3/7/20: ECB Jumping the Proverbial Shark?

ECB's money-printing press has been running overtime these weeks. So let's put the Euro area central banks' monetary policy shenanigans into perspective, comparing them to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) related measures, the Euro area sovereign debt crisis and the subsequent painful recovery:

Good thing: ECB has deployed COVID19 response at scale and fast. Bad thing: it is highly uncertain how much growth all of this activism is going to sustain. From 2000 through 1Q 2020, there is zero (statistically) relationship between current GDP growth (nominal) and ECB assets accumulation in the same year and in prior year:

Even ignoring statistical significance, the relationship itself is not positive, especially in the lagged data. In other words, there is absolutely no evidence of causality from ECB asset purchases to higher economic growth. While reasons for this results are complex (and not really a matter for this post), there are some serious questions to be asked as to how much tangible growth is being sustained by the Central Bank's activism. On the other side of the same argument, if we assume that the ECB purchases of assets are effective at sustaining growth in the Euro area economy, then we must have some serious questions as to what the Euro area economy is capable of producing in terms of GDP growth without such interventions.

In simple terms: we are damned if we do, and damned if we do not:

• Either monetary activism is not effective at sustaining growth, or
• If monetary activism is effective, then the state of the economic institutions overall is so dire, it remains comatose even with extraordinary supports from Frankfurt.

Neither is a pleasant conclusion. And there is not a third alternative.

Just in case you need a reality check on how poor Euro area's growth has been, here is a summary:

12/6/20: Summary of the Eurosystem Response Measures to COVID19

Great and tight summary of the Eurosystem monetary policies deployed in response to COVID19 pandemic: https://blocnotesdeleco.banque-france.fr/en/blog-entry/monetary-policy-measures-taken-eurosystem-response-covid-19.  Cumulative total through the end of May, EUR 1.27 trillion.

21/5/28: Trouble is brewing in the Euro paradise

My article for the Sunday Business Post on the continued risk/VUCA from politics of populism to the Euro area reforms and stability: https://www.businesspost.ie/business/trouble-brewing-euro-paradise-416876.

15/5/18: Beware of the Myth of Europe's Renaissance

My article for last Sunday's Business Post on why the Euro area growth Renaissance is more of a fizzle than a sizzle, and what Ireland needs to do to decouple from the Go Slow Europe: https://www.businesspost.ie/business/beware-myth-europes-renaissance-416318. Hint: not an Irexit... and not more Tax Avoidance Boxes...

21/11/17: ECB loads up on pre-Christmas sales of junk

Holger Zschaepitz @Schuldensuehner posted earlier today the latest data on ECB’s balance sheet. Despite focusing its attention on unwinding the QE in the medium term future, Frankfurt continues to ramp up its purchases of euro area debt. Amidst booming euro area economic growth, total assets held by the ECB rose by another €24.1 billion in October, hitting a fresh life-time high of €4.4119 trillion.

Thus, currently, ECB balance sheet amounts to 40.9% of Eurozone GDP. The ‘market economy’ of neoliberal euro area is now increasingly looking more and more like some sort of a corporatist paradise. On top of ECB holdings, euro area government expenditures this year are running at around 47.47% of GDP, accord to the IMF, while Government debt levels are at 87.37% of GDP. General government net borrowing stands at 1.276% of GDP, while, thanks to the ECB buying up government debt, primary net balance is in surplus of 0.589% of GDP.

Meanwhile, based on UBS analysis, the ECB is increasingly resorting to buying up ‘bad’ corporate debt. So far, the ECB has swallowed some 255 issues of BB-rated and non-rated corporate bonds, with Frankfurt’s largest corporate debt exposures rated at BBB+. AA to A-rated bonds count 339 issues, with mode at A- (148 issues).

It would be interesting to see the breakdown by volume and issuer names, as ECB’s corporate debt purchasing programme is hardly a very transparent undertaking.

All in, there is absolutely no doubt that Frankfurt is heavily subsidising both sovereign and corporate debt markets in Europe, largely irrespective of risks and adverse incentives such subsidies may carry.

29/9/17: Eurocoin: Eurozone growth is still on the upside trend

The latest data from Eurocoin - an early growth indicator published by Banca d’Italia and CEPR - shows robust continued growth dynamics for the common currency GDP through August-September 2017. Rising from 0.67 in August to 0.71 in September, Eurocoin posted the highest reading since March 2017 and matched the 3Q 2017 GDP growth projection of 0,67.

The charts below show both the trends in Eurocoin and underlying GDP growth, as well as key policy constraints for the monetary policy forward.

The last chart above shows significant gains in both growth and inflation over the last 12 months, with the euro area economy moving closer to the ECB target zone for higher rates. In fact, current state of unemployment and growth suggests policy rates at around 2.4-3 percent, while inflation is implying ECB rate in the regions of 1.25-1.5 percent.

In summary, euro area recovery continues at relative strength, with growth trending above the post-crisis period average since January 2017, and rising. Inflationary expectations are starting to edge toward the ECB target / tolerance zone, so October ECB meeting should be critical. Signals so far suggests that the ECB will outline core modalities of monetary policy normalisation, which will be further expanded upon before the end of 2017, setting the stage for QE unwinding and some cautious policy rates uplift from the start of 2018.

