Showing posts with label Manufacturing. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Manufacturing. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 6, 2021

5/4/21: Heating up inflationary risks

 

No, hyperinflation and, in fact, high inflation, ain't coming, yet. But the concerns with both are rising... 


Both, input prices and output prices have accelerated in March, compared to February in Markit's Manufacturing PMIs. 

Headline Markit statement says: "Conditions in the global manufacturing sector continued to brighten at the end of the first quarter, despite the potential for growth to be stymied by rising cost inflationary pressures and supply-chain disruptions." (Emphasis is mine).  And more: "Demand outstripping supply also contributed to a marked increase in purchasing costs during March. Input price inflation surged to a near-decade high, the pass-through of which led to the steepest rise in output charges since data on selling prices were first tracked in October 2009."

The same is happening in the U.S.: "Supplier lead times lengthened to the greatest extent on record. At the same time, inflationary pressures intensified, with cost burdens rising at the quickest rate for a decade. Firms partially passed on higher input costs to clients through the sharpest increase in charges in the survey's history."


5/4/21: BRIC's Manufacturing PMIs: 1Q 2021

 

Given a lot of noise about economic re-opening and abatement of the late 2020 wave of the pandemic, we expected BRIC countries PMIs to improve significantly in 1Q 2021 compared to 4Q 2020. Alas, the opposite took place:


  • Brazil Manufacturing PMI fell from 64.1 in 4Q 2020 to 55.9 in 1Q 2021. All three months of 1Q 2021 came in sub-60 (all three months of 4Q 2020 were above 60) and March 2021 was the lowest monthly reading since June 2020.
  • Russia Manufacturing PMI slipped from 51.5 in February to 51.1 in March. On quarterly basis, Russia Manufacturing PMI actually managed to rise from a recessionary reading of 47.6 in 4Q 2020 to a weak recovery reading of 51.2 in 1Q 2021. This is the highest reading since 1Q 2019 and the first above-50 reading since the end of 2Q 2019. Russia was the only BRIC economy posting increasing PMI in Manufacturing sector in 1Q 2021, and at that, the improvement went to anaemic growth from pretty steep contraction.
  • China Manufacturing PMI disappointed, falling from 53.8 in 4Q 2020 to 51.0 in 1Q 2021. Given structural importance of Chinese manufacturing globally, this implies a further build up in orders backlogs in the global supply chains, signaling more inflationary pressures down the line. On a monthly basis, March 2021 posted fourth consecutive decline in monthly PMIs, with March reading of just 50.6 - statistically, basically indistinguishable from zero growth conditions in the sector.
  • India Manufacturing PMI fell from 57.7 and 57.5 in January and February 2021 to 55.4 in March 2021, marking the slowest monthly rate of growth since August 2020. On a quarterly basis, India Manufacturing PMI fell from a hard-to-believe rate of expansion of 57.2 in 4Q 2020 to still robust growth of 56.9 in 1Q 2021.
Brazil and India were the two BRIC economies that managed to outperform global manufacturing sector growth in 1Q 2021 which came in at 54.1, up on 53.5 in 4Q 2020.

Global GDP-weighted BRIC group Index of Manufacturing Activity that I calculate based on Markit data fell from from 54.8 in 4Q 2020 to 52.8 in 1Q 2021, reaching the lowest reading since 2Q 2020 when it was at 45.0. Whilst BRIC group Index of Manufacturing Activity outperformed Global Manufacturing PMI in every quarter between 1Q 2019 and 4Q 2020, it fell below the global measure in 1Q 2021.

Monday, January 4, 2021

4/1/21: BRIC: Manufacturing PMIs 4Q 2020

Latest data for BRIC Manufacturing PMIs indicates three countries outperforming global rate of recovery in manufacturing sector, against one country (Russia) remaining in contraction territory and well below global growth mark.


On a quarterly basis,

  • Brazil's Manufacturing PMI stood at 64.1 in 4Q 2020, up on 62.6 in 3Q 2020, marking the second highest and the highest reading on record. The contraction in 2Q 2020 (with PMI at 42.0) was sharp, but not as sharp as in 1Q 2009. By these comparatives, GFC-related contraction of 2008-2009 resulted in 4 quarters average reading of 45.1 and saw three consecutive sub-50 readings. The Covid-19 related contraction was stretched only across one quarter, with 4 quarters average of 54.8 in 2020. It is, genuinely, hard to reconcile these numbers with reality of the Covid-19 crisis.
  • Russia Manufacturing PMI slipped to 47.6 in 4Q 2020 from 49.5 in 3Q 2020, marking sixth consecutive quarter of sub-50 readings. Statistically, Russian Manufacturing posted no growth (> 50 readings) in seven consecutive quarters. Over 2020 as a whole, Russian PMIs averaged abysmal 46.0, compared to the GFC and the Great Recession average of 2008-2009 of 44.7.
  • India Manufacturing PMI was at 57.2 in 4Q 2020, up on 51.6 in 3Q 2020, and averaging 49.5 for the year as a whole. During the GFC and the Great Recession period, India's PMI averaged at 51.1. Unlike Brazil, India is yet to recover to pre-Covid-19 levels of activity.
  • China Manufacturing PMI finished 2020 with a reading of 53.9, averaging 51.1 over 2020 as a whole, with overall PMIs performance suggesting that Chinese industrial producers have recovered from the Covid-19 pandemic by the end of 2020. China's Covid-19 experience has been more benign than the country contraction during the GFC and the Great Recession (46.9 average).
Global Manufacturing PMI stood at 53.5 in 4Q 2020 and an average of 49.3 over 2020 as a whole, against BRIC's Manufacturing Index (weighted by relative global GDP shares of the four economies) at 54.9 in 4Q 2020 and 50.5 for 2020 as a whole. In other words, BRICs have supported global growth to the upside during the Covid-19 pandemic. 

