3/11/20: COVID19 Update: Nordics

Things are getting more complicated in the Nordics in the wake of the unfolding second wave of the pandemic:

The second wave of the pandemic has started first in the Nordics excluding Sweden, but the same wave is now also beginning to manifest itself in Sweden. Adding to the complexity of analysis, Swedish data is now being reported with significant volatility (multiple consecutive '0' observations per week), making higher frequency comparatives basically impossible.

Nonetheless, Sweden is now catching up, once again, with the rest of the Nordics in terms of new cases.  In the last 7 days, Sweden averaged 1,204 cases per day (up on 627 average daily rate of new cases in the two weeks prior). Nordics ex-Sweden averaged (adjusting to Swedish population) 3,228 daily new cases over thee last 7 days, with prior 14 days average of 2,775.

In terms of daily deaths, Sweden currently performs significantly better than the rest of the Nordics. Sweden's average daily deaths run at 0 over the last 7 days and 0.43 deaths per day average over the prior 14 days period. Nordics ex-Sweden (again adjusting to Swedish population) averaged 17 deaths per day in the last 7 days, and 10.6 deaths in thee prior two weeks period. However, this better performance by Sweden is at least in part due to the later start of the second wave of the pandemic in thee country compared to other Nordics.

Overall, for now, excess deaths count in Sweden compared to other Nordics is shrinking, currently at 2,580.

Only time will tell whether thee current second wave dynamics are going to push Sweden once again into the position of being worse-hit by the pandemic than its Nordic counterparts. 

23/10/20: COVID19 Update: Nordics

My last update on Nordics vs Sweden comparatives was a month ago, although I did post some more recent data trends on Twitter since then. Here are the latest numbers:

New deaths counts are relatively benign, both in Sweden and (at a higher rate) in the rest of the Nordics. However, new daily counts in thee Nordics ex-Sweden are literally out of control as a new, and much larger wave of the pandemic sweeps EU27. 

Sweden entered the second wave of the pandemic with a delay, compared to other European states, so its numbers are still lagging those in other Nordic states. 

I commented on the often-heard argument in favour of Sweden's 'herd immunity' strategy earlier today and you can read it here, if you missed it (bottom of the post): https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2020/10/231020-covid19-update-countries-with.html. 

It appears, based on Sweden's (amongst others') experiences, that we really have very limited options in terms of public policy response to the pandemic. My five cents, based on multiple observations of experts' advice: we need 

• Fully enforceable and strongly policed public distancing measures, 
• Mandatory masks in all public places,
• Restricted (though, probably, not banned) access to public commons and public places,
• Effective and wide-spread free testing on demand, 
• Aggressive tracing and strictly enforced quarantines,
• Improved separation of COVID19 patients from all general health facilities (in order to ensure that normal health services provision is not impacted by the pandemic), and
• Significant increase in spending on public health and education so both key sectors of the society can be opened safely and sustainably.

There has to be public and state-level zero-tolerance view toward anyone failing to comply with these measures.  

Anything short of these will result in stop-and-go swings of the pandemic and knee-jerk policy reactions with rolling shutdowns of the entire economies. 

25/9/20: COVID19 Update: Nordics

 

Sweden is not acquiring the fabled 'herd immunity', folks. And other Nordics are now in a full-blown second wave of the pandemic:

As the figures above show, 

• Sweden has been experiencing a reduction in new cases through the first week of September. This resulted in Swedish daily case counts finally dropping below the numbers reported in other Nordic countries. 
• Since the start of September, Nordics ex-Sweden have entered the second wave of Covid19 pandemic, further exacerbating their relative position compared to Sweden.
• However, Sweden itself is now experiencing the second wave of the pandemic, and Sweden's historical troughs of new cases have remained always higher than the troughs reached by the other Nordic states.
• Both Sweden and the rest of the Nordics continue to enjoy low levels of deaths, however, in line with the numbers of new cases, Nordics ex-Sweden are showing signs of the new wave of the pandemic lifting deaths counts relative to the past troughs.

13/9/20: COVID19 Update: Nordics

 I have not updated the controversial comparatives between the Nordics (ex-Sweden) and Sweden in terms of COVID19 pandemic figures for some time now. For those of you who are out of the loop in this controversy, 

• Sweden imposed weak restrictions (basically none) on mobility and work environments in the wake of the pandemic, pursuing the strategy of 'herd immunity';
• Other Nordics imposed severe crack downs on mobility and social and work environments in response to COVID19 pandemic.

There has been a lot of controversy as to the effectiveness of the lack thereof of the Swedish strategy.

