Some interesting points on Nama, coming out of Minister Lenihan's answers to Dail questions this Wednesday, April 28 (emphasis is mine):
"The NAMA SPV structure has a subscribed capital of €100m. As explained to the Dail at the time of the legislation, and subsequently agreed with the EU, 49% of this capital was advanced by NAMA and 51% by private investors.
Three private investors, namely, Irish Life Investment Managers, New Ireland Assurance and a group of clients of Allied Irish Banks Investment Managers, have each invested €17m in the vehicle. It is important to note that in each case the beneficial owners of the investment are pension funds or other clients of these investment companies and not the parent credit institution. [It is equally important to note that in each case the full owner of each one of these entities is an institution directly involved either in Nama or in Banks Guarantee scheme, which, of course, under normal rules of engagement would imply potential conflict of interest]
The SPV has been established in accordance with Eurostat rules. The Board of the SPV is chaired by the CEO of NAMA and has three NAMA nominated directors with the private investors retaining the right to nominate a further three directors. Thus the SPV is structured in such a manner that NAMA representatives will maintain an effective veto over decisions of the SPV Board. [Thus the so-called 'veto' is a de facto, not de jure. Should one of the Nama representatives on the board fall ill, be delayed in travel or be absent on some state-sponsored junket, in absence of the said member, it is quite possible - even if only in theory - that the veto power can pass over to the 'private' owners of SPV.]
Further:
"In line with my statement to the House on 30 March on the banking situation, I subsequently issued Promissory Notes on 31 March to Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building Society. These Notes will ensure that both institutions continue to meet their regulatory capital requirements. The initial principal amount of the Note that issued to Anglo Irish Bank is €8.3bn and to INBS it is €2.6bn. As I indicated in my recent statement, it is likely that Anglo will need further capital in due course but the extent and timing of such further support remains to be determined.
The terms of the Promissory Notes that issued to both institutions on 31 March are substantively the same and, inter alia, provide that 10% of the principal amount will, if demanded by the institution, be paid each year and that the first such payment will fall due for payment from the Central Fund on 31 March 2011. An annual interest coupon, related to Government bond yields, is also payable on the Promissory Notes which the Minister has absolute discretion to pay on the due date or to add to the principal amount. [So, in contradiction to the deeply-informed Dara O'Brien TD, it is the state who will be paying interest to the banks. Not the other way around]
This ensures that the Note meets accounting requirements to be “fair valued” at the principal amount in the annual accounts of each institution, consistent with the regulatory capital requirements. [This sentence is an example of Minister's habitual abuse of financial terminology, in so far as it makes absolutely no rational sense to anyone even vaguely familiar with finance. 'Fair valued' must refer to a benchmark, being a comparative/relative term. 'Fair valued at the principal amount' is gobbledygook as principal amount - the face value of the bond/note can only be valued in relation to the price of the bond or yield on the bond, none of which are referenced in Minister's statement. Furthermore, fair value concept does not refer to the regulator capital requirements. It refers only - I repeat, only - to the market value of the bond/note.]
In the event of a winding-up of either institution, the aggregate of the outstanding principal amount and any unpaid interest that has accrued on the institution’s Note falls due for immediate payment. [So, at least in theory, the Exchequer might face an immediate call for billions of euros in cash... what provisions have been made to ensure we will have this covered? How will Minister Lenihan be able to raise such funding even if the economy is not in crisis? What will be the additional cost of having to raise such funding in a fire-issue of a new state bond? Has the Minister established adequate pricing scheme to charge the banks for the taxpayers assuming such a risk or has he 'gifted' this risk premium away, thereby potentially exposing taxpayers to added hundreds of millions in new costs of such emergency issuance?]
The Deputy may also wish to note that, as indicated in my banking statement of 30 March, the use of Promissory Notes means that the institution’s capital requirements are met in a way which spreads the cash payments over a number of years and thereby reduces the funding burden on the Exchequer that would otherwise arise in the current year. [This statement clearly shows that Minister Lenihan does not understand the basics of interest rate/yield curve relationships. He implicitly assumes that in the future, the state borrowing costs will be lower than they are today. There is absolutely no reason for such an assumption.]
Showing posts with label NAMA bonds. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NAMA bonds. Show all posts
Friday, April 30, 2010
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
Economics 31/03/2010: Nama funding scheme - Maddoffian Risk Pyramid
The saga of Nama continues, folks. Ah, and no, I do not mean the dumping of €8.3 billion to the Anglo which miraculously declared losses of €12bn = €4bn injected by taxpayer in 2009 + €8.3bn injected today. Had the Exchequer given Anglo €15bn last night, the bank would have declared losses of €19bn. And not even the admission on the public airways, by our illustrious 'public interest' director soon-to-be-chief of Anglo, Alan Dukes, that Anglo will most likely need more than additional €10bn promised to it by overly-generous-with-other-people-money Mr Lenihan.
