Eurozone: The High Cost of [Corporatist] Complacency

An interesting article from the Economists’ Voice (Éloi Laurent "Eurozone: The High Cost of Complacency", January 2009) argues that while the Euro is politically and economically attractive to a host of collapsing smaller economies, the Eurozone itself "is inert".

"How to make sense of this seeming contradiction?" asks Laurent. "It is tempting to blame America for Europe’s recession, but... Actually, if we view the last decade as a whole, we see that European passivity has cost it dearly and there lies the key to the Eurozone’s still unfulfilled promise."

Laurent's view of the Eurozone's failures reads like a description of what has happened in Ireland.

"...The ten years between 1999 and 2008 have been a golden era. There probably was not a better time in contemporary history to launch a monetary union and, learning by doing, to build efficient and resilient economic policy institutions to ensure its prosperity and sustainability. Yet, the decade was largely lost by Europeans in vain doctrinal debates and sterile blame game sessions. ...The reason [that technocratic debate] absorbs so much time and energy [of the European leadership] is that, absent a true democracy, economic doctrine has become over the years the justification of political power in Europe."

Laurent is only partially correct. Indeed, the technocratic economic doctrine debates have been a marker for European political landscape since 1999, but the debates became so central to the EU functioning because of the dogmatic pursuit of social consensus as the only benchmark for policy success. In other words, absent real democracy, the EU had to devise a deus ex machina replica of legitimizing democratic institutions. This is what social consensus - or corporatism, as it became known in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s - predicated upon.

The problem is that social consensus fails when ti comes to the need to formulate potentially unpopular and decisive policies. "With virtually the whole planet booming over the past decade, the Eurozone has, since its creation in 1999, displayed the worse performance in terms of growth and unemployment of the developed world, barely ahead of a depressed Japan."

What was the EU response to this crisis of insufficient growth? "One might conclude from [international comparisons] that the value added of the Euro is so far, at best, dubious and wonder why. But the European Commission did not, and recommended instead more of the same economic policies, stressing the importance of “budgetary surveillance” for the future and dismissing calls for improving economic cooperation and coordination among member states. [Thus] the ECB made in 2008 the exact same mistake as in 2001 by resisting a necessary cut in interest rates (actually, it increased interest rates in July 2008), waiting for the worst to be certain instead of trying to prevent it."

Laurent omits to mention the laughably naive EU Commission road maps and 'agendas' - the Lisbon I and Lisbon II frameworks for economic growth, the Barroso's Social Economy lunacy, and lastly the idea that geopolitical enlargement will resolve economic growth and political legitimacy deficits. For their claim that European Unification is predicated on a deeply historical rooting of European people, this Commission is failing a primary school lesson in history: the same strategies for legitimization have marked the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, as well as a bag full of unsavory regimes in the early 20th century Europe.

But, getting back to the economy: few probably remember today the 1970s. Back then, it took European countries more than double the length of time it took the US to come out of the crises, despite the fact that Europe had at the time much lower dependency on imported oil than the US. Why? That European disease of not willing to take the necessary economic policy adjustments. The same sclerosis is present within the Eurozone today. "After the 2001 recession, [thanks to the Fed active intervention] it took a year for the US to go from negative to vigorous growth. In the Eurozone, it took five years to fully recover. As for fiscal policy, ...a true European stimulus is still nowhere in sight, even as the economic outcome worsens by the day."

Taking real policy decisions and implementing new policies is something that is clearly not en vogue in Brussels. "Facts speak for themselves in this regard: the financial and banking crisis started to receive an adequate response after an improvised meeting of head of states and governments of the Eurozone last October, a standing body that does not even exist in
European treaties. As [Jean-Paul] Fitoussi observed: “the structure of power is such in Europe that those institutions who have the instruments to react have not the legitimacy to do so while those which have the legitimacy no longer have the instruments. Hence the passivity of European policy reaction.”

This is a sweeping (and absolutely apt) description of the entire political illegitimacy of the current EU power structures. But it is also an apt description of the Irish governance disease.

Just as an unelected and unaccountable EU Commission (and its Directorates) has no capacity to legitimize its rule, except via an elitist consensus bought by providing a guarantee of access to the feeding troughs of Brussels, so the elected European Parliament has no capacity to exercise its democratic mandate. Just as an unelected and unaccountable Social Partnership in Ireland has no capacity to rule except by bribing its way through all and any changes in economic environment, the elected Dail has been reduced to a nearly irrelevant student debating society. In both cases, corporatism has won and society has lost.

In 1934, Eoin O'Duffy - an Irish corporatist - stated: "We must lead the people always; nationally, socially and economically. We must clear up the economic mess and right the glaring social injustices of to-day by the corporative organization of Irish life; but before everything we must give a national lead to our people... The first essential is national unity. We can only have that when the Corporative system is accepted."

Am I the only one who sees clear parallels between this historical statement and our Government's (and EU's) active suppression of any dissent and the pursuit of a social-consensus model of policy formulation?

What if interest rates rise?

Just to stake some forward looking ground - here is a quick thought.

While we are preoccupied with the current crises, one has to wonder what the future might hold. Consider the following scenario.

Mid-2010 and German economy recovers slightly ahead of the rest of the Eurozone. Why? Because Germany is more exposed to global growth and thus will respond to renewed global demand for investment and consumer goods; and because German consumption has been suppressed since the mid 1990s, creating a significant domestic demand overhang. The ECB's response will be to immediately raise interest rates.

Of course, prior to German recovery, Manufacturing Purchasing Indices and other leading indicators will be flashing red for some time, prompting an earlier rise in interest rates in early 2010. So, say, Eurozone enters 2010 with 0.5-0.75% rate, goes to 1.0-1.25% by June 2010 and jumps to 2.0-2.25% by the end of 2010.

