Sunday, May 26, 2013

26/05/2013: Ireland Hard at Work on Troika & Tax Haven Fronts


Several recent points raised in relation to the work being done by Minister Noonan are worth a quick consideration.

Point 1: Ireland, allegedly, is the best-performing 'Troika programme' in the 'periphery' (forget the semiotics of a country being a programme and 1/3 of the EZ being a 'periphery'). We are fulfilling all programme requirements and are even ahead of schedule on some (namely - issuance of bonds we don't have to issue). If so, then can Minister Noonan explain:


Point 2: Ireland, allegedly, is not reliant in its adjustment on beggaring its neighbours via asymmetric tax regime, when it comes to corporate tax rates. Per Minister Noonan (see: http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/oireachtas/us-senate-committee-quoted-incorrect-tax-rates-for-apple-activities-here-d%C3%A1il-told-1.1404834): "The ability of multinational companies to lower their global taxes using international structures reflected the global context in which all countries operated." 

But then, "Mr Noonan said ... “some multinational corporations, with the assistance of legal practitioners and tax advisors, have exploited the differences in these systems to their own advantage”." So, wait a second here: it is down to 'some' MNCs - with help of legal & tax advisors - to 'exploit' tax system to their advantage. "The Minister said tax management was an international business. “Very clever accountants and very clever lawyers are involved in it and they basically try to get into an unspecified space between the tax laws of two jurisdictions." 

Ok, we get the point - bad advisors and bad companies are exploiting good Irish regime or global regime. Were it not for this 'exploitation, one can assume things would have been different, right? Wrong: “Operating in that space, they find ways of avoiding the tax that otherwise would not have been payable.”

Come again? Apparently, some multinationals just love hiring expensive advisors to avoid tax that would not have been payable even absent these advisors. You see, per Minister Noonan, Ireland's reputational problems of being branded a tax haven stem from utter stupidity of some MNCs that are so dim, they hire useless but very clever advisors to devise complicated and clever schemes to avoid that which doesn't exist. 

Seems like Minister Noonan has been exposed to too much logic lessons as of late.

26/5/2013: 'North' out, 'South' in?

The theme of 'North' (advanced economies and primarily EZ) banks deleveraging (exiting) out of the future centres if global growth - the 'South' - has been consistent one in my presentations on the future of global financial services. Here's an example: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/05/2452013-future-in-financial-services.html

It is good to see other researchers also spotting the trend: http://www.voxeu.org/article/european-bank-deleveraging-and-global-credit-conditions

However, my concern is distinct from that of the above authors. I do not think that EZ banks' deleveraging out of the middle income and emerging markets will have a huge detrimental impact, as - in contrast to earlier episodes - we now have emerging markets and BRICS banks more than capable of absorbing capacity created by the EZ banks exits.

Saturday, May 25, 2013

25/5/2013: Saturday Reading Links

Some interesting reading links:

FT Weekend edition has a full supplement on Venice Biennale 2013 - no link, but here's the official page: http://www.labiennale.org/en/art/exhibition/index.html?back=true


A fascinating article from The Economist on the movement toward technology displacing 'knowledge' workers nexthttp://www.economist.com/news/business/21578360-brain-work-may-be-going-way-manual-work-age-smart-machines

This cuts across my own view that we are seeing rising complementarity between technology and human capital, as opposed to substitutability thesis advanced in the article. The Economist view is thought provoking, for sure.


At last, there is a proof of the theorem that postulates that gaps between prime numbers are bounded: http://blogs.ethz.ch/kowalski/2013/05/21/bounded-gaps-between-primes/ and more on same http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/do_the_math/2013/05/yitang_zhang_twin_primes_conjecture_a_huge_discovery_about_prime_numbers.single.html


An excellent piece on the changes big data is bringing to economics - not from the point of view of new studies directions, but from the point of view of verifiability: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/economics-blog/2013/may/17/economic-big-data-rogoff-reinhart?CMP=twt_gu
There added 'bonus' points in the article discussing overall relationship between the research recognition, rewards and background work.


And a brilliant example of just how atavistic and primitive is the understanding of the web-based and mobile-platformed services in the top political echelons in Europe:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/electronics/10054717/France-preparing-tax-on-Apple-and-Google-to-fund-culture.html
Apparently, dinosaurs in French political elites have trouble comprehending just how revolutionary to culture and its creators (artists, thinkers, analysts, developers etc) Apple 'i'- and Google platforms are. It is highly likely that iTunes, for example, are doing more to distribution of Francophone music across the world than the entire Ministry of 'French' Culture. Then again, the entire tax debate in Europe is never about culture or arts or anything tangible, but about finding ever more elaborate and bizarre paths for milking the economy to sustain ever expanding state.


While on topic of matters European, a fascinating study on genetic persistency in European populations covered in http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/3770411-europeans-we-re-all-kissing-cousins
Given it comes from the US (original home to Apple and Google), may be the French can pay a special levy to the US for bothering to include their subjects in global research? Afterall, shall they fail to pay up, ignoring France should not be that hard - it works in geopolitics and economics, after all...


Sunday, May 19, 2013

19/5/2013: Namawinelake closure

I do not know the reasons behind the Namawinelake decision to stop operations, but the announcement that the blog will cease publishing new material starting from tomorrow was a shocker for me.

I can attest from my own & others' experiences that those of us who run anything independent of the officialdom mouthpieces (regardless of political / ideological orientation or even the lack of one) have near-zero support (moral or citations- and links-wise) from our internal (not to be confused with international) media and all businesses.

Those in our society, including the traditional media, who only benefit from the free analysis and the climate of openness and debate the independent analysts help to create prefer to endlessly endorse and support, including via advertising revenues, cross-links, citations and readership, those who offer no alternative but consensus.

In contrast, independent analysts in Ireland operate in the environment of constant, usually indirect, 'soft', pressure from the part of the Irish society which is fully aligned with the official elite. This 'aligned' sub-section of Ireland often has direct and indirect support (including financial) from major business, political and ideological organisations in this country, and even from European organisations. Because of this, Irish new independent media remains relatively small, under-resourced and often marginalised.

The rarity of honest, no-spin analysis in this country is exemplified by the rarity of excellence regularly provided by a handful of independent blogs, like Namawinelake. To say that Namawinelake will be missed is a massive understatement for me, personally.

