3/2/2012: De Kaufman Door 1

Kaufman Foundation - a research centre for studying entrepreneurship - runs quarterly reports on the panel of economics bloggers. These reports contain some brilliant insights into the cutting edge policies as well as some reaffirmations of orthodoxies.

Here's the one I liked in the current Q1 2012 issue:

So let's run through these in the context of the latest conceptual reforms ideas floating in the Irish education system:

• Voucher system - 76% of bloggers are in favor and 11% opposing (remember - these responses come from the Left, Right, Libertarian, professional, academic etc economists). In Ireland, of course the idea of parental choice is anathema to the Department of Education and the rest of the crowd that is setting the education agenda.
• Charter schools (characterized by greater independence, more parental engagement in all aspects of schooling etc) - 74% of bloggers agree, 11% disagree. In Ireland - calls to shut down independent schools abound and new non-state schools are having problems getting teachers funds.
• Teacher choice - 59% in favor, 19% opposed - less decisive vote, but the idea would be a total 'No go' for Ireland.
• Flexibility for principals - 9% opposed, 81% in favor. Not the flavor of the month for the DofE or the rest of the education policy pack.
• Higher teacher pay overall gets 10% opposition and 53% support, but merit pay for teachers idea gets 9% opposition and 74% support. Which of course will never ever take hold in Ireland.
• Transparency for value-added gets 8% opposition and 71% support. Do note the emerging clear theme - accountability and independence are valued, merit to be rewarded... oh, no, these are not happening here in Ireland.
• Higher standards - 30% oppose, 33% support because, presumably, it is hard to really define or trust 'standards'. 
• Greater federal involvement gets support from 12% of respondents and is opposed by 59%, while less federal involvement gets support from 57% and opposition from 18%. Well, now, I am not exactly an education specialist, but I did notice as of late that Irish debate about the secondary education has distinctly taken an anti-private schools turn. And there are pretty powerful voices here calling for nationalization of secondary education. Hmmm...

Of course, the above policy options are not exhaustive nor comprehensive. And yes, there are big differences between the US and Irish systems. But it is pretty clear to me that the above preferences expressed by US economics bloggers for more transparency, more accountability, more independence in the education system run diametrically counter to the prevailing ideology surrounding education reforms in Ireland today.

3/2/2012: Big Bad Speculators & Little Red Riding Hoods

That "Gotcha..." moment, you know... speaking last night at a round table discussion on the future of Europe, I was confronted with a question from the audience and a fellow panelist remarks in the same vein that, roughly speaking, attributed the entire current crisis in Europe to the derivatives markets and speculative investment. More than that, the same were blamed for everything from the environmental disasters to increases in commodity prices. Some parts of the Left just love the idea of finding a "capitalist" (even arch-capitalist - aka speculative) root to every problem - the "Gotcha..." thingy of pseudo intellectualist disdain for facts as much as for 'speculators' and 'markets'.

This of course does not mean that financial instrumentation, speculation or other forces of the financial markets did not contribute to the crisis, but it is a distinct claim from the one made by those proposing that they caused the crisis single-handedly.

By sheer accident, looking through some old research papers, I came across this study from the ECB: Lombardi, Marco J. and Van Robays, Ine, Do Financial Investors Destabilize the Oil Price? (May 20, 2011). ECB Working Paper No. 1346. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1847503

The study looks into the large oil price fluctuations that were observed in the recent years. In particular, the study considers the role of financial activities in the determination of oil prices.

Per study (emphasis is mine):

"The oil futures market has indeed become increasingly liquid, and the activity of agents that do not deal with physical oil, the so-called non-commercials, has greatly increased. This led some to hypothesize that inflows of financial investors in the futures market may have pushed oil prices above the level warranted by fundamental forces of supply and demand, whereas others argue that the impact of financial activity on the oil spot market is negligible or non-existent beyond the very short term."

