2/1/2015: Credit and Growth after Financial Crises

Generally, we think of private sector deleveraging as being associated with lower investment by households and enterprises, lower consumption and lower output growth, leading to reduced rates of economic growth. However, one recent study (amongst a number of others) disputes this link.

Takats, Elod and Upper, Christian, "Credit and Growth after Financial Crises" (BIS Working Paper No. 416: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2375674) finds that "declining bank credit to the private sector will not necessarily constrain the economic recovery after output has bottomed out following a financial crisis. To obtain this result, we examine data from 39 financial crises, which -- as the current one -- were preceded by credit booms. In these crises the change in bank credit, either in real terms or relative to GDP, consistently did not correlate with growth during the first two years of the recovery. In the third and fourth year, the correlation becomes statistically significant but remains small in economic terms. The lack of association between deleveraging and the speed of recovery does not seem to arise due to limited data. In fact, our data shows that increasing competitiveness, via exchange rate depreciations, is statistically and economically significantly associated with faster recoveries. Our results contradict the current consensus that private sector deleveraging is necessarily harmful for growth."

Which, of course, begs a question: how sound is banking sector 'return to normalcy at any cost' strategy for recovery? The question is non-trivial. Much of the ECB and EU-supported policies in the euro area periphery stressed the need for normalising credit operations in the economy. This thinking underpinned both the bailouts of the banks and the bailouts of their funders (bondholders and other lenders). It also underwrote the idea that although austerity triggered by banks bailouts was painful, restoration of credit flows is imperative to generating the recovery.

17/5/2014: Central Bank Annual Report 2013: Not Much to Report, Much to Promote

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from May 4, 2014.


This week, the Irish Central Bank published its annual report for 2013.

In the opening statement, Governor Patrick Honohan said: "The Bank’s key priorities included the ongoing repair of the banking system and achieving progress in the delivery of sustainable solutions for distressed borrowers. Significant progress was achieved on these fronts, though many tasks still remain to be completed."

This was not a great moment to stake such a claim.

In recent days, the state-controlled Ptsb, announced a substantial hike in variable rate charges on mortgages. Bank of Ireland, faced criticism for using a 'blunt force approach' with distressed borrowers.

Central Bank data, highlighted in the annual report, shows that in 2013 lending to non-financial corporations in Ireland posted its steepest year on year decline since the start of the crisis, down 6 percent. Credit to households fell at the second fastest annual rate, down 4.1 percent on 2012. Mortgages arrears, including the IBRC mortgages sold to the external investment funds, as percentage of all house loans outstanding, were virtually unchanged year on year at the end of 2013.

Reading through the Central Bank own financial accounts also reveals some significant insights into the inner workings of our financial system and its watchdog.

In the last three years, Irish Exchequer reliance on income from the Dame Street has gone up exponentially. In 2009-2013, the Central Bank paid EUR4.73 billion in total dividends to the State. Of this, 50 percent came from its operations in 2012-2013. This makes the CBI the largest net contributor to the State coffers of all public and semi-state organisations.

The bulk of the Central Bank earnings come from interest on assets it holds. Last year marked the second year of declines in this income. Back in 2010, the Central Bank collected EUR3.67 billion worth of interest. As the scope of the emergency lending to Irish banks fell, the interest income also declined, reaching EUR2.6 billion in 2012 and EUR2.02 billion in 2013.

Central Bank’s highest-paying assets today cover Irish Government Floating Rate Notes, NAMA bonds, and a Irish 2025 bond. All in, the money paid by the Government and NAMA to the Central Bank is being recycled back to the Exchequer at a hefty cost margin.

In a sign of continued improvement in the Irish banks funding situation, marginal refinancing operations and long-term refinancing operations (MROs and LTROs), representing lending to credit institutions from the Eurosystem fell to EUR39.1 billion in 2013, down from EUR70.9 billion in 2012. At their peak in 2010, these lines of credit amounted to EUR132 billion.

