Thursday, September 26, 2013

26/9/2013: Irish Residential Property Prices: August 2013

Residential Property prices Index for Ireland is out today, showing strong gains in property prices in Dublin.

Y/y August 2013 residential property prices increased by 2.8% nationally. This compares with an increase of 2.3% in July and a decrease of 11.8% recorded in the twelve months to August 2012. That is a reasonable number, ahead of inflation rate, which is natural given the contraction in the market experienced so far.

However, several sub-trends are worth noting.

  • Residential property prices grew by 0.9% in the month of August. This compares with an increase of 1.2% recorded in July and 1.3% growth in June. Which implies that the rate of growth has slowed down through August. Seasonality is a factor here. 
  • Annual rate of growth is still rising: from 1.23% in June, to 2.31% in July to 2.76% in August. This means we have: rising rate of growth and three consecutive months of growth. Last time we had three consecutive months of growth was back in 3 months through January 2008.
  • 3mo MA for all properties index is at 66.33 in August, which is the best reading since March 2012. Over the last 3 months property prices rose cumulative 3.4% and over the last 6 months they are up 4.04%
  • August reading is the highest level since January-February 2012, although prices are still down 48.66% on peak.

The above is illustrated in Chart below:


Now, absent other sub-trends, we can be tempted to call a turnaround in the prices at this stage. With two caution notes: (a) this still is subject to adverse risks from the mortgages arrears side, and (b) the above turnaround only applies to Dublin.


Next positive bit: the uptick in the overall index was co-driven by the Houses prices (as opposed to Apartments). Houses prices are more indicative of long-term demand, rather than of short-term lettings demand closer linked to Apartments.

  • Houses price index rose 0.87% m/m and was up 2.65% y/y in August. August annual rate of increase was faster than July (2.06%) and June (0.89%) and marks the third consecutive annual rise. 
  • 3mo MA is now at the levels last seen around March 2012 and the overall index itself is at the levels of January-February 2012. Prices are still down 47.12% on peak.

Chart to illustrate:

Apartments prices have been moving sideways doe the last 8 months, bouncing around 49.5 mean. August reading was weak but slightly up at 50.0.


The core driver for overall RPPI is Dublin:

  • Dublin residential properties prices rose 10.55% y/y in August marking 8th consecutive month of increases. 
  • 3mo MA is at 61.93, the best level since December 2011 and the index itself is at the levels of October 2011.
  • These are solid gains and Dublin market appears to be in full turnaround, although prices are still down 52.86% on peak. Most of these gains was driven by houses, not apartments.

Chart to illustrate:


In brief: 

  • Good news is prices are growing broadly in-line with inflation plus modest recovery in values. 
  • Further good news, Dublin prices are converging up toward national levels - something that should have happened ages ago. 
  • More good news: prices outside of Dublin are slowly correcting down, declining 2.6% y/y in August. 
  • I think we can call turnaround in prices to be sustained for Dublin and getting closer to showing sustained upward dynamics for national level prices. Prices for Apartments and prices for properties outside of Dublin are still in declining or flat mode. 
  • Headwinds and risks remain on the side of mortgages crisis resolution and income dynamics.

26/9/2013: Even with Hopium injections, we are not that far from Greece...

Irish Fiscal Council paper "The Government’s Balance Sheet after the Crisis: A Comprehensive Perspective" authored by Sebastian Barnes and Diarmaid Smyth is an interesting read.

The paper sets out a strong promise: "While discussion often focuses around the debt-to-GDP ratio as referenced by the EU Stability and Growth Pact, the reality is far more complex. This paper takes a comprehensive look at the Government’s balance sheet following the financial crisis. This involves assessing assets and liabilities of the General Government sector, off-balance sheet contingent and implicit liabilities as well as the wider public sector."

Alas, the side of the assets equation is a bit wanting...

While it is good to see the broader approach taken by the authors to the problem of fiscal sustainability of public finances in Ireland, too often, broadening of the coverage of the crisis-impacted sovereign balance sheet slips into the stream of extolling the riches of state-owned assets, whitewashing the liabilities using imaginary assets. The paper does not do this. Which is good. However, the paper is still creating loads of confusion because it provides no clear tabulation of the assets and the way they are accounted for in the analysis.

Instead of a concise tabulation, assets analysis is presented in two parts, both overlapping. This makes it nearly impossible to disentangle what the authors include where and to what specific value.

Let's start from the top:

Per authors: "General Government financial liabilities have increased four-fold since 2007, reaching €208 billion (127 per cent of GDP) in 2012. Over this period, Ireland experienced the largest increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio of any Euro Area country." Yep. Nothing controversial here.

"The Government has substantial holdings of financial assets. These increased modestly over the same period to reach €73 billion (45 per cent of GDP) in 2012. The main assets are cash balances, holdings of semi-state entities and investments in the banking sector."

Now, that's a bit of a statement, in my opinion, open to questions.

Firstly, it creates an impression that most of the assets Government has are liquid. Not so, in my view.

Secondly, it creates an impression that the Government has a functional power to seize these assets. Also a bit of stretch in my view.

Thirdly, is suggests that even if individually liquid and recoverable, these assets can be sold in the market or used as collateral in the case of distress. Again, not something I would agree with.

The authors conclude that "The Government’s net financial assets (NFA), subtracting financial liabilities from financial  assets, gives a broader measure of the financial position of government. NFA have  declined from a position of balance in 2007 to a net liability of €135 billion (82 per cent of GDP) in 2012. Using this broader measure, the Irish government was the third most indebted country in the Euro Area in 2012 (as a share of GDP)."

