26/10/2013: Confidozac Failing to Cure Euro Area's Policy Risks

While the euro leaders are happily slipping into dream-like state of amnesia, engaging in esoteric discussions and debates about the US spying scandals, wasting summit time on chatter and fluffing of feathers, the region's trials are not going away.

Debt overhangs remain persistent in the public, non-financial corporate and households domains; incomes remain stagnant and declining in real terms; unemployment is sky-high; deficits are sky-high; lending is stuck in 'reverse' gear; depositors are getting taken for a ride by the banking system malfunctions; and so on... Aggregate levels of uncertainty/risk in the system are not abating back to the levels of pre-crisis bliss, no matter how much intensive Positiviagra, Hopium and Confidozac have been pumped into the airways...

Proof?

Source: Scott Baker, Nicholas Bloom and Steven J. Davis at www.PolicyUncertainty.com

Higher numbers above imply higher uncertainty. September is showing reversion to trend, up... Good news is that we are on downward trend. Bad news is that we've been in these 'false bottoms' before (Q3 2009 and Q4 2010-Q1 2011). Worse news is that the we are nowhere near the levels of uncertainty that we've reached at the peak of 2000s recession and dot.com bust, let alone the levels of 'normalcy'.

11/10/2013: Euromoney Credit Risk Analysis: Q3 2013

The Euromoney Country Risk survey results are out for Q3 2013 and here is some analysis with a comment from yours truly. As usual, emphasis is mine:

"Some 101 of the 186 countries surveyed have succumbed to lower ECR scores (increased risk) since June, which, with 17 unchanged, leaves just 68 safer, according to the views of global economists and other country-risk experts surveyed during the third quarter."

Core global drivers:

• US federal shutdown & looming debt-ceiling deadline 
• Concerns about monetary tapering, and 
• Europe’s fiscal problems.

"... the shake-out that occurred in the wake of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 has still left the majority of sovereigns – some 75% in all – with vastly increased risk levels than before the crisis; in the case of the eurozone periphery - Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain – an astonishing 25 to 50 points each."

Notice that in the above, Euro area shows the highest rate of deterioration of any region, save the CIS, and CIS deterioration is in part driven by links to the Euro area.

Per ECR: "US causing fewer flutters for G10 risk profile than Europe’s problems."

"Within the G10 group of leading industrialized nations, the US is not considered a particularly riskier prospect in spite of its latest political troubles. The world’s biggest economy has slipped to 17th in the rankings, but its score is still higher than at the start of the year."

In the case of Europe, core downward pressure drivers are:

• "The unwillingness to see the euro weaken", 
• "A banking sector still in need of repair",
• "Weak political resolve on budget issues"and 
• "Individual country economic prospects heading in different directions.”

Per ECR: "Indeed, greater concerns are reserved for 21st-placed France, with its fiscal targets missed and the economy remaining sluggish, as well as for Aaa-rated Sweden, in fifth spot, where a moribund economy and a government relaxing fiscal policy with tax cuts ahead of next year’s parliamentary election are gnawing away at the sovereign’s gold-plated creditworthiness."

"Both countries have seen their scores slip the most (by 0.7 points each since June), within a group where Germany is flat-lining as it awaits the formation of a new government..."

"In the European Union, 17 of its now 28 member states are riskier, whether compared with June or since the end of last year..."

"Remarkably, in spite of the recoveries witnessed in some of the bailout countries, notably Ireland and Portugal, the eurozone crisis is continuing to cause ripples, with no fewer than 10 of the 17 member states still succumbing to lower scores during Q3. This comes amid weak economies, excessively high unemployment rates, spikes in political risk, trade-weighted appreciation of the euro, and Greek borrowing concerns re-emerging to keep the region’s worst performer grounded on 34 points."

Notice Ireland's strong position second to Austria in terms of overall gains in the risk scores (lower risk).

"Constantin Gurdgiev, another ECR contributor, based in Dublin, says: “The changes in risk assessments broadly reflect improved sentiment across the euro area, consistent with both improved global growth outlook and internal regional stabilization in the wake of protracted sovereign debt and growth crises.

“[However] structural weaknesses and risks remain, with France presenting significant long-term risk due to the complete absence of serious efforts to reform the labour markets and address a chronic lack of investment in new enterprises formation.

“The US debt-ceiling uncertainty also presents a lower risk to the euro area economies than the longer-term upward pressure on US yields. As benchmark yields for the US and Germany deteriorate into 2014, there will be renewed pressure on funding excessive debt levels across the majority of the euro area economies, most notably for Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland, but also for Belgium and the Netherlands.”"

Apologies for shameless self-promotion... :-)

8/10/2013: German Voters Go For Status Quo... Redux: Sunday Times September 29, 2013

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from September 29, 2013.


By any measure, last Sunday's German elections highlighted a resounding failure of the country electorate to connect with reality. Despite returning a number of historical outcomes, the voters reaffirmed the passive-conservative leadership mandate exercised by Angela Merkel since 2009. As the result, German policies are now likely to drift even farther away from the immediate needs of the euro area periphery, risking a renewal of the euro area crisis and a slowdown in the already less-than ambitious speed of European reforms. None of this is good news for Ireland.

The historical nature of the 2013 German elections is highlighted by the fact that Angela Merkel became the first euro area leader to be reelected as the head of state since the beginning of the Great Recession. And she has done it twice: first some 12 months into the crisis in 2009 and now 5 years from its onset. Ms. Merkel won the highest number of votes for her CDU/CSU party in 23 years. And she became the first German leader since the golden days of Konrad Adenauer back in 1961 to personally dominate the elections, instead of standing in the shadow of her party. Individually, all of these are rare events in modern German history. Taken together, they are probably unprecedented.

But herein lies the problem for all of us living outside Germany. The elections of 2013 have produced a strong mandate for doing nothing new when it comes to either the euro area or the larger Union reforms. The Chancellor re-elect retook the Bundeskanzleramt on a mandate of being a 'safe pair of hands'. The campaign her party waged focused on such important topics as charging foreign drivers for using autobahns. Instead of debating the core issues faced by the EU, and the role of Germany in this mess, voters largely engaged in navel-gazing. Satisfied with their relatively well-performing economy and receding immediate danger to the euro, they endorsed the leadership devoid of ideas, alternative views and aspirations. Not surprisingly, philosopher Jurgen Habermas declared the 2013 general election campaign a "collective failure" of the elites.

This means that the German elections left the core problems of the euro crisis unaddressed, raising the specter of renewed uncertainty about the future of the common currency area. This concern became immediately visible this week.

On Monday, ECB's Mario Draghi rushed to compensate for the policy paralysis signaled out of Germany by stating that the ECB is ready to deploy a new round of quantitative easing in the form of the third Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO3). To remind you, the first two rounds of LTROs were the ECB’s ‘pre-nuclear option’ response to strategic threats to the euro area economy in late 2010-early 2011. The ‘nuclear option’ was the subsequent announcement of the stand-by quantitative easing programme, known as Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). Mr. Draghi mentioning the prospect of renewing the LTRO scheme suggests that the ECB expects no change in euro area policies in the aftermath of last week’s elections.

Acknowledging this, Draghi also tried to push aside the pesky issue of the Greek Bailout 3.0. And in a direct reflection of the Berlin’s preferences, Draghi also downplayed the possibility of the ESM being licensed to provide financing cover for future bank failures.