Central Bank’s staff-related expenses rose from EUR106.3mln in 2012 to over EUR121.4mln in 2013. These increases were down primarily to salaries, allowances and pensions, as staff numbers employed stayed relatively unchanged between 2011 and 2013. Per employee staff expenses are now up 15 percent on 2012 levels.

Other operating expenses were up from EUR57.5 million to EUR70.3 million. The largest hikes incurred were in Professional fees, which rose by a quarter to EUR27.1 million. Only in 2011, at the height of banks’ recapitalisation, did the Central Bank manage to spend more on external consultants. So far, the banking crisis has been a bonanza for the Central Bank advisers who were paid EUR98.3 million in fees since 2009.

In return for the rise in expenses, the Bank marginally expanded some of its enforcement and supervisory functions. There was a rise in prudential supervision activity, but a decline in authorisations and revocations of regulated entities. The number of investigations also fell, from 216 in 2012 to 184 in 2013. However, the Central Bank oversaw 1,004 regulatory actions taken in 2013, up on 2012, but down on 2011.

Overall, the Annual Report paints a picture of the Central Bank continuing to engage in active enforcement and supervision, amidst overall declining need for banking sector supports.

10/10/2013: IMF's GFSR October 2013: Focus on Lending

More interesting analysis from the IMF's GFSR (previously covered topics: banks and corporate debt overhang are linked here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/10/10102013-imfs-gfsr-october-2013-focus_10.html).

This time around: lending to the economy. One chart:

Note that Ireland is a euro area outlier in terms of the huge extent of policy supports one demand side for credit and simultaneously above average support on supply side of credit:

Puzzled? Me too. Yes, we have huge number of various programmes, grants, schemes, incentives for funding supply and demand. Most of it is not in the form of credit, but rather equity - e.g. Enterprise Ireland funding. No, we don't have much of credit supply supports when it comes to policies or institutions relating to banks. We have lots of hot air talking about the need for banks to lend, more hot air on various 'checks' as to whether banks are lending or not… etc. So let's take a look at the table where the IMF gets its ideas on the above policies existence:

Per table above, Ireland has produced policies of Household Debt Restructuring. Wake me up here, folks, cause I am apparently living in some different Ireland from the one visited by the IMF. Oh, and yes, we also have put in place new policies on Corporate Debt Restructuring. What are these? Hiding our heads in the sand as companies go to the wall? Or may be these are policies promised on dealing with upward-only rent reviews which have driven thousands of companies into the ditch?

I think the IMF folks need to get out a bit more often… before compiling reports...

16/9/2013: A Liquidity Slush or an Equity Switch?

Three more charts from BIS Quarterly (http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1309a.pdf), showing the switch of liquidity out of the Emerging Markets into Advanced Economies...

 And then from the Advanced Economies bonds into Advanced Economies equities with a small bounce up on Emerging Markets equities side too...

Two thoughts:

1. There is no yield-driven bounce anymore, so pricing is not a huge help in this process; and
2. Is this the end of the debt bubble and the start of the equities rise (structural, not nominal rise, driven by shift in corporate funding models) or is this a temporary slush of liquidity?

5/11/2012: Bank credit to SMEs - demand side

My paper with Javier Sánchez Vidal, Ciaran Mac an Bhaird and Brian M. Lucey "What Determines the Decision to Apply for Credit? Evidence for Eurozone SMEs" is available here.

2/2/2012: Euro area credit supply remained constrained in Q4 2011

ECB's Bank Lending Survey (BLS) for January 2012 is out, showing dramatic failure of the December 2011 LTRO to kick start supply of credit to the real economy.

According to the BLS, credit standards by euro area banks tightened in the fourth quarter of 2011 on:

• loans to non-financial corporations (35% of euro area banks report tighter lending to NFCs in net terms, up from 16% in  the preceding quarter),
• loans to households for house purchase (29% of the euro area banks reporting net tightening of lending to households, up from 18% in the preceding quarter), and 
• loans for consumer credit (13%, up from 10% in the preceding quarter). 