Oh no - the really worrying thing is contained in the notes from March 26th issued by Nama (available here) that detail the financing arrangements that Nama will undertake to cover the purchases of the loans from Irish banks.
Some time ago it was rumored that the Government was setting on the following scheme:
Let me remind you what the problem with this scheme is.
Nama is buying long-term loans with work-out period stretched over 10-15 years. It will use short term financing to get these through. Problem 1: borrowing short to lend long is what got out banks into this mess in the first place. Now, Nama will have exactly the same risk-loaded funding structure as the worst of our banks. For example, at the peak of risk-loading, Anglo carried about 50% of its funding in short-term inter-banks loans. Nama will do the same for 100% of its funding requirement. Scared yet?
Nama will be loading up with short term debt as the yield curve for Libor and Euribor is pointing up. In other words, every progressive reset (6 months) and roll-over of the debt (12 months) will be more expensive to the State. My third year UCD undergrads last Fall knew that this is a bad risk. Nama, having paid millions to advisers and 'experienced' staff couldn't get it right! Trembling yet?
Nama will be rolling over bonds on an annual basis. This means annual transactions costs (making the entire borrowing much more expensive) and reliance on the ECB to re-collateralize the bonds (putting Frank Fahey's 'free lunch' funding out to new tender annually). Is anyone actually thinking about any of these risks out in the Treasury Building on Grand Canal Street?
Adding insult to injury - despite being issued by the agent different than the Sovereign, Nama bonds will be tax-exempt. In other words, issued at Euribor of, say 2.75%, the notes will effectively be priced at around 3.44%. Worse, the Guarantee statement obliges the Irish state to cover incidental and other expenses of the bond holders and exempts them from all and any taxes relating to the Guarantee. In other words, should the bond holders resell their Nama bonds at a profit (in part determined by the Guarantee), there will be no tax on such a resale.
In short, it appears that neither Nama, nor an army of its excruciatingly expensive advisers, nor DofF, nor the Government have any knowledge that normal interest yield curves are upward sloping - cost of borrowing, normally rises in time. Or may be they simply do not care. After all, its our money they are gambling with.
Oh no - the really worrying thing is contained in the notes from March 26th issued by Nama (available here) that detail the financing arrangements that Nama will undertake to cover the purchases of the loans from Irish banks.
Some time ago it was rumored that the Government was setting on the following scheme:
- Nama will issue 12 month bonds
- With interest rate rest at Euribor-Libor plus a margin every 6 months
- Which are to be fully unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by the state as ranking pari passu with the Nama other unsecured and unsubordinated debts.
Let me remind you what the problem with this scheme is.
Nama is buying long-term loans with work-out period stretched over 10-15 years. It will use short term financing to get these through. Problem 1: borrowing short to lend long is what got out banks into this mess in the first place. Now, Nama will have exactly the same risk-loaded funding structure as the worst of our banks. For example, at the peak of risk-loading, Anglo carried about 50% of its funding in short-term inter-banks loans. Nama will do the same for 100% of its funding requirement. Scared yet?
Nama will be loading up with short term debt as the yield curve for Libor and Euribor is pointing up. In other words, every progressive reset (6 months) and roll-over of the debt (12 months) will be more expensive to the State. My third year UCD undergrads last Fall knew that this is a bad risk. Nama, having paid millions to advisers and 'experienced' staff couldn't get it right! Trembling yet?
Nama will be rolling over bonds on an annual basis. This means annual transactions costs (making the entire borrowing much more expensive) and reliance on the ECB to re-collateralize the bonds (putting Frank Fahey's 'free lunch' funding out to new tender annually). Is anyone actually thinking about any of these risks out in the Treasury Building on Grand Canal Street?
Adding insult to injury - despite being issued by the agent different than the Sovereign, Nama bonds will be tax-exempt. In other words, issued at Euribor of, say 2.75%, the notes will effectively be priced at around 3.44%. Worse, the Guarantee statement obliges the Irish state to cover incidental and other expenses of the bond holders and exempts them from all and any taxes relating to the Guarantee. In other words, should the bond holders resell their Nama bonds at a profit (in part determined by the Guarantee), there will be no tax on such a resale.
In short, it appears that neither Nama, nor an army of its excruciatingly expensive advisers, nor DofF, nor the Government have any knowledge that normal interest yield curves are upward sloping - cost of borrowing, normally rises in time. Or may be they simply do not care. After all, its our money they are gambling with.
Monday, September 21, 2009
Economics 21/09/2009: ECB's penalties?
Updated version (00:42am September 22)
On June 23, 2009, ECB opened bidding for its first 12-month refinancing operation.