20/7/17: Euro Area's Great non-Deleveraging

A neat data summary for the European 'real economic debt' dynamics since 2006:

In the nutshell, the Euro area recovery:

1. Government debt to GDP ratio is up from the average of 66% in 2006-2007 to 89% in 2016;
2. Corporate debt to GDP ratio is up from the average of 72% in 2006-2007 to 78% in 2016; and
3. Household debt to GDP ratio is down (or rather, statistically flat) from the average of 58.5% in 2006-2007 to 58% in 2016.

The Great Austerity did not produce a Great Deleveraging. Even the Great Wave of Bankruptcies that swept across much of the Euro area in 2009-2014 did not produce a Great Deleveraging. The European Banking Union, and the Genuine Monetary Union and the Great QE push by the ECB - all together did not produce a Great Deleveraging. 

Total real economic debt stood at 195%-198% of GDP in 2006-2007 - at the peak of previous asset bubble and economic 'expansion' dynamism, and it stands at 225% of GDP in 2016, after what has been described as 'robust' economic recovery. 

15/4/17: Thick Mud of Inflationary Expectations

The fortunes of U.S. and euro area inflation expectations are changing and changing fast. I recently wrote about the need for taking a more defensive stance in structuring investors' portfolios when it comes to dealing with potential inflation risk (see the post linked here), and I also noted the continued build up in inflationary momentum in the case of euro area (see the post linked here).

Of course, the current momentum comes off the weak levels of inflation, so the monetary policy remains largely cautious for the U.S. Fed and accommodative for the ECB:

More to the point, long term expectations with respect to inflation remain still below 1.7-1.8 percent for the euro area, despite rising above 2 percent for the U.S. And the dynamics of expectations are trending down:

In fact, last week, the Fed's consumer survey showed U.S. consumers expecting 2.7% inflation compared to 3% in last month's survey, for both one-year-ahead and three-years-ahead expectations. But to complicate the matters:

• Euro area counterpart survey, released at the end of March, showed european households' inflationary expectations surging to a four-year high and actual inflation exceeding the ECB's 2 percent target for the first time (February reading came in at 2.1 percent, although the number was primarily driven by a jump in energy prices), and
• In the U.S. survey, median inflation uncertainty (a reflection of the uncertainty regarding future inflation outcomes) declined at the one-year but increased at the three-year ahead horizon.

Confused? When it comes to inflationary pressures forward, things appear to be relatively subdued in the shorter term in the U.S. and much more subdued in the euro area. Except for one small matter at hand: as the chart above illustrates, a swing from 1.72 percent to above 2.35 percent for the U.S. inflation forward expectations by markets participants can take just a month in the uncertain and volatile markets when ambiguity around the underlying economic and policy fundamentals increases. Inflation expectations dynamics are almost as volatile in the euro area.

Which, in simple terms, means three things:

1. From 'academic' point of view, we are in the world of uncertainty when it comes to inflationary pressures, not in the world of risk, which suggests that 'business as usual' for investors in terms of expecting moderate inflation and monetary accommodation to continue should be avoided;
2. From immediate investor perspective: don't panic, yet; and 
3. From more passive investor point of view: be prepared not to panic when everyone else starts panicking at last.

28/2/16: ECB in March: A Thaw or a Spring Blizzard?

My comment on what to expect from the ECB in March for Expresso http://en.calameo.com/books/004629676f86bc6c6796a.

As usual, full comment in English here:

While the transmission mechanism has been improving in recent months across the euro area, leading to stronger lending conditions across the common currency area and a wider range of the member states' economies, inflationary dynamics remained extremely weak, even when stripping out the effects of oil and other commodities prices. As the result, ECB continues to see inflation as the key target and is likely to intensify its efforts to boost price formation mechanism.

Thus, despite all the ECB efforts, inflation remains stubbornly low and even slipping back toward zero in more recent data prints. Improved lending is not sufficient to create a major capex boost on the ground, weighing heavily on growth dynamics. Lower costs of borrowing for the euro area governments, while providing significant room for fiscal manoeuvre, is simply not sufficient to sustain a robust recovery. About the only functioning side of the monetary policy to-date has been the devaluation of the euro vis a vis the US dollar - a dynamic more influenced by the Fed policy stance than by the ECB alone.

My expectation is that the ECB will cut its deposit rate to -40 bps (a cut of 10 basis points on current) with a strong chance that such a cut can be even deeper. We can further expect some announcement on an extension of the QE programme beyond the end of 1H 2017.

The key problem, however, is that the ECB is also becoming more and more aware of the evidence that past QE measures in Japan, the UK, the euro area and across Europe ex-Euro area have failed to deliver a sufficient demand side boost to these economies. Thus, in recent months, the ECB has been increasing rhetorical pressure on member states governments to engage in supply side stimuli. Unfortunately, this too is a misguided effort.

In the present conditions, characterised by markets uncertainty, heavy debt overhangs and mis-allocated investment on foot of previous QE rounds, neither supply nor demand sides of the policy equation hold a promise of repairing the euro area economy. In addition, accelerated QE will likely feed through to the markets via higher volatility and possible liquidity tightening (bid-ask spreads widening, fear of scarcity of high quality government bonds and uncertainty over viability of the current monetary policy course).