The paper studies "the importance of financial activity in determining the spot price of oil relative to the role of oil market fundamentals", using a sign-restricted structural VAR model. The model allows the study authors to separate financial activities into two types: stabilizing and destabilizing. This is achieved by postulating a model that links "the oil spot market to the futures market through a no-arbitrage condition", so that:

• Destabilizing financial shock is identified as one that creates "a deviation from the no-arbitrage condition, thereby ...driving oil futures prices away from the levels justified by oil market fundamentals. 
• Stabilizing financial activity is defined as "driven by changes in oil supply and demand-side fundamentals". 

In addition, the econometric framework adopted in the study allows to identify four different types of oil shocks:

• an oil supply shock
• an oil demand shock driven by economic activity 
• an oil-specific demand shock which captures changes in oil demand other than those caused by economic activity, and 
• a destabilizing financial shock (such as a spike in speculative activity).

The results suggest that 

• Financial activity in the futures market can significantly affect oil prices in the spot market, although only in the short run. 
• The destabilizing financial shock (speculation) only explains about 10 percent of the total variability in oil prices.
• Shocks to fundamentals "are clearly more important over our sample. Indeed, looking at specific points in time, the gradual run-up in oil prices between 2002 and the summer of 2008 was mainly driven by a series of stronger-than-expected oil demand shocks on the back of booming economic activity, in combination with an increasingly tight oil supply from mid 2004 on. Strong demand-side growth together with stagnating supply were also the main driving factors behind the surge in oil prices in 2007-mid 2008, and the drop in oil prices in the second half of 2008 can be mainly explained by a substantial fallback in economic activity following the financial crisis and the associated decline in global oil demand. Since the beginning of 2009, rising oil demand on the back of a recovering global economy also drove most of the recovery in oil prices."

However, the study did find that financial investors "did cause oil prices to significantly diverge from the level justified by oil supply and demand at specific points in time. In general, inefficient financial activity in the futures market pushed oil prices about 15 percent above the level justified by (current and expected) oil fundamentals over the period 2000-mid 2008, when the volume of crude oil derivatives traded on NYMEX quintupled. Particularly in 2007-2008, destabilizing financial shocks aggravated the volatility present in the oil market and caused oil prices to respectively over- and undershoot their fundamental values by significant amounts, although oil fundamentals clearly remain more important."

So some speculation is harmful to fundamentals-determined pricing, although the study does not consider the potential benefits from speculation-induced greater liquidity in the markets (which was not the core objective of the study to begin with), but largely, 5-fold increase in speculative activity accounts for just 10 percent of prices variability. 

3/2/2012: Ireland's Jobs Creation & Destruction data

CSO recently published its analysis of the labour market looking into jobs creation and destruction in the economy - a new study, currently in the 'experimental' stage and a very welcome addition to CSO tools, in my view.

Here's the core data:

Per charts (source for the chart is CSO):

• Job creation has increased slightly from 9% in 2009 to 12% in 2010
• Job destruction has fallen significantly from 28% in 2009 to 18% in 2010 
• Net job creation (job creation less job destruction) remained negative at – 6% in 2010

Note to CSO - a table with data would be good - or at least labeling of values in the chart. And do please continue with this analysis.

2/2/2012: US Mint Sales for January - signaling return to fundamentals-driven demand?

January data is out for US Mint sales and time to update my semi-regular analysis. Here's the note. I am putting a disclaimer below - so the Irish stuffbrokers' community that somehow gets their facts wrong when no one is around to correct them breaths easier. Everything you read below is my personal opinion informed by my analysis of the official data from the US Mint.

January data from the US Mint on sales of gold coins presents an interesting picture, both in terms of seasonality and overall demand for the asset class.

Some background to start with. 

