8/3/20: Global Economy's Titanic: Meet Your Iceberg

Here's that iceberg that is drifting toward our economy's Titanic... and no, it ain't a virus, but it is our choice:

Via: @Schuldensuehner

Years of easy credit, easy money. The pile of debt from Baa to lower ratings is the real threat here, for its sustainability is heavily contingent on two highly correlated factors: cost of debt (interest rates) and availability of liquidity. The two factors are closely correlated, but are also somewhat distinct. And both are linked to the state of the global economy.

There are additional problems hidden within A and even Aa rated debt, since these ratings are vulnerable to downgrades, and current Aa rating shifting to Baa or Ba will entail a discrete jump in the cost of debt refinancing and carry.

7/2/20: Mapping Real Economic Debt: BRICS

Some great charts on real economic debt, via IIF, with my highlighting of the BRICS economies:

First off, mapping corporate debt and government debt as a share of GDP:

 China is an outlier within the BRICS group when it comes to corporate debt.

 Chart above shows how dramatic has been deleveraging out of FX-denominated debt in Russia over the last decade. Much of this came from the reduction in US Dollar-denominated exposures.

Lastly, the chart above showing changes in the US Dollar-denominated debt quality (by corporate ratings). Again, Russia is a positive stand-alone in this, with more positive outlook than negative outlook corporates - a trend strikingly different from both the Emerging Markets overall, and for other BRIC economies.

23/9/19: Corporate Finance in a Chart

The glut of debt and the unbearable lightness of corporate leverage:

16/5/19: Identifying Debt Bubble 4.0

Having just posted on the debt supercycle-related comments from Gundlach (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2019/05/16519-gundlach-on-us-economy-and-debt.html), here is a chart identifying these super-cycles in the U.S. economy:

The periods of significant leverage in the U.S. economy have been identified as follows:

• First, I took nominal GDP growth rates (q/q) snd nominal total non-financial debt growth rates (also q/q) for the entire period of data coverage for which all data points are available (since 1Q 1966). 
• Second, I adjusted nominal non-financial debt growth rates to reflect the evolving ratio of debt to U.S. GDP.
• Third, I subtracted adjusted debt growth rates from nominal GDP growth rates to arrive at change in leverage risk direction. This is the difference figure shown in the chart below. Positive numbers reflect quarters when GDP growth rate exceeded growth in GDP-ratio-adjusted debt and are periods of deleveraging in the economy, and negative periods correspond to the situation where GDP growth rate was exceeded by GDP-ratio-adjusted growth rate in debt.
• Fourth, I calculated 99% confidence interval for historical average difference (shown in the chart below).
• Fifth, I identified three regimes of debt evolution: Regime 1 = "Deleveraging" corresponds to the Difference variable being non-negative (periods where the gap between growth rate in GDP and growth rate in debt is non-negative); Regime 2 = "Non-significant leveraging up" corresponds to periods where the gap (difference) between GDP growth rate and debt growth rate is between zero and the lower bound of the confidence interval for historical average difference; and Regime 3 = "Significant Leveraging up" corresponds to the periods where statistically-speaking, the negative gap between growth in GDP and growth in debt is statistically significantly below the historical average.

I highlighted in the above chart four periods of significant, persistent leveraging up, identified as Debt Bubbles 1-4. There is absolutely zero (statistical) doubt that the current period of economic recovery is yet another manifestation of a Debt Bubble. And, given the composition of the debt increases since the end of the Global Financial Crisis, this latest Bubble is evident across all three components of non-financial debt: the households, corporates and the U.S. Federal Government. 

24/2/19: Eurozone's Corporate Yields are not quite in a crisis territory... yet...

Euro area high yield corporate credit rates are under pressure to continue moving:

But they are far from being dramatic, even though banking sector margins have now surpassed ex-crises averages:

The problem, however, is what awaits on the horizon. So far, the ECB is planning on hiking rates in the second half of 2019. If it does, with one 25 bps hikes to the end of 2019, we are looking at high yield rates jumping close to a 7 percent mark:

That is a bit more testing than the current above-the-average yields.

20/2/19: Crack and Opioids of Corporate Finance

More addictive than crack or opioids, corporate debt is the sand-castle town's equivalent of water: it holds the 'marvels of castles' together, util it no longer does...

Source: https://twitter.com/lisaabramowicz1/status/1098200828010287104/photo/1

Firstly, as @Lisaabramowicz correctly summarises: "American companies look cash-rich on paper, but average leverage ratios don't tell the story. 5% of S&P 500 companies hold more than half the overall cash; the other 95% of corporations have cash-to-debt levels that are the lowest in data going back to 2004". Which is the happy outrun of the Fed and rest of the CBs' exercises in Quantitive Hosing of the economies with cheap credit over the recent years. So much 'excessive' it hurts: a 1 percentage point climb in corporate debt yields, over the medium term (3-5 years) will shave off almost USD40 billion in annual EBITDA, although tax shields on that debt are likely to siphon off some of this pain to the Federal deficits.

