26/9/20: America's Scariest Charts: Continued Unemployment Claims

 

Updating my charts for the continued unemployment claims:

The latest data is covering the period through September 12, 2020.

• On a non-seasonally-adjusted basis, there were 13,355,586 Americans with continued unemployment claims in the week of September 12, 2020, an increase of 212,869 on the week prior, but 9,438,559 down on the COVID19 peak reached in the week of May 9, 2020. At the lowest point in pre-COVID expansion period, weekly continued claims stood at 1,350,834. 
• In the last 4 weeks through September 12, 2020, average decline in continued unemployment claims was 461,476. At this rate of decline, it will take the U.S. economy 26-27 weeks to recover its pre-COVID19 lows in terms of continued unemployment.
• Current level of continued unemployment claims implies 9.14% unemployment rate.

Per charts above - covering seasonally-adjusted data that has been subject significant methodological revisions starting with September 2020:

• It would take thee U.S. economy 33 weeks from September 12, 2020 to complete full recovery to pre-COVID19 levels of continued unemployment claims
• In seasonally-adjusted terms, unlike in terms of raw data discussed above, September 12, 2020 continued unemployment claims stood at 12,580,000 down 167,000 on week prior. 

I will be covering new or initial unemployment claims in the net post, so stay tuned. 

23/8/20: America's Scariest Charts: Continued Unemployment Claims

 

Having updated non-farm employment data (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2020/08/23820-americas-scariest-charts.html), let's take a look at continued unemployment claims, as reported through the first week of August.

A chart to start with:

Continued unemployment claims are still falling.

• The weekly rate of declines is improving. Most current week on week decline is 636,000, an improvement on prior week/week decline of 610,000. $ weeks average weekly rate of decline is 326,750. 
• Latest continued unemployment claims are at 14,844,000 which is down from the COVID19 peak of 24,912,000 set in the week of May 9, 2020. 
• We have registered reductions in continued claims in 11 out of the 13 weeks since the peak claims.

Here is the chart comparing historical records of recovery in continued claims to the current crisis perid:

And the same on the log scale

Comparing current continued claims to pre-recession period claims:

• Current levels of claims are 8,687,000 higher than pre-recession period high, 13,195,000 above the pre-recession trough and 13,142,000 above the claims registered in the last  month before the onset of the recession.

The key takeaways from this are: 

1. What matters from now on is not so much the level of the recession peak, but the rate or the speed of the recovery toward pre-recession 'normal'. So far, the rate of recovery has been fast. If sustained, we might be able to avoid much of the damage that arises from long-term unemployment duration. 
2. The rate of benefits expirations will also matter a lot. We are looking at eligibility for unemployment dropping with weeks ahead, and the supplemental payment to unemployment insurance also falling off. As the two effect bite, the impact on the overall economy from reduced unemployment support schemes can be pronounced, triggering renewed recessionary risk. 

Stay tuned for the analysis of the first time unemployment claims figures next.

23/8/20: America's Scariest Charts: Employment

 

Good news, folks, just in time for the Republican National Convention. The latest data, through July 2020, shows some recovery in non-farm payrolls numbers that is bound to make a feature in political chest-beating coming up next week.

Behold the chart:

In basic terms:

• July non-farm payrolls stood at 139,582,000, up 1.291% on June, and up 9,279,000 on the COVID19 pandemic trough (April 2020). 
• Average monthly rate of jobs recovery has been so far 3,093,000 through July. Which is worse than 3,749,500 average rate of recovery recorded through June. In other words, we are potentially seeing a slowdown in jobs recoveries.
• At current average monthly rate of recovery, it will take us just over 4 months to regain jobs lost to COVID19 pandemic, assuming no further slowdown in the rate of recovery (a strong assumption).
• Currently, non-farm payrolls sit 12,881,000 below their pre-COVID19 peak employment levels, attained in February 2020.

Some of these are good news. Assuming the recovery dynamics remain unchallenged by:

1. Natural rate of moderation in jobs recoveries
2. Renewed pressures of COVID19 (see the latest on this here:https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2020/08/23820-covid19-update-us-vs-eu27.html), or a second wave of the pandemic
3. The ravages of political uncertainty surrounding November 3 elections (not only Presidential).