Mr Draghi’s precautionary moves were timed perfectly. Following the elections, sovereign yields on all peripheral countries’ bonds rose relative to German bunds. Credit default swaps – insurance contracts underwriting sovereign bonds – also crept up. The markets are not buying the ‘return to status quo’ story as good news. This was contrasted by the domestic news which saw the German economic sentiment, as measured by the CESIfo index of economic conditions rise for the third month in a row. This marks fifteenth consecutive quarter of the CESIfo index reading above historical average. In contrast, euro area economic conditions index has been stuck below its historical average levels for eight quarters in a row through this September.

Since 2009 elections, Chancellor Merkel held back from directly leading the euro area and instead opted repeatedly to wait for an escalation of the crises before responding with un-prepared, often ad hoc and wrong-footed solutions. Best examples of this approach to leadership are the EU's failures in Cyprus and Greece. Both are directly linked to Ms. Merkel’s prevarication in the face of escalating crises. All were driven by swings in domestic public opinion, rather than by any cohesive principles.

For Ireland, this mode of leadership spells lack of progress on key issues.

Gauging German public opinion there is currently zero appetite to shift away from the pre-elections status quo in which the Irish crisis is seen as largely self-induced and peripheral to German interests. This means that Germany is likely to continue supporting Irish debt sustainability rhetorically, while opposing practical resolution of the debt overhang. This week, Ms. Merkel gave another loud endorsement to Irish Government policies during the crisis. As she did so, the Irish Government – usually not known for its skeptical pragmatism – was actively pushing the timeline for banking debts problem resolution out into the later months of 2014. My gut feeling is that we can expect this timeline to stretch beyond 2015. Instead of allowing restructuring of our banking debts, Berlin will nod approvingly to a precautionary line of credit for Ireland via set-aside stand-by facility at the ESM. This credit will be provided on current ESM funding terms, some 1 percent below the cost of IMF funding and with longer maturities. Which is the good news.

In exchange for this token gesture we will be required to strictly adhere to fiscal adjustment targets for 2015. We will be further subjected to a new multi-annual fiscal programme stretching into 2018-2020 to be supervised by the EU Commission. ECB – by proxy, the German government – will be watching from the shadows.

Meanwhile, as Mr. Draghi statement this week indicates, Germany will block ESM from having any powers in dealing with future banking crises. Our retrospective banks debt deal will then have to wait until a new funding facility, most likely administered by the ECB, comes into place. Pencil that for sometime in 2016. Pushing legacy debts incurred by the Exchequer as the result of rescuing our banks into the hands of the ECB is likely to cost us. Frankfurt can, and potentially will, demand something in return for this. One thing the ECB can ask for is accelerated sales of the Central Bank-held Government bonds (the fallout from the Promissory Notes deal done earlier this year).  The ECB already has the power to do so. It also has a direct incentive: the bonds are set against our banks borrowings from the euro system. Of course, this will mean that we will be trading one debt for another, as accelerated sales of bonds will erode the temporary fiscal ‘savings’ achieved by the Promo Notes restructuring.

But the cost of the EU/German ‘assistance’ for Ireland will most likely extend further than bonds sales acceleration and new fiscal targets setting. German political agenda is well-anchored to continued saber-rattling on the need for corporate tax harmonization across the EU. With the 2009-2011 Franco-German tax harmonisation initiative all but dead, the focus in the next two-three years will shift toward advancing the consolidated common corporate tax base (CCCTB) proposals that suit German interests more than any other form of tax coordination. Based on her record to-date, Ms. Merkel is a fan of the CCCTB as are all of her potential coalition partners and the German voters.

German elections are also promising to create less certainty as to the structural reforms in the European Union space. Last Sunday’s results produced strong votes for the anti-euro party, Alternative fuer Deutschland (AfD). The party also did well in the previously held local elections. The new Merkel-led coalition will have to show caution when facing any prospect of further harmonisation and consolidation of power in Brussels.

When it comes to structural reforms, German public prefers for euro area to focus on specific hard fiscal targets and on replicating Germany's own structural reforms of the 1990s. While such reforms can be beneficent to the euro area peripheral states, for Ireland they offer only marginal gains. German reforms of the 1990s have focused on two core policy pillars: increasing flexibility of the labour markets and decreasing the burden of the welfare state. These came at a cost of continued consolidation of German economy around larger enterprises and suppression of domestic demand and household investment.

Ireland today requires some reforms in the social welfare system. But we also need to break up our dominant market players in the domestic sectors and to increase our households’ spending and investment.

In short, in the wake of the German elections, there is preciously little that Ireland can expect in terms of the European support for our recovery. Europe, with German blessing, will most likely lend us a hand to help us out of the 'safe' boat of the Troika programme. Thereafter, swimming in the turbulent waters of the Eurozone crisis will be up to us. Let's hope Budget 2014 provides generously for flotation vests.

BOX-OUT:

Marking the fifth anniversary of the Banking Guarantee of September 2008, there are plenty of stocktaking exercises going around. Yet, for all the ‘Fail’ marks being rightly handed out to the Guarantee, all signs in the streets suggest we have learned next to nothing from our past errors. This week offers at least two such examples. Firstly, the crisis showed that a non-transparent system of monitoring and managing financial risks will result in the connected-few gaming the entire system. This week, Minister Noonan intervened in the process of winding down the IBRC, bending the rules that normally apply to company liquidations. Granting anonymity to the funders of the toxic banks comes as a priority in this country. Unintended consequence of this is that it also perpetuates the cronyist relationship between the financial services and the state – exactly the outcome we should have learned to avoid. Secondly, we know that principles-based regulations require swift, robust and unambiguous enforcement. Also this week, the Central Bank effectively shut the door on any further investigations into Anglo dealings with the regulators that could have arisen from the infamous Anglo Tapes. Five years in, there are zero prosecutions, and scores of closed investigations. To paraphrase Bon Jovi’s famous refrain: the less we learn, the more things stay the same…

7/10/2013: IMF on Unconventional Monetary Policies Effectiveness

IMF released Policy Paper on Global Impact and Challenges of Unconventional Monetary Policies (UMPs). The paper covers all major monetary policy interventions across advanced economies and assesses their impact on emerging markets and advanced economies.

Here are some of the highlights of my analysis of the paper results:

When it comes to impact on bonds markets:

1) UMPs overall had zero statistical impact on bond yields in Ireland and Portugal, zero impact on Greece, except via a potential feed-through in commodities prices, moderate impact (reducing yields) for Italian Government bonds, and weak impact on Spanish yields.

2) There was significant statistically, but small overall adverse impact (increasing yields) for Germany and the Netherlands

Note: key to all tables:

3) Overall bond fund flows had zero impact on Irish and Portuguese bonds yields, adverse but small impact on Greek yields, small but positive impact on Spanish bonds yields and moderate positive impact on Italian bond yields.

4) UMPs overall had the impact of increasing bond flows for Ireland by 61.77% of GDP during the crisis, by 16.18% of GDP for Greece, by 8.32% for Italy, by 6.20% for Portugal and 10.68% for Spain.

5) In the case of Ireland, ALL of the increases in bond flows were associated with the US Fed and Bank of England interventions, and NONE with the ECB interventions. In other words, ECB policies seemed to have been absolutely irrelevant to Irish bonds flows.

6) In the case of Ireland, ECB interventions resulted in outflows (negative impact) on Irish equity funds, while Fed and BofE policies resulted in net inflows.

7) All UMPs combined had a net positive impact on equity funds flows in the case of Ireland of 24.48% of GDP, for Greece of 2.15% of GDP, for Italy of 0.77% of GDP and for Spain of 2.33% of GDP. For Portugal there was net negative effect of -1.17% of GDP - one of two countries in the euro area (with Austria) where net equity funds flows were negative as the result of UMPs interventions.

