Saturday, March 7, 2015

7/3/15: Irish Services Sector Activity & PMI: January 2015


Irish Services Activity Index for January came out yesterday, offering some interesting data reading.

Contextually: Services PMI has averaged 62.2 in the 3 months through February 2015 and it averaged 61.9 for the period of 3 months through November 2014 - both showing blistering growth in the sector.

Now, January Services Activity Index came in 12.6% ahead of the same level in January 2014. 2 mo average through January (comparative to PMI averages we have) is 119.6 which is 9.44% ahead of 3mo average through the same period of 2014. This is rapid growth and it accelerated in December-January as chart below shows.



The acceleration was broadly-based:

  • Information and Communication sub-sector activity rose 21.2% y/y with a massive 10.2% jump in m/m terms in January alone. The sub-sector growth rate is around 8.11% y/y in terms of 3mo average through January.
  • Professional, Scientific and Technical sub-sector activity posted a big 14.0% jump y/y in January and was up 11.8% m/m. 3mo average through January was up 13.1% y/y.
  • Wholesale and Retail Trade etc sub-sector activity rose 8.8% y/y and 9.5% m/m - also strong growth, although 3mo average through January was up weaker 7.2% y/y.
  • Transportation and Storage sub-sector activity rose 8.4% y/y but was down 1% m/m, having previously posted rapid growth in November and December. 3mo average through January 2015 is up 16.5% y/y.
  • Accommodation and Food services activity was up 14% y/y and down 0.33% m/m in January, with 3mo average through January 2015 standing 13.9% above 3mo average through January 2014.
  • Administrative and Support services activity rose only 2.9% y/y and was down 0.8% m/m, with 3mo through January 2015 up just 2.1% y/y.


So, in summary - January figures show a very surprising (and thus suspicious) jump in overall activity across a number of sectors. CSO provides no explanation as to this jump nor any warnings on it. My suspicion is that we are seeing the effects of the infamous 'knowledge development box' introduction in Budget 2015 with MNCs pushing forward more aggressive tax optimisation strategies through it, whilst maintaining previous tax arrangements. I will post a small note on this later, so stay tuned.


Now, an update of the validity of PMIs as a measure of Services Activity recorded in the sector. Table below shows correlations between Services Activity Indices and Services PMIs



As the table shows, there is very little relationship between Services PMIs performance (I also did same analysis for rates of change in the indices that show even worse performance for PMIs as indicators of current or future actual activity) and actual Services sector activity. Out of 84 correlations, 53 are either negative of statistically zero and only 13 have strong positive correlation with either levels of activity or growth in activity. Crucially, PMIs perform stronger (relatively speaking) in correlations with levels of activity, rather than growth rates in activity (in which they perform absolutely disastrously across all time horizons and lags). About the only areas where PMIs are useful in relating to the level of activity (but not growth in activity) are: strongly with ICT, weakly with Admin & Support services and overall Services. Which suggests strong bias in PMIs toward MNCs-dominated ICT services sub-sector. Another miserable point for PMIs: they are more indicative of contemporaneous activity than providing insight into future activity.

7/3/15: Fitch on Russian Banks: January data


Earlier this week, Fitch Ratings published 'Russian Banks Datawatch', covering banks' balance sheet data as of 1 February 2015. Fitch Ratings noted the following key developments in January:


  • "Corporate loans increased by RUB2.2trn (6.5%) in nominal terms in January", down -0.9% "after adjusting for 23% rouble depreciation against the US dollar"
  • "Retail lending dropped by a moderate RUB46bn (-0.4%) in nominal terms", but fell -1.1% in USD terms. Majority of banks are deleveraging at a rate of 1-4%
  • "Customer funding grew by RUB3.5trn (8.2%) in nominal terms", down only -0.1% "net of currency valuation effects as RUB328bn outflow from retail accounts was only partially compensated by RUB264bn inflow of corporate (excluding government entities) funding"
  • CBR funding: "Banks repaid about RUB1trn of state funding in January, which had become expensive after the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) increased the key interest rate to 17% from 11.5% in December 2014 (before cutting it slightly to 15% in February 2015)". Note: these repayments offset official forex outflows recorded in the months when banks borrowed funds. As a reminder, when a bank borrows in forex from the CBR, the borrowing is recorded as forex outflow. When the bank subsequently repays the funds in forex, the repayment is entered as forex inflow. But if the bank repays borrowings in RUB, the repayment is registered as an inflow in RUB.
  • Actual CBR funding deleveraging by the banks was even steeper: Banks repayment of RUB1trn is broken down into (1) "RUB1.6trn decrease of CBR funding" offset by (2) "RUB0.6trn increase in deposits from the Ministry of Finance, regional and federal budgets". Note: as deposits are liabilities, higher holdings of official deposits within the CBR account counts against the CBR balance sheet.
  • Fitch notes that going forward, "This trend [of net repayment of CBR loans] is likely to continue unless the CBR lowers the key rate further ...CBR funding of the sector in foreign currency has become significant, totalling USD21bn (of which USD9.5bn was provided to Otkrytie) at 1 February 2015".
  • Banks' profitability: "The sector reported a RUB34bn net loss in January (-6.2% annualised ROE). Alfa-bank significantly outperformed the sector with a net income of RUB30bn mainly due to FX-revaluation gains. Among state banks only Sberbank reported net income, at RUB3.7bn, while others were loss-making: VTB group had a loss of RUB21bn, Gazprombank RUB8bn and Russian Agricultural Bank RUB4bn. Retail banks performed poorly, and most were loss-making..."
  • Banks capital ratios: "The average total capital ratio (10% required minimum) of the 100 sample banks decreased by 54bps in January. As at end-1M15, seven banks in the sample (of those publishing capital ratios) had a total capital ratio below 11% [one of them] Fondservisbank (10.4%), was put under CBR temporary administration in February."
  • Capitalisation forward: "The announced state recapitalisation measures of over RUB2trn should moderately support banks' capitalisation, although these will be available primarily for larger banks" In other words, expect push for more banks consolidations from Q2 2015.


Summary: corporate lending is up in RUB terms but down in USD terms, retail lending is down both in RUB and USD terms. Deposits up in RUB terms and flat in USD terms, Profitability down significantly and the sector is generating net losses. Capitalisation down with a number of smaller banks heading closer to regulatory minimum, implying that recapitalisation funds will have to be used pretty soon and sector conslidation is likely to accelerate.

Friday, March 6, 2015

6/3/15: US NPF: Another Feel-Good Print with Bitter Aftertaste


My take on the US Non-Farm Payroll numbers in few tweets with some RTs:

Good news:


Why German cars? Because:
And bad: the unemployment rate falling to 5.5% means Fed hike moves closer and this, perversely, means Government debt cost for the US is going to rise (I know, I know, it is perverse, but...):
 But the 'bad' gets worse:

The above mans that US now has historically high level of people who are not in the labour force - some 98.9 million all ... meanwhile...


 ...aaaand.... jobs increases are not in higher value-added sectors:
 

 So to sum this all up:


 Done.

Thursday, March 5, 2015

5/3/15: Russian Economy: External Trade, Inflation and Wages


Quick digest of top news relating to Russian economy:

Customs receipts for Russian Federation in February 2015 reached RUB393.7 billion down 30% y/y. January-February receipts were RUB840 billion or 19.6% down y/y. Full year 2014, customs receipts amounted to RUB7.1 trillion - up 8.5% y/y.

Much of the decline is down to imports collapse: imports were down over 2014 by USD29 billion or 9.5% y/y to USD286 billion in 2014 from USD315 billion in 2013. Only three countries saw increased exports into Russia: U.S., Kazakhstan and Brazil. Largest declines in export to Russia were in Ukraine (31.9%), Japan (19.5%) and Belarus (15.6%). By category of imports: largest declines in Russian imports were in passenger vehicles (21.9%), heavy transport equipment and agricultural equipment and machinery (22.3%), engines and power trains (13.2%), household appliances (20%), milk and dairy products (17.5%), pharmaceuticals (13.1%), and alcoholic beverages (12.3%). Imports categories that posted y/y increases in 2014 were: computer equipment (8.6%), telecommunications equipment (6.9%), household chemicals (4.4%) and heating equipment (3.8%).

Given decline in external trade, largest adverse impact of the Russian crisis is being felt in Armenia and Ukraine.

  • Armenia received remittances from Russia to the tune of 10% of its GDP in 2012, which fell to around 6% by the end of 2014. Armenia's net exports into Russia accounted for roughly 3% of GDP, while Russian investors account for roughly 50% of total foreign investment stocks.
  • Ukraine received remittances from Russia amounting to 2.1% of GDP in 2012 and Russia accounted for roughly 25% of Ukrainian exports. Russian investors account for around 5% of the stocks of foreign direct investment in Ukraine.


Inflation: January inflation printed at 3.9% m/m, or 15% y/y. February 2015 inflation reached 16.7% y/y. Food prices rose 23.3% y/y in February, against 6.9% y/y inflation in food prices in February 2014. M/m February inflation was 2.2% m/m, suggesting potentially a slowdown in the rate of inflation. Some shorter term data suggest that over the first week of March, weekly CPI stood at 0.2% - the lowest weekly reading since October 2014. Good news, for many, bad news for many more: vodka prices fell 0.4% in February.

