26/5/16: European Reforms: Mostly "No Show" grades

An interesting heat map from Moody's covering the deteriorating pace of reforms in the euro area:

Source: @Schuldensuehner 

The key point is that under the monetary easing created by the ECB, Euro area sovereigns are all slacking off on reforms, especially more politically difficult reforms, such as product markets reforms (9 out of 11 states are in red, none in green), pensions & healthcare reforms and fiscal reforms (5 out of 11 are in read). The best performing countries are, bizarrely, Spain and Italy. Farcically, Ireland apparently does not require reforms to improve efficiency of public administration. Presumably, Moody's analysts never heard of tsunami of public waste unleashed by the likes of HSE and Irish Water.

Take it for what it is - a sketchy top-level view of the reforms landscape and give it a wonder: are ECB policies helping long term sustainability of European institutions or harming it?.. In 23 out of 60 point observations, the reforms have delivered so far 'no or limited progress' and only in 6 out of 60 point observations, the reforms have delivered 'substantial progress'. Go figure...

4/3/16: Can Cryan halt Deutsche Bank's decline? Euromoney

Recently, I wrote about the multiple problems faced by the Deutsche Bank (see post here http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/02/12216-deutsche-bank-crystallising.html).

Subsequently, Euromoney published a well-researched and wide-ranging article on the same subjects that is also worth reading, even though there are quite significant overlaps with my earlier post: http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3534126/Can-Cryan-halt-Deutsche-Banks-decline.html?single=true.

12/2/16: Deutsche Bank: Crystallising Europe’s TBTF Problems

This week was quite a tumultuous one for banks, and especially Europe’s champion of the ‘best in class’ TBTF institutions, Deutsche Bank. Here’s what happened in a nutshell.

Deutsche’s 6 percent perpetual bonds, CoCos (more on this below), with expected maturity in 2022, used to yield around 7 percent back in January. Having announced massive losses for fiscal year 2015 (first time full year losses were posted by the DB since 2008), Deutsche was under pressure in the equity markets. Rather gradual sell-off of shares in the bank from the start of 2015 was slowly, but noticeably eroding bank’s equity risk cushion. So markets started to get nervous of the second tier of ‘capital’ held by the bank - second in terms of priority of it being bailed in in the case of an adverse shock. This second tier is known as AT1 and it includes those CoCos.

Yields on CoCos rose and their value (price) fell. This further reduced Deutsche’s capital cushion and, more materially, triggered concerns that Deutsche will not be calling in 2022 bonds on time, thus rolling them over into longer maturity. Again, this increased losses on the bonds. These losses were further compounded by the market concerns that due to a host of legal and profit margins problems, Deutsche can suspend payments on CoCos coupons, if not in 2016, then in 2017 (again, more details on this below). Which meant that in markets view, shorter-term 2022 CoCos were at a risk of being converted into a longer-dated and zero coupon instrument. End of the game was: Coco’s prices fell from 93 cents to the Euro at the beginning of January, to 71-72 cents on the Euro on Monday this week.

When prices fall as much as Deutsche’s CoCos, investors panic and run for exit. Alas, dumping CoCos into the markets became a problem, exposing liquidity risks imbedded into CoCos structure. There are two reasons for the liquidity risk here: one is general market aversion to these instruments (a reversal of preferences yield-chasing strategies had for them before); and lack of market makers in CoCos (thin markets) because banks don’t like dealing in distressed assets of other banks. Worse, Asian markets were largely shut this week, limiting potential pool of buyers.

Spooked by shrinking valuations and falling liquidity of the Deutsche’s AT1 instruments, investors rushed into buying insurance against Deutsche’s default on senior bonds - the Credit Default Swaps or CDS. This propelled Deutsche’s CDS to their highest levels since the Global Financial Crisis. Deutsche’s CDS shot straight up and with their prices rising, implied probability of Deutsche’s default went through the roof, compounding markets panic.


Summing Up the Mess: Three Pillars of European Risks

Deutsche Bank AG is a massive, repeat - massive - banking behemoth. And the beast is in trouble.

Let’s do some numbers first. Take a rather technical test of systemic risk exposures by the banks, run by NYU Stern VLab. First number of interest: Systemic Risk calculation - the value of bank equity at risk in a case of systemic crisis (basically - a metric of how much losses a bank can generate to its equity holders under a systemic risk scenario).

Deutsche clocks USD91.623 billion hole relating to estimated capital shortfall after the existent capital cushion is exhausted. A wallop that is the third largest in the world and accounts for 7.23% of the entire global banking system losses in a systemic crisis.

Now, for volatility that Deutsche can transmit to the markets were things to go pear shaped. How much of a daily drop in equity value of the Deutsche will occur if the aggregate market falls more than 2%. The metric for this is called Marginal Expected Shortfall or MES and Deutsche clocks in respectable 4.59, ranking it 8th in the world by impact. In a sense, MSE is a ‘tail event’ beta - stock beta for times of significant markets distress.

How closely does Deutsche move with the market over time, without focusing just on periods of significant markets turmoil? That would be bank’s beta, which is the covariance of its stock returns with the market return divided by variance of the market return. Deutsche’s beta is 1.61, which is high - it is 7th highest in the world and fourth highest amongst larger banks and financial institutions, and it basically means that for 1% move in the market, on average, Deutsche moves 1.6%.

But worse: Deutsche leverage is extreme. Save for Dexia and Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, the two patently sick entities (one in a shutdown mode another hooked to a respirator), Deutsche is top of charts with leverage of 79.5:1.

Incidentally, this week, Deutsche credit risk surpassed that of another Italian behemoth, UniCredit:

So Deutsche is loaded with the worst form of disease - leverage and it is caused by the worst sort of underlying assets: the impenetrable derivatives (see below on that).


Overall, Deutsche problems can be divided into 3 categories:

1. Legal
2. Capital, and
3. Leverage and quality of assets.

These problems plague all European TBTF banks ever since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis. The legacy of horrific misspelling of products, mis-pricing of risks and markets distortions by which European banks stand is contrasted by the rhetoric emanating from European regulators about ‘reforms’, ‘repairs’ and ‘renewed regulatory vigilance’ in the sector. In truth, as Deutsche’s saga shows, capital buffers fixes, applied by European regulators, have yielded nothing more than an attempt to powder over the miasma of complex, derivatives-laden asset books and equally complex, risk-obscuring structure of new capital buffers. It also highlights just how big of a legal mess European banks are, courtesy of decades of their maltreatment of their clients and markets participants.

