30/4/17: Did Russia Really Cut 2017 Defense Budget by a Quarter?

Headline figures from the Federal Treasury of the Russian Federation show a budgetary cut to the country defense spending of a whooping 25.5% y/y for 2017: from RUB3.8 trillion (USD65.4
billion) to RUB2.8 trillion.

However, the headline figure of 25.5% is misleading, because it is based on a fiscal defense allocation in 2016 that includes the federal funding for defense industry debt reductions.

Let me explain.

Russian defense budget (excluding debt payments) in 2016 was RUB3.07 trillion. Debt payments added ca RUB700-800 billion to that amount. Which means that 2017 defense allocation represents a decline of just 7% on 2016 actual defense spending figure, slightly deeper cut, but still in line with previously budgeted 6% reduction. In other words, relative to October 2016 projections for 2017, latest budgetary proposal is to reduce defense spending by an additional RUB230-240 billion, not by RUB1.06 trillion associated with 25.5% cut figure.

Since the start of 2014 economic crisis, and the associated funding crisis (relating to sanctions against a range of Russian lenders and corporates), Russian defense sector has suffered from sustained debt pressures. In December last year, the Ministry of Finance, made a one-time payment to defense contractors to reduce their commercial debt levels, amounting to between RUB700 and RUB800 billion. The range of numbers that reflects timing of payments and exchange rates used, plus rounding differences.

Multi-annual budgetary framework implies that on top of 7% cut in 2017, defense budget will also face reductions of 3.8% in 2018 and 4.8% in 2019. On top of this, the reductions in 2017-2019, even if implemented (a big if) come on foot of Russian defense spending expansion in 2011-2014 that saw nominal defense spending rising at almost 20% per annum. Even with a 7% cut, 2017 defense spending will still be some 14.4% above 2014 levels (in nominal terms).

Based on the ludicrous mistake of including one-off debt repayment into defense budget figures, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) - a defense spending watchdog - reported that "Russia increased its spending by 5.9 per cent in 2016 to $69.2 billion, making it the third largest spender. Saudi Arabia was the third largest spender in 2015 but dropped to fourth position in 2016. Spending by Saudi Arabia fell by 30 per cent in 2016 to $63.7 billion, despite its continued involvement in regional wars." Even though the same report admits that "late in 2016 actual spending was pushed substantially higher by a decision to make a one-off payment of roughly $11.8 billion in government debt to Russian arms producers. Without this debt repayment, Russia’s military spending would have decreased by 12%".

This, in the nutshell, is the circus that is 'analysis' of Russian data: with actual spending down, and amounting to ca USD57.4 billion, Russia is still behind Saudi Arabia in terms of military expenditures. The one-off payment of debt in the State Owned semi-commercial military suppliers, hardly represents an expenditure that materially increased Russian army, navy of its airforce, in as much as, say Greek debt restructuring did not materially increase country investment or output. But, the narrative of 'Bad Kremlin is beefing up its military to start WW3' is simply too delightful to pass.

Thing is, personally, I am not a fan of either increasing spending on the military (for any country, including Russia) or subsidising debt loads of State (or private) enterprises. However, if we are to bother reporting fiscal spending across specific programmes, debt relief is not equivalent to increased spending on core programmes relating to defense. It's a waste of taxpayers' resources. But it is not a waste that has gone into funding new bombs or howitzers.

10/4/16: Russian Bonds Issuance: Some Recent Points of Pressure

Catching up with some data from past few weeks over a number of post and starting with some Russian data.

First, March issue of Russian bonds. The interesting bit relating RUB22.8 billion issuance was less the numbers, but the trend on issuance and issuance underwriting.

First, bid cover was more than four times the amount of August 2021 bonds on offer, raising RUB22.8 billion ($337 million) across

• fixed-rate notes (bids amounted to RUB47 billion on RUB11.5 billion of August 2021 bonds on offer)
• floating-rate notes (bids amounted to RUB25 billion on issuance of RUB9.33 billion of December 2017 floating coupon paper) and 
• inflation-linked securities (amounting to RUB2.01 billion)

This meant that Russia covered in one go 90 percent of its planned issuance for 1Q 2016, as noted by Bloomberg at the time - the highest coverage since 2011. With this, the Finance Ministry will aim to sell RUB270 billion in the 2Q 2016.

Bloomberg provided a handy chart showing as much:

Now, in 2011, Russian economy was still at the very beginning of a structural slowdown period and well ahead of any visibility of sanctions.

Sanctions are not directly impacting sales of Russian Government bonds, but the U.S. has consistently applied pressure on American and European banks attempting to prevent them from underwriting Moscow's Government issues (http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-warns-banks-off-russian-bonds-1456362124). Prior to the auction, Moscow invited 25 Western banks and 3 domestic banks to bid for USD3 billion worth of Eurobonds (the first issuance of Eurobonds by Russia since 2013). Despite the EU official statement that current sanctions regime does not prohibit purchases or sales of Government bonds, Western banks took to the hills (at least officially).

