14/2/21: COVID19 Update: Sweden and Nordics

Prior posts on COVID19 stats updates covered:

• Global data and trends: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/14221-covid19-update-worldwide-data.html;
• European & EU27 data and trends: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/14221-covid19-update-europe-and-eu27.html; 
• Data and trends for the most impacted countries and regions: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/14221-covid19-update-most-impacted.html; 
• Data on COVID19 dynamics in BRIICS countries: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/14221-covid19-update-briics.html; and
• COVID19 stats comparing US and EU27 & Europe: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/14221-covid19-update-us-vs-eu27.html.

Lastly, let's run through comparatives for COVID19 dynamics in Sweden vis-a-vis the rest of the Nordics.

No matter how you define the Nordics:

• As Sweden's closest land-linked neighbors of Finland and Norway (Nordics 1); or
• Adding to the two above Estonia and Iceland (Nordics 2); or
• Expanding the set to also include Netherlands and Denmark

there is only one conclusion than can be drawn from the above charts: Sweden is not doing too well in terms of cases recorded and in terms of deaths recorded through the pandemic so far.  Sweden's mortality rate per capita is substantially (86%) higher than that of the Nordics 3. 

Here is just how poor Sweden's performance has been:

14/2/21: COVID19 Update: U.S. vs EU27 comparatives

In previous posts, I covered the latest data for weekly Covid19 pandemic dynamics for:

• Global data and trends: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/14221-covid19-update-worldwide-data.html;
• European & EU27 data and trends: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/14221-covid19-update-europe-and-eu27.html; 
• Data and trends for the most impacted countries and regions: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/14221-covid19-update-most-impacted.html; and
• Data on COVID19 dynamics in BRIICS countries: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/14221-covid19-update-briics.html.

Now, as usual, EU27 (and Europe) comparatives to the U.S.

Start with new cases (weekly totals): 

Since the start of the pandemic, the U.S. has experienced three waves, against the EU27's two. The EU27's 2nd wave appears to have crested in week 45 of 2020, while the U.S.' current wave continued to rise until Week 1 of 2021. Over the last 8 weeks, US new cases exceeded those in the EU27 by 3,574,708 and population-size adjusted deaths by 29,150.

Next, weekly deaths:

The EU27's 2nd wave appears to have crested in week 48 of 2020 in terms of deaths, while the U.S.' current, third, wave continued to rise through week 3 of 2021. The EU27 weekly deaths counts show little signs of significant moderation since the Wave 2 peak, however, and are still running above Wave 1 peak.

Neither the U.S., nor the EU27 show any significant signs of deaths moderation that can be expected to occur in line with decline in new cases and vaccinations. This is surprising, because EU27 new cases moderated substantially since the peak of Wave 2.

Cumulated deaths per capita:

Since the start of Wave 2 in the EU27 (Wave 3 in the U.S.), EU27 deaths per capita have been converging with those in the U.S.

At the start of the EU27 Wave 2, U.S. total deaths per capita exceeded those in the EU27 by 87%. In week 5 of 2021, excess U.S. deaths compared to the EU27, cumulated over the period of pandemic stood at 96,595, or 108,1787 on the age-adjusted basis. 

In other words, U.S. cumulated deaths now exceed those in EU27 by 20.8 percent on population-size adjusted basis and by 23.3%. 

U.S. excess mortality compared to the EU27 and Europe, once we account for population differences is still rising:

In highly simplified terms, the U.S. pandemic experience has been associated with a cumulative excess mortality, compared to the EU27 and Europe of between 96,595 and 160,584 cases, respectively, based solely on differences in population sizes.

If older European and EU27 demographics are factored in, these excess U.S. deaths rise to 108,200 and 134,800, respectively.

I recently covered some new research on the policy-level failures in the U.S. during the COVID19 pandemic (see https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/3221-cost-of-trumps-failures-to-act-on.html). In simplified terms, the numbers above are shocking: were the U.S. to match policy responses in the EU27, we could have expected a death toll 96,600-108,200 lower than we currently observe. 

The U.S., however, managed much better than the EU27 in terms of deaths per case or the morbidity rate of the disease:

Overall new cases have become progressively less fatal through week 34 of 2020. This is most likely accounted for by improved and earlier diagnostics and treatments, as well as by increased share of infections detected in younger patients. These effects were exhausted around week 35 of 2020.

