31/5/20: S&P500 Shares Buybacks: Retained Earnings and Risk Hedging

Shares buybacks can have a severely destabilizing impact on longer term companies' valuations, as noted in numerous posts on this blog. In the COVID19 pandemic, legacy shares buybacks are associated with reduced cash reserves cushions and thiner equity floats for the companies that aggressively pursued this share price support strategy in recent years. Hence, logic suggests that companies more aggressively engaging in shares buybacks should exhibit greater downside volatility - de facto acting as de-hedging instrument for risk management.

Here is the evidence:

Note how dramatically poorer S&P500 Shares Buybacks index performance has been compared to the overall S&P500 in recent weeks. Since the start of March 2020, S&P500 Shares Buybacks index average daily performance measured in y/y returns has been -15.04%, against the S&P500 index overall performance of -0.89%. Cumulatively, at the end of this week, S&P500 Shares Buybacks index total return is down 10.18 percent against S&P500 total return of -0.967 percent.

While in good times companies have strong incentives to redistribute their returns to shareholders either through dividends or through share price supports or both, during the bad times having spare cash on balancesheet in the form of retained earnings makes all the difference. Or, as any sane person knows, insurance is a cost during the times of the normal, but a salvation during the times of shocks.

18/3/20: What's Scarier? Corporate Finance or COVID?

Larger corporates in the U.S. are seeking public supports in the face of COVID19 pandemic, from airlines to banks, and the demand for public resources is likely to rise over time as the disease takes its toll on the economy.

Yet, one of the key problems faced by companies today is down to the long running strategies of creating financial supports for share prices that companies pursued over the good part of the last decade, including shares buybacks and payouts of dividends. These strategies have been demanded by the activist investors across numerous campaigns and by shareholders, and have been incentivized by the pay structures for the companies executives.

Artificial supports for share price valuations are financially dangerous in the long run, even though they generate higher shareholder value in the short run. The danger comes from:

1. Shares buybacks using companies cash to effectively inflate share prices, reduce free float of shares and lower the number of shareholders in the company, thereby reducing future space for issuance of new shares;
2. Shares buybacks have often been accompanied by companies borrowing at ultra-low interest rates to purchase own firm equity, reducing equity capital and increasing debt exposures;
3. Shares buybacks generate future expectations of more buybacks, even during the times of financial weaknesses;
4. Shares buybacks also reduce future firms' capacity to borrow by either increasing debt to equity ratio, increasing overall debt loads carried by the firm or both;
5. Payouts of dividends also use cash reserves the company can hold to offset any future risks to its financial wellbeing and to invest in organic growth and R&D;
6. Payouts of dividends create future expectations of higher dividends from investors, reducing firm's capacity to deploy its cash elsewhere;
7. Payouts of dividends increase cum dividend prise to earnings ratios, reducing the overall capacity of the firm to raise capital cheaply in the future.

These are just some of the factors that overall imply that shares buybacks and payouts of extraordinary (or financial unsustainable) dividends can be a dangerous approach to managing corporate finances. 

So here is the evidence on just how deeply destabilizing the scale of shares buybacks and dividends payouts has been within the S&P 500 sector:

In Q3 2019, shares buybacks and dividends yielded USD1,246.73 billion on a four-quarters trailing basis, fourth highest quarter on record. Overall market yield contributions from buybacks (3.12%) was higher than that from dividends (1.81%), with combined yield of 5.05%. In simple terms, any company operating today will have to allocate 5.05 percent of its return to simply match shares buybacks and dividend payouts yields. This is a very high fence to jump.

Put differently, what the above data shows is that just one, single quarter - Q3 2019 - has managed to absorb more resources in shares repurchases and dividend payouts than what the corporate America is currently asking in financial supports from Washington. 

What's scarier? Corporate finance or corona virus?.. 

