1/5/15: Russian Economy: Latest Forecasts and Debates

Russian economy has been surprising to the upside in recent months, although that assessment is conditioned heavily by the fact that 'upside' really means lower rate (than expected) of economic decline and stabilised oil prices at above USD55 pb threshold. On the former front, 1Q 2015 decline in real GDP is now estimated at 2.2% y/y - well below -3% official forecast (reiterated as recently as on April 1) and -2.8% contraction forecast just last week, and -4.05% consensus forecast for FY 2015. It is worth noting that contraction in GDP did accelerate between February (-1.2% y/y) and March (-3.4% y/y). 2Q 2015 forecast remains at -3%.

In line with this, there have been some optimistic revisions to the official forecasts. Russian economy ministry has produced yet another (fourth in just two months) forecast with expected GDP decline of 2.8% this year. Crucially, even 2.8% decline forecast figure still assumes oil price of USD50 pb. Similarly, the Economy Ministry latest forecast for 2016 continues to assume oil at USD60 pb, but now estimates 2016 GDP growth at +2.3%

These are central estimates absent added stimulus. In recent weeks, Russian Government has been working on estimating possible impact of using up to 80% of the National Welfare Fund reserves to boost domestic infrastructure investment. This is expected to form the 3 year action plan to support economic growth that is expected to raise domestic investment to 22-24% of GDP by 2020 from current 18%. The objective is to push Russian growth toward 3.5-4% mark by 2018, while increasing reliance on private enterprise investment and entrepreneurship to drive this growth.

An in line with this (investment) objective, the CBR cut its key rate this week by 150bps to 12.5%. My expectation is that we will see rates at around 10%-10.5% before the end of 2015. From CBR's statement: "According to Bank of Russia estimates, as of 27 April, annual consumer price growth rate stood at 16.5%. High rates of annual inflation are conditioned primarily by short-term factors: ruble depreciation in late 2014 — January 2015 and external trade restrictions. Meanwhile, monthly consumer price growth is estimated to have declined on the average to 1.0% in March-April from 3.1% in January-February, and annual inflation tends to stabilise. Lower consumer demand amid contracting real income and ruble appreciation in the recent months curbed prices. Inflation expectations of the population decreased against this backdrop. Current monetary conditions also facilitate the slowdown in consumer price growth. Money supply (M2) growth rate remains low. Lending and deposit rates are adjusted downwards under the influence of previous Bank of Russia decisions to reduce the key rate. However, they remain high, on the one hand, contributing to attractiveness of ruble savings, and, on the other hand, alongside with tighter borrower and collateral requirements, resulting in lower annual lending growth."

There is an interesting discussion about the ongoing strengthening in Russian economic outlook here: https://fortune.com/2015/04/29/russia-economy-resilience/. Here's an interesting point: "Russian-born investment banker Ruben Vardanyan pointed out that the collapse of the ruble left much of the economy untouched, with roughly 90% of the population not inclined to buy imported goods. And that population, Vardanyan points out, has only increased its support for Vladimir Putin in the months following the imposition of sanctions." I am not so sure about 90% not inclined to buy imports, but one thing Vardanyan is right about is that imports substitution is growing and this has brought some good news for producers in the short run, whilst supporting the case for raising investment in the medium term.


Meanwhile, The Economist does a reality check on bullish view of the Russian economy: http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21650188-dont-mistake-stronger-rouble-russian-economic-recovery-worst-yet.

The Economist is right on some points, but, sadly, they miss a major one when they are talking about the pressures from USD100bn of external debt maturing in 2015.

Here is why.

Russia's public and private sector foreign debt that will mature in the rest of this year (see details here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/04/14415-russian-external-debt-redemptions.html) does not really amount to USD 100bn.

Foreign currency-denominated debt maturing in May-December 2015 amounts to USD68.8 billion and the balance to the USD100bn is Ruble-denominated debt which represents no significant challenge in funding. Of the USD68.8 billion of foreign exchange debt maturing, only USD2.01 billion is Government debt. Do note - USD611 million of this is old USSR-time debt.

Corporate liabilities maturing in May-December 2015 amounts to USD45.43 billion. Of which USD12.46 billion are liabilities to direct investors and can be easily rolled over. Some USD963 million of the remainder is various trade credits and leases. Also, should the crunch come back, extendable and cross-referenced. Which leaves USD32.07 billion of corporate debt redeemable. Some 20% of the total corporate debt is inter-company debt, which means that - roughly-speaking - the real corporate debt that will have to be rolled over or redeemed in the remaining months of 2015 is around USD26-27 billion. Add to this that Russian companies have been able to roll over debt in the markets recently and there is an ongoing mini-boom in Russian corporate debt and equity, and one can be pretty much certain that the overall net burden on foreign exchange reserves from maturing corporate debt is going to be manageable.

The balance of debt maturing in May-December 2015 involves banks liabilities. All are loans and deposits (except for demand deposits) including debt liabilities to direct investors and to direct investment enterprises. Which means that around 25-33% of the total banks liabilities USD26.57 billion maturing is cross-referenced to group-related debts and investor-related liabilities. Again, should a crunch come, these can be rolled over internally. The balance of USD19.9 billion will have to be funded.

So let's take in the panic USD100 billion of foreign debt claimed to be still maturing in 2015 and recognise that less than USD50 billion of that is likely to be a potential (and I stress, potential) drain on Russian foreign exchange reserves. All of a sudden, panicked references in the likes of The Economist become much less panicked.

Meanwhile, Russian economy continues to post current account surpluses, and as imports continue to shrink, Russian producers' margins are getting stronger just as their balance sheets get healthier (due to some debt redemptions). It's a tough process - deleveraging the economy against adverse headwinds - but it is hardly a calamity. And The Economist, were it to shed its usual anti-Russian biases, would know as much.

That said, significant risks remain, which means that a prudent view of the Russian economy should be somewhere between The Economist's scare crow and the Fortune's and the Economy Ministry's cheerleading. Shall we say to expect, on foot of current data and outlook, the 2015 GDP growth to come in at -3.5-4%, with 2016 economic growth to come in at +1.5-2%?

14/1/16: Debt in Sub-Saharan Africa & Country-Specific Risks

The age of QE in the West, as well as the Great Recession and the Global Financial Crisis have both undoubtedly left some serious scars on the Emerging Markets. One example is the rising (once again) debt in the countries that prior to 2007 have benefited from major debt restructuring initiatives. Here is the new World Bank paper assessing the extent of debt accumulation in Sub-Saharan Africa post-2007.

