of mortgages represented by these is up 9.1% to EUR25.69 billion from EUR23.55 billion a year ago, while amounts in arrears are up 36.46%, breaching EUR2 billion for the first time. This means that, penalties inclusive, the arrears are now attracting ca EUR202 million in roll up charges annually or about 40% of the annual savings that we need to deliver in Budget 2014 from the social welfare funds.

Total number of BTLs in arrears was up 15.06% y/y and the amounts of mortgages outstanding for the BTLs in arrears rose to EUR10.94 billion - up 11.45% y/y, while the actual cumulated levels of arrears hit EUR1.207 billion, up 43.63% y/y.

All in, there were 182,840 accounts in arrears, representing cumulative amount outstanding of EUR36,634 million and cumulated arrears of EUR3,231 million. These were up: +11.39% y/y for account numbers (+19,924 accounts), +EUR3.267 billion or 9.79% y/y for mortgages outstanding, and +EUR 907 million or +39.05% y/y for actual arrears.


Repossessions accelerated, but remained subdued overall, rising to 1,503 accounts (1,001 accounts for primary residences). This represents a y/y increase of 13.69% for all accounts, 6.04% rise for primary residences and 32.8% jump for BTLs.

Restructured mortgages numbers declined in Q2 2013, from 106,612 accounts to 100,920 accounts over the period of 12 months through June 2013. This breaks down as per decline of 6.57% for primary residences from 84,941 to 79,357 accounts, and a decline of just 0.5% for BTLs from 21,671 to 21,563 accounts.

Performance of restructured mortgages somewhat improved, although we do not know as to why this was the case. Restructured mortgages that were not in arrears as percentage of the total number of restructured mortgages has improved from 47.35% to 53.31% for primary mortgages, and from 51.17% to 61.13% for BTLs.






And some scarier figures for the end:
  • Total number of mortgages at risk of default or defaulted (mortgages in arrears, mortgages restructured and not in arrears, and repossessions) rose to 239,834 in H1 2013 (up 11.27% y/y)
  • Total number of primary mortgages at risk or defaulted rose to to 186,202 in H1 2013 (up 9.94% y/y)
  • Total number of BTL mortgages at risk or defaulted rose to to 53,632 in H1 2013 (up 16.12% y/y)
  • 20.26% of all primary residential mortgages were in arrears or at risk of default in Q1 2013, against 18.50% in Q2 2012.
  • 36.11%of all BTL mortgages were in arrears or at risk of default in Q1 2013, against 30.75% in Q2 2012.
  • 26.09% of all residential mortgages were in arrears or at risk of default in Q1 2013, against 23.55% in Q2 2012.
  • By volume of mortgages outstanding, 33.35% of the total mortgages pool or EUR46,618 million were mortgages either in arrears, or restructured at the end of Q2 2013, up on 29.51% (or EUR42,258 million) at the end of Q2 2012.


Friday, June 21, 2013

21/6/2013: Irish Mortgages Arrears Q1 2013


At last, with a delay of some 4 weeks we have the Mortgages Arrears data for Ireland for Q1 2013. The delay was caused by (my sources tell me) a reporting glitch from one of the institutions. 

At any rate, the CBofI release of the data does not seem to fit any of the conspiracies theories bandied about, so let's assume that it was a glitch. That raises a question - what sort of a glitch can disrupt reporting of something as simple as arrears without having any effect whatsoever on any lender's other operations? I shall leave this question for you to ponder.

What do the figures tell us? As usual, my suggestion is - ignore the spin in the media, read CBofI own release, read https://www.mortgageholders.ie/ position (due tomorrow am) and let's focus on raw numbers here.


In Q1 2013, number of outstanding mortgages accounts relating to principal dwelling houses/residences (PDH) stood at 774,109, down on 792,096 in Q4 2012 - a decline of 2.27% q/q, but an increase of 1.3% y/y. With BTLs added, total number of residential mortgages in the country stood at 923,504 or 2.01% below Q4 2012 and 20.9% above Q2 2012 when reporting began. Much of changes in the total numbers of mortgages in recent quarters is accounted for by classification changes.

While the number of mortgages outstanding dropped by 2.27% for PDH, volumes of loans relating to mortgages decline by far smaller 0.79%.

So observation 1: exits remain based predominantly on pay downs of older vintage, smaller mortgages, leaving the remaining pool of mortgages more toxic.


Total number of accounts in arrears in relation to PDH stood at 142,118 in Q1 2013, down 1.2% from 143,851 accounts in Q4 2012, but up 15.6% y/y. Total outstanding amounts relating to PDH accounts in arrears was up 2.85% q/q at EUR25.485 billion (up 11.21% y/y) and underlying volumes of accumulated arrears rose to EUR1.932 billion (up 7.81% q/q and 39.87% y/y).



Observation 2: Marginal decrease in arrears-impacted mortgages accounts was associated with deeper deterioration in terms of the volumes of PDH mortgages impacted by arrears. The problem got slightly more concentrated and much more toxic.

Number of accounts in arrears in relation to BTL rose to 39,371 in Q1 2013, up 3.73% q/q and up 13.4% y/y. Total outstanding amounts relating to BTL accounts in arrears was up 2.84% q/q at EUR10.891 billion (up 10.94% y/y) and underlying volumes of accumulated arrears were at EUR1.178 billion (down 1.29% q/q and up 40.13% y/y). Note: y/y comparatives for BTLs are only referencing 9 months period since the end of Q2 2012 - the first period for which we have data available.

Observation 3: BTLs continued to tank across the board, although cumulated arrears amounts did decline q/q. Assuming there were no reclassifications, this suggests some write-offs by the banks of defaulted loans.

Total (PDH+BTL) number of accounts in arrears stood at 181.489 in Q1 2013, down 0.17% from 181,806 accounts in Q4 2012, but up 11.4% on Q2 2012 - the earliest for which we have data available for BTL. Total outstanding amounts relating to all mortgages accounts in arrears was up 2.85% q/q at EUR36.376 billion a rise of 9.02% on Q2 2012. However, the core number, relating to cumulated arrears has jumped significantly more than any other arrears-related parameter. This rose to EUR3.11 billion in Q1 2013 up 4.17% q/q and +33.83% on Q2 2012.


Observation 4: across all residential mortgages, the problem of arrears became slightly marginally more concentrated and significantly more toxic.