So let’s start churning through them one-by-one.


The Saudi Arabia of Legal Problems

Deutsche has been slow to wake up and smell the roses on all various legal settlements other banks signed up to in years past. Deutsche has settled or paid fines of some USD9.3 billion to-date (from the start of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008), covering:

• Charges of violations of the U.S. sanctions;
• Interest rates fixing charges; and
• Mortgages-Backed Securities (alleged) fraud with respect to the U.S. state-sponsored lenders: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

And at the end of 2015, Deutsche has provided a set-aside funding for settling more of the same, to the tune of USD6 billion. So far, it faces:

1. U.S. probe into Mortgages-Backed Securities it wrote and sold pre-crisis. If one goes by the Deutsche peers, the USD15.3 billion paid and set aside to-date is not going to be enough. For example, JP Morgan total cost of all settlements in the U.S. alone is in excess of USD23 billion. But Deutsche is a legal basket case compared to JPM-Chase. JPM, Bank of America and Citigroup paid around USD36 billion on their joint end. In January 2016, Goldman Sachs reached an agreement (in principle) with DofJustice to pay USD5.1 billion for same. Just this week (http://www.businessinsider.com/morgan-stanley-mortgage-backed-securities-settlement-2016-2) Morgan Stanley agreed to pay USD3.2 billion on the RMBS case. Some more details on this here: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-deutsche-bank-lawsuit-idUSKCN0VC2NY.
2. Probes into currency manipulations and collusion on its trading desk (DB is the biggest global currency trader that is yet to settle with the U.S. DoJustice. In currency markets rigging settlement earlier, JPMorgan, Citicorp and four other financial institutions paid USD5.8 billion and entered guilty pleas already.
3. Related to currency manipulations probe, DB is defending itself (along with 16 other financial institutions) in a massive law suit by pension funds and other investors. Deutsche says ‘nothing happened’. Nine out of the remaining 15 institutions are pushing to settle the civil suit for (at their end of things) USD2 billion. Keep in mind of all civil suit defendants - Deutsche is by far the largest dealer in currency markets.
4. Probes in the U.S. and UK on its alleged or suspected role in channeling some USD10 billion of Russian money into the West;
5. Worse, UK regulators are having a close watch on Deutsche Bank - in 2014, they placed it on the their "enhanced supervision" list, reserved for banks that have either gone through a systemic failure or are at a risk of such; a list that includes no other large banking institution on it, save for Deutsche.
6. This is hardly an end to the Deutsche woes. Currently, it is among a group of financial institutions under the U.S. investigation into trading in the U.S. Treasury market, carried out by the Justice Department. 
7. The bank is also under inquiries covering alleged fixings of precious metals benchmarks.
8. The bank is even facing some legal problems relating to its operations (in particular hiring practices) in Asia. And it is facing some trading-related legal challenges across a number of smaller markets, as exemplified by a recent case in Korea (http://business.asiaone.com/news/deutsche-bank-trader-sentenced-jail).

You really can’t make a case any stronger: Deutsche is a walking legal nightmare with unknown potential downside when it comes to legal charges, costs and settlements. More importantly, however, it is a legal nightmare not because regulators are becoming too zealous, but because, like other European banks, adjusting for its size, it has its paws in virtually every market-fixing scandal. The history of European banking to-date should teach us one lesson and one lesson only: in Europe, honest, functioning and efficient markets have been seconded to manipulated, dominated by TBTF institutions and outright rigged structures more reminiscent of business environment of the Italian South, than of Nordic ‘regulatory havens’.

CoCo Loco

CoCos, Contingent Convertible Capital Instruments, are a hybrid form of capital instruments that are designed and structured to absorb losses in times of stress by automatically converting into equity should a bank experience a decline in its capital ratios below a certain threshold. Because they are a form of convertible debt, they are counted as Tier 1 capital instrument ‘additional’ Tier 1 instruments or AT1.

CoCos are also perpetual bonds with no set maturity date. Banks can be redeemed them on option, usually after 5 years, but banks can also be prevented by the regulators from doing so. The expectation that banks will redeem these bonds creates expectation of their maturity for investors and this expectation is driven by the fact that CoCos are more expensive to issue for the banks, creating an incentive for them to redeem these instruments. European banks love CoCos, in contrast to the U.S. banks that issue preferred shares as their Tier 1 capital boosters, because Europeans simply love debt. Debt in any form. It gives banks funding without giving it a headache of accounting to larger pools of equity holders, and it gives them priority over other liabilities. AT1 is loved by European regulators, because it sits right below T1 (Tier 1) and provides more safety to senior bondholders on whose shoulders the entire scheme of European Ponzi finance (using Minsky’s terminology) rests.

In recent years, Deutsche, alongside other banks was raising capital. Last year, Credit Suisse, went to the markets to raise some CHF6 billion (USD6.1 billion), Standard Chartered Plc raised about $5.1 billion. Bank of America got USD5 billion from Warren Buffett in August 2014. So in May 2014, Deutsche was raising money, USD 1.5 billion worth, for the second time (it tapped markets in 2013 too). The fad of the day was to issue CoCos - Tier 1 securities, known as Contingent Convertible Bonds. All in, European banks have issued some EUR91 billion worth of this AT1 capital starting from 2013 on.

Things were hot in the markets then. Enticed by a 6% original coupon, investors gobbled up these CoCos to the tune of EUR3.5 billion (the issue cover was actually EUR25 billion, so the CoCos were in a roaring demand). Not surprising: in the world of low interest rates, say thanks to the Central Banks, banks were driving investors to take more and more risk in order to get paid.

There was, as always there is, a pesky little wrinkle. CoCos are convertible to equity (bad news in the case of a bank running into trouble), but they are also carrying a little clause in their prospectus. Under Compulsory Cancelation of Interest heading, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Prospectus imposed deferral of interest payments on CoCos whenever CoCos payment of interest “together with any additional Distributions… that are simultaneously planned or made or that have been made by the issuer on the other Tier 1 instruments… would exceed the Available Distributable Items…” and/or “if and to the extent that the competent supervisory authority orders that all or part of the relevant payment of interest be cancelled…”

That is Prospectus-Speak for saying that CoCos can suspend interest payments per clauses, before the capital adequacy problems arise. The risks of such an event are not covered by Credit Default Swaps (CDS) which cover default risk for senior bonds.

