22/12/2014: Elvira Nabiullina, the Rouble’s last line of defence

Irish Independent on Elvira Nabiullina at the helm of the Central Bank of Russia (with comments from myself): http://www.independent.ie/business/world/elvira-nabiullina-the-roubles-last-line-of-defence-30854461.html 

22/12/2014: Sell-Side Research: Pressures and Changes

My post for LearnSignal blog on sell-side research: regulatory pressures and changing environment http://blog.learnsignal.com/?p=136

21/12/2014: Planning Permissions Q3 2014: Being Un-dead ≠ Being Alive

This week, there were some champagne-popping media headlines about planning permissions print for Q3 2014 released by the CSO. So what's the hype was about, folks?

Starting from the top, total number of new planning permissions granted in Q3 2014 stood at 4,238. This represents a rise of 9.37% y/y and follows a decline of 4.25% y/y in Q2 2014. Sounds pretty solid, except when you look at the levels of activity involved. Which is so abysmally low, that a 9.37% rise is hardly an uptick worth boasting about.

Take a look at the chart:

Firstly, the uptick is still within the range of activity between H2 2011 and present. Secondly, current level of activity is still below any quarter on record between Q1 1975 and Q3 2011. In summary, then, current print is worse than any quarter of the dreaded 1980s recession. And activity is still down 75.6% on pre-crisis peak. It is 29.4% above the current crisis trough, but Q3 2014 number of planning permissions is still 2.37% below the lowest point between Q1 1975 and Q3 2011.

Total area covered by planning permissions in Q3 2014 was up 18.35% y/y having posted a decline of 6.16% in Q2 2014. This sound great. But, again, levels of activity are too low to interpret these increases as much more than 'bouncing at the bottom'. Outside the current crisis, you'd have to go back to Q1 1989 to find comparable level of activity as measured by the square meters permitted.

Worse, as the chart above shows, there is no life in the house-building sector. Area covered by new permissions when it comes to Dwellings is basically flat at the bottom of what already constitutes extremely poor activity. Q3 2014 still reads less than any other quarter from mid 1988 through Q4 2011.

In line with the above, number of new planning permissions for dwellings is itself trending in a narrow range at the bottom of historical records chart:

What is truly amazing is that seven (!) years after the start of the crisis and with property prices surging, there is absolutely no signs of life in the construction sector, when it comes to new planning permissions. None. Nada. And yet, Irish media is going off the rails spinning the small percentage increases as signs of upcoming 'boom'.

21/12/2014: World Languages: Interactive Map

Almost Economics, but still more WLASze: Weekend Link on Arts, Sciences and zero economics: A fascinating mapping of world languages by weight and inter-connections: http://www.iflscience.com/brain/new-study-reveals-most-influential-languages.

Interactive version - way better than in the article - is here: http://language.media.mit.edu/visualizations/books

20/12/2014: Remembering that Debt Pile on Our Shoulders

Three charts to illustrate the extent of Ireland's debt problem... that's right, the one that has not gone away with all the recovery talk.

Let's start in the happy days of 2007, when Irish Government's sustainable debt per capita was running at EUR10,775 and we ranked 11th most indebted nation (on per capita basis) in the today's EA18.

And fast-forward to 2014, when, based on the IMF projections, our Government debt per capita will amount to an eye-watering 'sustainable' EUR42,469 ranking us a run-away 1st in the debt load:

Needless to say, this record should have propelled us to the top of the league of EA18 nations in terms of debt increases during the crisis. And it did:

In Census 2011 (see here:  http://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/census/documents/census2011profile5/Profile,5,Households,and,Families,full,doc,sig,amended.pdf) the average household size in Ireland was 2.7 persons, implying that Government debt alone amounts today to EUR114,666, before the mortgage and other debts kick in. And when I say before, I mean it : the Government has priority over all other claims on income, including food and shelter.

So how do you feel now when you think of the Budget 2015 measure to ease the burden of DIRT on families saving for the downpayment on house purchase? Lavished by the warmth of a caring Government, undoubtedly...

20/12/2014: Russia's Black Monday: The Debate is On

It is a hazardous task to attempt to explain fast spikes in Forex markets pressures during the ongoing currency crises. And hence few attempt. One very interesting - and I suspect rather correct - try is by Sergei Guriev http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ruble-collapse-corporate-debt-by-sergei-guriev-2014-12.

Guriev directly links the Russian Ruble's Black Monday (and I would add Black Tuesday too) on Rosneft debt redemption that takes place this weekend.

He is right on all points, including, probably, the suspicion that CBR delayed rate hike to allow Rosneft debt deal to go through, with a caveat.

The hike of November 11th (see my note on this here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/11122014-central-bank-of-russia-good.html) was weak. Weak by all fundamentals metrics, save one and a very important one: CBR knew at the hike time that the industrial activity was tanking and investment was starting to lose steam (if anaemic growth in investment to-date can be called that). So CBR delayed hike most likely for two reasons:

1. Rosneft deal; and
2. The fact that raising rates are hammering the economy (Governor Nabiullina clearly stated as much on several previous occasions and Professor Guriev might be reading too much into the statement by the Minister of Economy, Alexey Ulyukaev - Ulyukaev is locked into a long-term battle with CBR - see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/09/1292014-bank-of-russia-leaves-rates.html In fact, earlier this year, the Ministry was openly critical of CBR for the Bank lifting rates without 'coordination' with the Ministry).

Another point ignored by Guriev (predictably for an economist) is the dynamics-driven algos and shorts rebalancing that most likely came quickly into the market late Monday and continued to hammer Ruble on Tuesday.

But, on the net, the point that Rosneft debt is costing Russia dearly is on the money. And it will continue doing so into 2015 when the company debt redemptions are likely to hit 1/5th of the total corporate and banks' redemptions.

Do note, more granular analysis of the redemptions, putting to challenge some of Guriev's statements, is here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/19122014-plight-of-russian-banks.html

20/12/2014: Russian Crisis: Longer-Term Issues and Short-Term Risks

Earlier this week I was asked by Portuguese Expresso (http://expresso.sapo.pt/rublo-valoriza-12-e-bolsa-de-moscovo-ganha-14=f903111) to comment on Russian crisis developments. Here is the full transcript of my comments in English:


1) Why this recent crisis in the FX market? What are the main drivers?