One side note: the above comparatives are current-to-past. These, of course, do not take into the account where the U.S. employment figures would have been, absent COVID19 pandemic crisis. Whilst estimating potential employment levels is a hazardous exercise, taking a simple exponential trend (decaying over time) from August 2018 through the latest reported period implies potential July employment level ex-COVID19 of 153,267,800. Which is not that much of a gap to the pre-crisis peak. 

Another side note: if we assume that the rate of decay in jobs additions that prevailed between June and July 2020 (-17% decay) continues into the future (also a strong assumption), jobs recovery to the pre-crisis peak will take us through May 2021. For the pre-pandemic trend case, the recovery will take us into March 2022.

More data analysis of the U.S. labor markets is coming up in subsequent posts, stat tuned. 

25/720: Updated: America's Scariest Charts: Unemployment Claims

Updating my Scariest Charts for the latest data, through thee week of July 18, 2020:

First, a summary table and chart for changes in the Initial Unemployment Claims:

Next: Continued Unemployment Claims through the week of July 11, 2020:

Key takeaways this week:

Continued unemployment claims changes:

• Latest count at 16,197,000, down from 17,304,000 a week ago - a decline driven by both, re-gained jobs and exits from unemployment benefits;
• Latest week w/w decline is faster than in any of the prior weeks of the current recession;
• Latest counts are 14,495,000 above the levels recorded in the first week of the current recession and are 14,548,000 above pre-recession trough;
• At last week's rate of decline, we have 13 weeks of unemployment claims to work through before recovering to pre-recession levels; based on the last 4 weeks average - 19 weeks.

New unemployment claims changes:

• Latest new unemployment claims filed figures are the lowest in the current recession cycle, but materially close to those recorded in the week of July 4, 2020;
• Nonetheless, we are now in 18 weeks of continued new unemployment claims filings in excess of 1 million per week.

Longer term view:

• Discontinuation of emergency $600/week unemployment support payment or curtailing of the benefit is likely to push both of the above series down in the short run in mid- to late-August, with a knock-on longer term effect of increasing longer term unemployment claims in September and onward. 

16/720: Updated: America's Scariest Charts: Unemployment Claims

New data for the week prior on continued and new unemployment claims continues to support a view of a relatively slow and slowing-down recovery in the U.S. labour markets.

Continued unemployment claims:

Continued unemployment claims in the week of July 4 amounted to 17,338,000 down 422,000 on prior week. A week before, the rate of decline was 1,000,000, and in 4 weeks prior to the the week of July 4, 2020, average weekly rate of decline was 711,500. Current 4 weeks average rate of decline is 737,750 driven by two weeks of > 1 million declines. The good news is that we now have 8 consecutive weeks of drops in continued unemployment claims. The bad news is that we do not know how much of the decline from the COVID19 pandemic peak is down to benefits expirations, or due to benefits cancelations due to some income being earned, with restored income being below pre-COVID19 levels. In other words, we have no clue as to whether jobs being restored are of comparable quality to jobs lost.

Next, Initial Unemployment Claims: these remain troubling too. In the week of July 11, 2020, there were 1,503,892 new initial unemployment claims filed, the highest number in 5 weeks.

As the table above highlights, we now have more than 17 weeks of new unemployment claims filings in excess of 1 million. Note: new unemployment claims filings can reflect many factors, including:

1. A person becoming newly unemployed;
2. A person who was unemployed and temporarily left unemployment insurance coverage due to receipt of irregular earnings;
3. A person who was unemployed, and run out of benefits coverage, taking a temporary job, but re-listing as an unemployed at that job expiration; 
4. A person who was unemployed before but did not secure past unemployment benefits; and
5. A person who was unemployed but was denied prior benefits due to various reasons.

Here is the history of the Initial Unemployment Claims, smoothed out to a 3mo moving sum:

An updated employment outlook for July 2020:

10/7/20: America's Scariest Charts Updated

Updating my series of 'America's Scariest Charts' for the latest data releases this week.

First: continued unemployment claims for data through the week of June 27th.