Back in May 2009, the ECB announced that it would double the maximum length of time it lends money from six months to a year and in June it set the rate for 12-months financing at 1%.
Last time it applied a longer term horizon, ECB placed 348.6 billion euros in December 2007.
So in the nutshell, 1.5% coupon on our bonds bound for ECB and bearing 6 months maturity is a rotten deal.
How rotten? If we were to issue bonds at the ECB own long term financing facility rate with 12 months maturity. The expected cost of total borrowing over 15 years inclusive of the expected costs of roll-overs and reflective of the expected yield curve for ECB rates will be around €15.4bn. In contrast, current structure of 1.5% pa coupon plus 6-months maturity is expected to yield total interest cost of ca €17.5-18.9bn. Then again, what’s €2.1-3.5bn for the Government that burns through €400mln in borrowing on a weekly basis?
What is interesting is why didn't ECB make a similar deal with the Irish Government, allowing it to issue lower coupon bonds or extend maturity of these bonds or both? One can only speculate, for ECB will never tell one way or the other, but I suspect the answer to this lies within the ECB statement that Nama should not overpay for assets it purchases.
Hmmm... Leni took his plan to the ECB men, saying we will buy €77bn worth of stuff, that includes €9bn of rolled up interest, and we will pay €54bn for it. The ECB men pulled out a calculator and extracted: [€54bn/(€77bn-€9bn)-1]*100%=20.6%. The ECB men stared at Leni in disbelief... "Herr Brian, yor ekonomi iz in truble? Djast less fan 21% dropp in yor properti praicez?" 'Oh," replied Brian Lenihan, "but Frank Fahey School of Economics says you'll give us free money!" And here the ECB men smelled a rat...
Otherwise why would the ECB, amidst quantitative easing exercise, impose sanction-level conditions on our bonds? 6-months paper and 1.5% is worse than what ECB gives money to commercial banks at. Much worse, folks.
Now, ECB is no stranger to being taken for a ride. What is telling is that ECB's reaction to 'abuses' in the past is very similar to its reaction to Nama to date.
Most recently, back in July 2008, both the Australian bank, Macquarie Group and the British building society Nationwide have used their Irish subsidiaries to upload hundreds of millions of dodgy ABS packages (in the case of Macquarie, €455mln was borrowed against the most ridiculous collateral –Australian car loans) at the ECB discount window.
On September 4, 2008, ECB’s President, Jean- Claude Trichet stated that he will make it more expensive for banks to borrow from the ECB against most asset-based securities, starting from February 1, 2009. Amidst the crisis gripping European markets at the time, ECB raised `haircut' on the securities it allows to be used as a collateral for 12-months borrowing from 2% to 12%. Additional 4.4% were to apply to paper with no immediate market price.
Note, Irish haircut on bad debts is in effect just below 21% - not that far off the haircuts applied by the ECB (16.4%) on lending backed by much more robust collateral (average European mortgage-securing assets - i.e prperty markets - are down single digits across the entire crisis) than dodgy Irish development projects (down 60-80% and some down 90% in value and falling). When ECB haircut on unsecured banks bonds is added, the total asset discount that ECB could have applied was in excess of 21%. But what is even more significant, the value of the underlying assets accepted by the ECB is supposed to be calculated as the market price less the haircut.
Again, this stands in contrast to Nama which is taking not senior bonds, but ordinary loans, and which is using farcical long-term-economic-value 'pricing', not current market prices. Despite this, Nama haircuts are just 20.6% (once rolled up interest is accounted for) on lower grade assets than the ECB would consider at its window…
No wonder they won’t let Ireland issue bonds with a coupon of 1% or less with 12-months maturity - as would be consistent with a rating on par or better than that for commercial banks. In effect, contrary to the assertions of Brian Lenihan, it is now clear that the 1.5% for 6-months paper deal is far from being endorsed by the ECB. Instead it is a reflection of ECB’s unease with the details of Nama plans. All in, the ECB is now applying nearly as strict terms to the Irish Government Nama bonds as it does to private sector bonds issued by less than thriving European banks.
In July 2008, before changes were announced, the ECB run two-tier pricing system, whereby haircuts of 0.5-5.5% applied to Government paper against the key ECB rate of 4.25%. Mortgage-backed securities – especially Spanish and Irish ones – incurred 18% haircut. Now, do the maths – the spread of 0.5-5.5% haircut on 4.25% lending rate implies the cost of capital of 5-10% for government bonds collateral and up to 24% for MBS. Since July 2008, Irish property markets have fallen by over 12%, so the same collateral rules, that were described by analysts as being loose back in 2008 would require a haircut of ca 27% at the very least, for 1-year long holding period. Again, Nama is implying a haircut of 20.6% on a 15-year holding period.