Any healthy society requires healthy dissent both in the traditional and new media, funded and resourced by the society that values debate, honesty, independence and discourse. Any healthy economy requires a healthy society. It is a benefit to businesses, their customers, their investors, as well as in the interest of the entire nation to nurture and support such dissent. I can only hope that Namawinelake closure had nothing to do with our collective and repeated, long running failures to recognise the immense personal, social and economic values of the independent new media.

Friday, May 17, 2013

17/5/2013: Ireland v Iceland 2013

Ireland vs Iceland macroeconomic comparatives in 15 simple charts that DofF wouldn't want you to see...

All data is either IMF direct-sourced or based on IMF data. Click on the charts to see more detailed comments imbedded in them.

Three charts on GDP comparatives:

Investment:

External trade and balance:

Unemployment and Employment:

Government Finances:



17/5/2013: Good News Feel Chart That Is Real

Nice chart via Markit:


Lat time I checked, (yesterday) Irish CDS were trading at implied cumulative probability of default of 12.25% - wider than Iceland's 12.02% or South Africa's 10.58%.

The mountain we climbed down from is impressive by all possible standards, but it is not remarkable, nor does if get much past the hardly 'untroubled' days of 2009-2010...

17/5/2013: Welcome to Surreal Irish National Accounts


A significant, but only because it is now 'official', confirmation that Ireland's GDP and GNP figures are vastly over-exaggerated by the distorting presence of some MNCs in Ireland has finally arrived to the pages of FT: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/eb114bda-be3f-11e2-9b27-00144feab7de.html#axzz2TYJudjwo

As one of those who said this time and again, starting with my work in the Open Republic Institute in 2001 and through today, I am grateful to Jamie Smyth for pointing this out.

The ESRI, which - being tasked directly with doing research on Irish economy and being paid for doing such research - has slept through the years of boom as the Government wasted resources in chasing imaginary investment/GDP and spending/GDP targets. After years of the Social partnership bulls**t, we only now, driven into desperation by necessity of the crisis, are beginning to face the reality that we are poorer than our GDP and GNP levels actually imply.

I take heart that all those who never once before voiced their concern about the distorting nature of our MNCs-dependent economic variables are now quoted in the FT voicing that concern. Since the beginning of the crisis I put forward consistently a three-points position countering Ireland's official sustainability analysis when it comes the economy being able to sustain current levels of Government debt:

  1. Despite all the focus in Irish and international media and official circles, it is the total economic debt mountain (household, government and non-financial corporate debts) that matters in determining sustainability of our economic development;
  2. Irish economy's capacity to carry the above debt burden is determined not by GDP, but by something closer to an average of GNP and Total Domestic Demand which, in 2012, stood at 81.54 and 75.21% of our official GDP.
  3. Irish exports growth is now becoming decoupled from the real economy as it is primarily driven by services exports which are dominated by a handful of tax arbitrage plays with little real connection to value added generated in this country.
The ESRI note cited in FT - detailed and well-research as it is - only scratches the surface of tax arbitrage effects on our official statistics. 

Thursday, May 16, 2013

16/5/2013: There are jobs & then there are...

Off the start - there is nothing wrong with debt collection as business when it is properly delivered and regulated / supervised. And there is nothing wrong with debt collection agency growing its workforce.

But, then again, there is nothing particularly laudable about this either.

Unless, that is, you are an Irish Government Minister who cares none but for a headline grabbing opportunity.

Capita - some background on the company is given here: http://www.rte.ie/news/2013/0516/450722-capita-jobs/ and http://namawinelake.wordpress.com/2010/08/15/capita-aka-crapita-%E2%80%93-service-provider-for-one-of-nama%E2%80%99s-most-lucrative-contracts/ - is to double its workforce in Ireland by bringing in 800 new jobs. There is no information on the split of Capita's activities in the ROI, but one can venture a guess that booming business of debt collections here will take up the bulk of the new jobs 'created'.

Irony has it - Capita's new HQs in Dublin will be at the heart of the pride of Irish economy: the Barrow Street cluster that houses top firms in law and ICT services, but also has the dubious distinction of housing Ireland's 'bad bank' Nama. Nothing like calling the 'knowledge economy neighbourhood meets debt collectors' a 'vote of confidence in the Irish economy'.

Have we lost all bearings and compases?

I, for one, can't wait for the next congratulatory flyer from FG to my home - it will undoubtedly explain how the misery of thousands of Irish homeowners facing repossessions benefits my local economy of Ringsend-Irishtown with blessed new jobs.

16/5/2013: On That Impossible Monetary Policy Dilemma


At last, the IMF has published something beefy on the extraordinary (or so-called 'unconventional') monetary policy instruments unrolled by the ECB, BOJ, BOE and the Fed since the start of the crisis in the context of the question I been asking for some time now: What happens when these measures are unwound?

See http://liswires.com/archives/2102 and http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2012/10/28102012-ecb-and-technocratic-decay.html

The papers: UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICIES—RECENT EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS and UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICIES—RECENT EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS—BACKGROUND PAPER should be available on the IMF website shortly.

Box 2 in the main paper is worth a special consideration as it covers Potential Costs of Exit to Central Banks. Italics are mine.

Per IMF: "Losses to central bank balance sheets upon exit are likely to stem from a maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities. In normal circumstances, higher interest rates—and thus lower bond prices—would lead to an immediate valuation loss to the central bank. These losses, though, would be fully recouped if assets were held to maturity. [In other words, normally, when CBs exit QE operations, they sell the Government bonds accumulated during the QE. This leads to a rise in supply of Government bonds in the market, raising yields and lowering prices of these bonds, with CBs taking a 'loss' on lower prices basis. In normal cases, CBs tend to accumulate shorter-term Government bonds in greater numbers, so sales and thus price decreases would normally be associated with the front end of maturity profile - meaning with shorter-dated bonds. Lastly, in normal cases of QE, some of the shorter-dated bonds would have matured by the time the CBs begin dumping them in the market, naturally reducing some of the supply glut on exits.]

But current times are not normal. "Two things have changed with the current policy environment: (i) balance sheets have grown enormously, and (ii) assets purchased are much longer-dated on average and will likely not roll-off central bank balance sheets before exit begins."

This means that in current environment, as contrasted by normal unwinding of the QE operations. "…valuation losses will be amplified and become realized losses if central banks sell assets in an attempt to permanently diminish excess reserves. But central banks will not be able to shrink their balance sheets overnight. In the interim, similar losses would arise from paying higher interest rates on reserves (and other liquidity absorbing instruments) than earning on assets held (mostly fixed coupon payments). This would not have been the case in normal times, when there was no need to sell significant amounts of longer-dated bonds and when most central bank liabilities were non-interest bearing (currency in circulation)."