Continued unemployment claims fell from 18,760,000 in the week of June 20 to 18,062,000 in the week of June 27. Continued claims are now down 6,850,000 from their pandemic-period peak, which implies a decline of 978,571 per week since the peak. Based on the last two weeks' average weekly decline, it will take around 28 weeks to return continued unemployment claims to the pre-COVID19 levels.

Now, putting current crisis into historical perspective, the following chart uses log scale to show COVID19 recession experience in relation to all past recessions:

Next, new unemployment claims for the week of July 4, 2020. New claims in that week stood at 1,399,699, down slightly on the new claims in the eek prior at 1,431,343. Table below provides a summary:

Updated non-farm payrolls forecast for July 2020, based on June data for payrolls and the first data for July on changes in unemployment claims:

Average duration of unemployment is still completely swamped by the force and speed of the COVID19 onset, but is rising toward recession-consistent above-average territory:

3/7/20: Labor Market COVID19ed

I have been running a regular update on my 'America's Scariest Charts' covering labor markets developments (see most recent one here: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2020/07/2720-americas-scariest-charts-updated.html). These charts rely heavily on two data sets: Non-Farm Payrolls data (monthly frequency), and initial unemployment claims (weekly frequency). I ignored for now two other data series:

1. Average duration of unemployment: this is, of course, rising, but from low levels, as the COVID19 crisis is still relatively young; and
2. Continued unemployment insurance claims: these data have been also proximate to the initial unemployment claims through the period of February-May.

Now, with two months of some jobs recovery, it is worth looking at (2) above. So here they are: continued unemployment claims charts:

Let us start with history:

There is no scaling in the above chart, just the numbers of people claiming unemployment insurance on continued basis. Which is telling: in recessions, these rise; in recoveries they fall. You can see that the lowest unemployment claims tend to happen some months before the onset of the subsequent recession. And recoveries take long. Of course, in the 1970s, there were fewer people in the labour force and, therefore, the absolute numbers of the unemployed were also lower.

Which means, it is worth rescaling each episode of rising and falling unemployment claims to the pre-recession levels ('norm') and to the recession peaks, taking into the account how long does it take unemployment claims accumulated during the recession to drop back to the levels of pre-recession claims.

So, methodology. I define 'normal' unemployment claims level as being the lowest level attained in the 12 weeks preceding each recession. This is set as an index of 100 for every recession. We look at the period of 6 weeks prior to the onset of the recession to identify the starting level of recession in terms of unemployment levels (these are weeks -6 through 1 on the X-axis). We then look at subsequent weeks (non-negative values on the X-axis) and plot index of unemployment claims (current unemployment claims normalized to the 'normal' level) through the recession and into the recovery, mapping these until one of the two events occurs:

1. Either the index returns back to 100 - meaning unemployment claims finally are restored to the level of the pre-recession levels or the 'normal'; or
2. In cases where this does not happen, until the onset of the next recession.

First, let us do this for all recessions since 1967 (when the data starts) through the end of 2019 - ignoring for now the COVID19 period.

Lots of interesting stuff in the above.

• 2008-2009 Great Recession was long - longer than any other recession - in terms of labor markets recovery to 'normal' levels of unemployment claims. It was also sharp - second sharpest on record - in terms of the mass of unemployment claims at the peak of the recession. 
• Legacy of the 1990-1991 recession was also painfully long, but shallower on the impact side (peak levels of unemployment claims). 
• Epic 1973-1975 recession was horrific: it had a long lasting impact on unemployment claims and, in fact, it never got the point of returning unemployment claims levels back to the pre-recession 'normal'. 
• We normally think of the 2001 recession as being 'technical' - caused just by the gyrations in the stock markets, aka the dot.com bubble burst. But in reality it too was pretty long in terms of its impact on the unemployed and it was pretty sharp as well.

And so on... but now, time to bring in the COVID19 pandemic. Let us start by just plotting it with the rest of the data. Boom!

The COVID19 pandemic made so many people claim unemployment insurance - on continued basis, not just one-off first time claims that anyone can file - that you can no longer meaningfully consider the rest of the recessions in comparison. In data analysis, we say that COVID19 pandemic is an influential outlier - it distorts our analysis of all other recessions. In this case, it is useful to use logarithmic scale to visualize the data. So here it is:

 

Even with log-transform, as above, the COVID19 crisis is off-the charts! No one has ever seen anything like this. Which we know.

