18/9/2014: Quite a disappointing TLTRO round 1

So ECB's first tranche of TLTROs allotted at EUR82.6 billion - which is disappointing to say the least. Announcement is here: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140918_1.en.html

Prior to the allotment, the following were forecast:

• Credit Agricole: EUR100 billion (EUR200 billion into December tranche)
• Goldman Sachs: EUR200-260 billion in September and December TLTROs and EUR720-910 billion in overall programme
• Morgan Stanley: EUR250 billion in September & December TLTRO tranches and EUR100-400 billion for tranches 3-8
• Nomura EUR115 billion in September and EUR165 billion in December
• JPMorgan EUR150 billion in September
• Barclays EUR114 billion in September and EUR154 billion in December.

My own view on the subject as follows (from a comment given yesterday for international publication).

Note that the take up today has been disappointing for all above expectations (my own included), suggesting that traditional LTROs roll-overs dominated decision on TLTRO demand. This means that going into AQR reviews by the ECB the banks are reluctant to expand their corporate lending balance sheets and the loading now is on much heavier take up of TLTROs in December. In the mean time, low take up in this tranche can put some added pressure on ECB to deploy its ABS purchasing programme.


TLTROs vs LTROs

The key difference between TLTROs and LTROs is in the targeted nature of TLTROs. Conventional LTROs (despite the fact that term 'conventional' can hardly apply to these rather exceptional instruments) are unrelated to the balancesheet exposures of the banks and are designed to simply inject medium-term and long-term liquidity into the banking system as a whole. Thus, in the environment of deleveraging and uncertainty with respect to future losses, LTRO-raised funds flow to government securities with lower / zero risk-weighting and high liquidity. The effect is to reduce yields on Government securities, without providing any meaningful uplift in lending to the real economy. De facto, LTROs helped alleviate the sovereign debt crisis on 2010-2011, but also resulted in increased credit markets fragmentation and did nothing to reduce credit supply pressures in the real economies of the euro area countries. TLTROs - via targeting levels of real credit exposures to non-financial corporations - are holding a promise to shift funds into credit markets for companies, with weighting formula favouring banks with greater exposures to such lending. If successful, TLTRO programmes can incentivise banks to lend on the basis of risk-return valuations, which can, in theory, also alleviate the problem of financial markets fragmentation by attracting euro area banks into lending in the so-called 'peripheral' economies.

At this stage, both demand and supply of credit in the majority of the euro area economies are well outside the fundamentals-determined levels. The financial markets are severely fragmented and the ongoing deleveraging of the banks and companies balancesheets still working through the credit markets. This means that any forecast for TLTROs uptake and effectiveness are subject to huge uncertainty. My view is that we are likely to see rather cautious take up of the TLTRO funds in the first round, with many lenders dipping into the funding stream without full commitment. We are looking at the take up of around EUR100-150 billion in Thursday TLTROs. One reason for this is that the first tranche of TLTROs is likely to go into replacing maturing 3-year LTRO funds rather than new expansion of the banks balancesheets. To-date, banks repaid some EUR649 billion of LTROs, with EUR370 billion outstanding. Close-to-redemption LTRO funds need replacement and TLTROs are offering such an opportunity, albeit at a cost (TLTROs are priced 10bp higher than LTROs but offer longer maturity). All-in, the banks are likely to go for roughly EUR300 billion of TLTROs (with total potential allotment of EUR400 billion available, the cost will be the main factor here), with under half of this coming in September and the balance in December. Another reason pushing TLTROs demand into December, rather than September, is the ongoing ECB review of the banks (AQR analysis).

TLTROs, ABS and QE

ABS measures are going to aim to address the size of the ECB balancesheet, while providing support for effective yield on loans to the real economy. In this, well-structured ABS purchasing programme can provide support for TLTROs by increasing incentives for the banks to lend funds to corporates. However, excessive focus in the ABS programme on quality of assets and risk pricing can posit a risk of increasing fragmentation in the markets, as such focus can drive a significant wedge in pricing between corporate yields in the core economies of the euro area and the 'periphery'.