What happens then? Ireland, will by now have much higher taxes (three-tier rates structure of 25%, 48% and 52%), much lower standard deductions and standard rate ceiling, with higher PRSI and pensions tax relief at a standard rate. This will mean that before ECB rates hikes, our mortgages burden will be on par with those that prevailed at the onset of the crisis, but against a backdrop of lower disposable income. Now, as interest rates revert to rising, the burden of debt will start climbing up against decimated household incomes. Homeowners, with savings exhausted during the 2009-2010 downturn will be feeling more heat than they do today. Foreclosures will rise and personal insolvencies will go sky high. Consumption will remain suppressed, but this time, there will be no boost in savings. Ireland Inc might suffer a complete fall-out of the growth re-start.

An example
Here are some numbers. Assume we take a family with Q1 2008 after-tax income of €100 and a mortgage burden of €35 (35% of the after-tax income). By Q1 2009, due to falling interest rates, this family's mortgage costs will have fallen 26% (roughly 10% per each 1% fall in ECB rates). At the same time, the family income has declined to €91 due to increased taxation (Budget 2009) and recession. In Q1 2009, family mortgage burden was €26 or 28.5% of the disposable income.

Now, assume we are in Q4 2009 and recession continues and Mr Lenihan has stuck to his promises and raided the family income to 25-48-52% tax rates outlined above). The family after-tax disposable income now stands at €82, while the ECB has lowered the rate to 0.75% from current 1.50%. The family is now paying €24 in mortgage which constitutes a mortgage burden of 29.25% of the family income.

We go to Q1 2010 next. Recession and Mr Lenihan keep on robbing the family of income, so its after-tax take home pay is now €79.5. But due to advance leading indicators flashing recovery for Germany, the ECB tightens the rates a notch to 1.0%. Family mortgage burden jumps to 31% as the twin blades of higher taxes and interest rates inflict two simultaneous cuts to household's spending power.

On to Q4 2010. Things are going swimmingly in Berlin, so the ECB races with rates increases. We have three scenarios:

Scenario 1: relative stagnation in Ireland - so our income remains at €79, while German expansion drives rates to 1.75%. Irish family's mortgage burden jumps to 33.4% of the disposable income.

Scenario 2: recession in Ireland continues, with income falling to €76, while more mild German expansion drives the ECB to raise rates to 1.5%. Irish family's mortgage burden jumps to 34%.

Scenario 3: recovery shines upon Ireland and our income rises to €80, while rapid growth in Germany drives rates up to 2.25%. Our family's mortgage repayment burden is now at 36% of the disposable after-tax income.

Conclusion
May be Alan Ahearne, in his new capacity, can tell Minister Lenihan this much? Or anyone from a myriad of our vociferous social-democratic economists, begging the Government today to raise taxes. Little hope. His (and their) policy advice to date has been pretty much in line with the Government's efforts to demolish private sector workers in order to save public sector jobs. Then again, neither Ahearne, no Lenihan will be losing much sleep over ordinary families who will be unable to stay afloat in this WunderWorld of richly rewarded public sector and impoverished private sector workers that they are creating.

Recession? Raise taxes. Public finance busting at the seams? Raise taxes. Unemployment? Raise taxes. Public sector inefficiencies? Raise taxes. Exports plunging? Raise taxes. Banks falling off the cliff? Raise taxes. And always blame the outside world for any trouble we might land ourselves into. Classic economic problems with uniquely Irish responses.

"Pints!"

Market View: Lenihan's Cod Oil Sales Trip?

Weekly round up
We are in a thaw though don’t bet on this being a sign of global warming. The markets have shown some (to some not surprising) bounce in the latest (bear) rally. Across the world and here in Ireland. But the winter isn’t over, yet.

First where it all started from: the US. Some encouraging news:

• The U.S. trade deficit narrowed by 9.7% in January to $36bn, the lowest monthly gap since October 2002. This marks a sixth consecutive decline in the trade deficit, the first case of such extended contraction since the new data collection started in 1992. Oil and petroleum products deficit fell to $14.7bn in January, the lowest since September 2004. Trade deficit with China widened to $20.57bn relative to $20.31bn in the same month last year. Lower prices for inputs and commodities helped. In exports, main decreases were in the areas of capital goods and industrial goods – reflective of the global investment slowdown. Ditto in the area of imports (except that capital goods imports were down less than exports, suggesting companies continue to travel down the cost curve. Details here).
• US University of Michigan/Reuters consumer sentiment index notched up in March to 56.6 from 56.3 one month ago. While this beats analysts’ expectations (55.0), the improvement is hardly significant to signal any improvement in consumer spending and borrowing going forward. This is despite March being the first month of Obama’s massive stimulus plan – not exactly a ringing endorsement (for more on this see here)
  

So the last week came to be a somewhat bullish one with flat US Treasuries, low single-digit gains in commodities and a rally in stocks (up ca 10-14%) with commercial real estate-leading markets, like REITs. Up over 20%.
US Dollar has lost some ground on the Euro, further underlying markets desire to see continued strengthening of the US trade balance. In this beggar-thy-neighbour climate, good news for US is bad news for exports-driven Ireland.

Financials
JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley (first chart below) illustrate the rally for the financials. Most of the sector gains were probably due to rising levels of speculative news flow. If this is a signal of a renewed focus on balance sheet health, expect the rally to turn into a deep correction. Bank of America (BAC) – up some 85% during the week – is a case in point. There is no fundamentally new development, yet this week’s statements about improving outlook on profitability pushed the stock to the top of the financial shares (Citibank (C), Wells Fargo (WFC) etc) performance rankings. The second chart below illustrates, while highlighting the relatively poor performance of non-financials.