The IMF notes that "the ECB is less exposed to losses from higher interest rates as its assets— primarily loans to banks rather than bond purchases—are of relatively short maturity and yields of its loans to banks are indexed on the policy rate; the ECB is thus not included in the estimates of losses that follow." [Note: this does not mean that the ECB unwinding of extraordinary measures will be painless, but that the current IMF paper is not covering these. In many ways, ECB will face an even bigger problem: withdrawing liquidity supply to the banks that are sick (if not permanently, at least for a long period of time) will risk destabilising the financial system. This cost to ECB will likely be compounded by the fact that unwinding loans to banks will require banks to claw liquidity out of the existent assets in the environment where there is already a drastic shortage of credit supply to the real economy. Lastly, the ECB will also face indirect costs of unwinding its measures that will work through the mechanism similar to the above because European banks used much of ECB's emergency liquidity supply to buy Government bonds. Thus unlike say the BOE, ECB unwinding will lead to banks, not the ECB, selling some of the Government bonds and this will have an adverse impact on the Sovereign yields, despite the fact that the IMF does not estimate such effect in the present paper.]

The chart below "shows the net present value (NPV) estimate of losses in three different scenarios." Here's how to read that chart:

  • "Losses are estimated given today’s balance sheet (no expansion) and the balance sheet that would result from expected purchases to end 2013 (end 2014 for the BOJ, accounting for QQME). 
  • "Losses are estimated while assuming everything else remains unchanged (notably absent capital gains or income from asset holdings)… [so that] no stance is taken as to the precise path and timing of exit. ...These losses—which may be significant even if spread over several years—would impact fiscal balances through reduced profit transfers to government. 
  • "Scenario 1 foresees a limited parallel shift in the yield curve by 100 bps from today’s levels. 
  • "Scenario 2, a more likely case corresponding to a stronger growth scenario requiring a steady normalization of rates, suggests a flatter yield curve, 400 bps higher at the short end and 225 bps at the long. The scenario is similar to the Fed’s tightening from November 1993 to February 1995, which saw one year rates increase by around 400bps. Losses in this case would amount to between 2 percent and 4.3 percent of GDP,  depending on the central bank. 
  • "Scenario 3 is a tail risk scenario, in which policy has to react to a loss of confidence in the currency or in the central bank’s commitment to price stability, or to a severe commodity price shock with second round effects. The short and long ends of the yield curve increase by 600 bps and 375 bps respectively, and losses rise to between 2 percent and 7.5 percent of GDP. 
  • "Scenarios 2 and 3 foresee somewhat smaller hikes for the BOJ, given the persistence of the ZLB.


And now on transmission of the shocks: "The appropriate sequence of policy actions in an eventual exit is relatively clear.

  • "A tightening cycle would begin with some forward guidance provided by the central bank on the timing and pace of interest rate hikes. [At which point bond markets will also start repricing forward Government paper, leading to bond markets prices drops and mounting paper losses on the assets side of CBs balance sheets]
  • "It would then be followed by higher short-term interest rates, guided over a first (likely lengthy) period by central bank floor rates (which can be hiked at any time, independently of the level of reserves) until excess reserves are substantially removed. [So shorter rates will rise first, implying that shorter-term interbank funding costs will also rise, leading to a rise in lone rates disproportionately for banks reliant on short interbank loans - guess where will Irish banks be by then if the 'reforms' we have for them in mind succeed?
  • "Term open market operations (“reverse repos” or other liquidity absorbing instruments) would be used to drain excess reserves initially; outright asset sales would likely be more difficult in the early part of the transition, until the price of longer-term assets had adjusted. Higher reserve requirements (remunerated or unremunerated) could also be employed." [All of which mean that whatever credit supply to private sector would have been before the unwinding starts, it will become even more constrained and costlier to obtain once the unwinding begins.]
  • For a kicker to that last comment: "The transmission of policy, though, is likely to somewhat bumpy in the tightening cycle associated with exit. Reduced competition for funding in the presence of substantial excess reserve balances tends to weaken the transmission mechanism. Though higher rates paid on reserves and other liquidity absorbing instruments should generally increase other short-term market rates (for example, unsecured interbank rates, repo rates, commercial paper rates), there may be some slippage, with market rates lagging. This could occur because of market segmentation, with cash rich lenders not able to benefit from the central bank’s official deposit rate, or lack of arbitrage in a hardly operating money market flush with liquidity. Also, there may be limits as to how much liquidity the central bank can absorb at reasonable rates, since banks would face capital charges and leverage ratio constraints against repo lending." [But none of these effects - generally acting to reduce immediate pressure of CB unwinding of QE measures - apply to the Irish banks and will unlikely apply to the ECB case in general precisely because the banks own balance sheets will be directly impacted by the ECB unwinding.]
  • "There is also a risk that even if policy rates are raised gradually, longer-term yields could increase sharply. While central banks should be able to manage expectations of the pace of bond sales and rise in future short-term rates—at least for the coming 2 to 3 years—through enhanced forward guidance and more solid communication channels, they have less control over the term premium component of long-term rates (the return required to bear interest rate risk) and over longer-term expectations. These could jump because leveraged investors could “run for the door” in the hope of locking in profits, because of expected reverse portfolio rebalancing effects from bond sales, uncertainty over inflation prospects or because of fiscal policy, financial stability or other macro risks emerging at the time of exit. To the extent a rise in long-term rates triggers cross-border flows, exchange rate volatility is bound to increase, further complicating policy decisions." [All of which means two things: (a) any and all institutions holding 'sticky' (e.g. mandated) positions in G7 bonds will be hammered by speculative and book-profit exits (guess what these institutions are? right: pension funds and insurance companies and banks who 'hold to maturity' G7-linked risky bonds - e.g peripheral euro area bonds), and (b) long-term interest rates will rise and can rise in a 'jump fashion' - abruptly and significantly (and guess what determines the cost of mortgages and existent not-fixed rate loans?).]


