14/9/16: Expresso on ECB forward policy options

My comment on ECB's recent decisions (pre-meeting) in Portugal's Expresso
http://expresso.sapo.pt/economia/2016-09-07-Com-os-governos-ausentes-BCE-empurrado-para-fazer-mais

30/5/16: ECB's TLTROs, via Expresso

Portugal's Expresso on ECB's TLTROs programme, with quotes from myself (amongst others):

28/2/16: Expresso on Paul Mason's Latest Book

Portugal's Expresso reviewing Paul Mason's ( @paulmasonnews ) recent book "Postcapitalism: A Guide to Our Future" here: http://expresso.sapo.pt/economia/2016-02-28-Vem-ai-o-pos-capitalismo, including a comment of mine.

In English, my full view:

In his latest book, Paul Mason tackles some key themes of the global economic development in the new millennium : themes of debt overhangs, technological disruptions and the shifting of political, social and economic systems toward more data-intensive, more open and democratic platforms. Noting the links between the fragility of the global financial system (the financialisation hypothesis), persistent macroeconomic imbalances (global current account imbalances and savings-investment mismatch),  and the severe levels of private and public indebtedness, he draws two key conclusions that are required to describe the current state of the world economy: the link between the no-longer sustainable model of economic growth based on leveraging, and the need to break the status quo of indebtedness in the real economy. For those of us, who have, over the years, persistently called for these changes to be enabled by fiscal and monetary policies, Mason's book is a welcome addition to the arsenal of intellectual arguments supporting real change in the ways we structure our macroeconomic policies. For those who, like majority of Europe's political elites, have sleepwalked through the ongoing financial, fiscal, monetary and economic crises, it is a necessary wake up call.

I covered the above themes throughout the blog and across a range of articles in the past, most recent being this example: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/02/17216-four-horsemen-of-economic.html.

25/12/15: Comment for Expresso on U.S. Fed hike

My comment for Portugal's Expresso (December 19) on U.S. Fed rate hike:

14/11/15: My Comment on Portuguese Political Crisis

Two comments from myself on the topic of Portugal's political crisis effect on country macroeconomic and fiscal positioning:
http://expresso.sapo.pt/economia/2015-11-12-Divida-espanhola-e-portuguesa-sob-pressao and http://expresso.sapo.pt/economia/2015-11-11-Juros-da-divida-portuguesa-descem.-Mas-preco-dos-cds-continua-a-aumentar.

Full comment in English:

Do you think the financial markets and the debt agencies will move its focus from Greece to Portugal now and later on for Spain near or after theDecember 20 elections?

The latest euro area ‘periphery’ political crisis - the collapse of the Centre-Right Government in Portugal - sets the stage for a potential replay of the logistics of the Greek crisis of Summer 2015 scenario.

Both the markets and European leadership are likely to present the crisis as an isolated event, linked to the lack of ‘programme ownership’ in Portugal and not indicative of the broader political and policy trends across the EU. In other words, all official players in the sovereign debt markets will attempt to paint Portuguese situation as a ‘one-off’ event with no risk of contagion to other member states. As a result, rating agencies’ downgrades can be expected only if the crisis persists or if the new Government includes the elements of what is perceived to be ‘extreme Left’. At the same time, the rhetoric surrounding political crisis will be shifted into the discussion of domestic failures and the allegedly destructive role of populist politics. The key to this approach is the clear desire by the European leaders to contain the spread of political opportunism and limit the extent to which democratic politics can transmit public anger and dissatisfaction with post-crisis recovery from one ‘peripheral’ state to another, namely from Portugal to Spain and Italy, as well as, potentially, to Ireland which is likely to face elections in the first quarter of 2016. There are strong incentives for European authorities to send a warning message to Spanish electorate and political elites before December 20th elections, albeit it is difficult to see how such a warning can be structured in the case of Portugal. In my view, we are likely to see renewed talks about Portugal’s compliance with fiscal harmonisation rules and, potentially, a warning concerning the risk of the country running excessive deficits in 2016-2017 on foot of political realignment.


How do you evaluate the present risk of Portugal regarding the debt sovereign market? Yields will go for new highs in 2015?

Currently, CDS markets are pricing in 15.5% chance of sovereign default (under ISDA2003 rules) for Portugal, up on 14.5% a week ago, compared to 3.5% for Ireland, down from 3.8% a week ago. The trend to-date suggests some increased pressure on sovereign risk position for Portugal that has been priced in since the appointment of the Centre-Right Government and this is consistent with a view that relatively sharp increases in government debt yields represent possible overshooting of risk valuations. Two critical aspects of the crisis in the context of debt sustainability view are: how long the new political impasse will last and what signals a new Cabinet will send after appointment. If the crisis continues over a relatively prolonged period of time (more than a week) and /or if the new Cabinet is slow in clearly defining its position vis-a-vis the European policy direction toward sustained fiscal and structural reforms, bond yields are likely to continue rising, putting pressure on Portugal’s access to new funding. Absent significant worsening of the political crisis, Portugal’s debt sustainability dynamics are likely to remain hostages to economic fundamentals: the rate and the nature of economic growth over 2015-2016, rather than to political risks.