Irish Markets
Pretty much the same picture holds for Irish markets. Two of the three remaining banks led the positive momentum with few features of note:

1. Volumes were relatively weak (running at ca ½ of the 52-weeks daily averages);
2. IL&P underperformed (with the markets having little faith in the bank side of the insurer, as in the past);
3. Overall ISEQ posted a lacklustre performance for the week, signaling that the main concerns about Irish economy’s fundamentals are still there.
   

These are illustrated below and show continued theme of volatility around a relatively flat broad markets trend - something I predicted a month ago.
The above concerns, of course are to continue next week as well.

Ireland Inc Sales Pitch
It is now being rumored that Mr Lenihan is going on that 'road trip' to showcase Ireland to UK (and other international) investors. Here is a list of problems that I would put to him at such a sales meeting. All of these basically ask the same question - why would any investor expose herself to Ireland today.

1. Fiscal position: all the indications are that Minister Lenihan will opt for a ‘soft’ solution – raising taxes and refusing to inflict real cuts on the public sector. Thus, ‘savings’ on the current expenditure side will be pushed into 2011 or later as the Minister ‘cuts’ numbers through natural attrition. Taxes will hammer the economy today. Only an insanely naïve person can be convinced by such a strategy.
   
2. Corporate credit: debts problems continue to plague Irish companies, with more roll-overs and re-negotiations of the covenants. This will be compounded in weeks ahead by an accumulation of arrears to contractors and suppliers. Mini-Budget will spell a war of attrition between smaller services providers and larger contracting companies as the former struggle to extract payments in the environment where Messrs Lenihan and Cowen sneaking deeper into peoples' (and thus companies') pockets.
3. Corporate outlook: PE ratios are still too high for Ireland Inc, implying that there is more room for downgrades. In the US, there is more clarity as to the 2010 PE ratios supported by the markets, with a range in 15-20 perceived to be the top during the recovery part of the cycle (whenever this happens). So the expected downgrading room that is still remaining in, say S&P500 is -150 points or ca 20%. In Ireland, the same figures imply probably a range of sustainable 2010-2011 PE ratios of ca 10 (again assuming that we see some recovery starting in 2010 and companies actually living up to the idea of proper disclosure of losses and impairments – something that few of them have done to date). So the bottom line is that we can see ISEQ travelling all the way to 1,470-1,500 before hitting a sustainable U-turn, while IFin might be tumbling down to 200-215.
4. Earnings and demand are going to continue falling in months to come. Although much of this is already built into expectations, the actual numbers are not yet visible through the fog of corporate denial. Banks still lead in terms of balance sheets opacity and the Government is doing nothing less than destroying in a wholesale fashion private workers’ ability to stay afloat on mortgages repayment and consumption. Dividend yields are now poised to continue downward well into 2010 (optimistically) or even past 2011 (pessimistically). So any bottoming-out of the market will coincide with an on-set of an inverted J-styled recovery – we are not getting back to 4-5% long term growth trend once we come out of this recession. A poultry 2% would be a miracle and a Belgian-style 1.2-1.5% GDP growth over the long run is a more likely scenario.
5. Global growth for Ireland Inc is not going to be a magic bullet. The Government has wasted all chances of reforming the least productive sectors in this downturn and is hell-bent on protecting our excessively high cost base. This means we are unlikely to benefit from any serious global growth upturn.
6. Increased global reliance on Governments interventions is going to hurt Irish exports in the long run as national Governments will tend to reduce incentives for outsourcing, leading many MNCs to gradually unwind transfer pricing activities here in Ireland. There is absolutely no chance our Enterprise Ireland-sponsored companies are going to be able to take up the slack.
7. No recovery in Ireland will be possible until house prices and commercial real estate values stabilize and start improving. High debt, diminishing ability to repay existent loans (courtesy of Government raiding households finances to pay for waste in the public sector and a growing army of consultants – e.g Alan Ahearne & Co) all mean that there is no prospect for a return in house values growth until, possibly, well after 2013. Absent such a recovery, there will be no sustained rallies in other asset classes.
8. Finally, there is a psychological shift that is underway when it comes to Irish public perceptions of asset markets. This shift is now counter-positing a 40-50% decline in house prices against a 90% decline in most popular equity categories and a wipe-out of investors in nationalized (and potentially yet to be nationalized) banks. The return of a growth cycle is unlikely to trigger significant movement of households’ cash into Irish stocks. This will be further compounded by the aversion to leveraging and continued credit rationing (induced via new banking regulations and investor hysteresis).
   

So the conclusion is a simple one – Irish equities recovery is nowhere near becoming a reality. Expect further turbulence on a generally downward trajectory in weeks ahead, followed by a potential spike of misplaced short-term optimism in the wake of the mini-Budget. Once the investors work through the forthcoming Government decisions, it will be down again for ISE.

New Credit Markets Acrobats: Brian, Brian & Mary

The media is now ‘seriously’ talking about the Government setting up a ‘shamrock’ SFEF-styled bond (named after Societe de Financement de l'Economie Francaise guaranteed bonds issued by the French) for Ireland (see here).

The bonds peddlers – primary and secondary alike – have been enthused. The idea is that an already nearly-insolvent state will issue strong-guarantee senior, cash-redeemable only bonds covered by Ireland’s AAA rating for a large volume issuance, blah-blah-blah…

In reality there are serious and insurmountable problems with the idea of Ireland Inc issuing a SFEF to be disbursed across Irish banks in order to aid their capitalization and re-start lending.

First problem is that this state can hardly convince the markets to buy its own bonds, let alone a stand-alone, ring-fenced ‘aid’ bonds. The General Government Guarantee for such bond will either have to take priority over the Government guarantees on its own direct debt in order to fly, or it will have to take a second seat to these in order to flop.