Wages: A recent survey by a large recruitment company, the Hay Group, showed that 75% of businesses are planning to raise wages in 2015. RBC has details (in Russian): http://top.rbc.ru/economics/04/03/2015/54f706b39a7947103b521853 E-commerce enterprises are planning largest wage hikes (+11.3% on average), followed by Industry sector (+10%), media (9.7%), chemical sector (+9.4%). None of the wage hikes planned are matching expected inflation: Central Bank of Russia forecasts 2015 year-end inflation at 12-12.4% and average inflation during 2015 at 15.8%.

An interesting report in RBC on the proposals for economic reforms from the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (sort-of Russian IBEC), РСПП (see here: http://top.rbc.ru/economics/04/03/2015/54f724ea9a79472c640c6f5e). According to RSPP, Government response to the crisis should focus on achieving further liberalisation in the economy. First pillar of the proposals focuses on early stage reforms, especially those aiming to stabilise the financial situation in the corporate sector. Second pillar contains 73 specific Government and regulatory decisions that should be suspended to reduce their adverse impact on corporate sector.



Note: those who are interested to learn more about the above topics or the business and economic environment in Russia can contact me to arrange a more in-depth one-on-one briefing.

5/3/15: The Troika Tale of Irish Debt


Irish debt figures, despite all the 'positivity' chatter from the Merrion Street of late, have been making rounds across the analysts' notes (see, for example, McKinsey global debt research published recently) and the Troika assessments. Years of 'deleveraging' and 'permanent restructurings' or arrears, rounds of sovereign debt re-engineerings and 'burden reductions'... all in, the latest assessment of the Irish economy by the EU is telling the tale (see full document here: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2015/cr2015_ireland_en.pdf):


At the end of Q3 2014, household debt stood at EUR171.1 billion down less than 20% (actual decline 19.5%) on peak at the end of 2008. Corporate debt amounted to EUR344.4 billion, down 11.7% on peak attained in H2 2012.

Here's the EU assessment: "Private sector debt started to decline but is still considerably higher than the euro area average. Private sector non-consolidated debt amounted to EUR515.3 billion (283.5% of GDP) in the Q3 2014, down 10.6% from a peak of EUR576.6 billion in mid-2012. The correction begun since 2013 follows the excessive build-up between 2002 and 2011, when private indebtedness rose from about 120 % of GDP to over 320% of GDP [chart above]. Most of this increase can be attributed to the corporate sector amid expanding activity of multinationals and a growing number of SMEs taking on property-related debt. It grew by almost EUR300 billion between 2002 and 2012 (a 276% increase), while that of the household sector increased by about half of that amount (a 218% increase)."

And what about those multinationals? "...even taking [the MNCs effect on corporate debt] into account, Irish corporate debt levels as a percentage of GDP continue to exceed the euro area average by about 80%." Oh dear...

Households? Household "sector remains among the most indebted in the euro area at 91.5% of GDP. Survey data show that 56.8% of Irish households are indebted, and 33.9% of them have a mortgage on their main residence". And the deleveraging process? Why, it is effectively coming out decreased consumption and investment: as pay-down of debt "was not matched by an increase in disposable income: as it remains subdued and consumption is still recovering, overall debt levels remain high... This is partly because average earnings remain relatively flat. Two thirds of all Irish mortgage holders continue to benefit from favourable ’tracker’ interest rates that keep the cost of mortgage servicing low."

The last bit begs a question: what happens when interest rates rise? The gas bit of all this Troika talk is that there are no estimated effects of rising interest rates on sustainability of Irish private sector debt. As if the rates will never, ever, for sure, for certain can rise again.

Pass the Kool-Aid jug, folks... for here's that sorry chart from the McKinsey folks that tells the tale of Irish 'deleveraging' in colour:

And do note that Singapore has control over its currency and interest rates that we don't, a huge ex-pat population that we don't, and all the MNCs trimmings that we do.

Gulp... gulp...

5/3/15: Baltic Dry Index: Slight Gain, Still in Pain


With all the 'feel good' PMI readings of late, Baltic Dry Index has improved slightly (index gained 1.08% yesterday) from the historical lows of 509.00 on February 18 to 559.00 close yesterday.

Still, year on year, the index is down from 1391.00 to 559.00


In rather miserable 2013 on this date, BDI was at 806.00 and on the same day in 2012 it was at 782.00, in 2011 around 1382.00 and so on.

It will take a hell of a lot more 'improvement' to get us back to even remotely normal trading conditions.