Gold prices have been moving sideways with some relatively moderate volatility in recent months. Between August 2011 - the monthly peak in US Dollar-quoted price and January 2012, price has fallen 4.55%, but in the last month, monthly move was 10.82% and year on year prices are up 30.4%. Crisis-period average price is now at USD1,154/oz and the standard deviation in prices is around 337 against the historical (1987-present) standard deviation of 330. In 2011 standard deviation for monthly prices stood at (small sample-adjusted) 144, well below historical volatility, due to a relatively established trend through August 2011. However, prices returned to elevated volatility in August 2011-January 2012.

These price dynamics would normally suggest rising caution and buyer demand reductions over time. And to some extent, this sub-trend was traceable in the data for US Mint sales in some recent months too. For example, unadjusted for seasonal variation, August 2011 sales of Mint coins peaked at 112,000 oz with relatively moderate 0.67 oz/coin sold gold content. By November 2011, sales slowed down to a relative trickle of 41,000 oz at 0.71 oz/coin sold. December sales came in at 65,000 oz with gold content on average of 1 oz per coin sold. Much media hullabaloo ensued with calls for catastrophic fall off in demand, the renewed claims that a gold bubble is now in action and the decline is coinage sales as evidence of that.

In reality, there was very little surprising in the sales trends overall.

Chart 1 below shows US Mint sales in terms of the number of coins sold. Care to spot any dramatic bubble-formation or bubble-deflation here? Not really. There is a gentle historical upward trend since January 1987. There is volatility around that trend in 2010 and far less of it in 2011. There is seasonality around the trend with Q1 sales uplifts in January, some Christmas season buying supports in early Q4 etc. There is also a slightly elevated sub-trend starting from early 2009 and continuing through today. More interestingly, the sub-trend is mean-reverting (heading down) which is - dynamically-speaking stabilizing, rather than 'bubble-expanding' or 'bubble-deflating'.

Chart 1

Source: US Mint and author own analysis

Now, January sales are strong in the historical context and within the sub-trend since 2009. January 2012 sales of US Mint coins came in at 127,000 oz with relatively low 0.50 oz/coin sales. So coinage sales in terms of oz weight are 95.4% up on December, but 4.9% down on January 2011. For comparison, 2011 average monthly sales were 83,292 and crisis-period average monthly sales were 94,745 all at least 0.5 standard deviations below January 2012 sales. As chart above clearly shows, sales are now well ahead of historical averages and above 6 months moving average.

However, as chart below shows, sales in January were well below the trend line for average coin weight for sold coins: oz per coin sold is down 50.5% mom and down 43.1% year on year. Significantly, smaller coins were sold in January this year than in 2011. 2011 average oz/coin sold was 1.0 and the latest sales are closer to 0.59 oz/coin historical average.

Chart 2

Source: Author own data and analysis based on underlying data from the US Mint

There is no panic in the overall trends in demand for coins when set against the price changes, with negative general trend in correlations between demand and gold price established in mid-2009 continuing unabated, as shown in Chart 3

CHART 3

 Source: US Mint, World Gold Council and author own analysis

However, when we look closer at the 12 months rolling correlations and 24 months rolling correlations, the picture that emerges for January is consistent with gentle negative correlation that has been present since the beginning of 2011. See Chart 4 below. January 2012 12mo rolling correlation between gold price and volume of gold sold via US Mint coins is +0.02, having reverted to the positive from -0.42 in December 2011. This is the first positive (albeit extremely low) monthly 12mo rolling correlation reading since July 2010. 24 mo rolling correlation in January 2012 stood at benign -0.30, slightly up on -0.34 in December 2012. Again, resilience if present in the longer term series and at shorter horizon there are no huge surprises either. Of course, in general, one can make a case, based on the recent data, that investors are simply turning back to the specific instrument after gold price corrected sufficiently enough. In this light, latest US Mint data would be consistent with fundamentals-supported firming of demand. But crucially, there is no evidence of either panic buying or selling.

CHART 4

Source: Author own analysis based on the data from US Mint

Lastly, let's take a look at seasonally-neutral like-for-like January sales. Chart below shows data for January sales, suppressing the huge spike at 1999. Clearly, sales are booming in terms of coins numbers sold. But recall that coins sold in January 2012 are smaller in gold content, so overall gold sold via US Mint coinage is marginally down on January 2011, making January 2012 sales the fourth highest on record.

