15/4/15: Ruble Trades Below 50 to USD

Russian Ruble has crossed an important marker today, closing below 50 to USD for the first time since the end (28th to be precise) of November, effectively erasing all of the losses sustained during the speculative run of December 2014.

There has been more volatility in euro markets, so a bit less of an event today there:

Longer-term chart shows Ruble dramatic gains in both Euro and Dollar terms from around February

As I said before, these gains can prove to be temporary, so stay long with care, if you are long...

8/4/15: Ruble's Gains Are Convincing, But Risks Remain

Three charts:

Russian car sales

Source: @moved_average 

Down 42.5% y/y in March (estimated 43% decline).

Ruble v Dollar is going up and up:

Source: @Schuldensuehner 

Ruble v Euro is also up and up...

Source: @Schuldensuehner 


Linking all three? The myth of Ruble liquidity squeeze (e.g. here and here). Reality: sharp drop in imports, slight improvement in oil prices (and more importantly stabilisation of the trend to the upside) and improving conditions in the domestic banking sector are all driving ruble value up.

Another strong contributing factor is timing of external debt redemptions:

Source: https://www.tradingfloor.com/posts/pop-goes-the-rouble-4296859

These are now past their 2015 peaks.

All positive, but uncertainty remains and is still extremely high, so I would not be surprised if ruble starts posting some losses in and around the end of Q2.

26/3/15: De-dollarisation of Russian accounts: media catching up, but risks remain

As I highlighted a week ago here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/03/18315-russian-deposits-dollarisation.html, Russian households are starting de-dolarising their accounts in the wake of some regained confidence in the Ruble and the banking sector:

• See here on Ruble relative performance, recently: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/03/23315-em-currencies-on-rise.html
• See here on latest Russian banking sector stats: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/03/1732015-russian-banks-latest-stats.html

Now, the Moscow Times (h/t to +Russia Insider ) is covering same trend: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/ruble-panic-recedes-as-russians-start-selling-dollars/518053.html

However, not all is well, still and risks remain. Here is BOFIT analysis of the forward risks relating to oil prices and the banking sector (more on the latest forecasts later on the blog): "If the oil price remains, as assumed, at around USD 55 a barrel, and despite savings decisions, the federal budget deficit is set to grow so large in 2015 (to about 3.5% of GDP) that the government Reserve Fund may be eroded by as much as a half. It is possible that support measures will be implemented using government bonds (as in the bank support operations in December 2014, which amounted to 1.4% of GDP). The support operations can also draw on debtors’ bonds (as in the funding of the state-owned oil giant Rosneft, which was just under 1% of GDP). Where necessary, banks can use both instruments as collateral against even relatively long-term central bank funding. Recourse to the central bank has already become more substantial than ever before."

And more: in the face of oil price risks, "Bank panic situations where households and enterprises withdraw their funds from banks are possible, even though the authorities have intensified banking supervision. On the other hand, the Bank of Russia is ready to take immediate support measures."

All of which means that from the macroeconomic perspective, the current reprieve in dollarisation trends can be temporary. Over the next six months, I still expect continued decline in investment, with private sector capex depressed by a number of factors that are still at play: the Ukrainian crisis, the looming threat of deeper sanctions and oil price risks. State enterprises and larger state banks are likely to continue cutting back on large debt-funded investments and more resources will continue to outflow on redemption of maturing corporate and banking debt. 

So keep that seat belt fastened: the bumpy ride ain't over, yet.

17/3/15: IMF Cries Wolf as Emerging Markets Currencies Plunge

Remember the Russian Ruble Melt of 2014? Now get ready for the Emerging Markets Currencies Shake-n-Bake of 2015:

H/T: @Schuldensuehner

It is a miracle that the Fed can do in the IMF-sponsored mercantilist world of Exports-led Recoveries...  And guess who is now crying wolf? Why, IMF, of course: http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2015/031715.htm. Except they don't dare call it a wolf, just 'lessons to be learned'.