I am not so sure that EUR73 billion is the real number we should be using in computing Government net financial position. My gut feeling is that we are lucky if we can count EUR50 billion in somewhat liquid and accessible funds. And even then we are at a stretch. With that, our Government's net financial assets position rises to a  deficit of 95-96% of GDP and this means that we are now challenging Greece to the Euro area's title of the second most-indebted country. And that is before Greece Bailout 3.0 which will probably result in some sort of a debt write down for the Greeks (see here:http://english.capital.gr/News.asp?id=1877516) even if small.


Here are some details on my sceptical assessment. The paper lists the following Government 'assets' (comments outside quotation marks are obviously mine):

(A.) Shares and Other Equity. "This broad asset category was valued at €24 billion. It includes: (1) the value of semi-state assets, including the equity of General Government in the Central Bank; (2) a portion of the NPRF; and (3) other equity
holdings." (1) is at least in part imaginary. The valuations of semi state companies are 'hoped for' and are not tested in the market. They also do not account fully for the shortfalls in pension funds and the knock on effects to any purchaser of equity in these companies from the role these pension funds play in running the companies' strategies. They also ignore the fact that with transfer of ownership, the semi-states are unlikely to continue enjoy state protection of their dominant market positions. All in, (1) covers EUR12 billion of semi-states equity, plus EUR2 billion of balances in the Central Bank - of which, my guesstimate is, no more than EUR5-6 billion is recoverable. The authors state clearly that "Considerable uncertainty, however,surrounds the value of these assets." per CB reserves, these are euro system money and I wonder how much of this even technically belongs to the Irish state. (2) covers NPRF-held equities and banks shares. Equities component is small, with total EUR9 billion in NPRF 'assets' accounted for mostly by banks shares (excluding preference shares). National Accounts assign EUR11 billion to the total Government holdings of banks assets. These valuations are off the mark, in my view, as the only value of the banks (ex-Bank of Ireland) today is the value of capital injected into them, net the losses they will sustain on mortgages. The rest is awash on revenue side v cost side. At any rate, these assets are not exactly liquid and if released into the market in any appreciable quantity will cause severe dilution of their value. All-in, say EUR9-10 billion of this 'stuff' is a hoped-for value in any scenario of sovereign distress.

Bit (3) above: 'Other equity holdings' "valued at approximately €3 billion. This includes the value of direct holdings of bank equity by the Exchequer, investments in the insurance sector and capital contributions to the European Stability Mechanism." Seriously? We'd get a rebate on ESM contributions? Insurance sector 'investments'? Shave off some EUR1 billion here for a dose of realism.

(B.) Currency and deposits. "The Government holds a substantial amount of relatively liquid  assets, which are managed by the NTMA. These were valued at €24 billion at end-2012. This figure includes cash balances held by the Exchequer (€18 billion), local government (€1.4 billion) and cash balances held by other Government bodies(such as the NPRF)." Can the Government expropriate the funds belonging to local authorities? Legally and actually? Can the Government capture all balances held by the Government bodies? May be. May be not. Surely it depends on contractual obligations of these bodies and the nature of assets? So suppose that EUR2.4 billion of the above is not subject to capture/recovery.

(C.) Amongst gloriously liquid Irish Government 'assets' the paper (and it is accepted methodology, I must say, which of course doesn't mean it makes any sense beyond purely theoretical exercise) list: "Loans and Other Assets(such as Accounts Receivable). This category was valued at €15 billion and includes a broad range of assets, namely loans from the Housing Finance Authority (HFA)(€4 billion), other Government loans,tax accrual adjustments (mainly VAT and PAYE (€3 billion) and a range of smaller assets such as collaterals, EU transfers and mobile spectrum receipts." Good luck, as one might say, selling these or pledging them as a collateral. The entire notion that all of these assets have the stated face value in the market is questionable. That they might have a stated value in an environment of distress sufficient enough to warrant their seizure is plain bonkers.

And so on… The point is that a claim that EUR73 billion represents assets that can be used to fund any shortfall in Irish Government funding or that they provide any yield that is NOT accounted for on the balance sheet already (remember, current debt is driven by deficits and these are driven by operating costs and revenues of the Government, which in turn are accounting for all asset yields that currently accrue from all of the above assets) is a bit of a stretch and double-counting.

In light of this 'net liabilities' discussion, we need to see some serious, detailed, models-based liquidity and legal title risks analysis of the assets that (a) in total amount to EUR73 billion and (b) amount to EUR45 billion that remains unaccountable in the paper in any appreciable details.


But never mind - on the net, the paper is very useful and worth a read. Here are two little gems (I will blog on rest later):




Ouch! You don't need to be a nuclear scientist to spot the problem above…

The true value of the above is that it shows clearly that even on the 'net liabilities' basis, with all the hopium injected into valuations of assets, Ireland is not that much different from Greece... Have a nice day, ya all...

26/9/2013: Fiscal Council Estimates of the Promissory Note Deal

So the Irish Fiscal Council published tonight "The Government’s Balance Sheet after the Crisis: A Comprehensive Perspective" paper authored by Sebastian Barnes and Diarmaid Smyth. 

The paper is good, interesting, but as always (not a criticism) is open to interpretations, questions and debate. One criticism - it is hard to wade through double-counting and incomplete reporting of the Government assets and charts nomenclature does not appear to correspond to the one used in the text. One simple table listing all assets with the estimated value attached and a column outlining core risks to valuations involved would have saved the authors pages and pages of poorly constructed material.