Secondly, this pile up of corporate debt has come with little 'balancesheet rebuilding' or 'resilience to shocks' capacity. Much of the debt uptake in recent years has been squandered by corporates on dividend finance and stock repurchases, superficially boosting the book value and the market value of the companies involved, without improving their future cash flows. And, to add to that pain, without improving future growth prospects.

11/1/19: Herding: the steady state of the uncertain markets

Markets are herds. Care to believe in behavioral economics or not, safety is in liquidity and in benchmarking. Both mean that once large investors start rotating out of one asset class and into another, the herd follows, because what everyone is buying is liquid, and when everyone is buying, they are setting benchmark expected returns. If you, as a manager, perform in line with the market, you are safe at the times of uncertainty and ambiguity. In other words, it is better to bet on losing or underperforming alongside the crowd of others, than to bet on a more volatile expected returns, even though these might offer a higher upside.

How does this work? Here:

Everyone loves Corporate debt, until everyone runs out of it and into Government debt. Everyone hates Government debt, until everyone hates corporate debt. It's ugly. But it is real. Herding is what drives markets, even though everyone is keen on paying analysts top dollar not to herd.

19/12/18: Debt-Debt-Baby: BBB-rated & lower 'bump'

Gradual deterioration in the quality of corporate debt traded in the markets has been quite spectacular over 2018:

The above chart shows that at the end of 3Q 2018, the market share of BBB and lower-rated corporate  credit is now in excess of 50%, in excess of USD4.4 trillion, matching prior historical record set at 4Q 2017-1Q 2018. BIS' Claudio Borio was quick out on the rising risks: https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1812_ontherecord.htm, saying "...the bulge of BBB corporate debt, just above junk status, hovers like a dark cloud over investors. Should this debt be downgraded if and when the economy weakened, it is bound to put substantial pressure on a market that is already quite illiquid and, in the process, to generate broader waves. ... What does this all mean for the prospects ahead? It means that the market tensions we saw during this quarter were not an isolated event. ... Faced with unprecedented initial conditions - extraordinarily low interest rates, bloated central bank balance sheets and high global indebtedness, both private and public - monetary policy normalisation was bound to be challenging especially in light of trade tensions and political uncertainty. The recent bump is likely to be just one in a series."

You can read my views on the latter aspect of the markets dynamics in the post that will follow.

8/12/18: Back to the 1950s: Tracing Out 25 Years of the Credit Bubble

While the current cycle of declining interest rates has been running for at least 25 years, the most recent iteration of the period has been exceptionally benign. Since the end of the global financial crisis, Corporate and, to a greater extent Government, borrowing costs have run at the levels close to, or even below, those observed in the 1950s-1960s.

Since 2002-2003, FFR, on average, has been below the risk premium on lending to the Government & corporates. This has changed in 4Q 2017 when Treasuries risk premium fell below the FFR and stayed there since. In simple terms, it pays to use monetary policy to leverage the economy.
Not surprisingly, the role of debt in funding economic growth has increased.

And, as the last chart below shows, the relationship between policy rates (Federal Funds Rate) and Government and Corporate debt costs has been deteriorating since the start of the Millennium, especially for Corporate debt:

In simple terms, risk premium on Corporate debt has been negatively correlated with the Federal Funds Rate (so higher policy rates imply lower risk premium on Corporate bonds) and the positive relationship between Government debt risk premium and Fed's policy rate is now at its weakest level in history (so higher policy rates are having lower impact on risk premium for Government bonds). In part, these developments reflect accumulation of Government debt on the Fed's balancesheet. In part, the glut of liquidity in the banking and financial system (leading to mis-pricing of risks on a systemic basis). And, in part, the disconnection between Corporate debt markets and the policy rates induced by the debt-financed shares buybacks and M&As, plus yield-chasing investment strategies, all of which severely discount risk premia on Corporate debt.

29/10/18: Corporate Credit and the Debt Powder Keg

As it says on the tin: despite growth in earnings, the numbers of U.S. companies that are struggling with interest payments on the gargantuan mountain of corporate debt they carry remains high. The chart does not show those companies with EBIT/interest cover ratio below 1 that are at risk (e.g. with the ratio closer to 0.9) for the short term impact of rising interest rates. That said, the overall percent of firms classified as risky is at the third highest since the peak of the GFC. And that is some doing, given a decade of extremely low cost of debt financing.

Talking of a powder keg getting primed and fused…

13/9/18: Shares Buybacks Swallow much of Trump's Corporate Tax 'Reforms'

A recent post from the U.S. Fed looked at how companies with large holdings of cash abroad have used those funds following the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (the TCJA, or the Republican Tax Cuts), which incentivised the repatriation of foreign earnings stashed by the U.S. corporations abroad, including Ireland.