It appears that the ECB policies interventions were not supportive of the euro area periphery…

5/10/2013: Euromoney Country Risk: Italy v Spain

Euromoney Country Risk scores changes:

Notice-worthy:

• Improved score for Hungary driven by gains in Economic Assessment, Political Assessment and Structural Assessment
• Cyprus scores continue to deteriorate despite the claims from the Troika that the economy is close to 'stabilising'. Cyprus risk metrics are tanking at a rapid rate from 58.0 in March post-default rating to 52.1 only 6 months later.
• Spain is rated below Italy, but the two counter-moved in recent ratings, with scores differntials driven by the following:

The political cycle clearly disfavours Italy, but economic performance is on Italy's side.

Here's ECR's analysis on Italy v Spain, with comment from myself (you can click on slides to enlarge):

4/10/2013: IMF 11th review of Ireland: Growth Warnings

So IMF released its 11th review of Irish economy under the Extended Arrangement for funding.

Key points:

"Real GDP declined in the first quarter, reflecting a fall in exports and weak domestic demand. Nonetheless, fiscal results remain on track and sovereign and bank bond yields have risen relatively modestly in response to declining global risk  appetite. A range of other economic indicators are more encouraging, suggesting lower but still positive growth in 2013, though uncertainty remains. Growth projections for 2014 are also lowered given weaker prospects for consumption recovery and for trading partner growth."

So weaker than forecast growth conditions… ok… How much weaker?

"Balancing the weak GDP results for the first quarter against a range of more positive indicators, the growth projection for 2013 has been pared back by a ½ percentage point to 0.6 percent y/y, but uncertainties remain." Boom! Ugly stuff, folks. And replace 'but' with 'and' and you will get a double Boom!


"Most importantly, export growth has been cut by 1½ percentage points as data indicate a larger impact from the patent cliff and tepid recoveries in important trading partners. Lower imports dampen the impact on growth." Wait, weren't we told that patent cliff doesn't matter much cause exports are offset by imports etc?

"Domestic demand is expected to be flat, with private consumption still contracting modestly owing to fiscal consolidation and household debt reduction, cushioned by employment growth and low inflation. Fixed investment is expected to expand by some 2 percent given improving business sentiment and the uptick in housing starts, but remains the most volatile GDP component. This projection will need to be further reviewed when Q2 national accounts data become available near end September." We have that Q2 data available now… see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/09/2092013-domestic-economy-continuing-its.html and it ain't pretty…

More details here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/09/2092013-h1-2013-qna-domestic-economy-vs.html Net: Gross Fixed Capital Formation (basically investment in the economy) is down 9.40% in H1 2013 compared to H1 2012, down 14.09% compared to H1 2011 and down 67.73% compared to H1 2007. The reductions in capital investment jun H1 2013 compared to H1 2007 are ten-fold the size of reductions in current Government spending at EUR17,542 million. For another comparison, reductions in personal expenditure on goods and services by households over the same period is EUR4,757 million.

"Weaker consumption and export growth are expected to dampen the pace of recovery, with growth now penciled in at 1.8 percent in 2014. Export and consumption growth are expected to benefit from a projected rise in trading partner growth with employment growth contributing to incomes and confidence. Although consumption growth is still expected to become modestly positive in 2014, the pick up is weaker because a 1½ percentage point downward revision to household saving in 2012 suggests less room for lower savings given the priority households attach to debt reduction. Public consumption is also expected to be softer than previously anticipated as the full effects of the Haddington Road Agreement feed through in 2014. Export growth in 2014 is scaled back to reflect the possibility that recent weakness could persist."

Per IMF: "Growth firms to 2½ percent in 2015 as external growth rises further and fiscal consolidation eases, but durable recovery hinges on reversing the tide of NPLs." The miracle of 3%+ growth for ever, projected back in 2010-2011 to start in 2013-2014 is now replaced by the miracle of 2.5% growth projected to start in 2015… And the new projections out to 2018 no longer feature a single year of growth expected to rise above 2.5%… but all is still sustainable, just as it was in 2010 and 2011 and 2012 and… And the dream of 2.5% growth will, per IMF, be consistent with a positive output gap of ca 0.3%, which means that that is not the expected long-run real growth rate.

In effect, IMF admits now that Ireland cannot be expected to grow sustainably at the rates in excess of 3% per annum in real terms. Say goodbye to Ireland's 'growth miracle', say hello to Ireland's Belgium decades...


Another kicker: after 2015: "…the recovery continues to rely principally on net exports as domestic demand recovery is expected to be protracted as many households continue to deleverage in the medium term. Resolution of mortgages is not expected provide significant direct support to consumption recovery, as while some households may have a reduction in debt service due under a split mortgage restructuring, they may have previously been temporarily on interest-only terms, while other households may need to adjust consumption to serving their debt even if the debt service due is reduced. Rather it is expected that progress in reducing NPLs and enhancing bank profitability will gradually enhance the terms of banks’ access to market funding and their ability and willingness to lend to less indebted borrowers—which includes the younger cohort of households—unlocking housing market turnover and reducing household uncertainty."

Wow! So the IMF is warning us that things are going to remain tough even after the mortgages crisis 'resolutions'… Not like our Government is listening… And the IMF is telling us that the economy is going to get more polarised and paralysed... where did you hear that? Oh... http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/08/782013-sunday-times-july-28-2013.html

Employment: long-term unemployment remains a problem (we know that)… and surprisingly: "Facilitating SME examinership could aid resolution of SMEs in arrears, supporting their potential to invest and create jobs." Now, here's the key point: in all this excitement about family homes and repossessions we forgot that roughly 50% of SMEs loans are in arrears… and of the remaining 50%, unknown quantum is at risk… Hm… I wonder how that 'facilitated examinership' going to work for the employment stats and for property markets and mortgages arrears, when examiners go into the SMEs books to uncover potential subsidies to proprietor's income or when examinerships lead to cuts in employment levels?..

So back in 2011, IMF predicted Irish economy to grow 2.4% (GDP) in 2013, 2.9% in 2014 and 3.3% in 2015. This time, IMF is projecting Irish economy to grow 0.6% in 2013, 1.8% in 2014 and 2.5% in 2015. Nominal GDP was supposed to reach EUR182.5 billion by end of 2015 back in 2011 projections and is now forecast to reach EUR178.4 billion… What's being down EUR4.1 billion (one year difference) between friends, or EUR6.5 billion over three years, eh? Especially when all of this is sustainable, right?..

Still, gives us some perspective as to the whole circus going on: we are sticking to EUR3.1 billion fiscal target for 'adjustment' and washing off EUR4.1 billion in growth expectations underpinning 'sustainability' analysis… You'd think this is monkeys with abacus, but no - these are highly paid 'analysts', 'economists' on Government side, state side, sell-side at stockbrokerages and banks, ECB side, EU side, IMF side… And they all sing in unison: all is sustainable, just as they revise continuously their forecasts down and down and down. Which begs a question: at what stage will the sustainability malarky be replaced by the admission of the crisis? Presumably when GDP growth is revised to nil into perpetuity?

I will be updating charts on Irish economy forecasts from the IMF over the next few days, so stay tuned. Before that, I will be blogging more on key topics covered by the IMF review later today, also stay tuned…

23/9/2013: Everyone is doing more of the same, alongside German voters

And here we have it, folks: Germany votes for status quo, markets seem to be voting for the same...

Meanwhile, ECB is promising to do nothing new in larger quantities, should markets decide to follow Merkel in repeating more of the past...

16/9/2013: Some scary charts from BIS: Yields Blowing Up & Leverage Climbs

BIS Quarterly (http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1309a.pdf) has some interesting analysis of the US yields:

"An examination of the rise in US bond yields between May and July reveals as a key  driver the uncertainty about the future stance of monetary policy. The sell-off mainly shifted bond yields at long maturities, while the short end of the yield curve remained anchored by the Federal Reserve’s continued low interest rate policy."