In Q1 2013, 185,263 PDH mortgages accounts were either at risk of default or defaulting (the category that includes, per my methodology, all mortgages in arrears, all repossessions and all mortgages that are restructured and currently are not in arrears), which is 0.81% down on Q4 2012 and +13.97% up on Q1 2012. At the same time, there were 52,991 BTL accounts at risk or defaulting, up 2.15% q/q and up 14.74% y/y. Which means that across all mortgages, the number of accounts at risk of default or defaulting declined marginally from 238,663 to 238, 254 between Q4 2012 and Q1 2013. The number was up 10.53% y/y.

At the end of Q1 2013, 20.1% of all PDH mortgages accounts were at risk of default or defaulting, up on 19.8% in Q4 2012. The percentage of BTL mortgages that were at risk of default or defaulting in Q1 2013 was 35.5%, up on 34.5% in Q4 2012. 


Among all residential mortgages in Ireland, in Q1 2013 25.8% were at risk of default or defaulting, up on 25.3% in Q4 2012. 9 months ago that percentage stood at 23.6%, implying a swing up of 2.2 percentage points in 9 months or an annualised rate of increase in the incidence of risk of default or defaulting of 2.94 percentage points.


Update:  Here is a link to IMHO statement on today's data: https://www.mortgageholders.ie/irelands-mortgage-crisis-is-blowing-out-of-control/

Thursday, March 7, 2013

7/3/2013: Irish Mortgages Arrears Q4 2012

Mortgages arrears data for private residences in Ireland for Q4 2012 was published today by the Central Bank of Ireland. Few surprises.

As expected, arrears rose. Unexpectedly, the rate of increase was much much slower than before in q/q terms and slower in y/y terms. As encouraging as this might sound, there are some points of concern outlined below. Here are some details of data dynamics first:


  1. In Q4 2012 there were a total of 792,096 accounts relating to private residential mortgages in Ireland - a massive y/y increase from 765,267 accounts in Q4 2011 due to 'reclassification' of some mortgages accounts.
  2. This 'reclassification' made historical comparatives in terms of, say, arrears as % of the total mortgages, utterly useless. This is how Irish official stats go: relabel, re-order, and if it makes things look better by coincidence - spin. 
  3. Total number of mortgages in arrears for private residences rose from 141,389 accounts in Q3 2012 to 143,851 accounts in Q4 2012 - an increase q/q of 1.74%, well below any q/q increase since the beginning of the series. Average increase since Q3 2009 when the data started stands at 6.51%.
  4. Y/y total number of mortgages in arrears increased 21.43% in Q4 2012, the slowest rate of annual increases since the beginning of the series and below the average of 27.77%.
  5. Overall, in Q4 2012, 18.16% of all mortgages still outstanding in the country were in arrears. Adjusting for the CBofI 'reclassification' of mortgages accounts to allow for more direct historical comparative, 18.85% of all mortgages were in arrears. 
  6. Number of mortgages at risk or defaulted (defined as mortgages currently in arrears, restructured and not in arrears, plus repossessions) has risen in Q4 2012 to 186,785 (or 24.48% of the total adjusting for 'reclassifications', 23.58% based on official data) from 185,933 in Q3 2012. This implies a rise of 0.46% q/q and 19.61% y/y. Both represent the slowest rates of increase in series (short) history.
Two charts to illustrate:



Good news: the rates of arrears build up have slowed down in Q 2012. 

Bad news, getting worse slower is not the same as getting better. Especially given the deterioration tallied from 2009 through today. 

Worrying side: impacts of property taxes, banks guarantee lift-off, repossessions orders regime change, and personal insolvency 'reforms' are not visible in the current latest data. All represent a threat of accelerating arrears once again. 

Real news: just under 1/4 of Irish private residences-linked mortgages are now at risk of default, in arreas or defaulted and some 650,000-700,000 people are currently impacted by this crisis to the point of being unable to meet the original conditions of their mortgages.

Thursday, December 13, 2012

13/12/2012: Mortgages at Risk: Acceleration in the Trend


In the previous post (here) I detailed the trends in mortgages arrears in Ireland based on Q3 2012 data released today. Since then, I have seen some comments on the 'dynamics' of the mortgages arrears, suggesting that things are 'getting worse more slowly'.

This is simply incorrect. Here's a chart graphically showing acceleration of overall crisis since Q2 2012:


Note that data through Q3 2010 is imputed by estimating back trend from Q4 2010-Q2 2012 data reported by CBofI. Hence, the jump in orange line at Q3-Q4 2010.

13/12/2012: Irish Mortgages Arrears - Q3 2012


Q3 2012 data for Irish residential mortgages in arrears is out and here is the first summary of horrific details:

  • Total number of residential mortgages in arrears more than 90 days rose from 47,627 to 49,482 between Q3 2011 and Q3 2012 - a rise of 3.89% y/y. This marks acceleration in the rate of increase in arrears 90 days + from 1.13% in Q2 2012.
  • Total number of mortgages in arrears less than 90 days rose to 86,146 in Q3 2012 from 62,970 in Q3 2011 - an increase of 36.8% y/y, compared to a rise of 45.3% in Q2 2012.
  • Total number of accounts in arrears (90 days and over, and under 90 days) rose from 110,597 in Q3 2011 to 135,628 in Q3 2012 - an annual rate of growth of 22.63%. In Q2 2012 the rate of increase was 25.20%.
  • Total number of accounts at risk of default (currently in arrears, plus restructured and not in arrears, plus repossessed) rose to 180,314 in Q3 2012, up 6.5% q/q and up 21.95% y/y. In Q2 2012 the rate of annual increase was 20.92%.
  • Overal value of mortgages at risk now stands at €31,835,683,000 up 6.0% q/q and 19.8% y/y
Charts to illustrate:


Let's make it simple:
  1. Between Q3 2011 and Q3 2012, the % of loan accounts in arrears for more than 90 days rose from 8.1% or all accounts (10.8% of outstanding mortgages values) to 11.3% (15.1% of outstanding mortgages values).
  2. A a year to Q3 2012, the number of mortgages at risk of default or defaulted (including mortgages in arrears, restructured and current not in arreas and repossessions) rose from 147,857 to 180,314
  3. In Q3 2012, mortgages at risk accounted for 24% of all mortgages outstanding accounts and 29% of the total value of outstanding mortgages, up from 19% and 23%, respectively, in Q3 2011.
That's right - almost 1/4 of all mortgages accounts are now at risk or have defaulted, and almost 30% of the total value of outstanding mortgages is at risk.

Updated: here's the Irish Mortgage Holders Organization response to today's Arrears figures.