Per Fed note: "by the end of 2017, U.S. MNEs had accumulated approximately $1 trillion in cash abroad, held mostly in U.S. fixed-income securities", aka - bonds. Which, of course, also explains why Ireland is one of the largest domiciles for U.S. Treasuries.

The TCJA moved the U.S. "to a quasi-territorial tax system in which profits are taxed only where they are earned" so "...U.S. MNEs' foreign profits will therefore no longer be subject to U.S. taxes when repatriated. As a transition to this new tax system, the TCJA imposed a one-time tax (payable over eight years) on the existing stock of offshore holdings regardless of whether the funds are repatriated, thus eliminating the tax incentive to keep cash abroad."

As of Q1 2018, the U.S. firms "repatriated just over $300 billion, roughly 30% of the estimated stock of offshore cash holdings."

This "quantity of cash repatriated since the passage of the TCJA might have a notable effect on firm financing patterns and investment decisions in the near term". The Fed note argues "that funds repatriated in 2018:Q1 have been associated with a dramatic increase in share buybacks; evidence of an increase in investment is less clear at this stage, as it is likely too early to detect given that the effects may take time to materialize."

The top 15 U.S. firms (by cash holdings abroad) "account for roughly 80 percent of total offshore cash holdings, and roughly 80 percent of their total cash (domestic plus foreign) is held abroad... following the passage of the TCJA ...share buybacks spiked dramatically for the top 15 cash holders, with the ratio of buybacks to assets more than doubling in 2018:Q1. In dollar terms, buybacks increased from $23 billion in 2017:Q4 to $55 billion in 2018:Q1." Worse: "among the top 15 cash holders, the largest holders accounted for the bulk of the share repurchases: In 2018:Q1, the top 5 cash holders accounted for 66 percent, and the top holder alone accounted for 41 percent." Note: the top holder is... Apple.

Of course, "firms can also pay out cash to shareholders through dividends; however, unlike buybacks, dividends were little changed for the top 15 cash holders relative to the same period last year."

"...unlike in the case of share buybacks, there is no obvious spike in investment among the top 15 cash holders in 2018:Q1 relative to the previous quarter. Indeed, it appears that the top 15 cash holders have already been on a slight upward trajectory relative to other firms for a few years."

The repatriation "may also have been used to pay down debt; however, the aggregate debt of the top 15 cash holders declined only about $15 billion, or 2 percent of their total debt outstanding, suggesting limited paydowns so far."

Thus, in simple terms, and allowing some conditionality for lags in investment, the TCJA 2017 has primarily went to stimulate stock market activity, as opposed to either corporate deleveraging or corporate investment. This is consistent with 2004 repatriation amnesty, when the bulk of funds brought by the U.S. MNEs back to the U.S. went to fund shares repurchases in 2005.

It's back to the future folks.

Full note: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/us-corporations-repatriation-of-offshore-profits-20180904.htm.

15/6/18: Italian High Yield Bonds and Markets Exuberance

Nothing illustrates the state of asset valuations today better than the junk bonds tale from Italy. Here is a prime example from the Fitch ratings note from June 7:

"...longstanding Italian HY issuer and mobile operator WindTre sequentially refinanced crisis-era unsecured notes at 12% coupons into 3% area coupons by January 2018, despite losing cumulative revenue and EBITDA of 30% and 25%, respectively, and re-leveraging from 4x to 6x."

Give this a thought, folks:

1. We expect rates to rise in the future on foot of ECB unwinding its QE, the Fed hiking rates and monetary conditions everywhere around the world getting 'gently' tighter;
2. Euro is set to weaken in the longer run on foot of Fed-ECB policies mismatch;
3. WindTre issues replacement debt, increasing its leverage risk by 50%, as its revenue falls almost by a thirds and its EBITDA falls by a quarter;
4. WindTre operates in the market that is highly exposed to political risks and in an economy that is posting downward revisions to growth forecasts.

And the investors are piling into the company bonds, cutting the cost of debt carry for the operator from 12 percent to 3 percent. 

Per FT (https://www.ft.com/content/31c635f4-64df-11e8-a39d-4df188287fff): "Lending to corporates rose 1.2 per cent in the year to February 2018, according to the Bank of Italy, and the average interest rate on new loans was 1.5 per cent — a historic low."

Say big, collective "Thanks!" to the folks at ECB, who worked hard to bring us this gem of a market, so skewed out of reality, one wonders what it will take for markets regulators to see build up of systemic risks.

29/3/18: Credit downgrades and the sunny horizons of peak growth

The global economy is picking up steam. The U.S. economy is roaring to strength. 2018 is going to be another 'peak year'. Tax cuts are driving equity valuations up. Corporate balance sheets are getting healthier by a day... and so on.