"In addition, the federal funds futures curve also shifted upwards, signalling market perceptions that a policy rate exit from the current 0–0.25% band had become quite likely to occur as early as in the second quarter of 2014."

"A model-based decomposition of the  10-year US Treasury yield, which sheds light on the various drivers of these shifts,  indicates that the recent yield spike was largely the result of a rising term premium. This is consistent with markets reacting to uncertainty about the extent to which an improving economic outlook would affect future policy rates. It is also consistent with uncertainty as regards the impact that a reduction in the Federal Reserve’s purchases of long-term Treasuries would have on these securities’ prices."

"In comparison, the bond market sell-offs in 1994 and 2003–04 were different in  nature. During those episodes, long-term nominal yields rose together with policy rates or on the back of expected increases in future real interest rates and inflation. By contrast, inflation expectations were largely unchanged in the second and third quarters of 2013."

Basically, as we all know  by now, current yields have nothing to do with inflation and are solely priced by reference to expected liquidity conditions. Or put differently, nothing but printing press matters. So much for monetary policy-real growth links...


And BIS does deliver a nicely focused warning: "Their recent spike notwithstanding, bond yields in mature markets remained low by historical standards. For one, the yields on sovereign bonds in the largest world economies had been on a downward trend since 2007. And investment grade spreads in the United States, the euro area and the United Kingdom declined respectively by 75, 110 and 190 basis points between May 2012 and early September 2013, falling past their earlier troughs in 2010 and reaching levels last seen at end-2007. The evolution of the corresponding high-yield bond indices was similar, with spreads declining by 230 to 470 basis points over the same period."

Go no further than the second chart above: reversion to the mean is going to be brutal. And this brutality will only be reinforced by the fact that quietly, unnoticed by most, leverage has returned: overall share of leveraged and highly leveraged loans in total syndicated loan signings is now at all-time high.

Starting with page 6 (above link), the quarterly is a must-read as it exposes growing problem with high risk debt accumulation by investors and that amidst the historically low rates. The system is back at end-of-2007 levels of credit underpricing. The big difference today in contrast with 2007 is that no one has any bullets left to fight the bear, should one appear on the horizon.

9/8/2013: Political Waffle Passing for Learning?

Mr Schulz - the President of the European Parliament - has penned an op-ed that is available here: http://www.linkedin.com/today/post/article/20130809113308-239623471-did-we-really-learn-the-lessons-of-the-crisis?trk=tod-home-art-large_0


My response is as follows:

This article is a trite rehashing of cliches, some of which have served as pre-conditions to the crisis, by a man who is presiding over the institution complicit in creation of the crisis in the first place, as well as in exacerbating the adverse impact of the crisis on the member states of the EU. 

Let me just deal with the first set of Mr Schulz's core hypotheses: 

"Firstly, the invisible hand of the market does not work and needs a robust regulatory framework." 

Given that the Euro area crisis arose from the disastrous mis-management of the monetary union, the statement is absurd and ideologically dogmatic. Markets require proper regulation and are legally-based structures. Mr Schulz seems to fail to understand this and is confusing anarchy with the 'invisible hand' of the markets. European markets have failed, in part, due to wrong regulation (not the lack of regulation) and in part due to the lack of enforcement of existent regulation. Mr Schulz seems to have no idea as to these facts. Institutions that commonly failed to enforce existent regulations and treaties include, among others, the European Commission (allegedly reporting to the EU Parliament, that Mr Schulz presides over) and the European Parliament itself.

The markets failures were, in the case of the 'peripheral' euro states, exacerbated by the inactions and actions of the European authorities, including those by the European Parliament.

"Secondly, politics should gain primacy over markets and labour over capital." 

Primacy of politics over markets (or rather economics) in Europe is exactly what led us into this crisis. 

Political dominance over economic policies design is behind the creation of the monetary union and the expansion of the union to include countries that are not ready for a single currency regime. It is also responsible for the fraudulent ways in which some member states have acceded to the monetary union (e.g. Italy and Greece, where misreporting and financial instrumentation of deficits and debt were rampant and Mr Schulz's institution was amongst those that were aware of these facts, were required to be aware of these facts, and yet were inactive in the face of these facts). Politicization of the markets for Government bonds, for foreign exchange, for credit, for equity, for risk pricing, etc has been responsible for inducing many deep failures in the markets in Europe. For one, this politicization has led to an unsustainable debt accumulation in the private sector and transfer of private debts onto the shoulders of taxpayers. 

I might agree with Mr Schulz on the point of 'labour' supremacy over 'capital'. Alas these are poorly defined concepts in Mr Schulz's case. Labour can mean labour unions (organised labour movement) or labour as human capital (skills, entrepreneurship, creativity, etc) and everything in-between. All of these definitions will contain internal contradictions in incentives, preferences for policies and responses to policies to each other and to the definitions of capital that can be deployed. Mr Schulz fails to define the categories he references, which suggests that his assertions are once again nothing more than populist sloganeering. Mr Schulz seems to have no idea that capital can be physical, technological, financial, intellectual or human. That 'labour' can be complementary to physical and technological capital in which case primacy of labour over technology can be destructive to the objectives of both. Mr Schulz appears to be inhabiting a simplistic universe more corresponding to that inhabited by Marx and Engels in the late 1840s than the one that exists today.

"Thirdly, and most importantly, the economy and politics should return to the values of solidarity, social justice, decency and respect." 

This is both historically incorrect and, frankly put, too rich coming from someone heading a powerful EU institution. 

It is inherently incorrect because a return implies existence of something in the past. European societies never possessed any real sense of 'solidarity' or 'social justice' but historically (and to-date) relied on preservation of the status quo of distribution of wealth within the set confines of the European elites and independent of merit. Thus, Europe never pursued meritocratic systems of wealth and income allocations. And subsequently never developed such systems. What Mr Schulz might mean (and we are reduced here to guessing) is the return to the status quo of interest groups-driven 'social' allocations of resources - a system commonly known as tax (someone else) and spend (on me or my friends). 

It is a rich statement coming from Mr Schulz because he presides over the EU institution that was at least complicit in forcing member states to transfer private sector losses onto taxpayers and failed to structure properly core institutional frameworks of the EU. Whether this complicity involved errors of omission or commission is irrelevant. The outcomes of these errors are Greece today, Cyprus today, Ireland today, and Italy, Spain, Portugal and so on. From this point of view, the perspective of returning to values by the political and economic institutions of Europe would first and foremost involve (require) restructuring of the European institutions from the top. Mr Schulz's job would be on the line in any such process of renewal and return to accountability. 

That, alas, is the nature of leadership: you fail and you are gone. Writing op-eds full of well-meaning waffle is, frankly, not an excuse for the failures of both action and inaction.

23/7/2013: Ireland is not Greece... and never was...

Resting on one's laurels is a dodgy proposition. However, forgetting one's achievements is of an equally problematic virtue. To balance things up - a good reminder of Ireland's road travelled from the 1960s through 2008 and I have adjusted figures for Greece and Ireland for 2012 levels of GDP per capita based on IMF data.

Source: the original from World Bank, 2012.

Interesting bit - Ireland remains in the 'rich' club as a country that managed an elusive move from middle income economy in the 1960s to high income economy in 2000s and 2010s. Greece dropped out of the same group.

19/7/2013: Spain's Bad Loans: Heading for the Eurotroit solution?