In the former case, you can throw away any hope of top tier ratings for Government bonds out of the window, and assign risk weightings to public debt on par or even in excess of those currently allocated to our banks. Hmmm… an appetizing prospect.

In the latter case, the SFEF will be subordinate to the Government Banks Guarantee Scheme (GBGS) – a measure that had spectacularly failed to deliver for the banks and for the Exchequer. Even more to the point here, Ireland’s €440bn bank guarantee scheme has in effect converted Irish banks debts and deposits into a SFEF-styled vehicle already. According to both the European Commission and the ECB – this was a bad deal for the country credit position.

In February 2009, the Commission said the GBGS could have a “potential negative impact on the long-term sustainability of public finances”. The ECB’s assessment of such schemes across the EU also reads like a wholesale condemnation of the overly-optimistic packages, with Irish GBGS being a front-runner for the title of the most reckless of all. “…Together with weakening fiscal positions in the wake of the economic crisis, the bank rescue packages seem to have contributed to a sharp widening of intra-euro area government bond spreads, in particular for member countries with weaker fiscal positions. Looking ahead, it is important that governments return to sound fiscal positions as soon as possible in order to maintain the public’s trust in the sustainability of public finances”.

Expanding the scope of GBGS to cover not only the existent debt and deposits, but also the future lending (under the SFEF), while pushing the Guarantees quality even below the already low stuff that the original Scheme delivered is not an appetizing prospect, either.

Now, another problem with SFEF is that it is restricted by the EU rules to a 2-3 year maturity window (with only a small portion allowed to be issued with a 4-5 year horizon). This means that any SFEF written in 2009 will mature in 2011-2012. The Government latest bond placement shows that from now on, we are likely to see most of the standard new Government debt hitting the 2012 maturity date (for 2009 issues) and 2013 date (for 2010 issues). There is absolutely not a snowball’s chance in Hell that we can frontload so much debt (once our own Exchequer borrowing requirements are factored in) into the economy for 2011-2013 horizon.

In my view, the Government is completely missing the point by pursuing this idiotically frantic search for new cash to throw at the problem of banks balance sheets. As I have proposed in this blog before (here) and in numerous articles in the press, the solution to the problem of stalled lending must begin at the coal face of the credit demand and supply imbalances. These are driven as much by a lack of funding as by a lack of demand for funding. The problem is therefore a twin collapse in fundamentals and it requires address both sides of equation simultaneously.

Side 1: collapsed supply of funding is driven by deterioration in banks balance sheets. Solution: help banks to unload bad loans off the books by doing equity-for-loans swaps under the capitalization scheme.

Side 2: collapsed demand for funding is driven by the excessive leverage of the households and corporates. Solution: take their bad loans and restructure them via a combination of a partial write-down (to the amount equal to the recapitalization funding given to the banks) and restructuring.

This is, really, the only way we can get out of this mess!

Deflation is cemented, but Government rip-off continues

The above table, courtesy of Ulster Bank's economics team, is revealing.

CPI is now anchored firmly in the deflation zone at -1.7% for February - a record rate of deflation since Q1 1960 (when CPI fell 2%). Prices actually fell 0.4% last month, but because in February 2008 prices grew by 1.2%, the overall difference amounted to -1.7%. So don't be surprised if you are not feeling that easing on your household budget (other than house payments), yet.

The HICP harmonised measure (ex mortgage rates) fell to +0.1%, the lowest in history (since 1997). This implies that CPI fall off was dominated by the ECB-driven declines in the cost of mortgage finance. The average mortgage cost declined 8% in February and is now down 26% on a year ago. This is certainly helping many households to stay afloat, given rapid deterioration in after-tax disposable personal incomes and rising unemployment.

Now, do the math - if the ECB rate-cuts cycle is to run out of steam by H2 2009, as expected at ca 0.75-1% level, total savings on average mortgage will amount to a total of 33% off their peak. Assuming an average mortgage burden of 30% of the household budget at the peak, this will shift overall mortgage burden to ca 22% of the budget. Assuming income tax, VAT and other housholds-related measures stay on course laid out in Budget 2009, mini-Budget will result in a fall in the household disposable income of 3-5%. Add in expected fall in earned income (due to slowdown and rising unemployment) and we have a recession-induced 13-19% decline in the disposable income. Thus, the average mortgage burden for the household will rise back to 26% at the bottom of the ECB rates-cut cycle, virtually canceling any positive effects of the ECB rates cuts on households' balance sheets.

Another feature of the figures above is the collapse in prices in the clothing and footware sector - normally the sales end in February (between 2002-2008, February saw the first monthly increases in prices in this category for the year, averaging some 12%). This year, the increase was only 7.5% - lowest since 2000.Overall, in January we recorded the steepest drop off in prices in this category in the Eurozone.

But as always, it was in the Government controlled/regulated sectors where price changes were out of sync with the rest of economy. Health insurance costs were up 21%, house insurance was up 17%. Education was up 5.5% in February after a 5.6% increase in January, health was up 4.8% in February after an increase of 5.8% in January. Government-sponsored rip-off of consumers is still alive and kicking. (Note: of course, house insurance is not directly priced by the state, although it is a part of the regulated sector. Possible causes for the rise in house insurance in recent months might include inclement weather payouts and, more importantly, insurers using all means possible to strengthen their capital reserves positions. The latter is a function of regulation and markets assessment of inherent risks. Both, in turn, are functions of the public sector actions/inactions, although indirectly).

While private sector prices were down 0.1% in the last 12 months, Government-controlled prices were up and the rate of increases is accelerating. In 12 months to January 2009: Gas prices were up 20%. Health insurance +19%, Electricity +17%, Bus and Rail transport +13% & +9% respectively, Hospital services +7-9% (out-patient v in-patient). Total Government-controlled inflation +14% for regulated services in year to February 2009.

