16/2/19: Deep Crises: past, present, future?

Venezuela's economic (and political, social, public, etc) woes have been documented with exhaustion, although no one so far has produced a half-meaningful outline of solutions that are feasible and effective at the same time.

Take for example, the @IIF pitch in: "Venezuela’s economic collapse is almost unprecedented in recent history. Zimbabwe in the last 20 years and the collapse of the Soviet Union are the only comparable episodes." This accompanied the following chart:

What is, however, remarkable in this exposition, is not Venezuela's demise, which is impressive, but the experience of Russia and the contrasting experience of Ukraine in post-Soviet collapse era.

Here is the data from the World Bank on post-USSR collapse recoveries, through 2017. It is the similar to the one used by IIF, but a bit more current and details. And it compares the Western 'darling' of Georgia experience with that of the Ukraine and Russia:

You don't need to have a PhD in economics to comprehend the chart above in political terms: like it or not, the Western 'policies prescriptions' have not been a great source of optimism for Georgia,  Ukraine and Russia in the 1990s.  It hasn't been a great source of optimism for Georgia in the 2000s, and it hasn't been of much use for Ukraine since 2014.

In part, the reason is that the Western prescriptions for policy development and reforms were not exactly followed by these countries in the past, and in part, these prescriptions were not suitable to these economies and their societies. But, also in part, the reason as to why Western reforms did not work their magic in the three former-USSR states is that they were never accompanied by the genuine buy-in from the West. There was no 'great trade' opening, no 'structural FDI rush', no 'Marshall Plan supports'.  What little tangible support was extended to these countries (and other post-Soviet states) from the West was largely siphoned off into the pockets of the Western contractors and domestic oligarchs.

Russian recovery 'miracle' that is traceable above was down to the removal of the Western contractors from the proverbial feeding trough, and consolidation of domestic oligarchs and corrupt elites. One can't call these changes 'liberal' or 'reforms', but they were successful while they lasted (through 2014).

What is also telling is that the rates of recovery - at peak rates - in Georgia (during the hey-days of Western-style reforms) were not quite comparable with the same rate of Russian economic recovery. And that is before one considers the peak recovery in Ukraine since 2014.

Incidentally, returning to the IIF chart above, neither Peru (it took the country 8 years to recover from its 1989 crisis) nor Bolivia (same duration for its crisis of 1982) compare to the cases of the post-USSR collapse crises in magnitude and recovery duration. Zimbabwe does, and it recovered from its 1998-started economic collapse in 18 years, by the end of 2017). Last time I checked, Zimbabwe also did not follow the Western 'prescriptions' in its policies path, and still beats Georgia and Ukraine in terms of its experience (both former USSR states are now in year 28 of post-1989 economic crisis).

10/2/16: IMF to Ukraine: Sort Thyselves!

IMF on Ukraine (and it is narsty):

The only surprising bit is the tone. It is quite frankly unbelievable to think that the IMF were rationally expecting substantial and visible progress on such a tough and 'sticky' issue as corruption to be delivered within such a short span of time. Their key concern is, of course, warranted. But the sharpness of the tone suggests IMF is entering into an internal political dogfight between Ukrainian Presidency and the Government and it is siding, seemingly, with the President.

18/12/15: Ukraine Inches Even Closer to a Default

So, we have this:

Which means that Ukraine and Russia - so far - have failed to agree terms of debt restructuring. As a reminder, over the last few days, Ukraine and Russia were involved in a 'last minute' dialogue (via Germany) to resolve the issue.

Does this mean that Ukraine is now in a sovereign debt default? Technically - no. Ukraine will only be in a default after 10 days grace period expires, which means the parties to the talks still have 12 days to reach an agreement and avoid default.

Does this mean that Ukraine is now in breach of IMF lending criteria? Technically - no. IMF amended its own rules allowing lending to continue for countries in official sector default, as long as these countries continue to engage in debt restructuring negotiations with the lenders.

Can the two countries reach a deal in time to avoid official default? Unlikely: any deal between Russia and Ukraine (except for a deal that treats Russia under the same terms extended to private lenders - a deal that is simply unacceptable to Russia) will require approval of other (commercial) lenders under the agreement between commercial lenders and Ukraine struck earlier. There is simply not enough time to achieve such an approval, even assuming, there is a deal and the deal can be approved (both assumptions are quite a stretch).

Do both parties show will to negotiate in good faith? So far - no. Russian offer (see here) has been to restructure debt by extending repayment period (a real haircut absent nominal haircut, as far as I read this). The offer shifted Russian position in negotiations in the direction of Ukraine's position: from the opening position that the debt is official sector debt and thus should be repaid in full and in time. Ukraine's position has been to treat Russian debt equivalent to private sector debt and Ukraine (as far as public record goes) did not alter its position to move closer to Russian offer. Ukraine also deployed consistent rhetoric of "Our way or the highway" variety. In other words (I am willing to be corrected on this), Russia made insufficient step toward Ukraine, while Ukraine made no step toward Russian position whatsoever.