Spanish banks bad loans ratio of all assets for May 2013:

H/T: Ioan Smith @moved_average

The Eurotroit keeps rolling on... Notice how Spain has by now largely erased the reductions in bad loans driven by assets shifts to 'bad bank' Sareb (EUR50.45bn portfolio, with 76,000 empty housing units, 6,300 rented homes, 14,900 plots of land and 84,300 loans). Spanish bad loans as a percentage of total credit rose from10.5% in March to over 11.2% in May.

And they will continue rising.

That's because in Spain, ultimate level of bad loans is going to be closer to Ireland's, where over 50% of SME loans are non-performing, over 25.8% of all mortgages are non-performing or at risk of default, and as of June 2013, 24.8% of all loans were non-performing, against EuroTanic's average 7.5-7.6% (EUR920bn or so). Irish numbers exclude Nama.

So even with the sunshine and sea, Costa del Concrete is going to cost Spain over 20% in terms of bad loans ratio in the end.

18/7/2013: One table, four entries, wealth of irony...

One cannot contain a sense of deep irony when looking at today's mid-day CDS markets snapshot from CMA:

In one table we have:

• Euro area CDS spread from Finland (implied cumulative 5 year probability of default of 2.02% - which is asymptotically zero), Greece (implied CPD of 50.85% after two previous defaults), and Cyprus (implied CPD of 65.39% after previous default). 
• Egypt (implied CPD of 41.22% after a coup d'etat) 

That's, as Mario Draghi put it on June 25th, "reflect[s] on the importance of a stable euro and a strong Europe" or perhaps, as he put it "the euro area is a more stable and resilient place to invest in than it was a year ago" or may be "I am confident that the project for Europe will continue to evolve towards renewed economic strength and social cohesion based on mutual trust, both within and across national borders, and above all stability". Take your pick... (link)

17/7/2013: Wrong Austerity Compounds the Failures of the Monetary Union

Recent CEPR paper DP9541 (July 2013), titled "Debt Crises and Risk Sharing: The Role of Markets versus Sovereigns" by Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Emiliano Luttini, and Bent E Sørensen (linked here: www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP9541.asp) used "a variance decomposition of shocks to GDP", in order to "quantify the role of international factor income, international transfers, and saving in achieving risk sharing during the recent European crisis."

Basic idea of the exercise was that a lack of saving in good times may reduce consumption smoothing in bad times, forcing households to cut back their spending and consumption more dramatically once recession hits.

Under perfect risk sharing, the consumption growth of individual countries should be completely independent from all other factors, conditional on world consumption growth.

The authors of the study "calculate how much of a shock to GDP is absorbed by various components of saving, in particular government saving, and other channels, such as net foreign factor income for the sub-periods 1990-2007, 2008-2009, and 2010." The key finding here is that "overall, risk sharing in the EU was significantly higher during 2008-2009 than it was during the earlier period, but total risk sharing more or less collapsed in 2010." Notably, 2010 is the year when European economies embarked on 'austerity' path, primarily and predominantly expressed (especially in the earlier stages) in tax increases. It is worth noting that there virtually no reductions in public spending during 2009 or 2010 across the EU and even in countries where spending was cut, such as Ireland, much of the reductions came from indirect taxation - e.g. transfers of health spending from public purse to private insurance.

Further, the authors "study how the crisis a affected risk sharing for "PIIGS" countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain), which were at the center of the sovereign debt crisis, compared to non-PIIGS countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom)."

Again, the findings are revealing: "For 1990-2009, risk sharing was mainly due to pro-cyclical government saving but the amount of risk sharing from government saving turned negative in 2010 for the PIIGS countries: government saving increased at the same time as GDP decreased." In other words - this is the exact effect of austerity as practised by the EU periphery.

"For [euro area peripheral] countries our measure of overall risk sharing turns negative because (conditional on world consumption growth) the decline in GDP in 2010 was accompanied by a more than proportional decline in consumption. This mirrors the behavior of emerging economies where government saving typically is counter-cyclical as shown by Kaminsky, Reinhart, and V egh (2005)."

Crucially, the study shows that there is basically no risk-sharing mechanism that operates on the entire euro area level. Even common currency zone - via lower interest rates - does not deliver risk sharing in 2010 and has potentially a very weak effect in 2008-2009 period. Worse, for the euro area peripheral states, euro has been a mechanism that seemed to have removed risk sharing opportunities both in and out of the crisis:

"…although non-PIIGS countries shared a non-negligible amount of risk during 2000{2007 while the PIIGS shared little risk in those years: in the good year 2005, consumption increased faster than GDP leading to "negative risk sharing." In 2008 and 2009 the major amount of GDP risk is shared for non-PIIGS with low consumption growth rates in spite of large drops in GDP, with the amount of risk shared in 2008 over 100 percent (positive consumption growth in spite of negative GDP growth). For the PIIGS, consumption declined very little in 2008 in spite of a large drop in GDP, while the drop in GDP in 2009 clearly led to declining consumption and, in 2010, consumption fell by almost as much as GDP, indicating little risk sharing."

Top line conclusion: once the authors "decompose risk sharing from saving into contributions from government and private saving", data reveals "that fiscal austerity programs played an important role in hindering risk sharing during the sovereign debt crisis."

12/7/2013: Euromoney Country Risk: Q2 2013 update

Euromoney Country Risk Survey Q2 2013 update is out today, showing continued divergence in risk perceptions about Brics and Europe (rising risks) and North America and Latin America (falling risks):

Largest risk increases are:

One area of interest from my personal perspective: Russia:

"With one or two exceptions, the majority of former Soviet independent states, alongside Russia, have become riskier this year, continuing longer-term trends.

Diminishing economic growth is imparting a negative impact on the region, especially in light of the slowdown in Russia (Russia: Stagnant oil price dampens economic outlook).

However, the risks are also tied to worsening perceptions concerning other indicators, and for a variety of reasons, ranging from Russia’s institutional underpinnings and corruption record, and government stability in Azerbaijan, to currency and information access/transparency concerns in Ukraine and Georgia’s regulatory and policy environment.

The Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova – the latter especially – have seen their political risk profiles downgraded sharply, highlighting the region’s flaws, its failure to capitalize on the eurozone’s worse risk-return opportunities, and why Russia, ranking 62nd globally, is still the only country to score more than 50 out of 100."

I gave a comment on Russian scores changes:

My full view is as follows:

In my view, increased risks associated with the Russian economy relate to the lack of structural drivers for growth, lagging reforms and low returns on reforms already enacted, plus the overall downward revision of the emerging markets and commodities in the environment of highly uncertain and subdued global growth.

Russian Government drive toward modernisation of the economy has dramatically slowed down and is no longer appearing to be a long-term priority for policy development. At the same time, investment in the economy has fallen off the cliff due to a combination of exhaustion of construction investment, Cyprus crisis, continued low FDI and reduced overall economic growth, as well as the perception that tax increases are likely in the near future. Looming ruble devaluation is reducing both FDI and internal investment.

Institutional capital is lagging and remains largely un-effected by reforms rhetoric. If anything, last 24-30 months have seen sustained deterioration in reforms efforts. The comprehensive agenda for modernisation of the economy has been pretty much frozen, if not abandoned.

On the longer-term horizon, emergence of alternative energy supplies and shale gas reserves development worldwide is starting to feed through to the forecasts for future current account and earnings capacity of the Russian economy.

However, there is a negative bias built into markets analysts expectations and assessments of the Russian economy, compared to other BRICS. Brazil and India have largely unsustainable models of longer-term growth driven by internal investment dynamics, instead of institutional capital build up, China is a massive credit bubble ready to blow with current account surpluses acting as the only potential buffer, given already extensive expansion of credit and money supply undertaken, and South Africa is hardly a sustainable, or significant in global terms, economy by any measure. In my opinion, Russia's economic future is highly uncertain. But of all BRICS - Russia has the best potential for stable and sustainable growth based on intrinsic workforce and domestic investment and demand potentials. Whether it will realise these potentials is a different matter.