And so we do  it forget the ECB plight, here's what the technical note had to say about Frankfurt's dilemma:  "The ECB faces relatively little direct interest rate risk, as the bulk of its loan assets are linked to its short-term policy rate. However, it may be difficult for the ECB to shrink its balance sheet, as those commercial banks currently borrowing from the ECB may not easily be able to repay loans on maturity. The ECB could use other instruments to drain surplus liquidity, but could then face some loss of net income as the yield on liquidity-draining open market operations (OMOs) could exceed the rate earned on lending, assuming a positively-sloped yield curve, if draining operations were of a longer maturity." [I would evoke the 'No Sh*t, Sherlock" clause here: who could have thought Euro area's commercial banks "may not easily be able to repay loans on maturity". I mean they are beaming with health and are full of good loans they can call in to cover an ECB unwind call… right?]

Obviously, not the IMF as it does cover the 'geographic' divergence in unwinding risks: "But the ECB potentially faces credit risk on its lending to the banking system for financial stability purposes. In a “benign” scenario, where monetary tightening is a response to higher inflation resulting from economic growth, non-performing loans should fall and bank balance sheets should improve. But even then, some areas of the eurozone may lag in economic recovery. Banks in such areas could come under further pressure in a rising rate environment: weak banks may not be able to pass on to weak customers the rising costs of financing their balance sheets." [No prize for guessing which 'areas' the IMF has in mind for being whacked the hardest with ECB unwinding measures.]

So would you like to take the centre-case scenario at 1/2 Fed impact measure for ECB costs and apply to Ireland's case? Ok - we are guessing here, but it will be close to:

  1. Euro area-wide impact of -1.0-1.5% GDP shaved off with most impact absorbed by the peripheral states; and
  2. Yields rises of ca 200-220bps on longer term paper, which will automatically translate into massive losses on banks balancesheets (and all balancesheets for institutions holding Government bonds). 
  3. The impact of (2) will be more severe for peripheral countries via 2 channels: normal premium channel on peripheral bonds compared to Bunds and via margins hikes on loans by the banks to compensate for losses sustained on bonds.
  4. Net result? Try mortgages rates rising over time by, say 300bps? or 350bps? You say 'extreme'? Not really - per crisis historical ECB repo rate averages at 3.10% which is 260bps higher than current repo rate... 
Ooopsy... as some would say. Have a nice day paying that 30 year mortgage on negative equity home in Co Meath (or Dublin 4 for that matter).

16/5/2013: Euro Area 'Austerity' in One Chart

Frankly, folks, there is nothing like making a factual argument across emotive subject lines... I have put up two posts on Euro area 'austerity' - here and here - and the readers want more numbers, usually in hope of finding a hole in my arguments.

Here is, perhaps a better, summary of the Euro area Austerity in its own numbers - in levels of nominal expenditure and revenues:


I hope this settles the issue:

  1. Euro area austerity has meant revenues collected by the governments are up
  2. Euro area austerity has meant that Government spending is up
Tell me if this is a 'savage cuts' story or a 'tax burden rising' story...

Wednesday, May 15, 2013

15/5/2013: Italy v Spain in Big 4's Sickest Economy contest

More unpleasant stuff from the Euro zone. Headlines in the morning today:

  • Italian banks suffer the worst credit crunch in their history with banks credit down 2.12% in March 2013 y/y, according to the Italian Banking Association (ABI);
  • Meanwhile, bad loans have reached €64.3bn in March, rising by 4.3% y/y and by 33% m/m. 
  • Italian banks loans to households and non-financial companies dropped 3.1% in March y/y, falling to €1.46bn. 
  • Italian industrial production fell 5.2% in March y/y, the worst figure in the Eurozone’ Big 4 economies. Industrial production was down 1.5% in Germany in March and 1.6% in France.
  • The Italian housing market activity its now at lowest level since 1985. Last year 448,364 properties were sold, or 27.5% fewer than in 2011 and only 18,000 ahead of 1985 sales. 

It looks like Italy is going head on into competing with Spain for the title of the Big 4's sickest economy.

15/5/2013: Straight from 1984... The Department of Stabilisation...


Fir the fun of reading between the lines, follow my italics:

"IMF Executive Board Approves €1 Billion Arrangement Under Extended Fund Facility for Cyprus

The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) today approved a three-year SDR 891 million (about €1 billion, or US$1.33 billion; 563 percent of the country’s quota) arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility  (EFF) for Cyprus in support of the authorities’ economic adjustment program. [Given that Greece has more than double time to 'repay' its 'facilities' and Cyprus is likely to face an economic collapse worse than that experienced in Greece, good luck betting on that 3-year window not staying open less than a decade] The approval allows for the immediate disbursement of SDR 74.25 million (about €86 million, or US$110.7 million).

The EFF arrangement is part of a combined financing package with the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) amounting to €10 billion. It is intended to stabilize the country’s financial system [completely destabilised by the Troika arranging 'stabilisation' of the Greek economy], achieve fiscal sustainability [by pushing the GDP down by close to 13% in 2013 and likely another 15% by the end of the 'stabilisation' period], and support the recovery of economic activity [devastated by the Greek 'rescue' by the Troika and botched 'rescue' of Cyprus] to preserve the welfare of the population [who now need welfare as their jobs and savings are being vaporised by the economic 'stabilisation' measures of the Troika]."

15/5/2013: What IMF assessment of Malta has to do with Ireland?

Here's an interesting excerpt from the IMF Article IV conclusions for Malta, released today (italics are mine):

"In the longer term, regulatory and tax reform at the European or global level could erode Malta’s competitiveness. The Maltese economy, including the financial sector and other niche services, has greatly benefitted from a business-friendly tax regime. Greater fiscal integration of EU member states and potential harmonization of tax rates could erode some of these benefits, with consequences on employment, output, and fiscal revenues."

Now, Ireland is a much more aggressively reliant on tax arbitrage than Malta to sustain its economic model and has been doing so for longer than Malta. One wonders, how come IMF is not warning about the same risks in the case of Ireland?


Another thing one learns from the IMF note on Malta: "The largest banks will be placed under the direct oversight of the ECB from 2014. The MFSA should work closely with the ECB to ensure no reduction in the supervisory capacity of these banks."

Wait, we've all been operating under the impression that direct oversight from ECB is designed to increase quality and quantity of oversight. Quite interestingly, the IMF is concerned that it might reduce the currently attained levels of supervision.

Tuesday, May 14, 2013

14/5/2013: Ending German Austerity... and then what?

Everyone is running around with the latest catch-phrase designed to phase out thought: Germany must end austerity. So, folks, what will happen should Germany really end austerity?