Most likely, given the degrees of uncertainty relating to the political nature of the latest crisis, DBRS will take a ‘wait-and-see’ position, issuing negative watch warning on its ratings, but staying out of moving for an outright downgrade this time around. However, the risk of the downgrade remains significant and the impact of such a downgrade can also be material. Given that all major rating agencies have already downgraded Portugal Sovereign ratings, a DBRS downgrade will force the ECB to either halt purchases of Portuguese bonds in its QE programme or to issue a waver for eligibility criteria. In the former case, pressures on sovereign yields are likely to be severe making new issuance of debt much more costly proposition.


Note: DBRS did take a 'wait-and-see' position on Friday (see here)

28/10/15: O regresso do tigre celta

My article on Irish economic recovery for Portugal's Expresso (October 23, 2015, page 30):

16/615: Expresso on Ireland's Repayment of IMF Loans

My comment on Ireland's early repayment of IMF loans for Portugal's Expresso, 13/06/2015 ECONOMIA page 11

22/5/15: Expresso: E agora, Cameron?

Portuguese Expresso on UK elections impact on the economy, quoting myself on the subject:

Click on the image to enlarge

9/4/15: Expresso on IMF's WEO Update: Secular Stagnation is Here

Portugal's Expresso on IMF's 'secular stagnation' evidence via April 2015 WEO Update (Chapter 3): http://expresso.sapo.pt/a-receita-do-fmi-mais-infraestruturas-mais-inovacao-mais-produtividade=f918917. With my comments...

My view in full:

IMF findings on potential and long-term growth trends in the advanced economies published as a part of the April 2015 WEO update confirm what we have already known for some time: the ongoing economic growth slowdown is not only structural in natural, but is permanent, in economic terms.

More importantly, however, the IMF study shows that the structural slowdown in growth has started prior to the onset of the Global Financial Crisis and has been concentrated, in terms of drivers, in demographics of ageing, leading to decline in investment, and a fall off in the growth of the total factor productivity as advanced economies continued to exhaust growth along the technological frontier.

In simple terms, this confirms the thesis of the secular stagnation, especially as formulated by Robert J. Gordon (see http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2012/08/2882012-challenging-constant-growth.html).

From my point of view, the study documents one key trend: the trend of increasingly lower contribution of the human capital to growth over the period of 2001-2007 in the presence of slower, but still, relatively sustained growth contribution from employment.

This shows that during the pre-crisis boom, much of economic growth was derived not from intensive margin (technological progress and linking of technology to greater labour productivity) but from extensive margin (increased supply of physical capital and asset bubbles).

In the future, this imbalance in growth will require significant policy corrections in order to restore human capital growth to 2001-2003 levels. Absent these highly disruptive policy reforms (covering taxation systems, provision and distribution of key public services, restructuring of enterprise management systems etc), the world will find itself at the tail end of technological growth frontier, with low rates of return to technology and innovation and, as the result, permanently lower growth in the advanced economies.

27/2/15: Running out of cash: Greece heading into March

My comments to Portuguese Expresso on Greek agreement:

http://leitor.expresso.pt/#library/expressodiario/26-02-2015/caderno-1/temas-principais/divida-portuguesa-com-juros-em-minimos-mas-grecia-arrisca-se-a-entrar-em-incumprimento-em-marco

Unedited version here:

"Over the next four months, Greece is facing significant debt redemption pressures. In March, EUR5.83 billion of T-bills and IMF loans maturing and requiring a re-financing. Between now and the end of April, Greece will require to roll over EUR8.1 billion of T-bills and refinance EUR2 billion worth of IMF loans.

Currently, Greece has no money to cover its debt maturity redemptions in March and it is quite questionable if the country can find cash, outside the Programme extension facilities agreed last week but are yet to be ratified by the Eurogroup members and the Institutions, to do so in the markets. Currently Greek 10 year bonds are priced at 65.354, with a yield of 9.23% and rising. This suggests there is unlikely to be significant appetite in the markets to cover a substantial issue of new debt by Greece. At the same time, internal reserves available to the Government are virtually non-existent, especially given the rate of tax receipts deterioration in recent months. December 2014 tax revenues were 14 percent below target, January 2015 tax revenues fell 20% below target, implying a monthly shortfall close to EUR1 billion. In all likelihood, shortfall was at least as big in February as the new Government was tied up in negotiations with the Troika and deposits fled from the banks.

The key problem is that Greece has no option when it comes to delaying repayment of the above funds. IMF is the super-senior lender of last resort and T-bills markets are the bloodline for the Greek Government. Failing to redeem maturing T-bills will be a disaster for the country. In short, Syriza urgently needs to secure new funds to cover these redemptions."

21/1/2015: ECB QE: Risk-Sharing or Risk-Dumping?

My comment for Expresso (January 17, print edition page 12) on what to expect from ECB next.


Given the deflationary dynamics, including the 5y/5y swap at below 1.50 and the first negative reading since 2009, there is a strong pressure on ECB to act. Crucially, this pressure is directly link to the ECB mandate. Additional momentum pointing toward ECB adopting a much more pro-active stance this month comes from the euro area leading growth indicators. Ifo's Economic Climate for the Euro Area continued to deteriorate in the Q4 2014 and January Eurozone Economic Outlook points to effectively no improvement in growth prospects in Q1 2015 compared to Q4 2014. Eurocoin indicator showed similar dynamics for December 2014.