12/7/2013: Few links on European Federalism

Recently, I wrote about the emergence of federalist movement in Europe and the requirement for federalisation to proceed along the direction and depth consistent with looser, more locally-based and flexible path of Swiss Federalism. The original post is here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/06/1962013-european-federalism-and-emu.html

In a Project Syndicate article, Hans Helmut Kotz makes a very similar point, including the strong positioning of weaker federalist model as risk management driver for future policies:
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/germany-s-economic-groupthink-by-hans-helmut-kotz

Couple quotes (italics are mine):

"... if the eurozone is to be a sensible long-term proposition, mere survival is not enough. The main justification for a monetary union cannot be the possibly disastrous consequences of its falling apart. Even less convincing is the neo-mercantilist point that the eurozone would allow for indefinite current-account surpluses (it does not)."

"Originally, Europe’s monetary union was supposed to provide a stable framework for its deeply integrated economies to enhance living standards sustainably. It still can. But this requires acknowledging what the crisis has revealed: the eurozone’s institutional flaws. Remedying them calls for a minimum of federalism and commensurate democratic legitimacy – and thus for greater openness to institutional adaptation."


Update: Swiss Confederate system is once again coming up as a model for the EU Federalissation here: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/06/20/the-eu-should-take-inspiration-from-switzerland-in-its-attempts-to-increase-democratic-legitimacy/

8/7/2013: IMF on Euro Area: Repetition in the Endless Unlearning of Reality

IMF released its statement on 2013 Article IV Consultation with the Euro Area

The Statement reads (emphasis mine):
"Policy actions over the past year have addressed important tail risks and stabilized financial markets. But growth remains weak and unemployment is at a record high."

So what needs to be done, you might ask? Oh, nothing new, really. Euro area needs:
-- To take "concerted policy actions to restore financial sector health and complete the banking union". Wait… err… this was not planned to-date? Really?
-- "continued demand support in the near term and deeper structural reforms throughout the euro area remain instrumental to raise growth and create jobs". In other words: find some dish to spend on stuff and hope this will do the trick on short-term growth. Reform thereafter.

Not exactly encouraging? How about this: "…the centrifugal forces across the euro area remain serious and are pulling down growth everywhere. Financial markets are still fragmented along national borders and the cost of borrowing for the private sector is high in the periphery, particularly for smaller enterprises. Ailing banks continue to hold back the flow of credit." So the solution is - more credit? Now, what did we call credit in old days? Right… debt, so: "In the face of high private debt and continued uncertainty, households and firms are postponing spending—previously, this was mainly a problem of the periphery but uncertainty over the adequacy and timing of the policy response is now making itself felt in falling demand in the core as well." Wait a second, now: more credit… err… debt will solve the problem, but the problem is too much debt… err… credit from the past…

Ok, from IMF own publication earlier this year, what happens when credit - debt - is let loose:

Source: http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2013/03/05/a-missing-piece-in-europes-growth-puzzle/


Just in case you need more of this absurdity: "…reviving growth and employment is imperative. This requires actions on multiple fronts—repairing banks’ balance sheets, making further progress on banking union, supporting demand, and advancing structural reforms. These actions would be mutually reinforcing: measures to improve credit conditions in the periphery would boost investment and job creation in new productive sectors, which in turn would help restore competitiveness and raise growth in these economies. A piecemeal approach, on the other hand, could further undermine confidence and leave the euro area vulnerable to renewed stress." Oh, well, 5 years ago we needed

1. 'actions on repairing banks balance sheets' - five years later, we still need them;
2. actions on 'supporting demand' - aka, no tax increases and some investment stimulus - five years on, we still need them;
3. actions on 'advancing structural reforms' and five years on, we still need them too;
4. "measures to improve credit conditions in the periphery would boost investment and job creation in new productive sectors" - wait a second ten years ago we had easy credit conditions in the periphery and they failed comprehensively to 'boost investment and job creation in new productive sectors', having gone instead to fuel property and public spending bubbles… five years since the start of the crisis, we now should expect a sudden change in the economies response to easier credit supply?

IMF is more sound on banks: "bank losses need to be fully recognized, frail but viable banks recapitalized, and non-viable banks closed or restructured". But, five years, bank losses needed to be fully recognised too and we are still waiting. And when it comes to closing or restructuring non-viable banks, pardon me, but where was the IMF in the case of Ireland when the country was forced by the ECB to underwrite non-viable banks with taxpayers funds?

"A credible assessment of bank balance sheets is necessary to lift confidence in the euro area financial system." Ok, we had three assessments of euro area banks - none credible and all highly questionable in outcomes. Five years in, we are still waiting for an honest, open, transparent assessment.

Cutting past the complete waffle on the banking union and ESM, "The ECB could build on existing instruments—such as a new LTRO of longer tenor coupled with a review of current collateral policies, particularly on loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME)—or undertake a targeted LTRO specifically linked to new SME lending." Ooops, I have been saying for years now that the ECB should create a long-term funding pool for most distressed banks, stretching 10-15 years. Five years into the crisis - still waiting.


On structural reforms, IMF is going now broader and further than before and I like their migration:

"For the euro area, …a targeted implementation of the Services Directive would remove barriers to protected professions, promote cross-border competition, and, ultimately, raise productivity and incomes. A new round of free trade agreements could provide a much-needed push to improve services productivity. In addition, further support for credit and investment could be achieved through EIB facilities. The securitization schemes proposed by the European Commission and the European Investment Bank could also underpin SME lending and capital market development." Do note that the last two proposals are still about debt generation (see above).

"At the national level, labor market rigidities [same-old] should be tackled to raise participation, address duality—which disproportionally hurts younger workers—and, where necessary, promote more flexible bargaining arrangements. At the same time, lowering regulatory barriers to entry and exit of firms and tackling vested interests in the product markets throughout the euro area would support competitiveness, as it would deliver a shift of resources to export sectors [ok, awkwardly put, but pretty much on the money. Except, greatest protectionism in the EU is accorded to banks and famers, and these require first and foremost restructuring]."

In short - little new imagination, loads of old statements replays and little irony in recognising that much of this has been said before… five years before, four years before, three years before, two years before, a year before… you get my point.

8/7/2013: The More Things Change... in Greece

So Greece - off-the-charts in terms of not meeting its 'Programme' requirements has been fudged:

Now, recall:

• Privatizations penned in for 2012-2013 are not happening - at all,
• IMF requirement for at least full year funding held in reserves - not fulfilled at all,
• 12,500 public sector workers that were to be put into 're-allocation or redundancy' pool are not there,
• There is a massive overspend in a number of areas, including health, with a shortfall of EUR1bn at the state-owned EOPYY health insurer,
• Income tax, property tax and corporate tax are not being enforced in full, despite numerous promises...

Earlier this am I predicted that:

And per IMF release above, this is exactly what has happened - fudging complete... And what fudging!

While Troika says that outlook for the country remain uncertain, there has been a staff-level (technocrats) agreement on new 'reforms' on top of the old one on which Greece failed to deliver. And these new reforms - hold your breath - are more cuts in health spending, repeated promises to cut 12,500 public employees, and more tax reforms... The more things change...

"The More Things Change the more the stay the same

The more things change the more the stay the same

Ah, is it just me or does anybody see

The new improved tomorrow isn't what it used to be

Yesterday keeps comin' 'round, it's just reality

It's the same damn song with a different melody

The market keeps on crashin' "...