"Sub-Saharan African countries as a group showed a considerable reduction in public and external indebtedness in the early 2000s as a result of debt relief programs, higher economic growth, and improved fiscal management for some countries. More recently, however, vulnerabilities in some countries are on the rise, including a few with very rapid debt accumulation."

Across Sub-Saharan African countries, "borrowing to support fiscal deficits since 2009, including through domestic markets and Eurobond issuance, has driven a net increase in public debt for all countries except oil exporters benefitting from buoyant commodity prices and fragile states receiving post-2008 Highly Indebted Poor Country relief. Current account deficits and foreign direct investment inflows drove the external debt dynamics, with balance of payments problems associated with very rapid external debt accumulation in some cases. Pockets of increasing vulnerabilities of debt financing profiles and sensitivity of debt burden indicators to macro-fiscal shocks require close monitoring."

And looking forward, things are not exactly promising: "Specific risks that policy makers in Sub-Saharan Africa need to pay attention to going forward include the recent fall in commodity prices, especially oil, the slowdown in China and the sluggish recovery in Europe, dependence on non-debt-creating flows, and accounting for contingent liabilities."

Full paper: Battaile, Bill and Hernandez, Fernando Leonardo and Norambuena, Vivian, Debt Sustainability in Sub-Saharan Africa: Unraveling Country-Specific Risks (December 21, 2015). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7523 is available via SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2706885

3/8/15: IMF on Russian Economy: Private Sector Debt

Continuing with IMF analysis of the Russian economy, recall that
- The first post here covered GDP growth projections (upgraded)
- External Debt and Fiscal positions (a mixed bag with broadly positive supports but weaker longer-term sustainability issues relating to deficits).

This time around, let's take a look at IMF analysis of Private Sector Debt.

As IMF notes, economic crisis is weighing pretty heavily on banks' Non-performing Loans:

In part, the above is down to hefty write downs taken by the banks on Ukrainian assets (Russian banks were some of the largest lenders to Ukraine in the past) both in corporate and household sectors.

However, thanks to deleveraging (primarily in the corporate sector, due to sanctions, and some in household sector, due to economic conditions), Loan to Deposits ratio is on the declining trajectory:

Note: Here is a chart on deleveraging of the corporate sector and for Russian banks:

In line with changes in demand for debt redemptions, FX rates, as well as due to some supports from the Federal Government, banks' exposure to Central Bank funding lines has moderated from the crisis peak, though it remains highly elevated:

Illustrating the severity of sanctions, corporate funding from external lenders and markets has been nil:

And Gross External Debt is falling (deleveraging) on foot of cut-off markets and increased borrowing costs:

So companies are heading into domestic markets to borrow (banks - first chart below, bonds - second chart below):

Net:

1) Corporate external debt is falling:

2) Household debt is already low:

3) But the problem is that deleveraging under sanctions is coinciding with economic contraction (primarily driven by lower oil prices), which means that Government reserve funds (while still sufficient) are not being replenished. IMF correctly sees this as a long term problem:

So top of the line conclusion here is that banking sector remains highly pressured by sanctions and falling profitability, as well as rising NPLs. Credit issuance is supported not by new capital formation (investment) but by corporates switching away from foreign debt toward domestic debt. Deleveraging, while long-term positive, is painful for the economy. While the system buffers remain sufficient for now, long term, Russia will require serious changes to fiscal rules to strengthen its reserves buffers over time.

23/12/2014: A Simple Math: Russian Default or Not

A simple math:

• Russia's total external debt, stripping out cross-holdings of corporate entities and banks (debt owed by Russian subsidiaries to foreign parents, debt owed by Russian companies to Russian investment vehicles registered off-shore, debt owed by Russian JVs to foreign partners, etc) is around USD500 and USD600 billion, based on various estimates. Note: official estimates put gross external debt in foreign currency at USD540 billion at Q2 2014, of which we can net out around 15 percent for cross-holdings by (ultimately) Russian entities, implying gross external foreign currency-denominated debt net of cross holdings at ca USD460 billion.
• Of this, roughly USD101 billion matures in 2015
• Russian GDP is slightly over USD2 trillion
• Thus, total external debt of Russian companies, households and the Government net of cross-holdings amounts to 25-30% of its GDP.  By World Bank data referencing this runs at around USD23% of GDP.
• By the end of 2015, if the repayments take place, and factoring in dim sum new debt issuance, it will be around 22-27% of GDP or by World Bank methodology - around 20% of GDP.

By the above, Russian economy is nowhere near any significant risk of defaults, save for the risk of default induced solely by two forces (should they continue on the current trend):

1. Oil price collapse, now increasingly looking as being caused by the combination of shale output surge and Saudi Arabia's response to that, and
2. Western sanctions that effectively imposed external capital controls of extreme severity on Russian economy.

You can blame President Putin for many things, and rightly so. But for any, even nascent capital controls Russia imposes (I will post my thoughts on these in a couple of hours, once my comment to a journalist goes to print) you really should blame President Obama & the House of Saud.

Economics 28/05/2010: Spain's downgrade is a warning for Ireland

In a significant development today, Fitch cut Spain’s credit ratings to AA+ from AAA. This was expected.

What was unexpected and new in this development is the expressed reason for the cut.

Per reports, "Fitch said Spain’s deleveraging of record-high levels of household and corporate debt and growing levels of government debt would drag on economic growth." (Globe & Mail)

This puts pressure not only on the euro and European equities, but also on the rest of the PIIGS' sovereign bonds. Ireland clearly stands out in this crowd.

As I have shown here and more importantly - here, Ireland is by far the most indebted economy in the developed world. While it is true that a large proportion of our total external debt accrues to IFSC, even adjusting for that

• Our General Government Debt held externally is the fifth highest in the developed world;
• Our External Banks Debt is the highest in the world;
• Our Private Sector Debt (Total Debt ex Banks & Government) is the highest in the world; and
• Our Total External Debt is the highest in the world.

In addition, per IMF (see here) our budgetary position is one of the weakest in the world, including for the horizon through 2015 (here).

“The downgrade reflects Fitch’s assessment that the process of adjustment to a lower level of private sector and external indebtedness will materially reduce the rate of growth of the Spanish economy over the medium-term,” Fitch’s analyst Brian Coulton said in a statement.