27% cut held over 1 year was a ‘loose’ condition that had to be drastically revised by the ECB, but 20.6% shave on 15-year holding is deemed by the Irish Government to be reasonable? Who do they think they are foolin?
Another interesting note: following the expression of it dissatisfaction with ‘loose’ borrowing by Spanish and Irish banks, the ECB started quietly talking to the banks urging them to fall in-line. Exactly the same has happened when the ECB issued its thinly veiled directive to Leni – ‘do not overpay for Nama assets’…
On June 23, 2009, ECB opened bidding for its first 12-month refinancing operation.
Back in May 2009, the ECB announced that it would double the maximum length of time it lends money from six months to a year and in June it set the rate for 12-months financing at 1%.
Last time it applied a longer term horizon, ECB placed 348.6 billion euros in December 2007.
So in the nutshell, 1.5% coupon on our bonds bound for ECB and bearing 6 months maturity is a rotten deal.
How rotten? If we were to issue bonds at the ECB own long term financing facility rate with 12 months maturity. The expected cost of total borrowing over 15 years inclusive of the expected costs of roll-overs and reflective of the expected yield curve for ECB rates will be around €15.4bn. In contrast, current structure of 1.5% pa coupon plus 6-months maturity is expected to yield total interest cost of ca €17.5-18.9bn. Then again, what’s €2.1-3.5bn for the Government that burns through €400mln in borrowing on a weekly basis?
What is interesting is why didn't ECB make a similar deal with the Irish Government, allowing it to issue lower coupon bonds or extend maturity of these bonds or both? One can only speculate, for ECB will never tell one way or the other, but I suspect the answer to this lies within the ECB statement that Nama should not overpay for assets it purchases.
Hmmm... Leni took his plan to the ECB men, saying we will buy €77bn worth of stuff, that includes €9bn of rolled up interest, and we will pay €54bn for it. The ECB men pulled out a calculator and extracted: [€54bn/(€77bn-€9bn)-1]*100%=20.6%. The ECB men stared at Leni in disbelief... "Herr Brian, yor ekonomi iz in truble? Djast less fan 21% dropp in yor properti praicez?" 'Oh," replied Brian Lenihan, "but Frank Fahey School of Economics says you'll give us free money!" And here the ECB men smelled a rat...
Otherwise why would the ECB, amidst quantitative easing exercise, impose sanction-level conditions on our bonds? 6-months paper and 1.5% is worse than what ECB gives money to commercial banks at. Much worse, folks.
Now, ECB is no stranger to being taken for a ride. What is telling is that ECB's reaction to 'abuses' in the past is very similar to its reaction to Nama to date.
Most recently, back in July 2008, both the Australian bank, Macquarie Group and the British building society Nationwide have used their Irish subsidiaries to upload hundreds of millions of dodgy ABS packages (in the case of Macquarie, €455mln was borrowed against the most ridiculous collateral –Australian car loans) at the ECB discount window.
On September 4, 2008, ECB’s President, Jean- Claude Trichet stated that he will make it more expensive for banks to borrow from the ECB against most asset-based securities, starting from February 1, 2009. Amidst the crisis gripping European markets at the time, ECB raised `haircut' on the securities it allows to be used as a collateral for 12-months borrowing from 2% to 12%. Additional 4.4% were to apply to paper with no immediate market price.
Note, Irish haircut on bad debts is in effect just below 21% - not that far off the haircuts applied by the ECB (16.4%) on lending backed by much more robust collateral (average European mortgage-securing assets - i.e prperty markets - are down single digits across the entire crisis) than dodgy Irish development projects (down 60-80% and some down 90% in value and falling). When ECB haircut on unsecured banks bonds is added, the total asset discount that ECB could have applied was in excess of 21%. But what is even more significant, the value of the underlying assets accepted by the ECB is supposed to be calculated as the market price less the haircut.
Again, this stands in contrast to Nama which is taking not senior bonds, but ordinary loans, and which is using farcical long-term-economic-value 'pricing', not current market prices. Despite this, Nama haircuts are just 20.6% (once rolled up interest is accounted for) on lower grade assets than the ECB would consider at its window…
No wonder they won’t let Ireland issue bonds with a coupon of 1% or less with 12-months maturity - as would be consistent with a rating on par or better than that for commercial banks. In effect, contrary to the assertions of Brian Lenihan, it is now clear that the 1.5% for 6-months paper deal is far from being endorsed by the ECB. Instead it is a reflection of ECB’s unease with the details of Nama plans. All in, the ECB is now applying nearly as strict terms to the Irish Government Nama bonds as it does to private sector bonds issued by less than thriving European banks.