Well, at least markets are not yet crashin' cause 'Greece really doesn't matter anymore' theory, right?..


Updated: 

The Eurogroup continued the endless parade of statements, comments and instructions today with this: http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/newsroom/news/2013/07/eurogroup-statement-on-greece/ which is largely the same drivel as already released by the Troika.

Some exceptions:

The Eurogroup also takes note that the economic outlook is largely unchanged from the previous review and is encouraged by the early signals pointing to a gradual return to growth in 2014.

I mean, ok, the logic is iron-clad: for months we've noticed that things are largely unchanged, but we've had rounds and rounds of changes made to T&Cs of the 'bailout' because things are largely unchanged. Still, our expectations never stopped changing... the recovery previously penciled in for 2012 has been moved to H2 2012, then H1 2013, then H2 2013 and now to H1 2014 or maybe H2 2014...

and more:

The Eurogroup commends the authorities for their continued commitment to implement the required reforms

But obviously, these are not enough and are not being implemented, so the commendations are for what?.. Alternatively - they are enough and are bing implemented, in which case why is Eurogroup issuing any statements on Greece?

At the same time, significant further work is needed over the next weeks to fully implement all prior actions required for the next disbursement

Aha, now I understand - 'further work' is needed... except, wait a second, the 'further work' is the 'prior-agreed work' that... per above statement is a part of 'commitment to implement'... which Greece either has delivered (per commendation) or failed to deliver (per rather urgent 'need for further work')... so which one?..

Much of the rest in the statement is rather specific and make sone wonder - if Greece is being asked to do in the next two weeks what it has failed to do in last 12 months, why on earth is Greece deserving and commendations or, alternatively, how on earth can it be expected to deliver that?!

Never mind, all of it is pure fudge - Greece will not deliver 12,500 souls to the Purgatorio and it will not be able to tighten tax collection (something it failed to do over close to 50 years) in time for October 2104. And the Eurogroup is not expecting it to. Instead, there will be noise of compliance, sound of cash register emptying, followed by 3 months of calm and German elections.

To quote another musician:

So long, Marianne, it's time that we beganTo laugh and cry and cryAnd laugh about it all again
Laugh about it, folks... for following the Eurogroup statement, the IMF Chief, Christine Lagarde went out to face the public with a claim that, hold your breath, Euro area needs growth and ... deep gulp of air, please... jobs.

So long, Marianne, it's time that we began...

19/6/2013: European Federalism and EMU Experience

There is a number of flaws in the euro area design that were exposed by the current crisis. Perhaps the most fundamental is the flaw relating to the system complete incapacity to generate critical capacity. Despite the crisis continuing for the 7th year in a row, the EU and the euro area as its core sub-set remains unable to ask the key question of viability of the social, political and economic project based on the premise that ever-increasing levels of policies and institutions integration, harmonisation and coordination is a feasible and a desired direction to pursue.

Let's start from the top.

Firstly, it is now pretty much an accepted wisdom that in shaping the EMU, European leaders have failed to see even the basic implications of deep integration. The implications missed were not just monetary or economic. Current crisis has shown deep divisions within the euro area on matters such as inflationary preferences, expectations formation mechanisms, conditionality evaluations and fiscal transfers, all cutting across social and cultural division lines, rather than purely economic ones. This failure has led to the design flaws that are principles-based and, as such, cannot be corrected by managerialist solutions. They require structural change - a matter of concern for Europe, so far incapable of following through with even managerialist changes, such as adherence to well-specified Maastricht Criteria targets at the times of aplenty or expression of any solidarity at the times of constraints. There is little hope the EU can deliver on much less defined, broader and, at the same time, culturally and socially more challenging reforms and changes required to move the euro project forward, away from the danger zone.

Secondly, it is also pretty clear that the EU institutions are incapable of learning from the mistakes of their leaders and from the signals transmitted from the nation states and the electorates. Instead of making an effort to understand the underlying causes for a rushed, poorly planned and poorly executed monetary policy harmonisation, the EU leaders are now jumping head-in into attempting to cure the sever hangover from the common currency creation by doing more of the same - embracing the idea of banking and financial services integration (the Banking Union - EBU) and political consolidation (the Political Union - EPU).

A combination of the two directions will, under these conditions, risk leading Europe toward a repeat of the EMU fiasco on a much grander scale - a failure of all three 'unions' - the EMU, the EBU and the EPU. History can repeat itself, having shown its hand today as a structural crisis in one area of the system, with a replay of the crisis across the entire system.

There are number of reasons for this conjecture.

The EU's latest drives - across political and banking dimensions - into deeper integration are lacking the deep foundations on both, the demand and supply sides of their respective equations. In this, they are  exactly mirroring the EMU creation that too faced the original minor crisis in the 1990s only to be pushed through in the noughties.

In case of the EPU, the lack of these foundations is even more fundamental than in the case of EMU or EBU. EPU has no political legitimacy and is losing any potential future legitimacy on a daily basis. EU institutions and even the core ideas of the later-stages EU (EMU, Fiscal Compact, 6+2 Pack packages of legislation etc) are deep under water when it comes to popular mandates. All Eurobarometer surveys show rising dissatisfaction across the EU with the European institutions, including the common currency. The two words 'democratic deficit' that were present in the European politics prior to the crisis are now, probabilistically-speaking, dominate the popular and national discourse about Europe in every country of the Union, including the new Accession states. A popular mandate in Iceland has led to cancellation of the EU Accession talks this month.

Only doctrinaire Europhiles, and even then, predominantly within smaller countries' national elites, as exemplified by some members of Ireland's ruling coalition, today deny the presence of this deficit at the fundamental level across all European institutions.

There is also a major problem of Europe's 'capability deficit'. Brussels - full of (mostly) men in suits with offices to go to after lunch is hardly a source for inspiration or for leadership. And absent inspiration, perspiration does not work all too well. The entire European project lacks vitality, and thus - viability. There is no enthusiasm, no ideal, no dream. These were exhausted at the stages in the project history when 'peace between France and Germany' had meaningful referential counter-point (it no longer has, as no one sane enough would conjecture that absent the EU, Alsace will be once again dug into an anti-tank trenches giant washing board) or when the EU (brilliantly and correctly) was expanding the liberty of trade and freedom of movement across its internal borders. Absent purpose, leadership is wanting too. The void is filled with simulacra of bureaucrateese: the alphabet soup of 'programmes' such as ESM, EFSF, EFS, OMT, EBU, and so on, all the way until ordinary European gets lost in the world of corridors, meeting rooms, windowless conference venues, meaningless letters and mumbo-jumbo of various white papers, etc.

To confront these deficits, the EU is creating even more bureacrateese - papers, positions, plenaries, meetings, councils, pacts, compacts, conferences, agendas.

Amidst this, Europe still lacks a single face capable of holding its own in front of the electorate. Lacks, that is, on the 'federalist' or pro-EU side. There are rhetorically competent MEPs on the opposition side of the chamber, but there is not a single appointed or elected leader of the 'official' Europe capable of not putting to sleep at least half of his/her audience.

Europe has 4 'Presidents' today: President [of the Commission] Mr Jose Manuel Barroso, President [of the Council] Herman von Rompuy, President [of the Parliament] Martin Shulz, President [of the Eurogroup] Jeroen Dijsselbloem. Absent the latter one, not a single one have been known for talking straight on any hard issues. Including the latter one, none inspire many to anything akin the commitments and sacrifices required to achieve meaningful federalisation of the EU. All, with no exception, got their EU positions bypassing direct election by the voters of Europe. Power and responsibilities of each are directly proportional to the distance by which they are removed from the European electorate. When these levels of confusion and power politics dispersion are not enough, there's always a fifth President lurking around: the Head of the Presidency State. In Henry Kissinger's terminology, the question is not 'Who do you call when you want to speak to Europe?' can now be replaced by 'Who do you not call?' Latest G8 summit photos stood as a great exemplification of the problem: there amidst leaders of 8 nations stood three 'leaders' of Europe, not because they had anything to say, but because they had to be there to upstage one another.