9/2/16: Currency Devaluation and Small Countries: Some Warning Shots for Ireland

In recent years, and especially since the start of the ECB QE programmes, euro depreciation vis-a-vis other key currencies, namely the USD, has been a major boost to Ireland, supporting (allegedly) exports growth and improving valuations of our exports. However, exports-led recovery has been rather problematic from the point of view of what has been happening on the ground, in the real economy. In part, this effect is down to the source of exports growth - the MNCs. But in part, it seems, the effect is also down to the very nature of our economy ex-MNCs.

Recent research from the IMF (see: Acevedo Mejia, Sebastian and Cebotari, Aliona and Greenidge, Kevin and Keim, Geoffrey N., External Devaluations: Are Small States Different? (November 2015). IMF Working Paper No. 15/240: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2727185) investigated “whether the macroeconomic effects of external devaluations have systematically different effects in small states, which are typically more open and less diversified than larger peers.”

Notice that this is about ‘external’ devaluations (via the exchange rate channel) as opposed to ‘internal’ devaluations (via real wages and costs channel). Also note, the data set for the study does not cover euro area or Ireland.

The study found “that the effects of devaluation on growth and external balances are not significantly different between small and large states, with both groups equally likely to experience expansionary [in case of devaluation] or contractionary [in case of appreciation] outcomes.” So far, so good.

But there is a kicker: “However, the transmission channels are different: devaluations in small states are more likely to affect demand through expenditure compression, rather than expenditure-switching channels. In particular, consumption tends to fall more sharply in small states due to adverse income effects, thereby reducing import demand.”

Which, per IMF team means that the governments of small open economies experiencing devaluation of their exchange rate (Ireland today) should do several things to minimise the adverse costs spillover from devaluation to households/consumers. These are:

1. “Tight incomes policies after the devaluation ― such as tight monetary and government wage policies―are crucial for containing inflation and preventing the cost-push inflation from taking hold more permanently. …While tight wage policies are certainly important in the public sector as the largest employer in many small states, economy-wide consensus on the need for wage restraint is also desirable.” Let’s see: tight wages policies, including in public sector. Not in GE16 you won’t! So one responsive policy is out.
2. “To avoid expenditure compression exacerbating poverty in the most vulnerable households, small countries should be particularly alert to these adverse effects and be ready to address them through appropriately targeted and efficient social safety nets.” Which means that you don’t quite slash and burn welfare system in times of devaluations. What’s the call on that for Ireland over the last few years? Not that great, in fairness.
3. “With the pick-up in investment providing the strongest boost to growth in expansionary devaluations, structural reforms to remove bottlenecks and stimulate post-devaluation investment are important.” Investment? Why, sure we’d like to have some, but instead we are having continued boom in assets flipping by vultures and tax-shenanigans by MNCs paraded in our national accounts as ‘investment’. 
4. “A favorable external environment is important in supporting growth following devaluations.” Good news, everyone - we’ve found one (so far) thing that Ireland does enjoy, courtesy of our links to the U.S. economy and courtesy of us having a huge base of MNCs ‘exporting’ to the U.S. and elsewhere around the world. Never mind this is all about tax optimisation. Exports are booming. 
5. “The devaluation and supporting policies should be credible enough to stem market perceptions of any further devaluation or policy adjustments.” Why is it important to create strong market perception that further devaluations won’t take place? Because “…expectations of further devaluations or an increase in the sovereign risk premium would push domestic interest rates higher, imposing large costs in terms of investment, output contraction and financial instability.” Of course, we - as in Ireland - have zero control over both quantum of devaluation and its credibility, because devaluation is being driven by the ECB. But do note that, barring ‘sufficient’ devaluation, there will be costs in the form of higher cost of capital and government and real economic debt.It is worth noting that these costs will be spread not only onto Ireland, but across the entire euro area. Should we get ready for that eventuality? Or should we just continue to ignore the expected path of future interest rates, as we have been doing so far? 

I would ask your friendly GE16 candidates for their thoughts on the above… for the laughs…

3/12/15: 85 v 52: Of Duration of Risk Mispricing

One of the causes of the most recent crisis in the euro area is frequently linked to the superficially low interest rates set by the ECB during the period of 2002-2006. Taking historical average rates, the actual period of significant interest rates deviation from the ‘normal’ was between 38 and 52 months, depending on how you measure it.

Since then, of course we’ve learned the lessons… so the current period of ECB rates below their pre-crisis historical average (using 1/2 standard deviation around the mean to control for significance) is… err… 85 months and counting. Oh, and by magnitude, the current deviation is much much worse than the one that caused pre-crisis mispricing of financial assets and risks.

Just check the following chart, updated to today’s ECB call…

Eye popping, no?.. say 52 months to blow the bubble up… 85 months to… 

26/11/15: Counting Down to ECB's Big Surprise...

Counting the week to December 3rd ECB meeting, I have to ask one simple question: does anyone over in Frankfurt has a clue what they are doing?