Fitch said "Spain’s current government debt would likely reach 78 per cent of gross domestic product by 2013 from under 40 per cent before the start of the global financial crisis in 2007." Irish debt is projected to reach 94% of GDP by 2015 (IMF) or 122% of GNP - the real measure of our income. If we factor in the cost of Nama and banks, Irish Government debt will reach 122% of GDP by 2015.

This puts into perspective the real scope for public spending cuts we must enact in this and next year's Budgets. The Government aim to reduce spending by a miserly €3 billion in each year through 2012 will not do the job here. We will have to do at least 2.5 times that much to get our house in order.

19/12/2014: The Plight of Russian Banks Overhype?

Deutsche Bank note from earlier this month covering Russian banks is telling as to the nature of the problems.

Per DB: "A tighter funding situation and weak economic growth will dampen credit expansion, although Russian banks’ dependence on external funding is not strong. Rising NPLs will negatively impact profitability, but the government’s capacity to provide support to systemically important banks remains strong."

So in summary, few illustrations of the above.

There is a weak credit impulse in Russia through Q2 2014 (this is likely accelerated in Q3-Q4), especially on foot of hikes in CBR rates:

But credit growth remains elevated, albeit it is subdued relative to historical averages:

DB conclusion on growth potential is cautious: "Russian banks are facing several challenges. As economic growth is projected to remain weak and the banks’ external funding situation has tightened given EU and US sanctions, real credit growth is expected to slow down from the current 11% yoy (October data referring to total domestic credit)."

Still, "overall asset quality remains adequate (NPLs at 6.7% of total loans as of September), but it is likely to deteriorate over the coming months as the economy is close to recession and consumer indebtedness is growing. Moreover, rising loan loss provisions (with provisioning levels currently at 70% of total NPLs) and higher funding costs will have a negative impact on profitability over the next few quarters.

Capitalisation levels are moderate, with the ratio of core capital to risk-weighted assets standing at 9.4% in September. The Central Bank has started preparing Russian banks to meet Basel III capital requirements. But it recently delayed the implementation of the Basel III liquidity requirement by six months to July 2015, taking into account difficulties in obtaining long-term funding."

Worth noting that the delay is no longer: Russia introduced new bank recaps this week: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/19/us-russia-crisis-banks-capital-idUSKBN0JX0R620141219

Amazingly, Russian banks overall are not as reliant on foreign funding as one would have expected: "…a closer look at the funding structure of Russian banks shows that they are not overly dependent on external funding, which accounts for less than 20% of total debt liabilities. The share of the potentially most volatile funding sources (foreign interbank funding, syndicated loans, Eurobonds) has decreased since the financial crisis in 2008/2009. Non-resident deposits account for half of the USD 209 bn external bank debt outstanding. Moreover, only USD 44 bn of external bank debt will fall due within the next 14 months (see figure 5), with the largest 30 financial institutions holding an FX buffer of USD 32 bn (difference between FX liquid assets and FX liabilities maturing in the next five quarters)."

Two charts to illustrate:

Few caveats: "…when assessing the external debt of Russian banks, two contrasting data specification aspects have to be kept in mind. On the one hand, part of banks’ external borrowing is inter-company lending, which tends to be rolled over and thus mitigates external funding risks (figure 6 shows a proxy for this lending). On the other hand, bank external debt might be underestimated by the CBR using the “residency” and not the “nationality” concept of the borrower. Figure 7 shows that banks’ international debt securities falling due are significantly higher when using the nationality rather than the residency concept (USD 16.4 bn vs. USD 1.3 bn)."

But the key, so far, is the non-performing loans:

Clearly, Russian banking pressures from NPLs are, for now, benign. DB warns: "we expect NPLs to increase in Russia and Ukraine given the bleak economic outlook and currency weakness (against the background of relatively high levels of FX- denominated loans, especially in Ukraine)." Question is: what about provisioning cushions? Well, Russian banks seem to be fine here too:

On the net, DB warns that tough times are still ahead for Russian banks. I would agree. This week's changes in mark-to-market accounting rules and repo collateral quality requirements, as well as recpaitalisation of the banks are strengthening the system buffers to deal with shorter term aspects of the crisis. Higher policy rates (17% for key rate) are net positive for deposits, but negative for mortgages and credit. So where the balance of these changes lies is anyone's guess at this point in time.

14/4/15: Russian external Debt Redemptions: Q1 2015 - Q3 2016

With Q1 out of the way, Russia passed a significant milestone in terms of 2015 external debt redemptions.

In total USD36.647 billion of external debt matured in Q1 2015, the highest peak for the period of Q1 2015 - Q3 2016. Even controlling for inter-company loans and equity positions, the figure was around USD24 billion for Q1 2015, again, the highest for the entire 2015 and the first three quarters of 2016.

Here is the breakdown of maturing external debts:

All in, over the last 3 quarters alone, Russia has managed to repay and roll over USD156.23 billion worth of external debt, with net repayment estimated at around USD96.5 billion.

Painful in the short run, this is not exactly weakening Russian economy in terms of forward debt/GDP and other debt-linked ratios.

13/6/19: Russian International Reserves and Government Debt

Earlier today, an esteemed colleague of mine tweeted out the following concerning Russian foreign reserves:

Which is hardly surprising, as Russia has been beefing up its reserves for some time now, following the crisis of 2014-2016 and in response to the continued pressures of Western sanctions. I wrote about this before here: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2019/04/10419-russian-foreign-exchange-reserves.html.

It is interesting in the light of the above news to look at Russian Government 'net worth' or 'net debt' (note: this is not the total external debt of Russia, nor Government external debt, but the total Russian Government debt comparative). Here is the chart based on the OECD data, with added estimate for Russia for 1Q 2019 based on IMF data and the latest data from CBR:

Based on my estimates and on OECD data itself, Russian Government has the largest positive net worth (lowest net debt) of any country in top 10 countries in the world (measured using nominal GDP adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity), and it is in this position by a wide margin.

The caveat is that India, China and Indonesia are not reported in the OECD data. China's Government net worth is virtually impossible to assess, because the country debt statistics are incomplete and measuring the gross wealth of the Chinese Government is also impossible. India and Indonesia are easier to gauge - both have positive net debt (negative net worth). IMF WEO database shows estimated General Government Net Debt for Indonesia at 25.5 percent of GDP in 2018. India has substantial gross Government debt of ca 70% of GDP (2018 figures), and the Government holds minor level resources, with country's sovereign wealth fund totalling at around 5 billion USD.

