Showing posts with label euro area jobs destruction. Show all posts
Showing posts with label euro area jobs destruction. Show all posts

Friday, September 26, 2014

26/9/2014: Those Fabled Euro Area Structural Reforms: Greece, Spain, Portugal & Italy

EU Commission has published some interesting research on structural reforms in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece (strangely, no Ireland or Cyprus).

The full paper is available here: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2014/pdf/ee5_en.pdf

But here is an interesting set of charts, showing the effect of the said 'reforms' on the economies of these 'peripheral' states.

First chart shows employment growth against productivity growth in 2001-2008 and 2008-2013:

Above clearly shows that in two 'peripheral' countries covered, namely Portugal and Spain, productivity (as measured by value added per hour worked) rose during the crisis period, while the same fell in Greece and Italy. Productivity growth accelerated over the crisis period in Portugal and Spain and de-accelerated in Italy and literally fell off the cliff in Greece. And in all four economies, hours worked collapsed.

This all means two things:

  • Firstly, jobs destruction failed to sustain growth in productivity in Italy and Greece (in other words, the two economies suffered jobs losses dispersed across all sectors of activity), while jobs destruction did sustain improved productivity for the remaining active workforce in Spain and Portugal (where jobs destruction was more concentrated in several domestic sectors, such as retail and construction). 
  • Secondly, given that all four economies developed broadly similar 'structural reforms' packages, albeit with varying degree of implementation, the above suggests that the said reforms had zero-to-negative effect on economic performance in Italy and Greece, and potentially positive effect in Spain and Portugal. This is basically equivalent to saying that reforms overall effectiveness is not anchored in the structure of reforms, but is rather being driven by something else, something more idiosyncratic. Or, alternatively, that the reforms had no discernible effect whatsoever and instead nature of jobs destruction is driving differences in productivity growth.


The second chart shows annual trajectory in hours worked against productivity growth from 2008 through 2013.

Again, the above chart shows that in all four economies, relationship between productivity growth and employment is broadly negative. The diagonal line shows two segments of the chart: above the line, jobs destruction / creation effects are dominated by productivity growth effects. Below the line, the opposite takes place. So in a summary, the chart shows that the dominant driver in every economy as jobs destruction, not productivity growth. If structural reforms are of any significant help in driving productivity of workers, one would expect at least one of the economies to perform above the diagonal line. None do.

Quite surprisingly (or may be not) EU Commission offers an entirely opposite arguments on reforms efficacy. Even in the case of Greece - a country where both employment and productivity collapsed, the Commission paper argues that "Greece made a substantial adjustment in terms of employment while productivity stopped falling down". The folks in Commission believe that once the economy is completely exhausted on the downside, the lack of further declines is a sign of 'reforms-driven improvements'. This is about as crazy as cheering the fact that a lifeless body at the bottom of the empty pool is no longer falling.

Here is the Commission own guide to the above charts:


Do tell me which of the four countries locates in 'jobless growth' (early stage of reforms and structural changes working) area? Do note that other area of "Repositioning (growth less restructuring)" - which sounds exactly what it is: mindless demolition of jobs in hope that such a move can improve the remaining average. This is the best the 'periphery' has been able to achieve so far under the watchful eye of the EU Commission boffins.

Saturday, August 23, 2014

23/8/2014: Labour Costs and Euro area's myth of 'productivity' gains


Looking back at July 2014 IMF Article 4 paper on Euro area (most of which I covered back when it was published), here is an interesting chart mapping changes in the euro area countries' unit labour costs.

The chart is complex, so let me point out few things in it:

Firstly: improvements in the unit labour costs (ULCs) is reflected in the vertical distance between the black dot (accumulated change in ULCs over 2000-2007 period: higher level of the dot reflects lower competitiveness or higher ULCs compared to EA17 levels) and the black bar (accumulated change in ULCs over 2008-Q3 2013 period).

  1. This shows that Ireland has delivered (a) the highest ULCs deterioration of the sample of countries reported over 2000-2007 period, and (b) since 2008, Ireland has delivered the largest improvement in competitiveness (ULCs drop) of the sample. 
  2. Second largest improvement in ULCs was recorded in Greece and it is comparable to, but modestly shallower than in Ireland; third and virtually indistinguishable from the second - in Spain and fourth in Portugal.
  3. The above two facts suggest that improvements in the ULCs are indeed related to the rates of increases in  unemployment: all countries with significant improvements have seen dramatic rises in unemployment. Jobs destruction 'helps' competitiveness.
Secondly, coloured bars show composition of gains over two periods. Here, the following points arise:
  1. Labour costs declines have been responsible for the lion's share of ULCs gains in Greece, followed by Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
  2. Labour costs declines are dramatic in the case of only two countries: Greece and Ireland.
  3. The above two facts suggests that jobs destruction impacted dramatically in the sectors that were employment/labour-intensive, allowing for substantial moderation of labour costs across the remaining economy on average. So 'concentrated' jobs destruction 'helps' improve competitiveness a lot.
  4. Meanwhile, productivity gains in economy were significant contributors to improved competitiveness in Spain, followed - by some margin of difference - by Ireland, and Portugal.
  5. Points 1-2 and 4 together strongly suggest that in Ireland and Spain (and to a lesser extent Portugal) gains in competitiveness came about not because the remaining working population suddenly became more productive, but because the new jobless were working in sectors that were less productive, plus because remaining workers got paid less on average.
One more point: of course, our (and other euro area 'peripherals') gains here are measured not in absolute terms, but against EA17 aggregate levels of competitiveness, so to a large extent, our gains in the chart above are also down to their (other euro area countries') losses in competitiveness. This is exactly what the above figure shows for Austria, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands.

That's happy times of productivity growth in the euro area 'periphery', then... down to throwing people off the employment bus and bragging about fabled improved productivity for the remaining passengers...