Looking ahead, euro area banks "expect a further net tightening of credit standards, albeit at a slower pace than in the fourth quarter of 2011" in Q1 2012.  There is no easing of lending conditions on the horizon.

Overall rise in the net tightening  of credit standards was caused by:

• "the adverse combination of a weakening economic outlook" and 
• "the euro area sovereign debt crisis, which continued to undermine the banking sector’s financial position",
• In addition, "increased market scrutiny of bank solvency risks inQ4 2011 is likely to have exacerbated banks’ funding difficulties."

Euro area banks also reported a net decline in the demand for loans to NFCs in Q4 2011, albeit at  a slower pace than in the previous quarter (-5% in net terms, compared with -8% in Q3 2011).

• Banks indicated a sharp fall in the financing needs of firms for their fixed investment. 

The net demand for loans to households  declined further in Q4 2011, "broadly in line with previous expectations and with actual figures quoted in the previous survey round (-27% in the last quarter of 2011, compared with -24% in Q3 2011 for loans for house purchase, and -16% in the last quarter of 2011, compared with -15% in the third quarter for consumer credit).

For Q1 2012 banks expect a sizeable drop in the net demand for housing loans, while the decline in net demand for consumer credit is expected to remain in the same range.

Despite a massive LTRO in December 2011, "euro area banks reported a slight easing of access to wholesale funding in the last quarter of 2011, compared with replies from the previous survey,
although still a large number of euro area banks  (in net terms) continued to report significant
difficulties. ... Looking ahead, banks across the euro area overall expect some improvement  in access to wholesale market funding in the next quarter, potentially reflecting the anticipated effectiveness of non-standard measures taken by the ECB."

Banks also indicated that "sovereign market tensions led to a substantial deterioration of their funding conditions through balance sheet and liquidity management constraints, as well as through other, more indirect, channels. Banks also reported that vulnerabilities to risks stemming from the sovereign  crisis have significantly contributed to the tightening of credit standards, although some parts of the banking system were in a position to shield their lending policies from the impact of the crisis."

"...On the impact of new regulatory requirements on banks’ lending policies, banks’ replies point
to a further adjustment of risk-weighted assets and capital positions during the second half of 2011, to a larger extent than in the first half of the year and more than envisaged in July 2011. The same
applies for the impact of regulation on the net tightening of credit standards. In the coming months
banks indicate a further intensification of balance sheet adjustments and related constraints on the
bank lending channel."

02/07/2011: SMEs and smaller corproate loans rates

An interesting chart of rates charged on new business loans across SMEs and households - my calculations based on Table B.2.1 from the Central Bank database:
In April 2011, the spread between Non-Financial Corporate Loans volume under €1 mln over those for house purchases were:

• Floating rate and up to 1 year fixation corporate loans v similar house purchase loans: 1.54 percentage points, up from 1.18 in March and well above the historical average spread of 1.16 percentage points. Historical average spread for the period January 2008-present is 1.23 percentage points. April 2011 new business rate spread is the highest since January 2009.
• Over 1 year fixation rates spread stood at 1.88 percentage points in April, up on 1.63 percentage points in March 2011. Historical average is 1.02 percentage points and average spread for the period since January 2008 is 0.99 percentage points.

Hence, overall, setting aside the pesky issue that very little new credit is issued by the banks, current credit conditions are clearly pricing historical highs in terms of risk premium for smaller corporate loans. For businesses operating in Ireland, the credit crunch is only getting crunchier, it seems.

Economics 31/7/10: Credit flows in Ireland

Central Bank quarterly was published yesterday. Here are some updated charts on credit flows (data through May). The main conclusions are:

1. Private sector credit continues to contract and is again accelerating in the annual rate of decline (-10.4% yoy in May as compared to -9.3% declines in April and March).
2. Mortgage credit contractions are steadily declining (-1.8% in May against -1.6% in April & 1.4% in March).
3. Non-mortgage credit is accelerating in the rate of decline (-12.8% in May compared to -11.4% in April)
   
4. Nama - now through 50% of the loans purchases - has had no positive impact on credit supply. If anything, as charts for households lending show blow, it is being accompanied by a dramatic increase in the cost of borrowing for ordinary families.