I do not see the ECB deploying traditional QE programme at this point in time. The reason for this is simple: yields convergence in the Sovereign markets is ongoing, levels of yields are benign, and demand for sovereign assets remains strong. However, if TLTROs and ABS programmes prove to be successful, we may see banks exits from low-yielding sovereign debt (core euro area) and from high yield, but now significantly repriced peripheral debt (profit taking). Unlikely as this might be at this point in time, if such exits prove to be aggressive, the ECB will have to provide support for sovereign yields and a small-scale QE can be contemplated in this case.

In general, however, it is clear from Mr Draghi's recent speeches and statements that he sees two key problems plaguing the euro area economies: the problem of high structural and cyclical unemployment and the problem of low private investment. Both of these problems continue to persist even as the sovereign debt yields have fallen dramatically, suggesting that government spending stimulus and investment programmes are unlikely to repair what is structurally a longer-term set of weaknesses in the economy.

11/5/2014: Super Mario: Whatever It Takes Will Now Happen in June… Likely, Like…

This week, the ECB has sent a barrage of signals. Blanket-bombing the Forex markets, Super Mario laid it thick with the promises. Behind this there is less of the classical monetary policy and more of the classical exchange rates expectations balancing. Inflation is low, for sure. Euro is stubbornly stuck in the highs, for sure. The former is just fine for retirement-bound Germany. The latter is not fine for growth centres-bound BMWs and Mercs. So the majority of the Governing Council decided to move… but only in the future… and only once new forecasts are made available.

Basically, Draghi pre-committed to acting in June to ease policy. This is not the same as a promise of QE, neither in the form of actual printing or unconventional measures of any serious significance. Instead, my expectation is the ECB will pass through another refinancing rate cut or do some re-arranging on liquidity support measures side (maturity or volume or both). The Governing Council can then sit back and watch if the marginal move induces downward pressure on the euro. This being June, real economy in Europe will be heading into Summer, buying ECB some time for navel gazing.

Most likely outcome: as long as ECB does not drastically depart from the Fed and BofE, things will remain hard for the euro.

The ECB stance overlays the fundamentals that are consistent with medium-term low inflation and anaemic, albeit improving, growth (see http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/05/752014-eurocoin-leading-indicator-april.html). Any easing the monetary policy from here on is therefore consistent with ECB responding to deflationary pressures and Forex pressures, and not to the issues relating to fragmented lending markets. Thus, any easing in June remains conditional on ECB forecasts. Draghi noted as much, stating that

• Going forward, the ECB is still mindful of low inflation and is concerned with the medium-term trajectory in inflation, so that both levels and dynamics seem to matter now (it was the former and not the latter that were of concern before)
• The ECB is also worrying about the high valuation of the euro, especially consistent with low inflation. The two factors reinforce each other in the longer run.
• The fact that geopolitical crisis in Ukraine is now spilling over into the euro area more than to any other region.

The ECB still appears to be undecided on specific tools that it is going to use. Much of this indecision is probably down to the difficulties with structuring some less conventional measures. Much is due to the uncertainty as to how much easing will be required. Intervention for Forex sake will have to be initially smaller than intervention aimed at unlocking fragmented lending markets. This is my expectation for any June action, if any were to take place: symbolic act to alter forward expectations and buy time before end of summer.

The tool kit for this includes potential

• Shallow cut to refinancing rate: -10 to -15 bps
• Extending to full allotment of fixed rate liquidity provision. As Bloomberg puts it: "The ECB could extend its policy of granting as much cash as banks need against eligible collateral. The measure was introduced in October 2008 after the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. sparked a global credit crunch and is scheduled to run until at least July 2015."
• New LTRO. Again, via Bloomberg: "The ECB’s emergency 3-year loans to banks are losing their effectiveness as they approach maturity at the start of 2015, prompting speculation that a new round may be offered. Another LTRO might look different from the previous ones, when banks used most of the liquidity to buy government bonds. “We will want to make sure that this is being used for the economy,” Draghi said in December."
• Non-sterilisation of SMP (I wrote about this earlier here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/03/07032014-to-sterilise-or-not-to.html). This can ad up to EUR168 billion to liquidity supply.
• Reserve requirements can be lower or ECB can remove the reserve ratio of 1%. Both measures will increase liquidity supply.
• Negative Deposit rate from current zero rate to -0.05 to -0.1 percent (negative rates were used recently in Denmark: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-24/danish-central-bank-exits-negative-rates-first-time-since-2012.html). 