Saturday, November 17, 2012

17/11/2012: A tradeoff Ireland does not have an option of facing


"Banking Competition, Housing Prices and Macroeconomic Stability" by Oscar Arce and Javier Andres (The Economic Journal, Vol. 122, Issue 565, pp. 1346-1372, 2012 | http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2174836):

The paper develops a macroeconomic model "with an imperfectly competitive bank‐loans market and collateral constraints that tie investors’ credit capacity to the value of their real estate holdings".

The model shows that "lending margins are optimally set by banks and have a significant effect on aggregate variables." [Something that can be potentially magnified by the market structure, such as, for example duopolization of the market, as in the case of Ireland today].

"Fostering banking competition increases total consumption and output by triggering a reallocation of available collateral towards investors." In other words, that 'creative destruction' works - flows of collateral are made more efficient by a competitive banking system.

"Also, stronger banking competition implies higher (lower) persistency of credit and output after a monetary (credit crunch) shock."

"In the short‐run, output, credit and housing prices are more responsive on impact to shocks in an environment of highly competitive banks." "…Key to this last result is the reaction of housing prices and their effect on borrowers' net worth. The response of housing prices is more pronounced when competition among banks is stronger, thus making borrowers' net worth
more vulnerable to adverse shocks and, specially, to monetary contractions."

"Thus, regarding changes in the degree of banking competition, the model generates a trade-off between the long run level of economic activity and its stability at the business cycle frequency."

Of course, the problem for Ireland in the current crisis is that
1) we have an ongoing monetary crisis (with interest rates and FX rates policies out of synch with the economy needs);
2) a solvency crisis (debt overhang); and
3) a liquidity crisis

We are also experiencing a dramatic collapse of competitive forces in the banking sector just when we would hope for the competition in banking to start generating those efficiencies in funding allocations and thus sustaining recovery.

In other words, we have - per paper above - the worst of both worlds, we neither had a cushion of the rigid downward shocks responses in the economy going into the crisis, nor do we have the salvation option of using a competitive banking system to drive up recovery. All that, plus no controls over monetary policy.

And we are still hearing the drivel about a 'Lost Decade' for Ireland? Try decades...

Monday, October 22, 2012

22/10/2012: Financial Crises: Borrowers Pain, Creditors Gain


A very interesting paper on the effects of the financial crises on imbalance of power (and thus the imbalance of the incidence of costs) between the borrowers and the lenders. The paper is a serious reality check for Irish policymakers in the context of the 'reforms' of the Personal Insolvency laws currently being proposed. In fact, the Irish proposed 'reforms' actually tragically replicate the very worst implications of the study summarized below.

"Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial Crises" by Atif R. Mian, Amir Sufi, and Francesco Trebbi (NBER Working Paper No. 17831, February 2012 http://www.nber.org/papers/w17831) shows that "debtors bear the brunt of a decline in asset prices associated with financial crises and policies aimed at partial debt relief may be warranted to boost growth in the midst of crises. Drawing on the US experience during the Great Recession of 2008-09 and historical evidence in a large panel of countries, [the study explores] why the political system may fail to deliver such policies. [The authors] find that during the Great Recession creditors were able to use the political system more effectively to protect their interests through bailouts. More generally we show that politically countries become more polarized and fractionalized following financial crises. This results in legislative stalemate, making it less likely that crises lead to meaningful macroeconomic reforms."


Mortgage recourse:
"The higher level of recourse and tougher rules for declaring bankruptcy are likely to prevent borrowers from declaring default. As a result, debtors in European countries are more likely to absorb financial shocks internally than declare default. …We investigate this …by comparing the change in default rates across Europe and the United States during the 2007 to 2009 global housing crisis. Since the bankruptcy regime is relatively more lax in the United States, one would expect a larger increase in default rates." Controlling for rates of decline in house prices and the level of indebtedness of the borrowing households (LTVs at origination) the authors test explicitly data for US, U.K., Spain, France and Ireland from 2007 to 2009 using data from the European Mortgage Federation. 

Figure 1 


"The change in default rate (red bar) for USA between 2007 and 2009 is 5.9 percentage points. While the default rate level in 2007 is not shown in Figure 1, it is quite low and similar across the five countries (0.4%, 1.2%, 0.7%, 1.9%, and 2.1% for France, Ireland, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States, respectively). …All European countries in Figure 1 have high recourse and tough bankruptcy laws relative to the United States. The very large increase in default rates for the US is consistent with the notion that lower level of recourse and easier bankruptcy legislation helps indebted borrowers declare default. …A collective look at the three housing market variables in Figure 1 shows that the United States experienced the highest increase in default rates by far, despite some of the European countries experiencing very similar (if not stronger) decline in house price (e.g. Ireland) and having similar housing leverage (Ireland and the United Kingdom)."

  
The Political Response to Financial Crises and Debt Overhang:
                                                
"The 2007-2009 US financial crisis provides an interesting case study to examine the political tug of war between debtors and creditors. …[In the US], housing assets were the main asset for low net worth individuals, and their housing positions were quite levered. As a result, the collapse in house prices disproportionately affected low net worth individuals. Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2011) show that at the 10th percentile of the county-level house price distribution, house prices dropped by 40 to 60% depending on the house price index used. This decline would completely wipe out the entire net worth of the median household in lowest quintile of the net worth distribution. CoreLogic reports that 25% of mortgages are underwater; for the low net worth individuals in the US, this effectively means that their total net worth is negative." 

"It is in this context that Mian, Sufi and Trebbi (2010a), henceforth MST, document the political economy of two major bailout bills that were passed in the US Congress in 2008. The first of these bills, the American Housing Rescue and Foreclosure Prevention Act (AHRFPA), provided up to $300 billion in Federal Housing Administration insurance for renegotiated mortgages, which translated into using public funds to provide debtor relief… At the same time, creditors--i.e., the shareholders and debt-holders of large financial institutions--pushed a second bill which was closely tied to protecting their own interests [the $700 billion Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) which eventually led to TARP]…"

"While both debtors and creditors were effective in passing legislation in their favor, there were two important differences in the magnitude of their effectiveness. First, the debtor friendly bill provided fewer resources ($300 billion versus $700 billion) than the creditor friendly legislation… [despite the fact that] debtors faced substantially larger losses …than creditors in the face of the US housing crisis. Second, while the creditor friendly EESA bill was fully implemented and executed, the housing legislation was a miserable failure. As of December 2008, there were only 312 applications for relief under the program and the secretary of Housing and Urban Development was highly critical of the program. … When Obama Administration …implemented the Home Affordability Modification Program under AHRFPA, their initial goal was to help 3 to 4 million homeowners with loan modifications. In July, 2011 President Obama admitted that HAMP program has “probably been the area that's been most stubborn to us trying to solve the problem.”" 