The point of the U.S. pressure on the European banks is a simple threat: in recent years, the U.S. regulators have aggressively pursued European banks for infringements on sanctions against Iran and other activities. In effect, U.S. regulatory enforcement has been used to establish Washington's power point over European banking institutions. And the end game was that, despite being legal, sale of Eurobonds was off limits for BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, and UBS, not to mention U.S.-based Bank of America, Citi, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley and Wells Fargo.

Another dimension of pressure is the denomination of the Eurobond. Moscow wanted Eurobond issued in dollars. However, dollar-issuance requires settlement via the U.S., enhancing U.S. authorities power to exercise arbitrary restriction on a deal that is legal under the U.S. laws (as not being officially covered by sanctions).

Beyond underwriters, even buy-side for Russian Government bonds is being pressured, primarily by the U.S., with a range of European and American investment funds getting hammered: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-24/russia-loses-buyside-support-for-eurobond-after-banks-balk.

Russian Government bonds (10 year benchmark) are trading at around 9.26-9.3 percent yield range, well down on December 2014 peak of over 14.09 percent, but still massively above bonds for countries with comparable macroeconomic performance statistics.

Interestingly, there is a huge demand in the market for Russian Eurobonds, as witnessed by mid-March issuance by Gazprom of bonds denominated in CHF (see: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-16/gazprom-taps-switzerland-with-russia-s-first-eurobond-this-year).

It is worth noting again that Russian Government bonds are not covered by any sanctions and are completely legal to underwrite and transact in.

Beyond this, the Western sanctions were explicitly designed to avoid placing financial pressures on ordinary Russians. Government bonds are used to fund general Government deficits arising from all lines of Government expenditure, including healthcare, social welfare, education etc, but also including military spending, while excluding supports for sanctioned enterprises and banks (the latter line of expenditure is linked to funds being sourced from the SWF reserves). Given this, the U.S. position on bonds issuance represents a potential departure from the U.S.-stated objective of sanctions and can be interpreted as an attempt to directly induce pain on ordinary Russians (the more vulnerable segments of the population, such as the elderly, children and those in need of healthcare, or as they are termed in Russian - budgetniki - those whose incomes depend on the Budgetary allocations).

This is a sad turn of events from markets and U.S. policy perspectives - placing arbitrary and extra-legal restrictions on transactions that are perfectly legal is not a good policy basis, unless the U.S. objective is to fully politicise financial markets in general. Neither is the U.S. position consistent with the ethical stance de jure adopted under the sanctions regime.

5/5/15: Good Bonds, Bad Rules & Russian Deficits

Neat chart via @sobberLook showing Russian 2-year bonds yields out through today:

The blowout is over, but at 10.9% still ahead of anything 'normal' and remains pressured. To me, real test will be around 9.7% levels and then again around 9%.

Meanwhile, on a supportive side of things, Russia is about to decouple its budgetary balance estimates from the 3-year (back) average oil price rule, by switching to RUB denominated oil price benchmark. Which will improve the deficit calculations by bringing some reality to assumptions underlying the budget.

As the result of the switch, Budget for 2015 will see a correction in built-in oil price of RUB2,915, Budget 2106 - of RUB1,938 and Budget 2017 of RUB 760. Thereafter, the effect should be weaker, with Budget 2018 estimated impact is for price decline of RUB60. Current rule implies that Budget 2016 was to be estimated using oil price of USD89 per barrel, against the Economy Ministry forecast of USD60.  In 2015, Budget is computed using base line price of USD94 against the economic forecast (for the Budget) of USD55. Higher budgeted oil price implies higher spending, while revising the benchmark price down as per new proposed rule implies lower spending and, thus, lower deficits. So, in return, budget cuts and balancing of the budget, will be spread over longer horizon and will allow to more conservatively use Russian foreign exchange reserves.

More on this here: http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/articles/2015/05/05/minfin-pridumal-kak-viiti-iz-lovushki-byudzhetnogo-pravila.

20/12/2014: Russian Crisis: Longer-Term Issues and Short-Term Risks

Earlier this week I was asked by Portuguese Expresso (http://expresso.sapo.pt/rublo-valoriza-12-e-bolsa-de-moscovo-ganha-14=f903111) to comment on Russian crisis developments. Here is the full transcript of my comments in English:


1) Why this recent crisis in the FX market? What are the main drivers?