6/9/19: Small Cap Stocks EPS: racing to the bottom of the MAGA barrel

Everything is going just plain swimmingly in the Land of MAGA, where American companies are now expected to do their duty by President Trump's agenda for investment in the U.S. because, you know, this:

As 'share' part of the EPS ratio has shrunk (thanks to buybacks and M&As tsunami of recent vintage), earnings per share should have gone up... and up... and up. Instead, small cap stocks' EPS has collapsed. To the lowest levels since the 2007-2008 crisis.

But never mind, more money printing by the Fed will surely cure it all.

Source for the above chart: @soberlook and WSJ.

7/7/19: Investment for growth is at record lows for S&P500

Interesting chart via @DavidSchawel showing changes over time in corporate (S&P500 companies) distribution of earnings:

In simple terms:

1. Much discussed shares buybacks are still the rage: running at 31% of all cash distributions, second highest level after 34% in 2007. On a cumulated basis, and taking into the account already reduced free float in S&P 500 over the years, this is a massive level of buybacks.
2. 'Investment for growth' - as defined - is at 51% - the lowest on record.
3. Meaningful investment for growth (often opportunistic M&As) is at 38%, tied for the lowest with 2007 figure.

S&P 500 firms are clearly not in investment mode. Despite 'Trump incentives' - under the TCJA 2017 tax cuts act - actual capex is running tied to the second lowest levels for 2018 and 2019, at 26% of all cash distributions.

4/3/19: S&P 500 Share Price Support Scams are a Raging Trend

Having posted a record-breaking USD939 billion of shares repurchases in 2018, Corporate America is on track to set a new record-wrecking year of buybacks in 2019. per latest data from JPM (via @zerohedge), January-February 2019 saw USD187 billion worth of shares repurchases in S&P 500 index constituent companies.

This is a notch higher than in 2018 and almost 90 percent above 2017 period.

24/2/19: Buybacks vs Capex

U.S. corporates spending or 'investing' over the last 10 years:

• CapEx ($6.4T), including often non-productive M&As
• Buybacks ($4.9T) and 
• Dividends ($3.4T) 

via @mbarna6

Just another reminder why productivity growth is not being aided by cheap credit.

3/10/18: Dumping Ice bags into Overheating Reactor: Bonds & Stocks Bubbles

Wading through the ever-excellent Yardeni Research notes of recent, I have stumbled on a handful of charts worth highlighting and a related blog post from my friends at the Global Macro Monitor that I want to share with you all.

Let's start with the stark warning regarding the U.S. Treasuries market from the Global Macro Monitor, accessible here: https://macromon.wordpress.com/2018/10/03/alea-iacta-est/.  To give you my sense from reading this, two quotes with my quick takes:

"Supply shortages, induced mainly by central bank quantitative easing have been a major factor driving asset markets, in our opinion.  Not all, but a big part." So forget the 'not all' and think about risks pairings in a complex financial system of today: equities and bonds are linked through demand for yield (gains) and demand for safety. If both are underpricing true risks (and bond markets are underpricing risks, as the quote implies), it takes one to scratch for the other to blow. Systems couplings get more fragile the tighter they become.

"The float of total U.S. equities has shrunk dramatically, in part, due to cheap financing to fund share buybacks.   The technical shortage of stocks have helped boost U.S. equity markets and killed off most bears and short sellers." In other words, as I have warned repeatedly for years now, U.S. equity markets are now dangerously concentrated (see this blog for posts involving concentration risks). This concentration is driven by three factors: M&As and shares buy-backs, plus declined IPOs activity. The former two are additional links to monetary policies and, thus to the bond markets (coupling is getting even tighter), the latter is structural decline in enterprise formation and acceleration rates (secular stagnation). This adds complexity to tight coupling of risk systems. Bad, very bad combination if you are running a nuclear power plant or a major dam, or any other system prone to catastrophic risk exposures.

How bad the things are?

Since 1Q 2009, total cumulative shares buy-backs for S&P500 amounted (through 2Q 2018) to USD 4.2769 trillion.

Now, those charts.