The reason for this clause is that European regulators impose on the banks what is known as CRD (Combined Buffer Requirement and Maximum Distributable Amount) limits: If the bank total buffers fall below the Combined Buffer Requirement, then CoCos and other similar instruments do not pay in full. That is normal and the risk of this should be fully priced in all banks’ CoCos. But for Deutsche, there is also a German legal requirement to impose an additional break on bank’s capital buffers depletion: a link between specified account (Available Distributable Items) balance and CoCos pay-out suspension. This ADI account condition is even more restrictive than what is allowed under CRD.

This week, DB said they have some EUR1 billion available in 2016 to pay on EUR350 million interest coupon due per CoCos (due date in April). But few are listening to DB’s pleas - CoCos were trading at around 75 cents in the euro mark this week. The problem is that the markets are panicked not just by the prospect of the accounting-linked suspension of coupon payments, but also by the rising probability of non-redemption of CoCos in the near future - a problem plaguing all financials.

DB is at the forefront of these latter concerns, because of its legal problems and also because the bank is attempting to reshape its own business (the former problem covered above, the latter relates to the discussion below). DB just announced a massive EUR6.8 billion net loss for 2015 which is not doing any good to alleviate concerns about it’s ability to continue funding coupon payments into 2017. Unknown legal costs exposure of DB mean that DB-estimated expected funding capacity of some EUR4.3 billion in 2017 available to cover AT1 payments is based on its rather conservative expectation for 2016 legal costs and rather rosy expectations for 2016 income, including the one-off income from the 2015-agreed sale of its Chinese bank holdings.

Earlier this week, Standard & Poor’s, cut DB’s capital ratings on “concerns that Germany’s biggest lender could report a loss that would restrict its ability to pay on the obligations”. S&P cut DB’s Tier 1 securities from BB- to B+ from BB- and slashed perpetual Tier 2 instruments from BB to BB-.

Beyond all of this mess, Deutsche is subject to the heightened uncertainty as to the requirements for capital buffers forward - something that European banks co-share. AT 1 stuff, as highlighted above, is one thing. But broader core Tier 1 ratio in 4Q 2015 was 11.1%, which is down on 11.5% in 4Q 2014. In its note cutting CoCos rating, S&P said that “The bank's final Tier 1 interest payment capacity for 2017 will depend on its actual net earnings in 2016 as well as movements in other reserves.” Which is like saying: “Look, things might work out just fine. But we have no visibility of how probable this outcome is.” Not assuring…

DB is also suffering the knock-on effect of the general gloom in the European debt markets. Based on Bloomberg data, high yield corporate bonds issuance in Europe is down some 78 percent in recent months, judging by underwriters fees. These woes relate to European banks outlook for 2016, which links to growth concerns, net interest margin concerns and quality of assets concerns.


Badsky Loansky: A Eurotown’s Bad Bear?

Equity and debt markets repricing of Deutsche paper is in line with a generally gloomy sentiment when it comes to European banks.

The core reason is that aided by the ECB’s QE, the banks have been slow cleaning their acts when it comes to bad loans and poor quality assets. European Banking Authority estimates that European banks hold some USD 1.12 trillion worth of bad loans on their books. These primarily relate to the pre-crisis lending. But, beyond this mountain of bad debt, we have no idea how many loans are marginal, including newly issued loans and rolled over credit. How much of the current credit pool is sustained by low interest rates and is only awaiting some adverse shock to send the whole system into a tailspin? Such a shock might be borrowers’ exposures to the US dollar credit, or it might be companies exposure to global growth environment, or it might be China unwinding, or all three. Not knowing is not helpful. Oil price collapse, for example, is hitting hard crude producers. Guess who were the banks’ favourite customers for jumbo-sized corporate loans in recent years (when oil was above USD50pb)? And guess why would any one be surprised that with global credit markets being in a turmoil, Deutsche’s fixed income (debt) business would be performing badly?

Deutsche and other european banks are caught in a dilemma. Low rates on loans and negative yields on Government bonds are hammering their profit margins (based on net interest margin - the difference between their lending rate and their cost of raising funds). Solution would be to raise rates on loans. But doing so risks sending into insolvency and default their marginal borrowers. Meanwhile, the pool of such marginal borrowers is expanding with every drop in oil prices and every adverse news from economic growth front. So the magic potion of QE is now delivering more toxicity to the system than good, and yet, the system requires the potion to flow on to sustain itself.

Again, this calls in Minsky: his Ponzi finance thesis that postulates that viability of leveraged financial system can only be sustained by rising capital valuations. When capital valuations stop growing faster than the cost of funding, the system collapses.

In part to address the market sentiment, Deutsche is talking about deploying the oldest trick in the book: buying out some of its liabilities - err… senior bonds (not CoCos) - at a discount in the markets to the tune of EUR5 billion across two programmes. If it does, it will hit own liquidity in the short run, but it will also (probably or possibly) book a profit and improve its balance sheet in the longer term. The benefits are in the future, and the only dividend hoped-for today is a signalling value of a bank using cash to buy out debt. Which hinges on the return of the markets to some sort of the ‘normal’ (read: renewed optimism). Update: here's the latest on the subject via Bloomberg http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-12/deutsche-bank-to-buy-back-5-4-billion-bonds-in-euros-dollars

Back to the performance to-date, however.

Deutsche Bank's share price literally fell off the cliff at the start of this week, falling 10 percent on Monday and hitting its lowest level since 1984.

On bank’s performance side, concerns are justified. As I noted earlier, Deutsche posted a massive EUR6.89 billion loss for the year, with EUR2 billion of this booked in 4Q alone. Compared to 2014, Deutsche ended 2015 with its core equity Tier 1 capital (the main buffer against shocks) down from EUR60 billion to EUR52 billion.

Still, panic selling pushed DB equity valuation to EUR19 billion, in effect implying that some 2/3rds of the book of its assets are impaired. Which is nonsense. Things might be not too good, but they aren’t that bad today. The real worry with assets side of the DB is not so much current performance, but forward outlook. And here we have little visibility, precisely because of the utterly abnormal conditions the banks are operating in, courtesy of the global economy and central banks.