Charts:
Aggregate private sector credit above. Disastrous trends of the last 2 year continue unabated, despite the already significant contraction in the credit supply. This suggests that we are in a continued downward spiral when it comes to business and household investment (future capacity is under continued pressure down and the only thing that provides some positive support to capital side is, most likely, MNCs own inter-company investments). This goes to explain why one cannot accept earlier DofF projections for 2013-2015 potential rates of growth. We are in a situation very similar to Japan in the mid-1990s, where existent production is being driven at the expense of capital stock.

Mortgages:Clearly, no signs of moderation in the rates of decay anywhere here. But the picture is more sluggish than that for non-mortgages lending:
The reason for the different dynamics is that it is easier for households to cut back on smaller credit demand than on massive mortgages burden. Hence, non-mortgages lending is a leading indicator for what we can expect to follow in the mortgages markets. Not exactly a bright future for the housing markets, then.

Deposits side of our financial system:
Notice that deposits are down, mom, across the board, except for shorter term maturity corporate deposits. But yoy all deposits are down. Combined decline in all deposits in volume since January 2010 is €1,869 mln, or 3.4%. Not a small change. All deposit rates are down year on year - we are being paid less to save, but are charged more to borrow.

Loans stats next.
Loans for house purchases are falling, while mortgages rates are rocketing. The orange line above shows just what is happening with the cost of financing one's own home in Ireland, courtesy of our regulators (keen on talking about 'moral hazard'), all the special 'Working Groups' aiming to address the problems in the housing markets, and Nama. Remember - our Government (by now pretty much every minister in the cabinet) had sworn to us that Nama will restore functional banking. May be this is what they had in mind...

Last year I predicted that the game in the mortgages markets will play as follows:

• Once Nama starts transfers, incentives for the banks to play a Good Fella will diminish - repossessions will remain low, but rates will rise. We now can see this happening around us.
• Once Nama completes transfers, banks will go in earnest at rebuilding their margins & capital, meaning - repossessions will accelerate dramatically and rates will rise to the levels where the burden of financing mortgages will become a driver for more repossessions.
• 3-6 months after the above stage, banks will start hoarding repossessed property on their books. They will be forced to start selling it ca 6-9 months after February 2011 (completion date for Nama purchases).
• Combined effect of massively more expensive mortgages credit and inflow of repossessed properties into the market will drive prices in housing markets even further down.
  

So far, we are through the 1st bullet point and getting closer to the second one.

Meanwhile, in the land of short term loans, rates are more steady and credit supply is falling gently.
Now, let me ask you this question. What should be the priority here? Making sure people are not being skinned to pay for their homes, or making sure that credit cards rates and car loans are being underpinned by more stable interest rates?

Credit to non-financial corporations is continuing to slide. Year on year, shorter term (working capital) credit is now off a massive 19.3%. Longer term credit is off 2.7% yoy. What does this tell me about the economy?

1. Capital investment is going nowhere fast, with any rosy figures on volumes we might hear over the coming weeks being most likely driven by the MNCs own in-house investment flows; and
2. Companies have no capacity to refinance shorter term credit obligations, resulting in a cash flow pressures and lack of operating capital.

Not exactly a success story for our financial system administrators and regulators, then.

What if? - When the IMF knocks on neighbours' doors

In light of the IMF rescue packages for Latvia, Iceland and Hungary, it is worth looking at the conditions imposed under these loan contracts. While Ireland has not requested IMF assistance, yet, as probability of such a request rises (due to the deepening mismatch between Exchequer receipts and outlays), what austerity measures can the Irish Government count on should our rescue be structured along the lines similar to the above three states?

In answering this question (table below), I use the following comparatives:
(1) Current and forecast GDP and GDP per capita levels and growth rates;
(2) 2008 and 2009 budget deficits; and
(3) Relative extent of committed liabilities under various national rescue plans.