At this stage, even the ECB hawks are in agreement that some monetary easing action is required and most recent comments from the ECB Governing Council members strongly suggest that there is strong momentum toward adopting a sovereign bonds purchasing programme.

The question, therefore, has now shifted toward what form will such a programme take.

Indications are, the ECB will opt for a programme that will attempt to separate risk of default from market risks. Under such a programme, the risk of sovereign default will be vested with the National Central Bank (NCB) of the bonds-issuing country, while the ECB will carry the market pricing risks.

The problem is that such a programme will directly spread the risk of fragmentation from the private sector financial system to the Eurosystem as a whole. If the NCBs carry direct risks (in full or in part) relating to sovereign default, the entire Eurosystem will no longer act as a risk-sharing mechanism and will undermine the ECB position as a joint and several institution.

Another problem is that if risks are explicitly shared across the ECB and NCBs, the ECB will become a de facto preferred lender, with rights in excess of NCBs and, thus, above the markets participants. Any other arrangement will most likely constitute a fiscal financing and will violate the restrictions that prevent non-monetary financing.

These twin problems imply that, unless the ECB fully participates in risk sharing with the NCBs, the QE programme will risk inducing much greater risk of repricing in the 'peripheral' euro states and thus can lead to greater fragmentation in the markets.

12/1/2015: Euro area and Russian Economic Outlooks: 2015

My comments to the Portuguese Expresso, covering forecasts for 2015 for Russia and the Euro area:

- Russia

Despite the end-of-2014 abatement of the currency crisis, Russian economy will continue to face severe headwinds in 2015. The core drivers for the crisis of 2014 are still present and will be hard to address in the short term.

Geopolitical crisis relating to Eastern Ukraine is now much broader, encompassing the direct juxtaposition of the Russian strategy aimed at securing its regional power base and the Western, especially Nato, interest in the region. This juxtaposition means that risks arising from escalated tensions over the Baltic sea and Eastern and Central Europe are likely to remain in place over the first half of 2015 and will not begin to ease until H2 2015 in the earliest. With them, the prospect of tougher sanctions on Russian economy is unlikely to go away.

While capital outflows are likely to diminish in 2015, Russia is still at a risk of increased pressures on the Ruble due to continued debt redemptions calls on Russian companies and banks. In H1 2015, Russian companies and banks will be required to repay ca USD46 billion in maturing debt, with roughly three quarters of this due to direct and intermediated lenders not affiliated with the borrowers. These redemptions will constitute a direct cash call of around USD25 billion, allowing for some debt raising in dim sum markets and across other markets not impacted by the Western sanctions. USD36.3 billion of debt will mature in H2 2015, which implies a direct demand for some USD17-20 billion in cash on top of H1 demand. The peak of 2015 debt maturity will take place in Q1 2015, which represents another potential flash point for the Ruble, especially as the Ruble supports from sales of corporate foreign exchange holdings requested by the Government taper off around February.

Inflation is currently already running above 10 percent and this is likely to be the lower-end support line for 2015 annual rate forecast. Again, I expect spiking up in inflation in H1 2015, reaching 13-14 percent, with some stabilisation in H2 2015 at around 11 percent.

Economic growth is likely to fall off significantly compared to the already testing 2014.

Assuming oil prices average at around USD80 per barrel (an assumption consistent with December 2014 market consensus forecast), we can expect GDP to contract by around 2.2-2.5 percent in 2015, depending on inflation trends and capital outflows dynamics.

Lower oil prices will lead to lower growth, so at USD60 per barrel, my expectation is for the economy to shrink by roughly 4-5 percent in 2015. Crucially, decline in economic activity will be broadly based. I expect dramatic contraction in domestic demand, driven by twin collapse in consumer spending and private investment. In line with these forces, demand for imports will decline by around 15 percent in 2015, possibly as much as 20 percent, with most of this impact being felt by European exporters. Public investment will lag and fiscal tightening on expenditure side will mean added negative drag on growth.

About the only positive side of the Russian economy will be imports substitution in food and drink sectors, and a knock on effect from this on food processing, transportation and distribution sectors.

To the adverse side of the above forecasts, if interest rates remain at current levels, we can see a broad and significant weakening in the banks balance sheets and cash flows arising from growth in non-performing loans, and corporate and household defaults, as well as huge pressure on banks margins and operating profits. This can trigger a banking crisis, and will certainly cut deeper into corporate and household credit supply.

On the downside of my forecast, a combination of lower oil prices (average annual price at around USD50-60 per barrel) and monetary tightening, together with fiscal consolidation can result in economic can result in a recession of around 7 percent in 2015, with inflation running at around 13 percent over the full year 2015.

Even under the most benign assumptions, Russian economy is facing a very tough 2015. Crucially, from the socio-economic point of view, 2015 will see two adverse shocks to the system: the requirement to rebalance public spending on social benefits in order to compensate for inflation and Ruble devaluation pressures, and the rising demand on social services from rising unemployment. Volatility will be high through H1 2015, with crisis re-igniting from time to time, causing big calls on CBR to use forex reserves and prompting escalating rhetoric about political instability. We can also expect Government reshuffle and rising pressure on fiscal policy side. The risk of capital controls will remain in place, but. most likely, we will have to wait until after the end of Q1 2015 to see this threat re-surfacing.