"It is worth noting that one of the main reasons for the ineffectiveness of the HAMP program has been the lack of cooperation from creditors. The initial legislation made creditor cooperation completely voluntary, thereby enabling many creditors to opt out of the program despite qualifying borrowers. In fact, as Representative Barney Frank noted, banks actually helped formulate the program in the summer of 2008."

Need I remind you that in Ireland's reform bill to alter the draconian personal insolvency laws currently on the books, the banks not only have an option of voluntary participation, but an actual veto on resolution mechanism deployed.

"Cross-country evidence on financial crises and change in creditor rights The seminal work of La Porta et al (1998), followed by Djankov et al. (2007), introduced cross-country index of “creditor rights” from 1978 to 2002. The index captures the rights of secured lenders under a country’s legal system. A country has stronger creditor rights if: 
  1.  there are restrictions for a debtor to file for reorganization [In the case of Ireland's Insolvency Law reform, this factor is actually made worse than in the current legislation since the reform law is going to force debtors to undergo a period of compulsory arrangements dictated solely by the banks before they can file for bankruptcy]; 
  2. creditors are able to seize collateral in bankruptcy automatically without any “asset freeze” [again, my reading of Ireland's 'reform' proposals suggests automatic seizure of assets once bankruptcy is granted]; 
  3. secured creditors are paid first [as is the case in Ireland]; and 
  4. control shifts away from management as soon as bankruptcy is declared.  


"Overall, while creditor rights promote the origination of more credit, a financial crisis that results from excessive debt tends to reduce creditor rights. These results highlight a fundamental tension between the benefits of stronger creditor rights ex-ante and the debt overhang costs associated with giving creditor too much power in the financial crisis state of the world. Ex-post relaxation of creditor rights is not the norm after a financial crisis. …More specifically, we show that financial crises are systematically followed by political polarization and that this may result in gridlock and anemic reform. …Financial crises polarize debtors and creditors in society. On the one hand, debtors are weakened by a fall in the value of assets they hold. On the other hand, creditors become more sensitive to write-offs during bad times …and possibly more reluctant to converge onto a renegotiated platform because of their increased reliance on the satisfaction of the original terms of agreement."

Wednesday, September 26, 2012

26/9/2012: Nama valuations & August property prices


As promised - in the last post on today's data release for Irish Residential Property Price Index (RPPI) here's the summary of impact of latest price index movements on Nama valuations.

Note: the figures referenced are approximate and relate to averages of valuations, so these should be treated as a guide. Keep in mind that property prices reaching Nama valuations levels (adjusted for risk-sharing cushion and long-term economic value premium) still imply a loss on Nama books, in my view, due to costs associated with operations, plus the discounts on disposals of properties in volume and over time. Inflation adjustment further increases real loss.

Summary table:

In other words, we need 60%+ uplift on current price levels to achieve a break even on Nama average valuations.

26/9/2012: 2012 forecast for property prices in Ireland


In the previous post I covered main data for August Residential Property Price Index for Ireland. Now, annual forecasts based on data through August:


These imply a cumulated decline of ca3.2% on August 2012 through December 2012, a decline of 2.4-2.5% for Houses, a decline of 3.4-3.5% for Apartments, and a rise of 0-0.25% for Dublin. Obviously, these are not precise figures, so treat with caution.

I currently foresee decline of 51.5% for all properties in 2012 relative to the peak with range of forecasts of 55-61% decline through 2013 relative to peak for all properties index.

I have not updated these figures for some time now - over 6 months so there you go...









26/9/2012: Residential Property Price Index for Ireland, August 2012


Residential Property Price Index for Ireland (RPPI) for August 2012 is out today, triggering a torrent of usual commentary - some optimistic, some more bleak, depending on the focus of the analysis reported. Here are the facts:

Overall RPPI:

  • Index for all properties nationwide has risen marginally to 65.2 in August against July reading of 64.9 and this represents second consecutive monthly rise. M/m index rose 0.46% in August after posting a 0.15% rise in July. 
  • However, index reading remains below May when it stood at 65.5 and marks the third lowest reading in history of the series. 
  • 3mo MA for the overall index is now 64.97 in August and that is below 3mo MA ever recorded in the history of the series.
  • Y/y index fell 11.77% in August, which is an improvement on the fall of 13.58% in July and the shallowest annual rate of decline in any month since February 2011.
  • Overall residential properties prices are now 50.04% below their peak which is an improvement on the absolute bottom level of -50.34% on the peak, albeit statistically-speaking there is no discernable difference.
  • YTD average monthly change in the index is -0.68% and 12mo MA change is -1.03%. In other words, however you spin annual or monthly date, from September 2011 through August 2012 prices have fallen on average at a monthly rate of 1.03%.
Chart to illustrate:

Note, not a factual, but 'interpretative observation, we are seeing some attempts in the market to 'bottom out'. This does not mean that the market will bottom out here, but it does represent a first such instance of an attempt in the market.

Houses prices:

  • Safe as houses stuff prices rose to 68 in August from 67.8 in July marking second consecutive month of increases (in July prices rose 0.296% m/m and in August the rise was 0.295% - both statistically indistinguishable from zero).
  • However, as with overall residential prices, house prices through August failed to regain levels registered in May (68.2).
  • Y/y house prices are down 11.69% in August - slowest rate of annual drop since March 2011.
  • Relative to peak house prices are now down 48.48%
  • YTD average monthly drop is at 0.66% and 12mo MA monthly drop is at 1.03% so the same analysis for dynamics stands as for the overall RPPI above.
Chart on this below (after Apartments analysis).

Apartments prices:
  • Apartments prices firmed up to 46.9 in August from 45.8 in July and are still below the levels attained in June (47.6), implying the index is at the second lowest point in its history.
  • M/m prices rose 2.40% posting the first rise since April 2012. Y/y apartments prices are down 14.57% - the slowest rate of annual decline since February 2011.
  • Relative to peak, shoe boxes (err.. apartments) are now trading at a discount of 62.15%.
  • 12moMA of monthly deflation is at -1.53% and YTD average monthly price drop is -1.59%. Good luck if you are taking any solace from the one month blip.



Dublin prices:

  • Unlike the rest of the country (where I suspect prices changes are driven primarily by thin and selection-biased markets), Dublin property prices have continued steady decline dropping 0.52% m/m in August after 0.35% drop in July. 
  • August thus marks the second consecutive month since prices posted shallow increases in March-May 2012.
  • August also marks the month in which Dublin property prices have hit another record low at 57.3, with the previous record low attained in July (57.6) and in February 2012.
  • Dublin prices are now 57.40% below their peak.