Whatever it might mean, suppose end of austerity implies Germany moves from the currently projected general government deficit of -0.31% of GDP to a deficit of -3.31% of GDP, thus increasing Government spending by EUR81 billion in 2013. What then?

  1. Historically (since 1997 through forecast for 2018 by the IMF) EUR1 billion increase in German GDP is associated with EUR0.21 billion rise in German Current Account, although the relationship is not strong enough to call it statistically. In other words, Germans do not spend their surpluses on goods, like other economies do. They are more likely to increase their current account surpluses when income rises.
  2. Also, historically, EUR1 billion in German GDP growth is associated with EUR0.67 billion rise in German investment. 
  3. Furthermore, shrinking Government deficits in Germany are associated with widening of current account deficits (see chart below) and declining overall investment in the economy
  4. EUR81 billion in the euro area overall context is nothing but pittance, even before it gets diluted by German own internal demand.

Note: Change in current account balance is negative when current account deficit is falling

Let's not draw many causal conclusions out of the above, but the clear thing is: Germans do not tend to spend their budget deficits on imports of goods and services at any rate worth mentioning.

Herein rests the problem for the policy idiots squad: if Germans spend EUR81 billion more on Government, short of mandating that Berlin ships cheques out to the Euro Periphery, what on earth will this end of austerity do to help Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Greece or Italy? Add German tourists' bodies on the beaches of Italy and Greece? Fly truckloads of German youths to Spain for booze-ups? Increase sales of Fado music 700-fold? Restart bungalows sales craze in Lahinch? Open German savings accounts in Cyprus? Will these end Euro area periphery crises?

Neither one of the countries in the Euro periphery makes much of what Germans want. Irish trade with Germany is robust, but it is dominated heavily by the non-Irish corporates who channel tax arbitrage via trade, leaving little on the ground in Ireland to call 'national income'. 

So what if Germany 'ends austerity'? German demand for goods and services will go up. But it will be demand for German-made and Core-made goods and services, plus stuff from Asia Pacific. It will also push German unemployment from 5.6% to 5.4% or maybe 5.3%, depending on how many more peripheral countries' emigrants Germany can absorb. 

These might be good things for Germany. But sure as hell, if German stimulus were to work like neo-Keynesianistas hope it will, pressure on ECB to keep rates low and banks liquidity ample will be reduced, while internal German rates imbalance will amplify. German bond yields might also rise, which will only add to the already hefty debt servicing pressures in euro periphery. Does anyone think it might be a good idea for ECB to hike rates then? No?

Truth is - there is no substitute for getting Euro periphery's economies in order. German stimulus or 'end of German austerity' can sound plausibly nice, but the real problem in the EU is not German sluggish demand (it is a part of German problem, to be frank, but not the major one when it comes to the Euro area as a whole). The real problem in the EU is lack of real, tangible, non-leveraged growth sources.

14/5/2013: Corporate Tax Haven Ireland Weekly Links Page

Corporate Tax Haven Ireland in the news... again:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-13/europe-eases-corporate-tax-dodge-as-worker-burdens-rise.html

Update: Twitter in the news: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/10056570/Twitter-CEO-resigns-as-UK-boss-after-accounting-fiasco.html
Note Irish connection.

Keep track of 'Tax Haven' view of Irish economic policies by following the links, starting here:
http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/05/352013-not-week-goes-by-without-tax.html

Update 17/5/2013:
Three more stories, both relating to Google operations in Ireland:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/comment/ben-chu-lets-not-get-bamboozled-by-google-in-the-global-tax-avoidance-debate-8620046.html
and
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2013/may/16/google-told-by-mp-you-do-do-evil
and
http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/no-apology-for-low-tax-regime-as-google-debate-drags-on-richard-burton-29274843.html

I find it bizarre that Minister Bruton feels anyone on earth is asking for Ireland's apology. I think the point of this debate about the role of tax havens, like Ireland, is that policymakers around the world are seeking to close the loopholes through which companies engage in aggressive tax optimisation. Minister Bruton should focus on how Ireland can deal with this threat, as well as on how Ireland can develop a business platform (low tax is an important part of this platform) that actually operates on adding value here and not on beggaring our trading partners.

Minister Bruton's point about the need to create jobs in Ireland is nonsensical in the above debate. If we create jobs here on foot of value added in the Irish economy, then there is no problem with our MNCs activities globally, because low tax regime applies only to value added created here. Our trading partners have a problem with Ireland acting as a conduit for tax minimization whereby there is zero value added created in Ireland, but instead value added created elsewhere is booked via Ireland into tax havens. These forms of tax arbitrage do not create any jobs here in Ireland and generate no tax revenue here.

14/5/2013: Sunday Times May 12, 2013: UK, Europe and Ireland


This is an unedited version of my article for Sunday Times, May 12, 2013.

Loosely based on the famous quip by the US ex-Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, uncertain events that present significant risks of disrupting the established status quo can be classed into three categories: the unknown knowns, the known unknowns, and the unknown unknowns.

The former category represents risks we can continuously monitor, assess and price in our policy decisions and everyday lives. For example, a known presence of foreign exchange risk relates to the unknown bilateral exchange rate price, prompting investors and businesses alike to hedge against the potentially adverse changes in the rate.

At the other extreme, the unknown unknowns are what Nassim Taleb called the 'Black Swans'. Neither the extent of their impact, nor the nature of the risk they present are known to us, making hedging against such risks completely impossible.

The case in between the two extremes relates to the uncertain events often called the 'Grey Swan'. This is the most challenging of all forms of uncertainty. On the one hand we know that something very disruptive can happen in the case of approaching risk, but we have no ability to gauge with any precision as to the extent of this risk.

The best current example of such a 'Grey Swan' from Ireland's perspective is the uncertainty surrounding the future of the UK participation in the EU.

Consider first the background that shapes the risk. Aside from significant cultural, historical, institutional and familial links between the two countries, Ireland shares physical and maritime borders with the UK.

As the result of the above links, the UK today is a singularly the largest trading and financial investment partner for Ireland, as far as bilateral trade between nation states is concerned.

In 2012, bilateral merchandise trade between Ireland and the UK stood at EUR 31.7 billion, 23.5% more than our merchandise trade with the US and Canada combined. Ireland-UK trade flows in goods amounted to 61% of our bilateral trade with the entire EU27 (excluding the UK). Ireland's bilateral trade with the UK in services amounted to EUR 25.2 billion in 2011 - the latest year for which data is available. This places the UK as the second largest services trading partner for Ireland after the US. Ireland's trade balance in services with the UK is in strong EUR 5 billion annual surplus, contrasting a trade deficit of EUR 19 billion in our services trade with the US.