Earlier this week, Reuters reported on a conversation with an unnamed ECB source

Here’s what we have learned:

1. Things are far from smooth in the Euro area. We had some serious talking up on Money Supply side earlier this week, and we had incessant chatter about improving credit conditions. We even had promises of accelerated purchases in December (to offset holidays). But the ECB still appears to be directionless in so far as it still views QE road as insufficient. Menu of options is as wide as ever: more government bonds buys, deeper cuts to deposit rates, including a possible two-tier charge, purchases of municipal and regional debt, and even “buying rebundled loans at risk of non-payment has been discussed in preparatory meetings, although such a radical step is highly unlikely for now”. You really have to wonder: do they have any sense of direction (other than strictly forward)?
2. "There are some who say you should surprise markets. But you cannot surprise indefinitely. Sooner or later, you are bound to disappoint." That is per ECB official. Wait a second, sooner or later? Just how many iterations of this circus will we be looking at? ECB’s commitment (rumoured) to push through a major surprise is a desperate bet. If surprise works, markets are likely to overshoot fundamental valuations on all fronts: from EUR/USD and EUR/Sterling to major equities indices and bond prices. But overshooting is not likely to hold unless the ECB continues to surprise the same markets. If, as likely, inflation remains anchored at low levels over the time of these surprises, the ECB will find itself in a situation where the only way to trigger any positive response from the markets will be to double down on every turn. Scared yet?..
3. ”We have deflation, so you have to do something," said a second person. "How this all looks in a few years, nobody knows." And that is the scary bit - it appears that no one is willing to venture a field view deeper than a few months. Back to that directionless driving…
4. Things, however, are clearly not working for Count Draghul: “Failing to [surprise the markets with expanded QE] so risks disappointing investors who expect ECB policy-setters to bolster a one-trillion-euro plus programme of quantitative easing when they meet on Dec. 3, in a move so significant it has been dubbed 'QE2’.” It seems the Euro area monetary policy is now equivalent to showing up in an alligator park with a crate of chickens: the faster you throw them, the closer you get to becoming a meal yourself, yet try not throwing any at all and you are a meal. And as an aside, what kind of a strategist bets on surprise and then pre-leaks all possible routes for such a surprise?..  
5. Meanwhile, the gators are getting a sight of the chicken man slipping into their pond: “One person familiar with the matter said [non-performing loans that ECB might consider buying] could be packaged with more creditworthy loans before being put up for sale [to ECB]. "You could buy rebundled non-performing loans, combined with good loans," said the person. "If we get to that, then things are very bad.”” Oh dear, slice-and-dice tranches of MBS anyone? The ECB is moving closer and closer to tracing Lehman strategy ca 2006…
6. If the ECB does buy municipal and regional debt, we are in yet another fiscal corner. Buying such paper will absolutely nothing to stimulate private sector capex. But it will loosen the purse for local governments, thus undoing all the ECB-led efforts to reign in fiscal profligacy. And, given the horrific state of public finances across the Euro area, it will set up the ECB to support municipals and regions for many years to come.

So for now, we have captain Draghi steering the ship at faster speeds and with greater determination. Except we don't quite have any idea of the exact course. Thursday should be fun…

3/9/15: ECB Decides to Not Decide, but Reserves a Right to Decide More

ECB decision to hold rates unchanged at today's meeting was hardly of any surprise. This means there is little news in terms of actual policy actions coming from today's council. Instead, some surprises were delivered by Mario Draghi in his statement. Here is a summary.

Firstly, ECB cut GDP projections for the euro area economy. The ECB now expects euro area GDP to grow 1.4% in 2015 (down on previous forecast of 1.5%); 1.7% in 2016 (down of previous forecast of 1.9%) and 1.8% (down on previous forecast of 2.0%). The miracle of "2% growth next year or next after next" has now been abandoned. As the following tweet sums this up:

We also got revised outlook for inflation and a warning from Draghi that inflation can be low or that we might yet see deflation. ECB now projects HICP inflation at 0.1% in 2015 (previous forecast was 0.3%), 1.1% in 2016 (previous forecast at 1.5%) and 1.7% in 2017 (previous forecast was 1.8%). Which means that the ECB is still sticking to the miracle of "close to 2% inflation a year after next" target. Of course, both sets of revisions mean that declines in forecast growth in nominal incomes are going to be sharper than in real GDP. Which means euro area will get less income, more prices. That, presumably, remains the 'good side of inflation' in ECB's mind.

Draghi warned that the 'there are downside risks to September inflation projections'. Now, who could have guessed as much, given that I posted recently the 5yr/5yr swaps chart clearly showing that euro area inflation expectations in the markets have gone soft once again. Shall we repeat that again?

Source: @Schuldensuehner

Draghi's job today, however, was to talk down the euro. Which he did by simply stating that QE will be running at planned rate (EUR60bn purchases) through planned timeline (to September 2016) and can be extended and expanded if the need arises. Promptly, Euro dropped like a rock.

In a typical, by now ritualistic, referencing of the monetary policy transmission mechanism (still broken), Draghi referenced improved, but still poor credit conditions for euro area corporates. Chart illustrates:

Of course, there is little point of reminding all that growth in credit requires growth in demand. Unless, that is, you are a European policymaker who thinks (as they all seem to be required to do) that issuing loans to companies is a great idea to generate economic growth even if there is absolutely no need for new capacity creation in the economy with stalled demand.

In short, ECB has now reacted to the rot in the Emerging Markets (and in particular China). This is a reactive move with some serious wisdom behind it - the rot is not over yet, by all means and the ECB is out of the gates with signalling that it will continue priming the Government bonds markets pump to prevent any spiking in the rates or euro revaluations derailing already weak exports. With BRIC PMIs signalling ongoing and deepening deterioration in global growth conditions (link here), this is expected and wise. For now, doing nothing new, but promising to do it longer and more aggressively is the preferred response from Frankfurt. It might just be enough.