In July 2008, before changes were announced, the ECB run two-tier pricing system, whereby haircuts of 0.5-5.5% applied to Government paper against the key ECB rate of 4.25%. Mortgage-backed securities – especially Spanish and Irish ones – incurred 18% haircut. Now, do the maths – the spread of 0.5-5.5% haircut on 4.25% lending rate implies the cost of capital of 5-10% for government bonds collateral and up to 24% for MBS. Since July 2008, Irish property markets have fallen by over 12%, so the same collateral rules, that were described by analysts as being loose back in 2008 would require a haircut of ca 27% at the very least, for 1-year long holding period. Again, Nama is implying a haircut of 20.6% on a 15-year holding period.
27% cut held over 1 year was a ‘loose’ condition that had to be drastically revised by the ECB, but 20.6% shave on 15-year holding is deemed by the Irish Government to be reasonable? Who do they think they are foolin?
Another interesting note: following the expression of it dissatisfaction with ‘loose’ borrowing by Spanish and Irish banks, the ECB started quietly talking to the banks urging them to fall in-line. Exactly the same has happened when the ECB issued its thinly veiled directive to Leni – ‘do not overpay for Nama assets’…
Saturday, September 19, 2009
Economics 19/09/2009: Nama, bondholders and shareholders
Setting aside, for now, the issue of who subsidises who in Nama, a quick note on opportunity cost of the undertaking when it comes to the structure of Irish Financial Services in general.
June 2009 paper from a group of US and Canadian researchers, published for the European Finance Association, 2009 meeting (here) provides an interesting read. The study delivers "...a comprehensive analysis of a new and increasingly important phenomenon: the simultaneous holding of both equity and debt claims of the same company by non-bank institutional investors (“dual holders”). The presence of dual holders offers a unique opportunity to assess the existence and magnitude of shareholder-creditor conflicts. We find that syndicated loans with dual holder participation have loan yield spreads that are 13-20 basis points lower than those without. The difference is even greater after controlling for the selection effect. Further investigation of dual holders’ investment horizons and changes in borrowers’ credit quality lends support to the hypothesis that incentive alignment between shareholders and creditors plays an important role in lowering loan yield spreads."
Without giving too much technical detail, the study effectively says that inducing greater share of bond holders to also hold equity (or vice versa) results in lower cost of credit to the firm.
Now, recall that my Nama3.0 or Nama Trust proposal (here) has, as one of the first conditions for taxpayer bailout, a full or partial conversion of Irish Banks' debt holders into equity holders. This would have achieved two positive outcomes simultaneously:
June 2009 paper from a group of US and Canadian researchers, published for the European Finance Association, 2009 meeting (here) provides an interesting read. The study delivers "...a comprehensive analysis of a new and increasingly important phenomenon: the simultaneous holding of both equity and debt claims of the same company by non-bank institutional investors (“dual holders”). The presence of dual holders offers a unique opportunity to assess the existence and magnitude of shareholder-creditor conflicts. We find that syndicated loans with dual holder participation have loan yield spreads that are 13-20 basis points lower than those without. The difference is even greater after controlling for the selection effect. Further investigation of dual holders’ investment horizons and changes in borrowers’ credit quality lends support to the hypothesis that incentive alignment between shareholders and creditors plays an important role in lowering loan yield spreads."
Without giving too much technical detail, the study effectively says that inducing greater share of bond holders to also hold equity (or vice versa) results in lower cost of credit to the firm.
Now, recall that my Nama3.0 or Nama Trust proposal (here) has, as one of the first conditions for taxpayer bailout, a full or partial conversion of Irish Banks' debt holders into equity holders. This would have achieved two positive outcomes simultaneously:
- reduce demand for taxpayer funds, while assuring that some private markets trading in banks' equity will remain post-Nama Trust implementation; and
- per above study, lead to a long term improvement in the cost of liquidity for Irish banks.
Saturday, September 12, 2009
Economics 12/09/2009: More NAMA lies exposed
One interesting observation on Nama and a quick follow up to the developing story on ECB alleged unwillingness to deal with nationalized banks.
We, on the critics of Nama side, have expended much gunpowder arguing that there is a natural, legally binding order of rights contained in each asset class held by investors in and lenders to the banks. This order requires that first to take the hit in any balance sheet adjustment will be the shareholders. Then the subordinated debt holders and lastly the secured debt holders. This argument is used by myself and others to show that taxpayer must be last in the firing line - after all of the above take their dose of bitter medicine.
Yet in all of this excitement we forgot the humble contractors. Now, many of the loans Nama will buy into will be written against properties on which some work has been performed in the recent past, or is even ongoing today. The problem is, our heroic developers in many cases have not paid their bills to the contractors providing this work. As far as I can understand, these unpaid contractors are the holders of the priority right on repayment in the case of liquidation of the development firm - ahead of the bank holding lien on the property.