Overall, however, it is good to see the broader approach taken by the authors to the problem of fiscal sustainability of public finances in Ireland. We rarely observe such. And I will be blogging on this later.


But the very interesting bit relates to the final official estimates of the Promissory Notes deal. Keep in mind, here's my on-the-record estimate of the net benefit from the deal in the range of 4.5-6.3 billion euros over 40 years horizon with most of this accruing earlier on in the life span of the deal. Here's the record (see box-out at the end of the article: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/03/2332013-sunday-times-10032013.html).

So here are the Fiscal Council estimates:

Mid-range minimum sales of bonds scenario: net savings of EUR 5-7 billion. Accelerated sales scenario: mid-range estimate of EUR 2-3 billion. Base Case for Euribor+150 and Euribor +250 at minimum levels of sales of bonds: EUR4 billion and EUR7 billion. The difference to my estimate is immaterial since I am looking at a longer time horizon for my estimates than the model used by the Fiscal Council does.

Reminder - some other estimates of the net present value of the savings from the deal run into 19 billion euros… ahem!..


I am looking forward to studying the spreadsheet with the model included which the FC is promising to make available on their website.

Wednesday, September 25, 2013

25/9/2013: Planning Permissions, Ireland, Q2 2013 and H1 2013

Q2 data for Planning Permissions Granted in Ireland is out today and on the surface it offers some good news reading.

Per CSO: In the second quarter of 2013, planning permissions were granted for 1,926 dwelling units, compared with 1,406 units for the same period in 2012, an increase of 37.0%.

In addition:
  • Planning Permissions were granted for 1,496 houses in the Q2 2013 an increase of 28.3% y/y.
  • Planning permissions were granted for 430 apartment units, an increase of 79.2% y/y. 
  • The total number of planning permissions granted for all developments was 3,368. This compares with 3,672 in the second quarter of 2012, a decrease of 8.3% y/y. 
  • Total floor area planned was 834 thousand square metres in the second quarter of 2013. Of this, 39.9% was for new dwellings, 39.7% for other new constructions and 20.4% for extensions. The total floor area planned increased by 1.2% in comparison with the same quarter in 2012. 

Some encouraging signs up there… although if you think the crisis is over, here's a handy chart from CSO:
The above, as CSO notes, puts things into perspective: we are starting from exceptionally low levels, so even a small uptick translates into large percentage changes. Still, I am happy to spot an improvement.

Now, let's take a closer look. I am dealing from here on with permissions issued, not units covered by these permissions.

  • Total number of planning permissions was down at 3,368 in Q2 2013, a decline of 8.28% y/y. In Q1 2013 there was a decline of 2.76% y/y, so rate of decline increased from the beginning of the year.
  • Total number of planning permissions in H1 2013 stood at 6,643 - down 5.64% y/y.
  • Total number of new permissions for dwellings granted in Q2 2013 was 772, which is down 18.05% y/y, which compares to 9.93% drop recorded in Q1 2013.
  • Total number of planning permissions for dwellings in H1 2013 stood at 1,634 - down massive 13.95% y/y.
  • Total number of new permissions for other new construction (ex-dwellings) granted in Q2 2013 was 754, which is down 8.94% y/y, which compares to a rise of 12.95% recorded in Q1 2013.
  • Total number of planning permissions for other new construction (ex-dwellings) in H1 2013 stood at 1,539 - up barely noticeable 1.05% y/y. At least these series were up.
  • Total number of permissions for extensions granted in Q2 2013 was 1,489, which is down 3.87% y/y, which compares to a decline of 3.21% recorded in Q1 2013.
  • Total number of planning permissions for extensions in H1 2013 stood at 2,785 - down 3.57% y/y.
  • Total number of permissions for alterations, conversions and renovations granted in Q2 2013 was 353, which is unchanged y/y, and compares to a decline of 11.94% recorded in Q1 2013.
  • Total number of planning permissions for ACRs in H1 2013 stood at 685 - down 6.16% y/y.

So in terms of actual permissions issued: we have a bit of a soggy outcome: nothing is up, everything is down y/y… Declines have accelerated in Q2 compared to Q1 in four out of five categories; and H1 figures are very poor for all, but one category. In terms of units approved: we have a decent uptick. I would suggest we use caution and see if the activity picks up from here on.

Three charts to illustrate:



Tuesday, September 24, 2013

24/9/2013: Public Health, and Legal v Illegal Drugs...

In light of the Government push for stricter tobacco regulations while happily cheering the Arthur Day and providing support for the drink celebrations across the country, here's an interesting 2010 study (full citation at the bottom of the post) of the effects of various drugs in terms of causing various types of individual (user) and common (social) harm. Note: I have no objection to the idea that taken in moderation, alcohol is hardly harmful to anyone involved. Then again, I have possibly an objection as to what constitutes moderation in the case of Arthur Day level of booze consumption in Ireland…

Background: "Proper assessment of the harms caused by the misuse of drugs can inform policy makers in health, policing, and social care. We aimed to apply multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) modelling to a range of drug harms in the UK."

Method: "Members of the Independent Scientific Committee on Drugs, including two invited specialists, met in a 1-day interactive workshop to score 20 drugs on 16 criteria: nine related to the harms that a drug produces in the individual and seven to the harms to others. Drugs were scored out of 100 points, and the criteria were weighted to indicate their relative importance."

Findings: "MCDA modelling showed that heroin, crack cocaine, and metamfetamine were the most harmful drugs to individuals (part scores 34, 37, and 32, respectively), whereas alcohol, heroin, and crack cocaine were the most harmful to others (46, 21, and 17, respectively). Overall, alcohol was the most harmful drug (overall harm score 72), with heroin (55) and crack cocaine (54) in second and third places."