Note: my view has been (consistently over time) that Russia should restructure loans to Ukraine to a longer term, say 10-year, bond extended at original interest rate and allow for 2-3 years interest payments moratorium. Financially optimal solution would have been to impose a haircut on principal and extend maturity of the remaining balance. But, given Ukraine's failure to secure stronger restructuring with private sector lenders, this option is not available and is politically infeasible.

4/8/15: IMF Downgrades Ukraine Growth Outlook

IMF just published its Article IV consultation paper on Ukraine. Here are some key points (I am staying out of extensive commenting on these, but emphasis is added in the quotes).

Before we start, it is important to highlight that IMF notes significant breadth and depth of reforms already undertaken by the Ukrainian authorities, albeit warns about potential slippage in future reforms. Given the overall environment (geopolitical and domestic) in which these reforms are taking place, Ukrainian Government deserves a positive assessment of their work in a number of important areas.

"The 2015 baseline growth projection has been marked down to -9 percent (relative to -5.5 percent at the EFF approval), driven by a delayed pick up in industrial production, construction, and retail trade, and expectations of a weaker agricultural season." Note: this is a massive contraction compared to Programme projections.

"Domestic demand will be somewhat more constrained than anticipated earlier by tighter credit conditions and larger-than-expected decline in real incomes amid higher inflation."

"Growth is expected to start recovering in the second half of the year, supported by growing consumer and investor confidence, gradual rehabilitation of the banking system, and restoration of broken supply chains in metals, mining, and energy production. Later on, manufacturing should also start benefitting from the restored competitiveness of Ukraine’s exports. However, the recovery is expected to take hold only gradually through 2016. Medium-term growth projections remain unchanged." Note: you can see projections for following years in the table at the end of this post.

"The 2015 inflation has been revised upwards to 46 percent at end-2015, compared to
27 percent at program approval, driven by the faster-than-expected pass-through effects of the large exchange rate overshooting in March."

Note: again, this is a massive revision on programme-assumed inflation. Take together with the GDP revision above, it is hard to see how the IMF can continue arguing sustainability case for the programme at this stage, without hoping for massive recovery.

"Inflation is projected to recede quickly in 2016 to around 12 percent as the one-off effects subside and economic stabilization takes hold. Monthly core inflation rates are already well below 1 percent and expected to remain in such territory, as the negative output gap, subdued demand, and the stabilization of the exchange rate will put downward pressure on inflation."

Here's an interesting bit: Inflation 'one off' drivers include IMF-required adjustment in energy prices:

"The rapid pass-through of the large exchange rate depreciation in February and increases in regulated energy prices pushed inflation to 61 percent y-o-y in April. As the hryvnia recovered and stabilized in April–June, prices of some imported goods declined while increases in prices of non-tradables remained moderate. As a result, inflation in June moderated to 0.4 percent m-o-m, or 57½ percent y-o-y. The high y-o-y number masks the sharp disinflation that has already occurred: the seasonally adjusted annualized inflation in May–June 2015 fell to 13 percent."

But energy prices are yet to be fully inflated to their targets, so more is to come: "Gas and heating prices increases. Gas prices for households were increased by 285 percent on average, effective April 1. Heating prices were also increased by 67 percent, effective May 8. Despite these increases, gas and heating prices remain among the lowest in the region. The program aims to reach 75 percent of cost recovery gas and heating prices based on international prices by April 2016 and 100 percent by April 2017."

Which, of course, means there will be much more pain for ordinary Ukrainians, comes winter.

"The overall balance of payments remains broadly unchanged. The current account deficit is expected to widen to 1.7 percent of GDP in 2015, compared to 1.4 percent of GDP at program approval. Both exports and imports are projected to decline considerably this year, driven by (i) falling export prices and larger-than-expected loss of export capacity stemming from the conflict; and (ii) the weaker economy and steeper fall of energy consumption."

"Risks to the outlook remain exceptionally high. Risks to economic growth are predominantly on the downside reflecting (i) uncertainty about the duration and depth of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine; (ii) prolongation of the discussions on the debt operation (which could disrupt capital flows); and (iii) slippages in policy implementation. In addition, confidence could fail to revive due to these factors, or due to a more protracted bank resolution process. Higher-than-expected inflation—due to inflation expectations becoming more entrenched—could reduce domestic demand further. On the upside, an early resolution of the conflict could boost confidence and growth faster than projected."

"…Regarding program implementation, policy reversals, including regarding the flexible exchange rate policy and fiscal/energy price adjustment could lead to continuing balance of payments problems and raise repayment risks."

"Against significant headwinds, the authorities showed again their determination to stay the course of the program. ...However, although domestic support for a new Ukraine is strong, pressures from populist forces and vested interests are growing. Moreover, the local elections in the fall pose a risk that the reform momentum could fade."

Bad news on debt levels are:

Note: Public debt levels assume meeting IMF target for restructuring current debt. There is another dreamy feature to both graphs - as with all IMF programmes, debt peaks out in year one. Given past histories, however, the forecasts don;t quite turn to reality.

