9/8/2013: Political Waffle Passing for Learning?

Mr Schulz - the President of the European Parliament - has penned an op-ed that is available here: http://www.linkedin.com/today/post/article/20130809113308-239623471-did-we-really-learn-the-lessons-of-the-crisis?trk=tod-home-art-large_0


My response is as follows:

This article is a trite rehashing of cliches, some of which have served as pre-conditions to the crisis, by a man who is presiding over the institution complicit in creation of the crisis in the first place, as well as in exacerbating the adverse impact of the crisis on the member states of the EU. 

Let me just deal with the first set of Mr Schulz's core hypotheses: 

"Firstly, the invisible hand of the market does not work and needs a robust regulatory framework." 

Given that the Euro area crisis arose from the disastrous mis-management of the monetary union, the statement is absurd and ideologically dogmatic. Markets require proper regulation and are legally-based structures. Mr Schulz seems to fail to understand this and is confusing anarchy with the 'invisible hand' of the markets. European markets have failed, in part, due to wrong regulation (not the lack of regulation) and in part due to the lack of enforcement of existent regulation. Mr Schulz seems to have no idea as to these facts. Institutions that commonly failed to enforce existent regulations and treaties include, among others, the European Commission (allegedly reporting to the EU Parliament, that Mr Schulz presides over) and the European Parliament itself.

The markets failures were, in the case of the 'peripheral' euro states, exacerbated by the inactions and actions of the European authorities, including those by the European Parliament.

"Secondly, politics should gain primacy over markets and labour over capital." 

Primacy of politics over markets (or rather economics) in Europe is exactly what led us into this crisis. 

Political dominance over economic policies design is behind the creation of the monetary union and the expansion of the union to include countries that are not ready for a single currency regime. It is also responsible for the fraudulent ways in which some member states have acceded to the monetary union (e.g. Italy and Greece, where misreporting and financial instrumentation of deficits and debt were rampant and Mr Schulz's institution was amongst those that were aware of these facts, were required to be aware of these facts, and yet were inactive in the face of these facts). Politicization of the markets for Government bonds, for foreign exchange, for credit, for equity, for risk pricing, etc has been responsible for inducing many deep failures in the markets in Europe. For one, this politicization has led to an unsustainable debt accumulation in the private sector and transfer of private debts onto the shoulders of taxpayers. 

I might agree with Mr Schulz on the point of 'labour' supremacy over 'capital'. Alas these are poorly defined concepts in Mr Schulz's case. Labour can mean labour unions (organised labour movement) or labour as human capital (skills, entrepreneurship, creativity, etc) and everything in-between. All of these definitions will contain internal contradictions in incentives, preferences for policies and responses to policies to each other and to the definitions of capital that can be deployed. Mr Schulz fails to define the categories he references, which suggests that his assertions are once again nothing more than populist sloganeering. Mr Schulz seems to have no idea that capital can be physical, technological, financial, intellectual or human. That 'labour' can be complementary to physical and technological capital in which case primacy of labour over technology can be destructive to the objectives of both. Mr Schulz appears to be inhabiting a simplistic universe more corresponding to that inhabited by Marx and Engels in the late 1840s than the one that exists today.

"Thirdly, and most importantly, the economy and politics should return to the values of solidarity, social justice, decency and respect." 

This is both historically incorrect and, frankly put, too rich coming from someone heading a powerful EU institution. 

It is inherently incorrect because a return implies existence of something in the past. European societies never possessed any real sense of 'solidarity' or 'social justice' but historically (and to-date) relied on preservation of the status quo of distribution of wealth within the set confines of the European elites and independent of merit. Thus, Europe never pursued meritocratic systems of wealth and income allocations. And subsequently never developed such systems. What Mr Schulz might mean (and we are reduced here to guessing) is the return to the status quo of interest groups-driven 'social' allocations of resources - a system commonly known as tax (someone else) and spend (on me or my friends). 

It is a rich statement coming from Mr Schulz because he presides over the EU institution that was at least complicit in forcing member states to transfer private sector losses onto taxpayers and failed to structure properly core institutional frameworks of the EU. Whether this complicity involved errors of omission or commission is irrelevant. The outcomes of these errors are Greece today, Cyprus today, Ireland today, and Italy, Spain, Portugal and so on. From this point of view, the perspective of returning to values by the political and economic institutions of Europe would first and foremost involve (require) restructuring of the European institutions from the top. Mr Schulz's job would be on the line in any such process of renewal and return to accountability. 

That, alas, is the nature of leadership: you fail and you are gone. Writing op-eds full of well-meaning waffle is, frankly, not an excuse for the failures of both action and inaction.

Eurozone: The High Cost of [Corporatist] Complacency

An interesting article from the Economists’ Voice (Éloi Laurent "Eurozone: The High Cost of Complacency", January 2009) argues that while the Euro is politically and economically attractive to a host of collapsing smaller economies, the Eurozone itself "is inert".