On investment side, in 2011, Irish residents held some EUR 261 billion of UK portfolio securities, representing second largest portfolio of overseas investments after those in the US. Of these, over EUR 170 billion of securities related to Irish private sector non-financial corporations' assets. While Irish resident banks deleveraging saw their UK assets holdings fall from EUR140.5 billion in 2009 to EUR 90.4 billion in 2011, Irish resident corporate holdings of UK assets rose from EUR 120.2 billion to EUR 170.2 billion. Irish FDI into the UK at the end of 2011 stood at EUR 50.2 billion against UK FDI into Ireland at EUR 22.2 billion, making the UK our second largest bilateral FDI partner.

The trade and investment links are built on a complex web of economic and institutional inter-connections between our two countries. In addition to direct services trade figures, bilateral economic relations between Ireland and the UK extend to include shared services provision. For example, Irish IFSC heavily dependent on providing back-office and other specialist support to the UK-based institutions. Likewise, our research and development, education and other core professional services and functions rely heavily on institutional cross-links with the UK universities, professional services and research firms and clients.

Beyond purely economic ties, the UK position within the EU is more closely aligned to that of Ireland and our interest than for any other member state.

Both, Ireland and the UK share in the common agenda of seeing increased liberalisation in trade in services across the EU, and in accelerating the painfully slow process of implementation of the EU Services Directive. Both economies, focused on developing new markets and increasing global reach of their industries, require significant autonomy within and devolution of the EU policymaking. In more ways than Dublin is willing to admit, the UK position within the EU as an independently-minded, skeptical and cautious player that constantly acting to test the EU decisions against national economic and social interests serves Ireland much better than the Continental modus operandi of serial surrender of national interests to German and French diktat.

In other words, like it or not, Dublin is closer to London than it is to Berlin. Looking beyond the current crisis, this proximity is based on an equal partnership and symmetry of objectives, rather than on hierarchical hegemony of geopolitical power that is shaping the rest of the EU.


This realisation presents us with a dilemma. A UK referendum on the country continued membership in the EU can lead only three possible outcomes, all with serious implications for Ireland.

In the best-case scenario, UK achieves successful renegotiation of the terms and conditions for its membership in the EU. This will result in the UK continuing to position itself as a cautious outsider to the European core, providing counterbalance to Franco-German axis of geopolitical and economic power that smaller states with strong pro-growth interests, like Ireland, require in order not to succumb to dictate from Berlin or Brussels. This will also mean that our trade and investment links with the UK can continue offering us risks and markets diversification opportunities that we have enjoyed to-date.

In a less benign scenario, the UK remains in the EU, while failing to renegotiate its membership conditions. In this case the UK will be required to rapidly converge with the Continental core on major policies. These will include reforms of corporate taxation codes, harmonisation of other tax systems, and regulatory systems and enforcement institutions consolidation. The result will be reduced diversification of European institutions and increased vulnerability of these institutions to adverse economic and political shocks. Greater centralisation of power and decision making in Berlin and Paris, with London joining the Core, will leave Ireland on the margins of Europe alongside a small number of other demographically younger and economically more dynamic countries, such as Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands. UK’s inevitable joining of the euro will seal the end of Irish economic model of providing a platform for trade and investment entry into the euro area.

The worst-case scenario, however, is that associated with the possibility that the UK might exit the EU. Even if unlikely, this outcome deserves some serious consideration if only for the impact it can have on Irish economy.

An exit can trigger an outright trade war and capital flows controls between the EU and the UK. There is little love lost between German and French elites and the UK position within Europe, and past experiences with Norway, Switzerland, Lichtenstein and Bulgaria show that EU is capable of acting as a bully in the schoolyard. The consequences of such a conflict will be disastrous for Ireland.

Trade flows disruption, while not necessarily cutting off all exports and imports between the two countries, can shave off as much as 5 percentage points of our GDP overnight. In the longer-run, the impact of reduced joint projects development and co-shared services provision across the border will further reduce our access to the UK markets.

Disruptions to co-located financial services, from banking to pension funds, investment funds and insurance business, as well as in retail, logistics, and wholesale sectors will be significant. Rising cost of services, associated with lower competitive pressures, will benefit some Irish vested interests, such as a number of our semi-state companies, but at the expense of all consumers.

Changes within the EU in the wake of a possible UK exit will undoubtedly harm Irish economic growth prospects. Absent the UK critical assessment and testing of the EU drive for integration and enlargement, Brussels will be free to pursue aggressive tax reforms along the lines currently being developed under the 'enhanced cooperation' procedures by Berlin and Paris. The EU Services Directive agenda will be killed off completely by Paris and Berlin, neither of which want to see increased competition in protected services. Even in its current initial stage the directive promises to boost Irish GDP by 0.5-1% per annum. Research from Open Europe, published this week, estimates that Ireland can gain up to 2.1% of GDP from enhanced liberalization of trade in services beyond the current Services Directive.

Long run impact of the UK adopting a direct competitive stance vis-a-vis the EU can cost Ireland up to 10-12 percentage points off our economy's potential output with little on offer to replace this lost activity.

Bleak as the picture above might be, it offers a clear direction for Irish position vis-a-vis the ongoing debate within the UK and in Europe about both the role of our closest neighbour in the European project and the future of the EU itself.

Ireland needs a strong UK that continues to act as check and balance on the EU's persistent drive toward more integration and bureaucratization of the common policies and governance space. Ireland also needs a strong EU with diversified and flexible institutions capable of absorbing various shocks and creating a functional policies laboratory for possible responses to adverse global and internal challenges. We to support continued UK participation in Europe while respecting our neighbor’s national agenda by encouraging the EU to proactively engage with London in modernizing the terms of the UK membership within the EU.