Another set of bad news: Non-performing Loans (NPLs) as % of total assets was bad in 2013 and getting massively worse now:

And a summary of macro performance indicators and projections:

13/7/15: IMF's Russian Economy Forecasts 2015-2016

IMF WEO update covered, briefly, changes to the Fund outlook for the Russian economy. Here's a summary:

Overall, the only point here is the delayed upgrade to Russian forecast for 2015-2016. Lower rate of contraction forecast for 2015 (from -3.833% in April WEO to -3.4% this time around) and return to (basically zero) growth in 2016 (+0.2% forecast in july compared to -1.096% in April).

In its briefing on the WEO update, IMF said (emphasis mine): "The other country where the numbers are very bad is in Russia. We now forecast Russia’s growth to be negative at -3.4 percent. It’s a bit better than the forecast in April. That comes from a small improvement in commodity prices and a small increase in confidence, but that’s clearly a very large negative number that will lead to a very tough year in Russia."

Additional risk factor, noted by the IMF, is rates reversion in the U.S. and closing on the rate reversion cycle re-start in the euro area: "...this is going to be the year in which the interest rate in the U.S. is going to start increasing. The date by which the interest rate is expected to increase in Europe will also get closer, and so you are going to see tighter financial conditions, which means that capital will tend to go back to where the rates are attractive. So far, it hasn’t been happening on a very large scale. I think we can expect some capital outflows from a number of these countries, and these always create some problems but they can handle, but that is a challenge they are going to have to face."

Just how bad the effect of rates reversion will be is hard to tell. Overall, however, Russian economy has suffered quite significantly from both, the adverse changes in the global credit flows (away from emerging markets in general) and idiosyncratic drivers pushing credit supply lower. Here are two charts covering the latest BIS data we have:

Overall credit:

Credit to non-financial private sector:

And sources of funding:

Source for charts above: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/062915.pdf

23/6/15: Ukraine's Debt Haircuts Saga: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back

Two big setbacks for Ukraine in its bid to cut the overall debt burden and achieve targets mandated by the IMF.

First, Moody issued a note today saying that Ukraine will be in a default if it haircuts principal owed to private creditors. The agency said it believes Ukraine can deliver USD15.3bn in savings without haircuts. Ukraine believes it cannot. IMF backed Ukraine on this, but it is not to IMF to either declare a default even or not. Moody further noted that any moratorium on debt redemptions will have long-term implications for Kiev access to international debt markets.

Second, the IMF has signalled that private debt open to haircuts under Kiev-led negotiations does not include debt owed to Russia which is deemed to be official sector debt. This is not surprising, and analysts have long insisted that this debt cannot be included into private sector haircuts, but Kiev staunchly resisted recognising debt to Russia as official sector debt.

Incidentally, Ukraine debt to Russia is structured as a eurobond and is registered in Ireland, as reported by Bloomberg. The bond is structured as private debt, but Russia subsequently re-declared it as official debt. Re-declaration was somewhat of a positive for Ukraine, because a default on official debt does not trigger automatic default on private debt (the reason why the bond was originally structured as private debt was precisely the threat that a default on it will trigger default on all bonds issued by Ukraine). Ironies abound: IMF is happy to declare Russian debt to be official sector debt, because it takes USD3 billion out of the pool of bonds targeted for haircuts. This implies that for Kiev to achieve USD15.3 billion in savings, Ukraine will most likely need to haircut actual principal outstanding to private sector bond holders - something IMF wants Kiev to do. So here, too, Russian side gain is also Kiev's gain.

Ultimately, in my view, Moscow should write down the entire USD3bn in debt owed by Kiev. Because it would be ethical to do, and because it would help Ukraine. But that point is outside the fine arts of finance, let alone beyond the brutal realities of geopolitics.

More background on both stories: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-22/moody-s-backs-creditor-math-in-resisting-ukraine-debt-writedown.

20/6/15: Danske Outlook & Forecast for Ukraine

Danske Bank outlook and forecast for Ukraine:

12/6/15: IMF Tells Kiev: "Default"

Things are getting really testy Friday night in Ukraine. As I noted earlier today (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/06/12615-ukraine-debt-haircuts.html), IMF gave Kiev a bit of strong-man-behind-me support in negotiations with private sector bondholders.

Later today, IMF head had the following to say on the subject: "To ensure economic and financial stability, [programme] objectives need to be achieved in a manner consistent with maintaining a strong international reserves position over the medium term, in line with projections under the program. In this regard, the NBU’s international reserves cannot be used for sovereign debt service without the government incurring new debt, which would be inconsistent with the objectives of the debt operation. Ultimately, Ukraine’s debt repayment capacity is limited by its fiscal capacity."

De facto, Ms. Christine Lagarde means the following: forex reserves held by the National Bank of Ukraine will not be used to fund debt repayments or servicing. IMF loans cannot be used for debt redemptions or servicing. Which means Kiev can only pay out on bonds out of current revenues left or via new borrowing in the markets. Kiev has none of those funds available, so Ms. Christine Lagarde effectively gave Kiev an order to default, as "Ukraine lacks the resources under the program to fully service its debts on the original terms."

"...in the event that a negotiated settlement with private creditors is not reached and the country determines that it cannot service its debt, the Fund can lend to Ukraine consistent with its Lending-into-Arrears Policy."

Ms. Lagarde effectively said in Ukraine, IMF will act differently than it did in all European programme countries and differently from pretty much every other case in its history.