Chart 1, via Yardeni Research's "Stock Market Indicators: S&P 500 Buybacks & Dividends" book from October 3rd (https://www.yardeni.com/pub/buybackdiv.pdf)

What am I looking at here? The signals revealing flow of corporate earnings toward investment, or, the signs of the build up in the future economic capacity of the private sector. The red line in the lower panel puts this into proportional terms, the gap between the yellow line and the green line in the top panel puts it into absolute terms. And both are frightening. Corporate earnings are on a healthy trend and at healthy levels. But corporate investment is not and has not been since 1Q 2014. This chart under-reports the extent of corporate under-investment through two things not included in the red line: (1) M&As - high risk 'investment' strategies by corporates that, if adjusted for that risk, would have pushed the actual investment growth even lower than it is implied by the red line; and (2) Risk-adjustments to the organic investments by companies. In simple terms, there is no meaningful translation from higher earnings into new investment in the U.S. economy so far in 2018 and there has not been one since 2014. Put differently, U.S. economy has been starved of organic investment for a good part of the 'boom' years.

Chart 2, via the same note:

Spot something new in the charts? That's right: buybacks are accelerating in 1H 2018, with 2Q 2018 marking an absolute historical high at USD 1.0803 trillion (annualized rate) of buybacks. Guess what does this mean for the markets? Well, this:

And what causes the latest spike in buybacks? No, not growing earnings (which are appreciating, but moderately). The fiscal policy under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 2017, or Trump Tax Cuts.

Let's circle back: monetary policy madness of the past has been holding court in bond markets and stock markets, pushing mispricing of risks to absolutely astronomical highs. We have just added to that already risky equation fiscal policy push for more mispricing of risks in equity markets.

This is like dumping picnic-sized bags of ice into the cooling system to run the reactor hotter. And no one seems to care that the bags of ice are running low in the delivery truck... You can light a smoke and watch ice melt. Or you can run for the parking lot to drive away. As an investor, you always have a right choice to make. Until you no longer have any choices left.

13/9/18: Shares Buybacks Swallow much of Trump's Corporate Tax 'Reforms'

A recent post from the U.S. Fed looked at how companies with large holdings of cash abroad have used those funds following the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (the TCJA, or the Republican Tax Cuts), which incentivised the repatriation of foreign earnings stashed by the U.S. corporations abroad, including Ireland.

Per Fed note: "by the end of 2017, U.S. MNEs had accumulated approximately $1 trillion in cash abroad, held mostly in U.S. fixed-income securities", aka - bonds. Which, of course, also explains why Ireland is one of the largest domiciles for U.S. Treasuries.

The TCJA moved the U.S. "to a quasi-territorial tax system in which profits are taxed only where they are earned" so "...U.S. MNEs' foreign profits will therefore no longer be subject to U.S. taxes when repatriated. As a transition to this new tax system, the TCJA imposed a one-time tax (payable over eight years) on the existing stock of offshore holdings regardless of whether the funds are repatriated, thus eliminating the tax incentive to keep cash abroad."

As of Q1 2018, the U.S. firms "repatriated just over $300 billion, roughly 30% of the estimated stock of offshore cash holdings."

This "quantity of cash repatriated since the passage of the TCJA might have a notable effect on firm financing patterns and investment decisions in the near term". The Fed note argues "that funds repatriated in 2018:Q1 have been associated with a dramatic increase in share buybacks; evidence of an increase in investment is less clear at this stage, as it is likely too early to detect given that the effects may take time to materialize."

The top 15 U.S. firms (by cash holdings abroad) "account for roughly 80 percent of total offshore cash holdings, and roughly 80 percent of their total cash (domestic plus foreign) is held abroad... following the passage of the TCJA ...share buybacks spiked dramatically for the top 15 cash holders, with the ratio of buybacks to assets more than doubling in 2018:Q1. In dollar terms, buybacks increased from $23 billion in 2017:Q4 to $55 billion in 2018:Q1." Worse: "among the top 15 cash holders, the largest holders accounted for the bulk of the share repurchases: In 2018:Q1, the top 5 cash holders accounted for 66 percent, and the top holder alone accounted for 41 percent." Note: the top holder is... Apple.