8/2/15: Carry Trades Returns: More Pressure for Ruble & CBR

Carry trades involve borrowing in one currency at lower interest rates (say in Euro or Japanese Yen) and 'carrying' borrowed funds into investment or lending in another currency, bearing higher interest rates (e.g. into Australia or New Zealand, or Russia or Brazil). The risk involved in such trades is that while you hold carry asset (loan to, say, an Australian company), the currency underlying this asset (in this case AUD) devalues against the currency you borrowed in (e.g. Yen). In this case, your returns in AUD converted into Yen (funds available for the repayment of the loan) become smaller.

With this in mind, carry trades represent significant risks for the recipient economies: if exchange rates move in the direction of devaluing host economy currency, there can be fast unwinding of the carry trades and capital outflow from the host economy.

Now, let's define, per BIS, the Carry-to-Risk Ratio as "the attractiveness of carry trades" measured by "the ...risk-adjusted profitability of a carry trade position [e.g. the one-month interest rate differential]... divided by the implied volatility of one-month at-the-money exchange rate options".  In simple terms, this ratio measures risk-adjusted returns to carry trades - the higher the ratio, the higher the implied risk-adjusted returns.

Here is a BIS chart mapping the risk-adjusted ratios for carry trades for six major carry trade targets:

Massive devaluation of the Russian Ruble means that carry trades into Russia (borrowing, say in low interest rate euros and buying Russian assets) have fallen off the cliff in terms of expected risk-adjusted returns. There are couple of things this chart suggests:

1. Dramatically higher interest rates in Russia under the CBR policy are not enough to compensate for the decline in Ruble valuations;
2. Forward expectations are consistent with two things: Ruble devaluing further and Russian interest rates declining from their current levels.

Still, three countries with massive asset bubbles: New Zealand, Australia and Mexico are all suffering from far worse risk-adjusted carry trade performance expectations than Russia.

The Russian performance above pretty much confirms my expectations for continued weakness in Ruble and more accommodative gradual re-positioning of the CBR.

25/12/2014: Ruble Crisis: Stage 1 Capital Controls

In a recent post on Ruble Crisis (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/23122014-simple-math-russian-default-or.html), I have promised to post my comments that were forthcoming in Portuguese Express. Here they are, in English:

Q: Did Russian Government impose capital controls last week?

Yes. Both de facto and de jure, the new requirement on state-owned companies and a softer request for larger private companies to reduce their foreign exchange holdings constitute capital controls. However, the reduction is relatively benign and will not present a material risk to these companies' operations. 

The reason for this is that the benchmark holdings set at October 1, 2014 levels of reserves mean that the new restrictions cover primarily build up in foreign exchange reserves accumulated during the acceleration of the currency crisis. In a sense, these were precautionary accumulations of foreign exchange that have little to do with operational demands of the companies involved. A more material restriction could have been limiting reserves to a fixed proportion of revenues. In the 1998 crisis, Russian authorities forced exporters to convert all foreign exchange earnings in rubles. This time around, an intermediate measure, in severity ranking between the 1998 case and this week's announcement, would have been requiring exporter to convert, say 50 percent of their earnings into rubles. However, Moscow held back such a measure and opted for a weaker version, benchmarking reserves to October 1 positions. 

As is, the measure will likely increase supply of US dollars into the market by about USD50 billion - roughly the amount that has been accumulated in precautionary reserves. And this comes on foot of the new currency swap agreement with China that can inject up to USD24 billion into the markets.

The new restriction is voluntary in nature, in so far as companies can continue to accumulate reserves, but in reality, only those companies facing significant bond redemptions in 2015 will be allowed to do so. Barring the latter exemption, we would have seen moratorium on debt redemptions for larger Russian companies by mid-Q1 2015.

Overall, the new measure introduced by the Russian Government is, effectively, a bid to avoid introducing full scale capital controls and to enhance the Central Bank of Russia's firepower in the forex markets. This has already been reflected in the markets via a dramatic rebound in the Ruble valuations and an equally significant decline in the volumes of short ruble contracts which fell from this week's high of just under 70,000 to below 50,000.

Updated: here is the link to the article http://expresso.sapo.pt/rublo-valoriza-gracas-ao-controlo-suave-de-capitais=f903997

22/12/2014: Economic crisis in Russia is a lose-lose game for all

Here is an unedited version of my article for the Sunday Business Post December 21, 2014 on Russian Currency Crisis.