- Eurozone

2014 was characterised by continued decoupling of the euro area from other advanced economies in terms of growth. Stagnation of the euro area economy, arising primarily from the legacy of the balances sheet crisis that started in 2007-2008 will remain the main feature of the regional economy in 2015. Despite numerous monetary policy innovations and the never-ending talk from the ECB, the European Commission and Council on the need for action, euro area's core problems remain unaddressed. These are: public and private debt overhangs, excessive levels of taxation suppressing innovation and entrepreneurship, a set of substantial demographic challenges and the lack of structural drivers for productivity growth.

My expectation is for the euro area economy to expand by around 0.8-1 percent in 2015 in real terms, with inflation staying at very low levels, running at an annual rate of around 0.6-0.7 percent. Inflation forecast is sensitive to energy prices and is less sensitive to monetary policy, but it is relatively clear that consumer demand is unlikely to rebound sufficiently enough to lift inflation off its current near-zero plateau. Corporate investment will also remain stagnant, with exception of potential acceleration in M&A activities in Europe, driven primarily by the build up in retained corporate earnings on the balance sheets of the North American and Asian companies.

Barring adverse shocks, growth will remain more robust in some of the hardest-hit 'peripheral' economies, namely Ireland, Spain and Portugal. This dynamic is warranted by the magnitude of the crisis that impacted these economies prior to 2013. Thus, the three 'peripherals' will likely out-perform core European states in terms of growth. Italy, however, will remain the key economic pressure point for the euro area, and Greece will remain volatile in political terms. Within core economies, recovery in Germany will be subdued, but sufficient enough to put pressure on ECB and the European Commission to withdraw support for more aggressive monetary and fiscal measures. France will see little rebound from current stagnation, but this rebound will be relatively weak and primarily technical in nature.

Crucially, the ECB will be able to meet its balance sheet expansion targets only partially in 2015. Frankfurt's asset base expansion is likely to be closer to EUR300-400 billion instead of EUR500 billion-plus expected by the policymakers. The reason for this will be lack of demand for new funding by the banks which are still facing pressures of deleveraging and will continue experiencing elevated levels of non-performing loans. In return, weaker than expected monetary expansion will mean a shift in policymakers rhetoric toward the thesis that fiscal policies will have to take up the slack in supporting growth. We can expect, therefore, lack of progress in terms of fiscal consolidations, especially in France and Italy, but also Spain. All three countries will likely fail to meet their fiscal targets for 2015-2016. Thus, across the euro area, government debt levels will not post significant improvement in 2015, carrying over the pain of public sector deleveraging into 2016.

As the result of fiscal consolidation slack, growth will be more reliant on public spending. While notionally this will support GDP expansion, on the ground there will be little real change - European economies are already saturated with public spending and any further expansion is unlikely to drive up real, ROI-positive, activity.

Overall, euro area will, despite all the policy measures being put forward, remain a major drag on global growth in 2015, with the regional economy further decoupling from the North American and Asia-Pacific regions. The core causes of European growth slump are not cyclical and cannot be addressed by continuing to prime the tax-and-spend pump of traditional European politics. Further problem to European growth revival thesis is presented by the political cycle. In the presence of rising force of marginal and extremist populism, traditional parties and incumbent Governments will be unable to deploy any serious reforms. Neither austerity-centric deleveraging approach currently adopted by Europe, nor growth-focused reforms of taxation and subsidies mechanisms will be feasible. Which simply means that status quo of weak growth and severe debt overhangs will remain in place.

The above outlook is based on a number of assumptions that are contestable. One key assumption is that of no disruption in the current sovereign bonds markets. If the pick up in the global economy is more robust, however, we can see the beginning of deflation in the Government bonds markets, leading to sharper rise in 'peripheral' and other European yields, higher call on funding costs and lower ability to issue new debt. In this case, all bets on fiscal policy supporting modest growth will be off and we will see even greater reliance in the euro area on ECB stance.

25/12/2014: Ruble Crisis: Stage 1 Capital Controls

In a recent post on Ruble Crisis (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/23122014-simple-math-russian-default-or.html), I have promised to post my comments that were forthcoming in Portuguese Express. Here they are, in English:

Q: Did Russian Government impose capital controls last week?

Yes. Both de facto and de jure, the new requirement on state-owned companies and a softer request for larger private companies to reduce their foreign exchange holdings constitute capital controls. However, the reduction is relatively benign and will not present a material risk to these companies' operations. 

The reason for this is that the benchmark holdings set at October 1, 2014 levels of reserves mean that the new restrictions cover primarily build up in foreign exchange reserves accumulated during the acceleration of the currency crisis. In a sense, these were precautionary accumulations of foreign exchange that have little to do with operational demands of the companies involved. A more material restriction could have been limiting reserves to a fixed proportion of revenues. In the 1998 crisis, Russian authorities forced exporters to convert all foreign exchange earnings in rubles. This time around, an intermediate measure, in severity ranking between the 1998 case and this week's announcement, would have been requiring exporter to convert, say 50 percent of their earnings into rubles. However, Moscow held back such a measure and opted for a weaker version, benchmarking reserves to October 1 positions. 