Another caveat is where the debt is held (Central Banks holdings of debt are arguably low risk) and whether or not assets held by the Governments are liquid enough to matter in these calculations (for example, Russian gold reserves are liquid, while some of the Russian funds investments in local enterprises are not). These caveats apply to all of the above economies.

On the net, this means that Russian Government is financially in a strongest leveraging position of all major economies in the world.

Economics 1/10/10: External Debt

Yesterday, CSO published Q2 2010 data on our International Investment Position.

Here are some highlights:

"At 30 June 2010, the gross external debt of all resident sectors (i.e. general government, the monetary authority, financial and non-financial corporations and households) amounted to €1,737bn." So Irish total gross external debt rose €63bn qoq.

Our total foreign liabilities stood at €2,643bn and are offset by €2,500bn of foreign assets.

The liabilities also include €1,218bn of equity and derivative liabilities that do not form part of external debt.

Liabilities of the Monetary Authority (to ECB) that consist almost entirely of short term loans and deposits, amounted to €66bn, an increase of €28bn on Q1 2010, but down €38bn on Q2 2009.

General government foreign borrowing decreased by over €3bn to €80bn between end-March and end-June 2010.

The liabilities of other sectors (financial intermediaries and non-financial corporates) increased by €17bn from Q1 and at €657bn represented 38% of the total debt, a similar share to the
previous quarter.

Direct investment liabilities increased by €17bn to €262bn in Q2

Liabilities of monetary financial institutions (credit institutions and money market funds) consisting mostly of loans and debt securities were €672bn, an increase of over €5bn on Q1, but down €18bn on Q2 2009.

Few charts. Starting with levels of assets and liabilities:
Next, balance:
Notice declining surplus in Other Sectors.

Combining assets and liabilities:
Lastly, removing Government from the equation:
Clearly, a sign of expanding liabilities and rising assets, with net balance on the negative side slightly worse than in Q1.

Summarizing these in tables:

18/2/15: IMF Package for Ukraine: Some Pesky Macros

Ukraine package of funding from the IMF and other lenders remains still largely unspecified, but it is worth recapping what we do know and what we don't.

Total package is USD40 billion. Of which, USD17.5 billion will come from the IMF and USD22.5 billion will come from the EU. The US seemed to have avoided being drawn into the financial singularity they helped (directly or not) to create.

We have no idea as to the distribution of the USD22.5 billion across the individual EU states, but it is pretty safe to assume that countries like Greece won't be too keen contributing. Cyprus probably as well. Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy - all struggling with debts of their own also need this new 'commitment' like a hole in the head. Belgium might cheerfully pony up (with distinctly Belgian cheer that is genuinely overwhelming to those in Belgium). But what about the countries like the Baltics and those of the Southern EU? Does Bulgaria have spare hundreds of million floating around? Hungary clearly can't expect much of good will from Kiev, given its tango with Moscow, so it is not exactly likely to cheer on the funding plans… Who will? Austria and Germany and France, though France is never too keen on parting with cash, unless it gets more cash in return through some other doors. In Poland, farmers are protesting about EUR100 million that the country lent to Ukraine. Wait till they get the bill for their share of the USD22.5 billion coming due.

Recall that in April 2014, IMF has already provided USD17 billion to Ukraine and has paid up USD4.5 billion to-date. In addition, Ukraine received USD2 billion in credit guarantees (not even funds) from the US, EUR1.8 billion in funding from the EU and another EUR1.6 billion in pre-April loans from the same source. Germany sent bilateral EUR500 million and Poland sent EUR100 million, with Japan lending USD300 million.

Here's a kicker. With all this 'help' Ukrainian debt/GDP ratio is racing beyond sustainability bounds. Under pre-February 'deal' scenario, IMF expected Ukrainian debt to peak at USD109 billion in 2017. Now, with the new 'deal' we are looking at debt (assuming no write down in a major restructuring) reaching for USD149 billion through 2018 and continuing to head North from there.

An added problem is the exchange rate which determines both the debt/GDP ratio and the debt burden.

Charts below show the absolute level of external debt (in current USD billions) and the debt/GDP ratios under the new 'deal' as opposed to previous programme. The second chart also shows the effects of further devaluation in Hryvna against the USD on debt/GDP ratios. It is worth noting that the IMF current assumption on Hryvna/USD is for 2014 rate of 11.30 and for 2015 of 12.91. Both are utterly unrealistic, given where Hryvna is trading now - at close to 26 to USD. (Note, just for comparative purposes, if Ruble were to hit the rates of decline that Hryvna has experienced between January 2014 and now, it would be trading at RUB/USD87, not RUB/USD61.20. Yet, all of us heard in the mainstream media about Ruble crisis, but there is virtually no reporting of the Hryvna crisis).

Now, keep in mind the latest macro figures from Ukraine are horrific.

Q3 2014 final GDP print came in at a y/y drop of 5.3%, accelerating final GDP decline of 5.1% in Q2 2014. Now, we know that things went even worse in Q4 2014, with some analysts (e.g. Danske) forecasting a decline in GDP of 14% y/y in Q4 2014. 2015 is expected to be a 'walk in the park' compared to that with FY projected GDP drop of around 8.5% for a third straight year!

Country Forex ratings are down at CCC- with negative outlook (S&P). These are a couple of months old. Still, no one in the rantings agencies is rushing to deal with any new data to revise these. Russia, for comparison, is rated BB+ with negative outlook and has been hammered by downgrades by the agencies seemingly racing to join that coveted 'Get Vlad!' club. Is kicking the Russian economy just a plat du jour when the agencies are trying to prove objectivity in analysis after all those ABS/MBS misfires of the last 15 years?

Also, note, the above debt figures, bad as they might be, are assuming that Ukraine's USD3 billion debt to Russia is repaid when it matures in September 2015. So far, Russia showed no indication it is willing to restructure this debt. But this debt alone is now (coupon attached) ca 50% of the entire Forex reserves held by Ukraine that amount to USD6.5 billion. Which means it will possibly have to be extended - raising the above debt profiles even higher. Or IMF dosh will have to go to pay it down. Assuming there is IMF dosh… September is a far, far away.

Meanwhile, you never hear much about Ukrainian external debt redemptions (aside from Government ones), while Russian debt redemptions (backed by ca USD370 billion worth of reserves) are at the forefront of the 'default' rumour mill. Ukrainian official forex reserves shrunk by roughly 62% in 14 months from January 2014. Russian ones are down 28.3% over the same period. But, you read of a reserves crisis in Russia, whilst you never hear much about the reserves crisis in Ukraine.