18/9/2014: Quite a disappointing TLTRO round 1

So ECB's first tranche of TLTROs allotted at EUR82.6 billion - which is disappointing to say the least. Announcement is here: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140918_1.en.html

Prior to the allotment, the following were forecast:

• Credit Agricole: EUR100 billion (EUR200 billion into December tranche)
• Goldman Sachs: EUR200-260 billion in September and December TLTROs and EUR720-910 billion in overall programme
• Morgan Stanley: EUR250 billion in September & December TLTRO tranches and EUR100-400 billion for tranches 3-8
• Nomura EUR115 billion in September and EUR165 billion in December
• JPMorgan EUR150 billion in September
• Barclays EUR114 billion in September and EUR154 billion in December.

My own view on the subject as follows (from a comment given yesterday for international publication).

Note that the take up today has been disappointing for all above expectations (my own included), suggesting that traditional LTROs roll-overs dominated decision on TLTRO demand. This means that going into AQR reviews by the ECB the banks are reluctant to expand their corporate lending balance sheets and the loading now is on much heavier take up of TLTROs in December. In the mean time, low take up in this tranche can put some added pressure on ECB to deploy its ABS purchasing programme.


TLTROs vs LTROs

The key difference between TLTROs and LTROs is in the targeted nature of TLTROs. Conventional LTROs (despite the fact that term 'conventional' can hardly apply to these rather exceptional instruments) are unrelated to the balancesheet exposures of the banks and are designed to simply inject medium-term and long-term liquidity into the banking system as a whole. Thus, in the environment of deleveraging and uncertainty with respect to future losses, LTRO-raised funds flow to government securities with lower / zero risk-weighting and high liquidity. The effect is to reduce yields on Government securities, without providing any meaningful uplift in lending to the real economy. De facto, LTROs helped alleviate the sovereign debt crisis on 2010-2011, but also resulted in increased credit markets fragmentation and did nothing to reduce credit supply pressures in the real economies of the euro area countries. TLTROs - via targeting levels of real credit exposures to non-financial corporations - are holding a promise to shift funds into credit markets for companies, with weighting formula favouring banks with greater exposures to such lending. If successful, TLTRO programmes can incentivise banks to lend on the basis of risk-return valuations, which can, in theory, also alleviate the problem of financial markets fragmentation by attracting euro area banks into lending in the so-called 'peripheral' economies.

At this stage, both demand and supply of credit in the majority of the euro area economies are well outside the fundamentals-determined levels. The financial markets are severely fragmented and the ongoing deleveraging of the banks and companies balancesheets still working through the credit markets. This means that any forecast for TLTROs uptake and effectiveness are subject to huge uncertainty. My view is that we are likely to see rather cautious take up of the TLTRO funds in the first round, with many lenders dipping into the funding stream without full commitment. We are looking at the take up of around EUR100-150 billion in Thursday TLTROs. One reason for this is that the first tranche of TLTROs is likely to go into replacing maturing 3-year LTRO funds rather than new expansion of the banks balancesheets. To-date, banks repaid some EUR649 billion of LTROs, with EUR370 billion outstanding. Close-to-redemption LTRO funds need replacement and TLTROs are offering such an opportunity, albeit at a cost (TLTROs are priced 10bp higher than LTROs but offer longer maturity). All-in, the banks are likely to go for roughly EUR300 billion of TLTROs (with total potential allotment of EUR400 billion available, the cost will be the main factor here), with under half of this coming in September and the balance in December. Another reason pushing TLTROs demand into December, rather than September, is the ongoing ECB review of the banks (AQR analysis).

TLTROs, ABS and QE

ABS measures are going to aim to address the size of the ECB balancesheet, while providing support for effective yield on loans to the real economy. In this, well-structured ABS purchasing programme can provide support for TLTROs by increasing incentives for the banks to lend funds to corporates. However, excessive focus in the ABS programme on quality of assets and risk pricing can posit a risk of increasing fragmentation in the markets, as such focus can drive a significant wedge in pricing between corporate yields in the core economies of the euro area and the 'periphery'.

I do not see the ECB deploying traditional QE programme at this point in time. The reason for this is simple: yields convergence in the Sovereign markets is ongoing, levels of yields are benign, and demand for sovereign assets remains strong. However, if TLTROs and ABS programmes prove to be successful, we may see banks exits from low-yielding sovereign debt (core euro area) and from high yield, but now significantly repriced peripheral debt (profit taking). Unlikely as this might be at this point in time, if such exits prove to be aggressive, the ECB will have to provide support for sovereign yields and a small-scale QE can be contemplated in this case.

In general, however, it is clear from Mr Draghi's recent speeches and statements that he sees two key problems plaguing the euro area economies: the problem of high structural and cyclical unemployment and the problem of low private investment. Both of these problems continue to persist even as the sovereign debt yields have fallen dramatically, suggesting that government spending stimulus and investment programmes are unlikely to repair what is structurally a longer-term set of weaknesses in the economy.

31/7/2014: Deflationary Trap: Eurocoin Signals Slowing Euro Area Growth in July

July Eurocoin - higher frequency gauge of economic activity in the euro area published by CEPR and Banca d'Italia - is out. Headline number posted a decline from 0.31 in June to 0.27 in July, consistent with slower growth in the first month of Q3 2014.