Of course, Nama can go and tell the larger contractors that, look guys, you forget your claims on work done, write it off as a loss on your taxes and we will look after you when time comes to finish the properties. Smaller contractors will be simply told to get lost - suing the state (Nama) is a very expensive business for them. This is dandy in the banana republic we live in. But estimated (rumored) 30% of the properties Nama will claim under loans purchases will be outside this state - in countries like the USA, UK, France, Germany, Bulgaria, Romania. Nama has no sway there and their courts are not going to toe Brian Lenihan's line of National Interest. So in these countries, the unpaid or underpaid contractors can seize the properties ahead of Nama, leaving Nama with loans devoid of collateral.
This should be fun to watch as our legal eagles from Nama fly over to, say,
Now to the issue of ECB. Several of us - again from the Nama critics or sceptics - have done some digging on the issue. What my colleagues now firmly claim is that per their sources, there is a mandate on the ECB to actually treat publicly owned banks in exactly the same way as privately held banks so as not privilege the former over the latter.
Here is what I have found:
Per ECB own research paper The European Central Bank: History, Role and Functions written by Hanspeter K Scheller (link to it here) (Second revised edition, 2006), Annex I provides excerpts from the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Part 3 Community Policies, Title VII: Economic and monetary policy, Chapter 1 "Economic Policy":
"Article 101
1. Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the ECB or with the central banks of the Member States (hereinafter referred to as ‘national central banks’) in favour of Community institutions or bodies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the ECB or national central banks of debt instruments.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to publicly owned credit institutions which, in the context of the supply of reserves by central banks, shall be given the same treatment by national central banks and the ECB as private credit institutions."
Emphasis is mine. This clearly states that the pro-Nama supporters are simply wrong in claiming that the ECB will treat nationalized banks or Trust-owned banks any different from the privately held banks.
Further quoting from the same ECB publication:
"Article 21 Operations with public entities
21.1. In accordance with Article 101 of this Treaty, overdrafts or any other type of credit facility with the ECB or with the national central banks in favour of Community institutions or bodies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the ECB or national central banks of debt instruments.
21.2. The ECB and national central banks may act as fiscal agents for the entities referred to in Article 21.1.
21.3. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to publicly owned credit institutions which, in the context of the supply of reserves by central banks, shall be given the same treatment by national central banks and the ECB as private credit institutions."
So the same stands. Now, last year, the ECB issued clarification on Article 101 prohibitions of financing (here) which actually stresses that this prohibition (restricting Central Banks from providing ‘overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facilities with the ECB or with the central banks of the Member States … in favour of …public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings' and Article 21.1 of the ECB Statute that mirrors this provision):
Here is another interesting factoid. Chart below clearly shows that many European countries operate state owned banks. In Germany, for example the market share of state-owned banks is in excess of 40%.
Source: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1360698
Are pro-Nama advocates saying that these banks have no access to ECB's discount window as well? Or will ECB treat them somehow differently from the nationalized Irish banks? If the latter is true, should this be kept hidden from the Lisbon Treaty debate? (Now, personally, I do not believe Irish banks, if nationalized, will have any trouble in raising funding either via ECB or via private markets, so the above question is a rhetorical one).
Now, logic of Article 1 as stated above, actually suggests that the ECB will have harder time allowing Nama - a state-owned non-credit institution explicitly prohibited from obtaining financing from the ECB - to swap its own bonds for ECB's cash than it would allow state-owned bank - a credit institution explicitly allowed to obtain such funding from ECB - to do so. ECB's own paper and legal opinions are confirming, therefore that it is Nama, not the nationalized banks, that would have much harder time getting support from the ECB!
We, on the critics of Nama side, have expended much gunpowder arguing that there is a natural, legally binding order of rights contained in each asset class held by investors in and lenders to the banks. This order requires that first to take the hit in any balance sheet adjustment will be the shareholders. Then the subordinated debt holders and lastly the secured debt holders. This argument is used by myself and others to show that taxpayer must be last in the firing line - after all of the above take their dose of bitter medicine.
Yet in all of this excitement we forgot the humble contractors. Now, many of the loans Nama will buy into will be written against properties on which some work has been performed in the recent past, or is even ongoing today. The problem is, our heroic developers in many cases have not paid their bills to the contractors providing this work. As far as I can understand, these unpaid contractors are the holders of the priority right on repayment in the case of liquidation of the development firm - ahead of the bank holding lien on the property.