Inflation is now hitting 28.5% in January - double the Russian rate. And that is before full increases in energy prices are factored in per IMF 'reforms'. Ukraine, so far has gone through roughly 1/5 to 1/4 of these in 2014. More to come.

The point of the above comparatives between Russian and Ukrainian economies is not to argue that Russia is in an easy spot (it is not - there are structural and crisis-linked problems all over the shop), nor to argue that Ukrainian situation is somehow altering the geopolitical crisis developments in favour of Russia (it does not: Ukraine needs peace and respect for its territorial integrity and democracy, with or without economic reforms). The point is that the situation in the Ukrainian economy is so grave, that lending Kiev money cannot be an answer to the problems of stabilising the economy and getting economic recovery on a sustainable footing.

With all of this, the IMF 'plan' begs two questions:

1. Least important: Where's the European money coming from?
2. More important: Why would anyone lend funds to a country with fundamentals that make Greece look like Norway?
3. Most important: How on earth can this be a sustainable package for the country that really needs at least 50% of the total funding in the form of grants, not loans? That needs real investment, not debt? That needs serious reconstruction and such deep reforms, it should reasonably be given a decade to put them in place, not 4 years that IMF is prepared to hold off on repayment of debts owed to it under the new programme?

Note: here is the debt/GDP chart adjusting for the latest current and forward (12 months) exchange rates under the same scenarios as above, as opposed to the IMF dreamt up 2014 and 2015 estimates from back October 2014:

Do note in the above - declines in debt/GDP ratio in 2016-2018 are simply a technical carry over from the IMF assumptions on growth and exchange rates. Not a 'hard' forecast.

17/12/2011: The Plan and a Pie

Yes, yes, folks, I know, we have a plan. It's the plan to pay our debts (well, at least Government debts) from our 'exports-led growth'. We even had foreign experts telling us that we can do it - coming down from the Continent with lectures full of graphs and sums.

In reality, of course, the plan is a porky. We have booming trade in goods which is slowing down on growth rates, but remains pretty healthy. We have trade in services - that is not reported by the CSO in monthly series. That is in a deficit. Then there are other so-called 'invisibles' that are negative as well (see below). On the net, in 2010, our 'external surplus' measured by trade alone, including the invisibles (current account) was just €761mln. But then we have to add capital account - the inflows and outflows of capital - and that gives us the full external surplus - the Balance of payments bit - of a whooping debt-busting... €88 million.

Let's run through those figures... shall we?

Merchandise trade balance in Q3 2011 stood at €9,862mln or 6.9% ahead of Q2. Year on year, however, trade in goods shrunk 1.02% and for the first 9 months of 2011, trade balance in goods was 2.78% behind the same period of 2010. In other words, not a spectacular development so far in our strongest exporting sector. Certainly not what we would expect if we were to reach that 4.3-5.8 targets various Government documents set out for exports growth in 2011.

Services trade balance shows a deficit as of Q3 2011 at €379mln. The encouraging thing is that this is falling, and falling rapidly. But income flows abroad and current transfers abroad are running high at €8,170mln and €463mln respectively. This means total invisibles balance is in a deep deficit of €9,012mln in Q3 2011, improved by €700 mln on Q2 2011, but worse than same period 2010 by €227mln.

Adding up trade balance in goods and invisibles yields current account surplus of €850mln in Q3 2011. But for the 9 months of 2011, cumulated current account stands in a deficit of €669mln, not a surplus. And compared to same period 2010 this deficit in an improvement of €125mln.

Capital account for Ireland is in a small deficit in Q3 2011 of €12mln, slightly deeper than €8mln in Q2 2011, but worse  for 9 months through September 2011 (at €6mln deficit) than for the same period a year ago (surplus of €23mln).

Adding current and capital accounts yields balance of payments for Ireland - the full external balance - which in Q3 2011 stood at €838mln surplus. In 9 months through September 2011, the balance of payments was in cumulative deficit of €675mln - an improvement on the same period of 2010 when the balance of payments was in a deficit of €771mln.

Charts below illustrate the trends on the annual basis, providing forecast for 2011 based on data through September.

So let's ask that uncomfortable question: Can external surpluses get us out of the debt jail? table below sums up cumulated external accounts balances for 1998-2011(forecast).

Yep, that's right. Suppose we want to pay down original €100bn of government debt out of the external surpluses consistent with the booming exports trade of 2009-2011 and we take the best quarterly performance for each metric of the external balance. Suppose we assume that debt is financed at 3.5% perpetually. How long will it take Ireland to half its current debt exposure? Roughly speaking - 64 years based on trade balance (current account surpluses) and 85 years based on full balance of payments.

And the above does not factor in any current or future slowdowns in trade etc. Just based on our best performance, with exports at boom levels and imports permanently shrunk, we still cannot count on that magic bullet of 'external trade will save us' from the debt overhang.

So that Plan for External Surpluses as a vehicle out of our debt jail... well it's sort of:

Economics 01/05/2010: World Debt Wish 1

The last two weeks have thrown into the spotlight the reality of the troubled global economy we will be facing for years to come. This reality comes not the courtesy of the reckless banks and excessively greedy speculators. Instead, the 'new normal' is being powered by the same agency that many have come to see as the agent of salvation to the excesses of the private markets - the state.

By all numbers, world's largest governments are now broke. Insolvent and unable, due to political paralysis, to deal with the problem they face. This problem is compounded by the fact that in addition to the governments, the real economies are also broke. Unable to bear the weight of massive debt accumulated during 2003-2007 period, plus the expected burden of the government debts. The banks might have started the process over the period of 2006-2007, but before they did so, world governments were firmly on the path of unsustainable financing. The follies promoted and financed by the public purses in the developed world, which consumed hundreds of billions of taxpayers money, included a wide range of activities - from expansions of the public sector, to vast subsidies on environmental measures (most going to the least verifiable activities aimed at combating climate change instead of basic research, new technology development and investments in quality of life improvements), to pie-in-the-sky global economic development agendas and third world debt workouts. Geopolitical grandstanding, from aspirational 'democratization' to fictional 'unifications' also contributed significantly to the problem.

Now, the very economies that jostled for the positions of global power are suffering from debt overhang. And yet, rhetoric has not changed. Like a shopaholic unable to stop pulling out his credit card at every till in a shopping mall, world's leading economies cannot resist the temptation of vastly expanding public expenditure. In short, the governments around the world are now clearly exhibiting the same pattern of addictive behavior toward debt as a heroin junkie. The world has a debt wish!