In addition, Ms. Christine Lagarde has gone as far as ordering the bondholders to accept Kiev deal or face a forced default. Ms. Lagarde qualified this order being in the interest of the bondholders, explicitly linking that interest to the IMF 'conviction'. This is a major point, because IMF is now indirectly dictating - via Kiev - to the private markets terms and conditions of their surrender.

Note: I tend to agree with Ms. Christine Lagarde on the necessity of a write down, but this is one of these rare (if not unique) occasions where the IMF is effectively ordering a default and expropriating private property of third parties.

Final note: private sector investors have based their proposal for haircuts on the premise that Ukraine will be able to use forex reserves at NBU as a source of repayments post-restructuring. Ms. Lagarde now cancelled that position in one go.

All of this means two things - beyond the immediate consideration of Ukrainian situation:
1) IMF is trying to hedge the risk of future (not current) slippage in the programme and insulate the funds it supplies from being exhausted on debt servicing and repayments. This means the IMF is seeing Ukraine as a huge risk engagement at this stage and is doing preemptive damage control. All the talk about debt sustainability under the IMF programme is a fig leaf of decorum: even if haircuts are delivered as planned, IMF sees big risk of programme being derailed and wants its money ring-fenced.
2) IMF is also trying to re-establish some sort of an independent agency reputation, post-European experience.

Ukraine's default is now a matter of days, unless private bondholders surrender. Prepare for a wild ride…

12/6/15: Ukraine Debt Haircuts

Important article today in the FT on the issue of write downs on Ukrainian debt: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/949628a4-102a-11e5-bd70-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cg6nwFC9

In my view, the write down should take into the account discounts at which current debt holders have taken their long positions, so that vulture funds and distressed debt speculators take a larger haircut than someone who held debt over longer term and bought it at lower discounts. This will put heavier penalty onto distressed debt speculators and reduce penalty on investors who acquired Ukrainian debt before the crisis started.

Meanwhile, Ukraine's probability of default is climbing. Here are two sources: implied bonds probability of default at >95% and Credit Default Swaps implied probability of default at almost 82%.

Source: @Schuldensuehner

Source: CMA

The latest spike in default probabilities took place following IMF comments (see:  http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2015/tr061115.htm) that effectively altered markets expectation as to whether or not the IMF will allow Kiev to default on private debt. It now appears that the IMF has little problem with Kiev using strong-arm tactic of threatening (and enacting) a default on private sector debt. Prior to this week, the understanding was that the IMF will not lend to Ukraine if it goes into a default - a position that allowed private debt holders to argue that their intransigence is supported by the pressure from the IMF on Kiev to conclude a deal. Now, that pressure is gone and IMF seemingly is giving green light to Kiev to default, as long as such a default does not take place after any deal conclusion.

Update: The strategy deployed by IMF in the case of Ukraine - the strategy of actively forcing a default as a credible threat to private sector holders of debt - is not new. It was outlined in this document from 2002 (see page 28 of http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng/sdrm.pdf): "There may be a risk that creditors would withhold an extension of the stay in the hope that the IMF would provide more financing or call on the member to make additional adjustment efforts. For example, even in circumstances where the member is implementing good policies and negotiating in good faith, creditors may refuse to extend the period of the stay as a means of persuading the member to turn to the IMF for financing that could enhance the terms of any restructuring. The creditors could threaten to lift the stay to force the debtor to agree to more adjustment than contemplated under the IMF-supported program. Such risks could be reduced, however, by the resolute application of the IMF’s policy of lending into arrears, under which it signals its willingness to continue to support a program, even if the member has interrupted payments to its creditors."

31/5/15: IMF slashes Ukraine Economy Outlook

IMF statement on Ukraine with some pretty ugly forecast revisions.

[Note, emphasis in italics is mine]

"Press Release No. 15/243, May 31, 2015

IMF Statement on Discussions with Ukraine on First Review under the Extended Fund Facility Arrangement

An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission visited Kyiv during May 12-29 to hold discussions on the first review under the Extended Fund Facility Arrangement (EFF) in support of the authorities’ economic reform program (see Press Release No. 15/107).

At the conclusion of the visit, Mr. Nikolay Gueorguiev, mission chief for Ukraine, made the following statement today in Kyiv:
 ...
“The authorities’ commitment to the reform program remains strong. All performance criteria for end-March were met and all structural benchmarks due in the Spring are on course to be met, albeit some with a delay. This good program implementation has been achieved notwithstanding an exceptionally difficult environment, in part related to the unresolved conflict in the East, which took a heavier than expected toll on the economy in the first quarter of 2015.

Accordingly, the mission has revised down growth projections for 2015 to -9 percent and projects end-year inflation at 46 percent. Inflation was mostly driven by one-off pass-through effects of the large exchange rate depreciation in February as well as the needed energy price increases.

“In recent months, signs that economic stability is gradually taking hold are steadily emerging. The foreign exchange market has remained broadly stable. Gross international reserves, although still very low, have increased to US$9.6 billion at end-April. Banks’ deposits in domestic currency have been recovering. The budget outturn in the first months of 2015 was stronger than expected, partly due to temporary factors.