I will be blogging later tonight on my forecasts for 2012 prices and on impact of these prices changes on Nama balancesheet, so stay tuned.

Thursday, August 23, 2012

23/8/2012: Mortgages Arrears in Ireland - Q2 2012


At last we have the data for Q2 2012 mortgages arrears in Ireland, and these are ugly. That's right, folks - ugly.

Let's keep in mind: Irish average household size is at 2.73 persons per household as per Census 2011.

Top numbers:

  • Total number of outstanding mortgages in the state stood at 761,533 in Q2 2012, down 0.34% q/q and down 2.03% y/y. In the previous quarter (Q1 2012) the rate of mortgages decline was 0.63% q/q and 2.34% y/y. This suggests a slowdown in mortgages repayments (deleveraging) in the economy, despite the Government claims to the economic stabilization (something that would be consistent with accelerating deleveraging).
  • Outstanding balances of mortgages are at €111.99 billion in Q2 2012, a decline of 0.62% q/q and 2.69% y/y. Again, compared with Q1 2012, there is a slowdown in deleveraging (-0.70% q/q and -2.82% y/y in Q1 2012).
  • Of all mortgages outstanding, 45,165 mortgages or 5.93% (totaling €7.53 billion or 6.73% of all balances) were in arrears less than 90 days. In Q1 2012 the number was 46,284. This is a mew category of reporting and Central Bank deserves credit for continuing to improve data disclosure to the public.
  • Of all mortgages outstanding, 17,533 (2.3%) of mortgages were in arrears between 91 and 180 days, with mortgage balance of €3.13 billion (2.79%). Good news, there has been a deecrease q/q in these mortgages - down 3.52% (in Q1 2012 there was a rise of 2.06% in this category) in number of accounts and a drop of 5.73% (against a rise of 1.32% in Q1) in mortgages volumes. Year on year, this category of mortgages arrears is up 11.64 in Q2 2012 which marks a slowdown from 27.5% rise y/y in Q1.
  • However, the decline in the 91-180 days category of mortgages in arrears (-640 mortgages q/q) is almost ten-fold smaller than the rise in the arreas 180-days and over category (up 6,261 q/q in Q2). In other words, the decline in mortgages in arrears 91-180 days is explained fully by the rise of mortgages in arrears over 180 days.
  • Number of mortgages in arrears in excess of 180 days now stands at a massive 65,698, up 10.53% q/q in Q2 2012 (in Q1 2012 the same rate of increase was 11.89%) and up 64.1% y/y. These mortgages amount to €13.35 billion - which represents a 10.64% q/q increase and a 67.22% increase y/y.
  • Using old methodology, total arrears over 90 days now amount to 83,251 mortgages (up 7.24% q/q and 49.3% y/y), with a balance of €16.48 billion (up 7.11% q/q and 52.1% y/y). 
  • Thus, currently, 10.93% of all mortgages in Ireland are in arrears 90 days and more, and these amount to 14.72% of total mortgages balances. For comparison, in Q2 2011 these percentages were 7.17% and 9.42% respectively.
  • Using newly available data on mortgages in arrears less than 90 days, total number of mortgages in arrears in Ireland is 128,416 (16.86% of all mortgages outstanding) and these amount to €24.01 billion (21.44% of all outstanding balances).
  • Now, put the above number in perspective - that is around 350,576 people (actually more, since mortgages arrears are likely to impact younger and larger households over retired and smaller households) in this country who are missing payments on their mortgages.
  • In Q2 2012 there were 84,941 restructured mortgages (up 6.56% q/q and 21.63% y/y). The rate of restructuring has declined from Q1 2011 when q/q there was a rise of 7.17% and y/y there was a rise of 26.66%.
  • Of restructured mortgages, 47.35% were not in arrears. Percentage of restructured mortgages in arrears has fallen from 56.41% in Q2 2011 and from 48.50% in Q1 2012. Which, of course, means that more an more restructured mortgages are falling back into arrears, implying that the restructuring solutions do not work for at least 53% of mortgages to which they were applied.
  • As of the end of Q2 2012, there were total of 169,598 mortgages (22.27% of all mortgages outstanding) that were at risk (in arrears, restructured and not in arrears, and subject to repossessions). This represents (using average household size) 463,003 persons.

Charts to illustrate above trends:





At this stage, there is no point of denying that all restructuring and other 'solutions' deployed by the banks and designed by the Government are not working. The mortgages crisis is raging on. When you look at the third chart above, even using old definition of mortgages at risk (>90 days arrears), the trend up is linear, implying a constant rise in mortgages risk. Even abstracting away from the possible effects of the new insolvencies legislation on mortgages defaults, the trend above suggests that by Q1 2013 we will be close to 150,000 mortgages at risk (using in arrears more than 90 days metric). This would push overall mortgages at risk to beyond 200,000. More than half a million Irish people will be living in households at risk of falling behind on their mortgages repayments. The question I would like to ask of our 'leaders' is "Then, what?"

Tuesday, July 24, 2012

24/7/2012: Residential Property Price Index for Ireland, June 2012

So that 'stabilization' in Irish property markets on foot of 0.2% rise in May in the Residential Property Price Index (RPPI) turned out to be just the statistical noise? Looks increasingly so to me. The latest data from CSO is bleak:


"In the year to June, residential property prices at a national level, fell by 14.4%. This compares with an annual rate of decline of 15.3% in May and a decline of 12.9% recorded in the twelve months to June 2011."

Overall residential property prices "fell by 1.1% in the month of June. This compares with
an increase of 0.2% recorded in May and a decline of 2.1% recorded in June of last
year."

Dublin - the 'bright spot of the previous months for the 'green jerseys' hopes on recovery in the property markets has recorded a fall of 1% m/m in June and a 16.4% decline y/y.


"House prices in Dublin are 56% lower than at their highest level in early 2007. Apartments in Dublin are 62% lower than they were in February 2007. Residential property prices in Dublin are 57% lower than at their highest level in February 2007. The fall in the price of residential properties in the Rest of Ireland is somewhat lower at 47%. Overall, the national index is 50% lower than its highest level in 2007."


Charts updates and forecasts later today, so stay tuned.