Symptoms first. I took 36 countries data from the joint IMF/BIS/World Bank database on external debt positions - these countries represent world's largest debtor nations. Here are the charts (note, I will be publishing these charts over a number of posts in the next couple of days, so do come back for more).
The first chart above shows the overall composition of the total debts held by the world's largest 36 debtor nations. There are several apparent trends shown in this data:

1. Government borrowing did not accelerate dramatically during the current crisis. Instead, the entire government debt was showing clear pro-cyclical pattern during the boom years 2003-2007. In other words, the junkie was out for a fix well before the crisis hit.
2. Only in 2006-2007 did the banks managed to expand significantly their borrowing.
3. Globally, this cumulated banks debt mountain remains largely unaddressed despite a very significant contraction in banks-held debt from the peak. In other words, for all its destructive power, the crisis failed to bring banks debt balances back in line with pre-bubble levels of, say 2003-2004.
4. Global debt now stands dangerously close to the bubble peak.

A closer look at banks and governments
The following facts arise from the above chart:

1. Private sector debt globally falls below banks sector debt (see below for the case of Ireland).
2. Private sector debt deleveraging basically did not take place during the current crisis with non-banks and non-sovereign levels of debt remaining static close to the peak of Q4 2007.
   

Thus, world's largest debtors (and incidentally largest economies) remain exceptionally weak when it comes to their real economic activity reliance on debt financing.

And now on to Ireland:
The country that, according to the Government, has done so many things right in 2009 has... well:

1. Managed to virtually completely avoid any deleveraging in the current crisis, with our debt levels remaining at the peak levels attained (remember - all of the world peaked in debt levels back in Q4 2007) in Q4 2008.
2. There has been a marked increase in the rate of accumulation of government debt in Ireland in 2008-2009, again in departure from the world experience.
3. Irish banks have experienced steady deleveraging since Q4 2007 although this process is still to weak to return them to the healthier levels of 2003-2004.
4. Irish households and the rest of the real economy in Ireland have actually accumulated a debt mountain greater than our banking sector - a position that is different from the rest of the world.
   
5. There has been no deleveraging in the real economy, which continues to increase overall indebtedness.

In short, Irish debt position is deeply sicker than that of the rest of the largest debtor nations.

At this junction, data calls for some comparative analysis of the various debtor nations. This will be the subject of my next post on the topic. Tune in...

Economics 05/06/2010: Economics of Fiscal Stimulus

This is an unedited version of my article for June-July issue of the Village Magazine.

Weeks into a new round of ‘talks’ over the public sector reforms and Ireland’s Policy Kindergarten squad is getting more agitated by the issue of cuts in the Government expenditure. The logic of their arguments, led by the likes of Tasc, the Irish Times, and an army of Unions-employed ‘economists’, is perverse: “In order to get the economy back on track, we need to borrow more and spend on public services and wages.”

There are three basic arguments why stimulating Irish economy though increased public spending won’t work in the current conditions even in theory, let alone in practice. These are: the structural nature of the fiscal crisis we face, the size of the debt we face, and the lack of evidence that stimulus can work in a country like Ireland.

Structural deficits

Economists distinguish two types of deficits: cyclical and structural. The first type of deficits occurs when a temporary economic slowdown leads to an unforeseen decline in revenue and acceleration of certain components of spending (e.g. unemployment insurance and social welfare). By its definition, the cyclical deficit will be automatically corrected once economy returns to its long term growth path.

In contrast, structural deficits are those that arise independently of the short term changes in economic growth. They are the outcome of unsustainable increases in permanent spending and/or decline in the long term growth potential that might arise from a severe crisis.

In the case of Ireland, both of the latter factors are at play. Various estimates of the extent of structural deficits carried out by the likes of IMF, OECD, the European Commission, ESRI and independent analysts range between one half and two thirds of the 2009 General Government deficit, or 7-9.5% of GDP.

Reckless expansion of Government spending in the period of 2001-2007 is the greatest cause of these – not the collapse of our tax revenue. In the mean time, our economy’s long-term growth rate has declined from the debt-and-housing-fueled 4.5% per annum to a Belgium-like 1.8% per annum.

In 2000, General Government Structural Balance stood at roughly -0.5% of GDP. By 2008 this has fallen to almost -11% courtesy of a massive build up in permanent staff increases in the public sector, rises in welfare rates, explosion in health spending and creation of a gargantuan army of quangoes and supervisory organizations.

Forget, for a second, that majority of these expenditures represented pure waste, delivering nothing more than top jobs for friends of the ruling class, plus scores of jobs for public and quasi-public sector workers. Between 1981 and today Ireland has recorded not a single year in which Government structural balance was positive. Windfall stamps, VAT and capital gains tax receipts over 2001-2007 have masked this reality, as Goldman Sachs structured derivatives masked the reality of Greek deficits.

We are not getting any better

Over the recent months, the Government has been eager to ‘talk up’ our major selling points. Ireland, it goes, is a country with stabilized public finances and low debt to GDP ratio.

Last month, Eurostat exposed the lie behind the ‘stabilized public finances’ story. It turns out our Government has decided to sweep under the carpet billions of cash it borrowed in 2009 to recapitalize Anglo. Courtesy of this, our deficit for 2009 was revised to a whooping 14.3% of GDP – topping that of Greece.

But Irish General Government deficit this year is expected to come in between 11.7% and over 12% of GDP, depending on who is doing the forecasting – Department of Finance or ESRI. And this is before we factor in March 2010 statement by the Minister for Finance, promising over €10 billion for the banks this year. This means that, as the rest of the world is coming out of the recession, our fiscal deficit for 2010 is expected to either match or exceed the revised level achieved in 2009. Some stabilization.

Irish Government debt is expected to reach 78-82% of GDP by the end of 2010 – on par with Eurozone’s second sickest economy, Portugal. With Nama and banks recapitalizations factored in, Irish taxpayers will be in a debt hole equal to between 117% and 122% of GDP by 2011 and to 137% by 2014. At the point of the Greek debt crisis implosion last year, Greece had second highest debt to GDP ratio in the EU at 117%, after Italy with a massive 119%.

In totality, current crisis management approach by the Irish State is going to cost every Irish taxpayer in excess of €117,000 in added tax liability. Neither Iceland nor Greece come close.

Economy on steroids

Still think that we should be stimulating this economy through more borrowing?