Tuesday, November 3, 2020

3/11/20: BRIC: Manufacturing PMIs October

 BRIC's manufacturing PMIs are out for October, marking the start of Q4 2020. Overall, the results reinforce Q3 2020 trends highlighted here: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2020/10/141020-bric-manufacturing-pmis-q3.html



  • Brazil posted further acceleration in the recovery momentum with Manufacturing PMI rising to 66.7 from 3Q 2020 62.6. 3Q 2020 was the historical record quarter for Brazil's Manufacturing PMI readings. Brazil's Manufacturing PMIs have now strengthened every month since May 2020, the last month of sub-50 readings.
  • In contrast to Brazil, Russia Manufacturing PMI slipped again in October, hitting a 5-months low at 46.9, down from 48.9 in September and well below already poor 49.5 reading for 3Q 2020. Prior to 4Q 2020, Russia clocked five consecutive quarters of Manufacturing PMIs below 50.0 mark.
  • China Manufacturing PMI rose from 53.0 in 3Q 2020 to 53.6 in October. China's latest reading is on-trend, with rising PMIs for the third quarter in a row. 
  • India Manufacturing PMI stood at 51.6 in 3Q 2020 and this improved to 58.9 in October, marking a major acceleration in growth conditions. 
  • Three of the BRIC economies have posted October Manufacturing PMI readings more robust than Global PMI reading of 53.0. Thus, overall BRIC Manufacturing activity index stood at 55.2 in October, well ahead of 53.0 reading for 3Q 2020. The last time BRIC Manufacturing activity index was below that of the Global Manufacturing PMI was 4Q 2018.
  • Russia was the only BRIC economy to continue posting recessionary PMI reading in its manufacturing sector. 

Wednesday, October 14, 2020

14/10/20: BRIC: Manufacturing PMIs Q3 results

 

BRIC - Brazil, Russia, India and China - economies have posted a significant improvement in Q3 Purchasing Managers Indices in Manufacturing sector:


Brazil Manufacturing PMI rose to 62.6 - the highest on record in 3Q 2020 following 42.0 recessionary reading in 2Q 2020. This is a massive rebound from pandemic lows, and the level of 3Q reading puts into question validity or accuracy of the surveys. On a monthly basis, the index was at 64.7 and 64.9 in August and September. Brazil's manufacturing index was at sub-50 readings in March-May 2020, with a reasonably credible rebound in June and July. August and September readings are literally out of the ball park, both in terms of historical comparatives and in terms of past turning points from recessions to expansions. 

Russia Manufacturing PMI treaded water in 3Q 2020, swinging from 48.4 in July to 51.1 in August and back to 48.9 in September. As the result, Russia posted sub-50 reading for 3Q 2020 at 49.5, the only BRIC economy in this position. This marks 5th consecutive quarter of sub-50 PMIs. Statistically,  the last time Russian manufacturing was in the expansion territory was in 1Q 2019. 

India Manufacturing PMI rose strongly in Q3 2020 to 51.6, well above 35.1 recession trough in Q2 2020. However, statistically, current reading signals relatively weak recovery. September monthly index came in at more robust 56.8, suggesting that the economy may be gathering some momentum and recovery may be accelerating. 

China Manufacturing PMI was basically unchanged at 53.0 in September compared with 53.1 in August. 3Q 2020 PMI is at 53.0, which is an improvement on statistically zero growth reading of 50.4 in 2Q 2020. China's Manufacturing PMI numbers are historically less volatile, so 53.0 marks the fastest pace of expansion since 4Q 2010.

Overall, GDP-weighted BRIC Manufacturing Activity Index stood at 53.0 in 3Q 2020, above the Global Manufacturing Index (51.6) and up on 45.0 in 2Q 2020.

Thursday, September 10, 2020

8/9/20: BRIC: Manufacturing PMIs

Updating BRIC Manufacturing PMIs - with some delay (sorry, start of the academic year):


 These are quarter averages, with July-August for 2020. And wee have:

  • A mad print for Brazil. In the last four months, Brazil Manufacturing PMI went from 38.3 in May to 51.6 in June, 58.2 in July and a totally incredible 64.7 in August. As PMIs are indicators of month-on-month activity changes, and not comparable year-on-year, all we know is that there is a massive boom in the sector from the lows of the COVID19 pandemic recession. But we do not know if we are close to pre-COVID19 levels or close to the pre-COVID19 trends or anywhere, specifically. Still, if 64.7 reading in August is a genuine indicator of activity, we are seeing real recovery in the economy. In fact, July and August are now two highest PMI readings months in history of the series. On a quarterly average basis, we are at 61.5 so far for 3Q 2020 which is the highest in history, with the prior historical high registered in 1Q 2010 at 56.3. Current trough-to-peak swing in Manufacturing PMI for Brazil for the COVID19 period is incredible 19.5 points.
  • Russia, in contrast, continues to show signs of weaknesses in the Manufacturing sector, with 3Q 2020 PMIs so far running at 49.8 - statistically reflecting zero growth. Notionally, this marks the sixth consecutive quarter of PMIs below 50 in nominal terms and a seventh consecutive quarter at or below 50. Current trough-to-peak swing in Manufacturing PMI for China for the COVID19 period is sharp at 10.8 points, and this before we establish any recovery (over 50.0) momentum.
  • China Manufacturing PMI is currently averaging 53.0 for 3Q 2020, the highest reading since 4Q 2010. China posted statistically zero growth - PMI at 50.4 in 2Q 2020, on foot of a significant, but not catastrophic, contraction in 1Q 2020 at 47.2. Current trough-to-peak swing in Manufacturing PMI for China for the COVID19 period is relatively moderate at 5.8 points.
  • India Manufacturing PMI for 3Q 2020 is at 49.0, having risen from the recession trough of 35.1 in 2Q 2020, and trough-to-peak swing is at 13.9 points.
Overall, BRIC Manufacturing activity index is at 52.3 as of the first two months of 3Q 2020, up from 45.0 in 2Q 2020 and 49.1 in 1Q 2020. The trend is for a substantial improvement over time, with the trough-to-peak swing currently at 7.3 points.The index is outperforming Global Manufacturing PMI that currently sits at 51.2 for 3Q 2020, up 7.6 points on the trough in 2Q 2020. 