Interpretation: "These findings lend support to previous work assessing drug harms, and show how the improved scoring and weighting approach of MCDA increases the differentiation between the most and least harmful drugs. However, the findings correlate poorly with present UK drug classification, which is not based simply on considerations of harm."

And here are some charts (you can click on each chart to open a larger image)

Methodological tree used in assessment:

Overall results along two main branches of the methodological tree:

Two-dimensional positioning of the two main branches scores:




Lastly, all 16 criteria mapped:


As I quipped on twitter earlier this week, maybe before introducing plain packaging laws for tobacco products we should introduce blank labels for alcohol too? After all, if restricting the former is about public and personal health, restricting the latter at least as much would make sense. Not that I subscribe to the idea that the former is any good of a policy tool... just pointing the inherent contradiction in Government's strategies to deliver improvements in public health...


Study link: http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(10)61462-6/abstract

Citation: Nutt, David J, King, Leslie A and Phillips, Lawrence D. (2010) Drug harms in the UK: a multicriteria decision analysis. The Lancet, 376 (9752). pp. 1558-1565. ISSN 0140-6736

Note: I wrote about research on links between alcohol and mortality here (see bottom of the post).

Monday, September 23, 2013

23/9/2013: A summary of changes in the Irish GDP: 1970-2012

Summary of the changes in Irish GDP composition over 1970-2012 period (all in current market prices terms):

I marked in red bold those components that perform at their worst historical comparative in 2010-2012 period and in green bold those that perform at their historical best, as per their contributions to GDP.

Notable aspects of the above table:

  1. The 'greedy decade' of the 2000s was actually distinguished by the lowest share of the economy accruing to personal consumption of goods and services - the Range Rovers of South Dublin didn't really cause the bust, folk...
  2. Government spending rose, as a share of economy, in 2010s compared to 2000s and reached above the levels recorded in the 1990s, albeit still below the disastrous years of the 1980s.
  3. Gross fixed capital formation has been demolished in the 2010s by the crisis, although its peak during the excesses of the 2000s was still lower than in the 1970s.
  4. Exports of goods and services outstripped imports of goods and services, resulting in the net exports hitting their peak in the 2010s. Some 46 percent of our net external trade went out of the window as profits expatriated by the MNCs (and that is after we also account for profits on-shored into Ireland by Irish companies and investors).
  5. Oh, and the fabled EU subsidies - well, these have been drained (note, these subsidies are reflected here gross, without accounting for EU taxes paid).

23/9/2013: Everyone is doing more of the same, alongside German voters

And here we have it, folks: Germany votes for status quo, markets seem to be voting for the same...



Meanwhile, ECB is promising to do nothing new in larger quantities, should markets decide to follow Merkel in repeating more of the past...


23/9/2013: Sunday Times 08/09/2013: Irish Demographic Dividend Reversal

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from September 8, 2013.


Back in the heady days of the Celtic Tiger, Irish economics commentariat and banks experts were extolling the virtues of Ireland's 'demographic dividend'.  A confluence of high birth rates, declining mortality and robust inward migration was propelling Ireland toward perpetually rising population counts. With these, the argument went, Ireland faced the ever-lasting expansion of domestic demand and labour supply.

Less than a decade later, the dividend has all but vanished in the maelstrom of rampant emigration. More ominously, as the latest trends suggest emigration is now reaching well beyond the traditionally at-risk sub-categories of the recent newcomers to Ireland and the long-term unemployed. Instead, outflows of professionals and middle-class families are now also on the rise.


Cutting across this nirvana of consensus permeating the Irish society around 2004-2006, few dared to suggest that something major was amiss in the aforementioned theory. Yet, the risks to Ireland's 'demographic dividend' were visible even at the time of the boom. At the peak of the Celtic Tiger and since the beginning of the Great Recession, I wrote about them in Irish media, including in these very pages. The first threat to our long-term population trends even in 2004-2006 period related to the risk of a structural economic slowdown. The second one came from the demographic ageing of the core European states and the resulting inevitable rise in wages premium for younger workers in these economies.

With the onset of the Great Recession, increased job markets uncertainty and declining disposable incomes have acted to boost Ireland’s birth rates, seemingly supporting the argument of some analysts that the demographic dividend was still alive and well then. In 1995-2007, there were 56,423 annual births on average in the Republic. In 2008-2009 average annual number of births stood at 74,183. Changes in the incentives for having children offered by the Great Recession were clearly the factor pushing fertility up. Alas, the latest data covering the twelve months through April 2013 shows that this process is now exhausted with 2013 births counts down 8.7 percent on 2010 peak.

Offsetting the initial rise in births, the Great Recession pushed Ireland back into becoming a net emigration nation once again, for the first time since 1995. Data published by the CSO last week shows that in 12 months through April 2013, total of 89,000 people have left the country. This is the highest number since the records started in 1987. There was a small increase in immigration driven primarily by importation of specialist foreign workers by the booming ICT and IFSC sectors, plus the return of students working on 1 and 2-year visas abroad. Despite this, 2013 marks the fourth consecutive year of net emigration.

Current rates of emigration are running ahead of the 1987-1995 period average. Back then, net emigration from Ireland averaged 14,811 per annum. Over the last four years, the average net outflow of people from this country stood at 30,600 annually.

