Showing posts with label economics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label economics. Show all posts

Friday, June 12, 2020

11/6/20: America's Scariest Charts Updated


The latest data on initial unemployment claims for the week ending June 6, 2020 is out today (release here: https://oui.doleta.gov/press/2020/061120.pdf). Initial unemployment claims are up another 1,537,120 in one week, though the rate of new additions is down slightly on the revised 1,620,010 new claims in the week ending May 30, 2020.

Here is the summary of the claims and jobs losses during the current recession as compared to all previous post-WW2 recessions:


Cumulative estimated jobs losses so far in this recession amount to 21,088,120, though this number is likely to change as we get more updates on actual employment figures. Cumulative number of new unemployment claims filed in this recession stands at 40,358,315. This number includes those who were denied benefits in prior filings, but subsequently re-filed their claims. Nonetheless, the number is an important indicator of just how woefully horrific the COVID19 pandemic has been on U.S. labour force.

Updating data for June for Non-Farm Payrolls, and incorporating official number for May 2020, reported last week:


Estimated payroll numbers are now down to the levels las seen in 3Q 2000, effectively implying that COVID19 has ashed more jobs than were created in almost the entire 21 years of this century.

Here is another way to visualize the above data:


Here is what this week's initial claims print means for the index of jobs market performance during the current recession, compared to the already widely-debunked optimistic jobs report of last week for May:

In effect, this week largely destroyed most of the 2.509 million jobs created myth paraded by President Trump last week. In reality, of course, we know that that jobs creation print was to a large extent the outrun of re-registrations and benefits expirations, plus the figment of the BLS data collection methods. For the best explanation of these factors, read: https://www.thestreet.com/mishtalk/economics/surprise-the-bls-admits-another-phony-jobs-report and my take on this is: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2020/06/5620-incredible-jobs-report-meets.html.

Friday, June 5, 2020

5/6/20: "Incredible" Jobs Report Meets Reality


Some updates on the jobs report this morning for the U.S.

Political reaction:

Reality bites:

New initial unemployment claims last week: 1,603,000. Putting this into perspective:


Which brings latest non-farm payrolls figures back to 1Q 2000 levels:


So, yeah, right, "tremendous" or put differently, we have 20 years worth of jobs destroyed. Non-farm payrolls increase of 2,509,000 is a good thing at the tail end of May, but the average weekly new unemployment claims increases from March 14 through May 30 currently stand at 3,527,650. This means the "tremendous" gains are just 71% of the weekly average losses.

Beware of morons brigades pushing the successories posters.

Monday, June 1, 2020

1/6/20: COVID19 and European Banking


McKinsey research note on European banks' potential losses due to COVID19 is quite on the money:


With more than 1/3rd of European executives expecting "a muted recovery that would lead to sharp drops in banks’ revenue, a squeeze on their capital, and a hit on return on equity", European banks can expect revenues to drop by 40 percent plus, and ROE drop 11 percentage points in 2021.

And the problems are strategic. COVID19 is actually accelerating changes in customers' demand for services. "McKinsey’s European customer survey shows how customer behavior and needs have changed over the past month: digital engagement levels have climbed up to 20 percent, the use of cash has halved, 30 to 40 percent of customers have expressed a greater need for advice, while 20 to 40 percent want products to help them through the crisis.4 Pension shortfalls are a particular challenge with those close to retirement facing a very immediate problem."

Alas, European banks, especially those operating in the 2008-2014 crises-hit economies, such as Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal, are utterly unprepared for these shifting trends. I wrote about these problems in a series of two article for The Currency here: https://www.thecurrency.news/articles/4810/a-catalyst-for-underperformance-how-systemic-risk-and-strategic-failures-are-eroding-the-performance-of-the-irish-banks and https://www.thecurrency.news/articles/3833/culture-wars-and-poor-financial-performance-just-what-is-going-on-within-irelands-beleaguered-banks.