As is, the measure will likely increase supply of US dollars into the market by about USD50 billion - roughly the amount that has been accumulated in precautionary reserves. And this comes on foot of the new currency swap agreement with China that can inject up to USD24 billion into the markets.

The new restriction is voluntary in nature, in so far as companies can continue to accumulate reserves, but in reality, only those companies facing significant bond redemptions in 2015 will be allowed to do so. Barring the latter exemption, we would have seen moratorium on debt redemptions for larger Russian companies by mid-Q1 2015.

Overall, the new measure introduced by the Russian Government is, effectively, a bid to avoid introducing full scale capital controls and to enhance the Central Bank of Russia's firepower in the forex markets. This has already been reflected in the markets via a dramatic rebound in the Ruble valuations and an equally significant decline in the volumes of short ruble contracts which fell from this week's high of just under 70,000 to below 50,000.

Updated: here is the link to the article http://expresso.sapo.pt/rublo-valoriza-gracas-ao-controlo-suave-de-capitais=f903997

20/12/2014: Russian Crisis: Longer-Term Issues and Short-Term Risks

Earlier this week I was asked by Portuguese Expresso (http://expresso.sapo.pt/rublo-valoriza-12-e-bolsa-de-moscovo-ganha-14=f903111) to comment on Russian crisis developments. Here is the full transcript of my comments in English:


1) Why this recent crisis in the FX market? What are the main drivers?

The main drivers of the Russian Ruble crisis are, in order of declining importance:

1) Rapid decline in oil prices since August 2014,
2) Accelerating capital outflows in Q4 2014, relative to Q2 and Q3,
3) Sanctions restricting Russian banks and companies access to the international funding markets, thus precipitating a significant rise in demand for foreign currency needed to repay hard currency debt maturing in Q4 2014 and Q1 2015, and
4) The effect of Ruble switching from a tightly managed rate to free float, triggering both speculative and algorithmic trading re-adjustments.

2) Which of the drivers of the crisis is more important: sanctions or oil?

With oil prices above USD90 per barrel, Russian companies and banks would have little difficulty funding debt redemptions coming due in Q4 and Q1 2015. However, at oil prices around USD60 per barrel, foreign exchange inflows are severely constrained, triggering a spike in demand for dollars due to restricted cash flows. This demand had to be funded by borrowing rubbles and converting these into dollars, which, in effect represents a double squeeze on the Ruble: not only demand for Rubles falls relative to Dollars, but simultaneously the supply of Rubles rises due to borrowing.

Sanctions play an important role only in so far as they underpin the demand for dollars required for redemption of maturing debt. In a sense, President Putin was correct in estimating the effect of sanctions amounting roughly to 25-30 percent of the overall crisis re-pricing of the Ruble.

3) Who are the losers and the winners of this recent crisis? Especially, in terms of the crisis impact on Russian people?

There are no winners in this crisis when it comes to either Russian citizens or the residents. Turkey and China, as well as a number of other countries, including Kazakhstan, Armenia, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and others are gaining through increased flows of trade and investment via-s-vis Russia. China is gaining geopolitically and economically.

In terms of losers, countries heavily reliant on remittances from the migrants residing in Russia, including some of the above mentioned CIS countries, plus Ukraine and Moldova, are feeling the pain from collapsed Ruble valuations. Ordinary people in Russia, especially those who tend to hold Ruble deposits (such as retirees), as well as people reliant on foreign (imported) medicines and those living below the poverty line, are seeing large-scale destruction of their purchasing power and savings. A small number of Russian residents have purchased homes in recent years using mortgages denominated in foreign currencies. While before the crisis these mortgages carried lower interest rates, since the devaluation, the real cost of servicing these loans rose. Many businesses lease commercial real estate based on rents expressed in foreign currency. They too will face steep increases in the cost of servicing their offices and stores. Roughly one half of Moscow's retail properties are leased using contracts in dollars.

One category of Russian population is unlikely to lose signifcantly as the result of devaluations - the super rich. While their income-generating assets are based in Russia, much of their wealth resides outside Ruble zone.

This explains why the vast majority of Russians see sanctions as a Western attack on their own well-being, rather than a pressure on oligarchs or the Government.

4) Can we talk of a syncronization between the ruble and the oil prices?  

There is a very strong correlation between Russian GDP (in levels, not growth terms) and oil prices, so it is natural to think of a strong positive correlation between Ruble and oil prices. This correlation has been reinforced by the crisis, as economic growth in Russia shows considerable structural slowdown, thus only increasing the economy's dependence on oil.
   
5) Does the Dutch Disease represent the main structural problem with the Russian economy?

Yes, Russian economy is a classic example of the Dutch Disease or the Curse of Oil, with major and structural over-emphasis on energy and extraction sectors as generators of exports and foreign exchange earnings. However, Russia still retains a large and relatively diversified domestic economy. In effect, imports substitution under the current sanctions and counter-sanctions regimes is driving this diversification up, while low oil prices are reducing the link between oil and economic activity in terms of investment and output.

6) What can we expect in 2015: stagflation or outright recession? 

My forecast is for a significant recession in 2015 for the Russian economy, in the region of -3 percent, with positive scenario implying a recession of roughly 1% and the downside scenario predicting a recession of ca 4.5 percent. This is based on the following considerations. Firstly, the core drivers of this week's run on the Ruble are still present and cannot be addressed in the short run. Secondly, structural slowdown in growth that started manifesting itself in 2012 and came into full view in 2013 is still present. Thirdly, absent robust recovery in Europe and facing a slowdown in growth in China, Russia is poorly positioned on the exporting side and investment side.