The estimates are presented under two scenarios for Ireland:

• 'Benign' scenario implying IMF/external funding of 10% of the 2008 GDP which will cover ca 30% of committed state liabilities for 2009; and
• 'Average' scenario consistent with 25% of GDP borrowing covering ca 75% of liabilities).

A third scenario - consistent with relative liabilities in line with those in Iceland would imply an improbable, but not an impossible demand for external funding of up to 58% of GDP. To err on the conservative side, I omit this scenario in the current post.

Finally, it is worth noting that I do not 'price-in'

• the effect of deeper economic contraction in Ireland than in some of the reference countries;
  
• the effects of higher public spending as a share of the domestic economy in this country relative to the reference countries; and
• factors relating to inflation differentials and currency adjustments (note that all countries in receipt of IMF loans have had significant currency devaluations, while Ireland had a significant currency appreciation).

Thus, these estimates should be viewed as lower bounds.


To date, the only sign of any 'austerity' measures coming from the Department of Finance is a vague rumor that Brian Cowen is looking for a 5% wage bill cut in the public sector. Whether or not this figure is gross of the wage increases granted in the latest Partnership agreement is a moot point, given the austerity measures of 15-20% estimated above.

The latest plan is a 'white elephant'

The latest Government plan for crises-ridden Irish economy is, letter for letter, a rehashing of past clichés and a pandering to the minority interest groups in politics and business.

When the cornerstone crumbles

Perhaps the most frustrating in the entire document is its centre piece – the so-called €500mln venture capital fund which, according to the reports represents:
“…the key element in Building Ireland's Smart Economy... is the establishment of venture capital funds worth €500 million designed to lure innovative industries and boost research and development.” The Irish Times, December 19, 2008.

The fund will allow three US-based VC companies to invest in start-up Irish and foreign-owned IT and environmental "green tech" companies setting up here. The Government will provide up €25 million a year for 10 years and take a 49 per cent share in the investment companies. Investors will avail of a 15% tax rate on profits.

As quoted in the aforementioned article Taoiseach Brian Cowen said that:
"The aim is that Ireland becomes the world's leading location for business innovation, a country where there will be a critical mass of companies - both Irish and international - at the forefront of innovation, creating the products and services of tomorrow and well-paid quality employment."

It will do nothing of the sorts.

Poor record

This plan represents a clear lack of learning from the past mistakes. Our State’s record in acting as a venture capital investor is thin in experience and disastrous in quality.

Media Lab Europe (MLE) is one example that springs to mind. Some 8 years ago, the State decided to ride the IT bubble hysteria by dumping in excess of €35 million into an early-stage investment in a belief that government-paid provider of services to the various government agencies is the way to enhancing Ireland’s knowledge economy. Five years later it became apparent that the organization was incapable of delivering either commercial or academic value. MLE produced just 15 refereed papers (only 3 were published in the first-tier journals) between 2000 and 2005, signed up virtually no non-governmental business and clocked a mind-boggling loss on public investment.

Other high-tech state-run ‘investments’, inclusive of the public sector own IT programmes, fared equally poorly.

... and poor thinking

But last week’s plan is a true ‘white elephant’ of our economic development even if the record of this State in picking economic ‘winners’ is omitted. The plan fails on the basis of the Venture Capital sector own data across the following parameters:
(1) Timing – 10 year horizon;
(2) Sectors targeted for investment – IT and ‘green’ technologies;
(3) Type of investment – seed and early stage capital; and
(4) Size – €500 mln spread over 3 funds.

According to the European Commission DG for Enterprise and Industry (DGEI) analysis of seed capital funding, for the period of 1994-2003, 5-10 year seed and early-stage development capital funds average internal rates of return were -1.8% and 1.3% respectively. Almost exactly the same returns were recorded for the period of 1983-2003. This included better-performing US-based funds and covered the era of the IT bubble, when tech valuations reached stratospheric proportions.

European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA) confirms the above results for more current data. As shown in Table 1, 10-year returns averaged -1.1% for the early stage investments – the same type of investment envisioned in our State plan. In contrast, development finance might have been a safer bet for taxpayers money, but considering the dire shortage of high-quality early-stage domestic firms, this would require us to “pay” established foreign firms to locate here – something that is not kosher under the EU regulations.