The main drivers of the Russian Ruble crisis are, in order of declining importance:

1) Rapid decline in oil prices since August 2014,
2) Accelerating capital outflows in Q4 2014, relative to Q2 and Q3,
3) Sanctions restricting Russian banks and companies access to the international funding markets, thus precipitating a significant rise in demand for foreign currency needed to repay hard currency debt maturing in Q4 2014 and Q1 2015, and
4) The effect of Ruble switching from a tightly managed rate to free float, triggering both speculative and algorithmic trading re-adjustments.

2) Which of the drivers of the crisis is more important: sanctions or oil?

With oil prices above USD90 per barrel, Russian companies and banks would have little difficulty funding debt redemptions coming due in Q4 and Q1 2015. However, at oil prices around USD60 per barrel, foreign exchange inflows are severely constrained, triggering a spike in demand for dollars due to restricted cash flows. This demand had to be funded by borrowing rubbles and converting these into dollars, which, in effect represents a double squeeze on the Ruble: not only demand for Rubles falls relative to Dollars, but simultaneously the supply of Rubles rises due to borrowing.

Sanctions play an important role only in so far as they underpin the demand for dollars required for redemption of maturing debt. In a sense, President Putin was correct in estimating the effect of sanctions amounting roughly to 25-30 percent of the overall crisis re-pricing of the Ruble.

3) Who are the losers and the winners of this recent crisis? Especially, in terms of the crisis impact on Russian people?

There are no winners in this crisis when it comes to either Russian citizens or the residents. Turkey and China, as well as a number of other countries, including Kazakhstan, Armenia, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and others are gaining through increased flows of trade and investment via-s-vis Russia. China is gaining geopolitically and economically.

In terms of losers, countries heavily reliant on remittances from the migrants residing in Russia, including some of the above mentioned CIS countries, plus Ukraine and Moldova, are feeling the pain from collapsed Ruble valuations. Ordinary people in Russia, especially those who tend to hold Ruble deposits (such as retirees), as well as people reliant on foreign (imported) medicines and those living below the poverty line, are seeing large-scale destruction of their purchasing power and savings. A small number of Russian residents have purchased homes in recent years using mortgages denominated in foreign currencies. While before the crisis these mortgages carried lower interest rates, since the devaluation, the real cost of servicing these loans rose. Many businesses lease commercial real estate based on rents expressed in foreign currency. They too will face steep increases in the cost of servicing their offices and stores. Roughly one half of Moscow's retail properties are leased using contracts in dollars.

One category of Russian population is unlikely to lose signifcantly as the result of devaluations - the super rich. While their income-generating assets are based in Russia, much of their wealth resides outside Ruble zone.

This explains why the vast majority of Russians see sanctions as a Western attack on their own well-being, rather than a pressure on oligarchs or the Government.

4) Can we talk of a syncronization between the ruble and the oil prices?  

There is a very strong correlation between Russian GDP (in levels, not growth terms) and oil prices, so it is natural to think of a strong positive correlation between Ruble and oil prices. This correlation has been reinforced by the crisis, as economic growth in Russia shows considerable structural slowdown, thus only increasing the economy's dependence on oil.
   
5) Does the Dutch Disease represent the main structural problem with the Russian economy?

Yes, Russian economy is a classic example of the Dutch Disease or the Curse of Oil, with major and structural over-emphasis on energy and extraction sectors as generators of exports and foreign exchange earnings. However, Russia still retains a large and relatively diversified domestic economy. In effect, imports substitution under the current sanctions and counter-sanctions regimes is driving this diversification up, while low oil prices are reducing the link between oil and economic activity in terms of investment and output.

6) What can we expect in 2015: stagflation or outright recession? 

My forecast is for a significant recession in 2015 for the Russian economy, in the region of -3 percent, with positive scenario implying a recession of roughly 1% and the downside scenario predicting a recession of ca 4.5 percent. This is based on the following considerations. Firstly, the core drivers of this week's run on the Ruble are still present and cannot be addressed in the short run. Secondly, structural slowdown in growth that started manifesting itself in 2012 and came into full view in 2013 is still present. Thirdly, absent robust recovery in Europe and facing a slowdown in growth in China, Russia is poorly positioned on the exporting side and investment side.

On inflationary side, I expect Russian CPI to run above 10 percent in Q1 2015, rising in Q2 2015 before moderating in the second half of the year. Much will depend on the quality of 2015 crop, as well as on geopolitical developments.

7) Is there a risk of a new 1998 triple crisis, coupling the FX, debt, internal default and banking?

From fundamentals point of view, there is no risk of the repeat of 1998. 1998 crisis was triggered by a combination of large debt overhang from the 1980s and 1990s, funded at ever-escalating borrowing rates, a wide fiscal and current account deficits running over a number of years, the economy undergoing huge disruptions relating to transition, and the political crisis within the ruling classes. None of the above conditions are present today. However, one cannot rule out the risk of default due to a set of reasons very distinct from the driers of the 1998 crisis. Chiefly, the risk of default arises today from the possibility of a repeated and more prolonged run on the Ruble. Added uncertainty comes courtesy of the oil prices, which are currently simply unpredictable in the medium term. If oil prices do average over 2015 around USD80/bbl as consensus forecasts in the markets suggest, then the risk of default becomes negligible for the sovereign and the majority of larger banks and companies.

8) More hikes of key interest rates ahead for the CBR? Or 'nuclear options', like capital controls, moratorium in the FX reserves outflows? Other measures from the CBR?

Over the last couple of days, Ruble enjoyed significant rebound, thus reducing the risk of Russian authorities deploying capital controls or other drastic policy measures.

However, if the crisis returns with the intensity of December 15-16th, capital controls in conjunction with a holiday on debt redemptions for sanctioned entities cannot be ruled out.

Over the medium term, the prospect of capital controls also depends on the rate of foreign exchange reserves depletions in supporting Ruble and the speed of capital outflows. In 2015, Russia is facing foreign currency debt redemptions of some USD101 billion. All but USD2 billion of this relate to banks and corporates. We need to see oil rising toward USD80 mark and Ruble stabilising at around USD50 mark for the risk of capital controls to recede significantly.

The above debt maturity is a serious challenge. If recessionary dynamics place a substantial cap on corporate revenues and banks balance sheets, we can see some isolated, but larger scale corporate defaults. Otherwise, some less significant localised defaults can take place, especially in the weaker, lower tier of Russian banks. The latter will be benign and the CBR can facilitate orderly sector restructuring.