On inflationary side, I expect Russian CPI to run above 10 percent in Q1 2015, rising in Q2 2015 before moderating in the second half of the year. Much will depend on the quality of 2015 crop, as well as on geopolitical developments.

7) Is there a risk of a new 1998 triple crisis, coupling the FX, debt, internal default and banking?

From fundamentals point of view, there is no risk of the repeat of 1998. 1998 crisis was triggered by a combination of large debt overhang from the 1980s and 1990s, funded at ever-escalating borrowing rates, a wide fiscal and current account deficits running over a number of years, the economy undergoing huge disruptions relating to transition, and the political crisis within the ruling classes. None of the above conditions are present today. However, one cannot rule out the risk of default due to a set of reasons very distinct from the driers of the 1998 crisis. Chiefly, the risk of default arises today from the possibility of a repeated and more prolonged run on the Ruble. Added uncertainty comes courtesy of the oil prices, which are currently simply unpredictable in the medium term. If oil prices do average over 2015 around USD80/bbl as consensus forecasts in the markets suggest, then the risk of default becomes negligible for the sovereign and the majority of larger banks and companies.

8) More hikes of key interest rates ahead for the CBR? Or 'nuclear options', like capital controls, moratorium in the FX reserves outflows? Other measures from the CBR?

Over the last couple of days, Ruble enjoyed significant rebound, thus reducing the risk of Russian authorities deploying capital controls or other drastic policy measures.

However, if the crisis returns with the intensity of December 15-16th, capital controls in conjunction with a holiday on debt redemptions for sanctioned entities cannot be ruled out.

Over the medium term, the prospect of capital controls also depends on the rate of foreign exchange reserves depletions in supporting Ruble and the speed of capital outflows. In 2015, Russia is facing foreign currency debt redemptions of some USD101 billion. All but USD2 billion of this relate to banks and corporates. We need to see oil rising toward USD80 mark and Ruble stabilising at around USD50 mark for the risk of capital controls to recede significantly.

The above debt maturity is a serious challenge. If recessionary dynamics place a substantial cap on corporate revenues and banks balance sheets, we can see some isolated, but larger scale corporate defaults. Otherwise, some less significant localised defaults can take place, especially in the weaker, lower tier of Russian banks. The latter will be benign and the CBR can facilitate orderly sector restructuring.

9) With a break-even price of oil at an annual average USD107, as set in Budget 2015, is the Kremlin facing a risk of fiscal collapse?

Not in the short run.

Russian budget is expressed in Rubles-denominated price of oil. Hence, as long as Russian Ruble moves in line with the price of dollar, the budgetary pressures remain minor. For example, currently, Russian federal budget is in surplus despite the massive decline in Dollars-denominated revenues. And Russian Current Account is posting strong surpluses on foot of collapsed imports. However, over the longer term, Russian budgetary spending will have to rise to offset the effects of inflation and devaluation. When the pressure to do forces the Government to adopt some inflation-related adjustments in the budget, fiscal position will deteriorate. I do not expect this pressure to be insurmountable, however, over the next 12-24 months.

In addition, President Putin mandated the government to amend November Budget, cutting federal expenditures in real terms by 5% a year in 2015–2017. Three sectors are excluded from the cuts: defense, national security and social welfare. New targets will re-balance public sector wages from slight growth planned in previous Budget to a cut in real terms.

The longer-term issue is the ruble-oil price link up. As ruble devalues, short-term, federal budget remains balanced. But in the longer run, devaluation triggers inflationary pressures. So the challenge in the second half of 2015 will be balancing the books while inflation is expected to be running at above 10 percent mark. This is more critical than the shorter-term issues.

10) Do you expect Russia to push for an agreement on oil production cuts or a full “war” with OPEC?

OPEC is a non-homogeneous entity. Some members of OPEC are currently suffering similar fate to the Russian economy and some oil exporters outside the OPEC are feeling severe pressures as well.

It is clear that the immediate strategy for Saudi Arabia is to push for lower oil prices and higher output. This strategy is based on two considerations.

First, and foremost, Said Arabia is attempting to protect its market share in the face of the rising output of shale oil. Although shale is more expensive to extract, once production is put into place, there is significant margin that can be traded down in terms of oil prices before, over time, shale output declines. Saudi Arabia wants to weather this period and force, using lower prices, some shale production declines in the medium term.

The second, far less important consideration from the Saudi's persecutive is the effect of low oil prices on its key geopolitical challenger - Iran. The flash point here is Syria and Iran's (and Russian, to lesser extent) support for the regime there that is being opposed by the Saudis.

This leaves Russia in a weak position to bargain change vis-a-vis the OPEC. Instead of a 'war' with OPEC, Russia is adopting a response of shifting markets for its oil and gas East, toward Asia Pacific. This strategy is about the only one that is feasible in current circumstances and Russia has been pursuing it very pro-actively.

11) China is the “saviour” economy for Russia to avoid crisis?