Overall, I expect the CPI to average -3% for 2009 as a whole.

The real Golden Circle of Ireland Inc: Updated

An excellent letter today in the Irish Times by Myles Duffy (do see a link to his blog here) puts into perspective the real extent of Ireland's Golden Circle - reaching, cancer-like deep into our public service leadership. I have questioned in this blog on several occasions the competency of the CBFSAI. Now, as Myles puts it in his letter (linked here):

"When the governor of the Central Bank appeared before the Oireachtas Committee on Economic Regulatory Affairs, ...the committee was reminded that the governor is paid an annual salary of €348,000, a figure that reflects the voluntary reduction taken last October from the €368,000 that he had hitherto been paid.

It is interesting to compare the salary for this position with those whose influence on global economic affairs is absolutely pivotal and whose utterances and nuances greatly affect the world investment climate and the effectiveness of economic recovery initiatives.

The US Federal Reserve system consists of 12 federal reserve banks ...supported by the Federal Reserve Board based in Washington DC. The system as a whole employs almost 20,000 people and the board employs 2,053. The annual salary of the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Mr Ber Bernanke, is $191,300 (€150,000), and was approved by the US Congress in February 2008.

The president of the European Central Bank, M Jean-Claude Trichet, oversees a staff of 1,499 and was paid €351,816 last year. He is also provided with a residence, in lieu of a residential allowance, but his salary is subject to EU tax, pension, medical and accident insurance deductions.

...The Bank of Canada’s governor, Mr David Dodge, whose seven-year term ended on January 31st, was paid on a salary scale with a maximum of 407,900 Canadian dollars (€250,000).

...Mr Hurley ...and seven [out of eight] of his predecessors formerly held the position of secretary general of the Department of Finance... The salary of the governor is therefore influenced by that of the secretary general of the Department of Finance. This was set at €303,000 in September 2007 by the Review Body on Higher Remuneration in the Public Sector; the figure may have been reduced voluntarily by the current incumbent."

Given that Mr Hurley's position has none of the traditional demands of the Central Banks' chiefs across the world - he does not manage national currency, he has no role to play in interest rates and general monetary policy, etc - in terms of economic and financial functions he carries, he is largely a regulatory officer of the ECB. And yet he earns more than his real boss - the head of ECB. Vastly more when the cost of his pension and tax advantages to being located in Ireland are factored in. In fact, Mr Hurley is paid more in real terms than some of those whose names were listed as belonging to the Anglo's 10. This is pretty much all that needs to be said.


Update: In an unrelated (to the above) story, here is another potential affiliate (not quite a member) of the Golden Circle of those who have grown better off on the back of the Celtic Tiger. This time - from the shores of America. See this article in WSJ (here) - hat tip to PMD - on venerable and (for now?) honourable Senator Chris Dodd's dealings in Irish real estate...

Senator Dodd (D, Connecticut), Chairman of the US Senate Committtee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, is at the centre of the US policymakers efforts to deal with the financial crisis. He has been in the past insturmental in aggresive expansion of the Freddie-Fannie-Ginnie mandates to increase lending to lower income minorities - a move that has been at the heart of the current sub-prime mortgages collapse. Senator Dodd is also a senior member of the US Senate Committe on Foreign Relations and a member of the Subcommittee on European Affairs - a position of power that would require, one presumes, to keep any personal European affairs at arms length and spankingly clean. Adding more to the circus of titles, he is a member of the US Senate Committee on Rules and Administration - an entity responsible for setting rules of ethical conduct and compliance in the Senate.

Now, here are the main points of the story in WSJ:

"The story starts in 1994, when the Senator became one-third owner of a 10-acre estate, then valued at $160,000, on the island of Inishnee on Galway Bay. William Kessinger bought the other two-thirds share in the estate. Edward Downe, Jr., who has been a business partner of Mr. Kessinger, signed the deed as a witness. Senator Dodd and Mr. Downe are long-time friends, and in 1986 they had purchased a condominium together in Washington, D.C.

Mr. Downe is also quite the character. The year before the Galway deal, in 1993, he pleaded guilty to insider trading and securities fraud and in 1994 agreed to pay the SEC $11 million in a civil settlement. The crimes were felonies and in 2001, as President Clinton was getting ready to leave office, Mr. Dodd successfully lobbied the White House for a full pardon for Mr. Downe.

The next year -- according to a transfer document at the Irish land registry... -- Mr. Kessinger sold his two-thirds share to Mr. Dodd for $122,351. The Senator says he actually paid Mr. Kessinger $127,000, which he claims was based on an appraisal at the time. That means, at best, poor Mr. Kessinger earned less than 19% over eight years on the sale of his two-thirds share to Mr. Dodd. But according to Ireland's Central Bank, prices of existing homes in Ireland quadrupled from 1994 to 2004.

In his Senate financial disclosure documents from 2002-2007, Mr. Dodd reported that the Galway home was worth between $100,001 and $250,000. However, Mr. Rennie reports that in 2006 and 2007 the Senator added a footnote that reads: "value based on appraisal at time of purchase."

Mr. Dodd had good reason to add the qualifier. Senate rules call for valuations to be current and anyone who looked into the estimate would immediately spot Mr. Dodd's lowballing. A June 17, 2007 feature in Britain's Sunday Times did just that. "Diary" observed that in Roundstone "a two-bed recently made E680,000 ($918,000) and a cottage is currently on offer for E800,000." Noting Mr. Dodd's estimate of his property -- between E75,000 and E185,000 -- the diarist quipped, "to hell with the stamp duty, and form an orderly queue."