Of course, Nama can go and tell the larger contractors that, look guys, you forget your claims on work done, write it off as a loss on your taxes and we will look after you when time comes to finish the properties. Smaller contractors will be simply told to get lost - suing the state (Nama) is a very expensive business for them. This is dandy in the banana republic we live in. But estimated (rumored) 30% of the properties Nama will claim under loans purchases will be outside this state - in countries like the USA, UK, France, Germany, Bulgaria, Romania. Nama has no sway there and their courts are not going to toe Brian Lenihan's line of National Interest. So in these countries, the unpaid or underpaid contractors can seize the properties ahead of Nama, leaving Nama with loans devoid of collateral.
This should be fun to watch as our legal eagles from Nama fly over to, say,
- Newcastle to fight the UK system that treats people supplying work as real corporate citizens with real rights; or
- Plovdiv to fight Bulgarian courts, where a leather-jacketed Petar would have to explain to them that if you owe money to his cousin, you either should leave now and forget about that unfinished apartment complex 'with amazing views of the local dump' or risk never seeing your own little 4-bed in Howth ever again.
Now to the issue of ECB. Several of us - again from the Nama critics or sceptics - have done some digging on the issue. What my colleagues now firmly claim is that per their sources, there is a mandate on the ECB to actually treat publicly owned banks in exactly the same way as privately held banks so as not privilege the former over the latter.
Here is what I have found:
Per ECB own research paper The European Central Bank: History, Role and Functions written by Hanspeter K Scheller (link to it here) (Second revised edition, 2006), Annex I provides excerpts from the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Part 3 Community Policies, Title VII: Economic and monetary policy, Chapter 1 "Economic Policy":
"Article 101
1. Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the ECB or with the central banks of the Member States (hereinafter referred to as ‘national central banks’) in favour of Community institutions or bodies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the ECB or national central banks of debt instruments.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to publicly owned credit institutions which, in the context of the supply of reserves by central banks, shall be given the same treatment by national central banks and the ECB as private credit institutions."
Emphasis is mine. This clearly states that the pro-Nama supporters are simply wrong in claiming that the ECB will treat nationalized banks or Trust-owned banks any different from the privately held banks.
Further quoting from the same ECB publication:
"Article 21 Operations with public entities
21.1. In accordance with Article 101 of this Treaty, overdrafts or any other type of credit facility with the ECB or with the national central banks in favour of Community institutions or bodies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the ECB or national central banks of debt instruments.
21.2. The ECB and national central banks may act as fiscal agents for the entities referred to in Article 21.1.
21.3. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to publicly owned credit institutions which, in the context of the supply of reserves by central banks, shall be given the same treatment by national central banks and the ECB as private credit institutions."
So the same stands. Now, last year, the ECB issued clarification on Article 101 prohibitions of financing (here) which actually stresses that this prohibition (restricting Central Banks from providing ‘overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facilities with the ECB or with the central banks of the Member States … in favour of …public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings' and Article 21.1 of the ECB Statute that mirrors this provision):
- also applies to any financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties (so technically, either Nama as a state-own undertaking cannot borrow in the future from the ECB via debt issuance of its own - which will imply that Nama own bonds will have to be priced for sale in private markets only, implying horrific cost to the taxpayers of financing Nama work-out, or nationalized banks will have exactly the same access to the ECB lending in the future as Nama will) and
- crucially, that in dealing with publicly owned credit institutions there is no restriction of Article 1 under the ECB statues.
Here is another interesting factoid. Chart below clearly shows that many European countries operate state owned banks. In Germany, for example the market share of state-owned banks is in excess of 40%.
Source: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1360698Are pro-Nama advocates saying that these banks have no access to ECB's discount window as well? Or will ECB treat them somehow differently from the nationalized Irish banks? If the latter is true, should this be kept hidden from the Lisbon Treaty debate? (Now, personally, I do not believe Irish banks, if nationalized, will have any trouble in raising funding either via ECB or via private markets, so the above question is a rhetorical one).
Now, logic of Article 1 as stated above, actually suggests that the ECB will have harder time allowing Nama - a state-owned non-credit institution explicitly prohibited from obtaining financing from the ECB - to swap its own bonds for ECB's cash than it would allow state-owned bank - a credit institution explicitly allowed to obtain such funding from ECB - to do so. ECB's own paper and legal opinions are confirming, therefore that it is Nama, not the nationalized banks, that would have much harder time getting support from the ECB!
Tuesday, August 4, 2009
Economics 04/08/2009: NAMA, Liam Carroll & Short Termist Bonds
I should make it a habit to direct every NAMA post reader to my proposal for NAMA 3.0 here.
Yeps, Supreme Court came in on the side of the Government, throwing a lifeline to NAMA and forcing taxpayers into deeper losses. My earlier note stand now (see here) with all the gory implications for losses on Mr Carroll's loans now being back in the NAMA court.
But two birdies have chirped to me that there is more brewing up in the land of NAMA-fantasy. Apparently, the rumor has it, the Government plan is to issue short term bonds to cover NAMA liabilities. Given that NAMA will start issuing bonds in 2010 for this undertaking, the short term nature rumored is for a 2011-2012 bonds.