The twin squeeze of declining birth rates and strong net emigration has resulted in 2013 posting the weakest overall population changes in 23 years. In 12 months through April 2013, Irish population grew estimated 7,700 - one seventh of the annual average for the 1991-2007 period. This brings us dangerously close to a rerun of the 1980s-styled demographic collapse when Irish population actually declined in three years through 1990.

Truth be told, we are probably caught in this 'back to the future' demographic warp already.

Our official statistics show inflow of 29,400 immigrants, excluding the returning Irish nationals and the immigrants from the Accession states, in the 12 months through April 2013. Majority of these are likely to be foreign workers brought into the country temporarily by the MNCs. Moreover, the current CSO estimates are based on PPS numbers, foreign visas issuance, as well as household surveys. These methods are potentially underestimating the numbers of those Irish nationals who have left the country, but still have close family remaining here. Last, but not least, our data is probably also underestimating outflows of the EU12 Accession states’ nationals.

Controlling for the above factors, it is highly likely that we are already experiencing a reversal of the ‘demographic dividend’ and the onset of the zero-to-negative population growth in Ireland since 2011. This has meant that our population today is some 436,000 below where it would have been if the trend established between 2000 and 2007 were to continue.


Ireland's emigration flows and population changes by age and nationality are retracing the structural collapse of our economy: the story of our paralysed and polarised society burdened by debts, taxes, unemployment, lack of opportunities for career advancement and fear for the future.

From 2010 through 2013, the numbers of Irish nationals opting to leave the country net of those returning from abroad have been rising steadily. The net outflow of Irish nationals more than tripled between 2010 and 2013. If between 2006 and 2008, some 32,100 more Irish people returned home than left Ireland, over the subsequent 5 years, 90,700 more Irish people emigrated from the island than moved here.

In addition to the above, there are some new undertones that are emerging in the data over the last two years.

Official data on population breakdown by age groups shows that the bulk of population declines over the crisis in Ireland took place in the 15-29 year olds cohorts. However, since 2011, the 30-39 year olds cohort is also posting declining numbers. These age-related trends are now pushing us toward twin age dependency scenario where the numbers of old age-dependent residents and young age-dependents peak at the same time. Top productivity cohorts - ages 34-54 - grew by 124,000 since 2007, while old and young age dependents cohorts are up 203,600 over the same period of time. Working age cohorts (20 years of age through 64 years of age) accounted for 62.4 percent of Irish population in 2007. This year the ratio is 59.7 percent.

Compared against the age distribution of the unemployment, the latest trends suggest that jobs losses are no longer the sole drivers of emigration. Instead, it appears that emigration is increasingly afflicting those groups of population that are generally more secure in their jobs. The potential reasons for this are household debt overhang and lack of promotional opportunities open to the younger workers here.

While the numbers of emigrants between 15 and 24 years of age remained basically unchanged over 2011-2013 period, the numbers of emigrants between 25 and 44 years of age rose by a third. With this, there was a corresponding rise in families relocating abroad.

With banks starting to move more aggressively against distressed borrowers, these sub-trends are likely to strengthen over time.

Economic and social losses arising from debt crisis are also likely to increase as migrants due to debt and/or career considerations are more likely to carry with them above average skills, productivity and earning potential. In addition, these migrants are less likely to return to Ireland, especially if the debt they leave behind remains on the record against their names.


The impact of the current wave of emigration on our society and economy is likely to be more long lasting than that of the previous emigration waves. This conjecture is supported by a number of considerations.

Today’s emigrants are conditioned by their education, past employment experiences and social values systems to accept the mobile nature of their future careers. In other words, having left Ireland they are unlikely to look back at their homeland as a natural home. Increasingly, Irish emigrants are setting their sights on geographies that are more remote from Ireland than the UK and continental Europe. This puts more stress on their ties to Ireland. The latest data showing that emigrants to countries like Australia, New Zealand and Canada tend to show lower returns in recent years. In addition, debt legacy will hold many of them back from returning to Ireland in the future. Age-related considerations with further reinforce this effect, with many emigrants in their mid-30s and 40s today facing a prospect of never again being able to secure a mortgage in Ireland were they to attempt a comeback. Lastly, a major factor in today’s emigration from Ireland is that it involves greater proportion of emigrants who enter their host destinations legally, thus increasing their chances at future naturalisation.

Overall, CSO data confirms the above observations, as fewer and fewer Irish nationals are today returning back home.


Far from being a solution to our economic woes or a temporary safety valve for the economy saddled with high levels of unemployment, current wave of emigration from Ireland is undermining the prospects of economic recovery here. More crucially, by removing more politically and socially disenchanted and activist younger people and families, the emigration is acting to mute the voices of dissent here. With them, the raison d’etre for the robust political, social and economic changes is slipping away too.





BOX-OUT:

Markit-Investec Purchasing Manager Indices for Irish Manufacturing and Services have both posted significant gains in August, compared to July. August PMI for Manufacturing came in at 52.0, showing the fastest pace of economic activity growth for the sector since November 2012. Meanwhile, Services PMI reading of 61.6 was the highest since February 2007. Both indices are subject to significant distortions from the multinational companies based here. However, Services PMI is subject to more severe skews due to the tax arbitrage activities by companies operating in international financial services, ICT services and auxiliary business support services. Nonetheless, caveats aside, the latest data strongly suggests that Ireland has moved out of the triple-dip recession in Q3 2013 and will post growth in GDP for the three months through September. Aside from this, however, the PMIs continue to signal relative weakness in the domestic sectors compared to exports and employment growth signals have weakened in both sectors of the economy. Finally, additional good news were signaled by the improved profit margins in Services, now third month running and marking the first sustained upward momentum in profits in five years. This, however, was not the case in Manufacturing, where input costs rose against basically unchanged output prices.