“The authorities recognize that decisive implementation of economic reforms is indispensable for entrenching financial stability and restoring robust and sustainable growth. They are committed to advancing fiscal consolidation and energy sector reforms, including further energy tariff adjustments to eliminate the large losses of Naftogaz, reduce energy consumption, and foster energy independence. They are also moving ahead with the rehabilitation of the banking system, and the improvement of the business environment to enhance the productive potential of the economy.

“The authorities are also determined to complete the ongoing debt operation in line with program objectives. This will ensure that public debt is sustainable with high probability and the program remains fully financed, which are requirements for the completion of the review. More broadly, continued financial support for Ukraine’s reform efforts from official and private creditors is vital for the success of the program.”

Let's hope IMF optimism wins over the reality, but just two and a half months ago, the IMF projected gross international reserves for 2015 at USD18.3 billion, and now they are celebrating reserves at USD9.6bn. IMF programme sustainability analysis was forecasting real GDP decline of 5.5% in 2015 - not 9% decline the Fund now projects. See: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr1569.pdf for more details.

One has to wonder, just how 'flexible' the Fund became in recent years when it comes to 'hard' numbers underpinning it's 'programme sustainability' arithmetic.

30/5/15: Private Sector Counter-Proposal for Ukrainian Debt Restructuring

An interesting and far-reaching article on Ukraine's attempts to restructure some of its debts via Bloomberg: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-29/ukraine-creditors-said-to-offer-coupon-cuts-10-year-extension-ia9ao4ey

In the nutshell, Ukraine needs to restructure its debt per IMF three targets for debt 'sustainability':

• generate $15 billion in public-sector financing during the program period; 
• bring the public and publicly guaranteed debt-to-GDP ratio under 71% of GDP by 2020; and 
• keep the budget’s gross financing needs at an average of 10% of GDP (maximum of 12% of GDP annually) in 2019–2025

Note, these are different than what Bloomberg reports.

Key difference, however, is the matter of Russian debt. S&P note from February 2015 addressed this in detail: see more here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/04/15415-s-ukraine-ratings-and-reality.html. In simple terms, Ukraine's debt to Russia is not, repeat: not, a private debt. Instead it is official bilateral debt. As such it is not covered by the IMF programme condition for restructuring privately held debt regardless of whatever Ukrainian Rada or Government think. Full details of the IMF programme are linked here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/04/7415-imf-ninth-time-is-gonna-be-lucky.html

As I noted in March note, "IMF has already pre-committed Ukraine to cutting USD15.3 billion off its Government debt levels via private sector 'participation' in the programme" (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/03/16315-ukraines-government-debt.html) Once again, Bloomberg 'conveniently' ignores this pesky fact about only private debt being covered.

Now, it appears we have the first private sector offer for restructuring. It is pretty dramatic, as Bloomberg note linked above outlines. But it is clearly not enough, as it involves no cuts to the principal. This is the sticking point because the proposal front-loads notional savings to the amount of USD15.8 billion, but it subsequently requires Ukraine to repay full principal - a point that is not exactly in contradiction to the IMF plan in letter, but certainly risks violating it in spirit. The chart below shows that beyond Q2 2017, Ukraine is facing pretty steep repayments of debt and there is absolutely no guarantee that by then Ukraine will be able to withstand this repayments cliff.

To further complicate issues, Ukrainian Parliament (Rada) passed a law last week that would hold off repayments of debt until there is an agreement with private holders on haircuts. This presents three key problems for Ukraine:

1. The law can be used to hold off on repaying Russian debt, which is not private by definition and as such will constitute a sovereign default on bilateral loans. This will be pretty much as ugly as it gets short of defaulting on IMF.
2. The law, if implemented, will also halt repayments on genuine private debt. Which will also constitute a default.
3. If Russia refuses to restructure its debt (for example, citing the fact that it is non-private debt), Rada law will have to be applied selectively (e.g. if Rada suspends repayments on Russian debt alone), which will strengthen Russian position in international courts.

In case of default, be it on Russian debt or on private debt, or both, Ukraine will see its foreign assets arrested. Which involves state enterprises-owned property, accounts etc. The reason for this is that Rada has no jurisdiction over laws governing these bonds, which are issued under English law. In addition, Ukrainian banks - big holders of Ukrainian Government debt - will be made insolvent overnight as the value of their assets (bonds) will collapse.

Final point is that ex-post application of the law, there will be no possibility for achieving any voluntary restructuring of debt as all negotiations will be terminated because Ukraine will be declared in a default.

While Greece continues to attract much of the media attention, the real crunch time is currently happening in Kiev and the outcome of this crisis is likely to have a significant impact across the international financial system, despite the fact that Ukraine is a relatively small minnow in the world of international finance.

Here is Euromoney Country Risk assessment of Ukrainian credit risks:

Ukraine score is 26.30 which ranks the country 147th in the world in creditworthiness.

17/5/15: Forbes Opinion Piece on Ukrainian Crisis

An interesting, unorthodox - for Western media - perspective on the Ukrainian crisis and Russian longer term problem: http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/05/11/ukraine-fight-flares-again-u-s-should-keep-arms-and-troops-at-home/


Note: as usual, my reposting of the material does not qualify as an endorsement of the views presented.