9) With a break-even price of oil at an annual average USD107, as set in Budget 2015, is the Kremlin facing a risk of fiscal collapse?

Not in the short run.

Russian budget is expressed in Rubles-denominated price of oil. Hence, as long as Russian Ruble moves in line with the price of dollar, the budgetary pressures remain minor. For example, currently, Russian federal budget is in surplus despite the massive decline in Dollars-denominated revenues. And Russian Current Account is posting strong surpluses on foot of collapsed imports. However, over the longer term, Russian budgetary spending will have to rise to offset the effects of inflation and devaluation. When the pressure to do forces the Government to adopt some inflation-related adjustments in the budget, fiscal position will deteriorate. I do not expect this pressure to be insurmountable, however, over the next 12-24 months.

In addition, President Putin mandated the government to amend November Budget, cutting federal expenditures in real terms by 5% a year in 2015–2017. Three sectors are excluded from the cuts: defense, national security and social welfare. New targets will re-balance public sector wages from slight growth planned in previous Budget to a cut in real terms.

The longer-term issue is the ruble-oil price link up. As ruble devalues, short-term, federal budget remains balanced. But in the longer run, devaluation triggers inflationary pressures. So the challenge in the second half of 2015 will be balancing the books while inflation is expected to be running at above 10 percent mark. This is more critical than the shorter-term issues.

10) Do you expect Russia to push for an agreement on oil production cuts or a full “war” with OPEC?

OPEC is a non-homogeneous entity. Some members of OPEC are currently suffering similar fate to the Russian economy and some oil exporters outside the OPEC are feeling severe pressures as well.

It is clear that the immediate strategy for Saudi Arabia is to push for lower oil prices and higher output. This strategy is based on two considerations.

First, and foremost, Said Arabia is attempting to protect its market share in the face of the rising output of shale oil. Although shale is more expensive to extract, once production is put into place, there is significant margin that can be traded down in terms of oil prices before, over time, shale output declines. Saudi Arabia wants to weather this period and force, using lower prices, some shale production declines in the medium term.

The second, far less important consideration from the Saudi's persecutive is the effect of low oil prices on its key geopolitical challenger - Iran. The flash point here is Syria and Iran's (and Russian, to lesser extent) support for the regime there that is being opposed by the Saudis.

This leaves Russia in a weak position to bargain change vis-a-vis the OPEC. Instead of a 'war' with OPEC, Russia is adopting a response of shifting markets for its oil and gas East, toward Asia Pacific. This strategy is about the only one that is feasible in current circumstances and Russia has been pursuing it very pro-actively.

11) China is the “saviour” economy for Russia to avoid crisis?

As Russian exports and investment flows re-orient East, China is becoming a major trading and investment partner for Russia with huge play in Eastern and Southern Siberia. Geopolitically, closer links between Moscow and Beijing are of benefit to both sides, but economically, Russia is making a bet that growth slowdown in China will not reduce the space of the bilateral cooperation in trade and investment that has been developing between them.

This bet is, probably, short-term risky. China is going to run slower growth in years to come, and thus lower growth in demand for oil and gas. On the other hand, China will have to switch away from much less efficient coal in energy generation mix toward less polluting gas. The former is net negative for Russia, the latter is net positive.

20/12/2014: ECB, Inflation Expectations and Oil

There is much hype about the ECB not actively gunning for re-inflating the economy around. Which is understandable... as the fears of deflation are real. But it is also partially misplaced, as deflationary causes are a bit more complex and changing over time.

The main cause of the longer-term deflation is stagnant demand. This provides support for low level inflation base off which any negative shock to prices risks triggering a deflation. Here, in my opinion, ECB can do some helping, but not much.

The second cause, the shock to the downside, is oil price. And here ECB should do absolutely nothing, simply because lower cost of energy is neither caused by the monetary drivers, nor is hugely detrimental to the economy. If anything, lower cost of energy helps business margins and household budget, partially offsetting the stagnant demand.

Here's the link between Euro area inflation expectations and oil prices, courtesy of @ReutersJamie:

Yes, ECB is way off-target on its monetary policy: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/19122014-lots-of-talk-more-plans-little.html although the above begs a question if we really do want to see ECB balancesheet expanding so dramatically once again. Yes, ECB off-target on inflation. But no, ECB balancesheet growing is not a solution to the core problem holding European demand under water. Debt is, followed by lack of investment. And ECB can't help much with either. At least it cannot help by expanding it balancesheet.

19/12/2014: Lots of Talk, More Plans, Little Action: ECB Balancesheet Expansion

Couple of interesting charts, courtesy of @Schuldensuehner on the ECB balancesheet expansion:

First the target to be reached over 2015-2016:

Do notice the flat-lining of the balancesheet from the start of H2 2014 on, despite the deflationary pressures building up and ECB rhetoric pushing forward balancesheet expansion as being the 'silver bullet' rising proportionally.

Next, Nomura's estimates on how the target of leveraging up ECB balancesheet can be reached:

 (click on image to enlarge)

19/12/2014: Some links on Russian Crisis

Several interesting news this week on Russian corporate front.

One of the longer-running deal, the swap of assets between German BASF and Russian Gazprom was finally killed off on foot of sanctions. The deal collapse is one of the first spillovers to Europe from the Ruble crisis and the overall deterioration in Russian markets. Details here: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2014-12-18/gazprom-deal-to-swap-assets-with-basf-ends-as-relations-sour.html. Key quote from the point of macro analysis: "BASF attributed the breakdown in the agreement to “the currently difficult political environment.” “We will continue our joint ventures in Europe and Russia,” the company said in a statement. “The facts clearly show: Europe and Russia need each other also in the future.”"

Russian Duma approved the bill to recapitalise the banks, injecting some USD16.5 billion worth of funding into the banking system. Details: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/19/russia-crisis-banks-capital-idUSL6N0U318520141219?feedType=RSS&feedName=bondsNews.

This, amidst the already rolling contagion from Russian financial services to Europe's: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/18/russia-crisis-raiffeisen-idUSL6N0U23AT20141218 as Ruble devaluations help drive Raiffeisen Bank International's overall capital ratio one percentage point down. Austria has the largest exposure of to Russian banks - see http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/19122014-russian-banks-contagion.html.