Mr. Dodd is busy these days blaming everyone else for the real-estate bubble and financial meltdown. But he owes his constituents and the Senate an honest accounting of his Galway property over the past 15 years. If its value grew with the rest of the area, he needs to explain why Mr. Kessinger handed it over for a song, why that isn't an unreported gift under Senate rules, and what role Mr. Downe might have played as a middleman.

More broadly, Connecticut voters might want to know why their senior Senator has hung around for years with Mr. Downe, the kind of financial scoundrel Mr. Dodd spends so much time denouncing."

Now, of course, this side of the Atlantic we would like to know - was Senator Dodd, presumably a US resident, liable for tax on his purchase of the land share and how this tax was assessed.

A Patent Lie: Ireland's Capital Investment Stimulus

In its April 2008 review of Ireland's economy, seen by the Government some 5 months prior to its publication, OECD has identified two salient medium term problems linked to the twin crises we are currently experiencing:

Reforming the taxation of housing. "...the unusually favourable tax treatment increases the role of housing in the economy and adds to volatility in the housing market. There should be a gradual move towards a more neutral system of housing taxation," said OECD. Thus, even assuming its ignorance prior to the OECD report, the Government had at least 15 months since to design a functioning system of either land-value or property taxation, there by reducing the impact of the house prices slowdown.

Public spending needs to slow. "Fiscal performance has been strong in recent years but revenue growth has moderated as the economy, particularly the housing market, has weakened. Public expenditure is set to slow but it is important to avoid locking-in expensive commitments, particularly on public sector pay. As spending rises more slowly, improving public services will have to rely more on undertaking further reforms to public sector management and getting better value for money." Once again, nothing has been done in over 15 months to address these recommendations.

Chart below - taken from the OECD report, illustrates the extent of the problem.
However, a closer examination of the components of the public expenditure in Ireland show even more dramatic failure by the Irish Governments to stop the gravy train of wasteful expenditure.

Consider the following chart plotting actual net current expenditure against capital expenditure, incorporating my own forecast for fiscal consolidation in 2009-2010 and DofF January 2009 forecasts for the same period.
Two features can be glimpsed from the chart:

1. Over the last decade, there has been a steady, unrelenting rise in the current expenditure - largely reflecting social welfare spending and the wage bill increases in the public service.
2. Even before the mini-Budget this month, our capital expenditure has peaked in 2008. Recall that Brian Cowen and Mary Coughlan are endlessly repeating that in 2009-2010 NDP-linked capital investments will act as a stimulus to the economy. Either they have not seen their own Government projections, or cannot comprehend the reality. During the recessionary 2009-2010, Ireland Inc is planning to spend decreasing net amounts of funds on capital programmes. If the Government can think of the NDP (created two years ago) as a recession-busting stimulus, then it has fired virtually all of its ammunition in 2008. And, of course, that has made no difference to the recession, as we all know.

But there are more sinister trends in the expenditure figures. The DofF does not provide a historical data set for budgetary dynamics over time. Instead, possibly to keep the taxpayers in the dark about the real nature of our spending, DofF produces a multitude of largely useless, technologically backward annual reports. A troll through these reveals the following.

Chart below shows the net current and capital expenditures as a percentage of GDP.
According to this chart, the economically unproductive spending which is largely absorbed into public sector wages and social welfare subsidies (our current expenditure):

• has grown virtually exponentially as a share of economy, whilst the capital investment programmes have bounced along a declining trend, and
• has far outstripped capital investment in terms of its role in the economy.

This blows apart Governments' arguments that since the beginning of this century Ireland Inc was aggressively investing in the productive capacity of its economy. Instead, it shows that we were 'investing' in wages, perks and working conditions of our public sector 'servants' and in welfare subsidies at the time of unprecedented growth in prosperity and low unemployment. First Bertie & Cowen and now Cowen & Lenihan have engaged in a classic tax-and-spend banquet where the already-stuffed were getting fatter and fatter on taxpayers cash.

Should you wonder how high were the rates of growth in current and capital expenditure over the last decade, chart below shows that in 2000-2009, even by DofF own (excessively optimistic) projections for this year, cumulative capital investment's importance in overall economy will decline by 39%. In contrast, cumulative current expenditure growth will reach +27%.In short, the above figures show that:

• Our leaders have deceived us about the importance of capital investment in the economy: between 2000 and 2009, capital expenditure share of GDP has actually fallen, while the current expenditure share of GDP has risen much faster than the GDP itself;
  
• Since 2000, our Governments have misled the public about the nature of Exchequer expenditure growth by stressing less rapidly expanding investment portion of the budget and downplaying a rampant expansion of payoffs to the public and social welfare sectors promoted by the Social Partners;
• Our current leadership is now deceiving the country and the markets by referring to a falling capital-spending programme as economic stimulus. That 'stimulus' applied to 2008 and not 2009-2010 and even in 2008 it was relatively small, compared to the current spending waste;
  
• Our Governments since at least 1999 have engaged in reckless and unsustainable increases in the current expenditure - in 2000-2009, current spending has grown in nominal terms by 138%, outstripping almost 2:1 the rate of growth in the nominal GDP (72%). Meanwhile capital expenditure has grown by 57% - over 2.5times slower than the current expenditure.
  

Mr Cowen and the rest of the Government should stop talking about Ireland's plans to invest in infrastructure and knowledge economy. They should come clean on the fact that their leadership has left the country with a current spending bill well beyond our means.

Irish bonds - on the move again (updated)

UPDATE: see below

In case you've missed it, Irish bonds spreads are on a renewed march upwards - needless to say, in anticipation of the mini-Budget maxi-soaking-of-the-middle-class by Brian^2+Mary. Hat tip to BL, the chart explains all:The same story told in price indices:Of course, our primary (and not-so-primary) dealers keep telling us that Government bonds are fine, things are going swimmingly indeed. In the mean time, another local maximum is breached, 10-year at 223.4 and 5-year at 217.9. Term premium widened again. Perhaps the prospect of an imminent roll-over of the last month issue at maturity (2012) coinciding with still gargantuan budget deficits is driving the 10-year spread away from the 5-year bonds?.. Wait until we issue the next tranche.