Monday, June 25, 2012

25/6/2012: RPPI May 2012: Residential property prices in Ireland

CSO's residential property price index (RPPI) is out for May. Headlines are:

  • Overall Index moved from 65.4 in April to 65.5 in May, marking the first (+0.15%) m/m rise since September 2007 (previous best performance months saw zero falls in the index).
  • However, statistically (based on data from January 2008), we need to see a raise of 0.32% (1/2 stdev) at least to make a reasonable judgement on upward gain.
  • Overall RPPI is now at 3moMA of 65.67, down on 3mo MA of 65.87 in April and 67.5 in previous 3mos period through February.
  • Year on year, RPPI slipped -15.27% compared to May 2011 and 3mo MA through May 2012 of 65.67 was significantly below 3mo MA through May 2011 (78.17).
  • Relative to peak, RPPI is now down 49.81% in May 2012 - an improvement on -49.89% for April 2012, but, again, not statistically significant improvement.

Improvements in RPPI were driven by houses and Dublin houses in particular, with Dublin Apartments prices continuing to tank.

Looking at Houses and Apartments:

  • Houses index rose from 68.1 in April to 68.2 in May, marking the first monthly rise (+0.15%) since August 2010 and the largest m/m rise since November 2007. Monthly rise also failed to be statistically significant (stdev=0.643) for the crisis period (since January 2008)
  • 3moMA for houses index is now at 68.4, down on 68.67 in April 2012 and 81.3 in May 2011.
  • House prices index is down 15.17% y/y compared to -16.24% in April 2012 and house prices nationwide are now down 48.3% relative to their peak.
  • Apartments price index is now at 48.6 in May 2012 down 2.02% on 49.6 reading in April 2012 and down 19% year on year.
  • Apartments prices m/m decline in May broke 2 previous months consecutive increases.
  • Apartments prices are now down 60.77% to peak.
  • Monthly decline in apartments prices was statistically significant (stdev=1.56).



Dublin prices drove the overall index this month:

  • RPPI for Dublin stood at 58.4 in May, up on 58.3 in April 2012 (+0.17% m/m) marking the third consecutive m/m increase in the series. However, current rise was not statistically significant (stdev=1.18) and cumulative increases during the last 3 months (total of 1.39%) also fail to be statistically significant.
  • Annually, prices are down 17.51% in May, which is worse than 17.3% y/y decline in April.
  • Relative to peak, Dublin property prices are now down 56.58%.


So nothing new, folks - the market is looking for a catalyst - which is a fancy way of saying that it might go down or up, or stay flat.

Sunday, May 27, 2012

27/05/2012: Residential Property Prices: April 2012

Much has been made in the media on the foot of the latest (April 2012) data for residential property prices in Ireland.

In light of this, let's do some quick analysis of the data. The core conclusions, in my opinion are:

  1. Data from CSO - the best we have - only covers mortgages drawdowns reflecting actual sales. So this is tied to mortgages issuance activity and is of limited use in the markets where cash sales are significant.
  2. If increases in prices are sustained, mortgages drawdowns might be reflective of improved credit flows or credit flows fluctuating along the bottom trend.
  3. The above two points strongly suggest that we need to see more sustained trend to draw any conclusions on alleged 'stabilization' of the market.
  4. Aside from seasonality, the data shows patterns of false bull-runs or 'stabilization' episodes in the trends that usually were followed by downward acceleration on the pre-stabilization trend. Not surprisingly, the core improvements in March-April 2012 are in exactly the segments of the markets where such false starts have been more pronounced in the past.
So caution is warranted. 

Top stats:
  • Residential property price index has fallen from 66.1 in February and March 2012 to 65.4 in April implying m/m change in overall prices of -1.06% - the shallowest monthly decline since July 2011, other than zero change in m/m prices recorded in March 2012. 
  • This m/m pattern of slower decline (to near zero rate of fall) from a steep previous drop, followed by re-acceleration in decline is something that is traceable to October 2010-January 2011, June-August 2011, July-September 2010, February-April 2010, October-December 2009, so caution is warranted in interpreting short-term 'stabilization' episodes.
  • Y/y index fell 16.37% in April, an acceleration on March 2012 y/y decline of 16.32%, but a very slight one. Current y/y decline is the second shallowest since November 2011, so no signs of stabilization here either. In fact, April 2012 y/y rate of decline was the 5th sharpest for any month since January 2010.
  • Index reading continues underperforming its 3mo MA which currently stands at 65.87.
  • Relative to peak, the index is now down 49.89%.
  • Thus, overall, by both, its absolute level, and its 3mo MA, as well as relative to peak, the index is at its new historic low. Stabilization is not happening anywhere at the levels terms.


Chart below shows sub-indices performance for houses and apartments. While it is clear that houses sub-index is the driver of overall prices, the apartments sub-index received much of attention in recent months. The reason for it is two consecutive months of increases in apartments prices. Details are below:



  • Overall, House prices fell in April 2012 to index reading of 68.1 from 68.9 in March, registering a m/m drop of 1.16%. This represents an acceleration from -0.14% m/m decline in March 2012. However, April m/m drop is the shallowest since July 2011. 
  • Despite the above, bot the index and the 3mo MA have again hit their lowest point in history of the series.
  • Y/y house prices are down 16.24% and this is the fastest y/y decline since November 2011. 
  • Relative to peak house prices are now down 48.41%.
  • Apartments prices index has improved from 48.6 in March 2012 to 49.6% in April 2012 (m/m rise of 2.06% following a 0.41% rise in March 2012).
  • However, m/m rises are not rare for the sub-index. Apartments prices subindex rose - in m/m terms - in November 2011 (+2.68%), December 2010 (+0.31%), December 2007 (+0.50%) and posted falt or near-flat (1/4 STDEV from zero reading) in February 2008, January 2011, May 2011, and December 2011. 
  • 3mo MA is now at 48.87% and this is the lowest on the record 3mo MA reading for the sub-index.
  • Y/y the decline in April was 17.88% while March 2012 y/y decline was 20.33%. This is the lowest y/y decline reading since January 2012. However, back in April 2011, y/y decline was 'only' 15.29% - shallower than in April 2012.
  • Relative to peak apartments prices are now down 59.97%.

Conclusion: any talk about 'price trends improvement' in apartments will have to wait for further confirmation of the upward trend.

Chart below shows trends for prices in Dublin - another focal point of attention for those claiming substantive change in property prices trends.