And for the last bit, here is the latest polling from Russia:

19/12/2014: Russian Banks: Contagion exposures for Europe

From a different Deutsche Bank note, a handy chart plotting exposures of various Western banking systems to Russia.

Do keep in mind, same banks' exposure to Ireland was probably of a magnitude of 1/5th of their exposures to Russia, yet Irish banking system was deemed to be systemically important when it came to assessing the potential contagion from Anglo failure back in 2008.

19/12/2014: The Plight of Russian Banks Overhype?

Deutsche Bank note from earlier this month covering Russian banks is telling as to the nature of the problems.

Per DB: "A tighter funding situation and weak economic growth will dampen credit expansion, although Russian banks’ dependence on external funding is not strong. Rising NPLs will negatively impact profitability, but the government’s capacity to provide support to systemically important banks remains strong."

So in summary, few illustrations of the above.

There is a weak credit impulse in Russia through Q2 2014 (this is likely accelerated in Q3-Q4), especially on foot of hikes in CBR rates:

But credit growth remains elevated, albeit it is subdued relative to historical averages:

DB conclusion on growth potential is cautious: "Russian banks are facing several challenges. As economic growth is projected to remain weak and the banks’ external funding situation has tightened given EU and US sanctions, real credit growth is expected to slow down from the current 11% yoy (October data referring to total domestic credit)."

Still, "overall asset quality remains adequate (NPLs at 6.7% of total loans as of September), but it is likely to deteriorate over the coming months as the economy is close to recession and consumer indebtedness is growing. Moreover, rising loan loss provisions (with provisioning levels currently at 70% of total NPLs) and higher funding costs will have a negative impact on profitability over the next few quarters.

Capitalisation levels are moderate, with the ratio of core capital to risk-weighted assets standing at 9.4% in September. The Central Bank has started preparing Russian banks to meet Basel III capital requirements. But it recently delayed the implementation of the Basel III liquidity requirement by six months to July 2015, taking into account difficulties in obtaining long-term funding."

Worth noting that the delay is no longer: Russia introduced new bank recaps this week: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/19/us-russia-crisis-banks-capital-idUSKBN0JX0R620141219

Amazingly, Russian banks overall are not as reliant on foreign funding as one would have expected: "…a closer look at the funding structure of Russian banks shows that they are not overly dependent on external funding, which accounts for less than 20% of total debt liabilities. The share of the potentially most volatile funding sources (foreign interbank funding, syndicated loans, Eurobonds) has decreased since the financial crisis in 2008/2009. Non-resident deposits account for half of the USD 209 bn external bank debt outstanding. Moreover, only USD 44 bn of external bank debt will fall due within the next 14 months (see figure 5), with the largest 30 financial institutions holding an FX buffer of USD 32 bn (difference between FX liquid assets and FX liabilities maturing in the next five quarters)."

Two charts to illustrate:

Few caveats: "…when assessing the external debt of Russian banks, two contrasting data specification aspects have to be kept in mind. On the one hand, part of banks’ external borrowing is inter-company lending, which tends to be rolled over and thus mitigates external funding risks (figure 6 shows a proxy for this lending). On the other hand, bank external debt might be underestimated by the CBR using the “residency” and not the “nationality” concept of the borrower. Figure 7 shows that banks’ international debt securities falling due are significantly higher when using the nationality rather than the residency concept (USD 16.4 bn vs. USD 1.3 bn)."

But the key, so far, is the non-performing loans:

Clearly, Russian banking pressures from NPLs are, for now, benign. DB warns: "we expect NPLs to increase in Russia and Ukraine given the bleak economic outlook and currency weakness (against the background of relatively high levels of FX- denominated loans, especially in Ukraine)." Question is: what about provisioning cushions? Well, Russian banks seem to be fine here too:

On the net, DB warns that tough times are still ahead for Russian banks. I would agree. This week's changes in mark-to-market accounting rules and repo collateral quality requirements, as well as recpaitalisation of the banks are strengthening the system buffers to deal with shorter term aspects of the crisis. Higher policy rates (17% for key rate) are net positive for deposits, but negative for mortgages and credit. So where the balance of these changes lies is anyone's guess at this point in time.

17/12/2014: Russia: Running Out of Euros and Ikea Kitchens?

While Russians are converting dollars into rubles to buy Ikea furniture to store cabbage, shortages of which are imminent... or maybe converting Ikea kitchens into dollars to buy spare parts for Ladas door handles... there's a panic... allegedly.

In one city, some banks have run out of dollar kitchens and euro handles... even at the rate of 110 RUB/1EUR, though the main banks remained fully stocked with hard currency:

Funny enough, the reporter spotted a queue for currency only in one branch of one bank, where EUR was selling for 92 Rubles instead of 110... There is a rich behavioural economics paper sitting somewhere between the Russian retail currency exchanges margins...

Another behavioural adjustment was made today - by the Central Bank of Russia which suspended mark-to-market valuations of its own portfolio:  http://www.forexlive.com/blog/2014/12/17/russian-central-bank-imposes-temporary-moratorium-on-portfolio-revaluation/ The CBR also suspended mark-to-market valuations of credit institutions and banks. To offset asset base volatility, or in plain terms, to reduce impact of volatile exchange rates on assets and liabilities valuations.

And more households' behavioural 'antics': despite rapid rise in interest rates, demand for credit has sky-rocketed: http://www.interfax.ru/russia/413783 Households seem to be stocking up on short term credit while interest rates are still creeping up.

17/12/2014: Winners and Losers in Russian Crisis

My effort at explaining some of my thinking on Russian crisis in an interview with Expresso (in Portuguese and paywalled) here: http://expresso.sapo.pt/o-vencedor-da-crise-no-leste-europeu-e-a-china=f902733
and in English here: http://janelanaweb.com/trends/the-greatest-winner-of-the-2014-geopolitical-crisis-in-eastern-europe-has-been-china-constantin-gurdgiev/

17/12/2014: Russian Industrial Production & Investment

Russia's industrial output fell 0.4% in November after two months of relatively strong growth, expanding 2.9% and 2.8% in October and September. Core drivers were:

• Manufacturing sector contracted at 3% in November, having expanded 3.6% in October. The latest change, if confirmed over the next few months, might signal wearing off of the imports substitution effects from Russian counter-sanctions.
• Natural resources exploration sector expanded output by 2.5% in November
• Production of heat and electricity rose 7% in November
• Pipeline production grew by 30% in October, gas turbines manufacturing rose 91%. The $400 billion gas contract with China, signed in May was the reason, as Russia started construction of the 4,000 km Power of Siberia pipeline in September.