I suspect ECB will not go for negative rates, or opt for the outright non-sterilsation of SMP, albeit it can slow down the rate of sterilisation. Negative rates is a nuclear option that will have more significant impact on reducing euro strength. And it might add credit supply in the euro area on the aggregate, though I doubt this will have much of an effect on breaking the vicious cycle of market fragmentation (I find it unlikely that negative rates can trigger restart of credit supply in euro area impaired economies).

In the longer term, I suspect ECB is going to take a wait-and-watch approach through summer. If economic growth continues to pick up and inflation starts to rise, we shall see ECB abandoning any further action beyond the token signalling in June. If things deteriorate over the summer, ECB will look into more QE-focused policies in September-October. Corporate bonds purchases might be on the books then.

Couple of charts to illustrate ECB's long term dilemma:

Policy rates are at historical lows and moving out of synch with Euribor (fragmentation)

Meanwhile, the euribor-ECB spread rose to the highest level since April 2012... The Draghi Put period average spread is at 0.054, pre-Put at 0.594 and current spread is at 0.354. The cost margin in inter-bank markets is now closer to the crisis peak averages than to the Draghi Put average, showing the effects of LTROs and ECB easing wearing out.

And duration and magnitude of deviation from historical averages are frightening:

All of which shows that ECB will have to seriously push the bounds on unconventional measures, if it really wants to make a dent in the pile of problems (forex rates, fragmentation, aggregate liquidity supply, inflation, growth...) the ECB is facing.

4/2/2014: Good at anything? Europe's broken monetary policy engine

Monetary policy is not a nuclear science. It is not even anatomy, for what it matters. Instead, it is more like a simple task in civil engineering. Bank of Japan can get the message, the Fed wrote books on it, Bank of England has discovered it, Canadians, Swedes, Danes, Swiss, everyone has figured it out by now... Meanwhile, in the euro area, there is a whole lot of mystery, mystique, halls of mirrors and corridors of contortions, when it comes to the monetary policy. And a simple, plain-sight visibility of its failure…

Take a look at this chart, plotting euro area real GDP growth against M1 money supply growth rate (via Pictet):

Spot anything of interest? Oh, simples.com: M1 growth declines predate GDP growth and levels declines. No, seriously, since 2006, euro area could not manage one policy - money supply. Forget the intricacies of fiscal policy (it is not an easy job to spend money on stimulating economic activity, when you are in debt up to your ears), the EU simply could not put enough money into the real economy to prevent cash in circulation from shrinking.

How on earth can such a feat be achieved? Simple: the ECB pumped trillion euros plus into the banks, instead of pumping the very same trillion (and more still would have been needed) into the real economy. Frankfurt opted for loading money into the banks balance sheets . It should have opted for using printed money to pay down real economy's debts (households' and non-financial companies' debts) which would have (1) repaired banks balance sheets, and (2) repaired the real economy, restarting consumption and investment. Instead, we have a bizarre, senile, idiotic situation where we print money and then, de facto, lock it up in the vaults.

It would half as bizarre if it was just locking the liquidity in the vaults, but the euro area monetary policy is currently all about the repayments by the banks of the LTROs, or in different terms - burning of cash out of the economy. This is cutting down on M1 growth rate. Just as the M1 growth should be rising, not falling. Forget about doing the right thing at the wrong time… we are doing the wrong thing at the wrong time… and doing so repeatedly.

And the latest? Annual growth rate of M3 money supply is again slowing, to 1.0% y-o-y in December 2013 from already low 1.5% y/y growth in November. The law of under fulfilled low aspirations clearly at work: expectation was for 1.7% y/y growth in M3, and ECB delivered 1.0% - the lowest rate since September 2010. Oops, predictably, lending to the private sector remained at -2.3% y/y in December 2013, an all-time low.