As chart above shows, July reading is barely above the statistical significance line, suggesting that the slowdown is quite pronounced. As Eurocoin release indicates: "The negative impact of the fall in industrial production in May and of the weak performance of the stock market in July was partially offset by the flattening of the yield curve." In other words, save for the excessive exuberance in the bonds markets, the economy is showing substantial weaknesses going into Q3.

This means that while Q2 2014 projection is now for stronger growth at around 0.31-0.34% q/q, up on officially estimated Q1 2014 growth of 0.2%, Q3 2014 took off with a growth outlook of around 0.26-0.28%.

Current economic activity is sitting at around the rates compatible with November-December 2013. Barring any significant changes in HICP (although indications are, HICP will fall to 0.65% for July data), the ECB remain in the proverbial 'deflationary risks' corner:

UPDATED

To-date, while growth moved into positive territory over the last 12 months, inflationary dynamics have pretty much collapsed.

UPDATED

If July trend (falling activity) remains into August and September, we are looking at further worsening in the overall activity in the euro area and more pressure on inflation to the downside.

7/5/2014: Eurocoin Leading Indicator: April 2014

The latest Eurocoin leading growth indicator for the euro area is at 0.39 in April, statistically unchanged on 0.38 in March.

Q1 2014 forecast based on Eurocoin is now at 0.34% q/q growth and Q2 2014 forecast is now running closer to 0.38%.

In other words, things are slack.

Here are some charts:

Crucially, Eurocoin reading in April was driven by "favourable performance of the financial markets and by household and business confidence, although these were counterbalanced by the small downwards revision of euro-area GDP in the fourth quarter of 2013." Actual industrial activity and external trade data was not supportive to the upside.

In other words, much of the improvement in Eurocoin since December 2013 is down to financial and confidence effects and not to underlying real economy.

Monetary policy side and inflation remain stuck in slow-growth corner:

7/4/2014: Eurocoin March 2014: Q1 Growth Estimate at 1.4% y/y

I have not updated stats for Eurocoin leading growth indicator for euro area economy for some time now, so here's the latest.

In March 2014, eurocoin rose to 0.38, with Q1 2014 average reading of 0.35 and 6mo average of 0.29. In Q1 2013 the average stood at -0.18. Hence, Q1 2014 growth forecast is for 0.34% q/q expansion. Annualised Q1 2014 projection is for GDP growth of 1.39% and this compares against annualised contraction of 0.73% in Q1 2013.

Couple of charts:

5/9/2013: ECB Boldly Goes Nowhere... again

The longer it lasts, the uglier it gets... ECB stays put (predictably) on rates today is adding 57th month that the policy rates are deviating from the historical mean, with the 'hill' to mean reversion getting steeper:

Currently, mean-reversion implies an almost 200bps hike without overshooting. Factoring in historical overshooting, we are into 250-300bps territory. Good luck thinking that 'gentle' tapering or 'gradual' restoration or whatever else you might call it going to be painless...

Oh, and for all of this, what do we have on the rates side?

At least, for its pain, the Fed has boldly gone where no one, save for Japan, have travelled before when it comes to rates. Euro area, meanwhile, has been playing chicken with itself...

16/5/2013: On That Impossible Monetary Policy Dilemma

At last, the IMF has published something beefy on the extraordinary (or so-called 'unconventional') monetary policy instruments unrolled by the ECB, BOJ, BOE and the Fed since the start of the crisis in the context of the question I been asking for some time now: What happens when these measures are unwound?

See http://liswires.com/archives/2102 and http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2012/10/28102012-ecb-and-technocratic-decay.html

The papers: UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICIES—RECENT EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS and UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICIES—RECENT EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS—BACKGROUND PAPER should be available on the IMF website shortly.

Box 2 in the main paper is worth a special consideration as it covers Potential Costs of Exit to Central Banks. Italics are mine.

Per IMF: "Losses to central bank balance sheets upon exit are likely to stem from a maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities. In normal circumstances, higher interest rates—and thus lower bond prices—would lead to an immediate valuation loss to the central bank. These losses, though, would be fully recouped if assets were held to maturity. [In other words, normally, when CBs exit QE operations, they sell the Government bonds accumulated during the QE. This leads to a rise in supply of Government bonds in the market, raising yields and lowering prices of these bonds, with CBs taking a 'loss' on lower prices basis. In normal cases, CBs tend to accumulate shorter-term Government bonds in greater numbers, so sales and thus price decreases would normally be associated with the front end of maturity profile - meaning with shorter-dated bonds. Lastly, in normal cases of QE, some of the shorter-dated bonds would have matured by the time the CBs begin dumping them in the market, naturally reducing some of the supply glut on exits.]

But current times are not normal. "Two things have changed with the current policy environment: (i) balance sheets have grown enormously, and (ii) assets purchased are much longer-dated on average and will likely not roll-off central bank balance sheets before exit begins."

This means that in current environment, as contrasted by normal unwinding of the QE operations. "…valuation losses will be amplified and become realized losses if central banks sell assets in an attempt to permanently diminish excess reserves. But central banks will not be able to shrink their balance sheets overnight. In the interim, similar losses would arise from paying higher interest rates on reserves (and other liquidity absorbing instruments) than earning on assets held (mostly fixed coupon payments). This would not have been the case in normal times, when there was no need to sell significant amounts of longer-dated bonds and when most central bank liabilities were non-interest bearing (currency in circulation)."