Take a look at the private sector debts. In terms of external debt liabilities, Ireland is in the league of its own amongst the advanced economies. Our overall debts currently are in excess of the critically high liabilities of the HIPCs to which we are sending intergovernmental aid. And rising: in Q3 2009, our external debt liabilities stood at a whooping USD 2.4 trillion, up 10.8% on Q3 2007. Of these, roughly 45% accrue to the domestic economy – more than 6 times our annual national income.

Ireland’s share of the world debt is greater than that of Japan and more than double that of all BRICs combined, once IFSC companies are included. Over the next 5 years, the entire Irish economy will be paying out around €206,000 per each taxpayer in interest on this debt. Adding more debt to this pile is simply unimaginable at any stage, let alone when the cost of borrowing is high and rising.

These figures show that the main cause of the current crisis is not the lack of liquidity in the system, but an old-fashioned problem of insolvency.

This problem is directly related to the actions of the Irish state. Over the last decade, there was a nearly 90% correlation between the average increases in the Irish tax revenues plus the rate of economic growth and the expenditure growth on capital and current spending sides. In effect, courtesy of the ‘Boom is getting boomier’ Ahearn/Cowen team Ireland had two bubbles inflating next to each other – a private sector borrowing bubble and a public sector spending one. Government’s exuberant optimism, cheered on by the Social Partners – the direct beneficiaries of this ‘fiscal policy on steroids’ approach – explains why during Brian Cowen’s tenure in the Department of Finance, Irish structural deficit doubled on his predecessor’s already hefty increases.

But what went on behind the glossy Exchequer reports was the old-fashioned pyramid scheme. Some got rich. Temporarily, we had an army of politically connected developers and bankers stalking the halls of premier cars dealerships and property auction rooms.

Permanently, an entire class of public employees reaped massive dividends in terms of shares in privatized enterprises that cumulated in their pension plans. Current claims that because the values of some of these payoffs have declined over time (often due to the intransigent nature of the unions in the semi-state companies, staunchly resisting change and productivity enhancing reforms) is irrelevant here. Prior to their privatization, these companies were called 'public' assets. Creation of any, no matter small or large, private gains to their employees out of the companies' privatizations or securititization through pensions funds liabilities of their assets in favor of employees, therefore, is nothing more than an arbitrary, unions-imposed grab of the public asset.

Benchmarking, lavish pensions and jobs security – also paid out of the economy leverage (just think of the NPRF - explicitly created to by-pass the illegal, under the EU rules, taxation of economy for provisioning for future public sector pensions liabilities) – was a cherry on top of the cake. Public companies management got dramatically increased pay and a permanent indemnity against competition through a regulatory system that was all but a client of their semi-state companies.

From our hospital consultants to our lawyers, academics and other professionals – a large army of state-protected, often non-competitive internationally professional elites collected state-subsidised pay so much in excess of their real productivity that we became the subject of diplomats’ jokes.

Our state’s response to this was telling. Just as the country was borrowing its way into insolvency, our Government gave billions to aid developing nations. That was the price our leaders chose to pay to feel themselves adequate standing next to Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy at the EU summits. Incidentally, as the country today is borrowing heavily to cover its basic bills, Brian Cowen still sends hundreds of millions of our cash to aid foreign states and has recently decided to commit over €1,000 million – full year worth of the money he clawed out of the ordinary families through income levies – to the Greek bailout package.

Economics on Steroids

Still think more state-centred economy is the solution to our problem? Irish economists, primarily those affiliated with the Unions are keen on talking about the ‘positive multiplier’ effect of deficit-financed stimulus. Sadly for them, there is no conclusive evidence that borrowing at 5 percent amidst double-digit deficits and ‘investing’ in public services does any good for the economy.

Firstly, one has to disregard any evidence on fiscal stimulus efficiency coming out of the larger states, like the US, where imports component of public and private expenditure is much smaller than in Ireland. The US estimates of the fiscal stimulus multiplier also reflect a substantially lower cost of borrowing. Even if Ireland were to replicate US-estimated fiscal stimulus effects, higher cost of our borrowing will mean that the net stimulus to Irish economy will be zero on average.

Second, international evidence shows that for a small open economy, like Ireland, the total fiscal multiplier effect starts with a negative -0.05% effect on economic growth at the moment of stimulus and in the long run (over 6 years) reaches a negative -0.07-0.31%. Add the cost of financing to this and the long-term effect of deficit financed stimulus for Ireland will be around -2.3% annually.

Third, no one on the Left has a faintest idea what the new spending should be used for. Simply giving borrowed cash to pay the wage bill in the public sector would be unacceptable by any ethical standards. Any investment that is bound to make sense would have to focus on our business centre – Dublin, where infrastructure deficit is acute and potential demand is present. Alas, this will not resolve the problem of collapsed regional economies. Pumping more cash into the ‘knowledge economy’ absent actual knowledge infrastructure of entrepreneurship, private finance, skills and without a proven track record of exporting potential, is adventurist even at the times of plenty.

In short, the idea that expanded deficit financing will support any sort of real recovery in the economy is equivalent to arguing that pumping steroids into a heart attack patient can help him run a marathon.


Ireland needs severe rethinking and reforms of the grossly inefficient and ethically non-sustainable spending and management practices of our public sectors. It should start with significant rationalization of expenditure first and then progress to a more deeply rooted revision of the public sector objectives and ethos.

Ireland also needs a significant deleveraging of what is a basically insolvent economic structure. This too requires, amongst other things, a significant reduction in overall public spending. Far from ‘borrow to spend’ policies advocated by the Left, we need ‘cut to save’ policies that can, with time, yield a permanent increase in the national savings rate, productive private investment and improved returns on education and skills. Otherwise, we might as well give our college graduates a one-way ticket out of Ireland with their degrees, courtesy of Tasc and the Unions.

Ireland's Debt Mountain(s)

The latest CSO data merely confirms what we have known all along: Ireland is now by far the leading country when it comes to overall external debt held by its corporates, consumers and the Government. Our gross external debt has risen precipitously since the onset of the latest crisis from €1.537 trillion on January 1, 2008 to €1.671 trillion as of September 30, 2008. Some €21bn of this increase is accounted for by the State borrowing its way out of the need to reduce the runaway train of public spending. Roughly €25.3 bn came from the Monetary Authority.

