In light of Prof Paul Krugman's comments concerning the desirability of the GIIPS remaining in the euro earlier this week, the Sunday Independent has asked myself (amongst other commentators) to provide my opinion on Prof Krugman's proposed solution. Here is t
he link to the published article and below is an unedited version of my comment:
In his article, Paul Krugman puts forward what he terms an
alternative solution to the current course of policies, chosen by the EU in
dealing with the Sovereign debt and financial sector crises. The core of his
argument boils down to the need for the EU ‘peripheral’ states, notably Greece,
Spain, Portugal, and potentially Ireland, to exit the euro and restore national
currencies.
In my view, such a course, undertaken in cooperation with the EU
member states and the ECB is a correct one for Greece, and possibly Portugal, but
is not an option for Ireland, and the rest of the periphery. The reason for
this is that unlike Greece and Portugal, Spain and Ireland are suffering not so
much from the Sovereign debt overhang, but from a private and banking debts
crisis. Resolution of these latter crises will not be sufficiently helped by an
exit from the euro, primarily because private debt deflation will not be
feasible for debts already denominated in euro. In addition, exiting the euro
will entail significant economic and reputational costs to an extremely open
economy, like Ireland, reliant on FDI and high value-added euro-related
services, such as IFSC.
Two years ago, prior to the completion of the contagion from
banking debts to Sovereign debt, exiting the euro was a workable solution,
albeit a disruptive and a costly one for Ireland. Today, such an exit will
require default – most likely an unstructured and disorderly – on both
Sovereign and private debts, with simultaneous collapsing of the Exchequer
funding and the banking sector. This will lead, in my opinion, to a disorderly
unwinding of the entire economy of Ireland.
Professor Krugman is correct in his analysis that “continuing on
the present course, imposing ever-harsher austerity on countries that are
already suffering depression-era unemployment, is what’s truly inconceivable”.
He is also correct in stating, that, “if European leaders wanted to save the
euro they would be looking for an alternative course.”
The new course that the European and Irish leaders must adopt is
the course that will preserve and strengthen Irish participation in the Euro
zone economy, not push Ireland out of the common currency. This course requires
a number of steps to be taken by Irish and European authorities in close
cooperation with each other.
The first step is to recognize that Ireland’s economy is
suffering from a private (namely household) debt overhang and the incomplete
nature of the banking sector restructuring here. This means making a choice:
either Ireland continues down the current path, with economic adjustments to
the crisis stretched over decades of pain, or we jointly, with our European
‘partners’, take real charge of the economic restructuring. The former path
implies that Ireland will be sapping Euro area monetary and fiscal resources
for many years to come, while being unable to implement deep reforms due to the
lack of supportive economic growth and facing continued risks of a Sovereign
default. The latter path means that we take a quick, sharp correction in our
private debts and get back onto the growth path.
The second step is to devise a solution – most likely via the
ECB (to avoid placing burden of our adjustment on European taxpayers) – to
write down significant proportion of Irish mortgages and other household debts
while simultaneously allowing the banks to deleverage out of the household
debts. This can and should be achieved by the ECB canceling all of the Central
Bank of Ireland ELA and a part of Irish banks borrowing from the ECB itself and
using these cancellation proceeds to write down household debt. Delivering such
a deleveraging will open up room for stabilizing Government finances, as
reduced debt burden on private balancesheets will allow Ireland to divert
resources to paying down Sovereign debt, while a new cycle of domestic
investment and growth can commence, allowing for structural reforms in the
economy (covering both private and public sectors).
The third step is to create a long-term warehousing facility –
within the ESM – to roll over existent Government debt so Ireland will have a
period of 10-15 years within which this debt can be reduced without the need to
face uncertainty of market funding. This would be primarily a cash flow
management exercise. ESM lending rates should be set around funding cost plus
administrative margin, or in current terms around 3.0-3.2% per annum, saving
Irish Exchequer up to €3.4 billion annually in interest repayments, which can
be diverted to more rapid paying down of the national debt. Hardly a
chop-change, under conservative assumptions, this approach will allow Ireland
to save over €27 billion in funds from 2013 through 2020, reducing overall nominal
debt levels by 11.6% by 2020 compared to status quo scenario.
Combined, these policy steps will be able to put Irish economy
and Exchequer finances on the security platform from which structural and longer-term
reforms can take place without undermining economic growth potential. In
addition, good will extended by the EU to Ireland under such a co-operative and
coordinated approach to the crisis will assure continued Irish support and
participation within the EU. This, in turn, will assure that Ireland can play
an active and positive role in the Euro area growth and sustainable development
in years to come. Exiting the euro today is neither necessary, nor sufficient
for restoring Irish economy to growth. Resolving our debt crisis is both
feasible and the least-costly part of the solution to the broader Euro area
crises.