1/6/20: 3 months of COVID19 impact: BRIC Manufacturing PMIs


BRIC Manufacturing PMIs are out for May, showing some marginal improvements in the sector. However, of all four economies, China is the only one that is currently posting activity reading within the statistical range of zero--to-positive growth. Brazil, Russia and India remain deeply underwater.

Please note, these are quarterly PMIs, not monthly, based on GDP-weighted shares of manufacturing sectors and monthly PMI data points. 

Tuesday, May 26, 2020

26/5/20: COVID19 Impact on Travel and Consumer Demand


Some dire numbers from Factset on changes in consumer preferences / sentiment through March-April 2020:

Consumer Confidence by Age



  • "According to The Conference Board, consumer confidence has weakened significantly with the overall index falling from 118.8 in March to 86.9 in April, the lowest reading since June 2014." 
  • "... older Americans (aged 55 and over) are much less optimistic than survey respondents under 55. This poses a problem as we look to economic recovery... [as] households in which the head of household is 65 years old or older represent 22% of total household expenditures in the U.S. In addition, this age group dominates spending at full-service restaurants and travel and lodging."
Things are getting worse in travel and transport sectors:

Global Air Travel

  • "According to the International Air Transport Association, global air travel was down 52.9% in March compared to a year earlier, hitting its lowest level since the Global Financial Crisis."
  • "In the U.S., jobs in air transportation fell by 27.4% in April."
  • "The four major U.S. airlines—American, Delta, United, and Southwest—are prohibited from laying off or furloughing workers until after September 30 as a condition of receiving billions in payroll assistance as part of the CARES Act. But these carriers have been asking employees to take voluntary unpaid or lower-paying leaves, reduced hours, and early retirement."
On travel sector:

Vacation Plans

  • "The April consumer confidence survey shows that just 31.9% of respondents intend to take a vacation within the next six months. This down from 54.9% in February and is the lowest reading ever in the 42-year history of this survey question."
  • "We only have monthly personal consumption data through March... In March, consumption on accommodations was down 43.3% compared to February while air transportation had dipped by 53.5%." 

Saturday, May 9, 2020

9/5/20: Some uncomfortable facts on the U.S. wealth distribution since 1989


The distributional effects of COVID19 pandemic impact on the labour markets in the U.S. will likely result in a massive debasement of the national wealth shares of the 'Main Street' segment of American society (the 90 percent) and a further increases in the national wealth share of the top 10 percent. So much is rather clear from the data on the labour markets (e.g.: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2020/05/8520-path-of-tornado-us-labour-force.html).

But this process is not a unique feature of the current 'ideology' prevailing in the White House, nor is it a unique feature of the 'Republican Party ideology'. Historically, both, the Democratic Party Presidencies and the Republican Party Presidencies since the start of the 1990s on have been responsible for the dramatic drops in the share of national net worth accruing to those outside the top 10 percent of the wealth distribution. Here is the data through 4Q 2019:



The last time, the 'Main Street America' enjoyed sustained increases in net worth was during the tenure of George H. W. Bush. Since then, there have been just one short-lived period of increase in net worth, with subsequent declines erasing fully those gains: the Dot.Com bubble during the tail end of the Clinton and the starting part of the George W. Bush administrations.

And the current Presidency is actually somewhat exceptional to the trend: under Trump Administration, American's Main Street witnessed the lowest rates of decline in their share of the national net worth of 'just' 0.13% per annum, of all post-1992 administrations. In fact, the share of the country's net worth accruing to the bottom 50 percent of Americans has risen under the Trump Presidency tenure at the fastest annualized clip since the data series started.

In simple terms, American policies of destroying the prosperity of the majority of the country's population are not reflective of the 'political divide'. Both, Democratic and Republican Presidencies have led to the effective debasement of the wealth of the American Main Street. And, in equally simple terms, the Trump Administration tenure so far has been more benign to the bottom 50 percent of the American wealth distribution than any presidency since 1989.

Like it or not, but the data is quite telling.