Table 1: Funds Formed since 1980, top quarter returns as of 31 December 2006
http://www.evca.eu/knowledgecenter/barometer.aspx?id=462

Figure 1 illustrates two major EU-wide market trends in VC investments:
(1) Fewer and fewer private funds invest in high-tech start ups (due to higher risk, lower returns to these investments); and
(2) Both the seed and start-up capital shares of total VC allocations have been falling precipitously over time.
The Irish Government plan runs precisely against these two trends.

Figure 1: Allocation of funds raised 2002-2006, €bn
Sources: EVCA and PEREP Analytics for 2002-2007 figures

Another report compiled in March 2006 by DG for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG EFA) concluded, among other things:
“As a whole, the returns produced by European venture capital funds specialising in early stage (seed capital and start-up) investment have been disappointing. …taking into account the relatively high risk of this type of investing, the IRRs recorded do not appear competitive when compared to the more predictable buyout investing. …The difference in performance between venture capital and private equity may well be the main explanation for the recent trend for European investment activity to focus on less risky buyout investment rather than venture capital.” As Table 2 shows, even accounting for distributions to investors, early stage financing simply does not pay off when compared to development stage investments.

Table 2: Cumulative investment multiples for EU funds formed in 1980-2003
Source: DG EFA 2007

What about the risks associated with the plan? Again, using the DG EFA data, as Table 3 states, European VC investments underperformed the equity indices in all instances, with exception for the period of post-bubble recession in the US.

Table 3: Public markets returns vs. VC investment

Source: DG EFA 2007

Suppose that the Irish Government fund performance matches the peak past returns for EU VC funds. This implies that at the end of 10 years period we attain a cumulative total value per €1 invested multiple (inclusive of disbursements, etc) of ca x2.9 (as consistent with vintage 1995 funds). This delivers an annualized rate of return of 6.6% or risk-adjusted annualized return of only 3.7-4.8%. This is worse than putting the taxpayers money into a termed deposit with the Anglo Irish Bank. Now, considering the business cycle dynamics, the current investment, assuming 2009 will be the last year of economic contraction in Ireland, implies a historical valuation coincident with the VC funds of vintage 2000-2001. In this vintage, the EU funds yielded a cumulative total value multiples of ca x0.8 and x0.65 respectively, giving a compounded rate of return on the planned state fund of -35% to -20%. Risk-adjusted, this implies a range of -58.3-87%.


Destroying the market

In 2006, a DGEI workshop on seed finance has concluded that “Public intervention needs to take place in a way that avoids the risk of crowding out the private sector.”

To date, Irish VC markets have been characterized by monopolistic competition with Enterprise Ireland (EI) capturing a lions’ share of total investment and private VC firms acting as a competitive minority fringe. Thus, even at the times of plenty the Irish market can hardly be described as that with sufficient demand/supply clearance. In other words, during the time of the robust entrepreneurial activity, Irish start-ups have shown only minor ability to attract private VC capital. Of course, the presence of a state lender with soft budget constraints (EI) helped to undermine domestic VC services.

This structure of the market has hardly changed to warrant a new intervention by the Irish Government. Indeed, if capitalized as planned, the new plan will deliver a re-enforcement of the already unhealthy degree of state monopoly power over the VC market in this country. In the end, there is very little difference between the Irish Department of Finance boffins picking the ‘winning’ start-ups or appointing three US VC funds to do this for them. After all, the rules of the game are fixed (remember those IT and green-tech ideals?) and the losers are known in advance (Ireland’s taxpayers and entrepreneurs).

It would have been simply better for the Government to drop the CGT to match the 12.5% corporate tax. At least this would have assured that private gains yield returns to the Exchequer, without socializing private losses.