Less than a month ago, Russian economic data posted surprisingly positive results. Growth was running at 0.7 percent year on year in Q3 2014, more than doubling the consensus forecasts, and only a notch down from 0.8 percent expansion recorded in the second quarter. The exchange rate for the Ruble stood at 56.58 vis-a-vis the Euro and 45.58 vis-a-vis the dollar. Growth outlook for 2015 was a rosy 1.2 percent expansion in GDP.

Visiting Moscow in late November-early December, I was struck by the calm of the city that is known for its chaotic and fast moving business and social life. There were no queues at currency exchanges, no mad dashes for the banks and most certainly no signs of anyone stocking up on goods in fear of a runaway inflation. Business was hurting and economy was slowing down, but there was no panic about it.

Today, after a classic run on its currency experienced on Monday and Tuesday, Russia is amidst a full-blown crisis that is threatening to plunge the economy into a 4.5-4.7 percent contraction in 2015.

On Tuesday, Ruble reached the lows of 79.17 against the dollar and 99.56 against the euro. Two days of subsequent emergency interventions by the Central Bank of Russia and the Finance Ministry, the markets are calmer. Still, through Thursday, Russian currency was down 22.4 percent in value against the Euro and 24.0% against the Dollar compared to Monday open.

Scores of media and financial analysts are evoking the spectre of the 1998 default. This hype is a bit excessive. In 1998, the Russian economy was crippled by a host of problems not present today. Russia was running prolonged and sizeable fiscal deficits, eventually reaching 8 percent of GDP in 1998. So far this year, it is enjoying a fiscal surplus, although banks supports measures announced this week will likely push it into a deficit of 1 percent of GDP. Back in 1998, Government debt stood at just over 100 percent of the national output. This year, it is estimated to be around 15.7 percent. In the decade prior to 1998 default, Russian current account surpluses averaged just 1.13 percent of GDP. Since 2004 they have been running at around 5.6 percent.

This week’s crisis causes rest beyond macroeconomics – in a culmination of the geopolitical and financial risks.

First and foremost, the Russian economy is suffering the consequences of its strong connection to the global energy prices. Over the last 30 days, Brent oil price has declined by 33.4 percent - almost in line with the losses sustained by the Euro/Ruble currencies pair.

Compounding the above, capital outflows have accelerated once again in late November, pushing Central Bank forecast for full year 2014 capital flight to match 2009 crisis levels at USD 103 billion. The timing of the outflows acceleration is ominous. On Tuesday, at the peak of the currency crisis, markets were swelled with false rumors that Rosneft, the largest producer of oil in the country, was looking to offload USD30 billion worth of rubles.

Rosneft story is an indicator of the third real problem faced by Russia in this crisis. Courtesy of Western sanctions, Russian banks and companies have been effectively cut-off from the international funding markets since May this year. As the result, Russian companies and financial institutions have been forced to pay down foreign exchange-denominated debt instead of refinancing it. Rosneft is repaying USD7.6 billion today and the company will need to redeem USD19.5 billion more in 2015. All in, Russian companies and banks are facing some USD101 billion of foreign exchange-denominated debt maturing next year.

The plight of funding Russian economy’s external debt is a telling warning that the crisis for Ruble is not over yet. Excluding debts owed by companies to their off-shored investment vehicles, Russian private sector debt currently stands at a miserly 29 percent of the country GDP. In terms of corporate and banking leverage, Russia is about 7 times less leveraged than your average euro area country. Which puts into perspective the role sanctions are playing in driving down the Russian economy by starving it of credit.

In the longer run, the fallout from the Russian crisis is going to be unpleasant for all parties involved in this geopolitical standoff.

Ruble collapse is pushing misery onto the ordinary Russians, especially the elderly, those living below the poverty line, and those reliant on imported medicines. Meanwhile, power brokers and oligarchs, having stashed their wealth in euros and dollars and spread it across the globe, remain better insulated from the currency devaluations. Ruble collapse is also hurting predominantly smaller businesses which have no access to loans from the Central Bank and cannot raise credit in the dim sum markets of the East.

Ruble devaluation is punishing Ukraine and Moldova - two countries heavily dependent on remittances from migrants working in Russia. Ditto for Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia and a host of other countries where in recent days domestic currencies fell in line with the Ruble and consumers have started panic buying durable goods in an attempt to escape devaluations.