Sunday, September 22, 2013

22/9/2013: Relative v Absolute Income: What Matters to Our Well-Being?

A very important paper by Sacks, Daniel W. and Stevenson, Betsey and Wolfers, Justin, The New Stylized Facts About Income and Subjective Well-Being (January 23, 2013, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4067. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2205621). Note: emphasis in bold is mine

On foot of decades-long research that "asks people how happy or satisfied they are with their lives", "much of the early research concluded that the role of income in determining well-being was limited, and that only income relative to others was related to well-being".

This is the so-called relative income hypothesis that also engendered a strand of social policy research relating to relative income poverty.

"In this paper, [the authors] review the evidence to assess the importance of absolute and relative income in determining well-being. Our research suggests that"
1) absolute income plays a major role in determining well-being and
2) national comparisons offer little evidence to support theories of relative income and
3) the data show no evidence for a satiation point above which income and well-being are no longer related.

Authors "find that well-being rises with income, whether we compare people in a single country and year, whether we look across countries, or whether we look at economic growth for a given country. Through these comparisons we show that richer people report higher well-being than poorer people; that people in richer countries, on average, experience greater well-being than people in poorer countries; and that economic growth and growth in well-being are clearly related.

Crucial finding is that recent data rejects the so-called Easterlin Paradox: "Easterlin (1974), …asked “Does economic growth improve the human lot?” He answered: it does not. He began by showing that, relative to poor people, rich people within a country report greater well-being, as measured by self-reported happiness, life satisfaction, and related concepts. No-one disputes this observation… His argument was straightforward. If only absolute income matters, then when everyone gets richer, everyone’s well-being should rise. But if only relative income matters, then when everyone gets richer, no one’s well-being should rise, since no one gets richer relative to the average."

Here is the striking conclusion of the authors: "But is Easterlin correct? The accumulation of data over recent decades shows that Easterlin’s Paradox was based on empirical claims which are simply false. In fact rich countries enjoy substantially higher subjective well-being than poor countries, and as countries get richer, their citizens experience ever more well-being. What’s more, the quantitative relationship between income and well-being is about the same, whether we look across people, across countries, or at a single country as it grows richer. This fact turns Easterlin’s argument on its head: if the difference in well-being between rich and poor countries is about the same as the difference in well-being between rich and poor people, then it must be that absolute income is the dominant factor determining well-being."

Basic illustration of the above across countries:


Basic illustration across and within countries:


This is a paper that challenges the fundamentals of our understanding of the relationship between income, happiness, income inequality and absolute v relative poverty.


Note: I wrote about the related paper here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/05/452013-higher-income-vs-higher.html

22/9/2013: WLASze Part 2: Weekend Links on Arts, Sciences and Zero Economics

This the second part of WLASze: Weekend Links on Arts, Sciences and zero economics (part 1 is linked here). Enjoy!


Financial crises tend to have profound and long-run impacts on the societies they visit. This much should be pretty clear to the readers of this blog (from economics side of my musings). However, no man is an island and, thus, no art is an island either… What about financial crises impact on arts? Did gloom-n-doom of the Great Depression result in the darkening abstraction in arts, ultimately leading to the emergence of urbanist photography and design, as well as early abstract expressionism? Motherwell's Spanish Republic studies (http://www.moma.org/collection/object.php?object_id=79007) as culmination of darkness and pain?


Or Kline's torn dynamism?


Although all of these post-date the war, they are hardly infused by the giddy optimism of the 1950s and experimentation of the 1960s, instead carrying the pre-Vietnam fear and memory of the past, foreboding the replay of the previously experienced or at least a threat instead of foretelling a new era…Or more immediate deepening of German expressionism? The sombre consolidation of Bauhaus outside Weimar?

Enough of the argument here… Instead, back to the current events. Here's an interesting post based on Franco “Bifo” Berardi talk at Pratt Institute on his book The Uprising: Poetry and Finance, "which considers poetry as a salve in the wake of the international financial crisis. Or, as reviewer David Cunningham puts it now in considering the book for the UK’s Radical Philosophy journal, the book “posits a parallel between ‘the deterritorialization effect’ which has, on the one hand, ‘separated words from their semiotic referents’ and, on the other, separated ‘money from economic goods.’” Read and judge for yourself:
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/harriet/2012/11/audio-now-online-from-franco-berardi-talk-on-the-uprising-on-poetry-and-finance/?woo


On a brighter side of things, crises teach us (or attempt to teach us) to distill things more to the basics, to the necessary, striking out the superfluous. This can be a torturous process, but it can also be a path to beauty. Modern Japanese architecture, having faced the demons of severe constraints, often shows the emergence of angels of beauty out of the challenge of pushing organic spaces into contained sites. Two brilliant examples:

http://www.dezeen.com/2013/09/16/house-in-fujizakura-by-case-design-studio/
Cool, tranquil, beautiful and, yet, too individualistic for being inhabitable - a shell for a hermit crab of sorts…


And via deezen.com another example - this one a perfect balance of view, space, light and yet jigsawed into a challenging site…




http://www.dezeen.com/2013/09/11/alley-house-by-apollo-architects-associates/

There is a fundamental difference between 'compressed' European architecture and Japanese architecture. This difference arises from two distinct drivers for challenges of space. In European context, some (not all) of the spacial challenge rests on the basis of desire to appear to be 'environmentally conscious' - in other words, we often tend to build rural houses on micro scale to pretend that this 'helps the environment'. This gives our small rural houses architecture a forced, fake dimension. In the case of Japan, physical space constraints generate organic, unforced, organic effort to design spaces on intimate scale. End result, even urban architecture in Japan is often truly a balance of space, design, liveability, tradition and subtle, even modest distinction.