The recovery from the pandemic has been sharp as well (steeper slope than in other recessions), but both charts above highlight the fact that whilst the U.S. economy is restoring some jobs during May-June re-opening period, the process of restoring these jobs is slow. Unlike what you hear from the White House and the Republican Party and its media, we are not in a 'tremendous recovery' and there is no 'roaring growth'. There is a mountain of pain that is being chipped away. At a current rate of 'chipping away', it can take the jobs markets some 10 months to come back to the pre-COVID19 'normal'. But that assumes that there will be no permanent or long-term jobs losses from the pandemic and the aftermath of the pandemic. It also assumes that the second wave of COVID19 infections that the U.S. is currently experiencing is not going to lead to such losses of jobs, and will not result in return to April-May levels of restrictions, and will not trigger a third wave of pandemic in Autumn. All three 'ands' must hold to get to that 10 months recovery. 

Stay tuned, I will be updating this chart as we go.

2/7/20: America's Scariest Charts Updated

Some updates from the US Labour Markets to our America's Scariest Charts series today.

First, headline official Non-Farm Payrolls data for the month of June 2020 is out today. Here is the visual:

Total Non-Farm Payrolls dropped during the COVID19 pandemic to the crisis-period low of 130,303,000 in April 2020. This marks a drop of 22,160,000 on pre-crisis high - a decline of 14.53%, the sharpest drop on record for any recession. Since then, the payrolls improved in May and again in June. Payrolls rose 2,699,000 in May and by 4,800,000 in June, prompting the White House (and the army of its trolls) to herald an 'unprecedented' 'tremendous' recovery. However:

• Despite these gains, current employment levels remain 14,661,000 below pre-COVID19 highs.  
• Relative to the pre-COVID19 trend, current payrolls are 15,398,000 below where they would have been were the pre-crisis trends to remain place. 

Hardly 'tremendous' success so far.

Summary of comparatives of the current recession to prior recessions:

Now, next in the set of our America's Scariest Charts: initial unemployment claims 9also released today). The table above already shows the latest print for these series - for the week ending June 27, 2020, at 1,445,481 new claims filed. This was virtually unchanged on the revised final estimate for the week ending June 20, 2020 that came in at 1,460,056. New claims have basically stabilized from the week of May 30th through latest. 

The six-months moving sum of all initial unemployment claims filings is now at a massive 47.477,907. This number, of course, are reflective of claims filed. And it does not reflect expired claims or people moving from unemployment to employment. Hence, it is useful in only highlighting the relative magnitude of the current jobs crisis controlling for duration.

Prior to the COVID19 pandemic, there has been only one instance of initial unemployment claims exceeding 1 million count in any given week - during the week of January 9, 1982, when there were 1,073,500 new claims filed. Which means that last week's print - although well below peak COVID19 filings - still stands almost 35% above the worst weekly unemployment claims filing in pre-COVID19 history. 

So here is the overall 'recovery' to-date:

You can call it 'magnificent' or 'tremendous' or you can call it 'ugly'. I guess your perspective will depend on your party affiliations and the membership in the 1% vs 99% clubs.

16/12/16: The Root of the 2007-2010 Crises is Back, with a Vengeance

There are several fundamental problem in the global economy, legacies of the past 20 years - from the mid 1990s on - that continue to drive the trend toward secular stagnations (see explainer here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2015/07/7615-secular-stagnation-double-threat.html).

One key structural problem is that of excessive reliance on credit (or debt) to drive growth. We have seen the devastating effects of the rapidly rising unsustainable levels of the real economic debt (debt that combines government obligations, non-financial corporate debt and household debt) in the case of 2008 crises.

And we were supposed to have learned the lesson. Supposed to have, because the entire conversation about structural reforms in banking and capital markets worldwide was framed in the context of deleveraging (reduction of debt levels). This has been the leitmotif of structural policies reforms in Europe, the U.S., in Australia and in China, and elsewhere, including at the level of the EU and the IMF. Supposed to have, because we did not that lesson. Instead of deleveraging, we got re-leveraging of economies - companies, households and governments.