The positivity of recent headline has been contrasted by the realities of the gargantuan bubble in corporate debt. A bubble that is not going to get any healthier any time soon. In fact, based on the latest data (through 4Q 2017) from the S&P Global Market Intelligence, H1 2017 trend toward relatively balanced (or rather relatively moderately negative skew) credit ratings has turned decisively negative in 2H 2017. Worse, 4Q 2017 dynamics were markedly worse than 3Q 2017 dynamics:

Which brings up the following question: if things are getting downgraded that fast, what's likely to happen with the Fed policy 'normalization' impact on the corporate credit markets? Answers on tears-proof napkins, please.

21/11/17: ECB loads up on pre-Christmas sales of junk

Holger Zschaepitz @Schuldensuehner posted earlier today the latest data on ECB’s balance sheet. Despite focusing its attention on unwinding the QE in the medium term future, Frankfurt continues to ramp up its purchases of euro area debt. Amidst booming euro area economic growth, total assets held by the ECB rose by another €24.1 billion in October, hitting a fresh life-time high of €4.4119 trillion.

Thus, currently, ECB balance sheet amounts to 40.9% of Eurozone GDP. The ‘market economy’ of neoliberal euro area is now increasingly looking more and more like some sort of a corporatist paradise. On top of ECB holdings, euro area government expenditures this year are running at around 47.47% of GDP, accord to the IMF, while Government debt levels are at 87.37% of GDP. General government net borrowing stands at 1.276% of GDP, while, thanks to the ECB buying up government debt, primary net balance is in surplus of 0.589% of GDP.

Meanwhile, based on UBS analysis, the ECB is increasingly resorting to buying up ‘bad’ corporate debt. So far, the ECB has swallowed some 255 issues of BB-rated and non-rated corporate bonds, with Frankfurt’s largest corporate debt exposures rated at BBB+. AA to A-rated bonds count 339 issues, with mode at A- (148 issues).

It would be interesting to see the breakdown by volume and issuer names, as ECB’s corporate debt purchasing programme is hardly a very transparent undertaking.

All in, there is absolutely no doubt that Frankfurt is heavily subsidising both sovereign and corporate debt markets in Europe, largely irrespective of risks and adverse incentives such subsidies may carry.

20/7/17: Euro Area's Great non-Deleveraging

A neat data summary for the European 'real economic debt' dynamics since 2006:

In the nutshell, the Euro area recovery:

1. Government debt to GDP ratio is up from the average of 66% in 2006-2007 to 89% in 2016;
2. Corporate debt to GDP ratio is up from the average of 72% in 2006-2007 to 78% in 2016; and
3. Household debt to GDP ratio is down (or rather, statistically flat) from the average of 58.5% in 2006-2007 to 58% in 2016.

The Great Austerity did not produce a Great Deleveraging. Even the Great Wave of Bankruptcies that swept across much of the Euro area in 2009-2014 did not produce a Great Deleveraging. The European Banking Union, and the Genuine Monetary Union and the Great QE push by the ECB - all together did not produce a Great Deleveraging. 

Total real economic debt stood at 195%-198% of GDP in 2006-2007 - at the peak of previous asset bubble and economic 'expansion' dynamism, and it stands at 225% of GDP in 2016, after what has been described as 'robust' economic recovery. 

30/12/16: Corporate Debt Grows Faster than Cash Reserves

Based on the data from FactSet, U.S. corporate performance metrics remain weak.

On the positive side, corporate cash balances were up 7.6% to USD1.54 trillion in 3Q 2016 y/y, for S&P500 (ex-financials) companies. This includes short term investments, as well as cash reserves. Cash balances are now at their highest since the data records started in 2007.

But, there’s been some bad news too:

1. Top 20 companies now account for 52.5% of the total S&P500 cash holdings, up on 50.8% in 3Q 2015.
2. Heaviest cash reserves are held by companies that favour off-shore holdings over repatriation of funds into the U.S., like Microsoft (USD136.9 billion, +37.8% y/y), Alphabet (USD83.1 billion, +14.1% y/y), Cisco (USD71 billion, +20.1% y/y), Oracle (USD68.4 billion, +22.3%) and Apple (USD67.2 billion, +61.4%). Per FactSet, “the Information Technology sector maintained the largest cash balance ($672.7 billion) at the end of the third quarter. The sector’s cash total made up 43.6% of the aggregate amount for the index, which was a jump from the 39.3% in Q3 2015”
3. Despite hefty cash reserves, net debt to EBITDA ratio has reached a new high (see green line in the first chart below), busting records for the sixth consecutive quarter - up 9.9% y/y. Again, per FactSet, “at the end of Q3, net debt to EBITDA for the S&P 500 (Ex-Financials) increased to 1.88.” So growth in debt has once again outpaced growth in cash. “At the end of the third quarter, aggregate debt for the S&P 500 (Ex-Financials) index reached its highest total in at least ten years, at $4.57 trillion. This marked a 7.8% increase from the debt amount in Q3 2015.” which is nothing new, as in the last 12 quarters, growth in debt exceeded growth in cash in all but one quarter (an outlier of 4Q 2013). 3Q 2016 cash to debt ratio for the S&P 500 (Ex-Financials) was 33.7%, on par with 3Q 2015 and 5.2% below the average ratio over the past 12 quarters.