As Russian exports and investment flows re-orient East, China is becoming a major trading and investment partner for Russia with huge play in Eastern and Southern Siberia. Geopolitically, closer links between Moscow and Beijing are of benefit to both sides, but economically, Russia is making a bet that growth slowdown in China will not reduce the space of the bilateral cooperation in trade and investment that has been developing between them.

This bet is, probably, short-term risky. China is going to run slower growth in years to come, and thus lower growth in demand for oil and gas. On the other hand, China will have to switch away from much less efficient coal in energy generation mix toward less polluting gas. The former is net negative for Russia, the latter is net positive.

17/12/2014: Winners and Losers in Russian Crisis

My effort at explaining some of my thinking on Russian crisis in an interview with Expresso (in Portuguese and paywalled) here: http://expresso.sapo.pt/o-vencedor-da-crise-no-leste-europeu-e-a-china=f902733
and in English here: http://janelanaweb.com/trends/the-greatest-winner-of-the-2014-geopolitical-crisis-in-eastern-europe-has-been-china-constantin-gurdgiev/

1/11/2014: Expresso on Russian Ruble

My comment from earlier this week on Russian Ruble fate for Portugal's Expresso:
http://expresso.sapo.pt/rublo-afunda-se-face-ao-euro=f895605

In basic terms - there is too much ignoring of the underlying structural weaknesses in the Russian economy (in my view accounting for roughly 1/2 of Ruble devaluation) and too much focus on the shorter-term effects of the geopolitical crisis in Ukraine.

4/9/2014: Repaying Ahead of Schedule: Ireland & IMF Loans

Last week Portugal's Expresso published a big article on Irish plans to repay earlier the IMF loans. The link is here: http://fesete.pt/portal/docs/pdf/Revista_Imprensa_30_e_31_Agosto_2014.pdf (pages 37-38)

My view on the subject in full:

1-      The Irish hurry is politically engineered or they understand that the present low sovereign bond yields mood can be a short-term window of opportunity in the Euro area?

In my view, Irish Government interest in refinancing IMF loan is driven by both political and economic considerations. On political front, following heavy defeats in the European and Local elections, the ruling coalition needs to deliver new savings in Exchequer spending to allow for a reduction in austerity pressures in Budget 2015 and more crucially support increased giveaways in the Budgets in 2016 and 2017. Savings of few hundred millions of euros will help. And an ability to claim that the IMF loans have been repaid, even if only by borrowing elsewhere to fund these repayments can go well with the media and the voters tired of the Troika. On economic incentives side, the Government clearly is forwarding borrowing and re-profiling its bonds/debt maturity timings to minimise short-term pain of forthcoming repayments and to safeguard against the potential future increases in the rates and yields. In addition, there is a very apparent need to refinance the IMF loans as the interest charges on these is out of line with the current funding costs for the Government. It is worth noting here that the Irish Government is far from being homogeneous on the incentives side. For example, from Minister for Finance, Michael Noonan's statements, it is pretty clear that the incentives to refinance the IMF loans are predominantly economic and financial. On the other hand, for majority of the Labour Party ministers and a small number of the Fine Gael Cabinet Ministers, the incentives are more political.


2-      The move is also a way of reducing the “official sector” debt in the overall sovereign debt composition (higher than 50 per cent)?

The issue of the 'official sector' debt as opposed to the total public debt is less pressing for the Irish state. Larger share of the official sector debt in total debt composition provides short-term support for bonds prices, as higher official sector debt holdings imply lower private sector debt holdings in the present. However, in the future, the expectation in the markets is that the official sector debt will be refinanced via private markets, thus higher share of official sector debt today is a net negative for the future debt exposures. The result is that higher official share of debt is supporting lower current yields, but rises future yields, making the maturity curve steeper, ceteris paribus. In the current environment, Irish government is not significantly exposed to shorter-term debt markets, but it is exposed to longer termed debt roll-over demands that are consistent with political cycle. Reducing official exposures, therefore, can be supportive of the longer-term view of the debt issuance by the state. However, the issue is marginal to Irish policymakers and certainly secondary to the political and economic benefits the early repayment of the IMF loans brings.


3-      This initiative is useful to upgrade the sovereign debt sustainability?

In the short run, if successful, the initiative will provide improvement in the sovereign cash flows, but will cause the rebalancing of some private portfolios of Irish government debt. In the longer run, the direct effect of a successful refinancing of the IMF loans will most likely lead to little material change in the Government debt dynamics. The issue of the greater longer term concern is what the Irish Government is likely to do with any savings achieved through the debt restructuring. If the funds were to be used to fund earlier closing off of other official loans, there is likely to be a positive impact in terms of markets expectations on supply of Government bonds in the future and the direction of Irish fiscal reforms, both of which will support better risk assessments of the sovereign debt and Irish bonds. This is unlikely, however, due to the strong political momentum in favour of spending the new savings on reversing in part past savings achieved via public sector spending cuts and wages costs moderation. Such a move would likely be detrimental to Ireland's debt sustainability in the longer run. A third alternative is to deploy savings to reduce austerity pressures in the Budget 2015 across tax and spend areas. Tax reductions can be productive in stimulating sustainable growth and thus improving the fiscal position of the state in the longer run; spending cuts reductions will simply be consumed by remaining inefficiencies within the public sector.