Update: From NTMA press-release on February Euro4bn bond issue: "The bond attracted strong demand from domestic investors who subscribed 55% of the total, as well as investors from euro area countries (20%), the UK (13%) and the Middle East (9%). As would be expected with a relatively short maturity bond, banks accounted for 72% of the amount invested. Pension funds contributed 11%, fund managers 10% and Central Banks 7%." Does this suggest that most of the bond was 'bought-in' by the publicly-supported Irish Banks and the Euro-area Central Banks? After all a whooping 79% of the bond placement went to Banks and Central Banks (BCBs), 75% went to 'investors' (inclusive of BCBs) tothe euro area countries, and only a meagre 21% went to private institutionals (although how does one treat funds run by the state-supported banks?). As I said before, February issue was a pipe-priming for the low-quality issues to come that will aim from the origination date for placement with the BCBs. A helicopter drop, indeed, but not of money - of public waste!

Now, per current spreads: term premium on 5-10year bonds yield spreads is now at +2.52% or in pricing terms +6.6%, implying that our 3-year bond, priced at an annual yield to maturity (YTM) of 4.01% is equivalent, roughly, to a 5.7-5.9% yield for a 10-year security.

Insanity of our policies

Limbering through crises since the end of 2007 (for its was painfully clear, following the credit markets stalling in July-August 2007, that the near future promises no prospect of continuity of the orgy of credit and debt that we partook in from the beginning of this century) we now have reached that state of nature where the Government is, once again, embarking on an effort to 'do something' about the economy. The latest promise is that of a mini-Budget 2009 by the end of this month.

It reminds one of a famous fable about Albert Einstein's last exam. Upon being told that his final pre-retirement term paper in physics contained the same questions as those posited on the previous year exam, Einstein remarked: "Ah, yes, the questions are the same. The answers, however, have changed".

And so it is with Ireland Inc. The questions, or rather the issues faced by us are painfully the same as we faced before:

• Public spending that is running at ca 38% (current expenditure) ratio to GNP - the same as in the early 1980s;
• Businesses insolvencies and personal bankruptcies rising like an unstoppable tide - too great to see it before it breaks over our heads;
• Financial system that is facing ruin in real terms and a currency that is no longer offering any comfort;
  
• Collapsed taxes (some 25% down y-o-y already and counting) drawn out of a folding economy (having contracted ca 4-5% to date, heading for triple that rate in cumulative terms over 2009-2011);
• Rising tax burdens amidst shrinking economic activity and private sector incomes;
  
• A specter of mass emigration (with net outflows of workers out of Ireland recorded in 2008 already) and double-digit unemployment (expected to reach 14% this year);
• Public sectors war against the rest of society waged to ensure that the privileges - in employment, monopoly power, wages etc - of the few will be protected even at a cost of sacrificing the prosperity of the many;
• Corruption (this time - primarily of legal nature) led by the interest groups that stand close to the center of power;
• Elites, incapable of any new thinking, neurotically running for cover of failed ideologies;
• Academia that is so far removed from reality that its practitioners forget ABCs of their own disciplines (finance and economics) in their desire to embrace the consensus;
• Desperate electorate that, in a Stockholm Syndrome moment of truth, are begging their captors - the State and its leaders - to 'do something', 'anything', 'to present a plan for the future'; and so on.

The issues are, frighteningly, the same - beyond any doubt, despite repeated assurances by the Government to the contrary - we are now in the §980s Redux scenario. But have the answers changed?

Sadly, not. The menu of economic policy potions on offer from the Government and academe is:

• Conviction-driven hikes in direct income and consumption taxation (Priority 1);
• Ideologically motivated (the ideology of public greed) hikes in indirect taxation so desperate in their scope that we are now facing a prospect of a tax on text messages and a clawback of pension deductions (Priority 2);
  
• Ambiguous & vague promises of some current expenditure cuts (Priority 3);
• Empty & often outright senile promises of an NDP stimulus packaged along with a pork train of 'knowledge' economy, 'green' economy and 'social' politics measures (Priority 4).

In other words - continued waste, new waste and taxes is what passes for leadership in Irish political environment: Government and Opposition alike.

Has anyone noticed that having raised VAT in October, we are seeing continued collapse in VAT revenue? Having raised income tax from January on, we are seeing continuous deterioration in the income tax receipts? Having implemented not a single pro-growth policy since the beginning of 2008, we are seeing real costs of living and working in this country remaining stubbornly high and real returns to work depressingly declining?

How long will it take? How many homes will have to be repossessed? How many personal bankruptcies and corporate insolvencies declared? How many of us and our children will have to emigrate out of here before our policy idiocy will lead us to the conclusion that you cannot tax yourself out of a recession?

Some years before his final exam, Einstein remarked that "Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results".

For now our politicians soldier on, with Unions whistling in step, back into the 1980s. Back into the 1980s answers to the 1980s-like problems. Stop cheering them on!

Germany and the Euro

This post is a response to a comment by Tim (here):
"I just heard that Germany is considering leaving the euro. ...What do you think?"

I have not heard such a rumor - at least not at any credible level. I would be surprised if such sentiment was gaining significant strength in Germany. Here is the latest data I could find and my understanding of what is happening.