Box-out:

The 2013 QS University Subject Rankings published over the last few weeks should provide some food for thought for Ireland’s higher education mandarins. From the top of the rankings, only one Irish university, Trinity College, Dublin (ranked 67th in the world) makes it into top 100, with our second-best university, UCD, ranking in 131st place. UCC (ranked 190th) completes the trio of Irish universities in top 250 worldwide institutions. In subject rankings, Irish universities are performing poorly across a number of core disciplines. In Mathematics, Environmental Science, and Earth and Marine Sciences no Irish University ranks in top 150. In Chemistry, TCD is the only university to make top 100. No Irish university makes global rankings in Materials Science. No Irish university ranks in top 100 in Physics and Astronomy, Chemical Engineering, Civil and Structural Engineering and in Electrical and Electronic Engineering. TCD is the only university in Ireland with a Computer Science and Information Systems faculty ranked in top 100. The list of mediocre results goes on and on. Put simply, Ireland needs a complete overhaul of its higher education system if we were to even being matching the Government rhetoric about the quality of our workforce with reality.

14/5/2013: The Sick Man of Europe is... Europe


An excellent set of stats on the decline of public legitimacy of the EU between 2012 and 2013 from Pew Research: http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/13/the-new-sick-man-of-europe-the-european-union/

Certainly worth a read and confirms similar trends captured by other surveys.

14/5/2013: Negative Equity and Entrepreneurship: Local Evidence from the US


I have written before about the role positive/negative home equity has on entrepreneurship and real economic activity. Remember, the Irish Government and media believe that negative equity matters only when/if the household wants or needs to move home and that it has no effect outside this scenario.

A recent (March 2013) paper (linked below) from NBER argues very clearly that positive/negative equity has a real positive/negative effect on employment and business creation and that this effect is local to property prices region. In other words, unlike FDI or other foreign investments, home equity impacts domestic investment, locally anchored, and with it - domestic jobs creation.

Adelino, Manuel, Schoar, Antoinette and Severino, Felipe paper "documents the role of the collateral lending channel to facilitate small business starts and self-employment in the period before the financial crisis of 2008. We document that between 2002 and 2007 areas with a bigger run up in house prices experienced a strong increase in employment in small businesses compared to employment in large firms in the same industries. This increase in small business employment was particularly pronounced in (1) industries that need little startup capital and can thus more easily be financed out of increases in housing as collateral; (2) manufacturing industries where goods are shipped over long distances, which rules out that local demand is driving the expansion. We show that this effect is separate from an aggregate demand channel that relies on home equity based borrowing leading to increased demand and employment creation."

Some more granularity to the top-level results [italics are mine]:

"Overall, the evidence we present in this paper identifies the causal effect house prices in the creation of new small firms. These results show that access to collateral allowed individuals to start small businesses or to become self-employed. We conjecture that without access to this collateral in the form of real estate assets, many individuals would not have made the transition from unemployment to starting a new business or self-employment.

We show that the effect of house prices is concentrated in small firms only and had no causal effect  on employment at large firms. [In other words, there is no measurable effect on location competitiveness from house prices. Irish Government claims that residential property prices declines improved Irish competitiveness are not supported by the evidence from the US.]

Importantly, our results also hold when we exclude industries that are most likely to be affected by local demand shocks and when we restrict our attention to manufacturing industries. The effect of house prices is also stronger in industries where the amount of capital needed to start a new firm is lower, consistent with the hypothesis that housing serves as collateral but is not sufficient to fund large capital needs." [This goes to the issue of which types of firms creation benefit most from collateral access. The evidence suggests that smaller firms do so. But the fact that capital constraints bind also suggests that by typology, services firms, which are human capital intensive and require low levels of physical capital, benefit also more than average. Now, Ireland is human capital intensive economy, so draw your own conclusions.]

Adelino, Manuel, Schoar, Antoinette and Severino, Felipe, House Prices, Collateral and Self-Employment (March 2013). NBER Working Paper No. w18868. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2230758

Monday, May 13, 2013

13/5/2013: Banks Reputation Matters... for Borrowers too


Why banks reputations matter outside the interbank funding markets and regulatory offices? A question that is, perhaps, somewhat distant for Irish bank zombies, but ultimately the answer is not. It turns out, bank's reputation matters to the corporate borrower. And it matters materially.

Here's an interesting paper on this from Ongena, Steven R. G. and Roscovan, Viorel (see link below). As usual, italics are my own.

The authors argue that "banks play a special role as providers of informative signals about the quality and value of their borrowers. [Which is sort of trivial, when considered on 'accept' vs 'reject' or 0:1 basis. A '0' or 'reject' loan application signal provides information to the firm and to investors when the latter can observe the outcome of an application that the firm might be not as credit worthy as previously believed.]

Such signals, however, may have a quality of their own as the banks' selection and monitoring abilities may differ. [In other words, here's the core hypothesis: take two banks. Bank A has a lower capacity to price risk inherent in the firm than bank B. Over time, bank A repetitional capital should be lower than bank B. Now, firm 1 applies for a loan with A and B and gets rejected by B and accepted by A. Another firm, call it firm 2, applies for same loan and get accepted by B. Clearly, if the quality differential between A and B are known to the market, information about firms 1 and 2 experiences in applying for loans should matter in valuing firms 1 and 2.]

Using an event study methodology, we study the importance of the geographical origin and organization of the banks for the investors' assessments of firms' credit quality and economic worth following loan announcements. Our sample comprises 986 announcements of bank loans to US firms over the period of 1980–2003.

We find that investors react positively to such announcements if the loans are made by foreign or local banks, but not if the loans are made by banks that are located outside the firm's headquarters state. Investor reaction is, in fact, the largest when the bank is foreign.

Our evidence suggest that investors value relationships with more competitive and skilled banks rather than banks that have easier access to private information about the firms. [Confirming the core hypothesis above]"

Which is yet more bad news for Irish banks and the corporates stuck with them... and another reason why the banks reforms should deal with reputational fallout of this crisis as much as with macroprudential risks and regulatory capital cushions.


Ongena, Steven R. G. and Roscovan, Viorel, Bank Loan Announcements and Borrower Stock Returns: Does Bank Origin Matter? (June 2013). International Review of Finance, Vol. 13, Issue 2, pp. 137-159, 2013. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2262145

13/5/2013: Work Hours, Education Years and Wages


A fascinating fact: "An average person born in the United States in the second half of the 19th century completed 7 years of schooling and spent 58 hours a week working in the market. In contrast, an average person born at the end of the 20th century completed 14 years of schooling and spent 40 hours a week working. In the span of 100 years, completed years of schooling doubled and working hours decreased by 30%."

Restuccia, Diego and Vandenbroucke, Guillaume ask "What explains these trends?"

Their paper (link below) quantitatively assessed "the contribution of exogenous variations in productivity (wage) and life expectancy in accounting for the secular trends in educational attainment and hours of work."