CHART 5

 Source: Author own analysis based on the data from US Mint

The Table below shows summary of US Mint coins sales for 3 months November-January covering holidays periods sales, including the Chinese New Year sales. While January 2012 period shows healthy sales across all three parameters, there is still no sign of any panic buying by small retail investors anywhere in sight here. Sales are ticking nicely, in 2011 and 2012, well ahead of 2001-2008 levels (confirming lack of evidence that sustained price appreciation over the last 18 months has provided a signal to dampen retail demand), but behind 2009-2010 spikes (further supporting the view that 2011-2012 dynamics are those of potential moderation in the precautionary and flight-to-safety motives for demand, and more buying on long-term gold fundamentals).

TABLE: US Mint sales – 3 months through January

 Source: Author own analysis based on the data from US Mint

Welcome back to ‘normalcy’ in US Mint sales.

Disclaimer:

1) I am a non-executive member of the GoldCore Investment Committee
2) I am a Director and Head of Research with St.Columbanus AG, where we do not invest in any specific individual commodity
3) I am long gold in fixed amount over at least the last 5 years with my allocation being extremely moderate. I hold no assets linked to gold mining or processing companies.
4) I have done and am continuing doing academic work on gold as an asset class, but also on other asset classes. You can see my research on my ssrn page the link to which is provided on this blog front page.

5) Yes, you can find points (1)-(3) disclosed properly and permanently on my public profiles. 

6) I receive no compensation for anything that appears on this blog. Never did and not planning to start now either. Everything your read here is my own personal opinion and not the opinion of any of my employers, current, past or future.

2/2/2012: Exchequer non-returns from January

Exchequer returns pose no surprise - and none were expected, given this is just January - so no point of updating the detailed data sets.

Some top figures.

On tax receipts:

• Income tax revenues are up at €1,260mln in January 2012 over €987mln in January 2011 as USC kicks in full tilt this year.
• VAT is at +3% yoy to €1,725mln in part boosted by small gains in sales over Christmas period in terms of volumes.
• Corporation tax is up to €271mln from €72mln a year ago, but €250mln of this was due to delayed receipts from December 2011, so in reality, Corpo is down on 2011. 

None of the above are really significant as timing might have been a factor in all of these. It will take through March to see the real changes in the underlying numbers.

Exchequer deficit is at €393.7mln down from €483.2mln a year ago. So now, deduct that €250mln from the receipts side and you get Exchequer deficit at €643.7mln or some €160mln ahead of January 2011. Not pretty, eh?

Of course, as I said above, there is no point of doing any analysis on returns for just one month, so take the above comment with a huge grain of salt.

2/2/2012: Sunday Times 29/01/2012 - irish property bust

This is an edited version of my Sunday Times article from January 29, 2012.

In a recent Annual Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey of 325 major metropolitan areas in Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Ireland, United Kingdom and the United States, Dublin was ranked 10th in the world in terms of house prices affordability. The core conjecture put forward in the survey is that Dublin market is characterized by the ratio of the median house price divided by gross [before tax] annual median household income of around 3.4, a ratio consistent in international methodology with moderately unaffordable housing environments.

Keep in mind, the above multiple, assuming the median household income reflects current unemployment rates and labour force changes, puts median price of a house in Dublin today at around €175,000 – quite a bit off the €195,000 average price implied by the latest CSO statistics. But never mind the numbers, there are even bigger problems with the survey conclusions.

While international rankings do serve some purpose, on the ground they mean absolutely nothing, contributing only a momentary feel-good sensation for the embattled real estate agents. In the real world, the very concept of ‘affordability’ in the Irish property market is an irrelevant archaism of the era passed when flipping ever more expensive real estate was called wealth creation.