So for all its OMT, LTROs, BU 'policies activism', the ECB is now 5th year into mismanaging basic crisis-related monetary policy. Inventiveness and monetary engineering gushing out of Mario Draghi left, right and centre to the delight of the policy analysts and bonds salesmen, and the euro area is still where it was: below reference line on M3 growth.

14/11/2013: With banks or without, things are heading for desperate in Italy...

The banks stress tests are coming up and the Euro periphery system is quickly attempting to patch up the massive cracks in the facade. The key one is the continued over-reliance of banks on sovereign-monetary-banking loop of cross-contagion. The banking system weakness is exemplified by Italy: Italian banks are the main buyers of Italian sovereign debt, which in turn means that Italian government stability rests on the banks ability to sustain purchasing, which implies that the ECB (with an interest of shoring up Italian economy) is tied into continuing to provide cheap funding necessary for the Italian banks to sustain purchasing of Italian Government debt… and so on.

Three key facts are clouding this 'stability in contagion' picture:

1. Banks in Italy and elsewhere are not deleveraging fast enough to allow them repay in full the LTROs coming due January and February 2015;
2. Banks in Italy are now fully saturated with italian Government debt, posing threats to future supply of Italian bonds and putting into question the robustness of the banking stress tests; and
3. Italian Government is running out of room to continue rolling over its massive debts.

If all 3 risks play out at the same time or close to each other, things will get testy for the Euro.


Point 1: Banks in the euro zone continue to carry assets that amount to three times the size of the euro area economy. This puts into question the core pillar of banking sector 'reforms' that the ECB needs to see before the banking union (BU) comes into being. The ECB needs to have clarity on quality of assets held by banks and, critically, needs to see robust deleveraging by the banks before th BU can be launched. If either one of these conditions is not fully met, the ECB will be taking over the banking system that is loaded with unknown and unpriced risks.

Per recent ECB data, Banks in the euro zone held EUR29.5 trillion in total assets by the end of 2012. That is down 12% on 2008. Too slow of a pace for a structural deleveraging. Worse, the bulk of the adjustments was back in 2009 and little was done since. Which makes the level of assets problem worse: on top of having too many assets, the system has virtually stopped the process of deleveraging. Knock on effect is that the firming of asset markets in Europe in recent two years was supported by a slowdown in assets disposals by the banks. In turn, this second order effect means that many banks assets on the books are superficially overvalued due to their withholding from the market. Nasty, pesky first and second order effects here.

Worse. Pressure on assets side is not limited to the 'periphery'. German banks held EUR7.6 trillion in total assets at the end of 2012, followed by the French banks with EUR6.8 trillion. Spain and Italy's banking sectors came in distant second and third, with EUR3.9 trillion and EUR2.9 trillion in total assets.

Capital ratios are up to the median Tier 1 ratio rising from 8% in 2008 to 12.7% in 2012. Quality of this capital is, however, subject to the above first and second order effects too - no one knows how much of the equity valuation uplift experienced by the euro area banks in recent months is due to banks reducing the pace of assets deleveraging…


Point 2: Assets quality in some large banking systems is too closely linked to the sovereign bonds markets. Italy is case in point. ECB tests are set to exclude sovereign debt risk exposures, explicitly continuing to price as risk-free sovereign bonds of the peripheral euro area states. But in return for this, the ECB might look into gradually forcing the banks to limit their holdings of sovereign bonds. This would be bad news for Italian banks and the Italian treasury.

The problem starts with a realisation that Italian banks are now primarily a vehicle for rolling over Government debt. Italy's Government debt is over EUR2 trillion. EUR397 billion of that is held by Italian banks. Another EUR200-250 billion can be safely assumed to be held by Italian banks customers who also have borrowings from these banks. Any pressure on the Italian sovereign and the ca EUR600 billion of Italian debt sloshing within the banking system of Italy is at risk.  That puts 20.7 percent of Italian banks assets at a risk play. [Note: by some estimates, Italian banks directly hold around 22% of the total Italian Government debt - close to the above figure of EUR397 billion, but way off compared to Spanish banks which are estimated to be holding 39% of the Spanish Government debt, hence all of the arguments raised in respect of Italy herein also apply to Spain. A mitigating issue for Spain is that it's debt levels are roughly half those of Italy. An exacerbating issue for Spain is that its deficit is second highest in Europe, well ahead of Italain deficit which is relatively benign).