The testaments to the 'fake' constraints in the Western World are abandoned spaces - which in my view (aside from presenting a challenge as to why we need severe spatial constraints of design in the firs place) carry almost intrinsic artistic beauty in and by themselves. I wrote about this before in previous WLASze posts… so here are few more links documenting abandonment:
http://www.boredpanda.com/abandoned-places/


H/T for the above to @nicolematthews1

and more: http://blogof.francescomugnai.com/2013/01/30-of-the-most-beautiful-abandoned-places-and-modern-ruins-ive-ever-seen/


Abandonment is no threat, however to the greats of European art. Grand Palais in Paris is hosting the first in 40 years retrospective of George Braque. To me, Braque is ahead of the other great, associated closely with him - Picasso, especially in the context of defining fauvism and cubism.
http://www.france24.com/en/20130920-rare-braque-exhibition-opens-grand-palais-paris-picasso





Picasso and Braque... and Mark Tansey's take on their dual significance:



And from cubism (a quasi-scientific approach to space, light and positioning in painting) to physical positioning in a stream of light. Here's a massively important paper:
"By Bernoulli’s law, an increase in the relative speed of a fluid around a body is accompanies by a decrease in the pressure. Therefore, a rotating body in a fluid stream experiences a force perpendicular to the motion of the fluid because of the unequal relative speed of the fluid across its surface. It is well known that light has a constant speed irrespective of the relative motion. Does a rotating body immersed in a stream of photons experience a Bernoulli-like force? We show that, indeed, a rotating dielectric cylinder experiences such a lateral force from an electromagnetic wave." In other words, light has the same properties as air and water in their ability to create, for example, support drag that holds airplanes in the air...

Here's a popular link: http://www.technologyreview.com/view/519471/optical-bernoulli-forces-could-steer-objects-bathed-in-light-say-theorists/

From the authors: "The forces obtained here are only a fraction of the incident radiation pressure and seem to require infeasible rotation rates, but we expect that they can be resonantly enhanced by techniques similar to those that have been used by other authors to enhance scattered power for a given particle diameter. Mie resonances are already visible in Fig. 4, but much stronger resonant phenomena can be designed… Material dispersion will contribute an additional source of lateral force… Such enhancement mechanism, …may permit the future experimental observation and exploitation of optical “Bernoulli” forces.

We are far away from 'flying on light' but we know that theoretically it is feasible… And more… can light create 'vacuum' as a flow of water does?.. Injection pump for light anyone?..


And to conclude, a splash of hydraulic / fluid dynamics art from the Science Gallery (Trinity College), this time in Canada: http://www.therecord.com/whatson-story/4117146-big-splash/ Surface Tension, watery exhibition from @ScienceGallery opened in @THEMUSEUM in Kitchener, Ontario. Congrats to all involved! Great to see SG spreading its wings around the globe. Note, I covered SG latest exploits in Dublin here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/08/382013-wlasze-part-1-weekend-links-on.html.

22/9/2013: Two articles on the Great Recession

Two recent posts on the Great Recession in the US worth reading:
http://www.oftwominds.com/blogaug13/recession-never-ended8-13.html
and
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-08-26/guest-post-detroitification-it%E2%80%99s-government-stupid

The former argues pretty cogently that "The reality is that the recession never ended for 95% of U.S. households, and by many metrics the recession has deepened."

The latter has a handy guide to its core arguments as per drivers for the Great Recession:

"The reason why the economy is not recovering and will not recover can be explained in five simple points:

  1. Wealth and standard of living increases can only be achieved by producing more, not less.
  2. Capital increases are required to produce more. Wage gains are directly tied to productivity gains and more capital enables productivity to rise. 
  3. The private sector uses and expands capital. 
  4. Government destroys capital. It confiscates it from the private sector and uses it for consumption, effectively reducing the supply. Jobs, income and growth that otherwise would have developed do not. The rare exception is if government “invests” in capital projects like roads, infrastructure or meaningful education. If properly chosen, this government spending can assist in the production of capital.
  5. The proportion of assets and capital confiscated has increased greatly over the last century. At some point, the capital and wealth left behind in the private sector is inadequate to reproduce itself. That is when economic growth turns negative and standards of living decline. Long before that point growth rates diminish."

At a very general level, the above 5 points are fine. More fine detail would add the role of credit/leverage, as I argued here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/08/2282013-why-this-time-things-might-be.html

And a nice chart to sum it all up:


Saturday, September 21, 2013

21/9/2013: Human Capital & Social Mobility: Capital Tax v Education Spending Reforms

A new paper Human Capital, Social Mobility and the Skill Premium (September 18, 2013, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4388. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2327435) by Angelopoulos, Konstantinos and Malley, James R. and Philippopoulos, Apostolis produces fascinating insights into the relationship between human capital, physical capital and skills/wage premium.

The main drivers of the skill/wage premium are commonly recognised to be: 
  1. Skills-complementary technical change (SBTC - B standing for 'biased'), "which raises the demand for skilled labour, and the relative supply of skilled versus unskilled labour". Economic policy can influence this channel by increasing R&D and innovation which lead to increased technology contribution to the economic activity and in turn generate demand for complementary skills.
  2. "Occupational choice of economic agents, usually focusing on the distinction between entrepreneurs and workers, and its implications for social mobility." Here, economic policy too can have an impact via, say labour markets regulations and interventions, as well as general taxation policies.
  3. Direct policy impact via stimulating "capital accumulation via tax reforms" and direct "labour markets …intervention".