Note: November Manufacturing PMIs were up http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/1122014-russia-manufacturing-pmi.html signalling that things might improve in December data.

On a no-surprise side, fixed capital investment was down in the first nine months of 2014 and in Q3 2014 - declining by around 2% or well below expectations. SMEs investments declined, while investment by larger companies rose. Oil refining investments remain the largest contributor to manufacturing sector investments, per BOFIT. Food sector investments also were robust. Q3 also saw reversal of negative growth in total investments in machinery & equipment by large and medium-sized firms.

BOFIT: "Growth in investments of large firms reflects the government’s goal, reinforced at the start of this year, of getting large state-owned enterprises to increase investments
despite the hard times. The economy ministry indicated in November that investments of so-called natural monopolies, which represent some of the biggest state-owned enterprises, will grow even more notably next year."

Another handy chart via BOFIT:

17/12/2014: Some Ruble-Heavy Reading: Contagion, Reserves & Fundamentals

Some interesting set of articles on the topic I mentioned earlier on Irish radio and in the post here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/16122014-russian-inflation-hot-but.html  - the topic of contagion from the run on Russian ruble to the global economy:

• First off, the Guardian on the destabilising effects of playing brinksmanship with Russia (not to excuse the equally destabilising effects of Russia playing its own brinksmanship): http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/16/russia-economy-west-vladimir-putin?CMP=twt_gu
• Second, RT article on subject of spillovers: http://rt.com/op-edge/215031-russian-ruble-crisis-aftershocks/ Note: the article quotes myself on the topic
• Third, FT Alphaville piece - tongue-in-cheek - on Russian external liabilities http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2014/12/16/2074181/russian-foreign-liabilities-in-perspective/ Give that a thought - these are owed to someone in the West (mostly in Europe).
• Fourth, Bloomberg View piece on spillovers: http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-12-16/russias-problems-are-everyones-problems - not much in the way of factual, but on the money in general
• Fifth, a bit over-the-top, but important question of potential geopolitical response from Moscow here: http://www.businessinsider.com/what-will-happen-next-2014-12?IR=T
• Sixth, factual report on PIMCO effect from the Russian crisis: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-12-16/russia-crisis-hits-pimco-fund-wipes-out-options-as-ruble-sinks.html
• Seven (update): WSJ on Ruble spillover to European companies: http://www.wsj.com/articles/rubles-decline-deepens-concerns-for-european-companies-1418760793

As an aside to the menu of options available to Russian Government, here is one of a 'limited capital control': http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/12/how-putins-fealty-to-the-washington-consensus-made-his-currency-crisis-worse.html aka de-dollarisation of the retail deposits. Surely, that would just amplify pain for ordinary savers.

And another aside: in-depth analysis of the reserves position and demand for debt redemptions for Russia here: http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/12/oil-ruble-ideology.html. Key quote from the article:

"We notice that the strong depreciation of the Rouble corresponds to a peak in repayments, but that the situation will loosen up in early 2015. It is sure therefore that the exchange rate will reverse its tendency in the first semester of 2015. The question is, up to what point? If the Rouble stabilizes around 50 roubles for 1 USD, inflation will be strong next year and could reach 12%. If we witness a rise in oil prices and the Rouble stabilizes around 40-42 roubles for 1 USD, the inflation rate could amount to merely 10%. Still, this implies that the Central Bank of Russia keep an eye on such establishments which could be tempted to speculate on the exchange rate, dragging it farther down than it should normally be. Explicit threats were made by President Putin at the occasion of his declaration of general policies before the chambers of parliament on December 4th. However spectacular it has been, the depreciation of the Rouble by no means puts into question the financial stability of Russia. The trade balance remains in excess, with an amount outstanding of 10 billion dollars a month. This is largely sufficient to face up to coming payments. The budget is actually profiting from this depreciation, which should allow the government to spend a little bit more in 2015. Russia will therefore remain one of the least indebted countries in the world, which is not necessarily an advantage and goes to show that, provided it takes up debts internally, the country wields over a strong potential for investment and development."

Another update: a must-read from Bloomberg's @Bershidsky on why sanctions are at best secondary when it comes to the run on the Ruble:  http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-12-17/lift-sanctions-now-to-humiliate-putin

16/12/2014: Russian Inflation: Hot, but Hardly a Meltdown, yet...

While everyone is chasing tails of Ruble (or Rouble / Rubel / Roubel and any other toungue-twisting permutation), here is one fact on the Russian economy:

Russian 12-month inflation was running above 9% at the end of November. 

Sounds a lot. In fact, as I am typing this, one UK news report is referencing Russian inflation and telling us that if the UK were to experience such, there would have been panic. Right...

Truth is, Russia is accustomed to inflation at 7% - whether it is a positive marker or not, it is simply a fact - so 9% is a bit less of a drama than one might expect. However, end-November food price inflation is 12.6% y/y and non-food inflation is at 6%. The latter is benign, but likely to rise more. The former is a bit of concern, as Russian crops hit nearly historical records this year. Admittedly, it takes time for field-to-table route to be completed, but… According to the economy minister Alexei Ulyukayev, roughly 4% of the above inflation is down to Ruble depreciation (so expect more pressure here when December CPI is out), but 2.5% is down to imports bans under Russian counter-sanctions. Slightly confusing the message, Ulyukayev's deputy estimated that around 2.4% of full year inflation will come courtesy of Ruble devaluations (again, this will have to be revised up now). 

Expectations forward are not rosy. I expect inflation to hit 10% before year-end and roll over that number in Q1 2015. CBR, meanwhile, expects it to be close to, but below 10% mark in Q1 2015. Many analysts and the CBR expect inflation to moderate in Q2 2015. I doubt that. It will be sticky to the upside, likely North of 12%. 

And the crucial marker for the entire 2015 will be the 2015 crop, not estimates, but actual output, which - judging by cyclicality - is not going to be as good as this year's one.

Here's a neat chart plotting Russian CPI from 2005 on, courtesy of BOFIT. 

Source: BOFIT

Do tell me again that the current inflation rates are a 'meltdown'… though one still has to recognise they are a concern.