A train wreck of Irish economic policy

In managing the ongoing economic crisis, observing Irish Government policy can only be compared to watching a train wreck in slow motion. The banks re-capitalization scheme announced this week is just another example. By ignoring Ireland's impoverished and debt-overloaded consumers and companies, the latest plan will not deliver any real benefits to growth, credit flows or consumer/producer confidence.

One frame…

First, the rails buckle underneath as the Exchequer balance snaps under the weight of reckless public spending. Pop, pop – the fastenings fly off as tax line after tax line comes short. “No worries, we have a plan”, calls out the engineer. Enter the emergency budget – empty of any ideas as to how to mend the path or to lighten the load.

Then, the engine slumps oil-less. Banks hit the friction of bad corporate and household loans. The sparks of private unemployment fly. “All’s fine,” shouts the engineer, “we have insurance”. Emergency banks guarantee follows, but panic engulfs the carriages.

For what seems like an eternity the train pushes on. Dust, gravel and engine parts are shooting in all directions. Business insolvencies double year on year under the weight of the heaviest corporate debt load in the EU. Consumers crumble under the largest debt mountain in the OECD. Homes repossessions are on the rise and retail sales crash. The policy engine spins out of control: income, savings and consumption taxes go up and business rates increase. “The fundamentals are sound,” shout engineers. The rest of the world is selling off Irish shares and assets.

By the end of last week, the index of Irish financial companies shares has fallen 67% relative to the Black Monday of September 29th – the point that triggered the banks guarantee. “This will all end happily,” chirp engineers, “We’ll commission new reports, appoint new committees and issue more emergency responses.”

… to another

Enter this Sunday’s desperate ‘capitalization’ package. This promises to deliver some €10 billion to the banks in a swap for equity. The details, predictably, are sparse. Everyone expects the capital injections to be a copy-cat of those instituted by Germany and the UK – the countries hardly facing the same problems as Ireland. This implies a mixture of private and public funds to be made available to the banks with some token conditions, e.g dividends and management bonuses caps.

In a statement the Department of Finance said the plan will underpin the availability of loans to individuals and businesses.

Ooops. By-passing Ireland’s impoverished consumers and companies, the plan will not deliver any such benefits.

Elsewhere in Europe and the US, similar capitalization schemes have failed to reduce the cost of corporate borrowing or to restart lending to the households. In the UK, a £43 billion capital injection scheme has been in place for almost two months and the supply of consumer and business credit continues to fall - whether due to demand slowdown, lenders withdrawal from the market or both. In the US, massive banks’ capital supports have lowered the mortgage rates, but there is no meaningful increase in new mortgages uptake.

Three reasons for State-to-Banks recapitalization in-effectiveness

First, heavily indebted households are unlikely to take up new credit regardless of the cost. Short of the Government scheme to reduce the household debt or to increase after-tax incomes, no policy will shift consumers out of precautionary savings and into credit markets. So the retail sales will continue falling, businesses will suffer and consumers will keep on heading North for shopping. Our engineers, who two months ago raised VAT and now stubbornly refuse to back-down will see even less VAT revenue in 2009.

Second, heavily indebted Irish businesses can use new credit to either roll-over existent debts, or to finance short-term operational expenses, e.g export transactions. With exception of export credits, any new lending will simply re-arrange the deck chairs on the sinking Titanic of corporate Ireland. None of the new loans will go into capital acquisition, investment or hiring. These activities have stopped not because credit got dear, but because economic demand for goods and services has collapsed.

Third, for the banks, turning recapitalization proceeds into business loans will defeat the entire purpose of the scheme. Assuming re-capitalization is needed because bank’s capital is running too low relative to the size of the impaired or threatened loans, recapitalization must drive up the capital-to-loans ratio. Taking the money and using it to issue more loans will do exactly the opposite.

And this brings us to the issue of costs. The scheme will use the last of the remaining taxpayers’ money – the National Pensions Reserve Fund – to increase capital reserves of the banks. This means the state will no longer have any remaining capacity to inject a meaningful stimulus into the real economy. The consumers will go on cutting spending, business will go on laying off workers and the Exchequer will go on issuing new emergency responses. The more things change…