This, if true, makes no sense for several important reasons. Here are some:
(1) Issuing short-term debt with maturity before 2013 is equivalent to a financial suicide. The reason is simple - there is no credible (or for that matter even an incredible one) commitment from the ECB that
(3) Short term maturity does not take into account the main risk to NAMA valuations, namely that by 2011 or for that matter 2013, the assets taken over by NAMA will be priced at any significant upside relative to what NAMA will pay for them, implying that, under short-term issuance, this Government will face the need to
Considering rolled up interest charges on impaired loans, banks' restructuring of interest payment schedules on so-called 'performing' stressed loans that in any other country would be classified as having defaulted, NAMA will be purchasing assets from the banks at an extremely shallow effective discount.
For example, a discount of 30% applied to a loan with 1.5 years (since July 2008 through December 2009) rolled up interest at 10%, and a built in re-financing cost of 1% will be equivalent to an effective discount of just 18.1% relative to the original principal of the loan itself. If, in the mean time, the underlying asset value itself has depreciated by, say 40%, then
NAMA will be buying a Euro 60 asset for Euro81.86. Now, in order for NAMA to recoup the original cost of purchase (not counting the cost of financing the purchase and managing the asset etc), the asset value needs to appreciate by a compound 36.4% within the span of the bond
finance. Thus between now and 2011 when the alleged bonds should mature, the annualized rate of appreciation required on the assets for NAMA just to recoup the original loan amount would have to be 16.8% per annum!
If anyone in the Department of Finance thinks this is a sane bet on a market turn-around, God help us.
Short-term financing of long-term obligations, as we should have learned in the current crisis, is equivalent to giving steroids to an unfit athlete and sending him out to run a marathon.
Though to repeat once again - this is just a speculation at this moment in time although two independent sources have tipped me on this one.
Yeps, Supreme Court came in on the side of the Government, throwing a lifeline to NAMA and forcing taxpayers into deeper losses. My earlier note stand now (see here) with all the gory implications for losses on Mr Carroll's loans now being back in the NAMA court.
But two birdies have chirped to me that there is more brewing up in the land of NAMA-fantasy. Apparently, the rumor has it, the Government plan is to issue short term bonds to cover NAMA liabilities. Given that NAMA will start issuing bonds in 2010 for this undertaking, the short term nature rumored is for a 2011-2012 bonds.
This, if true, makes no sense for several important reasons. Here are some:
(1) Issuing short-term debt with maturity before 2013 is equivalent to a financial suicide. The reason is simple - there is no credible (or for that matter even an incredible one) commitment from the ECB that
- such issuance can be rolled over at the same or lower interest rates to cover maturing bonds; and
- the EU will allow these bonds to remain off the balance sheet of the Government upon the roll over.
(3) Short term maturity does not take into account the main risk to NAMA valuations, namely that by 2011 or for that matter 2013, the assets taken over by NAMA will be priced at any significant upside relative to what NAMA will pay for them, implying that, under short-term issuance, this Government will face the need to
- engage in a massive refinancing operations
- at the time when its balance sheet liabilities will be almost at their peak (see Department of Finance projections);
- pay higher expected cost of borrowing than today; and
- potentially, load the NAMA liabilities onto Government own balancesheet, while
- facing market prices and demand for real assets that is well below the valuations applied by NAMA.
Considering rolled up interest charges on impaired loans, banks' restructuring of interest payment schedules on so-called 'performing' stressed loans that in any other country would be classified as having defaulted, NAMA will be purchasing assets from the banks at an extremely shallow effective discount.
For example, a discount of 30% applied to a loan with 1.5 years (since July 2008 through December 2009) rolled up interest at 10%, and a built in re-financing cost of 1% will be equivalent to an effective discount of just 18.1% relative to the original principal of the loan itself. If, in the mean time, the underlying asset value itself has depreciated by, say 40%, then
NAMA will be buying a Euro 60 asset for Euro81.86. Now, in order for NAMA to recoup the original cost of purchase (not counting the cost of financing the purchase and managing the asset etc), the asset value needs to appreciate by a compound 36.4% within the span of the bond
finance. Thus between now and 2011 when the alleged bonds should mature, the annualized rate of appreciation required on the assets for NAMA just to recoup the original loan amount would have to be 16.8% per annum!
If anyone in the Department of Finance thinks this is a sane bet on a market turn-around, God help us.
Short-term financing of long-term obligations, as we should have learned in the current crisis, is equivalent to giving steroids to an unfit athlete and sending him out to run a marathon.
Though to repeat once again - this is just a speculation at this moment in time although two independent sources have tipped me on this one.
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