The main drivers of the Russian Ruble crisis are, in order of declining importance:

1) Rapid decline in oil prices since August 2014,
2) Accelerating capital outflows in Q4 2014, relative to Q2 and Q3,
3) Sanctions restricting Russian banks and companies access to the international funding markets, thus precipitating a significant rise in demand for foreign currency needed to repay hard currency debt maturing in Q4 2014 and Q1 2015, and
4) The effect of Ruble switching from a tightly managed rate to free float, triggering both speculative and algorithmic trading re-adjustments.

2) Which of the drivers of the crisis is more important: sanctions or oil?

With oil prices above USD90 per barrel, Russian companies and banks would have little difficulty funding debt redemptions coming due in Q4 and Q1 2015. However, at oil prices around USD60 per barrel, foreign exchange inflows are severely constrained, triggering a spike in demand for dollars due to restricted cash flows. This demand had to be funded by borrowing rubbles and converting these into dollars, which, in effect represents a double squeeze on the Ruble: not only demand for Rubles falls relative to Dollars, but simultaneously the supply of Rubles rises due to borrowing.

Sanctions play an important role only in so far as they underpin the demand for dollars required for redemption of maturing debt. In a sense, President Putin was correct in estimating the effect of sanctions amounting roughly to 25-30 percent of the overall crisis re-pricing of the Ruble.

3) Who are the losers and the winners of this recent crisis? Especially, in terms of the crisis impact on Russian people?

There are no winners in this crisis when it comes to either Russian citizens or the residents. Turkey and China, as well as a number of other countries, including Kazakhstan, Armenia, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and others are gaining through increased flows of trade and investment via-s-vis Russia. China is gaining geopolitically and economically.

In terms of losers, countries heavily reliant on remittances from the migrants residing in Russia, including some of the above mentioned CIS countries, plus Ukraine and Moldova, are feeling the pain from collapsed Ruble valuations. Ordinary people in Russia, especially those who tend to hold Ruble deposits (such as retirees), as well as people reliant on foreign (imported) medicines and those living below the poverty line, are seeing large-scale destruction of their purchasing power and savings. A small number of Russian residents have purchased homes in recent years using mortgages denominated in foreign currencies. While before the crisis these mortgages carried lower interest rates, since the devaluation, the real cost of servicing these loans rose. Many businesses lease commercial real estate based on rents expressed in foreign currency. They too will face steep increases in the cost of servicing their offices and stores. Roughly one half of Moscow's retail properties are leased using contracts in dollars.

One category of Russian population is unlikely to lose signifcantly as the result of devaluations - the super rich. While their income-generating assets are based in Russia, much of their wealth resides outside Ruble zone.

This explains why the vast majority of Russians see sanctions as a Western attack on their own well-being, rather than a pressure on oligarchs or the Government.

4) Can we talk of a syncronization between the ruble and the oil prices?  

There is a very strong correlation between Russian GDP (in levels, not growth terms) and oil prices, so it is natural to think of a strong positive correlation between Ruble and oil prices. This correlation has been reinforced by the crisis, as economic growth in Russia shows considerable structural slowdown, thus only increasing the economy's dependence on oil.
   
5) Does the Dutch Disease represent the main structural problem with the Russian economy?

Yes, Russian economy is a classic example of the Dutch Disease or the Curse of Oil, with major and structural over-emphasis on energy and extraction sectors as generators of exports and foreign exchange earnings. However, Russia still retains a large and relatively diversified domestic economy. In effect, imports substitution under the current sanctions and counter-sanctions regimes is driving this diversification up, while low oil prices are reducing the link between oil and economic activity in terms of investment and output.

6) What can we expect in 2015: stagflation or outright recession? 

My forecast is for a significant recession in 2015 for the Russian economy, in the region of -3 percent, with positive scenario implying a recession of roughly 1% and the downside scenario predicting a recession of ca 4.5 percent. This is based on the following considerations. Firstly, the core drivers of this week's run on the Ruble are still present and cannot be addressed in the short run. Secondly, structural slowdown in growth that started manifesting itself in 2012 and came into full view in 2013 is still present. Thirdly, absent robust recovery in Europe and facing a slowdown in growth in China, Russia is poorly positioned on the exporting side and investment side.

On inflationary side, I expect Russian CPI to run above 10 percent in Q1 2015, rising in Q2 2015 before moderating in the second half of the year. Much will depend on the quality of 2015 crop, as well as on geopolitical developments.

7) Is there a risk of a new 1998 triple crisis, coupling the FX, debt, internal default and banking?

From fundamentals point of view, there is no risk of the repeat of 1998. 1998 crisis was triggered by a combination of large debt overhang from the 1980s and 1990s, funded at ever-escalating borrowing rates, a wide fiscal and current account deficits running over a number of years, the economy undergoing huge disruptions relating to transition, and the political crisis within the ruling classes. None of the above conditions are present today. However, one cannot rule out the risk of default due to a set of reasons very distinct from the driers of the 1998 crisis. Chiefly, the risk of default arises today from the possibility of a repeated and more prolonged run on the Ruble. Added uncertainty comes courtesy of the oil prices, which are currently simply unpredictable in the medium term. If oil prices do average over 2015 around USD80/bbl as consensus forecasts in the markets suggest, then the risk of default becomes negligible for the sovereign and the majority of larger banks and companies.