The IMF notes that "the ECB is less exposed to losses from higher interest rates as its assets— primarily loans to banks rather than bond purchases—are of relatively short maturity and yields of its loans to banks are indexed on the policy rate; the ECB is thus not included in the estimates of losses that follow." [Note: this does not mean that the ECB unwinding of extraordinary measures will be painless, but that the current IMF paper is not covering these. In many ways, ECB will face an even bigger problem: withdrawing liquidity supply to the banks that are sick (if not permanently, at least for a long period of time) will risk destabilising the financial system. This cost to ECB will likely be compounded by the fact that unwinding loans to banks will require banks to claw liquidity out of the existent assets in the environment where there is already a drastic shortage of credit supply to the real economy. Lastly, the ECB will also face indirect costs of unwinding its measures that will work through the mechanism similar to the above because European banks used much of ECB's emergency liquidity supply to buy Government bonds. Thus unlike say the BOE, ECB unwinding will lead to banks, not the ECB, selling some of the Government bonds and this will have an adverse impact on the Sovereign yields, despite the fact that the IMF does not estimate such effect in the present paper.]

The chart below "shows the net present value (NPV) estimate of losses in three different scenarios." Here's how to read that chart:

• "Losses are estimated given today’s balance sheet (no expansion) and the balance sheet that would result from expected purchases to end 2013 (end 2014 for the BOJ, accounting for QQME). 
• "Losses are estimated while assuming everything else remains unchanged (notably absent capital gains or income from asset holdings)… [so that] no stance is taken as to the precise path and timing of exit. ...These losses—which may be significant even if spread over several years—would impact fiscal balances through reduced profit transfers to government. 
• "Scenario 1 foresees a limited parallel shift in the yield curve by 100 bps from today’s levels. 
• "Scenario 2, a more likely case corresponding to a stronger growth scenario requiring a steady normalization of rates, suggests a flatter yield curve, 400 bps higher at the short end and 225 bps at the long. The scenario is similar to the Fed’s tightening from November 1993 to February 1995, which saw one year rates increase by around 400bps. Losses in this case would amount to between 2 percent and 4.3 percent of GDP,  depending on the central bank. 
• "Scenario 3 is a tail risk scenario, in which policy has to react to a loss of confidence in the currency or in the central bank’s commitment to price stability, or to a severe commodity price shock with second round effects. The short and long ends of the yield curve increase by 600 bps and 375 bps respectively, and losses rise to between 2 percent and 7.5 percent of GDP. 
• "Scenarios 2 and 3 foresee somewhat smaller hikes for the BOJ, given the persistence of the ZLB.

And now on transmission of the shocks: "The appropriate sequence of policy actions in an eventual exit is relatively clear.

• "A tightening cycle would begin with some forward guidance provided by the central bank on the timing and pace of interest rate hikes. [At which point bond markets will also start repricing forward Government paper, leading to bond markets prices drops and mounting paper losses on the assets side of CBs balance sheets]
• "It would then be followed by higher short-term interest rates, guided over a first (likely lengthy) period by central bank floor rates (which can be hiked at any time, independently of the level of reserves) until excess reserves are substantially removed. [So shorter rates will rise first, implying that shorter-term interbank funding costs will also rise, leading to a rise in lone rates disproportionately for banks reliant on short interbank loans - guess where will Irish banks be by then if the 'reforms' we have for them in mind succeed?] 
• "Term open market operations (“reverse repos” or other liquidity absorbing instruments) would be used to drain excess reserves initially; outright asset sales would likely be more difficult in the early part of the transition, until the price of longer-term assets had adjusted. Higher reserve requirements (remunerated or unremunerated) could also be employed." [All of which mean that whatever credit supply to private sector would have been before the unwinding starts, it will become even more constrained and costlier to obtain once the unwinding begins.]
• For a kicker to that last comment: "The transmission of policy, though, is likely to somewhat bumpy in the tightening cycle associated with exit. Reduced competition for funding in the presence of substantial excess reserve balances tends to weaken the transmission mechanism. Though higher rates paid on reserves and other liquidity absorbing instruments should generally increase other short-term market rates (for example, unsecured interbank rates, repo rates, commercial paper rates), there may be some slippage, with market rates lagging. This could occur because of market segmentation, with cash rich lenders not able to benefit from the central bank’s official deposit rate, or lack of arbitrage in a hardly operating money market flush with liquidity. Also, there may be limits as to how much liquidity the central bank can absorb at reasonable rates, since banks would face capital charges and leverage ratio constraints against repo lending." [But none of these effects - generally acting to reduce immediate pressure of CB unwinding of QE measures - apply to the Irish banks and will unlikely apply to the ECB case in general precisely because the banks own balance sheets will be directly impacted by the ECB unwinding.]
• "There is also a risk that even if policy rates are raised gradually, longer-term yields could increase sharply. While central banks should be able to manage expectations of the pace of bond sales and rise in future short-term rates—at least for the coming 2 to 3 years—through enhanced forward guidance and more solid communication channels, they have less control over the term premium component of long-term rates (the return required to bear interest rate risk) and over longer-term expectations. These could jump because leveraged investors could “run for the door” in the hope of locking in profits, because of expected reverse portfolio rebalancing effects from bond sales, uncertainty over inflation prospects or because of fiscal policy, financial stability or other macro risks emerging at the time of exit. To the extent a rise in long-term rates triggers cross-border flows, exchange rate volatility is bound to increase, further complicating policy decisions." [All of which means two things: (a) any and all institutions holding 'sticky' (e.g. mandated) positions in G7 bonds will be hammered by speculative and book-profit exits (guess what these institutions are? right: pension funds and insurance companies and banks who 'hold to maturity' G7-linked risky bonds - e.g peripheral euro area bonds), and (b) long-term interest rates will rise and can rise in a 'jump fashion' - abruptly and significantly (and guess what determines the cost of mortgages and existent not-fixed rate loans?).]