Most worrisome were the increases of roughly €45 bn in the liabilities of the Other Sectors. This line of liabilities (up 4.13% between Q2 and Q3 2008) should have been rising at a much slower pace than the Gross External Debt (up 3.16%) if the households and firms were actually de-leveraging. Alas, this is not the case, suggesting that declines in households' incomes and corporate revenues are forcing the real side of Irish economy deeper into debt-dependency. This will have two implications on 2009 economic environment in Ireland:
(1) 2008 consumers' strike - leading to a precipitous collapse in retail sales - will continue as Irish households attempt to play catching up with de-leveraging that is well underway in the US and UK;
(2) Income tax hikes and VAT rates increases passed in the Budget 2009 will further exacerbate excessive debt burden problems, leading to slower, more painful de-leveraging of corporate and household balancesheets and prolonging the current crisis.

Economics 12/02/2010: Crisis pressures in broader debt markets

And so the Greek saga continues, with yesterday’s announcement that the EU has a worked-out rescue package for the country now turning out to be yet another wishful thinking piece of poorly prepared PR. No package details, and the markets are not impressed.

But forget Greece for a moment. The good news is that just as in Autumn 2008, the last couple of months have been the case of “bad news = good news”. The markets have finally started to turn their attention to the completely reckless ways in which majority of Governments around the world have been managing their finances, both before the crisis and during it.

The new line of fire is now directed at Turkey and Japan.

Japan, pushing for well over 200% of GDP ratio of debt is in a league of its own. And the current Government is hell-bent on raising the debt limits higher with aggressive spending targets and Napoleonic plans for shifting even more public expenditure into largely unproductive investment (for a country with already extensive public capital stock, the diminishing marginal returns on new public investment have set in some time ago). Debt ratio to working age population is now well above USD100,000 and is rising at accelerating pace. Savings rate has fallen to below 4% while the fiscal deficits are now much higher than they were back in the days when the savings rate was around 18%. Current account balance has declined from the peak of 5% in 2007 to under 1.5% today and is set to fall further. With these dynamics in mind, Japan is going to account for roughly 11% of the total global expected issuance of new bonds in 2010.

Turkey is a serious basket case, although it might not appear to be such from the simple debt levels comparisons. Like Ireland, Turkey has low debt to GDP ratio (45% as opposed to Greece with 113%, Portugal with 77%, Spain with 54%), It is in line with Ireland current 46.2% debt levels (although in Ireland’s case, a GNP base would work much better, bringing out true public debt to a much more formidable 57% of GNP). But it is not the level of debt that is worrisome. The awesome rate of debt increase, along with hidden debts that the public sector underwrites are the real concerns here.

An interesting chart from Turkey Data Monitor:
shows just how bad Turkish debt dynamics are. In the environment where it is currently yielding over 8% with an average maturity being around 2 years, the problem for Turkey is the following:

• Can a country with history of past debt problems and rising deficits really roll-over some USD125 billion worth of debt? and
• Can such a country do this in the environment where worldwide, national governments are expected to issue some USD4.5 trillion worth of bonds in 2010 - three times the normal volume of global debt issuance?

Now, think of it this way – Turkey debt is held by domestic banks (roughly 60%) and the remainder – by foreigners. This, normally, presents the point of stability. Alas, if the banks are not operating in the liquidity saturated markets for funding (and they are clearly not doing so) the Turkish Government cannot default on the debt without risking destabilizing its banking system. And if it does destabilize the banks, the Government ‘solution’ to default will imply demand for massive banks rescue package, adding further to the debt mountain. In other words, unlike with other countries that have heavier exposures to international lenders, Turkey simply must refinance the roll-over debt.

So dynamics matter. And they matter for Ireland. Which got me thinking – just how bad is our debt position going to get and what costs will this impose on the economy. Here are few charts:
Start with gross debt as percentage of GDP and GNP. Above chart shows figures for the official debt estimates from Stability Plan Update, December 2009, issued by the Department of Finance. Additional lines show the ratio of debt to GNP and also extension of debt figures to include Nama's €59 billion allocation, plus expected €12 billion in post-Nama capital injections into the banks. Finally, the last line shows the above, accounting for a lower growth rate in GNP scenario than the one forecast by the DofF for 2012-2014 period. The important issue here is that our debt to GNP (the real measure of our economy) is going to breach 100% even under DofF own rosy assumptions.

Next, consider the growth rate in our debt:
Pretty dramatic, especially when you compare the rate of growth in 2009-2012 against the tiny rates of decline predicted for 2013-2014. The rates of decline in fact will be about half the rate of interest we will be paying on this debt.

So expect no respite in terms of the cost of debt financing in sight:
The above are pretty big annual numbers - up to €14 billion going to feed the debt monster annually! Crazy stuff for an economy worth around €130 billion in terms of its GNP. Alternatively, €14 billion is roughly 30% of the total Government expenditure that this country can afford if we were to stay on structurally balanced fiscal path!

And thus, cost of debt financing as percentage of our economy is going to be excruciating - up to 9.5% of the annual economic output at the peak (under the most pessimistic scenario). Which means the total cost of the current fiscal crisis is also going to be astronomical:
By the end of 2014, thus, we are looking to have wasted between €50 billion and €80 billion in total on sustaining that which is simply unsustainable - our gargantuan public sector overspending.


Incidentally, this pretty much explains why I do not believe that marginal reforms of the public sector, such as 'productivity improvements', 'reduced spending on external consultants' and 'staff re-allocations' will be enough to address the issue. In real world we inhabit, we need a massive cut in terms of overall spending on public sector and this can only be achieved by slashing numbers employed in the public sector and cutting pensions and wage expenditure on the remaining staff.


PS 1: given chronic lack of skills, aptitude and capabilities present in many areas of the public sector, an idea of using internal expertise to reduce reliance on external consultants advice and expertise, while hoping for improved efficiency is simply absurd.


PS2: A year ago, myself and Brian Lucey wrote an article for the Irish Times about the massive debt overhang in the Irish economy. Using IMF statistics we established that Irish economy stands out as the second most indebted economy in the world in terms of ratio of debts to GDP, the most indebted economy in the world when it comes to applying our real measure of economic activity - GNP, and one of the most indebted economies in absolute terms.

In response to the article, we were told by the Irish officials that 'total debts do not matter, only public debt does'.

In the real world, total debts of economy do matter because they show structural composition of economy itself, revealing the extent to which economic growth is being financed by reckless borrowing.

This month, Hayman Advisors weighted in on our side:
The above debts cover public debt, plus 5 top banks per country, with Iceland figure showing pre-crisis conditions. Forbes magazine reproduced this chart in their cover story for February 8 edition with a tag line saying "It's the Total Debt, Stupid".

I agree.