Stay tuned for BRIC Services PMIs and Composite PMIs next.

Tuesday, October 2, 2018

1/10/18: BRIC Manufacturing PMI dips down in 3Q 2018


BRIC Manufacturing PMIs turned south in 3Q 2018 in line with Global trend, but leading that trend to the downside. Per latest data through September 2018:

Russia Manufacturing PMI averaged miserly 49.0 in 3Q 2018, down from anaemic 50.2 in 2Q 2018. This was the lowest quarterly reading since 3Q 2015 when the Russian economy was in an official recession. Russia is the only BRIC economy nominally in contraction territory, when it comes to PMIs-signalled manufacturing sector activity, and 49.0 is statistically close to being sub-50 reading as well.

Brazil’s Manufacturing PMI remained broadly unchanged on 2Q 2018 reading of 50.9 at 50.8 in 3Q 2018. Although notionally above 50.0 mark, statistically, the reading was not significantly different from zero growth signal of 50.0. This means that both Russian and Brazilian economies registered deteriorating PMIs over two consecutive quarters in the case of Brazil and 4 quarters in the case of Russia.

China Manufacturing PMI was at disappointing 50.5 in 3Q 2018, down from a weak 51.1 reading in 2Q 2018. This marks the worst reading in China PMI in five quarters. As with Brazil, China’s Manufacturing PMI for 3Q 2018 was not statistically distinct from 50.0.

India Manufacturing PMI was the only one that remained statistically in expansion territory at 52.1 in 3Q 2018, basically unchanged on 52.0 in 2Q 2018 and barely up on 51.8 in 1Q 2018.

Meanwhile, Global Manufacturing PMI averaged 52.5 in 3Q 2018, down from 53.2 in 2Q 2018 and 54.0 in 4Q 2017 and 1Q 2017. All in, Global PMI has finished 3Q 2018 at the lowest level in 8 consecutive quarters.




Wednesday, April 25, 2018

25/4/18: Tesla: Lessons in Severe and Paired Risks and Uncertainties


Tesla, the darling of environmentally-sensible professors around the academia and financially ignorant herd-following investors around the U.S. urban-suburban enclaves of Tech Roundabouts, Silicon Valleys and Alleys, and Social Media Cul-de-Sacs, has been a master of cash raisings, cash burnings, and target settings. To see this, read this cold-blooded analysis of Tesla's financials: https://www.forbes.com/sites/jimcollins/2018/04/25/a-brief-history-of-tesla-19-billion-raised-and-9-billion-of-negative-cash-flow/2/#3364211daf3d.

Tesla, however, isn't that great at building quality cars in sustainable and risk-resilient ways. To see that, consider this:

  1. Tesla can't procure new parts that would be consistent with quality controls norms used in traditional automotive industry: https://www.thecarconnection.com/news/1116291_tesla-turns-to-local-machine-shops-to-fix-parts-before-theyre-installed-on-new-cars.
  2. Tesla's SCM systems are so bad, it is storing faulty components at its factory. As if lean SCM strategies have some how bypassed the 21st century Silicon Valley: http://www.thedrive.com/news/20114/defective-tesla-parts-are-stacked-outside-of-california-machine-shop-report-shows.
  3. It's luxury vehicles line is littered with recalls relating to major faults: https://www.wired.com/story/tesla-model-s-steering-bolt-recall/. Which makes one pause and think: if Tesla can't secure quality design and execution at premium price points, what will you get for $45,000 Model 3?
  4. Tesla burns through billions of cash year on year, and yet it cannot deliver on volume & quality mix for its 'make-or-break' Model 3: http://www.thetruthaboutcars.com/2018/04/hitting-ramp-tesla-built-nearly-21-percent-first-quarter-model-3s-last-week/.
  5. Tesla's push toward automation is an experiment within an experiment, and, as such, it is a nesting of one tail risk uncertainty within another tail risk uncertainty. We don't have many examples of such, but here is one: https://arstechnica.com/cars/2018/04/experts-say-tesla-has-repeated-car-industry-mistakes-from-the-1980s/ and it did not end too well. The reason why? Because uncertainty is hard to deal with on its own. When two sources of uncertainty correlate positively in terms of their adverse impact, likelihood, velocity of evolution and proximity, you have a powerful conventional explosive wrapped around a tightly packed enriched uranium core. The end result can be fugly.
  6. Build quality is poor: https://cleantechnica.com/2018/02/03/munro-compares-tesla-model-3-build-quality-kia-90s/.  So poor, Tesla is running "reworking" and "remanufacturing" poor quality cars facilities, including a set-aside factory next to its main production facilities, which takes in faulty vehicles rolled off the main production lines: https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-03-22/elon-musk-is-a-modern-henry-ford-that-s-bad.
  7. Meanwhile, and this is really a black eye for Tesla-promoting arm-chair tenured environmentalists, there is a pesky issue with Tesla's predatory workforce practices, ranging from allegations of discrimination https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Tesla-Racial-Bias-Suit-Tests-the-Rights-of-12827883.php, to problems with unfair pay practices https://www.technologyreview.com/the-download/610186/tesla-says-it-has-a-plan-to-improve-working-conditions/, and unions busting: http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/21065/tesla-workers-elon-musk-factory-fremont-united-auto-workers.  To be ahead of the curve here, consider Tesla an Uber-light governance minefield. The State of California, for one, is looking into some of that already: https://gizmodo.com/california-is-investigating-tesla-following-a-damning-r-1825368102.
  8. Adding insult to the injury outlined in (7) above, Tesla seems to be institutionally unable to cope with change. In 2017, Musk attempted to address working conditions issues by providing new targets for fixing these: https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/24/elon-musk-addresses-working-condition-claims-in-tesla-staff-wide-email/. The attempt was largely an exercise in ignoring the problems, stating they don't exist, and then promising to fix them. A year later, problems are still there and no fixes have been delivered: https://www.buzzfeed.com/carolineodonovan/tesla-fremont-factory-injuries?utm_term=.qa8EzdgEw#.dto7Dnp7A. Then again, if Tesla can't deliver on core production targets, why would anyone expect it to act differently on non-core governance issues?
Here's the problem, summed up in a tight quote:


Now, personally, I admire Musk's entrepreneurial spirit and ability. But I do not own Tesla stock and do not intend to buy its cars. Because when on strips out all the hype surrounding this company, it's 'disruption' model borrows heavily from governance paradigms set up by another Silicon Valley 'disruption darling' - Uber, its financial model borrows heavily from the dot.com era pioneers, and its management model is more proximate to the 20th century Detroit than to the 21st century Germany.

If you hold Tesla stock, you need to decide whether all of the 8 points above can be addressed successfully, alongside the problems of production targets ramp up, new models launches and other core manufacturing bottlenecks, within an uncertain time frame that avoids triggering severe financial distress? If your answer is 'yes' I would love to hear from you how that can be possible for a company that never in its history delivered on a major target set on time. If your answer is 'no', you should consider timing your exit.


Friday, June 10, 2016

10/6/16: Italian Manufacturing Capacity post-crisis


A third paper on manufacturing capacity, also from Italy is by Libero Monteforte and Giordano Zevi, titled “An Inquiry into Manufacturing Capacity in Italy after the Double-Dip Recession” (January 21, 2016, Bank of Italy Occasional Paper No. 302: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2759786).

Here, the authors “…investigate the effects of the prolonged double-dip recession on the productive capacity of the Italian manufacturing sector”. The authors “…estimate that between 2007 and 2013 capacity contracted by 11–17%, depending on the method.”

In addition, the authors “…conduct an exercise to quantify the loss with respect to a counterfactual evolution of capacity in a ‘no-crisis’ scenario in which pre-2008 trends are extrapolated: in this case the loss is close to 20% for all methods.”

Summary of the results:


And here is decomposition of the potential output drop by factor of production:



Per authors: “In terms of factor determinants, about 60% of the cumulated drop of potential output in 2007-13 came from labour, while around 25% was attributable to the TFP (Chart above). The reason why the contribution of capital is comparatively small is twofold: first, the industrial
sector is characterized by a large wage share (close to 70%), therefore the contribution of K in the production function is limited; second, capital is a highly persistent variable and the fall in investments recorded during the two recessions, even if remarkably large, has not (so far)
resulted in a dramatic drop of the capital stock.”

The key lessons from all of this are: potential output in Italy fell precipitously across the manufacturing economy in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. Meanwhile, counterfactual extension of pre-crisis trends was strongly signalling to the upside in manufacturing.

Majority of metrics used suggest that productive capacity in Italy declined by 15-18 percent through 2013, while counterfactual estimates for pre-crisis trend would have implied an average rise of ca 5 percent.

Last, but not least, “Firms producing basic metals, fabricated metal products and machinery and equipment are found to be the ones that were most penalized by the crisis of the last six years; by contrast, sectors that were already shrinking before 2008, such as the manufacture of textiles, appear not to have performed significantly worse during the double-dip recessions than they had in the early 2000s.”

10/6/16: Italian Industrial Production: 2007-2013


Staying with the earlier theme of industrial / manufacturing sector trends, here is a paper from the Banca d’Italia, authored by Andrea Locatelli, Libero Monteforte, and Giordano Zevi, titled “Heterogeneous Fall in Productive Capacity in Italian Industry During the 2008-13 Double-Dip Recession” (January 21, 2016, Bank of Italy Occasional Paper No. 303: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2759788) looks at the two periods of shocks, separated by one period of brief recovery.

Per authors, “between 2008 and 2013 productive capacity was considerably downsized in the Italian manufacturing sector” based on micro data from the Bank of Italy surveys across “the whole 2008-13 period and in four sub-periods (pre-crisis 2001-07, first phase of the crisis 2008-09, recovery 2010-11, and second crisis 2012-13).”



The study main findings are:
i) “losses of productive capacity varied widely across manufacturing sub-sectors with differences in pre-crisis trends tending to persist in a few sub-sectors during the double-dip recession”;
ii) “large firms were more successful in avoiding major capacity losses, especially in the first phase of the crisis”;
iii) “the share of sales on foreign markets was negatively correlated with performance in 2008-09, but the correlation turned positive in 2012-13”;
iv) “among the Italian macro-regions, the Centre weathered the long recession better” (see charts below);
v) “subsidiaries underperformed firms not belonging to any group”; and
vi) “the negative effects on productive capacity of credit constraints, which discouraged investments, were felt by Italian firms particularly in 2012-13”.