So markets are exaggerating the risks, for now. Psychologically, this is just a case of panic.

But panic today might be a precursor to the future. More of a longer term concern is DB’s exposure to the opaque world of derivatives that left markets analysts a bit worried (to put things mildly). Deutsche has taken on some pretty complex derivative plays in recent years in order to offset some of its losses relating to legal troubles. These instruments can be quite sensitive to falling interest rates. Smelling the rat, current leadership attempted to reduce bank’s risk loads from derivatives trade, but at of the end of 2015, the bank still has an estimated EUR1.4 trillion exposure to these instruments. Only about a third of the DB’s balance sheet is held in German mortgages and corporate loans (relatively safer assets), with another third composed of derivatives and ‘other’ exposures (where ‘other’ really signals ‘we don’t quite feel like telling you’ rather than ‘alternative assets classes’). For these, the bank has some EUR215 billion worth of ‘officially’ liquid assets - a cushion that might look solid, but has not been tested in a sell-off.


In summary: 

Deutsche’s immediate problems are manageable and the bank will most likely pull out of the current mess, bruised, but alive. But the two horsemen of a financial apocalypse that became visible in the Deutsche’s performance in recent weeks are worrying:
1) We have a serious problem with leverage remaining in the system, underlying dubious quality of assets and capital held and non-transparent balance sheets when it comes to derivatives exposures; and
2) We have a massive problem of residual, unresolved issues arising from incomplete response to markets abuses that took place before, during and after the crisis.

And there are plenty potential triggers ahead to derail the whole system. Which means that whilst Deutsche is not Europe’s Lehman, it might become Europe’s Bear Sterns, unless some other TBTF preempts its run for the title… And there is no shortage of candidates in waiting…



Links: 
DB’s 2015 report presentation deck: https://www.db.com/ir/en/download/Deutsche_Bank_4Q2015_results.pdf
DB’s internal memo to employees on how “ok” things are: https://www.db.com/newsroom_news/2016/ghp/a-message-from-john-cryan-to-deutsche-bank-employees-0902-en-11392.htm

13/1/16: Bail-ins in Europe: Have Some Fun, Legal Eagles…

In a recent article for Forbes, In Europe, 2016 Will Be The Year Of Lawsuits, Frances Coppola neatly summed up the problem of the EU’s attempts to structure a functional bail-in mechanism for failing banks resolution regime.

I covered to topic in a number of previous posts here (the more recent one). But as the first days of the New Year are rolling in, the problem is becoming apparent.

FT covered the problem with Portugal’s Novo Banco bail in here. Summing up the case: “Europe’s new regime for winding up failing banks has made an inauspicious start, as investors lashed out at the European Central Bank for allowing Portugal to impose losses on almost €2bn of senior bondholders in Novo Banco”.

And beyond Portugal, there is the case of Austria’s attempt to reduce burden on taxpayers from bailing out Hypo Alpe Adria via “imposing losses on bondholders through a reversal of guarantees given by the province of Carinthia”. Back in July 2014, the whole house of cards that is Europe’s ‘no-bail-outs’ promise of the new regulatory architecture was taken down by the Austrian court ruling that ex post bail ins of bondholders can’t be done. Which rounds things from the impossibility of ex post bail-ins to the impossibility of ex ante bail-ins.

And then there is the case of the Cypriot banks’ depositors bail-ins of 2012 that is about to start going.  A reminder of the case: “The EU initially agreed to provide bank recapitalisation assistance as it was necessary to safeguard the Eurozone, but in March 2013 the European Commission and the European Central Bank relented and set new conditions for providing financial assistance that involved depriving depositors of Cyprus Popular Bank (Laiki Bank) of all their savings – except the government-guaranteed amount of €100,000 – and in the case of Bank of Cyprus of 47% of uninsured deposits. The EU’S change of mind was unprecedented and unexpected because bank deposits are regarded as sacrosanct. …The EU was not prepared to assist depositors in Cyprus with €7 billion because the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was not satisfied Cyprus could sustain such a debt.”

One must also remember the role of the European ‘regulators’ in all of this mess. Take the Bank of Cyprus. It passed EU banks stress tests just before it crashed and burned in a subsequent bail-out and bail-in to the tune of €23 billion to the taxpayer and a 47.5% haircut on deposits over €100k.

It looks like 2016 is going to be a fun year for European financial sector ‘reforms’ and a stimulus to the legal profession. All paid for by the taxpayers, of course.

15/7/15: Greece is Not Unique in Dissing EU Commitments

In previous two posts, I explored couple of angles on the famous Trust thingy that, allegedly, Greece so massively lacks. But, of course, my comparatives related to the 'peripheral' euro states, mostly Ireland. You can use the same two charts to draw conclusions on comparing Greek performance to other states, but the question still remains: outside the 'periphery' just how much Trust currency is there in circulation in the EU?

Take countries that are not in the group of borrowers from the IMF. There should be plenty of Trust to go around amongst them and the EU. And this means there should be plenty of agreement between their policies and the policies suggested to them by the Commission, especially those aimed at addressing that major burner of Trust - failure to comply with core fiscal criteria.

We can take a snapshot of this 'metric' of Trust by looking at how severely do EU member states deviate in their policies from the Commission prescriptions. This 'metric', after all, is an exact replica of the arguments advanced in the Eurogroup in the context of accusing Greece of wasting EU's trust.

So here is a handy chart, from the EU Commission:

What the above shows is that back in 2013 all of the EU states who were issued with 'country-specific recommendations' concerning their poor fiscal performance opted to ignore these recommendations. That is some Trust, there.

Between 2011-2012 and 2013 the extent of non-compliance did not decline (despite all the talk about austerity and structural reforms), but rose both on average and specifically in 10 out of 14 countries covered by these recommendations. That's some more Trust, right there.

On average, in 2013, some 43% of all EU Commission recommendations were not implemented by the states that are so distinctly Trustworthy from Greece, that Greece was singled out as a special case by the Eurogroup and the Euro Council.

Some of the worst offenders was Germany, and its pal (in berating Greece) Lithuania, plus the usual suspects of Italy and France.

Now, I am not a fan of EU Commission recommendations. But the fact is: Greece is by far not unique in terms of 'reforms' fatigue or lack of engagement with the EU Commission proposals on fiscal adjustments.