Net debt issuance is also a problem: 3Q 2016 posted 10th highest quarter in net debt issuance in 10 years, despite a steep rise in debt costs.

While investment picked up (ex-energy sector), a large share of investment activity remains within the M&As. “The amount of cash spent on assets acquired from acquisitions amounted to $85.7 billion in Q3, which was the fifth largest quarterly total in the past ten years. Looking at mergers and acquisitions for the United States, M&A volume slowed in the third quarter (August - October) compared to the same period a year ago, but deal value rose. The number of transactions fell 7.3% year-over-year to 3078, while the aggregate deal value of these transactions increased 23% to $564.2 billion.”

The above, of course, suggests that quality of the deals being done (at least on valuations side) remains relatively weak: larger deals signal higher risks for acquirers. This is confirmed by data from Bloomberg, which shows that 2016 median Ebitda Multiple for M&A deals of > USD 1 Billion has declined to x12.7 in 2016 from an all-time high in 2015 of x14.3. Still, 2016 multiple is the 5th highest on record. In part, this reduction in risk took place at the very top of M&As distribution, as the number of so-called mega-deals (> USD 10 billion) has fallen to 35 in 2016, compared to 51 in 2015 (all time record). However, 2016 was still the sixth highest mega-deal year in 20 years.

Overall, based on Bloomberg data, 2015 was the fourth highest M&A deals year since 1996.

So in summary:

• While cash flow is improving, leading to some positive developments on R&D investment and general capex (ex-energy);
• Debt levels are rising and they are rising faster than cash reserves and earnings;
• Much of investment continues to flow through M&A pipeline, and the quality of this pipeline is improving only marginally.

Source: https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2016-12-30/trump-set-to-refill-m-a-punch-bowl-in-2017

29/12/16: Drowning in Debt

Recently, I posted about the return - with a vengeance - of one of the key drivers of the Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recession, the rapid rise of the debt bubble across the global economy. The original post is available here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/12/161216-root-of-2007-2010-crises-is-back.html

There is more evidence of the problem reaching beyond corporate finance side of the markets for debt. In fact, in the U.S. - the economy that led the de-risking and deleveraging efforts during the early stages of the recovery - household debt is now once again reaching danger levels.

Chart 1 below shows that, based on data from NY Federal Reserve through 3Q 2016, full year 2016 average household debt levels are likely to exceed 2005-2007 average by some 3 percent. In 3Q 2016, total average household debt was around USD98,312, a level comparable to USD98,906 in 2006.

And Chart 2 shows that overall, aggregate levels of household debt and per capita levels of household debt both are now in excess of 2005-2007 averages.

Finally, as Chart 3 below indicates, delinquencies rates are also rising, despite historically low interest rates and booming jobs markets. For Student Loans and Car Loans, 3Q 2016 delinquencies rates are 1 percentage points and 3.8 percentage points above the 2005-2007 average delinquency rates. For Mortgages, current delinquency rates are running pretty much at the 2005-2007 average. Only for Credit Cards do delinquency rates at the present trail behind the 2005-2007 average, by some 2 percentage points.

Now, consider the market expectations of 0.75-1 percentage increase in Fed rates in 2017 compared to 3Q 2016 (we are already 0.25 percentage points on the way with the most recent Fed decision). Based on the data from NY Fed, and assuming average 2015-2016 growth rates in credit forward, this will translate into extra household payments on debt servicing of around USD1,085-USD1,465 per annum depending on the passthrough rates from policy rate set by the Fed and the retail rates charged by the banks.

Given the state of the U.S. household finances, this will be some tough burden to shoulder.

So here you have it, folks:
1) Corporate debt bubble is at an all-time high
2) Government debt bubble is at an all-time high
3) Household debt bubble is at an all-time high.
Meanwhile, equity funding is slipping even for the usually credit-shy start ups.

And if you want another illustration, here is total global Government debt, based on IMF data:

We’ve learned no lessons from 2008.


Sources for data:
https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/average-credit-card-debt-household/
https://www.newyorkfed.org/microeconomics/data.html
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/index.aspx

16/12/16: The Root of the 2007-2010 Crises is Back, with a Vengeance

There are several fundamental problem in the global economy, legacies of the past 20 years - from the mid 1990s on - that continue to drive the trend toward secular stagnations (see explainer here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2015/07/7615-secular-stagnation-double-threat.html).

One key structural problem is that of excessive reliance on credit (or debt) to drive growth. We have seen the devastating effects of the rapidly rising unsustainable levels of the real economic debt (debt that combines government obligations, non-financial corporate debt and household debt) in the case of 2008 crises.