Worse, pressure cooker is now full and been on a boiler for some time. In the wake of LTROs, Italy's banks loaded up on higher-yielding Italian Government debt funded by cheap LTRO funds - Italian banks took EUR255 billion in LTROs funds. In August 2013, Italian banks exposure to Italian Government debt hit EUR397 billion, just shy of the record EUR402 billion in June and double on 2011 levels. I

Either way, with or without explicit ECB pressure, Italian banks have run out of the road to keep purchasing Italian Government debt. Which presents a wee-bit of a problem: Italy needs to raise EUR65 billion in new debt in 2014. Italy is now in the grip of the worst recession since WWII and its debts are rising once again.

Chart below shows that:
1) Italian Sovereign exposures to external lenders declined in the wake of the LTROs, but are back to rising in recent quarters;
2) Italian banks reliance on foreign funding rose during the LTROs period, declined thereafter and is now again rising; while
3) Other (non-financial and non-state) sectors remain leveraged at the levels consistent with late 2006.

Point 3: Overall, Italian Treasury is now competing head on with the banks for foreign lenders cash and Italian corporate sector is being forced to borrow abroad in absence of domestic credit supply. Foreign investors bought almost 2/3rds of the last issue of Italian bonds, but how much of this appetite can be sustained into the future is an open question. Foreign investors currently hold slightly over a third of Italy's debt, or EUR690 billion, down from more than EUR800 billion back in 2011. The Italian Government is now turning to Italian households to mop up the rising supply. Italy issued EUR44 billion worth of inflation-linked BTP Italia bonds with 4 year maturity. As long as inflation stays low, the Government is in the money on these.

Next in line - desperate measures to raise revenues. Per recent reports, there is a proposal working its way through legislative corridors of power to raise tax on multinational on-line companies trading in Italy. The likes of Google, Amazon and Yahoo will be hit with a restriction on advertisers to transact only with on-line companies tax-resident in Italy, per bill tabled by the center-left Democratic Party (PD). The authors estimate EUR1 billion annual yield to the state - a tiny drop in the ocean of Italian government finances, but also a sign of desperation.

28/10/2012: ECB and technocratic decay?

Some interesting comments from BNP on ECB and Mr Draghi's tenure to-date. The note is linked here.  But some quotes are enlightening [comments are my onw]:

"While the ECB justifies the OMT as being to improve the functioning of the monetary system, the fact it has done nothing to help the monetary system in Ireland or Portugal suggests the scheme is about fiscal financing." [I fully agree]

"The balance-sheet implications of buying in the secondary market are the same as if bonds had been bought in the primary market. Mr Draghi’s adherence to the spirit of the Treaty is in question. We support his flexibility, however." [In the short run - yes, Draghi's flexibility is a necessary compromise. Alas, in the long run it is of questionable virtue. Hence, as I remarked ages ago, it's not the measures the ECB unrolls in the crisis that worry me, but the impossibility of unwinding them without wrecking havoc on the economy.]

"...Mr Draghi did [cut rates] in November and December [2011], taking rates back to where they started the year before the two misguided mid-2011 hikes. Mr Draghi cut rates again in July 2012, not only taking the refi rate below the 1% barrier (to 75bp), but also cutting the deposit rate to zero, apparently in an attempt to reinvigorate the interbank market (so far, fruitlessly). Mr Draghi should be praised for cutting rates and for overcoming the 1% barrier, in our view." [I agree.]

"However, he seems to be reluctant to take the deposit rate below zero, which looks timid. Moreover, he has failed to stimulate private credit supply. The LTRO has facilitated the expansion of credit to governments, but to some extent, this has crowded out private-sector credit, where growth is now down 0.8% y/y (-0.4% adjusted for sales and securitisation). The line that this is due to weakness in credit demand is a feeble excuse for the ECB failing to do enough to stimulate supply or to circumvent the lack of credit supply, for example, through credit easing. This has been the major failure of Mr Draghi’s tenure." [I am not so sure on BNP rejecting the idea of weak demand. Most likely, both weak supply and demand are reinforcing each other. More on this once we have our paper on SMEs access to credit published in working paper format, so stay tuned].