9/10/2014: IMF Lagarde: We Are Out of Ideas, You Are Out of Convictions

In several recent posts, I have highlighted the fact that the IMF - that stalwart of global 'structural' reforms - has now effectively exhausted its toolkit of ideas as to how we can get global growth back on track. And the governments around the advanced economies world are now equally out of conviction to deploy the IMF's old toolkit.

This is evident across the board: from the Fund latest World Economic Outlook update which keeps endlessly banging on about the need for

• Accommodative monetary policies and, simultaneously, de-risking of the financial economy (the two tasks that actually contradict each other, as IMF own GFSR report admits);
• Structural markets reforms (which in the IMFspeak means preciously little more than more reforms of the labour markets, or in distilled terms: more 'activation' efforts to bring the unemployed to still inexistent jobs and push welfare recipients off the dole into still inexistent jobs);
• Credit supply restoration in the economy amidst continued banks deleveraging (which basically means that the banks need to get rid of old - presumably bad risk - loans while increasing their stock of new - presumably better risk - loans);
• Creation of better, more robust risk management frameworks in banking while increasing banking sector concentration (the outcome of the deleveraging process) and increasing risks concentrations by creating more centralised controls and supervision (e.g. the European Banking Union); and so on.

All of the above 'reforms' are clearly self-contradictory in so far as achieving one side of the objective implies undermining the other side.

And with today's release, we have a veritable Map to the Middle-Earth from the Fund's own Christine Lagarde. In today's "The Managing Director's Global Policy Agenda" Ms. Lagarde is navel gazing over 14 pages of text, charts and slides under the sub-heading of "Aiming Higher, Trying Harder". You get the sense of frustration of the Fund stuff with the intransigent Governments unwilling to deploy all of the medicines prescribed to them by the Fund, but you also get a feeling for the out-of-touch banality of the IMF's approach to the crisis.

Take the preamble. "Bold and resolutely executed policies are needed to prevent growth from settling into a “new mediocre,” with unacceptably low job creation and inclusion. Measures should emphasize":

• "Lifting growth. Decisive structural reforms are needed to bolster confidence and lift today’s actual and tomorrow’s potential growth and break the pattern of persistent underperformance and insufficient job-creation. Accommodative monetary policies should continue to support demand and provide breathing space as these reforms are implemented. But it is essential that they are accompanied by macro-critical reforms that remove deep-seated distortions in labor and product markets; improve credit flows to productive sectors; strengthen growth-friendly fiscal frameworks; and eliminate infrastructure gaps." You get a sense that this has been said before, argued many times over and offers nothing new. In effect, the IMF is saying: spend more, cut spending more, re-spend more; and fund it all by printing presses, while making sure the rag-tag of the real economy (SMEs and households) don't get their hands on the printed cash.
• "Building resilience. Easy money continues to increase market and liquidity risks, especially in the shadow banking sector, potentially compromising financial stability. Appropriate regulation and vigilant financial sector supervision, including developing and deploying macro-prudential tools, can help limit excessive financial risk-taking. Preparations for less benign financial conditions also need to be stepped-up. As monetary policy normalization approaches in some major economies, stronger policy frameworks, institutions, and economic fundamentals can mitigate potentially adverse spillovers." But, dear IMF, who creates this 'easy money'? And for who the money is 'easy'? The answer is in the first point above: printing presses do create 'easy money' and Governments and larger banks get 'easy money'. So de facto, IMF advice 1 and 2, taken together mean that creating growth + building resilience to risk = growing the share of Government and big banks in the economy. That should really keep troubles at bay, especially since the current crisis is caused by… yep, you've guessed it, rising role of Governments and big banks in the economy. Apparently, what can't kill you makes you stronger.
• And then there is IMF advice that IMF should learn to follow itself: "Achieving coherence. International cooperation is needed to amplify the benefits from these bold policies and to avoid exacerbating existing distortions, particularly regarding financial stability and global imbalances. Dialogue and policy cooperation can help smoothly rebalance global demand; minimize adverse spillovers and spillbacks from asynchronous monetary unwinding; ensure consistent financial regulation; and maintain an adequate global financial safety net. Fresh momentum must be injected into the global trade dialogue." Where did we hear that? Ah, yes, right - we've heard in Greece (when the IMF quietly stood by as the EU rained chaos onto Greek and Cypriot financial systems and Exchequers by refusing to get Public Sector Participation - or restructuring - going); and we heard it in Ireland (where the IMF stood idly by as the Irish Governments and European partners loaded some EUR70 billion-plus worth of banks debts onto the real economy and then destroyed entire sectors of the economy in the name of Nama-lution); and in Italy (where IMF is still refusing to acknowledge the need for sovereign debt restructuring).

Do not forget that the IMF team has run out of Athens this week in a hissy - the most heavily 'repaired' economy in the world seems to be going off-the-rails again.

Here is the road map for advanced economies as traced by the IMF:

As we have it: in Euro Area the achievements were: 1) 'good progress' on monetary easing (the printing press) but more to be done; 2) 'some progress' on consolidating the banking system eggs in one regulatory basket (and more to be done); 3) basically no fiscal reforms; and 4) no reforms on taxation, no improvement in competition across both labour and product markets (not to mention decline in competition in financial economy).

Are we still talking, Ms Lagarde? Oh yes…

Let's take a look at the first pillar of IMF 'wisdom': the printing press. Here's Fund own assessments of the outcomes: "Despite massive and welcome monetary support in major advanced economies and slowing fiscal consolidation, the recovery remains uneven and sluggish. Growth, and hence policy advice, are increasingly divergent across countries. Inflation is still below target in many advanced economies and is a growing concern in the euro area, while unemployment has stayed high. … The envisaged acceleration in economic activity has again failed to materialize."

So just as with Krugmanomics, the IMFology calls for more printing, cause previous rounds weren't enough: "Growth prospects in advanced economies are expected to remain uneven across regions. The strongest growth rebound is expected in the United States, while growth in Japan will remain modest. The crisis legacy brakes (including high private and public debt) are expected to only gradually ease in the euro area, while inflation expectations continue to drift down and deflationary risks are rising. Growth elsewhere, including other Asian advanced economies, Canada, and the United Kingdom, is projected to be solid."