The 2nd wave of the pandemic in the EU27 was associated with a significant initial increase in severity. A smaller increase took place in the U.S. in the 3rd wave. Overall, the most recent wave of the pandemic saw relative uplift in the EU27 mortality rate, while the U.S. mortality rate continued to decline.

U.S. trend remains power-law, implying sustained decreases in mortality of new cases over time, while the EU27 trend has shifted toward a polynomial since Week 53 of 2020, implying rising risk of sustained increases in mortality.

In terms of the rate of change in weekly deaths: 

4-weeks average W/W rate of change in new cases, through Week 5 of 2021 was -20.7% in the  U.S. against -8.6% in the EU27.  4-weeks average W/W rate of change in deaths, through Week 5 of 2021 was -3.0% in the  U.S. against -1.9% in the EU27. 

A summary of the U.S.-EU27 comparatives:

14/2/21: COVID19 Update: BRIICS

 In previous posts, I covered the latest data for weekly Covid19 pandemic dynamics for:

• Global data and trends: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/14221-covid19-update-worldwide-data.html;
• European & EU27 data and trends: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/14221-covid19-update-europe-and-eu27.html; and
• Data and trends for the most impacted countries and regions: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/14221-covid19-update-most-impacted.html.

Now, let's take a closer look at the pandemic dynamics in the BRIICS (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa).

In broadly defined terms, there is an ongoing decline in both new cases and new deaths over the last week across all BRIICS. That said, it is too early to call the peaking of the second wave of this pandemic in terms of deaths counts, since weekly counts remain extremely high and show only one week of sustained declines. The good news is that last week's declines were evident in all BRIICS. Another good news is that we now have at least four consecutive weeks of declines in new cases across the entire group, except for Indonesia, where we only have one week of declines, and China. 

A summary table:

14/2/21: COVID19 Update: Most impacted countries

 

Previous posts on the COVID19 update covered global numbers and trends (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/14221-covid19-update-worldwide-data.html) and European & EU27 trends (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/14221-covid19-update-europe-and-eu27.html).

Here are some comparatives across all countries with the highest rates of detected infections (> 5% of population):

Note: I highlighted countries with > 10 million population.

Another way of looking at this is to take countries with more than 250,000 confirmed cases, as presented in the next set of tables:

Comparing regions to the above countries:

And looking at the countries by population relatives:

The table above really drives home the depth of the crisis in Europe and the U.S. U.S. accounts so far fo 20 percent of global deaths, having just 4.3 percent of the global population. This gives the U.S. second worst ratio of its share of global deaths to its share of world population. Only the UK exceeds the U.S. in this horrific metric. The EU27 fall in the third place, below the U.S. with 21.4% of the world's deaths and 5.8% of the global population. 

14/2/21: COVID19 Update: Europe and EU27

 Summary table from the previous post covering worldwide trends (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/14221-covid19-update-worldwide-data.html) puts Europe and EU 27 in the context of global trends:

The chart next shows weekly data dynamics for new cases for EU27 and Europe:

Both Europe and EU27 have experienced two waves of the pandemic, with the second wave characterized by two key features:

1. Long and slow decline in the new cases counts, lasting from the peak of the wave around Week 45 of 2020; and 
2. Re-acceleration in the wave into another local peak at Week 1 of 2021. 

The quick reversals of decline trend around Weeks 51-53 of 2020 is a worrying sign that improvements in overall pandemic trends are fragile.

The fragility of the trend in terms of improvements are even more evident in the numbers of new weekly deaths. Both Europe and EU27 are yet to confirm the peaking of the second wave of the pandemic in terms of weekly new deaths. Nominally, the peaks of the most recent wave in Week 49 of 2020 in the EU27 and Week 3 of 2021 in Europe have not, yet, been followed by accelerating or deepening declines in the deaths counts.

One clear positive trend remains in terms of mortality rates per case:

The caveat to the above is a slight uplift in mortality around Week 51 of 2020 as shown in the above.

Cumulated deaths per capita are exhibiting a slight slowdown over time (slope) but are still increasing at a rate massively in excess of what was witnessed during the period of Week 19-43 of 2020. In other words, we are not yet out of the woods, even compared to the pandemic dynamics of the Summer 2020.

As with global figures, it is too early to say anything about vaccinations effects on general trends.