4-      The Irish had some interesting political initiatives during the bail-out and post-bail-out period. First they change the annual promissory notes repayments into very long long debt (a kind of soft debt restructuring of 25 billion, 12 per cent of total public debt); then they decided for a “clean” exit opting out from the OMT constraints; and now they take the move to get out of IMF loans. In the framework of the Euro are peripheral countries this is an “innovation”?

The Irish government has taken a clearly distinct path from other euro area 'peripheral' states. However, this path is contingent on a number of relatively idiosyncratic features of the crisis in Ireland. Restructuring of the IBRC Promissory Notes was required due to political pressures of facing continued and clearly defined cost of the IBRC restructuring, but also by the significant pressures from the ECB to close off the ELA lines to IBRC, as well as Frankfurt's unhappiness with the structure of the Promissory Notes. In the end, this policy 'innovation' basically traded off short term savings for longer term costs and increased longer term uncertainty. It achieved substantial improvements in cash flow up front, but, depending on the schedule of bonds sales into the future, created little real savings over the life time of the loans. In the case of 'clean exit', Ireland benefited from the fact that a bulk of its deficits were incurred in extraordinary supports for the banks through 2011. In this sense, the Government had two years of relative stabilisation and decline in fiscal pressures before exiting the Troika programme. No other country in the euro 'periphery' had such deficit and debt dynamics. The move to refinance the IMF loans, however, is probably the first significant policy lead that Ireland deployed, as this move (if successful) will be paving the way for Spain, Portugal and Greece to follow in the future. Throughout the second stage of the euro area sovereign debt crisis (2012-present), the Irish Government deserves the credit for being recognised as being the one most actively seeking marginal improvements in the cash flow and rebalancing of debt costs and maturities within the euro area 'periphery'. But in part, this activism is also down to the fact that Ireland had a longer run in the debt crisis than any other 'peripheral' states and it deployed a plethora of various programmes, creating a policy map that is a patchwork of temporary and poorly structured programmes, like the IBRC Promissory Notes. Repairing these programmes offers Ireland a rather unique chance to get an uplift on some of its exposures.

11/7/2014: My comment on Greek and Portuguese bonds pressures

Portugal's Expresso on Greek and Portuguese bond yields with my comment: here.

My full comment in English:

In my view, we are seeing a strong reaction by the markets to adverse news relating to some peripheral euro area countries. 

In the Greek case, much of the rise in bond yields can be attributed first to the persistent uncertainty over the deficit adjustments and the progression of the reforms. The most recent suggestions by some analysts that Greece may require additional EUR2-3 billion over 2015-2016 relating to the news that the country pension fund is now facing an annual EUR2 billion funding gap have triggered some pressure on the country sovereign debt. This was compounded by thin and nervous markets for today's issuance of EUR1.5 billion bond which originally attracted just over 2.0x cover, but saw final demand slump somewhat on generally negative sentiment in the markets. Today's bond was priced at a yield of 3.5% with guidance between 3.5% and 3.625% issued two days ago on Tuesday. This is below the April 2014 5-year bond issue - the issue that attracted EUR20 billion worth of bids and was priced at 4.95%. However, shortly after the issue, secondary markets yields on April bond shot up to 5.10%.

In Portugal's case, the core risk trigger so far has been building up of pressures in the banking sector, and in particular in relation to Espirito Santo International announcement on Tuesday. This pushed Portuguese yields above 4% for 10 year bonds in today's trading. 

Portuguese risks have also put a stop to Banco Popular Espanol contingent convertible bond issue, as well as Spanish construction company ACS plans for an issue.

All in, Greek 10 year bonds closed at 502.0 spread to 10 year German bund up 20.4 bps on yesterday, Portugal's at 276.2 up 22.3 bps, Spanish at 161.8 up 9.2 bps, Italian at 174.1 up 9.3 bps, and Irish at 112.7, up 4.4 bps.

Spreads on 10 year German Bund:

The markets instability is a reminder that while current monetary and investment climates remain supportive of lower yields, markets are starting to show increasing propensity to react strongly to negative newsflows. Investors' view of the 'peripheral' states as being strongly correlated in their performance remains in place, especially for Spanish, Portuguese and Greek sovereigns and corporate issuers. 

The markets are jittery and are getting trigger-happy on sell signals as strong rises in bond prices in recent months have resulted in sovereign and corporate debt being over-bought by the investors. These investors are now staring into the prospect of gradual uplift in US and UK interest rates, weakening of the euro and thus rising cost of carry trades into the European sovereign bonds. At some point in time, these pressures are likely to translate into earlier investors in 'peripheral' bonds starting to exit their positions. 

We are not there yet, but market nervousness suggests that we are getting close to that inflection point.

9/6/2014: ECB Will Still Need Outright QE...

My comments on ECB policy moves last week and what awaits euro area in terms of monetary policies in the near future is on Expresso website (Portuguese) : http://expresso.sapo.pt/bce-pode-estar-a-alimentar-duas-bolhas-financeiras=f874782 and a longer version in English here: http://janelanaweb.com/novidades/constantin-gurdgiev-ecb-will-need-further-measures-including-an-outright-qe/

Needless to say, no one in the Irish mainstream media asked for my two-pence.

20/3/2014: ECB Rates and Policy Expectations

My comment on ECB policy in Portugal's Expresso:

Click on image to enlarge