Meanwhile, last week revised economic forecasts by Russian Economy Ministry were factoring in USD80 bbl Ural's price of oil for 2015. Sounds outrageously high? Not really: Brent consensus forecast by IEA-polled economists produces the expectation slightly above that. With this price assumed, Russian economy is forecast to shrink by 0.8% in 2015. Again, you might think that the world is collapsing, if you are to read current headlines related to the run on the Ruble, but let me remind you that euro area economy shrunk by 1.08% in 2012-2013 and last time I checked, Frankfurt is still around.

Russia desperately needs some breathing space on the funding markets side. And it needs to stop capital flight. If it finds solutions to these twin problems, it can weather the storm.

Note: I was asked today on Irish radio to comment on the effects of the Russian crisis on Europe and Ireland. Here is a summary of my view:

Continued currency crisis in Russia presents risks to the European economy hard to estimate.

Russian imports of goods and services are likely to contract by between 12 and 15 percent in 2015, with much of this effect being driven by decline in capital goods and consumer goods imported traditionally from Europe. Second order effect is ongoing substitution of Russian imports away from Europe and in favour of Asia Pacific as a source of goods. This means that the impact on Russian demand for exports from Europe is likely to be even stronger.

In addition, financial exposures to Russia run high in Austria, Italy, France and the UK. While the European banks have strengthened of their balancesheets in recent months, another adverse shock to their assets base is not something they would like to contemplate. While it will not be a sector-defining event, continued deterioration in Russian assets valuations will not be helping.

The big unknown - Russian response to current pressures - is yet another risk factor no one in Europe needs. If Russia opts for capital controls and/or imposes a holiday on repayment of larger debt tranches coming due in H1 2015, European financial system will receive another shock as much of Russian banks and corporate funding was underwritten in Europe.

In simple economic terms, everyone around the world would benefit from Russia stepping off the financial precipice line as soon as possible.

16/12/2014: Next Stop... for Parabolic Ruble...

Ruble down below USD70 and EUR87.40, with 109.20 against Sterling. The CBR move last night (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/15122014-dont-blink-or-russian-data.html) is nothing more than a blip on the FX trading screen and a massive hit on the economy.

credit @TheStalwart

There is an emergency meeting scheduled by Medvedev and the next stop is either capital controls or EUR100 marker... or maybe both. The point is that no one is in control anymore, not because they are not trying, but because they are unable...so... smile, as you prepare to ride the RUB/USD chart...

16/12/2014: The Surreal Takes Hold of Kiev and Moscow...

While all of us are watching the Ruble crash, there is an ongoing collapse in Ukraine: http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/12/imf-world-bank-halt-lending-ukraine-franklin-templeton-4-billion-ukraine-bet-goes-bad.html.

I posted IMF 'note' on the emergency visit to Kiev last week http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/14122014-imf-emergency-mission-to-kiev.html which, in simple terms, amounted to nothing... as in nada... or no new lending.

And to note a simple fact: yesterday's Moscow dramas were nothing compared to Kiev dramas: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/15122014-russia-ukraine-cds-hitting.html and

Note: Russia's CDS rose, but didn't even make it into top under-performers group, while Ukraine did... and at an eye watering 77.36% probability of default (cumulative at 5 years). In other words, unless the IMF stamps out some USD15+ billion in new 'loans', Ukraine is done for.

The Russia/Ukrainian 'Arc':

It shows that Ukraine is getting worse faster than Russia is getting worse...

But back to Russia for now, as West's newest 'ally' East of Dniper is out of criticism or questioning... Ruble is tanking, still, as predicted in the first link above:

Credit to: @Schuldensuehner 

The reason is that when you have a 1am Governing Council meeting, you signal to the domestic economy that things are out of control (and they are), which prompts:

• Companies facing upcoming debt redemptions or holding Ruble deposits to run for FX cover and demand dollars or euros or pounds or Mongolian tugriks; and
• Households facing actual inflation (in PPP terms, not CPI) to run for FX deposits and demand same dollars or euros, less so unfashionable pounds and certainly not Mongolian tugriks...

The only way to stop this is... capital controls. All of which has little to do with the actual economy as a cause of the malaise, but all of which will cause actual economy to contract.

Oh, Happy Birthday, Wassily Kandinsky... your Composition VII aptly illustrates the whole mess:

15/12/2014: Don't Blink... or Russian Data Will Get You!

It seems you blink these days and Russian ruble slides: down 10%+ today alone against the USD and down massive 48.13% for the year so far:

Credit: @RobinWigg

Blink again: the Central Bank revises estimates for capital outflows: new estimates suggest Q4 outflows have accelerated again to the levels of Q1 2014, implying full year outflows of USD133.8 billion, basically on par with the disastrous 2008.

Credit: @Schuldensuehner 

You sneeze and... boom... new estimates for growth are coming out: down to -4.5% for 2015 or even 4.7% assuming oil prices staying at 'current' levels of USD60 per barrel (annual average).

Reach out for a cup of tea and as oil price plummets, so does the ruble. If we take RUB3500/barrel or RUB3720/ barrel estimates built into two revisions of the Budget, you have USD/RUB rate in 88-93 range.

Put kids to bed and 10.5% Central Bank rate goes up to 17% - on foot of an emergency: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-12-15/russia-increases-key-interest-rate-to-17-to-stem-ruble-decline.html

Take a smoke break and Russian CDS are busting past the 30% CPD ceiling: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/15122014-russia-ukraine-cds-hitting.html

Analysts' nightmare, comedians' rich picking. And comedians are out, in force, pretending to be analysts - the host of geopolitical journalists are now all spotting 'economic analysis' on their webpages. It is going to get worse - Politburo 'Hats Readers' are now coming out with economics and finance analysis, so expect a massive crash...

In truth, as noted earlier (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/11122014-central-bank-of-russia-good.html) 100bps hike in CBR rate earlier this month was useless. Useless across the board. Tonight's hike to 17% is clearly a serious push for an attempt to stabilise the ruble and stem the capital outflows. But it won't do the trick either. Much of outflows is driven by bond redemptions. So is much of the demand for dollars. And in this scenario, all the interest rates are going to achieve is collapse investment.