8) More hikes of key interest rates ahead for the CBR? Or 'nuclear options', like capital controls, moratorium in the FX reserves outflows? Other measures from the CBR?

Over the last couple of days, Ruble enjoyed significant rebound, thus reducing the risk of Russian authorities deploying capital controls or other drastic policy measures.

However, if the crisis returns with the intensity of December 15-16th, capital controls in conjunction with a holiday on debt redemptions for sanctioned entities cannot be ruled out.

Over the medium term, the prospect of capital controls also depends on the rate of foreign exchange reserves depletions in supporting Ruble and the speed of capital outflows. In 2015, Russia is facing foreign currency debt redemptions of some USD101 billion. All but USD2 billion of this relate to banks and corporates. We need to see oil rising toward USD80 mark and Ruble stabilising at around USD50 mark for the risk of capital controls to recede significantly.

The above debt maturity is a serious challenge. If recessionary dynamics place a substantial cap on corporate revenues and banks balance sheets, we can see some isolated, but larger scale corporate defaults. Otherwise, some less significant localised defaults can take place, especially in the weaker, lower tier of Russian banks. The latter will be benign and the CBR can facilitate orderly sector restructuring.

9) With a break-even price of oil at an annual average USD107, as set in Budget 2015, is the Kremlin facing a risk of fiscal collapse?

Not in the short run.

Russian budget is expressed in Rubles-denominated price of oil. Hence, as long as Russian Ruble moves in line with the price of dollar, the budgetary pressures remain minor. For example, currently, Russian federal budget is in surplus despite the massive decline in Dollars-denominated revenues. And Russian Current Account is posting strong surpluses on foot of collapsed imports. However, over the longer term, Russian budgetary spending will have to rise to offset the effects of inflation and devaluation. When the pressure to do forces the Government to adopt some inflation-related adjustments in the budget, fiscal position will deteriorate. I do not expect this pressure to be insurmountable, however, over the next 12-24 months.

In addition, President Putin mandated the government to amend November Budget, cutting federal expenditures in real terms by 5% a year in 2015–2017. Three sectors are excluded from the cuts: defense, national security and social welfare. New targets will re-balance public sector wages from slight growth planned in previous Budget to a cut in real terms.

The longer-term issue is the ruble-oil price link up. As ruble devalues, short-term, federal budget remains balanced. But in the longer run, devaluation triggers inflationary pressures. So the challenge in the second half of 2015 will be balancing the books while inflation is expected to be running at above 10 percent mark. This is more critical than the shorter-term issues.

10) Do you expect Russia to push for an agreement on oil production cuts or a full “war” with OPEC?

OPEC is a non-homogeneous entity. Some members of OPEC are currently suffering similar fate to the Russian economy and some oil exporters outside the OPEC are feeling severe pressures as well.

It is clear that the immediate strategy for Saudi Arabia is to push for lower oil prices and higher output. This strategy is based on two considerations.

First, and foremost, Said Arabia is attempting to protect its market share in the face of the rising output of shale oil. Although shale is more expensive to extract, once production is put into place, there is significant margin that can be traded down in terms of oil prices before, over time, shale output declines. Saudi Arabia wants to weather this period and force, using lower prices, some shale production declines in the medium term.

The second, far less important consideration from the Saudi's persecutive is the effect of low oil prices on its key geopolitical challenger - Iran. The flash point here is Syria and Iran's (and Russian, to lesser extent) support for the regime there that is being opposed by the Saudis.

This leaves Russia in a weak position to bargain change vis-a-vis the OPEC. Instead of a 'war' with OPEC, Russia is adopting a response of shifting markets for its oil and gas East, toward Asia Pacific. This strategy is about the only one that is feasible in current circumstances and Russia has been pursuing it very pro-actively.

11) China is the “saviour” economy for Russia to avoid crisis?

As Russian exports and investment flows re-orient East, China is becoming a major trading and investment partner for Russia with huge play in Eastern and Southern Siberia. Geopolitically, closer links between Moscow and Beijing are of benefit to both sides, but economically, Russia is making a bet that growth slowdown in China will not reduce the space of the bilateral cooperation in trade and investment that has been developing between them.

This bet is, probably, short-term risky. China is going to run slower growth in years to come, and thus lower growth in demand for oil and gas. On the other hand, China will have to switch away from much less efficient coal in energy generation mix toward less polluting gas. The former is net negative for Russia, the latter is net positive.