Problem Case Study: U.S. Corporates

Take the U.S. corporate bonds market (that excludes direct loans through private lenders and intermediated loans through banks) - an USD8 trillion-sized elephant. Based on the latest research of the U.S. Treasury Department, non-banking institutions - plain vanilla investment funds, pension funds, mom-and-pop insurance companies, etc are now holding a full 1/4 of U.S. corporates bonds. According to the U.S. Treasury, these expanding holdings of / risk exposures to corporate debt are now "a top threat to stability" of the U.S. financial system. And the warning comes at the time when U.S. corporate debt is at an all-time high as a share of GDP, based on the figures from the Office of Financial Research.

And it gets worse. Since 2007, corporate debt pile in the U.S. rose some 75 percent to USD8.4 trillion, based on data from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association - which is more than USD8 trillion estimated by the Treasury. These are long-term debt instruments. Short term debt obligations - money market instruments - add another USD 2.9 trillion and factoring in the rise of the value of the dollar since the Fed meeting this week, closer to USD3 trillion. So the total U.S. corporate debt pile currently stands at around USD 11.3 trillion to USD 11.4 trillion.

Take two:

1. Debt, after the epic deleveraging of the 2008 crisis, is now at an all-time high; and
2. Debt held by systemic retail investment institutions (insurance companies, pensions funds, retail investment funds) is at all time high.

And the risks in this market are rising. Since the election of Donald Trump, global debt markets lost some USD2.3 trillion worth of value. This reaction was driven by the expectation that his economic policies, especially his promise of a large scale infrastructure investment stimulus, will trigger inflationary pressures in the U.S. economy that is already running at full growth capacity (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/12/151216-us-economic-policies-in-era-of.html). Further monetary policy tightening in the U.S. - as signalled by the Fed this week (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/12/151216-long-term-fed-path-may-force-ecb.html) will take these valuations down even further.

Some estimates (see https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-16/republican-tax-reform-seen-shrinking-u-s-corporate-bond-market) suggest that the Republican party corporate tax reforms (that might remove interest rate tax deductibility for companies) can trigger a 30 percent drop in investment grade bonds valuations in the U.S. - bonds amounting to just under USD 4.9 trillion. The impact would be even more pronounced on other bonds values. Even making the estimate less dramatic and expecting a 25 percent drop across the entire debt market would wipe out some USD 2.85 trillion off the balancesheets of the bonds-holding investors.

As yields rise, and bond prices drop, the aforementioned systemic retail investment institutions will be nursing massive losses on their investment books. If the rush to sell their bond holdings, they will crash the entire market, triggering potentially a worse financial meltdown than the one witnessed in 2008. If they sit on their holdings, they will be pressed to raise capital and their redemptions will be stressed. It's either a rock or a hard place.


Problem Extrapolation: the World

The glut of U.S. corporate debt, however, is just the tip of an iceberg.

As noted in this IMF paper, published on December 15th, corporate leverage (debt) has been on a steady march upward in the emerging markets (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16243.pdf).

And in its Fiscal Monitor for October 2016, the Fund notes that "At 225 percent of world GDP, the global debt of the nonfinancial sector—comprising the general government, households, and nonfinancial firms—is currently at an all-time high. Two-thirds, amounting to about $100 trillion, consists of liabilities of the private sector which, as documented in an extensive literature, can carry great risks when they reach excessive levels." (see http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2016/02/pdf/fm1602.pdf)

Yes, global real economic debt now stands at around USD152 trillion or 225 percent of world GDP.

Excluding China and the U.S. global debt levels as percentage of GDP are close to 2009 all time peak. Much of the post-Crisis re-leveraging took place on Government's balancehseets, as illustrated below, but the most ominous side of the debt growth equation is that private sector world-wide did not sustain any deleveraging between 2008 and 2015. In fact, Advanced Economies Government debt take up fully replaced private sector debt growth rates contraction. Worse happened in the Emerging Markets:

So all the fabled deleveraging in the economies in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis has been banks-balancesheets deleveraging - Western banks dumping liabilities to be picked up by someone else (vulture funds, investors, other banks, the aforementioned systemic retail investment institutions, etc).