And with all of those 'structural reforms' - do we have an uplift in at least potential (if not actual) output? Nope: "Growth potential may be lower than earlier assumed… Increasing evidence suggests that potential growth started to decline in advanced economies even before the onset of the crisis—which may be affecting the current pace of recovery. The recent slowdown in EMEs also has a large structural component, raising questions about the sustainability of growth rates achieved prior to the crisis and during the 2010–11 rebound."

So here are two road maps side by side: one for Spring 2014 and another for Fall 2014… and, save for gentle re-phrasing of the same, the two are largely identical when it comes to the advanced economies.

So spend more on infrastructure as opposed to reduce debt overhang... and that will be funded by what? Pears and apples?

Out of new ideas. QED.

28/1/2014: Decline in Debt and Regaining of Trust?

The following out this morning:

So is Herr Schaeuble correct? Did reductions of debt help 'regain trust during the crisis'? Were there actual reduction in debt?

Table summarises 2007-2013 maximum debt levels (for General Government Debt as % of GDP) attained by the euro area economies and the year when this maximum was attained:

Three observations:

1. With exception of two countries: Germany and Portugal, 2013 debt to GDP ratios are maximal for the entire period 2007-2013.
2. In the case of Germany, peak debt level attained in 2010 was 82.44% of GDP, while in 2013 estimated level of debt/GDP is expected to be 80.393% of GDP. The reduction is small. Meanwhile, German bund yields are not reflective of any specific reduction - they were low in 2009 and 2010 and they are low now.
3. Portugal's peak debt/GDP ratio is notionally at 2012 at 123.8% of GDP. Country 2013 expected debt/GDP ratio is 123.56%, which is statistically indifferent from 2012 levels, so we cannot call this material by any measure.

Here's evolution of debts over the period in two charts, confirming that there has been no reduction in debt levels relative to the earlier stages of the Global Financial Crisis:

And here is the chart showing how dramatic were the increases in debt levels over the course of the crisis:

But, of course, virtually the entire euro area bond yields have shown improvements in 2012-2013, which is really totally and completely divorced from the debt dynamics:

The IMF is not even projecting decline in debt until 2015...

4/12/2013: Quote of the day

A quote of the day:

"A recent study by Federal Reserve economists concluded that America’s protracted high unemployment will have serious adverse effects on GDP growth for years to come. If that is true in the United States, where unemployment is 40% lower than in Europe, the prospects for European growth appear bleak indeed." Joseph Stiglitz

Via http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/joseph-e--stiglitz-says-that-the-europe-will-not-recover-unless-and-until-the-eurozone-is-fundamentally-reformed#vc6wVyQBWlqbgj7F.99

Agree or disagree with (as I do with some of) his prescriptions, but the above quote is a key to understanding why Euro area's economy is a brick that hit the water.

28/5/2013: EU Looks Into Bending Rules... Again...

Spiegel [http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/vorschlag-der-eu-kommission-deutschland-kaempft-um-den-sparkurs-a-902198.html] reports that the EU Commission, as a part of a planned shift in the policy focus from austerity to structural reforms, will consider altering accounting rules per classification of fiscal deficits. The idea is that member states will be allowed to exempting certain types of government spending from the deficit calculations.

How this will work? Ok, insolvent state, like, say Greece, can borrow (somewhere) EUR X billion to use as a backing for its 50% share in matching EU Structural funds, thus raising EUR 2X billion for investment. The EU will then allow Greek Government to classify EUR X billion borrowings as aquarium fish and not deficit nor debt.

So
(1) EU thinks it is a grand idea to hide even more debt and deficit under the proverbial rug of 'accounting rules' bent to suit EU; and
(2) EU thinks that 'structural funds' deployment will be sufficient to 'stimulate' euro area economies out of structural balance sheet recession.

I suggest they (a) read up on why honesty and transparency matter in fiscal accounting and (b) read up on what happened in Japan where a stimulus ca 100 times larger than 'structural funds' one was applied to no avail.

Then again, the EU might also change the rules on reading, so the inconvenient reality does never interfere with the dreamy Enronising…

16/5/2013: Euro Area 'Austerity' in One Chart

Frankly, folks, there is nothing like making a factual argument across emotive subject lines... I have put up two posts on Euro area 'austerity' - here and here - and the readers want more numbers, usually in hope of finding a hole in my arguments.

Here is, perhaps a better, summary of the Euro area Austerity in its own numbers - in levels of nominal expenditure and revenues:

I hope this settles the issue:

1. Euro area austerity has meant revenues collected by the governments are up
2. Euro area austerity has meant that Government spending is up

Tell me if this is a 'savage cuts' story or a 'tax burden rising' story...

12/5/2013: On euro's future...

A very interesting contribution from Niall Ferguson to the debate about the future of the euro: here. Interestingly, one can juxtapose Ferguson's article against the list of most recent news briefings from the PressEurop:

12/5/2013: Much austerity? Not really... & not of the kind we needed

A week ago I published a blogpost exploring IMF data on austerity in Europe, based on a sample of 20 EU countries with advanced levels of economic development (excluding Luxembourg). You can read that post here. The broad conclusions of that post were:

1. There is basically no austerity in Europe, traceable to either changes in deficits, changes in Government spending or changes in debt. If anything, the European fiscal policies can be characterised by a varying degree of fiscal expansionism during the current crisis, relative to the pre-crisis 2003-2007 period.
2. This, of course, does not account for transfers between one set of expenditures (e.g. public investment reductions) and other lines of spending (e.g. banking sector measures).
3. The only area of fiscal policy where austerity is evident is on taxation burden side, which rose in the majority of sampled economies.

The numbers got me worried and in this post I am looking solely on deficits side of Government spending. If there is savage austerity in EU27, so savage it is killing European economies, surely it would show up in General Government deficit numbers. As before all data reported is based on averages and comparatives computed by me from IMF's WEO data as reported in April 2013 edition of the database.

Let's take a closer look.

Only 2 countries out of 20 have recorded a reduction in average deficits during the crisis period (2008-2012) compared to the pre-crisis average (2003-2007). These were Germany, where annual average deficits declined by 0.95 percentage points (pretty significant) and Malta, where annual average deficits fell 0.79 percentage points (also pretty sizeable drop).