Thursday, May 7, 2020

7/5/20: No Value in Them, Stonks

No, folks, the markets are still not in line with fundamentals:


And that applies to all three sets of fundamentals: pre-COVID19 conditions in the underlying economy (secular stagnation), during-COVID19 collapse of the economy, and post-COVID19 expectations for the economy.

Which, of course, explains why Buffett sees no opportunities for buying, given the above chart is one of his favourite indicators of value.

Wednesday, May 6, 2020

6/5/20: 1Q 2020 US GDP:


From Factset: "The decrease in first-quarter real GDP was largely driven by the 7.6% decline in consumer spending, which subtracted 5.3% from the total GDP number. Investment was also a drag on growth, while an improvement in the trade deficit partially offset these negatives. We may see downward revisions to these numbers with the next two data revisions, and second-quarter growth is expected to be far worse. Analysts surveyed by FactSet are currently expecting a 29.9% contraction in Q2."


Yeeks!

6/5/20: Eurozone Composite PMI: Covid Horror Show


Final Eurozone Composite Output Index came in at 13.6 (Flash: 13.5, against March Final: 29.7). March was bad. April is worse. Final Eurozone Services Business Activity Index was at 12.0 (Flash: 11.7, March Final: 26.4), final Manufacturing PMI covered here: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2020/05/4520-eurozone-manufacturing-pmis-crater.html.


1Q 2020 implied decline in Euro area GDP is at around 3.5%. 2Q 2020 start is now worse than 1Q 2020.


Thursday, April 9, 2020

9/4/20: Ifo Eurozone Forecast Q1-Q3 2020: Covid19 Impacts


Germany's ifo Institute joint forecasts for Eurozone growth are out today. Bleak reading. The forecasts below assume that Covid-19 restrictions will be gradually lifted over the summer 2020.

Seasonally and working-day adjusted GDP growth:


From ifo forecast: "The economy in the euro area is expected to slide into a deep recession in the first half of 2020:

  • GDP growth is forecast to be -2% in Q1 and -10% in Q2, followed by a recovery in Q3 with +8%. 
  • Due to the lack of comparable events in the last decades and the unpredictable course of the pandemic, these estimates are subject to substantial uncertainty."
  • "Gross fixed capital formation is also certain to decline, with -2% in Q1 and -10% in Q2, due to supply disruptions, planning uncertainty and a preference for liquidity."
  • "Foreign demand is likely to contribute negatively to growth, as a result of the euro area’s exposure to recessive international trade and a struggling global economy."


Inflation environment:

Headwinds and risks: 

  • "A more unfavorable course of the pandemic would require longer and possibly stricter containment measures...
  • "Despite massive liquidity provision by governments and central banks, a prolonged downturn would then lead to liquidity strains in the economy. 
  • Increased debt levels associated with low income flows and asset devaluations are likely to lead to solvency issues for thinly capitalized corporations and private households.
  • An ensuing rise in loan defaults could in turn lead to problems in the banking sector." 
  • "A resurgence of the European debt crisis on a large scale thus constitutes a non-negligible risk to the forecast."

Thursday, April 2, 2020

2/4/20: COVID19 in three charts


#COVID2019 economy in three pics:

U.S. unemployment claims, week 2 of filings:

Irish unemployment claims, first month of filings:


 World GDP forecast after one month of Covid pandemic:
FUGLY! All around. 

Wednesday, March 25, 2020

Monday, March 23, 2020

23/3/20: Private Consumption Gets the Virus. Heads to an ICU...


Via @bkollmeyer, Deutsche Bank's Research chart on discretionary spending across the global economy:


I have no access to the primary data on this, but if the chart is true, the global economy is 'borked'. 