17/5/15: Ukraine's GDP down 17.6% in 1Q

Some pretty bad numbers out of Ukraine this week. 

Remember that 1Q 2015 Russian GDP shrunk 1.9% y/y in real terms and the forecasts for 2015 full year decline range between 3% (official forecast) to north of 7% (some Western banks analysts), with the consensus at around 3.8-4.0%.

Now, Ukraine's economy is in the IMF programme and the Fund latest forecast for 2015 full year growth was -5.548%. That is the base on which the so-called debt sustainability analysis is based. Even the World Bank - which forecast -7.5% real GDP decline for 2015 - was contrarian to the IMF optimism.

However, this week official data shows real GDP decline of 17.6% in 1Q 2015 y/y and down 6.5% on 4Q 2014. Exports to the EU are down 1/3rd, exports to Russia down 61% and industrial output is down more than 20%. With inflation at around 60% y/y in April, retail sales are down 31% at the end of 1Q 2015 y/y. 

Good news is - it is likely that 2H 2015 will see some improvement in Ukrainian growth dynamics, just as the same is likely in Russia. But I fear that we are going to see a much sharper contraction for the full year overall, compared to the IMF forecasts. If that turns out to be the case, Ukraine can require restructuring of its IMF 'assistance' package, although much of that risk also hinges on the progress on haircuts negotiations with the private sector creditors. These negotiations have not been progressing too well, so far, but there may be a turnaround in the works. 

In short, Ukraine's 'debt sustainability' charade the IMF has put up is now firmly in crosshairs of two risks - the haircut slippage and economy collapse. And both risks are rising, not falling so far…

27/3/15: Inching toward default: Ukraine CDS

Ukraine default scenarios (and debt restructuring) is now in the front line news, especially with IMF declaring then un-declaring its distaste for Russian position on EUR3 billion debt Ukraine owes Moscow that is due this year: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/27/ukraine-crisis-imf-idUSL2N0WS1FO20150327. So much so, even Reuters are confused...

But here's the markets absent any confusion: Ukraine CDS are now trading with implied probability of default of 98.2%.

Source: @Schuldensuehner 

Which is, at this stage, only a question of whether or when the ISDA call the default.

Whether you like it or not, Ukraine needs to restructure its debts. Its economy cannot carry the interest burden and it cannot sustain any sort of recovery absent a significant debt writedown. Lending to the country to repay some of these debts is madness of highest order - so much so that even the IMF knows it. Even if Ukraine gets a massive writedown of debt, it will have years of extremely painful reforms ahead of it, and its economic development model will have to be re-written in its entirety. But at least the Ukrainian people will be able to think of this pain as not going to fund foreign legacy lenders. A small consolation, but a necessary one.

22/3/15: Ukraine: disastrous growth figures

Ten quarters of shrinking GDP, out of 11 last. Ukraine:

Source: FT

When's the next 'rethink' by the IMF of the debt projections?..

16/3/15: Ukraine's Government Debt Projections: Smiling IMF, Whinging Private Lenders

Few weeks ago I covered in some details the implications for Ukraine of the latest IMF-led lending package: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/02/18215-imf-package-for-ukraine-some.html. My projection was for the debt/GDP ratio reaching over 100% in the medium term (2016-2017) based on the timing of disbursal of the new loans package and the composition of the package at the time.

The latest IMF forecasts (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr1569.pdf) show debt/GDP ratio peaking at 94.6% of GDP in 2015. IMF latest estimate is based on the assumption that, having posted primary deficit of 1.15% of GDP in 2014, Ukraine will return a primary surplus of 1.1% of GDP in 2015. As IMF notes, average primary balance in 2004-2013 in Ukraine was -2.4% of GDP, so, as some would say... 'good luck' with that.

And the programme is also anchored to the private sector-held public debt restructuring. Here's MOU from the Ukrainian authorities on this: "To secure adequate public sector financing in the coming years, while also putting public debt firmly on a downward path, we intend to consult with the holders of public sector debt on a debt operation to improve medium-term debt sustainability. To facilitate this consultation, and in line with international best practice, we have hired financial and legal advisors (prior action). While the specific terms of the debt operation would be determined following our consultations with creditors, it would be guided by the following program objectives: (i) generate US$15 billion in public sector financing during the program period; (ii) bring the public and publicly guaranteed debt/GDP ratio under 71 percent of GDP by 2020; and (iii) keep the budget’s gross financing needs at an average of 10 percent of GDP (maximum of 12 percent of GDP annually) in 2019–2025. The restructuring is expected to be based on the program baseline macro framework applicable at the time the debt operation is launched. The debt operation is expected to be finalized by the time of the first review." Or in more simple terms, the IMF has already pre-committed to Ukraine cutting USD15.3 billion off its Government debt levels via private sector 'participation' in the programme. Something that is (a) questionable in terms of Ukraine's ability to deliver on, and (b) making a number of very powerful lenders quite unhappy (see http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article.php?id=517502).