In brief, we are now headed into the inevitable:

• Step 1: capital controls with limited exemptions for individual sectors and firms; and
• Step 2: debt redemptions break for companies directly impacted by the sanctions.
• Step 3 (or maybe it will be step 1 or 2): revise growth estimates for 2015 to -7%, because there won't be any domestic investment at 17% rates and there won't be any foreign investment at 49% devaluation rate, and there will be no government investment at capital outflows into USD130 billion and bond redemptions mounting (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/11/24112014-external-debt-maturity-profile.html). There won't be much of consumption as RUB heads toward RUB/EUR100 marker and banks are not lending.

Speed up your blinking, folks, and buckle your seat belts.

15/12/2014: Russia & Ukraine CDS Hitting Major Highs

Both Russian and Ukrainian CDS are going hyperbolic:

15/12/2014: BlackRock Institute Survey: North America & Western Europe, December 2014

BlackRock Investment Institute released the latest Economic Cycle Survey results for North America and Western Europe:

"This month’s North America and Western Europe Economic Cycle Survey presented a positive outlook on global growth, with a net of 52% of 84 economists expecting the world economy will get stronger over the next year, compared to net 47% figure in last month’s report." Back in October, the proportion was 43% and in September it was 55%. The consensus of economists project mid-cycle expansion over the next 6 months for the global economy - same as in October and November.

"At the 12 month horizon, the positive theme continued with the consensus expecting all economies spanned by the survey to strengthen or stay the same except Finland, Sweden and Norway." Norway featured as an exception in October report and November. Back in October and November reports, expected deviation from stronger trend was also reported for Belgium.

"Eurozone is described to be in an expansionary phase of the cycle and expected to remain so over the next 2 quarters. Within the bloc, most respondents described Finland and Italy to be in a recessionary state, with the even split between contraction or recession for Greece, France and Portugal. Over the next 6 months, the consensus shifts toward expansion for both Finland and Italy." These results were broadly consistent with october and November reports.

"Over the Atlantic, the consensus view is firmly that North America as a whole is in mid-cycle expansion and is to remain so over the next 6 months." Again, this was in line with October and November reports.

 Note: Red dot denotes Austria, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Spain and Switzerland.

For comparative purpose: October survey mapping 6 months out:

Previous report was covered here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/10/6102014-blackrock-institute-survey-n.html

Note: these views reflect opinions of survey respondents, not that of the BlackRock Investment Institute. Also note: cover of countries is relatively uneven, with some countries being assessed by a relatively small number of experts.

15/12/2014: BlackRock Institute Survey: EMEA, December 2014

BlackRock Investment Institute released the latest Economic Cycle Survey results for EMEA:

"With caveat on the depth of country-level responses, which can differ widely, this month’s EMEA Economic Cycle Survey presented a mixed outlook for the region. The consensus of respondents describe Russia, Croatia and the Ukraine in a recessionary state, the outlook changes to expansion for Croatia over next two quarters." In previous survey, the same three countries were described as likely to remain recessionary.

"At the 12 month horizon, the consensus expecting all EMEA countries to strengthen or remain the same with the exception of Russia and the Ukraine. Globally, respondents remain positive on the global growth cycle with a net 58% of 43 respondents expecting a strengthening world economy over the next 12 months – an 28% increase from the net 30% figure last month. The consensus of economists project mid-cycle expansion over the next 6 months for the global economy."

Note: Red dot represents Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Romania, Israel, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia

Previous report was covered here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/10/23102014-blackrock-institute-survey.html

Note: these views reflect opinions of survey respondents, not that of the BlackRock Investment Institute. Also note: cover of countries is relatively uneven, with some countries being assessed by a relatively small number of experts.

15/12/2014: Ruble's Continued Woes

And Ruble starts the week on a downside trend...  Two charts via @Schuldensuehner

In USD terms at 58.77 and in EUR terms at 73.21.

Predictably, interest rate hikes of last week are not holding the line (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/11122014-central-bank-of-russia-good.html)

14/12/2014: IMF (Emergency) Mission to Kiev

Given economic / fiscal position of Ukraine (see http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/10122014-ukraine-greece-cds-flash-red.html) it is unsurprising that the IMF has dispatched a 'rapid response' team out to Kiev. Here's the IMF official statement on the visit:

Not to over-interpret the above, it suggests that the IMF is considering seriously further 'assistance' to Ukraine and that such a commitment will be based not so much on the progress of structural reforms to-date, but on the progress of the promises of reforms in the future.

Of course, it is hard to imagine Ukrainian authorities unrolling any big and binding reforms in the current climate and given short span of life of the new Rada to-date, so don't take the above comment as sarcasm - Ukraine needs assistance now and the promise of reforms is real, in my opinion. The only problem is that any assistance via IMF will be short-term (3 years or so) and will be in the form of debt, while what Ukraine really needs is longer-term funding and in a form of a Marshall Plan (even if in debt form, at least on terms of near-zero cost of funding and flexible maturity). Sadly, such preferential funding is unlikely to come...

14/12/2014: Irish Building & Construction Q3 2014: Another Quarter of Unconvincing Recovery

Indices for activity (volume and value) in Building & Construction sector in Ireland were published this week covering Q3 2014. Here are the details:

Across all Building & Construction sector:

• Value index for all Building & Construction sector rose to 108.6 in Q3 2014 - the highest reading since Q4 2009 and the second reading over 100.0 since Q4 2010. Year-on-year, index is up solid 11.38%, slightly slower than Q2 rise of 11.55%. The index, however, is still 70.88% below the peak.
• Excluding Civil Engineering, Building & Construction activity rose in value 103.4 in Q3 2014, he highest reading since Q4 2013 and up 9.77% y/y. This is the slowest rise in the index in 6 quarters. In Q2 2014, index rose 11.82% and in Q1 it was up 14.91%.
• In volume terms, all Building & Construction activity index reached 108.1 in Q3 2014, up 9.97% y/y, slightly below 10.37% growth in Q2 2014. Volume of activity in the sector is still 72.40% below the pre-crisis peak.
• Again, taking out Civil Engineering, the activity in the sector is growing at a slower pace in volume terms - up 8.43% y/y in Q3 2014 and down 80.03% on peak.

Chart to illustrate:

In basic terms, overall activity in the broad sector is running along a nearly flat trendline with some signs of very fragile recovery. And that is off the levels so abysmally low that one would require sustained 20%+ growth rates to achieve any meaningful gains.