What matters today and in years ahead are the household expectations about the future disposable after-tax incomes in terms of the security and actual levels of earnings, stability of policies relating to household taxation, plus the demographic dynamics. None of these offer much hope for the medium-term (3-5 years) future when it comes to property prices.

Household earnings are continuing to decline in real terms (adjusting for inflation) in line with the economy. The CSO-reported average weekly earnings fell 1.2% year on year in Q3 2011 once consumer inflation is take out. But the average earnings changes conceal two other trends in the workforce that have material impact on the demand for property.

Firstly, reported earnings are artificially inflated because the workforce on average is becoming older. Here’s how this works. Younger workers and employees with shorter job tenure also tend to be lower-paid, and are cheaper to lay off. Thus, the rise in unemployment, alongside with the declines in overall workforce participation, act to increase average earnings reported. This explains why, for example, average weekly earnings in construction sector rose 2.5% in Q3 2011 year on year, while employment in the same sector fell 4.1% over the same period. This means that fewer potential first-time buyers of property are having jobs, and at the same time as the existent workers are not enjoying real increases in earnings that would allow them to trade up in the property markets.

Secondly, the real world, rising costs across the consumer expenditure basket, further reducing purchasing power of households, is compounded by the composition of these costs. One of the largest categories in household consumption basket for those in the market to purchase a home is mortgage interest. This cost is divorced, in the case of Ireland, from the demand and supply forces in the property markets and is influenced instead by the credit market conditions. In other words, the 14.1% increase in mortgage interest costs in the 12 months through December 2011, once weighted by the relative importance of this line of expenditure in total consumption is likely to translate into a 2-3% deterioration in the total after-tax disposable income of the average household that represents potential purchaser of residential property.

And then there are effects of tax policies on disposable income. One simple fact illustrates the change in households’ ability to finance purchases of property in recent years: between 2007 and 2011 the overall burden of state taxation has shifted dramatically onto the shoulders of ordinary households. In 2007, approximately 46% of total tax collected in the state came directly out of the household incomes and expenditures. In 2011 the same number was 58%.

The above factors reference the current levels of income, cost of living and tax changes and have a direct impact on demand for property in terms of real affordability. In addition, however, the uncertain nature of future economic and fiscal environments in Ireland represents additional set of forces that keep the property market on the downward trajectory. For example, in Q3 2011 there were a total of 116,900 fewer people in employment in Ireland compared to Q3 2009. However, of these, 113,700 came from under 34 years of age cohort. Unemployment rate for this category of workers, comprising majority of would-be house buyers, is now 20.4% and still rising, not falling. Given the long-term nature of much of our current unemployment, no one in the country expects employment and income growth to bring these workers back into the property markets for at least 3 years or longer. Without them coming back, only those who are trading down into the later age of retirement are currently selling, plus those who find themselves in a financial distress.

Tax uncertainty further compounds the problem of risks relating to unemployment and future expected incomes. Government projections that in 2013-2015 fiscal adjustments will involve raising taxes by €3.1 billion against achieving current spending savings of €4.9 billion are rightly seen as largely incredulous, given the poor record in cutting current spending to-date. Thus, in addition to already draconian pre-announced tax hikes, Irish households rationally expect at least a significant share of so-called current expenditure ‘cuts’ to be passed onto households via indirect taxation and cost of living increases.

In short, there is absolutely no catalysts in the foreseeable future for property markets reversing their precipitous trajectory. No matter what ‘affordability’ ranking Irish property markets achieve, the demand for property is not going to grow.

This, of course, brings us to the projections for the near-term future. The latest CSO data for the Residential Property Price Index released this week shows that nationwide, property prices were down 16.7% in December 2011 compared against December 2010. Linked to the peak prices as recorded by the now defunct PTSB-ESRI Index, the latest CSO figures imply that nationally, residential property prices have fallen from the peak of €313,998 in February 2007 to ca €166,000 today (down 47% on peak). In Dublin, peak-level average prices of €431,016 – recorded back in April 2007 – are now down to close to €195,000 (almost 55% off peak).