And we were supposed to have learned the lesson. Supposed to have, because the entire conversation about structural reforms in banking and capital markets worldwide was framed in the context of deleveraging (reduction of debt levels). This has been the leitmotif of structural policies reforms in Europe, the U.S., in Australia and in China, and elsewhere, including at the level of the EU and the IMF. Supposed to have, because we did not that lesson. Instead of deleveraging, we got re-leveraging of economies - companies, households and governments.

Problem Case Study: U.S. Corporates

Take the U.S. corporate bonds market (that excludes direct loans through private lenders and intermediated loans through banks) - an USD8 trillion-sized elephant. Based on the latest research of the U.S. Treasury Department, non-banking institutions - plain vanilla investment funds, pension funds, mom-and-pop insurance companies, etc are now holding a full 1/4 of U.S. corporates bonds. According to the U.S. Treasury, these expanding holdings of / risk exposures to corporate debt are now "a top threat to stability" of the U.S. financial system. And the warning comes at the time when U.S. corporate debt is at an all-time high as a share of GDP, based on the figures from the Office of Financial Research.

And it gets worse. Since 2007, corporate debt pile in the U.S. rose some 75 percent to USD8.4 trillion, based on data from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association - which is more than USD8 trillion estimated by the Treasury. These are long-term debt instruments. Short term debt obligations - money market instruments - add another USD 2.9 trillion and factoring in the rise of the value of the dollar since the Fed meeting this week, closer to USD3 trillion. So the total U.S. corporate debt pile currently stands at around USD 11.3 trillion to USD 11.4 trillion.

Take two:

1. Debt, after the epic deleveraging of the 2008 crisis, is now at an all-time high; and
2. Debt held by systemic retail investment institutions (insurance companies, pensions funds, retail investment funds) is at all time high.

And the risks in this market are rising. Since the election of Donald Trump, global debt markets lost some USD2.3 trillion worth of value. This reaction was driven by the expectation that his economic policies, especially his promise of a large scale infrastructure investment stimulus, will trigger inflationary pressures in the U.S. economy that is already running at full growth capacity (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/12/151216-us-economic-policies-in-era-of.html). Further monetary policy tightening in the U.S. - as signalled by the Fed this week (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/12/151216-long-term-fed-path-may-force-ecb.html) will take these valuations down even further.

Some estimates (see https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-16/republican-tax-reform-seen-shrinking-u-s-corporate-bond-market) suggest that the Republican party corporate tax reforms (that might remove interest rate tax deductibility for companies) can trigger a 30 percent drop in investment grade bonds valuations in the U.S. - bonds amounting to just under USD 4.9 trillion. The impact would be even more pronounced on other bonds values. Even making the estimate less dramatic and expecting a 25 percent drop across the entire debt market would wipe out some USD 2.85 trillion off the balancesheets of the bonds-holding investors.

As yields rise, and bond prices drop, the aforementioned systemic retail investment institutions will be nursing massive losses on their investment books. If the rush to sell their bond holdings, they will crash the entire market, triggering potentially a worse financial meltdown than the one witnessed in 2008. If they sit on their holdings, they will be pressed to raise capital and their redemptions will be stressed. It's either a rock or a hard place.


Problem Extrapolation: the World

The glut of U.S. corporate debt, however, is just the tip of an iceberg.

As noted in this IMF paper, published on December 15th, corporate leverage (debt) has been on a steady march upward in the emerging markets (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16243.pdf).

And in its Fiscal Monitor for October 2016, the Fund notes that "At 225 percent of world GDP, the global debt of the nonfinancial sector—comprising the general government, households, and nonfinancial firms—is currently at an all-time high. Two-thirds, amounting to about $100 trillion, consists of liabilities of the private sector which, as documented in an extensive literature, can carry great risks when they reach excessive levels." (see http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2016/02/pdf/fm1602.pdf)

Yes, global real economic debt now stands at around USD152 trillion or 225 percent of world GDP.

Excluding China and the U.S. global debt levels as percentage of GDP are close to 2009 all time peak. Much of the post-Crisis re-leveraging took place on Government's balancehseets, as illustrated below, but the most ominous side of the debt growth equation is that private sector world-wide did not sustain any deleveraging between 2008 and 2015. In fact, Advanced Economies Government debt take up fully replaced private sector debt growth rates contraction. Worse happened in the Emerging Markets:

So all the fabled deleveraging in the economies in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis has been banks-balancesheets deleveraging - Western banks dumping liabilities to be picked up by someone else (vulture funds, investors, other banks, the aforementioned systemic retail investment institutions, etc).

And as IMF analysis shows, only 12 advanced economies have posted declines in total non-financial private debt (real economic debt) as a share of GDP over 2008-2015 period.  Alas, in the majority of these, gains in private deleveraging have been more than fully offset by deterioration in government debt:

Crucially, especially for those still believing the austerity-by-cuts narrative presented in popular media, fiscal uplift in debt levels in the Advanced Economies did not take place due to banks-rescues alone. Primary fiscal deficits did most of the debt lifting:

In simple terms, across the advanced economies, there was no spending austerity. There was tax austerity. And on the effectiveness of the latter compared to the former you can read this note: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/12/10122016-austerity-three-wrongs-meet.html. Spoiler alert: tax-based austerity is a worse disaster than spending-based austerity.