Very interesting outrun by region, presented here in two charts:




Some beef on that point: “The decline in [productive capacity] was not evenly distributed across the Italian macro-regions. The macro-regions more exposed to foreign demand were severely hit by the global financial crisis, with [productive capacity] declining by 8.6% in the North West and 7.0% in the North East.” Now, here’s the irony: Italy was (barely) able to sustain long-term Government borrowing on foot of its extremely strong exporters. During the recent twin crises, this very strength of the Italian economy turned against it. Which sort of raises few eyebrows: strong exporting capacity of Italy led the country to experience sharper shock than in many other states. Yet, the core prescription for growth from across the EU members states is - export!; and core prescription for recovery from the status quo main stream economists is - beef up current ace t surpluses (aka, raise exports relative to imports). Italian evidence does not really sound that supportive of these two ‘solutions’…

“During the temporary recovery, the South under-performed the rest of the country, losing 4.0% of its [productive capacity], while [productive capacity] stagnated in the other macro-regions.”

“The sovereign debt crisis affected the entire country more evenly. As a result, between 2010 and 2013 the loss of [productive capacity] in the South (-8.0%) was roughly twice as large as that recorded in the rest of the country (-4.7%)… The gap reflects the within-country heterogeneity in firms’ characteristics : …South Italy has mainly small firms, with an average of 100 employees (roughly constant during the double-dip crisis). Average firm size is larger in the Centre, just below 150, and in the North East, around 180, and even more so in the North West (consistently above 200). …southern regions have smaller export shares (about 20%), which are higher everywhere else (around 35% at the beginning of the sample); the export share shows a positive trend in all macro-regions.” You can see these reflected in the charts above.

In summary, thus, “the degree of foreign exposure helps to explain why the North suffered more during the global financial crisis. Also, the continuing decline of [productive capacity] in the South since 2007 is consistent with the smaller firm size in that macro-area (discussed above) and the larger decline of domestic demand there”.


So the key lesson here is: in the current environment characterised by rising regionalisation of trade flows and weak global demand, the exports-led recovery is more likely to trigger a negative shock to the economy than support economic growth.

Unless you are talking about a country like Ireland, where exports are booming despite global demand slowdown. Which, of course, cannot be explained by anything other than beggar-thy-neighbour tax optimisation policies.

10/6/16: Wither Manufacturing? Evidence from Denmark


Couple of posts relating to most current research on the recovery and longer term prospects in global manufacturing. As usual here, we shall focus on the advanced economies.

A recent NBER paper, by Andrew Bernard, Valerie Smeets, and Frederic Warzynski, titled “Rethinking Deindustrialization” (March 2016, NBER Working Paper No. w22114: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2755386) looked at decline in manufacturing activity in Denmark, showing that “manufacturing employment and the number of firms have been shrinking as a share of the total and in absolute levels.” The authors examine this phenomena over the period of 1994 to 2007.

“While most of the decline can be attributed to firm exit and reduced employment at surviving manufacturers, we document that a non-negligible portion is due to firms switching industries, from manufacturing to services.”

Here is an interesting list of related findings based on looking closer at the “last group of firms before, during, and after their sector switch”:

  • “Overall this is a group of small, highly productive, import intensive firms that grow rapidly in terms of value-added and sales after they switch.”
  • “By 2007, employment at these former manufacturers equals 8.7 percent of manufacturing employment, accounting for half the decline in manufacturing employment.”
  • “…we identify two types of switchers: one group resembles traditional wholesalers and another group that retains and expands their R&D and technical capabilities.”

Net result? Quite surprising conclusion that the “findings emphasize that the focus on employment at manufacturing firms overstates the loss in manufacturing-related capabilities that are actually retained in many firms that switch industries.”


Friday, October 3, 2014

3/10/2014: Services PMI for Ireland: September 2014


Markit/Investec released their Services PMI for Ireland today. I covered Manufacturing PMI release here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/10/1102014-irish-manufacturing-pmi.html

On Services side:

  • MNCs-driven activity in the sector expanded once again, with PMI for September rising to 62.5 from 62.4 in August and almost matching 62.6 reading in June.
  • 12mo MA is now at 60.9 - which is simply unbelievable, given the overall economy performance over the last 12 months. Predictably, of course, there is somewhat little connection between the survey - weighted heavily on MNCs side, such as ICT Services giants we house in Ireland - and the real economy.
  • 3mo average (Q3 2014 average) is at 62.1 which is identical to Q2 2014 average and is ahead of Q3 2013 average of 58.7. In other words, judging by the figures coming out of PMIs, Irish services economy is growing roughly at 7-8 percent per annum. Good luck spotting that on the ground.

Still, the above chart clearly shows that whether connected to real lives or not, Services economy is now averaging growth rates (post-crisis) that are above those recorded in pre-crisis period. This suggests two things:
  1. There has been a significant switch in economic activity in favour of services (dominated by the dynamics in ICT Services); and
  2. There has been a larger gap opening up between the real economy and tax optimisation-based economy.
I will blog on composite performance on quarterly basis, pooling together both Manufacturing and Services PMIs next, so stay tuned.

Tuesday, September 23, 2014

23/9/2014: Irish factory Gate Prices: Deflation and Inflation in August


CSO's latest data on monthly factory gate prices shows that producer prices rose 0.3% in August 2014 m/m and fell 2.0% y/y, moderating a y/y drop of 2.4% recorded in July 2014.