14/2/21: COVID19 Update: Worldwide Data

 Worldwide trends for COVID19 pandemic in terms of cases and deaths:

There is some ambiguity in timing the waves of the pandemic. This ambiguity is driven by the dynamics of the new cases and, to a lesser extent, deaths. Globally, we have exited Wave 3 that started around Week 34 of 2020 and peaked in Week 1 of 2021. Promising dynamics aside, latest level of new infections remains at the levels well above Waves 1 and 2 peaks.

Weekly death counts have also peaked in Week 3 of 2021, marking the end of Wave 3. However, the latest death counts are the fifth highest on record and remain severely elevated compared to deaths recorded at the peak of Waves 1 and 2.

Recent decreases in mortality rate are most likely attributable to three key drivers: (1) earlier detection of cases due to improved testing; (2) younger demographics of those with confirmed infections; and (3) improved treatments in the earlier stages of the disease. The decrease in mortality appears to have stabilized and is slightly reversing in the first 5 weeks of 2021. This is the most worrying aspect of the three trends discussed above.

Here is a summary table, with green cells showing improvements and red cells showing deterioration in dynamics:

Last week's deaths have shown an improvement on 4 weeks average in all regions world-wide, and this has been consistent across all (excluding Asia) regions also in terms of new cases 4 weeks average compared to prior 4 weeks average. Deaths, however, are still up on the 4weeks average relative to prior 4 weeks average basis in most regions, with exception of two.

For now, it is hard to attribute the above improvements to vaccinations (long term solutions) and the improved dynamics are probably more consistent with a natural flow of the pandemic wave, reflecting tightening of restrictions on social activities in virtually all major geographies following the holidays season. This, along with the rapidly growing prevalence of the new, more infective, strands of the virus suggests that the gains made in recent weeks are at a risk of reversals. 

4/2/21: The Impact of the Business Closures on Covid-19 Infection Rates

 In a recent post, I covered the impact of the failure at the Federal level to implement more robust measures on rents and tenure security for households (see: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/3221-cost-of-trumps-failures-to-act-on.html). Another interesting aspect of the U.S. experience during the pandemic relates to the policies concerning the closure of essential vs non-essential businesses. A recent (January 2021) study by Song, Hummy and McKenna, Ryan and Chen, Angela T. and David, Guy and Smith-McLallen, Aaron, titled: "The Impact of the Non-Essential Business Closure Policy on Covid-19 Infection Rates" (NBER Working Paper No. w28374: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3772613) looked at the implications of this specific policy response to the Covid-19 pandemic.

Per authors, durig the pandemic, "many localities instituted non-essential business closure orders, keeping individuals categorized as essential workers at the frontlines while sending their non-essential counterparts home". The authors examined "the extent to which being designated as an essential or non-essential worker impacts one’s risk of being Covid-positive following the non-essential business closure order". The study used data for the State of Pennsylvania, accounting for the intra-household transmission risk experienced by the workers' cohabiting family members and roommates. 

The study estimated that:

• "... workers designated as essential have a 55% higher likelihood of being positive for Covid-19 than those classified as non-essential; in other words, non-essential workers experience a protective effect. 
• "While members of the health care and social assistance sub-sector contribute significantly to this overall effect, it is not completely driven by them. 
• "We also find evidence of intra-household transmission that differs in intensity by essential status. Dependents cohabiting with an essential worker have a 17% higher likelihood of being Covid-positive compared to those cohabiting with a non-essential worker. Roommates cohabiting with an essential worker experience a 38% increase in likelihood of being Covid-positive. 
• Overall, "analysis of households with a Covid-positive member suggests that intrahousehold transmission is an important mechanism."

In summary: "Our findings suggest that essential workers and their cohabitants (whether dependents or other primary policyholders sharing the same address) are at substantially higher risk of being positive for Covid-19 than are non-essential workers and their cohabitants. Conversely, non-essential workers and their cohabitants experience a protective effect against the risk of Covid-19 infection as a result of the nonessential business closure policy." 

And the kicker: "the designation of some workers as essential and others as non-essential during the pandemic has increased the health risk profile of some jobs while reducing it for others, all while other underlying aspects of these jobs (e.g., monetary compensation) remain minimally affected." In other words, the essential workers carry risk without carrying associated risk premium in their compensation (monetary or non-monetary).