So here are the key data trends and points:

Key takeaways from the above:

• As of September 12, Sweden has the total number of 89,377 cases. Nordics ex-Sweden, normalized to the Swedish population size had 35,277 cases, or 39.5% of the total number of Swedish cases. So to-date, Sweden has experienced significantly greater exposure to the virus than its Nordic countries counterparts.
• As of September 12, Sweden has the total number of 5,829 deaths. Nordics ex-Sweden, normalized to the Swedish population size had 2,188 cases, or 37.5% of the total number of Swedish deaths. Sweden also experienced much higher death counts from the pandemic than its Nordic countries counterparts.
• Notably, per first chart above, since 26-27th of August, Nordic ex-Sweden have experienced a rather substantial re-acceleration in new cases, in line with the rest of the EU27 (see more on this here: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2020/09/12920-covid19-update-us-vs-eu27.html). Sweden is only appearing to show signs of such re-acceleration starting with the end of the first week of September.
• The above change in trends for new cases is yet to translate into change in trends in deaths: in the last 7 days, average daily new deaths for Nordics ex-Sweden, adjusting for population differences, was 0.83. The same number fo Sweden was 1.57. In the prior 14 days, the averages were reversed at 1.034 and 0.571, respectively.

Watch the new wave developing in days ahead... 

13/7/20: COVID19 Update: Sweden v Nordics

Updating charts comparing Sweden and ex-Sweden Nordic countries, normalizing population of the latter to that of Sweden:

Nope, no 'herd immunity' in Sweden. But there is a crushed curve for new cases and deaths in the Nordics. 

10/7/20: COVID19 Update: Sweden v Nordics

Sweden has been continuing its uncontested-by-anyone-else march toward thee non-existent 'herd immunity':

And the pipeline of upcoming intensive care patients seems to be un-abating:

In the mean time, the rest of the Nordics have crushed the curve. And this is without inclusion of Iceland. 

Personally, I cannot understand how Sweden's resident are tolerating this, but... who knows... 

20/06/20: COVID19 Update: Sweden v Other Nordics

Sweden is a now a verifiable basket case amongst the Nordic countries when it comes to the country management of the COVID19 pandemic:

The two charts above show that Sweden performance in both daily cases and deaths has been truly shockingly poor, compared to all other Nordic countries combined. The same is true in country-by-country comparatives.

In fact, based on ECDC data, were Sweden to perform as all other Nordics (including Estonia), its total number of cases of COVID19 registered would currently stand at 22,890, against its actual count of 54,443, and its death toll would have been 2,113 against its actual death toll of 4,877.

5/5/20: Sweden v Denmark: Covid19 experiences and outruns

For those interested, there's an ongoing debate about the benefits and costs of two different approaches to dealing with the Covid19 pandemic that are being contrasted in the case of Sweden (low level of restrictions) and Denmark (high level of restrictions). The two countries offer a decent 'natural experiment' data, due to their physical, cultural, historical and socio-economic proximities.

Peter Turchin dissects the evidence on the outcomes here: http://peterturchin.com/cliodynamica/a-tale-of-two-countries/ in a very readable and, yet, empirically rigorous analysis.

The chart above is the key, although not the only source of the insights. Lines represent a fitted model, while points represent actual data.

What is notable in the above (some of it is in Peter's post, some is not) are the following features of the data:

1. Death rates models in Denmark trail below those in Sweden, albeit the two converge into late April and reverse in early May. We do not know why, though Peter identifies one specific potential cause: slower and lower rate of testing in Sweden. Another potential cause can be the duration of treatment differences between the two countries. A third potential one, differences in vintage/strand of the virus. Etc...
2. Actual death rates uptick in Denmark around May 1 seem to be relative outliers to the Denmark data (we do not know why, nor do we know if these are going to become a 'new normal' or a 'new trend'). These outliers are certainly responsible for the trend lines reversals.
3. Actual death rates in Sweden are massively more volatile than those in Denmark. This volatility is most evident in April. This should imply serious differences in the accuracy/precision of both models, with Swedish model potentially down-weighing these upward outliers (this depends on the model used, of course).

The rest of conclusions are down to you, folks.

10/6/16: Wither Manufacturing? Evidence from Denmark

Couple of posts relating to most current research on the recovery and longer term prospects in global manufacturing. As usual here, we shall focus on the advanced economies.

A recent NBER paper, by Andrew Bernard, Valerie Smeets, and Frederic Warzynski, titled “Rethinking Deindustrialization” (March 2016, NBER Working Paper No. w22114: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2755386) looked at decline in manufacturing activity in Denmark, showing that “manufacturing employment and the number of firms have been shrinking as a share of the total and in absolute levels.” The authors examine this phenomena over the period of 1994 to 2007.

“While most of the decline can be attributed to firm exit and reduced employment at surviving manufacturers, we document that a non-negligible portion is due to firms switching industries, from manufacturing to services.”

Here is an interesting list of related findings based on looking closer at the “last group of firms before, during, and after their sector switch”:

• “Overall this is a group of small, highly productive, import intensive firms that grow rapidly in terms of value-added and sales after they switch.”
• “By 2007, employment at these former manufacturers equals 8.7 percent of manufacturing employment, accounting for half the decline in manufacturing employment.”
• “…we identify two types of switchers: one group resembles traditional wholesalers and another group that retains and expands their R&D and technical capabilities.”

Net result? Quite surprising conclusion that the “findings emphasize that the focus on employment at manufacturing firms overstates the loss in manufacturing-related capabilities that are actually retained in many firms that switch industries.”