Beyond that, weaker Ruble is not good for European exporters. Europe exported some EUR120 billion worth of goods and services to Russia in 2013. This year the figure is likely to be around 10 percent lower. Next year, projected decline in Russian imports across the board is expected to hit 15 percent. For imports from Europe this number will be higher, since Russian importers have been aggressively switching in favour of cheaper alternatives from Turkey, China, and some of the former Soviet Union states. All in, Europe is looking at a loss of enough trade over 2014-2015 to put 50-60,000 jobs in exporting sectors into unemployment lines.

If the crisis reignites with the force witnessed this week, capital controls and debt repayment holidays will become inevitable. With them, redemptions of some USD 136 billion worth of private sector debt maturing over the next 18 months will be put into question. That is a lot of risk for Austrian, Dutch, Swedish, French and Italian banks which have an average exposure to Russia to the tune of almost 2.3 percent of their countries’ GDP.

So far, Ireland has been relatively insulated from such risks. In fact, our merchandise exports to Russia  have risen 19.3 percent year on year in the first ten months of 2014 - a truly impressive performance. The reason for this is that, for now, Irish exporters are seen as more neutral, more willing to engage with their Russian counterparts than our competitors in some other European countries. Another reason is that our sales to Russia, small as they might be, are heavily geared toward SME exporters.

No matter what London and Washington politicians say, economic crisis in Russia is a lose-lose game for all.

20/12/2014: Russia's Black Monday: The Debate is On

It is a hazardous task to attempt to explain fast spikes in Forex markets pressures during the ongoing currency crises. And hence few attempt. One very interesting - and I suspect rather correct - try is by Sergei Guriev http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ruble-collapse-corporate-debt-by-sergei-guriev-2014-12.

Guriev directly links the Russian Ruble's Black Monday (and I would add Black Tuesday too) on Rosneft debt redemption that takes place this weekend.

He is right on all points, including, probably, the suspicion that CBR delayed rate hike to allow Rosneft debt deal to go through, with a caveat.

The hike of November 11th (see my note on this here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/11122014-central-bank-of-russia-good.html) was weak. Weak by all fundamentals metrics, save one and a very important one: CBR knew at the hike time that the industrial activity was tanking and investment was starting to lose steam (if anaemic growth in investment to-date can be called that). So CBR delayed hike most likely for two reasons:

1. Rosneft deal; and
2. The fact that raising rates are hammering the economy (Governor Nabiullina clearly stated as much on several previous occasions and Professor Guriev might be reading too much into the statement by the Minister of Economy, Alexey Ulyukaev - Ulyukaev is locked into a long-term battle with CBR - see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/09/1292014-bank-of-russia-leaves-rates.html In fact, earlier this year, the Ministry was openly critical of CBR for the Bank lifting rates without 'coordination' with the Ministry).

Another point ignored by Guriev (predictably for an economist) is the dynamics-driven algos and shorts rebalancing that most likely came quickly into the market late Monday and continued to hammer Ruble on Tuesday.

But, on the net, the point that Rosneft debt is costing Russia dearly is on the money. And it will continue doing so into 2015 when the company debt redemptions are likely to hit 1/5th of the total corporate and banks' redemptions.

Do note, more granular analysis of the redemptions, putting to challenge some of Guriev's statements, is here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/19122014-plight-of-russian-banks.html

17/12/2014: Some Ruble-Heavy Reading: Contagion, Reserves & Fundamentals

Some interesting set of articles on the topic I mentioned earlier on Irish radio and in the post here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/12/16122014-russian-inflation-hot-but.html  - the topic of contagion from the run on Russian ruble to the global economy:

• First off, the Guardian on the destabilising effects of playing brinksmanship with Russia (not to excuse the equally destabilising effects of Russia playing its own brinksmanship): http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/16/russia-economy-west-vladimir-putin?CMP=twt_gu
• Second, RT article on subject of spillovers: http://rt.com/op-edge/215031-russian-ruble-crisis-aftershocks/ Note: the article quotes myself on the topic
• Third, FT Alphaville piece - tongue-in-cheek - on Russian external liabilities http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2014/12/16/2074181/russian-foreign-liabilities-in-perspective/ Give that a thought - these are owed to someone in the West (mostly in Europe).
• Fourth, Bloomberg View piece on spillovers: http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-12-16/russias-problems-are-everyones-problems - not much in the way of factual, but on the money in general
• Fifth, a bit over-the-top, but important question of potential geopolitical response from Moscow here: http://www.businessinsider.com/what-will-happen-next-2014-12?IR=T
• Sixth, factual report on PIMCO effect from the Russian crisis: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-12-16/russia-crisis-hits-pimco-fund-wipes-out-options-as-ruble-sinks.html
• Seven (update): WSJ on Ruble spillover to European companies: http://www.wsj.com/articles/rubles-decline-deepens-concerns-for-european-companies-1418760793

As an aside to the menu of options available to Russian Government, here is one of a 'limited capital control': http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/12/how-putins-fealty-to-the-washington-consensus-made-his-currency-crisis-worse.html aka de-dollarisation of the retail deposits. Surely, that would just amplify pain for ordinary savers.

And another aside: in-depth analysis of the reserves position and demand for debt redemptions for Russia here: http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/12/oil-ruble-ideology.html. Key quote from the article:

"We notice that the strong depreciation of the Rouble corresponds to a peak in repayments, but that the situation will loosen up in early 2015. It is sure therefore that the exchange rate will reverse its tendency in the first semester of 2015. The question is, up to what point? If the Rouble stabilizes around 50 roubles for 1 USD, inflation will be strong next year and could reach 12%. If we witness a rise in oil prices and the Rouble stabilizes around 40-42 roubles for 1 USD, the inflation rate could amount to merely 10%. Still, this implies that the Central Bank of Russia keep an eye on such establishments which could be tempted to speculate on the exchange rate, dragging it farther down than it should normally be. Explicit threats were made by President Putin at the occasion of his declaration of general policies before the chambers of parliament on December 4th. However spectacular it has been, the depreciation of the Rouble by no means puts into question the financial stability of Russia. The trade balance remains in excess, with an amount outstanding of 10 billion dollars a month. This is largely sufficient to face up to coming payments. The budget is actually profiting from this depreciation, which should allow the government to spend a little bit more in 2015. Russia will therefore remain one of the least indebted countries in the world, which is not necessarily an advantage and goes to show that, provided it takes up debts internally, the country wields over a strong potential for investment and development."

Another update: a must-read from Bloomberg's @Bershidsky on why sanctions are at best secondary when it comes to the run on the Ruble:  http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-12-17/lift-sanctions-now-to-humiliate-putin

1/12/2014: Ruble-Oil-Dollar: Riding the Magic Mountains' Rails...

Russian ruble remains in a full tie in with oil prices:

 H/T to @Schuldensuehner

Based on my estimates, given 2015 Budget set at Rub3,500/bbl pricing, USD70/bbl oil price implies a range of Rub/USD pair at 51-52 with probability between 91 and 96 percent depending on the GDP metric one opts for. So on the lower end we can see Rub/USD as far down as 56, assuming no changes in other currencies pairs, but fundamentals-justified pair should be closer to 54-55 at the lower end of Ruble valuations and at around 52-53 for Q1 2015 average. The key to these ranges are EUR/USD and Rub/EUR pairs.

Note 1: I just returned from a rather informative trip to Moscow, so will be updating my outlook for the Russian economy accordingly in days ahead.

Note 2: Few charts explaining oil correlation with Russian GDP and GDP growth

Firstly: real and nominal GDP and nominal GDP per capita all show close links to oil prices at levels basis:

But, relationship is much weaker for changes (e.g. growth rates):

18/11/2014: Commodities-linked Currencies and Ruble

Good chart plotting side by side all commodities-linked currencies relative to USD (via @auaurelija) :

Above suggests that Ruble devaluations from September 1 to-date are somewhere around 3/10th part due to same effects that impact other major commodities producers. Given Russian energy exports exposure to European markets, the effect might be as large as 3/7th.

11/11/2014: Another Wild Ride for Rollercoaster Ruble

On the first day of its quasi-somewhat-sort-of-free float, Ruble is, as predicted (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/11/7112014-russian-ruble-rough-days-ahead.html) is showing no trend other than the one in rising volatility.