4/2/21: U.S. Labor Markets: America's Scariest Charts, Part 6

 Having covered some core stats relating to the U.S. labor markets in previous 5 posts:

1. Continued Unemployment Claims (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/4221-us-labor-markets-americas-scariest.html);
2. Labor force participation rate and Employment-to-Population ratio (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/4221-us-labor-markets-americas-scariest_4.html); 
3. Non-farms payrolls (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/4221-us-labor-markets-americas-scariest_16.html); 
4. New (initial) unemployment claims data through January 30, 2021 (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/4221-us-labor-markets-americas-scariest_57.html); and
5. Average duration of unemployment (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/4221-us-labor-markets-americas-scariest_41.html),

in this last post, we will focus on the overall employment index for the current recessionary cycle:

Currently, into month 10 data of the recession (December 2020), and employment index is reading close to the conditions in the recession of 1945, but better than the recession of 1953. We are still trending worse than any recession in modern period (post-Gold Standard), and that is quite an achievement (in negative terms). Dynamically, improvements in employment conditions have been flattening out from month 5 of the recession through month 8 and index improvements have slowed down to almost nil in months 9 and 10. Unless there is a significant reversal in this trend, by the end of 2021 we are likely to be around the same labor markets conditions as at the same time during the Great Recession. 

4/2/21: U.S. Labor Markets: America's Scariest Charts, Part 5

 The first four posts on the state of the U.S. labor markets have covered:

1. Continued Unemployment Claims (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/4221-us-labor-markets-americas-scariest.html);
2. Labor force participation rate and Employment-to-Population ratio (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/4221-us-labor-markets-americas-scariest_4.html); 
3. Non-farms payrolls (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/4221-us-labor-markets-americas-scariest_16.html); and
4. New (initial) unemployment claims data through January 30, 2021 (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/4221-us-labor-markets-americas-scariest_57.html)

In this post, let's take a look at the latest data on average duration of unemployment through December 2020:

As the chart above clearly shows, current average duration of unemployment spell is already higher than the peak of any prior recession other than the Great Recession. However, the duration remains relatively benign when we control for the business cycle (red line and the chart next).

Dynamically, it is hard to imagine average duration of unemployment to be staying around its current levels. Something to watch in months to come as an indicator of the direction of structural (as opposed to cyclical) unemployment. 

4/2/21: U.S. Labor Markets: America's Scariest Charts, Part 4

 The first three posts on the state of the U.S. labor markets have covered:

1. Continued Unemployment Claims (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/4221-us-labor-markets-americas-scariest.html);
2. Labor force participation rate and Employment-to-Population ratio (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/4221-us-labor-markets-americas-scariest_4.html); and
3. Non-farms payrolls (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/4221-us-labor-markets-americas-scariest_16.html)

In this post, let's take a look at new unemployment claims data through the week of January 30, 2021:

The data confirms the worrying trends cited in reference to continued unemployment claims. In the last week of January 2021, based on preliminary estimates published today, initial unemployment claims stood at 816,247 - a decline of just 23,525 on prior week reading. The 4-weeks cumulative initial unemployment claims are at 3,744,581, which only 103.433 down on prior 4 weeks period. Net, over the last 5 weeks, the reduction in initial unemployment claims stands at a miserly 19,725. 

Despite little media coverage, the U.S. labor markets remain stricken by the pandemic effects on economic activity. If we strip out data for the pandemic period-to-date, the latest weekly reading for initial unemployment claim ranks as the 10th highest in the history of the series. 

4/2/21: U.S. Labor Markets: America's Scariest Charts, Part 3

 In two prior posts, I covered two of America's Scariest Charts:

1. Continued Unemployment Claims (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/4221-us-labor-markets-americas-scariest.html) and 
2. Labor force participation rate and Employment-to-Population ratio (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/4221-us-labor-markets-americas-scariest_4.html)

Here, let's take a look at non-farm payrolls that measure employment levels in the economy.

In December 202, employment growth stalled. In fact, non-farm payrolls fell 328,000 in the last month of 2020 to 143,777,000, or 9,400,000 below pre-pandemic peak. December was the first month of declines in employment since April 2020, but employment growth was relatively slow already in November when the U.S. economy added 603,000 jobs, the slowest pace of recovery after July for the entire period of recovery of May-November 2020.

This evidence further reinforces the argument that labor markets conditions in the U.S. remain abysmal, prompting American workers to slip out of the labor force. 