In contrast, "although education policies and tax policies have been considered as important determinants of social mobility, their impact on the joint determination of social mobility and the skill premium has generally not been studied."

Human Capital, Social Mobility and the Skill Premium "develops a dynamic general equilibrium model to highlight the role of human capital accumulation of agents differentiated by skill type in the joint determination of social mobility and the skill premium."

The authors find that "the model with endogenous social mobility can capture the empirical co-movements of the skill premium, the relative supply of skilled to unskilled workers and aggregate output in the U.S. data from 1970-2000." The study shows "that the model predictions for these empirical co-movements are improved when we allow for positive externalities from skilled human capital on social mobility." In other words, skill premium for skilled and unskilled workers tends to rise/fall jointly (co-move) and this co-movement is strengthened when increased social mobility of skilled human capital is associated with increased social mobility of unskilled human capital.

The authors' "policy results first show that endogenous social mobility creates additional incentives for the agents which enhance the beneficial effects of policy on aggregate outcomes and wage equality."

"Second, that important dynamic effects of policy on the skill premium are captured by allowing human capital accumulation to affect social mobility. In particular, post reform, the skill premium is higher in the short- to medium-run than in the long-run."

"Third, that although all policy reforms considered lead to an increase in output and social mobility, their implications regarding the skill premium differ. In particular, the skill premium increases after a capital tax cut and decreases after an increase in spending on education for unskilled agents and in spending on education for skilled
agents."


In other words, the authors show that "endogenous social mobility and human capital accumulation are key channels through which the effects of capital tax cuts and increases in public spending on both pre- and post-college education are transmitted."

Note: in my view this tends to support the idea - outlined by me in my TEDx Dublin talk last Saturday - that we are witnessing migration to the age of tech-enabled human capital away from the skills-enabled tech capital. 

"In particular, social mobility creates additional incentives for the agents which enhance the beneficial effects of policy reforms. Moreover, the dynamics of human capital accumulation imply that, post reform, the skill premium is higher in the short-to medium-run than in the long-run."

Note: in the context of my TEDx Dublin theme, the above reinforces my concept of new policy paradigm of C.A.R.E. (policy dimension aimed at establishing a comprehensive economy that is capable of Creating, Attracting, Retaining and Enabling human capital).

"Regarding all three results above, the effects of public spending on education for skilled agents are dependent on the externality that skilled human capital has on social mobility. In particular, a negative externality generally reduces many of the positive effects of this policy reform."


What about a capital tax cut

The "improvement in aggregate outcomes" following tax cut "also implies increased wage inequality. The reason is that the policy-induced increase in the capital stock is skill-biased because capital complements skilled labour more than unskilled. Hence, …the skill premium increases with the capital stock post-reform."

However, this "increase in the skill premium works to encourage the accumulation of unskilled human capital, as a means to increase social mobility to capture the higher returns associated with skilled employment. In turn, …the resulting increase in the relative skill supply acts to lower the skill premium. In fact, the reduction in the skill premium starts taking effect 20-30 years after the reform, when the increase in the share of skilled labour is sufficiently strong to counterbalance the increase in the capital stock."

Note: in my TEDx Dublin talk context, the above relates to the changes in underlying drivers for growth I highlighted in the chart - in particular, the lags we are experiencing in terms of the Age of Tech translating with a delay into future wage premium erosion (some might argue we are already witnessing this today). 


Education spending increase for unskilled workers: "As expected, the stock of human capital for unskilled labour increases and this raises output in all models and social mobility in the models that allow for endogenous skill accumulation. In turn, this increase in the relative supply of skill leads to a decline in the skill premium in the medium- to long-run. However, initially, the skill premium increases …because the labour productivity gains, brought about by the increase in human capital, also increase the return to physical capital and thus lead to increased capital stock, which tends to increase the skill premium." 

Over time, "when the relative skill supply has increased sufficiently, the skill premium starts to decline. In this case, in fact, the increase in the share of skilled in the population is sufficiently strong to decrease the skill premium in the long-run."

"The dynamic processes of human capital accumulation and social mobility have non-trivial implications on the …determination of …skill premium-social mobility" co-movements. Long-run: wage inequality is reduced along with increased social mobility. Short-run: wage inequality increases.


Summary: 

(1) In the long-run, "government spending on unskilled education, by increasing the labour productivity of unskilled labour and increasing their skill accumulation, raises output, reduces wage inequality and improves social mobility. However, "the increase in government education spending crowds out private consumption." In the short-run, unskilled education increases lead to increased inequality and social mobility declines.

(2) "…Increases in government spending on the education of the skilled agents has positive effects on output and consumption, as well as encouraging social mobility, despite the reduction in the skill premium. This occurs because, by supporting the productivity of the skilled, the government indirectly increases the potential future benefits of the unskilled, if they succeed in climbing the social ladder. However, these results are sensitive to whether externalities of skilled human capital on social mobility are positive or negative. The former enhance the positive effects on social mobility, wage inequality, and welfare, whereas the latter reverse them for social mobility and wage inequality and lower them for welfare."

(3) "Wage inequality effects of capital tax cuts are significantly dampened by the increase in the relative skill supply, which follows the increased returns to upward social mobility, while, at the same time, the aggregate efficiency effects of the capital tax cut become stronger."