And as IMF analysis shows, only 12 advanced economies have posted declines in total non-financial private debt (real economic debt) as a share of GDP over 2008-2015 period.  Alas, in the majority of these, gains in private deleveraging have been more than fully offset by deterioration in government debt:

Crucially, especially for those still believing the austerity-by-cuts narrative presented in popular media, fiscal uplift in debt levels in the Advanced Economies did not take place due to banks-rescues alone. Primary fiscal deficits did most of the debt lifting:

In simple terms, across the advanced economies, there was no spending austerity. There was tax austerity. And on the effectiveness of the latter compared to the former you can read this note: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/12/10122016-austerity-three-wrongs-meet.html. Spoiler alert: tax-based austerity is a worse disaster than spending-based austerity.

In summary, thus, years of monetarist activism spurring a massive rise in corporate debt, coupled with the utter inability of the states to cut back on public spending and the depth of the Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recession have combined to propel global debt levels past the pre-crisis peak to a new historical high.

The core root of the 2007-2010 crises is back. With a vengeance.

7/12/15: A new study on psychology of crisis response & the role of the media

This is a new study developed by an excellent young Irish psychologist - Seamus Power - at the University of Chicago. 

All Irish people, over the age of 18, are eligible to take part in this survey and all walks of life, ages, demographics etc are really needed. The survey should take under 15 minutes to complete.

Seamus is interested in your responses to a range of questions and your reactions to a randomly assigned media article covering the topics relating to policy responses to the recent crisis.

I can't really stress enough how important this topic is for Ireland and for social sciences, so please, take a few minutes to complete it. We need data-based evidence and Seamus will be sharing his findings with all of us.

Study link here: http://ssd.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bKESEHr6IXjkXGt .

12/1/2015: Euro Area vs US Banks and Monetary Policy: The Weakest Link

Cukierman, Alex, "Euro-Area and US Banks Behavior, and ECB-Fed Monetary Policies During the Global Financial Crisis: A Comparison" (December 2014, CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10289: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2535426) compared "…the behavior of Euro-Area (EA) banks' credit and reserves with those of US banks following respective major crisis triggers (Lehman's collapse in the US and the 2009 [Greek crisis])".

The paper shows that, "although the behavior of banks' credit following those widely observed crisis triggers is similar in the EA and in the US, the behavior of their reserves is quite different":

• "US banks' reserves have been on an uninterrupted upward trend since Lehman's collapse"
• EA banks reserves "fluctuated markedly in both directions". 

Per authors, "the source, this is due to differences in the liquidity injections procedures between the Eurosystem and the Fed. Those different procedures are traced, in turn, to differences in the relative importance of banking credit within the total amount of credit intermediated through banks and bond issues in the EA and the US as well as to the higher institutional aversion of the ECB to inflation relatively to that of the Fed."

Couple of charts to illustrate.

As the charts above illustrate, US banking system much more robustly links deposits and credit issuance than the European system. In plain terms, traditional banking (despite all the securitisation innovations of the past) is much better represented in the US than in Europe.

So much for the European meme of the century:

1. The EA banking system was not a victim of the US-induced crisis, but rather an over-leveraged, less deposits-focused banking structure that operates in the economies much more reliant on bank debt than on other forms of corporate funding; and
2. The solution to the European growth problem is not to channel more debt into the corporate sector, thus only depressing further the reserves to credit ratio line (red line) in the second chart above, but to assist deleveraging of the intermediated debt pile in the short run, increasing bank system reserves to credit ratio in the medium term (by increasing households' capacity to fund deposits) and decreasing overall share of intermediated (banks-issued) debt in the system of corporate funding in the long run.