4/2/21: U.S. Labor Markets: America's Scariest Charts, Part 2

In the previous post, I covered the first set of data - Continued Unemployment Claims (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/02/4221-us-labor-markets-americas-scariest.html) - that highlights the plight of American economy in the current crisis. Now, let's take a look at Labor Force Participation rate and Employment to Population ratio:

The chart and the table above highlight continued serious problems in the structure of the U.S. labor markets. While official continued unemployment claims are inching back toward some sort of a 'norm', much of so-called improvement in unemployment dynamics is actually accounted for by the dire state of labor force participation which is still trending below anything one might consider reasonable. Current labor force participation rate is 61.5 which is well below anything seen before the onset of the pandemic in March 2020. By a mile below. And in terms of historical perspectives, we have no modern recession (from 1980 onwards) that matches these lows of labor force participation. Structurally, this means that instead of gaining jobs, the unemployed simply roll off the cliff of unemployment assistance and drop out of the labor force, discouraged by the lack of meaningful decent jobs in the market. 

Employment to population ratio is a little better, but it is still stuck below pre-pandemic levels and is low compared to prior recessions' troughs. 

The conditions in the U.S. labor markets might be improving somewhat off the pandemic lows, but the situation overall remains dire. 

3/2/21: The Cost of Trump's Failures to Act on Covid19: Case of Housing Market Interventions

 

COVID-19 pandemic has been associated with a range of deep and dramatic policy interventions, including rolling lockdowns, monetary and fiscal policies interventions, wide ranges of subsidies and supports, but also measures relating to addressing the risk to households and companies arising from the pre-pandemic financial commitments. 

One of the most, potentially, impactful measures has been adoption of a range of policy interventions that aimed to reduce the impact of income shocks on housing availability. In addition to targeting reduction of financial burden of the pandemic shocks on households, the measures also targeted the objective of lowering the risk of spread of the disease via promotion of housing stability.

A recent paper, by Jowers, Kay and Timmins, Christopher D. and Bhavsar, Nrupen and Hu, Qihui and Marshall, Julia, titled "Housing Precarity & the Covid-19 Pandemic: Impacts of Utility Disconnection and Eviction Moratoria on Infections and Deaths Across US Counties" (January 2021, NBER Working Paper No. w28394: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3772641) looked into the effectiveness of housing markets interventions in the latter context. 

Per authors, "housing precarity, which includes both the risk of eviction and utility disconnections or shut-offs, reduces a person’s ability to abide by social distancing orders and comply with hygiene recommendations."

The authors found that 

1. "...policies that limit evictions are found to reduce COVID-19 infections by 3.8% and reduce deaths by 11%.
2. "Moratoria on utility disconnections reduce COVID-19 infections by 4.4% and mortality rates by 7.4%."

"Had such policies been in place across all counties (i.e., adopted as federal policy) from early March 2020 through the end of November 2020, ... policies that limit evictions could have reduced COVID-19 infections by 14.2% and deaths by 40.7%. (emphasis is mine) [While], for moratoria on utility disconnections, COVID-19 infections rates could have been reduced by 8.7% and deaths by 14.8%."

These are genuinely huge numbers. Assuming the effects are non-additive, the lower end estimate of human losses to Covid19 pandemic due to the Trump Administration's failure to act coherently and resolutely in imposing similar policies to support households' tenancy in rental and mortgages markets across the U.S. is in the range of > 40 percent. If the effects are additive, the magnitude of the preventable deaths rises to well over 50 percent.

6/1/21: BRIC: Composite Economic Indicators: 4Q 2020

• Manufacturing PMIs for BRIC economies for 4Q 2020 are discussed here: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/01/4121-bric-manufacturing-pmis-4q-2020.html.
• Services PMIs are covered here: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/01/6121-bric-services-pmis-4q-2020.html.

Now, Composite PMIs:

• Brazil Composite PMI rose from 51.6 in 3Q 2020 to 54.4 in 4Q 2020, marking second consecutive quarter of > 50.0 readings. Average 4 quarters PMI stands at 46.2, suggesting that Brazil's economy has not, yet, recovered fully from the Covid19 pandemic impact. Nonetheless, statistically, both 3Q and 4Q readings are signaling economic expansion and 4Q growth in Brazil's economy appears to be faster-paced than global (global composite PMI was at 53.3 in 4Q 2020).
• Russia Composite PMI is in a contraction territory, with 4Q 2020 reading of 47.7, down from 55.9 in 3Q 2020. Over the course of 2020, Russia Composite PMI averaged 46.0, the second weakest in the BRICs group. At 47.7, 4Q 2020 PMI is exactly in line with 1Q 2020 PMI.
• India Composite PMI rose from 45.9 in 3Q 2020 to 56.4 in 4Q 2020, signaling rapid bounce back in the economy, that, nonetheless continues to suffer from the pandemic-induced economic crisis. Full year 2020, Composite PMI average is at 44.3, by a distance, the lowest in the BRICs group. 
• China Composite PMI rose from 54.7 in 3Q 2020 to 56.3 in 4Q 2020, marking third consecutive quarter of economic growth, with full year PMI averaging 51.4, suggesting that the Chinese economy has now recovered fully from the Covid19 pandemic impact. 

Overall, three out of four BRIC economies posted 4Q 2020 Composite PMI above Global Composite PMI: Brazil, India and China, with Russia being the only BRIC economy posting both sub-Global and sub-50 Composite PMI reading at the end of 2020. Only one BRIC economy has, so far, signaled full recovery from the Covid19 crisis shock: China, with all other BRICs still recovering from the pandemic.

Given that both BRIC Manufacturing Sector Activity Index (54.9 in 4Q 2020) and BRIC Services Sector Activity Index (54.8 in 4Q 2020) are above Global Manufacturing (53.5) and Services (52.3) PMIs, BRIC economies as a group have supported global economic growth to the upside in 4Q 2020. In contrast, BRIC Manufacturing Activity Index outperformed Global Manufacturing PMI in 3Q 2020 (53.0 to 51.6), while BRIC Services Activity Index (51.0) underperformed Global Services PMI (51.4). 

6/1/21: BRIC: Services PMIs: 4Q 2020

 

BRIC's manufacturing PMIs for 4Q 2020 were covered here: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/01/4121-bric-manufacturing-pmis-4q-2020.html. Now, to Services PMIs:

• Brazil Services PMI rose from 47.5 in 3Q 2020 to 51.4 in 4Q 2020, with aggregate 2020 levels of activity still significantly below 2019 levels. At 51.4, the index is barely statistically above 50.0 (95% confidence bound is 51.3). However, the latest quarterly reading is the first nominally above 50.0 after three consecutive quarters of sub-50 readings. 
• Russia Services PMI crashed in 4Q 2020 from 56.8 in 3Q to 47.7. Statistically, Russian services sector is contracting and it is contracting rapidly. In the entire 2020, there were three quarters of deeply sub-50 readings against one quarter of above 50.0 expansion. Services sector reading is basically identical to 47.6 recorded in Manufacturing sector, which means that in 4Q 2020 there was no 'comfort zone' in the Russian economy in terms of growth.
• India Services PMI rose significantly in 4Q 2020 compared to 3Q 2020, from 41.9 to 53.4.  However, this growth is unlikely to bring India's services activity anywhere near pre-Covid19 levels. 
• China Services PMI rose for the third consecutive quarter in 4Q 2020. In 2Q 2020, China's Services PMI was at 52.6, which increased to 54.3 in 3Q 2020 and to 57.0 in 4Q 2020. Nonetheless, it is still doubtful that Chinese services activities have fully recovered from the pandemic as of the end of 2020.
• Overall, BRIC Services Activity Index based on PMIs and respective GDP shares in the global economy rose for the second quarter in a row from 51.0 in 3Q 2020 to 54.8 in 4Q 2020. This marks some recovery from the Covid19 pandemic impact, although this recovery remains incomplete. BRICs have - as a group - outperformed Global Services PMI which rose from 51.4 in 3Q 2020 to 52.3 in 4Q 2020.

5/1/21: Ireland PMIs: 4Q 2020

Ireland's economic activity improved significantly in December, and the improvements were marked across all three sectors:

• Ireland's Manufacturing PMI rose 52.2 in November to 57.2 in December, marking the third consecutive month of > 50 readings, the second consecutive month of indicator being statistically above 50.0 line. The last three months average (53.23) is on 2Q 2020 average (53.30) and this is pretty encouraging, given the weakness in the indicator over 1H 2020. 
• Ireland's Services PMI also rose in December, reaching 50.1 from recessionary 45.4 in November. 4Q average is still weak at 47.9 (contractionary) after being effectively stagnant at 50.03 over 3Q 2020. Monthly increase in December, however, is a brighter spot.
• Ireland's Construction sector PMI (data through mid-December) is at 53.5, which is strong compared to month prior (48.6) and the first time the index is above 50 line since July 2020. 
• Official Composite PMI that accounts only for two sectors of activity (Manufacturing and Services) is now at 53.4, having broken above the 50.0 line for the first time since August 2020.