On average, EU20 sample annual deficits have increased by a massive 3.44 percentage points over the pre-crisis period. In  non-Euro area states, the average increase was 3.16 percentage points. But in 'savagely austerian' Euro area, the increases averaged 3.51 percentage points.

So far, the Euro area analysts' rhetoric opposing austerity has been focused on 2012 as the year of highest - to-date - cuts. Was this so? Not really:

Again, as above, there is scantly any evidence of deficit reductions, and plenty of evidence that deficits are getting worse and worse. Again, the comparative is not to the absurd levels of spending during peak spending years of the crisis, but to pre-crisis averages. After all, stimulus is not measured by an ever-escalating public spending, but by increase in spending during the recession compared to pre-recession.

The same conclusion can be reached if we look at 2007 deficit compared to 2012 deficit.

In other words, folks, Europe has had, so far, only 3 measurable forms of austerity, none comfortable to the arguments we keep hearing from European Left:

1. Tax increases (remember, we want to soak the rich even more, right?)
2. Revenue re-allocations to banks measures (remember, no one on Europe's official Left has come out with a proposition that banks should not be bailed out) and to social welfare (clearly, the Left would have liked to spend even more on this)
3. Germany

Note: we must recognise the simple fact that social welfare spending will rise in a recession for a good reason. The argument here is not that it should not (that's a different matter for different debate), but that when it does increase, the resulting increase is a form of Government consumption stimulus.

So let's make the following argument: Euro area did not experience 'austerity' in any pure form in the reductions in deficits. Instead, it experienced a 'stimulus' that was simply wasted on programmes and policies that had nothing to do with growth stimulus (e.g. banks supports). Here are two charts to illustrate:

What the charts above clearly show is that Euro area can be divided into three types of member states:

• Type 1: states where cumulated 5 year surpluses over pre-crisis period gave way to cumulated 5 year deficits. These are: Estonia, Finland, Spain and Ireland.
• Type 2: states where cumulated 5 year deficits over the pre-crisis period were replaced by more benign deficits over the crisis period period. These are Germany and Malta.
• Type 3: all other euro area states where cumulated 5 year deficits over pre-crisis period were replaced by even deeper cumulated deficits over the 5 years of the crisis.

The only two types of fiscal policy that Euro area is missing in its entirety is the type where pre-crisis deficits gave way to crisis period cumulated surpluses (no state in the sample delivers on this) and the type where pre-crisis surpluses gave way to shallower crisis-period surpluses (only one European state - Sweden - qualifies here).

Oh, and one last bit relating to the chart above: all of the peripheral countries, save Italy, had a massive increase in deficits on cumulated basis during the crisis compared to pre-crisis period. Apparently this is the savage austerity that has been haunting their economies.


Updated:
An interesting issue raised by one of the readers:

And my response:

2/5/2013: Austerity... savagely over-hyped?..

It was May 1 yesterday and in celebration of that great socialist holiday, "In Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy and France tens of thousands of people took to the streets to demand jobs and an end to years of belt-tightening".

Except, no one really asked them what did the mean by 'belt-tightening'. Some, correctly, meant by the term the concept of transfers from taxpayers (usually via higher taxes, rather than spending cuts) to the broken banks, but majority, undoubtedly, we decrying cuts in Government spending. You see, damned austerity is just that (or supposed to be just that): cuts in the levels of expenditure. These can mean reduction in absolute level of spending, or a reduction in spending as a proportion of GDP.

And, you see, not much of that is going on in Europe nowdays, despite all the fierce rhetoric about savage cuts.

Ok, let's do some exercises, using IMF data.

First, consider tax revenues:

In the chart above, I marked with darker columns countries where tax revenues as % of GDP have declined during the current crisis (more precisely, taking average tax revenues fior 2003-2007 pre-crisis boom days and comparing against 2012 outrun). Guess what?

• In % of GDP terms, savage austerity meant that Government revenues have declined by less than 1 percentage point in Cyprus (-0.89 ppt), Czech Republic (-0.64 ppt) and Portugal (-0.08 ppt), the revenues have fallen by between 1 and 2 percentage points in Ireland (-1.26 ppt) and the UK (-1.68 ppt) and have declined by more than 2 percentage points in Denmark (-2.50 ppt), Spain (-3.28 ppt) and Sweden (-3.15 ppt).
• All in, only 8 out of the 20 EU countries considered above (these are all advanced economies of the EU, excluding Luxembourg, where data is so dodgy, no meaningful analysis can be made) have managed to post any declines in Government revenues relative to GDP. All other countries have posted increases. Overall, sample average Government revenues as % of GDP stood at 43.04% in 2003-207 period and this has risen to 43.84% in 2012.
• Now, onto levels of revenues. The sample of countries shown above had combined annual Government revenues of EUR7,791.61 billion in 2003-2007 on average. In 2012 this number stood at a 17.96% premium or EUR9,190.96 billion.
• Of all 20 countries considered, only one - Ireland - had experienced level reduction in Government revenues, which dropped from an annual average of EUR57.896 billion in 2003-2007 period to EUR55.42 billion in 2012.
• As I said above, there is only one meaningful form of austerity in Europe today: austerity of higher tax burdens on people.

Now, let's check out expenditure side of Europe's 'savage austerity' story:

Again, chart above highlights in darker color countries where Government expenditure had declined in 2012 compared to 2003-2007 pre-crisis average in % of GDP terms. The picture hardly shows much of any 'savage cuts' anywhere in sight:

• Of the three countries that experienced reductions in Government spending as % of GDP compared to the pre-crisis period, Germany posted a decline of 1.26 percentage points (from 46.261% of GDP average for 2003-2007 period to 45.005% for 2012), Malta posted a reduction of just 0.349 ppt and Sweden posted a reduction of 1.37 ppt.
• No peripheral country - where protestes are the loudest - or France et al have posted a reduction. In France, Government spending rose 3.44 ppt on pre-crisis level as % of GDP, in Greece by 4.76 ppt, in Ireland by 7.74 ppt, in Italy by 2.773 ppt, in Portugal by 0.562 ppt, and in Spain by 8.0 ppt.
• Average Government spending in the sample in the pre-crisis period run at 44.36% of GDP and in 2012 this number was 48.05% of GDP. In other words: it went up, not down.
• In level terms, things are even uglier for the 'anti-austerians'. Total (for this sample of countries) Government annual spending averaged EUR8,002 billion in 2003-2004 period and this rose to EUR9,941 billion in 2012 a rise in Government spending of whooping 24.2%.
• In level terms, not a single country in the sample of 20 advanced EU economies posted a decline in Government spending from the pre-crisis period to 2012. All posted increases in overall spending ranging between 88% for Estonia, to 7.76% for Portugal. Of all peripheral countries, not one cut a single cent on 2003-20007 average spending levels, with Cyprus hiking spending by whooping 39.8% in 2012 compared to 2003-2007 averages, France delivering a massive increase of 24.9%, Greece raising it modestly by 8.73%, Ireland by a massive 22.01%, Italy by a relatively benign 14.67%, Portugal by the sample lowest rate of 7.76% and Spain by a jaw-dropping 38.67%.
• All in, there is no 'savage austerity' in spending levels or as % of GDP.