Underlying the above trends, we have at least some life showing in the Residential Building segment. In Q3 2014, Residential Building activity index posted a 21.13% y/y rise in terms of value, reversing two consecutive quarters of decline. Still, value of activity in this sub-sector remains 90.5% lower than at the pre-crisis peak. In volume terms, the index rose 19.55% and is down 91% on pre-crisis peak. 

Two chart below show just how pathetic the recovery has been to-date in Residential Building & Construction sub-sector.

In summary, there is barely any life in the Building & Construction sector activity - measured against both volume and value of activity - across all sub-sectors, save Civil Engineering, where the falloff has been relatively shallower (down 26% on peak in Q3 2014 in terms of value and 28.5% in terms of volume). And, of course, the data is again contrary to the booming Construction Sector PMIs. What a surprise!

Interestingly, in non-Residential Building sector, activity is growing at the rates of just 2.33% y/y in terms of volume and 3.75% y/y in terms of value - despite the numerous 'good news' claims from Nama and the commercial real estate sector and despite the allegedly 'low' vacancy rates and rising rent rolls.

13/12/2014: CESIfo on Minimum Wage Effects in Germany

An interesting research note from Germany's CESIfo institute on the effects of minimum wage law change. The note, titled "Minimum Wage: German Firms Plan Price Increases, Staff Cuts and Reductions in Working Hours" is available (in German) here:
http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/ifosd_2014_23_5.pdf

Basically, on January 1, 2015 Germany will implement a Federal minimum wage of EUR8.50/hour (see background here: http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28140594).

CESIfo undertook a survey of employers' expectations as to hiring and labour utilisation / demand changes expected following its introduction. The key point to note is that these are expectations reported by surveyed businesses, not the actual responses.

Per CESIfo German companies that will be affected by the minimum wage as of 1 January 2015 are planning to

• Increase their prices (26 percent)
• Reduce bonuses (23 percent), 
• Reduce payrolls (22 percent), 
• Reduce working hours (18 percent), and 
• Scale back investment activity (16 percent). 

Furthermore, "most companies are planning to implement a combination of these measures, and only 43 percent of the firms affected plan not to react at all… eastern German companies will be far more deeply affected than their western German counterparts by a ratio of 43 percent to 24 percent."

By sector, the impact is distributed as follows:

• "Service providers, and especially those in the catering and hotel industry, mainly intend to respond by increasing prices (31 percent)."
• "In retailing, responses to the minimum wage were primarily cited as staff cuts (29 percent) and shorter working hours (33 percent)."
• "In manufacturing, staff cuts (26 percent) ranked just above reductions in bonuses (23 percent) and raising prices (23 percent)."

So may be we'll see an uptick in German inflation in early 2015... to the delight of the ECB and the detriment of all of us reliant on its low interest rates... But it will be inflation of a different nature...

12/12/2014: Ruble's Euro Pain

A quick footnote to the yesterday's post on Central Bank of Russia move. RUB/EUR is also in pain territory just as RUB/USD:

Charts courtes of @Schuldensuehner 

12/12/2014: That Invisible Irish 'Trickle Down' Recovery: Consumers' View

In recent posts (see all five of them linked here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/12122014-qna-q3-2014-irish-external.html) I covered in detail the latest official stats on Irish economic recovery/growth. The picture these figures present is of basically static domestic economy, with questionable quality 'exports-led recovery'.

So what's can one add to the above? Ah, just a couple of recent surveys.

Remember, the political meme is that the recovery is charging ahead and is trickling down to ordinary families and into the real economy. Which, naturally, suggests that households should be feeling better. If not fully 'great', at the very least better… So do they?

We can look at consumer confidence indicators from the ESRI to check. Alas, these are bearing negative relation with actual domestic demand. Still, on a shorter note, core retail sales have been rising recently - in volume - and a starting to show some life in value. Chart below illustrates just how weak the 'real recovery' has been despite the sentiment - as measured by ESRI - has been allegedly at all time highs:

But there are other surveys to look at.

Based on Amarach data: in April 2014, 41% of Irish people thought Ireland is a great place to live in. By November 2014 this rose to 56%.But less than half of us felt that there are
opportunities in Ireland for those who are prepared to seek them out (49% in November, still, a rise on 42% in April 2014). So the 'recovery' is not exactly the one where opportunities for betterment are being presented, even if we control for effort.

Good news is - people are getting more optimistic: in November, 56% of surveyed felt that better times lie ahead for the Irish economy, up on 48% in April. Hopium is a powerful drug, especially when dispensed in massive doses of Government-paid-for PR via all channels of traditional media. Allegedly, quality of life in Ireland is ranked as being high by a rising proportion of people too: from 48% in April to 56% in November, although we have no idea what this means, really, this should translate into a feel-good factor of sorts. Right? Well, let's give it a pause and think - the above are all issues relating to 'us' as a collective. Let's see what surveys said about personal.

View: "I feel angrier about austerity now than I have ever felt before." If things are so good at collective levels, surely they should good at personal level too? In November 2014, 49% of surveyed agreed with the above statement and only 16% disagreed. Wow! All the recovery and the goodies from the Budget 2015 and those feeling angrier with the state of our policies is outstripping those who do not by more than 3:1.

Confirming the above, 59% of Irish people felt that economic pressures are making them  depressed. Only 24% disagreed. 39% of Irish people felt that the economy (not the economists) is having a negative impact on their personal health. 29% disagreed. When asked of they feel being successful/very successful in managing their finances, 56% of us agreed back in September 2013, 50% agreed in April 2014 survey and 50% in November 2014 survey. So things are not getting better in terms of our perceived financial health over time. They are getting worse.

Do the people plan to 'vote' with their money for the recovery? Don't hold your breath, folks. Only 16% of us said they will loosen the purse strings a bit next year. 49% said they won't.

Here are some numbers on how we feel about the state of our financial affairs, not as a nation or as Troika

Well, the last line in the table above is telling.

But may be the above data is suspect? Well, why not check with the 'Optimists par excellence' from the ranks of Big 4 'consultancies'? Let's take a look at Deloitte. Surely they can see the optimism around?

Check out their H2 2014 Consumer Review. Here are the snapshots:

We feel, predominantly, no better about all major points of economic well-being today:

And we want to save more, spend less and borrow less:

So where's that 'trickle down' optimism contagion from all the feel-good policies the Government allegedly lavishing upon us all? Spot one beyond those jobs-for-life-and-pensions-for-free walls of the Government 'think tanks', if you can…