"How to make sense of this seeming contradiction?" asks Laurent. "It is tempting to blame America for Europe’s recession, but... Actually, if we view the last decade as a whole, we see that European passivity has cost it dearly and there lies the key to the Eurozone’s still unfulfilled promise."

Laurent's view of the Eurozone's failures reads like a description of what has happened in Ireland.

"...The ten years between 1999 and 2008 have been a golden era. There probably was not a better time in contemporary history to launch a monetary union and, learning by doing, to build efficient and resilient economic policy institutions to ensure its prosperity and sustainability. Yet, the decade was largely lost by Europeans in vain doctrinal debates and sterile blame game sessions. ...The reason [that technocratic debate] absorbs so much time and energy [of the European leadership] is that, absent a true democracy, economic doctrine has become over the years the justification of political power in Europe."

Laurent is only partially correct. Indeed, the technocratic economic doctrine debates have been a marker for European political landscape since 1999, but the debates became so central to the EU functioning because of the dogmatic pursuit of social consensus as the only benchmark for policy success. In other words, absent real democracy, the EU had to devise a deus ex machina replica of legitimizing democratic institutions. This is what social consensus - or corporatism, as it became known in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s - predicated upon.

The problem is that social consensus fails when ti comes to the need to formulate potentially unpopular and decisive policies. "With virtually the whole planet booming over the past decade, the Eurozone has, since its creation in 1999, displayed the worse performance in terms of growth and unemployment of the developed world, barely ahead of a depressed Japan."

What was the EU response to this crisis of insufficient growth? "One might conclude from [international comparisons] that the value added of the Euro is so far, at best, dubious and wonder why. But the European Commission did not, and recommended instead more of the same economic policies, stressing the importance of “budgetary surveillance” for the future and dismissing calls for improving economic cooperation and coordination among member states. [Thus] the ECB made in 2008 the exact same mistake as in 2001 by resisting a necessary cut in interest rates (actually, it increased interest rates in July 2008), waiting for the worst to be certain instead of trying to prevent it."

Laurent omits to mention the laughably naive EU Commission road maps and 'agendas' - the Lisbon I and Lisbon II frameworks for economic growth, the Barroso's Social Economy lunacy, and lastly the idea that geopolitical enlargement will resolve economic growth and political legitimacy deficits. For their claim that European Unification is predicated on a deeply historical rooting of European people, this Commission is failing a primary school lesson in history: the same strategies for legitimization have marked the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, as well as a bag full of unsavory regimes in the early 20th century Europe.

But, getting back to the economy: few probably remember today the 1970s. Back then, it took European countries more than double the length of time it took the US to come out of the crises, despite the fact that Europe had at the time much lower dependency on imported oil than the US. Why? That European disease of not willing to take the necessary economic policy adjustments. The same sclerosis is present within the Eurozone today. "After the 2001 recession, [thanks to the Fed active intervention] it took a year for the US to go from negative to vigorous growth. In the Eurozone, it took five years to fully recover. As for fiscal policy, ...a true European stimulus is still nowhere in sight, even as the economic outcome worsens by the day."

Taking real policy decisions and implementing new policies is something that is clearly not en vogue in Brussels. "Facts speak for themselves in this regard: the financial and banking crisis started to receive an adequate response after an improvised meeting of head of states and governments of the Eurozone last October, a standing body that does not even exist in
European treaties. As [Jean-Paul] Fitoussi observed: “the structure of power is such in Europe that those institutions who have the instruments to react have not the legitimacy to do so while those which have the legitimacy no longer have the instruments. Hence the passivity of European policy reaction.”

This is a sweeping (and absolutely apt) description of the entire political illegitimacy of the current EU power structures. But it is also an apt description of the Irish governance disease.

Just as an unelected and unaccountable EU Commission (and its Directorates) has no capacity to legitimize its rule, except via an elitist consensus bought by providing a guarantee of access to the feeding troughs of Brussels, so the elected European Parliament has no capacity to exercise its democratic mandate. Just as an unelected and unaccountable Social Partnership in Ireland has no capacity to rule except by bribing its way through all and any changes in economic environment, the elected Dail has been reduced to a nearly irrelevant student debating society. In both cases, corporatism has won and society has lost.

In 1934, Eoin O'Duffy - an Irish corporatist - stated: "We must lead the people always; nationally, socially and economically. We must clear up the economic mess and right the glaring social injustices of to-day by the corporative organization of Irish life; but before everything we must give a national lead to our people... The first essential is national unity. We can only have that when the Corporative system is accepted."

Am I the only one who sees clear parallels between this historical statement and our Government's (and EU's) active suppression of any dissent and the pursuit of a social-consensus model of policy formulation?