As you know,  I calculate my own index of economic activity based on all three sectors PMIs and using relative weights of each sector in Irish Gross Value Added, based on the latest National Accounts data. This is plotted against Markit's Composite PMI in the following chart:

Just as Composite PMI, my index of economic activity also rose in December (to 52.9) from 48.2 in November. This marks the first month of above-50 readings after 3 consecutive months of contraction. Nonetheless, 4Q 2020 index is at 50.03 - signaling zero growth q/q and this stands contrasted to 3Q 2020 reading of 51.2 (statistically zero growth, nominally, weak positive growth).

4/1/21: BRIC: Manufacturing PMIs 4Q 2020

Latest data for BRIC Manufacturing PMIs indicates three countries outperforming global rate of recovery in manufacturing sector, against one country (Russia) remaining in contraction territory and well below global growth mark.

On a quarterly basis,

• Brazil's Manufacturing PMI stood at 64.1 in 4Q 2020, up on 62.6 in 3Q 2020, marking the second highest and the highest reading on record. The contraction in 2Q 2020 (with PMI at 42.0) was sharp, but not as sharp as in 1Q 2009. By these comparatives, GFC-related contraction of 2008-2009 resulted in 4 quarters average reading of 45.1 and saw three consecutive sub-50 readings. The Covid-19 related contraction was stretched only across one quarter, with 4 quarters average of 54.8 in 2020. It is, genuinely, hard to reconcile these numbers with reality of the Covid-19 crisis.
• Russia Manufacturing PMI slipped to 47.6 in 4Q 2020 from 49.5 in 3Q 2020, marking sixth consecutive quarter of sub-50 readings. Statistically, Russian Manufacturing posted no growth (> 50 readings) in seven consecutive quarters. Over 2020 as a whole, Russian PMIs averaged abysmal 46.0, compared to the GFC and the Great Recession average of 2008-2009 of 44.7.
• India Manufacturing PMI was at 57.2 in 4Q 2020, up on 51.6 in 3Q 2020, and averaging 49.5 for the year as a whole. During the GFC and the Great Recession period, India's PMI averaged at 51.1. Unlike Brazil, India is yet to recover to pre-Covid-19 levels of activity.
• China Manufacturing PMI finished 2020 with a reading of 53.9, averaging 51.1 over 2020 as a whole, with overall PMIs performance suggesting that Chinese industrial producers have recovered from the Covid-19 pandemic by the end of 2020. China's Covid-19 experience has been more benign than the country contraction during the GFC and the Great Recession (46.9 average).

Global Manufacturing PMI stood at 53.5 in 4Q 2020 and an average of 49.3 over 2020 as a whole, against BRIC's Manufacturing Index (weighted by relative global GDP shares of the four economies) at 54.9 in 4Q 2020 and 50.5 for 2020 as a whole. In other words, BRICs have supported global growth to the upside during the Covid-19 pandemic. 

3/1/21: Covid19 update: Sweden vs Nordics

 

As before, let's conclude the latest update of the Covid19 trends data with analysis covering comparatives between Sweden and other Nordics. 

Sweden is commonly used as a shining example of 'saving the economy' by not 'panicking' into severe mobility restrictions. This argument is commonly used by the folks who tend to believe in sinister Big State conspiracies around other countries' responses to the pandemic.

Sweden started the pandemic by openly pursuing the strategy targeting 'herd immunity'. In this, the country approach to the pandemic containment was similar to that of the Netherlands. However, unlike Sweden, the Netherlands quickly reversed this approach and switched to the more common policy response of imposing severe mobility restrictions.

When it comes to the Nordic countries, there has been both some significant heterogeneity in Covid19 policies responses and some shared experiences. To reflect some of these, I look at three Nordics groupings to compare these with Sweden:

• Nordic 1 group comprising Sweden's immediate neighbors of Norway and Finland. This is the 'closest' group to Sweden as the three countries share relatively open borders and, in normal times, have no mobility restrictions between them. All three countries are physically remote from the rest of Europe, with far less mobility across borders to third countries than, say, Belgium or the Netherlands.
• Nordic 2 group adds Iceland and Estonia to the first group. Iceland is, obviously, an island nation that is also relatively well isolated in physical terms, making its border controls more effective. Estonia is a country that is not physically isolated, but shares less physical land-based borders with the rest of the EU (ex-Finland). Both, N1 and N2 groups are, therefore, characterized as those countries which can impose more effective control of their borders for the purpose of isolating during the pandemic.
• Nordic 3 group adds two key countries that have much less capacity to isolate from the Continental EU states: Denmark and the Netherlands. 