One notable line here is for Ireland. Ireland's economy is heavily dependent on personal consumption expenditure. Here are the latest data:
    PC as % of
    modified
    total
   demand
        PC as %          of GNI*
     1995-199958.857.6
     2000-200754.755.2
200754.156.7
     2008-201462.863.8
     2015-201859.455.4
201958.7               NA

My estimate is that 2019 Personal Consumption to GNI* ratio was around 55.2%. If true, coupled with the above-cited DB research, Irish economy has taken a nosedive of around 4 percentage points for FY 2020 just on personal consumption side of economic activity. Investment and private sector production will be the other contributors to that decline.

Sunday, February 23, 2020

23/2/20: Fake Data or Faking Data? Inflation Statistics


As economists and analysts, almost all of us are trying - at one point or another - make sense of the, all too often vast, gap between the reality and the economic statistics. I know, as I am guilty of this myself (here's a recent example: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2020/02/18220-irish-statistics-fake-news-and.html).

An interesting and insightful paper from Oren Cass of the Manhattan Institute dissects the extent of and the reasons for the official inflation statistic failing to capture the reality of the true cost of living changes in the U.S. over recent years (actually, decades) here: https://www.manhattan-institute.org/reevaluating-prosperity-of-american-family). It is a must-read paper for economics students, analysts and policymakers.

His key argument is that: "Economists and families see three things differently:

  • Quality Adjustment. Products and services that rise substantially in price but in proportion to measured quality improvements can become unaffordable, while having no effect on inflation.
  • Risk-Sharing. New products and services can increase costs for the entire population yet deliver benefits to only a very small share, while having no effect on inflation.
  • Social Norms. Society-wide changes in behaviors and expectations can alter the value or necessity of a good or service, while having no effect on inflation."
In other words, over time, official inflation starts to measure something entirely different than the real and comparable across time consumption expenditure. As the result, you can have a paradox of today: low inflation is associated with falling affordability of life. 

An example: "In 1985, ... it would require 30 weeks of the median weekly wage to afford a three-bedroom house at the 40th percentile of a local market’s prices, a family health-insurance premium, a semester of public college, and the operation of a vehicle. By 2018, ... a full-time job was insufficient to afford these items, let alone the others that a household needs."

To address some of the shortcomings of the inflation measures, Cass offers a different metric, called COTI - Cost of Thriving Index - which basically amounts to the number of weeks that a given line of expenditure requires in terms of median income. Or "Weeks of Income Needed to Cover Major Household Expenditures". Two charts below illustrate:



And here is a summary table:

Excluding food, other necessities and looking solely at Housing, Health Insurance, Transport and College Education, the number of weeks of work at an overall median wage required to cover the basics of the necessary expenditure is now in excess of 58.4 weeks. For female workers' median wage, the number is 65.6 weeks. 

Which means that even before you consider other necessities purchases, and before you consider taxes, you are either dipping massively into debt or require a second income to cover these. 

Note: these do not account for income taxes, state taxes, property taxes, dental insurance. These numbers do not cover payments for water, gas, electricity. There is no mandatory car insurance included. No allowances for deductibles coverage savings (e.g. HSAs). No childcare, no children expenditures, no food purchases, and so on.

And even with all these exclusions, median income cannot afford the basics of living in today's America. 

A word from Fed, anyone?

Tuesday, February 18, 2020

18/2/20: Irish Statistics: Fake News and Housing Markets


My latest column for The Currency covers the less-public stats behind the Irish housing markets: https://www.thecurrency.news/articles/9754/fake-news-you-cant-fool-all-of-the-people-all-of-the-time-on-property-statistics.

Key takeaways:
"Irish voters cast a protest vote against the parties that led the government over the last eight years – a vote that just might be divorced from ideological preferences for overarching policy philosophy."

"The drivers of this protest vote have been predominantly based on voters’ understanding of the socio-economic reality that is totally at odds with the official statistics. In a way, Irish voters have chosen not to trust the so-called fake data coming out of the mainstream, pro-government analysis and media. The fact that this has happened during the time when the Irish economy is commonly presented as being in rude health, with low unemployment, rapid headline growth figures and healthy demographics is not the bug, but a central feature of Ireland’s political system."