Exports prices rose 0.4% and home sales prices were down 0.3% m/m. However, y/y exports prices are now down 2.1% and home sales prices are down 1.4%.

Noting the effects of European agricultural products trends associated with Russian counter-sanctions, dairy products prices were down 2.4% m/m and meat and meat products prices fell 0.4% m/m. Outside sanctions impact, Beverages prices rose 2.7% y/y, basic pharma products prices fell 4.5% y/y.

Capital goods prices rose 1.3% y/y and 0.3% m/m, while energy prices fell 13% y/y, petroleum fuel prices were down 2.3%.

Given moments in inputs prices and outputs prices, business margins appear to be pressured by: forex valuations (primarily driving exports prices changes to the downside) and by ongoing domestic deflation in the private sectors. Margins were supported by some decreases in the inputs costs (energy) and offset by the increases in prices of capital goods.

Chart below shows the overall downward trend in producer prices for manufacturing sectors that has been established now from roughly Q3 2012.


But never mind the above... all is rosy based on Irish PMIs readings...

Wednesday, September 3, 2014

3/9/2014: Services PMI for Ireland: August 2014


Services PMI for Ireland are out today, so here is the update on combined PMIs. You can read my analysis of the Manufacturing PMIs here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/09/192014-irish-manufacturing-pmi-august.html

Services sector in Ireland posted another month of high level growth in activity in August.

  • August PMI for Services sectors (Markit and Investec) rose to 62.4 from 61.3 in July and up on 61.6 in August 2013. 
  • This marks 6th consecutive month of readings above 60 (which signify rapid growth), and 25th consecutive month of readings above 50 (which signify growth).
  • 3mo average through May 2014 was 61.4 and 3mo average through August is at 62.1, showing continued trend support above 60-61 mark.

Chart below illustrates both series - Manufacturing and Services:


The above shows that both Manufacturing and Services sectors are now running at the levels well above their post-crisis period average.

Chart below shows the growth estimates consistent with averages:


The above shows some good news: current trend is above already robust long-term growth estimate.

The chart below combines both PMIs and shows that the two sectors together now fully supporting growth in the economy - which is a good news and a significant gain on 2013 and 2012.


So overall, strong news from the PMIs.

Thursday, May 22, 2014

22/5/2014: Happy Times Roll: Irish Manufacturing Producer Prices


Deflation keeps hammering Irish Manufacturing sector:

Per CSO: year on year, factory gate prices fell 2.7% in April 2014, compared with a decrease of 3.1% in the year to March 2014, including

  • a decrease of 3.1% in the price index for export sales (subject to potential effects of currency fluctuations) and 
  • a decrease of 0.6% in respect of the price index for home sales.


Nothing to worry about, folks, this economy is gaining strength and momentum all of the time... PMIs booming and producers confidence is rising (if you ask IBEC).

Tuesday, February 18, 2014

18/2/2014: Wither Irish manufacturing? Not so fast! Sunday Times, February 2

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times  column from February 2, 2014


The news flow was mixed in recent days when it comes to covering Irish economy.

After a massive boost of consumer confidence and a maelstrom of media spin extolling the expected rebound in Christmas season sales, December retail sector statistics came in as a disappointment. Over the entire Q4 2013, core retail sales (excluding motors) were up just 1.1 percent year on year in terms of volume and down 0.5 percent in value. Profit margins in services sectors have shrunk once again in the third quarter and with them, non-financial services sectors activity also slumped in the five months through November 2013.

One bright spot, however, was the return to growth in industrial production. Based on 5 months data through November, in the second half of 2013 industrial output was up 1.2 percent year on year in Traditional sectors and up 3.3 percent in Modern sectors.


This latter bit of news highlights the potential for the sector to play a more active role in delivering long-term source of growth in Irish economy.

Over the second half of 2013, using data through November, Irish manufacturing activity rose 3 percent in volume and 0.1 percent in turnover terms. The improvement in output was largely driven by the MNCs-dominated modern sectors. However, it was also supported by positive performance in domestic sectors, such as food, basic and fabricated metals, and capital and core consumer goods. All in, H2 2013 marked a positive break in the previously negative trend across a number of manufacturing sectors. And this change was even more substantial when one takes out downward pressures exerted on the 2011-2013 figures by the pharmaceuticals, where patents cliff continues to cut into output and revenues of major MNCs operating from Ireland.

Adding to good news, capital goods sectors growth signaled the restart in domestic and international investment cycle. And this confirmed the earlier data on capital acquisitions in the industry.

The latest data is now starting to feed through to official forecasts. This week, the Central Bank upgraded 2014 and 2015 outlook for Irish economy. Specifically, the Central Bank is now projecting investment growth of 8.9 percent in 2014 against 0.1% estimated growth in 2013. Crucially, investment in machinery and equipment, having declined 10 percent in 2013 is now forecast to rise 7 percent in 2014.


The news of the quiet out-of-media-sight stabilisation in the Irish manufacturing is welcome because our exports and economy at large are still heavily dependent on industrial and manufacturing sectors activity.  This news is also positive because manufacturing sectors are responsible for high quality jobs creation and hold a significant potential for Ireland in developing a long-term sustainable economic growth model in the future.  In 2013, weekly earnings in industry were the third highest of all private sectors in Ireland and carried a premium of 33 percent on average private sector earnings.

Beyond the above reasons, there are two basic arguments as to why the latest manufacturing trends are encouraging in the context of sustainable economic development.

The first one is a push-factor, driving Ireland in the direction of the new manufacturing.