And the result? "We find that the observed increase in wages and life expectancy accounts for 80% of the increase in years of schooling and 88% of the reduction in hours of work. Rising wages alone account for 75% of the increase in schooling and almost all the decrease in hours in the model, whereas rising life expectancy alone accounts for 25% of the increase in schooling and almost none of the decrease in hours of work."

Restuccia, Diego and Vandenbroucke, Guillaume, A Century of Human Capital and Hours (July 2013). Economic Inquiry, Vol. 51, Issue 3, pp. 1849-1866, 2013. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2261571

Aside 1: note that higher wages (when aligned with higher productivity) imply higher human capital intensity and lower hours of wrok supplied.

Aside 2: there seem to be no control for the reporting of hours supplied. In mid-19th century and even in first half of 20th century, most of work performed was time-sheeted. Today, majority of us do not have time cards, so on the surface, our contracts say 40 hours per week, in reality this means 60 hours per week.

13/5/2013: Unionisation and Innovation: Firm-level Data


A very interesting paper on the effects of unionisation of the workforce on firm-level innovation (italics are mine).

The authors find that "patent counts and citations, proxies for firms’ innovativeness, decline significantly after firms elect to unionize and increase significantly for firms that vote to deunionize. To establish causality, we use a regression discontinuity design relying on “locally” exogenous variation in unionization generated by union elections that pass or fail by a small margin of votes. The market reaction to firms that elect to unionize is negatively related to firms’ past innovation output [So if a firm had above average innovation output before the unionization, market reacts to bid down the firm value post-unionization in anticipation of the adverse impact]. Our evidence suggests unionization stifles innovation."

Slightly more specifically: "For instance, innovation quantity (quality) of firms that pass union elections within a margin of 2 percentage points is 42.8% (40.4%) lower than that of firms that do not pass union elections within a margin of 2 percentage points three years subsequent to union elections. We also estimate RDD on a sample of private firms over the same period. Consistent with our results for public
firms, we find that private firms’ innovativeness is negatively related to unionization."

Interestingly: "we attempt to identify possible underlying economic channels through which unionization impedes firm innovation. Inconsistent with the conventional view, we find little evidence that investment in R&D changes as a result of unionization. Our results suggest that the channel through which unionization impedes innovation is not an underinvestment in innovation input (i.e., R&D), but rather a decline in innovation productivity."

The whole paper is available here: Bradley, Daniel J., Kim, Incheol and Tian, Xuan, Providing Protection or Encouraging Holdup? The Effects of Labor Unions on Innovation (May 10, 2013). http://ssrn.com/abstract=2232351

13/5/2013: Cyprus CDS

It doesn't look like anyone (save for Olli Rehn) is betting on Cyprus' 'vast gas wealth' to be anywhere near its current account anytime within the next 5 years...

13/5/2013: Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurial Activity, 2012


Some absolutely fascinating data and insights on entrepreneurship in the US over the period of 1996-2012 in Fairlie, Robert W., Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurial Activity 1996-2012 (April 2013) (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256032 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2256032)

The paper is based on the Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurial Activity - an "indicator of new business creation in the United States. Capturing new business owners in their first month of significant business activity, this measure provides the earliest documentation of new business development across the country. The percentage of the adult, non-business owner population that starts a business each month is measured using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). In addition to this overall rate of entrepreneurial activity, separate estimates for specific demographic groups, states, and select metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) are presented. The Index provides the only national measure of business creation by specific demographic groups."

The paper extends the Index to 2012 data "with consideration of trends in the rates of entrepreneurial activity over the seventeen-year period between 1996 and 2012."

Key findings for 2012 data update:

  • "The rate of business creation declined from 320 out of 100,000 adults in 2011 to 300 out of 100,000 adults in 2012. 
  • "The business creation rate of 0.30 percent translates into approximately 514,000 new business owners each month during 2012; it was 543,000 in 2011. 
  • "The decline in the business creation rate to 0.30 percent in 2012 is …only slightly higher than pre-recessionary and long-term levels. The decline in business creation over the past year may be due to improving labor market conditions putting less pressure on individuals to start businesses out of necessity.
  • "The overall decline in business creation rates was entirely driven by a substantial decline in business creation rates among men. Entrepreneurial activity remained unchanged in 2012 for women.
  • "Immigrants were nearly twice as likely as were the native-born to start businesses each month in 2012. The immigrant rate of entrepreneurial activity decreased from 0.55 percent in 2011 to 0.49 percent in 2012.



  • "Over the past seventeen years, Latinos, Asians, and immigrants experienced rising shares of all new entrepreneurs, partly because of rising rates of entrepreneurship, but also because of increasing populations. The oldest age group (ages 55–64) also experienced a rising share of all new entrepreneurs, mainly because it represents an increasing share of the population.
  • "Although the entrepreneurship rate declined for high school dropouts from 2011 to 2012 (0.57 percent to 0.52 percent), this group has the highest rate of business creation, which may be due to more limited labor market opportunities than for more highly educated groups.




  • "The construction industry had the highest rate of entrepreneurial activity of all major industry groups in 2012 (1.43 percent). The second-highest rate of entrepreneurial activity was in the services industry (0.41 percent).
  • "The states with the highest rates of entrepreneurial activity were Montana (530 per 100,000 adults), Vermont (520 per 100,000 adults), New Mexico (520 per 100,000 adults), Alaska (430 per 100,000 adults), and Mississippi (430 per 100,000 adults). 
  • "The states with the lowest rates of entrepreneurial activity were Minnesota (150 per 100,000 adults), Nebraska (170 per 100,000 adults), Michigan (180 per 100,000 adults), Wisconsin (180 per 100,000 adults), and Ohio (190 per 100,000 adults).



  • "The states experiencing the largest increases in entrepreneurial activity rates over the past decade were Nevada (0.21 percentage points), Georgia (0.16 percentage points), Vermont (0.13 percentage points), California (0.12 percentage points), Louisiana (0.12 percentage points), and Massachusetts (0.12 percentage points).
  • "States that experienced the largest decreases in entrepreneurial activity rates were Wyoming (-0.13 percentage points), Wisconsin (-0.12 percentage points), and South Dakota (-0.10).
  • "Among the fifteen largest MSAs in the United States, Miami (0.56 percent) had the highest entrepreneurial activity rate in 2012, and Detroit (0.10 percent) had the lowest rate.