Using monthly trends for the last 4 years, and adjusting for quarterly changes in average earnings and unemployment, we can expect the residential property price index to fall 11-12% across all properties in 2012. Houses nationwide are forecast to fall in price some 12-14% - broadly in line with last year’s declines, while apartments are expected to fall 11-12% year on year in 2012, slightly moderating the 16.4% annual fall in 2011.

More crucially, even once the bottom is reached, which, assuming no further material deterioration in the economy, can happen in H2 2012 to H1 2013, the recovery will be L-shaped with at least 2-3 years of property prices bouncing along the flat trendline at the bottom of the price correction. After that, return toward longer-term equilibrium will require another 1-2 years. Assuming no new recessions or crises between now and then, by 2015-2016 we will be back at the levels of prices recorded in 2010-2011. Between now and then, there will be plenty more reports about improving affordability of housing in Ireland and articles about the proverbial foreign investors kicking tyres around South Dublin realtors’ offices.

Chart: Residential Property Price Index, end of December figures, January 2005=100

Source: CSO and author own forecast

Box-out:

Ireland’s latest shenanigans in the theatre of absurd is the fabled ‘return to the bond markets’ with this week’s swap of the 2 year 4.0% coupon Government bond for a 4.5% coupon 3-year bond. The NTMA move means we will be paying more for the privilege to somewhat reduce the overall massive debt pile maturing in 2014, just when the current Troika ‘bailout’ runs out. So in effect, this week’s swap is a de fact admission by the state that Ireland has a snowball’s chance in hell raising the funding required to roll over even existent debt in 2014 through the markets. Which, of course, is an improvement on the constant droning from our political leaders about Ireland ‘not needing a second bailout’. Of course, as far as our ‘return to the markets’ goes – no new debt has been issued, no new cost of financing the state deficits has been established in this swap. The whole event is a bit of a clock made out of jelly – little on substance, massive on PR, and laughable from the functionality perspective.

2/2/2012: Euro area credit supply remained constrained in Q4 2011

ECB's Bank Lending Survey (BLS) for January 2012 is out, showing dramatic failure of the December 2011 LTRO to kick start supply of credit to the real economy.

According to the BLS, credit standards by euro area banks tightened in the fourth quarter of 2011 on:

• loans to non-financial corporations (35% of euro area banks report tighter lending to NFCs in net terms, up from 16% in  the preceding quarter),
• loans to households for house purchase (29% of the euro area banks reporting net tightening of lending to households, up from 18% in the preceding quarter), and 
• loans for consumer credit (13%, up from 10% in the preceding quarter). 

Looking ahead, euro area banks "expect a further net tightening of credit standards, albeit at a slower pace than in the fourth quarter of 2011" in Q1 2012.  There is no easing of lending conditions on the horizon.

Overall rise in the net tightening  of credit standards was caused by:

• "the adverse combination of a weakening economic outlook" and 
• "the euro area sovereign debt crisis, which continued to undermine the banking sector’s financial position",
• In addition, "increased market scrutiny of bank solvency risks inQ4 2011 is likely to have exacerbated banks’ funding difficulties."

Euro area banks also reported a net decline in the demand for loans to NFCs in Q4 2011, albeit at  a slower pace than in the previous quarter (-5% in net terms, compared with -8% in Q3 2011).

• Banks indicated a sharp fall in the financing needs of firms for their fixed investment. 

The net demand for loans to households  declined further in Q4 2011, "broadly in line with previous expectations and with actual figures quoted in the previous survey round (-27% in the last quarter of 2011, compared with -24% in Q3 2011 for loans for house purchase, and -16% in the last quarter of 2011, compared with -15% in the third quarter for consumer credit).

For Q1 2012 banks expect a sizeable drop in the net demand for housing loans, while the decline in net demand for consumer credit is expected to remain in the same range.