Worldwide, we are witnessing a new trend in manufacturing. In the commoditised manufacturing geared toward mass-market supply, global supply chains continue to drive down margins and costs, necessitating ever-increasing degree of automation and labour cost reductions. This trend covers a wide range of goods, such as generic consumer goods and intermediate goods production, ranging from textiles and clothing, to consumer electronics, and basic materials industries. Here, robots are increasingly displacing workers. For example, the McKinsey Global Institute study published this month projects that by 2025 up to 25 percent of the tasks performed by industrial workers in developed countries and up to 15 percent in developing countries will be at a risk of replacement by automated systems.

Meanwhile, highly specialist, customised manufacturing, where the businesses processes are dominated by user-unique design and/or proximity to customers, are seeing development costs and time-to-build lags becoming the main points of competition between producers. Actual production in these sectors is based on high precision and skills flexibility and these drivers are pushing for on-shoring of these sectors to the economies with requisite skills and talent infrastructure. The examples of such manufacturing sub-sectors are also numerous, spanning customised precision equipment manufacturing, professional equipment design and production, medical devices, customised medical equipment, individualised or specialist medicines, technology-intensive and complex machinery, but also high value-added consumer goods. Ireland has some limited experience in this area, with companies such as Mincon and Mainstay Medical, Outsource Technical Concepts and others. And we are witnessing growth in design-rich consumer goods areas, such as homewares, personal accessories and higher value-added foods.

I covered these trends in my recent presentation at the TEDxDublin in September 2013 and over the last three months, major consultancies, such as McKinsey and the Institute for Business Value, IBM have written on the topic.


The second factor is the pull-factor of the opportunities presented by new manufacturing.

The crucial point for Ireland is that this trend offers smaller economies a comparative advantage over larger manufacturing centres, as long as the smaller economies can create, attract, retain and enable core human capital.

The competitive advantage of skills-intensive manufacturing is anchored to traditions of high quality specialist production in the country, and to the innovative and entrepreneurial capacity of the economies. Here, examples of Switzerland, Northern Italy, Germany, Holland, Sweden, Denmark and Finland offer a significant promise for countries like Ireland.

In fact, our immediate neighbours industrial policy platform is now firmly focused on enhancing the connection between industrial design, consumer innovation and manufacturing. This is well-anchored in the UK’s Design Council initiatives and in the Government programmes aiming to systemically increase the role of industrial design in the UK manufacturing. Most recently, Government report “Future of manufacturing: a new era of opportunity and challenge for the UK”, published in October 2013 stresses the importance of merging skills, design and technological innovation in driving the future industrial policy in the UK.


To deliver on this potential, our industrial policy needs to be enhanced further to stimulate growth in entrepreneurship in manufacturing. We also need policies that more closely align product, process and design innovation and R&D, especially within indigenous and traditional sectors.

Skills training in manufacturing should be boosted via a targeted apprenticeship programme that develops key expertise and provides support for training both in Ireland and abroad. Our supports for development of manufacturing clusters in traditional industries need to become more pro-active, providing shared sales and marketing platforms for smaller producers.

We can start by consolidating various promotional agencies under the cover of Enterprise Ireland in order to reduce trade and investment facilitation bureaucracy, while increasing resources available on the ground in the foreign markets. Aligning Enterprise Ireland’s pay and promotion systems with tangible longer-term outcomes for indigenous entrepreneurs and exporters should be considered. The overall thrust of reforms should be on reducing duplication and complexity of the system.

Recent report by the Entrepreneurship Forum, published earlier this month outlined a number of measures aimed at helping the unemployed and underemployed to transition into entrepreneurship. These include reducing the eligibility period for the Back to Work Enterprise allowances and creating an entrepreneurship internship programmes. Beyond this, focused incubation and co-working centres targeting manufacturing entrepreneurs can help develop new capabilities and generate new startups. Aligning these programmes with vertical market access accelerators set up in key cities can help enhancing growth potential of indigenous high value-added entrepreneurship. The above programmes can also stimulate inflow of key talent into the country from abroad, including entrepreneurial talent. One of the core benefits of high value-added manufacturing is that the jobs created and capital investment made in this sector are much better anchored in the economy than comparable outlays undertaken in services sectors.

To simultaneously enhance incentives to undertake entrepreneurial activities and to invest time, effort, talent and funding in such activities, employee stock ownership should be encouraged. Over the recent years, this column has repeatedly argued for a reform of tax codes applying to employee share ownership in startups and SMEs. The Entrepreneurship Forum report echoed these ideas.

Driving growth across the design-rich and R&D-intensive manufacturing will also require managerial talent. Looking across the sectors, Irish management skills are the strongest in the externally trading traditional industries, such as food, beverages, and building and construction services. Here, the pressures of global competition, coupled with the acute need to build exports bases have driven management to adopt lean and effective M&A and organic growth models. Management track record of companies such as CRH, Glanbia, Kerry Group and Ryanair presents the best practices in their sectors that can and should be brought to enterprises in much earlier stages of development.


The encouraging signals from Irish manufacturing suggest that we can put our indigenous economy on an evolutionary path toward ever-increasing reliance on radical technological innovation, design and creativity. This path is closely aligned with the need to develop new models of entrepreneurship that combine disruptive technologies with cultural, managerial and skills-rich talent. The key to success here will be in developing greater agility and flexibility of all systems: from crowdsourcing networks for new product development, to training and education, to data analytics for gauging new demand and to new market access platforms.