Stay tuned for subsequent analysis of other economic statistics for Ireland in the next article.

Friday, February 14, 2020

14/2/20: Pandemics, Panics and the Markets


In my recent article for The Currency I wrote about the expected market effects of the 2019-nCov coronavirus outbreak: https://www.thecurrency.news/articles/8490/constantin-gurdgiev-pandemics-panics-and-the-markets.


While past pandemics are not a direct nor linear indicators of the future expected performance, the logic and the dynamics of the past events suggest that while the front end short term effects of pandemics on the economies and the markets can be significant, over time, rebounds post-pandemics tend to fully offset short run negative impacts.

Key conclusions from the article are:

  • "...The market appears to worry little about public health risks, after their impact becomes more visible, although the onset of a pandemic can be associated with elevated markets volatility. This volatility is higher the faster the evolution of the health scare, but so is the market rebound from each crisis lows."
  • "This is not say that investors have little to worry about in today’s markets. We are still trading in the heavily over-bought market, and concerns about global growth are not getting much of a reprieve from the newsflows. The good news is, to date, the latest global health crisis does not seem to be a trigger for a major and sustained sell off. The bad news is, we are yet to see its full impact."

Tuesday, January 21, 2020

21/1/20: US Deficits, Growth and Money Markets Woes


My article for The Currency on the effects of the U.S. fiscal profligacy on global debt and money markets is out: https://www.thecurrency.news/articles/7371/the-us-deficit-has-topped-1-trillion-and-investors-should-be-worried.

Key takeaways:

"As the Trump administration continues along the path of deficits-financed economic expansion, the question that investors must start asking is at what point will debt supply start exceeding debt demand, even with the Fed continuing to throw more cash on the fiscal policies bonfire?"


"In the seven years prior to the crisis of 2008-2012, US economic growth outpaced US budget deficits by a cumulative of $1.56 trillion. This period of time covers two major wars and associated war time spending increases, as well as the beginnings of the property markets and banking crises in 2007.

"Over the last seven years since the end of the crisis, US economic growth lagged, on a cumulated basis, fiscal deficits by $928 billion, despite much smaller overseas military commitments and a substantially improved employment outlook.

"These comparatives are even more stark if we are to look at the last three years of the Obama Administration set against the first three years of the Trump Presidency. During the 2014-2016 period, under President Barack Obama, US deficits exceeded increases in the country’s GDP by a cumulative amount of $226 billion. Over the 2017-2019 period, under  Trump’s tenure in the White House, the same gap more than doubled to $525 billion.

"No matter how one spins the numbers, two things are now painfully clear for investors. One: irrespective of the stock market valuations metrics one chooses to consider, the most recent bull cycle in US equities has nothing to do with the US corporate sector being the main engine of the economic growth. Two: the official economic figures mask a dramatic shift in the US economy’s reliance on public sector deficits since the end of the crisis, and the corresponding decline in the importance of the private sector activity."


Friday, January 10, 2020

10/1/20: U.S. Tariffs on European Wines: Inflicting Self-Harm


Next week, the  Office of the US Trade Representative is expected to make a determination on the potential imposition of an up to 100% tariff on imports of wine from Europe. Which is a bad thing for the overall state of the global trade, bad news for the European producers of wine, bad news for the American consumers and their European counterparts, and bad news for the U.S. wine industry. But 'bad things' do not stop there. There will be costs imposed on restaurants and bars. There will be negative spillover effects - in the long run - to the competitiveness of the U.S. wine making industry competitiveness. In other words, the new tariffs are a perfect exemplification of how poor policies in one sector can hammer the entire complex chain of value added across a much broader economy, both in the long run and the short run.

Let's start from the top.