Two charts: one day and five days:

Both: MarketWatch 

It has been a wild ride. The shorts are having their lunch:

 Source: @Schuldensuehner 

Remember, CBR abandoned regular interventions strategy and opted for free float of the Ruble. But the float is not quite free, as CBR said it will instead intervene in limiting supply of foreign currency to trading and debt cover only, removing the so-called speculative positions of Russian banks and corporates.

This will be tough to strategise, since much of the so-called 'capital outflow' (Western terminology) or 'speculative demand' (Russian terminology) is related to debt maturity redemptions. These are hitting Russian economy hard in the wake of virtual shut-down of Western debt markets for all Russian companies and banks (including those not covered by sanctions):

Source: Reuters

Still, something will have to be done. Russia is losing foreign exchange reserves fast:

The latest statistics from the CBR covering October show that, inclusive of gold holdings, the value of Russian foreign exchange reserves fell to USD416.23 billion at the end of October, down USD94.76 billion year on year (-18.5%) and down USD63.93 billion (-13.3%) since the first round of sanctions was introduced. Actual foreign exchange reserves (currency holdings) are down USD96.02 billion year on year to USD370.92 billion.

The only surprising bit - given the rate of reserves depletion - is that Russia still did not introduce direct capital controls, although CBR decision this week is looking increasingly like a veiled control regime.

Note: more detailed comments on the Ruble are forthcoming in Euromoney report and Expresso, so stay tuned for links.

7/11/2014: Russian Ruble: Rough Days Ahead

Things are getting ugly in the Ruble corner today:

First this:

Via @Schuldensuehner

Then a bit of a recovery to this:

Via @Schuldensuehner

And in the longer run, this:

Three points:

1. Ruble is supposed to move to a free float by the end of 2014;
2. Central Bank of Russia abstained from intervening in forex markets between May and the end of September, but it has burned through ca USD68 billion so far this year in total defending the currency with USD22.21 billion of this in October alone (see chart below).
3. Central Bank announced two days ago that it will limit its interventions in the markets going forward to just USD350 million per day maximum cap. The Bank is taking a more 'random walk' approach to interventions, announcing that it will intervene in the markets only sporadically. This increased the uncertainty about Ruble supports. So far, Ruble is down more than 27% y/y to USD.

Remember, weaker Ruble offsets, in part, adverse effects of weaker oil prices on Russian fiscal balances. The bad news - from the exporting countries point of view - is that Russia's imports are becoming less and less affordable, pushing more activity away from European exports and in favour of domestic substitution. 

Per official accounts, CBR has sold USD25.232 billion and EUR 2.159 billion (gross of purchases) in the entire 2013, with major purchases starting in Q2 2013. In contrast in the 10 months of 2014 so far, CBR sold USD66.247 billion and EUR 5.426 billion, gross. Net of purchases, 2013 net sales of USD24.261 billion against 2014 (through October) net sales of USD63.426 billion; and 2013 net sales of EUR2.048 billion against 2014 net sales of EUR5.189 billion.

Overall, we can expect more rough days ahead for the Ruble, but a possible recovery in Q1 2015 once the risk re-pricing takes hold post free float and the effects of USD repricing in the wake of the US Fed policy decisions is complete.

13/10/2013: Predictably, Russia pushes on toward ruble free float

One interesting note on Russian economy from recent news flow: the push toward free float for ruble continues, with the Bank Rossiy under new stewardship predictably continuing with the old policy objectives (as I predicted back in March: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/03/1432013-comment-of-appointment-of-new.html):

Latest news is that Bank Rossiy (Bank of Russia) broadened the band for interventions in ruble exchange rates to 3.1 rubles for euro/dollar basket - trippling the previous targets. The plan is still to get rid of the bands by 2015. Thereafter, inflation targeting (possibly with broader growth metrics in mind too) will be the main target. Side effect - expect dollar (and euro) reserves to rise on this move as interventions become less frequent.

18/6/2012: Russian Ruble Note

For the ongoing Irish trade mission to Russia, IRBA issued the following note to our members concerning the current FX environment relating to Russian ruble (click on individual slides to enlarge):