Of course, "firms can also pay out cash to shareholders through dividends; however, unlike buybacks, dividends were little changed for the top 15 cash holders relative to the same period last year."

"...unlike in the case of share buybacks, there is no obvious spike in investment among the top 15 cash holders in 2018:Q1 relative to the previous quarter. Indeed, it appears that the top 15 cash holders have already been on a slight upward trajectory relative to other firms for a few years."

The repatriation "may also have been used to pay down debt; however, the aggregate debt of the top 15 cash holders declined only about $15 billion, or 2 percent of their total debt outstanding, suggesting limited paydowns so far."

Thus, in simple terms, and allowing some conditionality for lags in investment, the TCJA 2017 has primarily went to stimulate stock market activity, as opposed to either corporate deleveraging or corporate investment. This is consistent with 2004 repatriation amnesty, when the bulk of funds brought by the U.S. MNEs back to the U.S. went to fund shares repurchases in 2005.

It's back to the future folks.

Full note: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/us-corporations-repatriation-of-offshore-profits-20180904.htm.

2/8/18: Shares Buybacks: the Evil Symptoms of an Ever More Evil Disease

Yesterday, I have posted a quite unusual (for my normal arguments) defense of the shares buybacks. Normally, as the readers of this blog know, I see buybacks as a net negative to organic investment. However, that view needs to be anchored to the economic conditions prevailing on the ground. In other words, buybacks are net negative for investment and organic economic growth, unless buybacks are companies' rational responses to specific economic and policy conditions.

With this in mind, here are my thoughts on the subject of buybacks that have accelerated in recent years:

The proposition that shares buybacks are ‘starving’ (aka slowing) the economy is false. And it is false for a number of reasons, listed below:

Reason 1: Stock buybacks can ONLY slow down economic growth in the conditions when new investment by firms can generate higher economic value added than other uses of funds in the economy (e.g. investment by other agents, than the firm, or increasing aggregate demand by investors recycling gains from buybacks into general consumption, etc). Currently, this does not appear to be the case. In fact, firms are hesitant to invest in the economy even when we control for buybacks. Thus, buybacks are similar to dividends: payouts of dividends and higher buybacks rates may signal lack of profitable investment opportunities for the firms.

Reason 2: Stock buybacks can slow down economic growth if they increase cost of capital for the firms. With equity capital (shares) being made superficially more expensive than debt (QE, tax preferences, demographic shifts in clientele reasons, etc), this is not the case. equity capital is currently more expensive than debt as a funding source for new investment for listed companies. While this situation may reverse in time (which it did only on very rare occasions in the past), companies today can borrow cheaply to retire expensive equity. This might not make sense from the economy point of view (rising degree of financial leverage, increasing risk of destabilising increases in debt carry costs, etc), it might make sense from the company and management point of view.

Reason 3: Stock buybacks can harm economic growth if they reduce returns on productivity (theory of labour productivity being unrewarded via slow wages growth). This too is not the case, because labour productivity and TFP have been collapsing since prior to the increases in shares buybacks. I wrote enough about this on this blog before in the context of the twin secular stagnations theses.

So what does the story of skyrocketing shares buybacks really tell us? The reality, consistent with Reasons 1-3 above, is that stock buybacks are a SYMPTOM of the disease, not the disease itself. Shares buybacks are driven by secular stagnation: more specifically, primarily by supply-side secular stagnation (S-SSS), and are second-order related to demand-side secular stagnation (D-SSS). How?

S-SSS implies lack of profitable investment opportunities for short and medium-term investments by the firms. With falling TFP & labour productivity, and with demographically-induced slowdown in demand, this is patently so. S-SSS also implies the need for protracted QE and other distortions in capital funding costs that disincentivise equity capital relative to debt funding channels.