Despite a massive LTRO in December 2011, "euro area banks reported a slight easing of access to wholesale funding in the last quarter of 2011, compared with replies from the previous survey,
although still a large number of euro area banks  (in net terms) continued to report significant
difficulties. ... Looking ahead, banks across the euro area overall expect some improvement  in access to wholesale market funding in the next quarter, potentially reflecting the anticipated effectiveness of non-standard measures taken by the ECB."

Banks also indicated that "sovereign market tensions led to a substantial deterioration of their funding conditions through balance sheet and liquidity management constraints, as well as through other, more indirect, channels. Banks also reported that vulnerabilities to risks stemming from the sovereign  crisis have significantly contributed to the tightening of credit standards, although some parts of the banking system were in a position to shield their lending policies from the impact of the crisis."

"...On the impact of new regulatory requirements on banks’ lending policies, banks’ replies point
to a further adjustment of risk-weighted assets and capital positions during the second half of 2011, to a larger extent than in the first half of the year and more than envisaged in July 2011. The same
applies for the impact of regulation on the net tightening of credit standards. In the coming months
banks indicate a further intensification of balance sheet adjustments and related constraints on the
bank lending channel."

30/1/2012: Irish Long-term Unemployment Saga

Unemployment figures, by age - distinguish youth and adult unemployment - have been preoccupying many analysts in recent weeks. Loads of media attention has been paid - internationally, if not in Ireland - to the plight of youth unemployment. In the next several posts, I will take a closer look at the data for EU27, including Ireland. All of the data comes courtesy of the Eurostat and covers the latest available period Q3 2011.

First, let's take a look at long term unemployment (defined as unemployment spell of 12 months or more) and very long-term unemployment (defined as 24 months or more).

Table below summarizes the data:

As you can see, we are not exactly a good performer. Prior to the crisis, Irish long-term unemployment averaged just 1.4% of the active age population - 23rd lowest in the group of EU27 plus Norway. In Q3 2011 our long-term unemployment stood at 8.8% - the third highest in the sample of 28 states. Over the period covered we have experienced an increase in long-term unemployment of 7.4 percentage points - the steepest rise in the EU27+Norway.

Matters are even worse when it comes to very long-term unemployment, where our rate has moved from  0.7% average for Q3 readings pre-crisis to 5.4% in Q3 2011 - an increase of 4.7 percentage points. Only Slovakia (6.0%) is worse performer than Ireland in terms of overall very long-term unemployment rate and we are the absolute worst in the EU27 + Norway group in terms of increase in very long-term unemployment.

Here is a chart to illustrate some of the above:

\Broken down by gender:

Long-term unemployment rates for men and women:

Ireland used to rank 22 in the EU 27+Norway in the size of its long-term unemployment pool amongst the males prior to the crisis. By Q3 2011 we had the highest rate of male long-term unemployment. We fared much better in terms of long-term female unemployment, moving from the lowest unemployment in the sample of countries prior to the crisis to 9th highest position. However, in both male and female long-term unemployment, Ireland experienced the largest and second largest, respectively, increases during the crisis.

Things are even worse for Irish very long-term unemployed figures. Prior to the crisis, very long term unemployment amongst Irish males averaged 1.0% (22nd highest in the EU27+Norway). In Q3 2011 that number rose to 7.5% (the highest in the EU27+Norway). This increase was the largest in the sample of countries over the period.

Very long-term unemployment amongst the females in Ireland averaged just 0.4% in pre-crisis period - third lowest in the EU27+Norway sample. In Q3 2011 this rose to 2.4% - 10th highest reading in the sample. Ireland's rate of increase in female very long-term unemployment was the fastest in the EU27 + Norway group of countries.

In the next post we will take a look at the unemployment figures by age.

30/1/2012: Dublin gets horrific ranking on economy

Dubious distinction for Dublin - identified as the World's 4th Worst-Performing City (see link here): and here are the snapshots of our 'neighborhood' in the rankings:

Source: http://www.businessinsider.com/the-10-worst-performing-cities-in-the-world-2012-1#

Between, I am puzzled by the pic selected for Dublin. Can't think of where it was taken...