22/12/2013: Most Important Charts of the Year: via BusinessInsider

A new set of The Most Important Charts from BusinessInsider.com is out, this time covering the full year:
http://www.businessinsider.com/most-important-charts-2013-12

My contribution is here: http://www.businessinsider.com/most-important-charts-2013-12#constantin-gurdgiev-trinity-college-dublin-85

The full chart:

Note: 2013 marks the fifth consecutive year of the European growth crisis. Amidst the recent firming up in global conditions, it is important to remember that per capita GDP (in US Dollar terms) in both the euro area and the UK remains below the pre-crisis peaks. In absolute terms, euro area cumulated 2008-2013 losses in GDP per capita range from EUR 1,311 for Malta to EUR 56,496 for Ireland, with the euro area average losses of EUR 20,318. No advanced economy within the EU27 has managed to recover cumulative losses  in GDP per capita to-date. On average, euro area GDP per capita in 2013 is forecast to be 9.7% lower than pre-crisis. Across other advanced economies, the GDP per capita is expected to be 8.4% higher in 2013. While this makes the euro area a strong candidate for growth in 2014-2015, absent apparent catalysts for longer term gains in value added, and TFP and labour productivity expansion, a European recovery can be a short-lived bounce-back, rather than a dawn of a New Age.

Sources: Author own calculations based on IMF data.

There is an earlier version of the same chart I prepared, covering also the duration of the crisis and its extent using as a metric GDP per capita in constant prices in national currency (not USD):

2/10/2013: Clusters Resilience in Downturns

Interesting research paper from CEPR on the resilience of firms clusters to the downturns. The DP 9667 "Are clusters more resilient in crises? Evidence from French exporters in 2008-2009" by Philippe Martin, Thierry Mayer, and Florian Mayneris (September 2013) looks at two types of clusters: traditional clusters and incentivised clusters.

Per abstract [emphasis mine]:

• "Clusters have already been extensively shown to favor firm-level economic performance (productivity, exports, innovation etc.)."
• "However, little is known about the capacity of firms in clusters to resist economic shocks."
• "In this paper, we analyze whether firms that agglomerate in clusters and firms that have been selected to benefit from the "competitiveness cluster'' industrial policy, implemented in France in 2005, have performed better on export markets during the recent economic turmoil."
• "We show that, on average, both agglomeration and the cluster policy are associated with a higher survival probability of firms on export markets, and conditioning on survival, a higher growth rate of their exports."
• "However, these effects are not stronger during the 2008-2009 crisis; if anything, the opposite is true."
• "We then show that this weaker resilience of competitiveness cluster firms is probably due to the fact that firms in clusters are more dependent on the fate of the "leader", i.e. the largest exporter in the cluster."

Note: couple of things to note as a potential lesson to be learned:

1. Make clusters more horizontal, rather than vertical, to reduce excessive dependency on one 'leader' firm.
2. The above is probably even more critical of a consideration for clusters involving partnering of smaller firms with larger MNCs.

21/5/2012: Quick note on US Markets' Crash Indices

The risk-off thingy is starting to bite - with a few frantic calls over the weekend from across the Atlantic. People are shifting strategies like feet in Swan Lake's pas de deux. Here's an nice set of charts that shows we are in a precarious starting point to the risk-off market indeed.

The Yale University Crash Index - latest data takes us only through April, shows that the base off which we have entered May markets is already loaded with high risk:

April 2012 Institutional Index came in at 26.94 reading, which compares unfavorably to historical average of 36.86 and to crisis period average of 31.27. Jittery markets mean that 2011-present average is 29.88 - worse than crisis period average and that April 2012 was even worse than that. Meanwhile, individual investors index showed usual lags, with lower pessimism in April at 28.47, which is a better reading than 26.57 for crisis period average and better than 24.76 for 2011-present average. Still, individual investors are more risk conscious than historical average of 33.70.

One interesting bit - disregarding the issue of lags, historical correlation between two indices is 0.76 while crisis period correlation is 0.82, which suggests that May reading should come down like a hammer for individual investors. The same is confirmed by looking at changes in indices volatility. Standard errors for Institutional investors responses have compressed from historical 3.82 average to crisis period 2.99 average to 2.85 average for the period since January 2011. Similarly, for individual investors, historical average standard error is 3.36, declining to 2.731 for crisis period and 2.724 average since January 2011.

Note that per charts above, since the beginning of the crisis in mid-2007 (data shows clear break in data at June 2007), Individual investors index has been flat trending (volatile along trend), while Institutional investors index has been trending down (with loads of volatility, too).