D-SSS implies that with demographic, structural shifts in economic activity across generations, etc, aggregate demand side of the economy is getting pressured. Which means, again, 2nd order effects, adverse pressure on supply side.

So shares buybacks are NOT a disaster, nor a disease. The disease is the structure of the economy, with
- Technological & human capital productivity and innovation stalling,
- Adverse demographics undermining future economic capacity,
- Infrastructure investments yielding lower potential growth uplifts,
- Policies (monetary & fiscal) stuck in the 20th century extremes,
- Increasing concentration, monopolisation & oligopolization of the economy and the markets resulting in reduced entrepreneurial activity.

Shares buybacks & resulting wealth inequality or concentration are not orthogonal sets to the political & policy mismanagement that marks the last 25 years of our (Western) history. They are DIRECT outcome of these.

So, go ahead, political punks. Make the markets day. Shut down shares buybacks, so you can keep gerrymandering the economy, manipulating the markets, & bend the society to your desired ends. The longer you do this, the more you do this, the tighter is the lid on the pressure cooker. The more spectacular the blowout to follow.

8/1/17: Corporate Cash: Organic Capex Still Sluggish

In 2016, based on data from Goldman Sachs, 26 percent of aggregate S&P500 company cash went to fund shares buybacks, matching 2013 ratio of buyback to cash for the highest in 9 years. At the same time, Dividends rose to 19 percent of cash compared to 18 percent in 2015, and M&As contracted to 14 percent of cash from 18 percent in 2015.

As the result, CAPEX and R&D spending by S&P500 companies managed to rise to 41 percent of cash in 2016 from 40 percent in 2015, making this the third (after 2015) lowest CAPEX & R&D spend year (as a share of total cash) since 1999.

CAPEX & R&D represent organic investments by the firms and are jobs additive. M&As and Buybacks are forms of financial allocations and are not supportive of jobs creation. In 2016, based on the data, the split between financial and organic investment was 40:41, which is slightly better than in 2015 (42:40), but still represents the fourth worst year on record (since 1999).

Charts below illustrate:

Controlling for volatility, on trend, share of cash diverted to organic investment continues to trend down and is forecast to fall below 40 percent in 2017. Meanwhile, share of cash going to financial allocations is trending up and is forecast to reach 43 percent of total cash in 2017.

And, financial markets are once again starting to reward buybacks relative to organic growth:

All in, the trends suggest that CAPEX improvements are unlikely to materialise any time soon and the secular decline in investment, consistent with supply and demand sides of secular stagnation thesis is here to stay. Which is bad news for the  S&P500 constituents - lack of organic investment spells lack of value added growth and market potential in the long run. Glut of M&As and Buybacks spells rising risks from misallocation of cash (M&As) and superficial priming up of equity valuations (buybacks-sustained asset bubble). Neither are good.

19/12/16: Why Investment-less Growth: Explaining Secular Stagnation in Investment

One key component of the supply side secular stagnation is the notion that in recent years, corporate investment in the U.S. and other advanced economies have declined on a secular trend (or structurally). With low investment, there is low productivity growth and weak wages growth. The end result is not only lower economic growth, but also declining long term potential growth.

Since the thesis of supply side secular stagnation started making rounds in the economic policy literature, quite a few economists jumped into the debate proposing various explanations to the phenomena. To-date, however, there have not been an empirical study that looked at all reasonably plausible explanations on offer to assess which can account for the decline in capital investment.

German Gutierrez Gallardo and Thomas Philippon, in there paper “Investment-Less Growth: An Empirical Investigation” published this month by NBER do exactly that. The authors “analyze private fixed investment in the U.S. over the past 30 years.”

First, the authors establish that indeed, “investment is weak relative to measures of [firm] profitability and valuation – particularly Tobin’s Q, and that this weakness starts in the early 2000’s.” In other words, whilst firms remain profitable, they simply do not reinvest their profits at the same rate today as in the 1990s.