In summary, thus, years of monetarist activism spurring a massive rise in corporate debt, coupled with the utter inability of the states to cut back on public spending and the depth of the Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recession have combined to propel global debt levels past the pre-crisis peak to a new historical high.

The core root of the 2007-2010 crises is back. With a vengeance.

17/6/16: Credit markets on the ropes?

In their research note, titled aptly “Credit Metrics Bode 1ll”, Moody’s Analytics produced a rather strong warning to the corporate credit markets, a warning that investors should not ignore.

Per Moody’s: “The current business cycle upturn is in its latter stage, aggregate measures of corporate credit quality suggest. The outlook for the credit cycle is likely to deteriorate, barring improved showings by cash flows and profits, where enhanced prospects for the latter two metrics depend largely on a sufficient rejuvenation of business sales.”

In other words, unless corporate performance trends break to the upside, credit markets will push into a recessionary territory.

“Recessions materialized within 12 months of the year-long ratio of internal funds to corporate debt descending to 19.1% i n Ql -2008, Ql-2000, and Q4-1989. As derived from the Federal Reserve's Financial Accounts of the United States, or the Flow of Funds, the moving year long ratio of internal funds to corporate debt for US non-financial corporations has eased from Q2-2011's current cycle high of 25.4% to the 19.1% of Ql-2016.”

Moody’s illustrate:

Now, observe the ratio over the current cycle: the peak around the end of 2011-start of 2012 has now been fully and firmly exhausted. Current ratios sit dangerously at 4Q 2007 and close to 1-3 quarters distance from each previous recession troughs.

The safety cushion available to the U.S. corporates when it comes to avoiding a profit recession is thin. Per Moody’s: “The prospective slide by the ratio of internal funds to corporate debt underscores how very critical rejuvenations of profits and cash flows are to the outlooks for business activity and credit quality. Getting profits up to a speed that will keep the US safely distanced from a recession has been rendered more difficult by the current pace of employment costs."

Here’s the problem. Employment costs can be cut back to improve profitability in a normal cycle. The bigger the cut back, the more cushion it provides. But in the current cycle, employment costs are subdued (do notice that this environment - of slower wages and costs inflation - is the same as in 2004-2007 period). Which means two things:

1. U.S. corporates have little room to cut employment costs except by a massive wave of layoffs (which can trigger a recession on its own); and
2. U.S. corporates have already front-loaded most of the risk onto employment costs during the Great Recession. Which means any new adjustment is going to be even more painful as it will come against already severe cuts inherited from the Great Recession and only partially corrected for during the relatively weak costs recovery period since then. 

Moody’s are pretty somber on the prospect: "As inferred from the historical record, restoring profits through reduced labor costs is all but impossible without the pain of a recessionary surge in layoffs. Thus, barring a recession, employment costs should continue to expand by at least 5% annually."

That’s the proverbial the rock and the hard place, between which the credit markets are wedged, as evidenced by the recent dynamics for both Corporate Gross Value Added (the GDP contribution from the corporate sector) and the nominal GDP:

Again, the two lines show steady downward trend in corporate performance (Corporate GVA) and slight downward trend in nominal GDP. In terms of previous recessions, sharp acceleration in both trends since the end of 4Q 2014 is now long enough and strong enough to put the U.S. onto recessionary alert.

Per Moody’s: "As of early June, the Blue Chip consensus projected a 3.2% annual rise by 2016's nominal GDP that, …signals a less than 3% increase by corporate gross value added. [This]... implies a drop by 2016's profits from current production that is considerably deeper than the - 2.5% dip predicted by early June's consensus. Moreover, as inferred from the consensus forecast of a 4.4% increase by 2017's nominal GDP, net revenue growth may not be rapid enough to stabilize profits until the second-half of 2017, which may prove to be too late for the purpose of avoid ing a cyclical downturn."

In other words, there is a storm brewing in the U.S. economy and the credit markets are exhibiting stress consistent with normal pre-recessionary risks. Which is, of course, somewhat ironic, given that debt issuance is still booming, both in the USD and Euro (a new market of choice for a number of U.S. companies issuance in response to the ECB corporate debt purchasing programme):

Just as the corporate credit quality is deteriorating rapidly:

You really can’t make this up: the debt cornucopia is rolling on just as the debt market is flashing red.

8/5/16: Leverage and Management: Twin Risks or Separate Risks?

A new paper “How Management Risk Affects Corporate Debt” by Yihui Pan, Tracy Yue Wang, and Michael S. Weisbach (NBER Working Paper No. 22091 March 2016) looks at the role management risk (uncertainty about future managerial decisions) plays in increasing overall firm-wide default risk.