And so we do  it forget the ECB plight, here's what the technical note had to say about Frankfurt's dilemma:  "The ECB faces relatively little direct interest rate risk, as the bulk of its loan assets are linked to its short-term policy rate. However, it may be difficult for the ECB to shrink its balance sheet, as those commercial banks currently borrowing from the ECB may not easily be able to repay loans on maturity. The ECB could use other instruments to drain surplus liquidity, but could then face some loss of net income as the yield on liquidity-draining open market operations (OMOs) could exceed the rate earned on lending, assuming a positively-sloped yield curve, if draining operations were of a longer maturity." [I would evoke the 'No Sh*t, Sherlock" clause here: who could have thought Euro area's commercial banks "may not easily be able to repay loans on maturity". I mean they are beaming with health and are full of good loans they can call in to cover an ECB unwind call… right?]

Obviously, not the IMF as it does cover the 'geographic' divergence in unwinding risks: "But the ECB potentially faces credit risk on its lending to the banking system for financial stability purposes. In a “benign” scenario, where monetary tightening is a response to higher inflation resulting from economic growth, non-performing loans should fall and bank balance sheets should improve. But even then, some areas of the eurozone may lag in economic recovery. Banks in such areas could come under further pressure in a rising rate environment: weak banks may not be able to pass on to weak customers the rising costs of financing their balance sheets." [No prize for guessing which 'areas' the IMF has in mind for being whacked the hardest with ECB unwinding measures.]

So would you like to take the centre-case scenario at 1/2 Fed impact measure for ECB costs and apply to Ireland's case? Ok - we are guessing here, but it will be close to:

1. Euro area-wide impact of -1.0-1.5% GDP shaved off with most impact absorbed by the peripheral states; and
2. Yields rises of ca 200-220bps on longer term paper, which will automatically translate into massive losses on banks balancesheets (and all balancesheets for institutions holding Government bonds). 
3. The impact of (2) will be more severe for peripheral countries via 2 channels: normal premium channel on peripheral bonds compared to Bunds and via margins hikes on loans by the banks to compensate for losses sustained on bonds.
4. Net result? Try mortgages rates rising over time by, say 300bps? or 350bps? You say 'extreme'? Not really - per crisis historical ECB repo rate averages at 3.10% which is 260bps higher than current repo rate... 

Ooopsy... as some would say. Have a nice day paying that 30 year mortgage on negative equity home in Co Meath (or Dublin 4 for that matter).

26/4/2013: ECB's policy mismatch in 6 graphs

For those interested in the monetary drivers of the current euro area crisis, here's an interesting new paper from CESifo (WP 4178, March 31, 2013): "The Monetary Policy of the ECB: A Robin Hood Approach?" by Marcus Drometer, Thomas I. Siemsen and Sebastian Watzka.

In the paper, authors "derive four sets of counterfactual national interest rate paths for the 17 Euro Area countries for the time period 1999 to 2012. They approximate desirable national interest rates countries would have liked to implement if they could still conduct independent monetary policy. We find that prior to the financial crisis the counterfactual interest rates for Germany trace the realized EONIA rate very closely, while monetary policy has been too loose especially for the southern European countries. This situation was inverted with the onset of the financial crisis. To shed light on the underlying decision rule of the ECB, we rank different rules according to their ability to aggregate the national counterfactual paths to the EONIA rate. In addition to previous literature we find that those mechanisms which care for countries who fare economically worse than the Euro Area average perform best."

Paper is available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2244821

Here are few charts, illustrating the results. In these TR references Taylor Rule, quarterly estimated backward-looking Bundesbank rule denoted BuBa, monthly estimated Bundesbank rules with interest rates smoothing denoted BuBaS and BuBaGMM respectively for backward- and forward-looking, and realised EONIA rate.

Legend:

CHARTS

Per authors: "Two results are worth noting.

First, the counterfactual interest rate path derived from the original Taylor rule and our baseline counterfactual path (quarterly estimated backward-looking Bundesbank rule) trace each other very closely. In fact, they are hardly distinguishable. The monthly estimated Bundesbank rules with interest rate smoothing (backward- and forward-looking) deviate sometimes considerably from the quarterly paths. …all four paths yield qualitatively similar results...

Second, …all four counterfactual paths for Germany lie strikingly close to the actual realization of the EONIA rate. Especially
for the southern European countries the ECB’s monetary policy has been too loose according to all four counterfactuals."

And more: "For all four sets of counterfactual national interest rate paths the Robin Hood rules outperform the standard decision rules. Especially our "economic-needs"-rule performs exceptionally good across all four specifications. Moreover, the forward looking model performs worse than the three backward looking specifications."

In other words, ECB policy rules were completely mis-matching the reality in all countries, save Germany, with (per charts above) mismatch most dramatic in… right… Ireland.