Per authors, there are “two broad categories of explanations: theories that predict low investment because of low Q, and theories that predict low investment despite high Q.”

As a reminder, Tobin’s Q is a ratio of total market value of the firm to total asset value of asset held by the firm. In simple terms, higher Q means that market value of the firm is higher relative to the cost of replacing the capital and other assets owned by the firm. Thus, a Q between 0 and 1 means that the cost to replace a firm's assets is greater than the value of its stock, so the stock is considered to be undervalued. A Q greater than 1 in contrast implies that a firm's stock is more expensive than the replacement cost of its assets, so the stock is overvalued.

So under the fist argument, if we observe low Q, firms are undervalued by the market and have no incentive to invest as they cannot raise capital for such investment from the markets that perceive the firm’s asset value to be already high (or above the firm value established in the market).

Under the second argument, something other than market valuations drives firm decision to invest or not. What that ‘something other’ is is a matter of various theories.

1. Some theories postulate that in the presence of financial market imperfections (high costs, low liquidity supply, high risk premiums etc), low investments prevail even when Q is high (market value of the firm >> total assets value). 
2. Other theories, including the one that is currently most favoured as an explanation for dramatic decline in productivity growth in recent years (over the alternative explanation of the ‘secular stagnation’ thesis), the problem is that even with high Q, there might be low investment because there is mis-measurement in the markets as to the value of total assets of the firm. This can happen when there are intangible (hard to value) assets held by the firm, or when assets are dispersed across different currencies, markets and geographic, making them hard to value. It is worth noting that the argument of intangibles is commonly used today to argue that there is no real secular stagnation or decline in productivity growth because “things are simply not measured properly anymore”.
3. Another view is that decreased competition (either due to technology - e.g. mega aggregators platforms such as google and apple, or due to regulation, or due to trade wars raging on, or broader trend of regionalisation of trade, etc) can reduce investment even in the times of higher Q (high market valuations).
4. Finally, there is always a view that firms might under-invest because of short-termism in management strategies or due to restrictive investment climate induced by tighter risk governance (the latter point may overlap with regulatory constraints).

The authors find no support for the first argument. In other words, they find that low Q is not causing low investment. No surprise here, as markets are hardly in the mood of attaching low value to firms. In fact, we have been going through a massive uplift in M&As and equity valuations.

Which means that low investment is happening despite high market valuations - we are in the second set of arguments.

The authors “do not find support for theories based on risk premia, financial constraints, or safe asset scarcity”. They also find “only weak support for regulatory constraints.”

“Globalization and intangibles explain some of the trends at the industry level, but their explanatory power is quantitatively limited,” and does not provide support for aggregate - across economy - explanation of low investment.

So here comes the kicker: “we find fairly strong support for the competition and short-termism/governance hypotheses. Industries with less entry and more concentration invest less, even after controlling for current market conditions. Within each industry-year, the investment gap is driven by firms that are owned by quasi-indexers and located in industries with less entry/more concentration. These firms spend a disproportionate amount of free cash flows buying back their shares.”

Let’s sum this up: short-termism is a problem that holds firms from investing more, and it is more pronounced in industries with less competition. Firms which are owned by investors or funds that focus on indexing (pursue investment returns in line with broader indices, e.g. benchmarking to S&P500) invest less. The investment part of secular stagnation thesis, therefore, is linked at least indirectly to financialization of the economies: the greater is the weight of broad markets in investor decision-making, the lower the investment and the shorter is the time horizon, it appears.



Full paper: Gutierrez Gallardo, German and Philippon, Thomas, Investment-Less Growth: An Empirical Investigation (December 2016). NBER Working Paper No. w22897. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2880335

15/5/16: Gamable EPS and Shares Buybacks

EPS (Earnings per Share) is a corporate metric that is often pursued by the corporate managers and executives to increase their own payouts, and confused by investors for a signal of company health. As is well known (and we show this in our Risk & Resilience course), EPS is a 'gamable' metric - in other words, it can be easily manipulated by companies often at the expense of actual balance sheet quality.