So, here are the updated charts, in which I adjust all three groups to normalize cases and deaths numbers to Sweden's population scale:

As of the end of 2020, cumulative excess deaths in Sweden compared to other Nordics, adjusting for differences in population sizes are:

• 7,545 more deaths in Sweden than in Nordics 1 group of Finland and Norway;
• 7,359 more deaths in Sweden than in Nordics 2 group of Finland, Norway, Estonia and Iceland; and
• 3,808 more deaths in Sweden than in Nordics 3 group of Finland, Norway, Estonia, Iceland, Denmark and the Netherlands.

Put differently, between 3,800 and 7,545 more deaths took place in Sweden than in its relatively comparable European neighbors, primarily because Swedish Government prioritized economic well-being over public health.

2/1/21: Covid19 update: U.S. vs EU27

In previous posts, I covered Covid-19 updates for the last week of 2020 for:

• Worldwide trends: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/01/2121-covid19-update-worldwide-numbers.html;
• Europe and the EU27: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/01/2121-covid19-update-europe.html; 
• Countries with more than 250,000 cases: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/01/2121-covid19-update-countries-with-250k.html; and
• BRIICS: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/01/2121-covid19-update-briics.html.

In this post, let's take a look at the latest data for the U.S. compared to the EU27.

Weekly counts of new cases and deaths, illustrated above, suggest that:

• Since the start of the pandemic, the U.S. has experienced three waves, against the EU27's two of the pandemic. The EU27's 2nd wave appears to have crested in week 45, while the U.S.' current wave continued to rise through week 51 of 2020. Week 52 data is hard to interpret, as it represents poorer quality of data due to the holidays season.
• Over the last 8 weeks, US new cases exceeded those in the EU27 by 337,233.
• The EU27's 2nd wave appears to have crested in week 48 in terms of deaths, while the U.S.' current wave continued to rise through week 51. Once again, we should ignore, for now, week 52 data.
• Over the last 8 weeks, US new deaths continued to run below those in the EU27. On population-adjusted basis, US deaths cumulated over the last 8 weeks are 33,622 lower than those in the EU27. Over the entire pandemic period, US deaths currently exceed those in the EU27 by 69,416 on population-adjusted basis.

The last point is worth considering more closely:

• Since the start of Wave 2 in the EU27 (Wave 3 in the U.S.), EU27 deaths per capita have been converging with those in the U.S.
• At the start of the EU27 Wave 2, U.S. excess total deaths per capita exceeded those in the EU27 by 87%. Latest excess is 26% and it was 28% in week 51.
• Adjusting for differences in population, U.S. excess deaths relative to the EU27 fell from the Wave 1 maximum of 103,038 to 69,389 today. 
• Adjusting for differences in population, U.S. excess deaths relative to Europe fell from the Wave 1 maximum of 122,441 to 117,690 today. 
• Adjusting for age differences and population size differences, the U.S. pandemic is associated with 135,343 excess deaths compared to the EU27.

Despite the big negatives, mortality rates have declined for the later waves of the pandemic in both the EU27 and the U.S.:

Note: the above chart is not adjusted for demographics differences between the U.S. and the EU27, which means that part of the amelioration in mortality rates in the U.S. relative to the EU27 is down to these differences.

Lastly, rates of change in cases and deaths, both, suggest that the pandemic Wave 2 (in the EU27) and wave 3 (in the U.S.) are still at risk of re-accelerating as new data arrives and as we intergate more accurate figures for Week 52 of 2020:

Finally, a summary table for comparatives:

The table above clearly shows the reality of the pandemic impact differences between the EU27 and the U.S. to-date. Through week 52 of 2020, the U.S. performance is consistently worse than that of the EU27 in all metrics, but one: mortality rate per 1,000 positive cases. This only difference is most likely accounted for by the factor exogenous to the pandemic policy responses in the two countries, being down primarily to younger demographics of the U.S. population.