Causes

The reason for the introduction of the tariffs on wines made in Europe - the first wave of which came in in October - has absolutely nothing to do with the wine makers or wine importers or wine consumers. Back in September this year, the WTO Arbitration Panel has ruled that Boeing (the U.S. civilian aircraft manufacturer - in addition to being also a major military-industrial complex player) and Airbus (Boeing's European counterpart) received tens of billions in illegal state supports and subsidies over the period of 15 years. These supports included tax subsidies and credits and subsidised loans. All of which was well known to anyone even remotely familiar with economics of both the EU and the U.S. well before the WTO rulings.

Given the state of the U.S. trade policy (War First, Trade Later) and the fact that Boeing is in a pile of financial problems stemming from its disgraceful handling of the 737 Max scandal, the U.S. rushed out of the stables to mount its trade offensive against the EU. imposing 25% tariff levy against European wine producers. The measure, of course, was 'designed' (if one call it thus) to hurt European economies. Wine industry is iconic for countries like France (Airbus major domicile), Italy (which hasn't much to do with Airbus and was partially spared from the hit) and Spain (another Airbus HQ domicile). Germany also got hit, especially given its well known white wine production. Now, Airbus has also major presence in Mobile, Alabama, USA (where is works on A319, A320 and A321 models) and Mirabel, Canada (A220 model), although Chateau Mobile and the fabled reds of Mirabel were spared by the U.S. trade authorities.

The new round of tariffs - the 100% ones being currently considered - also come on foot of the finding that France’s new digital services tax discriminates against US tech companies, according to USTR, even though the French tax is a de facto precursor to the OECD's Digital Services Tax initiative (covered here: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2019/08/12819-oecd-tax-plans-some-bad-news.html and, in more detail, here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3406260).

European response to the same triggers was to call for a negotiated resolution of the disputes over Boeing and Airbus. Which, of course, is not how the U.S. does business these days.

First round impact

The first round of sanctions had little impact on the wine makers, hammering instead U.S. supply chain - distributors, warehousing, wholesalers and retail - and U.S. consumers (just in time for the Holidays season). The reason for this is that European producers have a massive latent excess demand for their wines in Asia-Pacific and Eastern and Central Europe, where consumers prefer European wines - by taste, brands and cost points - to the U.S. wines. U.S. distributors and wholesalers took a direct hit: most of the 25% tariff has been absorbed into lower profit margins by the importers.

One of the reasons this worked is that the U.S. demand for wine is growing, which means that for relatively benign tax hikes, suppliers can lower unit margins in hope of compensating with continued growth in demand.


Demand has grown from the recent plateau of 2 gallons pa per person in 1999-2002, to just under 3 gallons in 2018. This margins logic breaks down when tariffs rise above 35-40% mark, making cost pass-through to the consumers virtually unavoidable.

A message from the small wine importing firm, specialising on ESG impact-driven natural wines, makes another case: http://www.jennyandfrancois.com/2019/12/17/wine-tariffs-threaten-our-very-existence/. "These [proposed 100%] tariffs are really without precedent, but to glimpse a window on the possible disastrous consequences, we could examine the 1930 Smoot Hawley Act. History teaches us that this act hastened the arrival of the Great Depression, extended its length, led to a 65% downturn in global trade, and made imported goods a luxury item only affordable to the top 1% of the American population. What’s more, those tariffs were only between 40-48%, not the 100% tariffs currently in discussion. Smoot Hawley is the reason most of the world’s leaders today favor unregulated free trade." And "I spent 20 years of my life building a successful business, and in one signature the Trump administration could make it all crumble."


Killing wine wasn't a great policy back in the 1930s. For everyone involved. Hammering European wine today won't be either.

A wider impact can be seen in the restaurant and catering sector. Here is how disastrous tariffs on wine can be for restaurants business: https://www.postandcourier.com/blog/raskin_around/proposed-wine-tariffs-could-spur-widespread-charleston-restaurant-closures-opponents/article_3a07ee26-2e44-11ea-a9e1-b3eafe8429c4.html. "One downtown Charleston restaurant owner estimates the loss of Prosecco alone would amount to a $57,167 annual revenue loss... Just those drinks hypothetically work out to more than $1,000 a month in server tips, on average. Assuming that loss is equally shared by a 12-person front-of-house crew, each employee would be out approximately $94, or about two-thirds of the average monthly household utility bill in Charleston."