So what is going on, folks? May be we can find austerity in deficits? Afterall, Paul Krugman & Co are telling us that we need to run deficits in the economy during recessions and this is the leitmotif to all of the anti-austerian policies proposals?

Savage austerity thesis must find at least a significantly large number of countries where there is no deficit financing going on during the crisis compared to pre-crisis activity, or at least a very large number of countries where deficits have declined compared to pre-crisis activity. Is that the case?

Sorry to say it, folks, errr... No. That is not the case.

• Only three countries in the entire sample of 20 have posted decreases in Government deficits in level and as 5 of GDP terms.
• In level terms, deficits declined in Germany, Italy and Malta. They rose in all other countries. Overall level of deficits in 20 countries analysed rose from EUR40.07 billion in 2003-2007 (annual averages) to EUR127.79 billion in 2012. In other words, during 'savage austerity' deficits tripled, not shrunk.
• In terms of relative weight to GDP, deficits also declined only in three countries - the same three countries as above. 
• Savage austerity meant that deficits increased in all peripheral states save Italy and that across 20 economies, whereas average deficit stood at -1.315% of GDP in 2003-2007 period, that rose to -4.215% of GDP in 2012.

 

As I said above, there are really two reasons for protesting in Europe today against what can very loosely be termed 'austerity':

1. As taxpayers we should protest against higher taxes & charges levied against us by the States to pay for various banks rescue measures and for continued public spending inefficiencies and private sector subsidies (note: I am not saying that all public sector spending is inefficient, I am alleging that some of it remains inefficient today); and
2. As taxpayers and residents we should protest about misallocation of scarce resources (including some public spending) from necessities (e.g. social welfare and unemployment protection, health, education, etc) to rescuing insolvent banks and corporate cronies.

Aside from the above reasons, please spare yourselves the blind belief in various Social Partners-produced spin about 'savage cuts'. All they care for is to increase even more state spending on their pet projects.

30/4/2013: The latest from the island nuked by the Troika 'rescuers'

Cypriot Parliament has narrowly (29:27 votes) approved the EU 'rescue' package agreement that covers EUR 17 billion in funds, according to the majority of the media analysts. Alas, the devil of the package is in the details.

Cyprus is not (repeat - not) getting EUR 17 billion in funds. Instead the package lists the following sources of funding:
- EUR 1.2 billion to be raised via losses on junior bonds in Popular and BoC
- The “bailin” of uninsured depositors (deposits in excess of EUR 100K) and senior bondholders is set to yield €8.3 billion
- EUR 10 billion loan from the euro zone and the IMF of which the IMF will provide EUR 1 billion (http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2013/pr13103.htm)
- EUR 1 billion from rolling over domestically-held government bonds, plus EUR 100 million from extending Russian bilateral loan
- EUR 0.4 billion from gold sales by the Cypriot central bank and EUR 0.5 billion from privatizations

Grand total is, therefore, EUR 1.2 + 8.3 + 10 + 1.1 + 0.9 = EUR 21.5 billion.

Per preliminary MOU, Cyprus 'programme' has three core pillars:

"The first pillar aims to restore the health of the financial system and minimize the contingent liabilities from the banks to the state." This includes haircuts on depositors and bondholders in the first stage - as confirmed in the today's approval vote. In later stages, this involves "a substantial reduction in the size of the banking system in relation to the economy as well as in restructuring and recapitalization of one of the banks."

“The second pillar entails an ambitious and well-paced fiscal adjustment that balances short-run cyclical concerns and long-run sustainability objectives, while protecting vulnerable groups. In addition to the fiscal consolidation already underway—estimated at about 5 percent of GDP— an additional 2 percent of GDP in measures will be implemented during the program period, including by raising the corporate income tax rate from 10 to 12 ½ percent and the tax rate on interest income from 15 to 30 percent. An additional 4½ percent of GDP in measures will be needed over the medium term to achieve a 4 percent of GDP primary surplus by 2018, which is required to put debt on a firmly downward path. There will be protection for the most vulnerable groups. The social welfare system will be reviewed to streamline administration costs, minimize the overlap of existing programs, and improve their targeting to ensure that public resources reach those in need."

The third pillar, per usual IMF waffle, involves 'structural reforms'. “To complement the fiscal consolidation efforts, the program will undertake substantial structural reforms aimed to improve the effectiveness of the public sector. The state’s capacity to collect revenues will be strengthened with the implementation of a comprehensive reform agenda to modernize and harmonize procedures, improve internal coordination, and exploit economies of scale. Public financial management reforms will include the implementation of a medium-term budget framework and the adoption of a law on fiscal responsibility. In addition, to enhance the efficiency of the economy and reduce public debt, viable state-owned enterprises will be privatized. Finally, based on an assessment of needs, the program will supplement the recent reform of the pension system with additional measures to ensure its long-run sustainability.

In short, Cyprus gets the usual Troika 'Package +' of big-bang commitments delivery of which will be measured as common not by achieved sustainability or risk metrics, but by passed legislation and enacted legal changes (paper ahead of real impact). And the '+' bit refers to the total wrecking of the Cypriot economy under the reforms of the banking sector and international financial services sector, plus tax hikes which will assure that if there is any oil / gas off-shore, Cypriots will be out with shovels and snorkelling masks to dig every hydrocarbon molecule out to repay these debts.

21/4/2014: Sunday Independent article

My article on Euro area austerity policies failure in Sunday Independent - it's not in levels of cuts, but in the lack of real change from the status quo.