And the last blast, the potent one: "If central bankers don’t want politicians to mess with central banking, central bankers would be wise not to mess with politics. Mr Draghi was intimately involved in Italian politics and the demise of former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s tenure in the summer of 2011. More recently, his plans for the OMT were reportedly shared with the German chancellor’s office well in advance. The ECB is a very political animal under Mr Draghi. As the only institution with pan-eurozone power, a prominent role for the ECB in crisis resolution and a strong link to politics
may be unavoidable, and even desirable. But ultimately, such links may return to haunt it." [Yep, I agree. Mr Draghi's competence in office comes with a typical European price tag - get a technocrat and surrender checks and balances. This both signifies to the sickness at the heart of Europe (technocracy displacing democracy) and the inability of the 'patient' to develop institutional path for dealing with this sickness (with EZ potentially/arguably facing either a collapse in the hands of democracy or decay in the hands of technocracy).]

25/6/2012: Thinking outloud: Euro Area Banks Levy

Latest reports suggest the EU leaders are pushing for a 'banking levy' to finance common deposit insurance scheme, a banks resolution fund and joint supervision authority.

It has been my view all along that the former two are required for the financial sector future health and to break the onerous link between the banks and the sovereigns. Alas, I must point out the reality of what such a proposals will mean.

To start with, let's us ask a question: What happens when economy enters a recovery stage from even a cyclical downturn?

Answer: surplus savings built during normal downturn alongside accommodative monetary policies result in an increased supply of capital to finance capex expansion in the private sector. This leads to rising cost of capital on demand side (as demand for capex quickly outstrips supply) and on supply side (as monetary authorities tighten rates into upswing cycle).

But here's a problem, Roger, and it's Europe: suppose the economy is about to take off onto capex growth path:

• Savings nowhere to be seen as deleveraging of households will be still ongoing
• Deleveraging of banks, including in anticipation of LTROs expiration means no supply of new credit
• Policy rates might stay low, but retail rates will remain higher than normal as banks balancesheets remain weak and state or EU-held (via 'resolution' vehicle) equity remains high
• In the mean time, five years of the crisis have created a massive penned up demand for capital, so market rates will be even higher
• Equity capital will be scarce, as global recovery will most likely be ongoing, sapping capital into more growth-generative regions, and
• There's that EU levy as an icing on the cake to add to costs and shrink the margins.

Now, posit the above against the following environment scenario:

• Households debts are still high, but incomes are now undermined by five years (plus) of a recession and stagnation
• SMEs and many corproates balancesheets are weak (due to stagnation in exports and internal demand, plus deleveraging costs)

What do you get? Oh, rapid increase in credit costs, leading to more households and business insolvencies. So, go ahead, as Clint The Market would have said, make my day, punk. Raise some more levies...

27/3/2012: One song, two charts... oh, dear

So long and thanks for all the fish
So sad that it should come to this
We tried to warn you all but oh dear

You may not share our intellect
Which might explain your disrespect
For all the natural wonders that
grow around you

So long, so long and thanks
for all the fish...


Oh...

Do spot that Bank of Ireland name in the above.


via FTAlphaville today's suckers are European taxpayers and economies as the 'dolphin' of Irish banking are stuck in high gear shifting ELA funding for ECB funding. And don't forget that IL&P too dipped in for a cool 2bn (here).And that, of course is translating into the brilliant 'reduction' in Irish banks ELA debts as detailed in the chart here (H/T to AD).


A game of shells big enough to:


The world's about to be destroyed
There's no point getting all annoyed
Lie back and let the planet dissolve
Around you...



Well, may be not the world, but enough to toast Irish economy.

22/1/2012: An update to Euribor risk premium post

On the foot of the previous post, I recomputed risk premia for 3 maturities: 12, 9 and 6 months euribor. Here's the chart:

And some top of the line numbers:

To compare against rates dynamics:

22/1/2012: What do interbank lending rates tell us about risk valuations?