  • Dublin property prices sub-index has improved from 58.0 in march 2012 to 58.3 in April 2012, reaching exactly the same level as in January 2012. Thus, m/m index rose 0.52% which is slower than March 2012 m/m rise of 0.69%. Last time the sub-index posted non-negative m/m change was in July 2011 when it remained unchanged m/m and last time sub-index actually posted positive growth was in May 2011.
  • To see two consecutive monthly rises in the index, however, is rare. We would have to go to January-February 2007 for that. However, index posted a number 'near trend reversals' in the past marked on the chart. All turned out to be false calls and virtually all led to re-acceleration of the downward momentum compared to pre-event.
  • Y/y sub-index posted a decline of 17.30% against 18.31% in March 2012. In April 2011 y/y change was 12.96% - much shallower than current y/y decline.
  • 3mo MA is unchanged in April 2012 at 57.97 compared to March 2012, and is much lower than 71.27 registered in April 2011.
  • Relative to peak, house prices in Dublin are now 56.65% down which is identical to their position in January 2012.

Overall, all data points to potential stabilization that is in a very nascent state. However, this is certainly a local phenomena for now - with Apartments and Dublin properties showing some potential signs of improvement. Only the future can tell if:
  1. we are witnessing actual flattening of the trend, and/or
  2. we are witnessing a reversal of downward trend toward a positive (sustained) trend.

Friday, May 25, 2012

25/5/2012: Mortgages in Arrears: Q1 2012

Latest mortgages arrears data from the CB of Ireland came in with a slight surprise that most of the media should have anticipated. During the launch of the annual report, the CBofI has pre-leaked some of the top-level figures for arrears, with media reports of 10.5% (or ca 80,000) of mortgages in arrears expected in Q1 2012 figures. Of course, given the usual tactic of first exaggerating, then underwhelming (presumably there's some psychological strategy working its magic somewhere here), it should have been expected that actual numbers - bad as they may be otherwise - will 'surprise' to the positive side relative to the leak-related expectations. It might have worked.

Alas, the end numbers - whether or not they are better than leaked out 'estimates' - are pretty dismal.

In Q1 2012, there were 764,138 mortgages outstanding amounting to €112,688.5 million. The latter number is €789 million down on Q4 2011 and€3.27 billion lower than Q1 2011 figure. So in 12 months, with foreclosures and restructuring factored in, Irish mortgagees were able to pay down just 2.82% of the mortgages outstanding. This is not exactly a massive rate of de-leveraging for heavily indebted households.

Of these, 77,630 mortgages were in arrears over 90 days (up 9.4% qoq and 56.5% yoy), with total outstanding amounts of €15,386 million (up 10% qoq and 60.3% yoy). Previous quarter-on-quarter increases were, respectively, 12.7% and 13.1%.

Repossessions in Q1 2012 stood at 961 up from 896 in Q4 2011.

Restructured mortgages:

  • At the end of Q1 2012, there were 38,658 mortgages restructured, but not in arreas, up 5.06% qoq (against previous qoq rise of 1.16%) and up 5.44% yoy.
  • In addition, there were 41.054 restructured mortgages that were in arrears, up 9.23% qoq against previous quarterly rise of 12.67%, and up 56.25% yoy.
Overall, defining at risk or defaulted mortgages as those mortgages that are currently in arrears (including restructured and in arrears), plus restructured but not in arrears mortgages and repossessions:
  • At the end of Q1 2012 there were 117,249 at risk or defaulted mortgages, constituting 15.34% of all mortgages outstanding and amounting to €21.72 billion, or 19.27% of total volume of mortgages outstanding.
  • Number of mortgages at risk or defaulted has increased 7.93% qoq in Q1 2012 as compared to a rise of 8.39% qoq in Q4 2011. Annual rise in Q1 2012 was 34.83%.
  • Volume of mortgages at risk or defaulted has increased 8.09% qoq in Q1 2012 as compared to a rise of 9.8% qoq in Q4 2011, and there was an annual increase of 37.67%.
  • In Q4 2011, mortgages that are at risk or defaulted constituted 14.13% of the total number of mortgages, while in Q1 2011 the proportion was 11.11%, and this rose to 15.34% in Q1 2012.
CHARTS:



Note: more on this next week.

Monday, March 26, 2012

26/3/2012: Residential Property in Ireland - things are still getting worse, faster

Residential Property Price Index for February is out today and, surprise, the property price deflation is accelerating.

Details:

  • All properties headline index now stands at 66.1 down from 67.6 in January 2012 and 80.4 in February 2011. So mom contraction of 2.22% in February 2012 makes this the fastest rate of monthly decline since March 2009 and the third fastest rate of monthly decline in history. Relative to peak, residential property price index is now down 49.35%. 12mo MA of monthly declines is at 1.62% and January-February average is at 2.05%. Year on year index is down 17.79%. Which is what it says on the tin - third month of accelerating declines in prices in a row.
  • House prices sub-index is now at 69.0 against January 2012 reading of 70.4 and February 2011 reading of 83.5. Monthly rate of decline in February was 1.99% - steeper than anything recorded since October 2011, marking third consecutive month of accelerating monthly drops. Year on year, the index is down 17.37%. Compared to peak valuations, house prices index is now 47.73% down. Year-to-date average monthly drop is 1.90% against 12 mo MA decline of 1.58%. Again, house prices are dropping at an accelerated rate now as well.
  • Apartments sub-index has reversed two months of consecutive shallow gains in November -December 2011 and run a 4.30% contraction inJanuary 2012. February 2012 monthly drop was even larger at 5.47%. The sub-index now reads 48.4 against February 2011 reading of 63.5. Year on year February apartments prices index stood at -23.78%. 12mo MA decline is 2.06% and this has dramatically accelerated to January-February average of 4.88% monthly rate of price declines.
  • Dublin properties prices sub-index was at 57.6 in February 2012, down 1.2% on January 2012 and down 20.33% on February 2011. This is the only major sub-index that posted de-acceleration in monthly contraction rates. 12mo MA contraction rate is 1.87% and January-February average is 2.58%, but January mom decline was 3.95% against 1.20% drop in February.
Charts to illustrate:




Note: no update to my forecasts.

Nama valuations:




Thursday, March 8, 2012

8/3/2012: Economy on a flat-line: Sunday Times 4/3/2012


This is an unedited version of my article in Sunday Times March 4, 2012.



This week, the conflicting news from the world’s largest economy – the US, have shown once again the problems inherent in economic forecasting. Even a giant economy is capable of succumbing to volatility while searching to establish a new or confirm an old trend. The US economy is currently undergoing this process that, it is hoped, is pointing to the reversal in the growth trend to the upside in the near future. The crucial point, however, when it comes to our own economy, is that even in the US economy the time around re-testing of the previously set trend makes short-term data a highly imperfect indicator of the economic direction.