And outside the baseline scenario, here is IMF's assessment of risks to Ukraine's debt profile: "Under a growth shock, entailing a cumulative growth decline of over 9 percentage points in 2016–17, the debt-to-GDP ratio reaches nearly 119 percent in 2017. A real exchange rate shock not dissimilar to the one in 2014 would also keep the debt ratio above 100 percent of GDP throughout the projection period. The combined macro-fiscal shock, an aggregation of the shocks to real growth, interest rate, primary balance and exchange rate, produces unsustainable dynamics, sending debt above 200 percent of GDP in 2017. The contingent liabilities shock highlights the risk of a further deterioration of the banking sector and associated higher fiscal costs. Its impact is mitigated by the buffer embedded under the baseline for larger-than-expected bank restructuring costs. By imposing a large associated shock to growth (14 percentage points below the baseline in 2016–17) and given the resulting deterioration in the primary balance together with an increase in interest rates, under the contingent liabilities shock debt peaks at 116 percent of GDP in 2017."

So in simple terms, I will largely stick with my original estimates that around 2016-2017, we are likely to see Ukraine's government debt around 100% of GDP marker.

11/3/15: IMF Approves Bailout 3.0 for Ukraine

IMF statement on Ukraine:

Backgrounders: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/02/18215-imf-package-for-ukraine-some.html and here: https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2015/pr1550.htm

Key points to the above: IMF came through just-in-time after seeing Ukraine going down to the last USD 4.5 billion in reserves and only barely enough time to pay the loans due to be repaid to... IMF. In a sense, IMF decision avoids the risk of IMF engineering the most pesky form of sovereign default known to the humanity: a default on IMF debt. Congratulations, IMF.

The hope-filled IMF statement is worth reading, but apparently, Ms. Lagarde sees Minsk 2 agreements as "largely holding for now". Which is consistent with some reports but most certainly is at odds with the UK, US and Nato views.

Another part worth noting is IMF's continued insistence that Ukraine's economic collapse is just a temporary 'balance of payments' problem. And in line with delirium, IMF is lauding the Ukrainian authorities for allowing "the exchange rate to adjust", as if Kiev had not thrown every last bit of meagre reserves and every possible bit of capital controls at defending the exchange rate in a futile attempt to prevent such 'adjustment'.

That said, let us hope that Ukrainian economy is indeed provided some much needed support through this package and that the reforms, penned into the agreement, do not lead another Maidan.

23/2/15: Ukraine CDS-implied Default Rate Shoots Above 97%

As noted by @Schuldensuehner Ukraine's probability of default is now just shy of 97.1%:

Which is spectacular in its own right. But one has to consider what this market pricing really implies.

As we know, Ukraine will receive super-senior debt injections courtesy of the IMF. This will alleviate the immediate crunch on Government liquidity (Ukraine FX reserves are now below scheduled debt redemptions for March-September). So the above risk spike cannot be attributed to the risk of liquidity crisis.

As I explain here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/02/18215-imf-package-for-ukraine-some.html , this liquidity support comes at a hefty cost: the debt burden that will result from the international lenders intervention will be non-sustainable and it can exacerbate popular discontent with current Government.

Now, the latest news from the Eastern ATO are pretty disastrous, and, arguably, also unlikely to go well with the Ukrainians.

This is of course speculative, but given lack of the risk around future liquidity crunch, the latest spike in the CDS spreads suggests that the markets see serious political risks ahead soon.

21/2/15: Russian Sovereign Wealth Funds: 2015 drawdowns

In the previous note I covered Moody's downgrade of Russian sovereign debt rating (see http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/02/21215-moodys-downgrade-russia-risks-and.html). Now, as promised, a quick note on Russian use of sovereign fund cash reserves (also referenced in the Moody's decision, although Moody's references are somewhat more dated, having been formulated around the end of January).

Back at the end of January, Russia’s sovereign wealth funds amounted to USD160 billion, with the Government primarily taking a historically-set approach (from 2003 onwards) of arms-length interactions with the Funds management. This relative non-interference marked 2014 and is now set to be changed, with the Government looking at using SWFs to provide some support for the investment that has been falling in 2013-2014 period and is likely to fall even further this year.

Fixed investment in Russia fell 2.0% y/y in 2013, and by another 3.7% in 2014. Private investment is likely to fall by double digits in 2015, based on the cost of funding, lack of access to international funding and general recession in the economy. It is likely to stay in negative growth territory through 2016.

Thus, last week, Prime Minister Medvedev signed an executive order deploying up to RUB500 billion from the Reserve Fund. The money will be used, notionally, to cover this year deficits (expected to hit 2% of GDP), thus protecting the state from the need to borrow from the markets. The Fund was originally set up precisely for this purpose - to finance deficits arising during recessionary periods. In other words, this is stabilisation-targeted use of stabilisation funds. The fund is fully accounted for in the total Forex reserves reported by the Central Bank. Latest figures for end of January 2015 showed the fund to have USD85 billion or RUB5,900 billion in its reserves, so this year allocation is a tiny, 8.5% fraction of the total fund. All funds are allocated into liquid, foreign currency-denominated assets.