Here is an interesting set of charts for euribor:

Notice that as maturity span shortens, there is an increasingly rapid decline in the rates in recent month. This, of course, is a reflection of two forces acting simultaneously - the ECB LTRO and the rate drop in December. You can see this here in the context of 12 months euribor plot for end-of-month (and end of last week for January 2012):

Sounds good? Indeed, the short-term end of liquidity curve improved dramatically, but... here's a trick - the long-term end of the curve is not improving as much as (1) the repo rate supports, and (2) LTRO (3 year facility) should lead it to. To see this - here's a chart:

And the above term premium is rising despite the risk premium falling:

Note: the last chart above is not seasonally adjusted and, with exception for 2010, euribor rates tend to fall seasonally in January compared to December.

In fact, current risk premia are well above the long-term relations and at more extreme end of the spectrum than during the previous months:

The above suggests to me that what we are observing in the liquidity markets is a combination of some improvement due to ECB's LTRO move (substitution along maturity curve) and the (very) incomplete pass through of ECB rate change to funding markets. There appears to be no evidence in risk reduction anywhere in sight.

26/12/2011: LTRO will not solve Euro banks' problem

As the annus horribilis concludes for the terminally ill, but refused (by the ECB & EU & the respective Governments) death, Euro area banks, the key note of that Mahlerian (the 5^th symphony-styled) Trauermarsch is the LTRO allocation of cheap 3 year €489 billion worth of ECB credit (at 1%) to the European banks. And, thus, the theme for 2012, the second movement in the opus magnum of the Euro destruction, is the looming recapitalization deadline for the said zombies – the end of June.

Alas, the hope that seems to sweep the markets to boost, albeit moderately, Euro area banks valuations – the hope that having the mother of all carry trades can help these banks recover their margins just in time to use ‘organic’ recapitalization path through mid 2012 – is seemingly out of reach.

Firstly, I put ‘organic’ in the inverted commas, since the margins rebuilding on the back of ECB-created artificial liquidity boost is about as organic as performing a puppet show with a corpse is ‘live-like’.

Secondly, the carry trade I am talking about - for those readers of this blog who are unfamiliar with finance – is the artificial exercise of taking cheap loans in one country/currency and carrying funds into purchase of assets in another country/currency. Of course, with nothing but loss making (or near-loss making) assets in the markets of the Euro zone, any banks who borrowed funds in the LTRO will be either buying Government paper (yielding on average, say, 3.0 percent margin on borrowings gives Euro area banks pre-tax uplift of just €7.3 billion in 6 months time (and no, there are no capital gains realizable, since buying today and selling into mid-2012 will leave this paper, at best, capital gains neutral). Thus, to make even a dent in the capital demand, the banks will be needing assets yielding more than double the junkier Euro area sovereign yields, which means carry trade, and all associated currency and asset risks.

Of course, Euro area banks can try to magnify their returns via ECB-offered leveraged carry trades. But unless ECB offers more LTRO-styled longer term operations, doing so at 3mo or even 11mo liquidity supply windows would be simply mad. 

So, having borrowed through LTRO, Euro area banks will purchase Government bonds which then can be used as a collateral for further ECB borrowing. So let us assume that the banks will be buying liquid debt, e.g. Spanish or Italian. The margin earned by banks is ca 2.6-3.5% per annum after they cover the cost of LTRO borrowing. Note, this carry trade will turn loss-making for the bank if the sovereign bonds yields fall below 1% cost of ECB LTRO funds. In my view, this is highly unlikely.

So the whole operation can provide some €14.6 billion annually to the banks in terms of profits earned. And this is pretty much the unleveraged maximum. Nice one, but through June 2012 hardly enough to support banks recaps. Even if EBA deadline is shifted to December 2012, profits from LTRO are nowhere near the required funds to cover recapitalizations. Recall that under 9% Core Tier 1 scenario, euro area banks require something to the tune of €119 billion in fresh capital.

The downside from this conclusion is that the Euro area banks will require, post LTRO either a warrant to die (the preferred option, assuming the death warrant involves orderly shutdown of the insolvent banks) or a public bailout of immense proportion. Given the EU hit some serious trouble coming up with €200 billion for loans to IMF, good luck with that latter option.