Specifically, the paper argues that “management risk is an important yet unexplored determinant of a firm’s default risk and the pricing of its debt. CDS spreads, loan spreads and bond yield spreads all increase at the time of CEO turnover, when management risk is highest, and decline over the first three years of CEO tenure, regardless of the reason for the turnover.”

The authors also show that a “similar pattern but of smaller magnitude occurs around CFO turnovers.”

Overall, “the increase in the CDS spread at the time of the CEO departure announcement, the change in the spread when the incoming CEO takes office, as well as the sensitivity of the spread to the new CEO’s tenure, all depend on the amount of prior uncertainty about the new management.”

Which means that leverage risk and management turnover risk can be paired.


In some detail, as authors note, “firm’s default risk reflects not only the likelihood that it will have bad luck, but also the risk that the firm’s managerial decisions will lead the firm to default”. In other words, while leverage risk matters on its own (co-determining overall firm risk), it also runs coincident and is possibly correlated with management turnover risk. “Management risk occurs when the impact of management on firm value is uncertain, and, in principle, could meaningfully affect the firm’s overall risk.”

This is not new. Empirically, we know that management risk is “an important factor affecting a firm’s risk. However, the academic literature on corporate default risk and the pricing of corporate debt has largely ignored management risk. This paper evaluates the extent to which uncertainty about management is a factor that affects a firm’s default risk and the pricing of its debt.”

Using a sample of primarily S&P 1500 firms between 1987 and 2012, the authors “characterize the way that the risk of a firm’s corporate debt varies with the uncertainty the market likely has about its management. The basic pattern is depicted in [the chart above]… The announcement of a CEO’s departure is associated with an increase in the firm’s CDS spread, reflecting an increased market assessment of the firm’s default risk. The CDS spread declines at the announcement of the successor, and further declines during the new CEO’s time in office, approximately back to the pre-turnover level after about three years.”

Quantitatively, the effect is sizeable: “the 5-year CDS spread is about 35 basis points (22% relative to the sample mean) higher when a new CEO takes office than three years into his tenure. Spreads on shorter-term CDS contracts exhibit an even larger sensitivity to CEO turnover and tenure. Spreads on loans and bond yield spreads also decline following CEO turnovers. These patterns occur regardless of the reason for the turnover; changes in spreads following turnovers that occur because of the death or illness of the outgoing CEO are not economically or statistically significantly different from changes in spreads in the entire sample.”

Dynamically, the results are also interesting: the process of risk pricing post-CEO exits is consistent with information updating / learning by markets. “The observed decline in default risk over tenure potentially reflects the resolution of uncertainty about management and hence a decline in management risk. …Bayesian learning models imply that if the changes in spreads around CEO turnover occur because of changes in management risk, then when ex ante uncertainty about management is higher, spreads should increase more around management turnover and decline faster subsequently. Consistent with this prediction, our estimates suggest that the increase in the CDS spread at the time of the CEO departure announcement, the change in the spread when the incoming CEO takes office, as well as the sensitivity of the spread to the new CEO’s tenure, all depend on the amount of uncertainty there is about the new management. For example, the increase in CDS spreads at the announcement of a CEO departure when the firm does not have a presumptive replacement is almost three times as high as when there is such an “heir apparent.” The revelation of the new CEO’s identity leads to smaller declines in spreads prior to the time when he takes over if the new CEO is younger than if he is older; presumably less is known about the young CEOs ex ante so less uncertainty is resolved when they are appointed. But once a younger CEO does take over, the market learns more about his ability from observing his performance, so the spreads decline faster.”

Fundamentals that may signal CEO quality ex ante also matter: “…when the CEO has an existing relationship with a lender before he takes his current job, the lender is likely to know more about the CEO’s ability and future actions, leading to lower management risk. Consistent with this argument, we find that the sensitivity of interest rates to the CEO’s time in office is 39-57% lower for loans in which the CEO has a prior relationship with the lender compared to those without such a relationship. This relation holds even if the CEO is an outsider and the relationship was built while he worked at a different firm, so the existence of the relationship is exogenous to the credit condition of the current firm.”

What about cost of debt and risk pricing? Some nice result here too: “Since uncertainty about management is likely to be idiosyncratic rather than systematic, it theoretically should not affect a firm’s cost of debt (i.e., the expected return on debt). Accordingly, firms should not adjust the cost of capital they use for capital budgeting purposes because of management-related uncertainty. In addition, since variation in management risk appears to be relatively short-term, it is unlikely to affect firms’ long-term capital structure targets. However, since management risk increases the volatility of cash flows, it should increase the demand for precautionary savings. Consistent with this idea, we find that firms facing higher management risk tend to have higher cash holdings. In particular, cash holdings decline with executive tenure, but only for firms for which management risk is likely to be high.”


Overall, an interesting set of results - highly intuitive and empirically novel. One thing that is missing is control for quality of governance within the firms, e.g.
- CSR
- ERM
- Board and C-level quality metrics
Avenue for future extension of the study…