The second use of SWFs is via the economic support programme that will draw up to RUB550 billion worth of funds in 2015 from the second SWF - the National Welfare Fund (NWF). Part of this funding is earmarked for banks capitalisation, ring fenced explicitly for banks providing funding to large infrastructure investments and lending for the enterprises. The use of the NWF funds is more controversial, because the Fund was set up to provide backing for future pensions liabilities, including statutory old-age pensions. However, the NWF has been used for the economic stimulus purposes before, namely in the 2009 crisis. Currently, NWF holds USD74 billion or RUB5,100 billion worth of assets. Liquid share of these assets, denominated in foreign currencies, is also included in the Central Bank-reported Forex reserves, but long-term allocated illiquid share and ruble-denominated assets are excluded from the CBR reported figures.

Now, per Moody's note issued last night, "The second driver for the downgrade of Russia's government bond rating to Ba1 is the expected further erosion of Russia's fiscal strength and foreign exchange buffers. …Taking at face value the government's plans to proceed with its planned fiscal consolidation for 2015, Moody's expects a consolidated government deficit of approximately RUB1.6 trillion (2% of GDP) as well as a widening of the non-oil deficit. The deficit would likely be financed by drawing on the Reserve Fund, which is specifically designed for circumstances when oil prices fall below budgeted levels. …Moreover, under the stress exerted by a shrinking economy, wider budget deficits and continued capital flight -- in part reflecting the impact of the Ukraine crisis on investor and depositor confidence -- and restricted access to international capital markets, Moody's expects that the central bank's and government's FX assets will likely decrease significantly again this year, cutting the sovereign's reserves by more than half compared to their year-end 2014 level of approximately USD330 billion. In a more adverse but not unimaginable scenario, which assumes smaller current account surpluses and substantially larger capital outflows than in Moody's baseline forecast, FX reserves including both government savings funds would be further depleted. While the government might choose to mobilise some form of capital controls to impede the outflow of capital and reserves, such tools are not without consequences. Capital controls, which might include a rationing of retail deposit withdrawals and/or prohibition upon repatriation of foreign investment capital, would weaken the investment climate further and undermine confidence in the banking system."

21/2/15: Moody's Downgrade: Russia Risks and Politics

Moody's downgraded Russian sovereign debt last night from Baa3 to Ba1 with negative outlook. Moody's put Russian ratings on a review back on January 16.

The bases for the downgrade were (quotes from Moody's statement):

1. "The continuing crisis in Ukraine and the recent oil price and exchange rate shocks will further undermine Russia's economic strength and medium-term growth prospects, despite the fiscal and monetary policy responses". In more specific terms, "Russia is expected to experience a deep recession in 2015 and a continued contraction in 2016. The decline in confidence is likely to constrain domestic demand and exacerbate the Russian economy's already chronic underinvestment. It is unlikely that the impact of recent events will be transitory. The crisis in Ukraine continues. While the fall in the oil price and the exchange rate have reversed somewhat since the start of the year, the impact on inflation, confidence and growth is likely to be sustained." As I noted on numerous occasions before, monetary policy environment remains highly challenging. Per Moody's "The monetary authorities face the conflicting objectives of keeping interest rates high enough to restrain the exchange rate and bring down inflation and keeping rates low enough to reinvigorate economic growth and bank solvency."
2. "The government's financial strength will diminish materially as a result of fiscal pressures and the continued erosion of Russia's foreign exchange (FX) reserves in light of ongoing capital outflows and restricted access to international capital markets." I will post a quick note on this matter later today, so stay tuned. Here's Moody's view: "Taking at face value the government's plans to proceed with its planned fiscal consolidation for 2015, Moody's expects a consolidated government deficit of approximately RUB1.6 trillion (2% of GDP) as well as a widening of the non-oil deficit. The deficit would likely be financed by drawing on the Reserve Fund, which is specifically designed for circumstances when oil prices fall below budgeted levels. Moody's also expects that widespread demands for fiscal easing are likely to emerge if, as the rating agency projects, the recession persists into 2016. In a scenario in which the government would turn to borrowing in the domestic market to finance at least a share of these deficits, higher spending could result in an increase of the debt-to-GDP ratio to 20% or more."
3. "The risk is rising, although still very low, that the international response to the military conflict in Ukraine triggers a decision by the Russian authorities that directly or indirectly undermines timely payments on external debt service." In other words, we are facing a political risk. Capital controls and debt repayment stops are two key risks here and these were visible for some time now, especially if you have followed my writing on the Russian crisis.

What's the driver for the negative outlook? Uncertainty. Per Moody's: "The negative outlook on the Ba1 rating reflects Moody's view that the balance of economic, financial and political risks in Russia is slanted to the downside, with scenarios incorporating either an escalation of the Ukraine crisis and/or damage caused by recent shocks being greater than in Moody's baseline scenario. Essentially, the probabilities associated with the downside scenarios are higher than those associated with an upside scenario in which the recession is shorter and shallower than Moody's baseline."


Conclusion: an ugly, but predictable move by Moody's. One can say part of it is down to rating agencies activism in trying to establish some sense of credibility post-Global Financial Crisis, whereby getting tougher on ratings is a major objective, and it is well-served by getting tougher on politically softer targets, like Russia. But one can equally argue that the ratings downgrade is consistent with economic environment and some longer-run fundamentals. My view would be is that we are seeing both, with the balance of impetus tilted toward the latter argument.