Per Eurobarometer 70, December 2008, 56% of German population tend to trust in the ECB - a fall of 4 percentage points on Spring 2008. EU27 average was significantly lower at 48% (a fall of 2 percentage points on Spring 2008). This still places Germany as 13th ranked country in the EU27 in terms of overall trust in the ECB. Ireland is 14th with 52% (down 6 percentage points on Spring 2008). In general, decline in trust for ECB tends to be rising with the worsening in economic conditions: Portugal leads the fall with -10%, Spain follows with -8%, Ireland comes next.

Also significantly, the decline in those trusting ECB has translated into an even higher rise in those who tend not to trust the ECB (as opposed to those who declined to answer): in Germany, 8 percentage increase in those who do not trust the ECB, in Spain +13%, in Ireland +10%, and so on. This shows that people are actually becoming more decisive in their negative position vis-a-vis ECB policies. But, again, it does not show Germans swinging decisively against the Euro membership. In my view, the rising negative perception of the ECB is driven by the policy lags with which the ECB greeted the economic crisis between July 2007 and July 2008.

As far as I understand, there was no direct question on the Euro in the preliminary EB70 results available at this time.

Eurobarometer 69, Spring 2008, does show results for trust in Euro itself. Even before the crisis pushed Germany into a recession, only 17% of Germans tended to claim that their approval of the Euro is one of the top two reasons for supporting the ECB. Same as in Ireland, but below the EU27 average of 19%. Table below gives results for "QA25a Which of the following are the main reasons for trusting the European Central Bank?":
"QA26a Which of the following are the main reasons for not trusting the European Central Bank?" Table below shows response to the above question:When it came to mistrusting the ECB, 18% of Germans named being against the Euro as one of the top two reasons for their position vis-à-vis the ECB.

These numbers do not show a significant doze of skepticism about the Euro amongst the Germans, but they do show that the two tails of the attitudes to Euro distribution are both ‘fat’ and virtually identical in size. In other words, anti-Euro enthusiasts are roughly as prevalent as Euro supporters in Germany. In Ireland, those mistrusting the ECB due to their dislike for the Euro are less numerous than those who support ECB because of the Euro.

Overall, 60% Europeans (EU27), 69% of Germans, and 87% of Irish approved of the Euro in Spring 2008. Going further back in time, Eurobarometer 68 (Autumn 2007) shows 68% of Germans supporting the Euro, 87% of the Irish doing the same. EU27 average was 61%. Eurobarometer 67 (Spring 2007) showed 71% of Germans supporting the Euro, as opposed to the EU27 average of 63% (Ireland – 88%).

So on the net, the trend in the EU27 is for a very slight decline in support for Euro from 63% in the Spring 2007 to 60% in Spring 2008. For Germans these figures were 71% to 69% and for Irish – 88% to 87%. This is hardly a sign of a decisive shift in opinion against the Euro.

It will be interesting to see, once full Eurobarometer 70 results are in, if there has been further erosion in support for the Euro. Most likely, given the current economic conditions, there would be a rising sense of pessimism. But I still doubt Germany will reach a swing point.

Needless to say, the implications of a German exit from the Euro would be disastrous for the global financial system and for Ireland in particular.

First there will be an effect of unwinding the Euro positions worldwide and a monumental mess of absorbing ex-Euro positions (assets and liabilities) into national currencies.

Second, there will be a logistical nightmare of reintroducing new exchange rates, as the original (EMU-entry point) exchange rates are no longer reflective of the actual economic conditions.

Third, there is a problem of divesting the ECB roles back to the national Central Banks and re-establishing these Central Banks' reputational capital.

Fourth, for countries like Ireland, indeed for the APIIGS, the end of the Euro would spell a massive and instantaneous devaluation. Imagine the trade flows and investment positions disruptions that would arise if the reintroduced 'punt' were to be devalued by ca 50% instantaneously.

Fifth, the Euro has become a part of the reserve currencies basket around the world. It is hard to see how the central monetary authorities around the world can unwind their Euro holdings in an orderly fashion in the current environment.

Sixth, the resulting crisis at the EU level - triggered by a removal of the fundamental pillar of EU expansionism and internal markets supports - will be of a magnitude equivalent to the current economic and financial crises combined. Amongst obvious economic implications, there will be a significant political cost of the tearing up of the entire fabric of the EU elite built on the singularly integrationsit agenda.

Fortunately, once again, I am not seeing any significant signs of the public opinion in Germany shifting decisively against the country membership in the Euro.

Euronews is now Purer than Before: says Heathrow Sign

Euronews - a channel co-financed by the EU Commission and that virtually never bothers to broadcast any opinion or analysis of the events that does not mirror to a letter the views of the EU Commission and the rest of the establishment is doing some re-branding (see the pic below for a truly Pravda-esque advertising, possibly also co-financed by the European citizens' hard earned taxes).
Being launched as a hard-news 're-focused' channel, its new identity is now Euronews Pure. The latest linguistic twist has been added to distinguish it from the presumably 'poluted' CNN, BBC, Bloomberg, Reuters, etc. Given Euronews record of almost never being able to actually break news, the 'purity' must be in analytical capabilities of the channel. Alas, since Euronews never gives credit to its journalists - anonymity in journalism is the best cover of all - and since it never interviews those critical of the official EU positions, it is hard to imagine exactly how this can be the case.

Overall, my suggestion would be for the Euronews/EU Commission's Ministry of Truth to spend some money explaining why do people of Europe, who enjoy (at least for now) virtually unlimited access to global information channels need Euronews at all? They can post the result near all vital locations with captive audience: elevators, EU bureaucrats' offices, European hospitals, public restrooms and so on - in short, wherever the wait is necessary and is necessarily burdensome...

Russian Business Forum

Last week, Irish Management Institute hosted another successful and very well attended Russian Business Forum. IBEC and Enterprise Ireland have promised to post all presentations on their sites, but here are the slides of my own presentation.