The five-headed 'leadership' beast is now on a quest to 'increase democratic mandate' of the EU Commission. To do so, it is proposed that the blocks of parties shall be formed in the EU Parliament to 'nominate' the next Commission and its President. In other words, the EU leadership sees 'renewal' and 'democratic participation' as a function of optics. Dominant blocks of largely sclerotic national-level parties will be dominating the EU legislature and executive to simply replicate the stasis that has captured national political platforms of the main EU states: Germany, France, Italy and Spain. Effective opposition will remain impossible, just as it remains today, but the fig leaf of 'more direct' ('slightly less-managed') democracy will act to cover this up from, hopefully, oblivious or satisfied electorates.

Thus, by design from above (not by will from below), the EU is supposed to move toward a two-party system, replicative of the traditional core parties of the national politics: the centre-left with a clientilist base in unions, state employees and 'social pillars' - the 'social democratic centre'; and the centre-right with a clientilist base of 'employers confederations' and state managers - the 'populist & conservative movements'.

The dynamism of such a system will be equivalent to the excitement of a turtles race on sticky putty. Or differently, a two-party system will do for the political leadership what the Euro did for the monetary policy - put a straightjacket of superficial conformity onto the society that for centuries was based on differentiation-driven boundaries and nation states.

Both demographic and socio-economic changes from the 1945 through today, in Europe as elsewhere, have meant emergence of more diversity and differentiation in markets for everything, starting with simple products, such as diapers to complex services, such as healthcare. To assume that politics and ideologies can remain in the stasis of the two, adjoining at the centre and even overlapping, sets of ideals and policies is about as naive and counterproductive as it was to assume that Greece and Finland, or Latvia and Portugal, can be brought into single currency within a span of one/two decades.

There are three key ingredients that are required to sustain two-party system: 1) stability of ideological preferences (informed by popular objectives for policy), 2) allegiance to the single unifying institution of the state overriding local/national/ethnic or even more atomistic allegiances and interests, and 3) organic evolution of the two-party system (usually out of the bifurcating economic power balance, such as land-owners vs capital owners, workers vs capital owners etc).

Modern world, especially the world of Europe, does not support either one of these preconditions. Current conflicts and, thus, incentives lines are drawn across generations; skills groups; risk-taking capabilities and preferences of populations; national and even sub-national distinctions; ethnic, historical and cultural differences and grievances; external threats that range across a very wide spectrum from immigration from the South to hegemonic threat from the East, to cultural threat from the West, and so on. Two ideologies can never capture this diversity, let alone provide a sufficient basis for forming participatory democratic institutions. Look no further than internal nation states' dynamics in the UK (Scotland, Norther Ireland, Wales), Italy (North, South, East), Spain (Centre, North-East, North-West), Belgium, and recall the fate of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia. Look at the emergence of challengers to the two-party systems in all European states - never quite capable of displacing one of the parties of the 'old' system, but always present, reflective of the ongoing process of atomisation, or rather customisation of politics.

At the same time, with hundreds of millions spent on propagandising the concept of European citizenship, Europeans remain in deep allegiance to their nation-states, and in many Federal states - to their local 'tribes'. In fact, the EU has been recognising this and reinforcing the locally-anchored distinctions. Culturally, everyday life matters more to the majority of Europeans today that the 'geopolitical' aspirations of Brussels. And culturally, we are living in an increasingly 'goo-cal' world, where trade delivers to us goods and services from all over the world, but we identify ourselves on the basis of goods and services that are local in origin.

In the countries, where two-party system seemingly is stable - e.g. the US and the UK - underneath the surface, the fact that the two-party system fails to capture sufficient percentage of population in an ever-increasingly individualised world is also evident. It is expressed in the stalemate produced by the system where mainstream parties are captive to small minorities of activists and are often torn internally by sub-groups and sub-interests.

Lastly, the two-party system of ideological debate has been shown inadequate in the face of the current crisis.

Looking forward, this failure is extremely significant. In order to work, compared to today's EU, the EPU must be either comprehensive or devolved. On the latter, see below. The former requires significant transfer of power and power base to the EU, implying ca 20% of GDP-sized Federal Government, dominant power of taxation, harmonisation of core public services, such as health, social security, pensions, education. The member states will be allowed some 'gold-plating' of the Federally-set standards, but the standards will have to be set nonetheless. The reason for this is that in a real Federal Union, there will be a functional Transfer Union and that implies standardisation of services funded by transfers. A two-party system will never be able to break away from the sub-national political bases sufficiently enough to deliver such homogenisation.


If European federalism is to evolve, it will have to evolve on the basis of accommodating more diversity, not by homogenising the system by reducing differentiation and fragmentation of the political institutions. It will have to adopt market-like features where turnover of ideas is fast, deployment of solutions (goods and services) is rapid and never permanent, and the system thrives on diversity. This is the exact opposite of the harmonisation and consolidation implicit in traditional federalism, but is rather more consistent with Swiss federalism. The key to this form of federalism is that it severely limits the central powers of taxation and redistribution of resources and vests powers of policy origination, design and implementation in local hands. It also acts to encourage policy heterogeneity - an added bonus in the world of uncertainty, as it allows for creation of policy hedges: a shock impacting different systems differently necessarily shows both the pitfalls and the strengths of various institutions and regulations. In other words, Europe needs less of European centralisation and more of European diversity.

Before this can be delivered, however, Europe needs to systemically dismantle or reduce those institutions that act as an impediment to bottom-up governance - the institutions of centralisation of power.

The first for a review should be the strictest of them all - the euro. Here, the required change will see assisted exits from the euro of non-core states, leaving behind only those countries for which monetary harmonisation makes sense. Most likely these are Germany, Finland, Czech, Austria, and possibly Belgium and the Netherlands. Other countries can revert to their own currencies and/or run open currency system with euro remaining one of the legal tenders in their economies. Belgium and Luxembourg can run in a union with France, if so desired.

The second candidate for restructuring will be the EU Commission. The President of the Commission should be elected on the basis of direct vote with state-based 'electoral' voting system similar to that of the US, to alleviate extremes of population-weighted distribution of votes. The President then can appoint her/his own Commission on the basis of: (1) each member state must be represented in the Commission, (2) Commission candidates can be nominated by member states, the EU Parliament and the President, (3) each member is confirmed independently by the EU Parliament and the Senate.

The third candidate for reform is the EU legislature. The European Parliament should be augmented by the independent, separately elected Senate, based on member states' representation principle and vested with the powers similar to that of the US Senate. The Senate should be directly elected and it should replace the current Council. To strengthen direct links between nation states and the Senate, the formal leaders of the nation states (e.g Italian and Irish presidents) should serve as senators representing their states.

The fourth candidate for reform should be the system of European checks and balances. This should, among others, include a Constitutional ceiling on taxation and redistribution powers.


There are other reforms that will be required. This is hardly a place to attempt to narrate them all. However, the key principle is that the EU needs a drastic reconstruction of its upper levels of legislative and executive powers. And the key question that is yet to be asked and debated (a necessary pre-condition to deriving any solutions) is whether the proposed EPU (and to a less important extent, the proposed EBU) stand a chance of working out any better than the failing EMU?