The impact is not lagged: "when the 25 percent tariff was implemented, Root says, “it became part of our working capital immediately. We had to come up with $40,000 unexpectedly” in order to free up wine which had already shipped. But he characterizes a 100 percent tariff as “impossible.”"

Even in the time-sensitive, so less tariff-elastic cases, it is the U.S. businesses that have been absorbing the lion's share of the cost increases, as illustrated by the 2019 vintage of Beaujolais Nouveau release last year that came after the 25% tariff hike of October 2. This is covered well here: https://www.winemag.com/2019/10/29/tariffs-on-european-union-goods-impact-u-s-wine-industry/. In theory, producers should be absorbing more of the tax increase cost in lower elasticity supply cases. But due to supply chain complexity and the fact that producers face global demand, with lots of substitution options, while the U.S. wholesalers, retailer and consumers have inelastic demand (due to timing-sensitive nature of the market for Nouveau releases) this is not the case.

Bad news for the U.S. producers

So higher tariffs on European wines should be a good thing to the American producers of wine, right? After all, as prices of their competitors rise, their products should experience increased demand due to consumer substitution in favor of cheaper alternatives.

This is a fallacious argument, given complexity of the wine business.

Firstly, price-sensitive consumers who have a greater incentive to switch away from European wines toward other alternatives are likely to go for cheaper Chilean and Australian wines instead of the already higher-priced Californian, Oregonian and other U.S. offerings.

Secondly, demand for all wine is likely to decline due to higher prices, but also due to the reduced range of wines that consumers might consider affordable to them. Consumers do not simply buy the wine by the price. Instead, consumers buy, say, California wine because they want something different from the Italian wine, and they buy Italian wine to diversify their consumption (broaden the range of taste options) from French offerings, and they buy French offerings because they have been consuming Spanish ones, and so on, until they reach back to California wines. It is exactly the same with food: making Thai cuisine more expensive does not necessarily mean Italian restaurants will gain more customers. Instead, it might mean that consumers will reduce demand for eating out in all restaurants and switch to fast food instead.

Thirdly, wine business is also complex. U.S. producers innovate and collaborate with European producers. Adversarial trade is not good for technology and intellectual property transfers between them. And U.S. producers are also worried about inevitable EU counter-measures. Worse, if tariffs were to trigger significant drop off in the number of wholesale, retail and restaurant businesses and trading volumes, smaller U.S. producers (who tend to be more innovative and have greater intellectual property investments in the industry) will have fewer channels to sell and market their own offerings. Here is one California wine producer views on the effect of potential decrease in the number of wholesale / distribution partners under the 100% tariffs proposal: https://tablascreek.typepad.com/tablas/2019/12/no-100-tariffs-on-european-wines-wont-be-good-for-california-wineries.html. To quote them on restaurants part of the chain impact alone: "Restaurants are famously low-margin businesses anyway. Increasing the costs of their wine programs will push some out of business, further reducing outlets for our wines."

Lastly, no U.S. producer of wine would want to face a prospect of their brand capital worldwide being associated with state-imposed tariff 'protection'. Majority of the American winemakers compete on their own creativity, experience, and marketing. In a highly product-differentiated world, hammer-all tax measures do little to help indigenous producers to succeed. They dilute quality of signalling that successful brands develop with their sweat and capital.

To quote, again, the excellent Tablas Creek folks (link above): "Why wouldn’t the wine community just switch its sources to other, non-tariff countries? Wine is not a commodity, where a customer can simply swap in a wine, even one made from the same grape, from one part of the world for another and expect them to be comparable. Wines are products inextricably tied to the place in which they are produced. And the disruption of 100% tariffs on wines from the world’s oldest wine regions would have cascading impacts that would reach deep into a whole network of American businesses, investors, and consumers."