30/1/2012: Fake Doctors Treating Fake Disease in Greece

There are many 'expert' voices in the media saying Greece should exit the Euro zone in order to return to growth. This, as I commented earlier today, is a gross oversimplification of the reality.

There is simply no evidence whatsoever that Greece can grow on its own any faster or more sustainably than it did within the Euro. In fact, the evidence presented below shows that the only period during the last 30 years in which Greece was able to somewhat marginally close the gap in growth between itself and the Advanced Economies group is the period immediately following its accession to the Euro.

It is a fallacy of 'alternative expectations' to believe Greece will be enabled to grow its economy under post-euro devaluation beyond achieving a 1-2 years-long 'bounce'. Analysts who expect Greece to recover on the back of exiting the euro & devaluing are deluding themselves for two major reasons:

1. Greece has no fundamentals for growth & its debt overhang will remain, unless it defaults hard. Even with a default, removing debt overhang is not going to deliver growth to Greece beyond simple mechanical post-depression bounce, as Greece lacks all fundamentals for growth - institutional, cultural and historical. 
2. However, with a hard default option, post-Euro, Greece will not be able to borrow & absent Government spending Greece has no capacity to grow. This is clearly shown in the charts below which highlight that in 23 out of the last 29 years, Greece has managed to achieve growth only with accompanying fiscal imbalances. 

In summary, Greece never once had any fundamentals to grow on its own without massive subsidies either via loose monetary policy or overinflated expectations relating to the country accession to the European common structures. Greece is not about to get real growth-driving fundamentals within or outside the euro area.

In short, all those talking about 'Greece must exit euro zone to achieve growth' are nothing more than fake doctors treating a patient who himself is faking a disease. Greece's problem is not the Euro. It's problem is Greece itself.

Here are the charts proving the point.

Fiscal imbalances:

Structural failure:

External insolvency:

Rotten growth fundamentals:

And lastly, rotten growth record

QED.

28/1/2012: Spin of 'great investment destinations' - Malta

For 'Malta is a great investment destination' crowd. Here is a quick stats summary based on IMF WEO:

So let’s summarize the above:

Malta is poor, has moderate inflation, which is of course consistent with low growth. Malta’s exports of goods and services are growing very slowly – if it is such a great trading location, can someone explain this? Malta performs well in unemployment terms, but this conceals the fact that Malta’s population is either too old or too young or too long unemployed to actually count as being in the workforce. Hence, Malta is second worst performer in the euro area in terms of actual employment rates.

Malta’s public finances are in line with majority of other Accession States, so it is doing decently well (though not spectacularly) in terms of Government deficit and structural balance. It is not exactly a stellar performer when it comes to Government debt, but it is extremely poor performer when it comes to external balance – current account. Which, of course, is the exact opposite of the evidence required to support the premise that Malta is a success in terms of attracting foreign investment, or being a great destination to trade from.

You can tell, I hate spin!

28/1/2012: Eurocoin for January 2012

The latest leading indicator for euro area growth -Eurocoin - for January continues to signal recessionary dynamics, albeit at moderating rates of decline.

January Eurocoin rose to -0.14 from -0.20 in December 2011. Here are some charts:

Eurocoin is now in the negative territory for four consecutive months. 3mo MA is at -0.18, 6mo MA at -0.07, crossing into negative for the first time since the last recession. In January 2011 the indicator stood at +0.48. Quarterly rate of growth is now at -0.17 implying annualized contraction of -0.56%.

There is now, due to persistent negative reading, more consistency in eurocoin and ECB repo rate, but inflation-growth remain unbalanced when it comes to applying Taylor rule to ECB rate policy.

All in, the rates decision based on the leading indicator performance should be to stay put and await more significant moderation on inflation side. Mild bout of inflationary recession is still on the cards for the euro area for Q1.