25/1/15: Swiss Out, Danes In: Pegs and Euro Mess

My comment from earlier this week on SNB and Denmark's Nationalbank pegs decisions (Expresso, January 24, 2015 page 09):

There are two truths about currency pegs.

The first one is that no Central Bank is an island. In other words, all pegs are temporary in their duration and costly in their nature, while held.

The second one is that exiting a peg with underlying conditions similar to those when the peg was set in the first place can never be a smooth and risk-free decision. Disruptive nature of such an exit is only highlighted by the necessity of the peg in the first place.


Swiss CHF to Euro peg is emblematic of the above two facts. The peg, de facto maintained from the summer 2011 (but officially launched on September 6, 2011) at the height of the euro area crisis, was designed to remove pressures on the Swiss Franc arising from the rapid acceleration of capital inflows from the euro area to Switzerland. The resulting inflows pushed values of CHF well beyond the sustainable bounds, threatening to derail the Swiss economy, heavily dependent (especially in 2011) on exports.

The cost of the SNB peg to the Swiss economy was manageable, but accelerating in recent months. As part of the peg, SNB printed CHF to purchase surplus euros. Bought euros were accumulated on the SNB balance sheet. recent devaluation of the euro against the US dollar, and expected future devalutations of the euro (on foot of upcoming ECB QE measures) pushes down the real value of these forex reserves accumulated by the SNB. Exiting the peg simply realigned these values to actual currency fundamentals and crystallised the loss in one go, de facto partially sterilising the inflows.

Chart below illustrates accumulation of Forex reserves by SNB from the peg introduction on September 6, 2011.

The disruption caused by the SNB exiting the peg has been significant. Some 46 percent of all Polish mortgages have been issued in CHF. Hundreds of thousands of loans in other Eastern European countries were tied to CHF as well. The cost of funding these loans rose by between 15 and 20 percent overnight, causing some panicked reactions from some Eastern European Central Banks. Beyond this, home-felt impact of SNB move has been less pronounced in the short run. However. in the longer term, stronger Swiss Franc is going to put severe pressure on Swiss exports and will likely result in deterioration in the overall balance of payments. Swiss economy is still heavily reliant on Forex valuations to support its global trade. Current world trade conditions - with the likes of Baltic Dry Index at 753,000 close to crisis period lows, and IMF projections for ever lower rates of global trade growth in 2015-2016 - all signalling serious pressures on Swiss exporters.


Denmark's decision to introduce a Krone/Euro peg this week is likely to fare about as well as that of the Swiss decision in 2011. Just as the Swiss, Danish regulators also set negative deposit rates to further reduce pressure on Krone from Euro inflows. However, the pressure on the Krone is rising not due to the crisis-related capital flight (as was the case with Switzerland in 2011-2013), but due to currency hedging in anticipation of the ECB quantitative easing move expected to be announced this week.

Danish peg is critically different from the SNB previous attempt to peg CHF. The reason for this is that Krone has a long-term link to the Euro and in effect current peg is simply a form of repricing this link. And, unlike CHF (which accounts for roughly 5.2 percent of global currency trading volumes), Krone is a relative minnow in the forex markets (its share of the global currency trade is only 0.8 percent).

The two factors make Krone peg more credible and less costly to defend over the medium term. But none of these factors help to alleviate the problem of currency valuations for Danish exporters, who will see their markets for exports more contested now that the Krone is appreciating against the Euro.

The reserves dynamics preceding the Denmark's peg introduction and the SNB peg announcement in September 2011 are similar: both currencies have sustained heavy 'buy' pressures and both pressures were driven by the crises in the euro area. SNB introduced the peg at relatively benign levels of forex reserves accumulation back in 2011 which, at the time, were nonetheless consistent with crisis-period peak levels. Denmark's Nationalbank's peg introduction also takes place close to crisis period peak of reserves accumulation and the question to be asked is: how much pain on DKK can Denmark take in this environment. 

25/4/2014: ECB, Denmark & Negative Rates, 'Peripherals' & Russia: today's links

Rumours mills been busy of late with all the talk about ECB doing 'whatever it takes' to get inflation going again. See this for example: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/ecb-prepares-measures-to-combat-possible-deflation-a-965636.html

Here is the best take on Denmark's brief brush with ECB's (allegedly) favourite weapon: the negative deposit rates:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-24/danish-central-bank-exits-negative-rates-first-time-since-2012.html


But while we are on topic of things monetary and fiscal, here is Euromoney take on what's been happening in the markets for 'peripheral' sovereign debt (note: my comment at the bottom): http://euromoney.msgfocus.com/c/123DSxhABTIFoVxuegyp64hKZL and alternative link: http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3334400/Category/14091/ChannelPage/8959/Ireland-and-Spain-lead-the-way-on-a-long-road-back-for-the-eurozone-periphery.html

To give you more context, here is the full comment I made:

The numbers cited are even better summarised in my earlier post on the subject here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/04/2342014-some-scary-reading-from-eurostat.html

Meanwhile, here's what has been happening in the sovereign debt markets today - CDS spreads:

And finally, Russian credit downgrade: http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/04/25/russia-economy-ratings-idINL6N0NH19I20140425