In contrast to the US economy, however, Irish data currently bears little indication that we are turning the proverbial corner on growth. It is, however, starting to show the volatility that can be consistent with some economic soul-searching in months ahead. Majority of Irish economic indicators have now been bouncing for 6 to 12 months along the relatively flat or only gently declining trend. Some commentators suggest that this is a sign of the upcoming turnaround in our economic fortunes. Others have pointed to the uniform downward revisions of the forecasts for Irish growth for 2012 by international and domestic economists as a sign that the flattening trend might break into a renewed slowdown. In reality, all of these conjectures are at the very best educated guesswork, for our economy is simply too volatile and the current times are too uncertain to provide grounds for a more ‘scientific’ approach to forecasting.

Which means that to discern the potential direction for the economy in months ahead, we are left with nothing better than look at the signals from the more transparent, real economy-linked activities such as monthly changes in prices, retail sales and house price indices, and longer-range trade flows statistics, unemployment and workforce participation data.

This week we saw the release of two of the above indicators: residential property price index and retail sales. The former registered another massive decline, with residential property prices falling 17.4% year on year in January 2012, after posting a 16.7% annual decline in December 2011 and 15.6% decline in November 2011. With Dublin once again leading the trend compared to the rest of the country, there appears to be absolutely no ‘soul-searching’ as house prices continue to drop. House prices, of course, provide a clear signal as to the direction of the domestic investment – and despite all the noises about the vast FDI inflows and foreign buyers ‘kicking tyres’ around empty buildings and sites – this direction is down.

More interesting are the volatile readings from the retail sales data.

The headline indices of retail sales volumes and values for January 2012, released this week were just short of horrific. Year on year, retail sales declined 0.34% in value terms and 0.76% in volume terms. Monthly declines were 3.7% across both value and volume. Relative to peak, overall retail sales are now down 25% in value terms and 21% in volume. January monthly declines in value and volume were the worst since January 2010. Stripping out motor trade, on the annual basis, core retail sales fell 1.94% in value terms and 2.74% in volume terms, although there was a month-on-month rise of 0.3% in value index. Monthly performance in volume of sales was the worst since February 2011.

Looking at the detailed decomposition of sales, out of twelve core Retail Businesses categories reported by CSO, ten have posted annual contractions in January in terms of value of sales. The two categories that posted increases were Fuel (up 5%) and Non-Specialised Stores (ex-Department Stores) (up 1.7%). The former posted a rise due to oil inflation, while the latter represents a small proportion of total retail sales – neither is likely to yield any positive impact on business environment in Ireland. In volume terms, increases in sales were recorded also in just two categories. Non-Specialised Stores sales rose 1.0%, while Pharmaceuticals Medical and Cosmetic Articles rose 1.5% year on year. Overall, only one out of 12 categories of sales posted increases in both value and volume of sales. All discretionary consumption items, including white goods and household maintenance items posted significant, above average declines in a further sign that households are continuing to tighten their belts, cutting out small-scale household investment and durables. The trend direction is broadly in line with November 2011-January 2012 3-months averages, but showing much sharper rates of contraction in demand in January.

The above confirm the broader downward trend in domestic demand that is relatively constant since Q1 2010 and is evident in value and volume indices as well as in total retail sales and core sales. More importantly, all indications are that the trend is likely to persist.

One of the core co-predictors – on average – of the retail sector activity is consumer confidence. Despite a significant jump in January 2012, ESRI consumer confidence indicator continues to bounce along the flat line, with current 6 months average at 56.5 virtually identical to the previous 6 months average and behind 2010-2011 average of 57.3. Based on the latest reading for consumer confidence, the forecast for the next 3 months forward for retail sales is not encouraging with volumes sales staying at the average levels of the previous 6 months and the value of sales being supported at the current levels solely by energy costs inflation.

Lastly, since 2010 I have been publishing an Index of Retail Sector Activity that acts as a strong predictor of the future (3 months ahead) retail sales and is based both on CSO data and ESRI consumer confidence measures, adjusted for income and earnings dynamics. The Index current reading for February-April is indicating that retail sales sector will remain in doldrums for the foreseeable future, posting volume and value activity at below last 6 months and 12 months trends.

Which means that the sector is likely to contribute negatively to unemployment and further undermining already fragile household income dynamics for some of the most at-risk families. During the first half of the crisis, most of jobs destruction in both absolute and relative terms took place in the construction sector, dominated by men. Thus, for example, in 2009 number of women in employment fell 4.2%, while total employment declined 8.1%. By 2010, numbers of women in employment were down 2.8% against 4.2% overall drop in employment. Last year, based on the latest available data, female employment was down 2% while total employment fell 2.5%. In other words, more and more jobs destruction is taking place amongst women, as further confirmed by the latest Live Register statistics also released this week, showing that in February 2012, number of female claimants rose by 3,479 year on year, while the number of male claimants dropped 8,356 over the same period.

The misfortunes of the retail sector are certainly at play in these. Per CSO, female employment in the Wholesale and Retail Trade sector has fallen at more than double the rate of overall retail sector employment declines in 2010 and 2011. Relative to the peak, total female employment is now down 10.2%, while female employment in retail sector is down 17.9%.

Traditionally, acceleration of jobs destruction amongst women is associated with increasing incidences of dual unemployment households. This is further likely to be reinforced by the increasing losses of female jobs in the retail sector, due to overlapping demographics and relative income distributions. Such development, in turn, will put even more pressure on both consumption and investment in the domestic economy.

CHART

Source: CSO and author own calculations

Box-out:

The forthcoming Referendum on the EU Fiscal Compact will undoubtedly open a floodgate of debates concerning the economic, social and political implications of the vote. Yet, it is the economic merits of the treaty that require most of the attention. A recent research paper by Alessandro Piergallini and Giorgio Rodano from the Centre for Economic and International Studies, University of Rome, makes a very strong argument that in the world of distortionary (or in other words progressive) taxation, passive fiscal policies (policies that target constitutionally or legislatively-mandated levels of public debt relative to GDP) are not feasible in the presence of the active monetary polices (policies that focus solely on inflation targeting). In other words, in the real world we live in, the very idea of Fiscal Compact might be incompatible with the idea of pure inflation targeting by the ECB. Which is, of course, rather intuitive. If a country or a currency block were to pre-commit itself to a fixed debt/GDP ratio, then inflation must be allowed to compensate for the fiscal imbalances created in the short run, since levying higher taxation will ultimately lead to economic distortions via household decisions on spending and labour supply. Given that ECB abhors inflation, the Fiscal Compact must either be associated with increasingly less distortionary (less progressive) taxation or with the ECB becoming less of an inflation hawk.