And I have written about this problem here on the blog for ages now.

So here is a fresh chart from the Deutsche Bank Research (via @bySamRo) detailing shares buybacks (repurchases) contribution to EPS growth:

In basic terms, there is no organic EPS growth (from net income) over the last 7 quarters on average and there is negative EPS growth from organic sources over the last 4 consecutive quarters.

As noted in my lecture on the subject of 'EPS gaming', there are some market-structure reasons for this development (basically, rise of tech-based services in the economy):

Source of data: McKinsey

Source: McKinsey

However, as the chart above shows, shares buybacks simply do not add any value to the total returns to the shareholders (TRS) and that is before we consider shift in current buybacks trends toward debt funded repurchases. So, in a sense, current buybacks are rising leverage risks without increasing TRS. Which is brutally ugly for companies' balance sheets and, given debt covenants, is also bad news for future capex funding capacity.

15/4/16: Corporate Finance, S&P500 and Bubble Trouble...

Classical corporate finance tells us that companies should be valued on their earnings with past earnings being indicative of future earnings (predictive component). Which is tosh. In today's world that is.

Q4 2016 saw highest payouts to shareholders (combined cash dividends and share repurchases) in over 10 years (couple of slides from my course presentation):

And yet... yet... earnings have hit the brick wall back in Q3 2014 and have been trending down ever since:

You really can't call S&P500 anything but a sail-in-the-Fed-wind. There are no fundamentals sustaining it above 1600-1650 range. At least, not corporate fundamentals.

Unless, of course, one expects the recent extraordinary payout performance to remain indefinitely present in the future. Which only a sell-side analyst or a lunatic can...

7/12/15: Another "Nothing to See Here" Chart for M&As

I have written over the recent months about the over-heating present in the global (and especially N. American) M&A markets (see posts here,  here and here) so it is only reasonable from continuity perspective to post some more data on the subject. Here it is :

Source: @Jim_Edwards

Looking at the volumes of M&A deals since around the start of 2Q 2014 through today, one cannot escape a simple conclusion: absent organic growth in revenues, and with shares buy-backs now being discounted in the markets (belatedly awakening to the reality of unsustainable valuations in the equity markets), current levels of M&A (over at least 18-21 months period) are simply, certifiably, clearly bonkers.

11/11/15: Take a Buyback Pill: U.S. Corporates Shy Away from Capex

As buy-backs of shares inch down as the drivers of U.S. stocks valuations (chart below), things are not going much smoother for the hopes of a capex cycle restart in the U.S. corporate sector.

As the following chart from Goldman Sachs research shows, 2015 has been shaping up as yet another year of decline in investment pipeline for U.S. companies. Capex and R&D investment share of aggregate cash holdings by S&P 500 companies is expected to hit 41% this year, down from 47% in 2014 and 2013 and marking the lowest reading since 2007. Worse, Goldman expects 2016 figure to be even lower at 40%.

Goldman figures relating to ‘Investment for Growth’ indicator include M&As, which in my opinion should not be considered in this context, as success rate of M&As is extremely low (historically at around 30%) and current M&A valuations are frankly bonkers. 

H/T to @prchovanec

Take a look at stripped out mix of real investment against buybacks in ratio terms, per Goldman’s reported data:

As shown above, relative weight of shares buybacks in terms of cash allocations by U.S. carpets has been on the rising trend now in comparison to Capes & R&D spending since 2009 and it has been flat since 2010 on for the ratio of buybacks to dividends. In fact, combined weight of M&As and buybacks ratio to Capex & R&D is now at 0.98, the highest since 2007.

In simple terms, there is little indication in the Goldman (and other) numbers of any restart of Capex cycle and all indication, major U.S. corporates are living in a world of surplus liquidity and shortages of investable strategies and opportunities.