Box-out:

This Monday, in its monthly report, Germany's Bundesbank stated that in future crises, countries requiring international assistance should first impose a one-off capital tax on net assets of its own citizens, before any international assistance can be extended to them. In the view of the Bundesbank, a capital tax reflects the principle that "tax payers are responsible for their government's obligations before solidarity of other states is required". These latest musings about the need for a capital or wealth tax come on foot of October 2013 IMF report that estimated that reducing euro area's debt levels to 2007 levels will require a 10 percent tax on net wealth of the euro area residents. Neither the IMF, nor Bundesbank identify explicitly specific assets to which the tax should apply. Alas, past experience with Cyprus suggests that such a tax will most likely take the form of a levy on household deposits. Logically, all other assets held by the households are already either heavily taxed, or illiquid. Property taxes are in place in majority of countries and it is hard to imagine every household being able to come up with cash to cover 10 percent levy on their assets values without being forced to sell their homes. Equity and investment funds are de facto illiquid, as a large scale sell-off of these assets in a distressed economy will trigger a crisis hardly any better than the one the levy will be trying to cure. Business equity is notoriously illiquid. Which leaves deposits as the only readily available cash sitting on captive banks balancesheets. In short, Bundesbank and the IMF might be talking about 'capital levies' and solidarity, but all they really mean are deposits bail-ins and loading pain onto taxpayers. That's one way to underwrite inherently faulty and unstable common currency zone.

Monday, December 17, 2012

17/12/2012: Don't write manufacturing off - part 2


In the previous post I reproduced the summary chart from McKinsey research paper on the future of manufacturing (linked in the post). Here is a more detailed version of the same:


Again, few points worth raising in Ireland's development context: given our openness to trade and limited domestic markets, as well as strong access to global labour markets, we should be prioritizing development that focuses on:

  1. Trade intensity (with intensities at around and above 50%)
  2. Value intensity (with intensities at around and above 30%)
  3. R&D intensity (with intensities at least in double digits)
  4. Labor intensity (with intensities at least in double digits)
From the above 4 criteria, equally weighted, our priorities (scores in brackets reflect sum of values across the above 4 criteria), we have:
  • Computers and office machinery (155)
  • Semiconductors and electronics (132)
  • Medical, precision, and optical (123)
  • Furniture, jewelry, toys, other (105)
  • Other transport equipment (94)
  • Textiles, apparel, leather (92)
  • Machinery, equipment, appliances (82)
  • Chemical (80)
  • Motor vehicles and parts (77)
  • Electrical Machinery (76)
Interesting view?

17/12/2012: Don't write manufacturing off


Here is an amazing (yep, amazing) report from McKinsey on the future of Manufacturing: http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/mgi/research/productivity_competitiveness_and_growth/the_future_of_manufacturing

And here is a really fascinating eye-opening chart from it:

What are the interesting bits in the above?

  1. The US retained its position as number 1 manufacturing source in the world (note - with recent emergence of on-shoring trend for US manufacturing, this is likely to stay)
  2. China moved - predictably - quite fast in the league table
  3. India's performance has been relatively weaker than that of China - not surprising 
  4. Russia - in 2000 only 21st in the world is now 11th
  5. Brazil moved from 15th in 2000 to 6th
  6. Indonesia moved from 20th in 2000 to 13th
  7. Germany dropped from the 2nd in 1980 to the 4th
  8. Italy rose from the 6th in 1980 to the 5th
  9. France dropped from the 5th to the 8th
  10. In 1980 and 1990, EU had 5 countries in the top 10, in 2000 - 4 countries and the same number in 2010 - a rate of relative decline
  11. Big loser is Canada, rising from 10th in 1980 to 9th in 2000 and falling to 15th in 2010.

Here is another revealing chart, mapping 5 broad categories of manufacturing sectors based on specific inputs intensities:
Let's give it a thought. Ireland is a location most suited for R&D intensive and labour (skilled) intensive sectors, as we have neither sufficient capital, nor access to cheap energy (sorry, the renewables bugs - these are not cheap and not abundant). We also want to aim for high trade intensity and high value density. Which means priority sectors for us should be:
  • Motor vehicles, trailers, parts
  • Other transport equipment
  • Electrical machinery
  • Machinery, equipment, appliances
Tier 2 priorities (mostly driven by imported capital due to their high capital intensities) should be:
  • Chemicals
  • Computers and office machinery
  • Semiconductors and electronics
  • Medical, precision, and optical
Interestingly, and rather counter contrary to the perceived effects of the web-based economy, R&D intensive areas of the economy remain manufacturing:

These are just some of the fascinating insights. I will try blogging on the report some more in later posts.

Monday, January 11, 2010

Economics 11/01/2010: Manufacturing Activity Sliding

Once again, spot on with the general trend toward renewed deterioration in Q4, industrial production posted a 9.1% decline in November 2009. Per CSO: “The seasonally adjusted volume of industrial production for Manufacturing Industries for the three month period September to November 2009 was 3.1% lower than in the preceding three month period.” Monthly change was -9.1% as well in November, for Manufacturing Industries as contrasted with 1.6% decline in October. In all industries, November decline was 8%, compared with October monthly decline of 1.4%.


The sectors contributing most to the change in November were: Computer, electronic and optical products (-36.1%) and Food products (-12.5%). The “Modern” Sector, comprising a number of high-technology and chemical sectors, showed an annual decrease in production for November 2009 of 3.7% while a decrease of 17.7% was recorded in the “Traditional” Sector. In seasonally adjusted terms, the picture was slightly less poor: Modern Sectors declined 10.5% in monthly terms, marking second consecutive monthly decrease (the index fell 5.8% back in October 2009), while Traditional sectors fell 2.2% in November, after registering an increase of 5.5% in October. The series are obviously volatile – analysis of volatility is to follow later (grading times for both UCD & TCD) – but all signs point to a renewed deterioration taking hold.