5/3/15: Russian Oil & Gas: production and exports


Russian energy exports in the year of economic sanctions -  a nice survey Oil Price (h/t to @RussiaInsider) via http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Impotent-Western-Sanctions-Fail-To-Disrupt-Russian-Energy-Exports.html.

Basic summary: volumes are up (coal), holding (uranium). But, tellingly, no discussion of oil and gas exports. Reason: both are under twin pressures of price and sanctions. So a quick add-on:

  • Oil revenues: switching wells off in Siberia in the winter is tricky, risky and hard to do, so the black gold continues to flow even at current prices. But 2014 oil exports revenues were down 11.4% to USD153.8 billion and volume of exports was down 5.6% y/y to 223.4 million tons. 
  • Oil production: OPEC estimates Russian oil production to decline by 70,000 bpd in 2015 with exports declining by 60,000 bpd y/y. Meanwhile some industry players have much more gloomy outlook: Lukoil sees a possible drop in Russian production of 800,000 bpd by the end of 2016: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/03/russia-crisis-lukoil-idUSL5N0W537K20150303. Meanwhile, December 2014 saw a sharp rise in Russian oil exports to 4.4 million bpd as the Government cut export duty from 59% to 42%. New duty covers also 2015, so we can expect some support for production levels. OPEC estimated Russian production volumes to average 10.58 million bpd, with Q1 2015 forecast of 10.6 million bpd and Q2 forecast of 10.54 millions bpd.
  • Gas: full year estimates for Gazprom exports are down 18.6% y/y to USD54.73 billion, volume of exports down 12.1% to 172.6 billion cubic meters. Average contracted price in 2014: USD317 per 1,000 cubic meters, down 7.5% y/y.
  • Gas plans: Russia has been aggressively shifting new contracts for supplies to Asia Pacific and Turkey. By Energy Ministry estimates, Russian gas exports to Asia will rise from 14 bcm in 2014 to 130 bcm in 2035 and oil and coal exports will more than double.
  • Worth noting the increasing switch in favour of refined petroleum products exports, discussed here: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/09/russia-oil-exports-idUSL6N0TS1XV20141209
  • Overall trade impact of the above was to drive down exports revenues to USD782.9 billion or down 7% y/y. Trade surplus was USD210.9 billion in 2014.
  • If imports remain where they were in 2014, and oil price averages of 2015 at USD45 pb, Central Bank of Russia estimates a decline in exports revenues (and trade balance) os around USD 160 billion - painful, but still leaving the country in a trade surplus.

Wednesday, March 4, 2015

4/3/15: Irish Manufacturing & Services PMIs: February 2015


With all recent work-related excitement, I have delayed analysis of the Irish PMIs until now. So here's a look at the latest numbers.

Services PMI slipped slightly from the dizzying 'knowledge development box'-induced highs of 62.5 in January (62.6 in December) to still dizzying 61.4 in February. The slip-up is a minor hiccup on otherwise uninterrupted 'walk along the ceiling' the series been performing since April 2014. 3mo average performance of 62.2 in 3 months through February 2015, compared to already impressive 61.9 for 3mo average through November 2014 and up 1.9 points on vertigo-inducing 3mo average through February 2014.

Of course, these are strange numbers. More telling, probably are m/m changes. In last two months, PMIs posted m/m declines that now fully offset preceding 2 months rises. So things are flat in terms of growth momentum. One wonders how much of the level performance is attained by forex valuations? And how much is attained by MNCs activities in a handful of sub-sectors, as opposed to the firms trading in the indigenous economy? How much of the activity is down to tax optimising activities of the MNCs vs how much of it is down to actual and real activity by the MNCs? Alas, we won't ever know the answer to these questions.

Reports don't mention forex or currency valuations. Investec did comment that increases in employment were recorded in all four of the "segments of the services industry surveyed by this report (TMT, Business Services, Transport & Leisure and Financial Services)". But we have no comparatives or even levels reported to us on employment or any other subcomponent of PMIs anymore.

Manufacturing PMI, meanwhile, posted an acceleration in growth from 55.1 in January 2015 to 57.5 in February 2015, more than offsetting m/m loss of 1.8 points in January 2015. 3mo average through February 2015 was 56.5, which is marginally stronger than 3mo average through November 2014 at 56.2 and 3.4 points ahead of 3mo average through February 2014.

Again, we have no idea what is driving these strong figures and what the breakdown is between MNCs and indigenous firms. How much of this performance down to 'contract manufacturing' - a new MNCs trick that is so distorting our national accounts, even IMF had to comment on it? How much is down to usual activities of double-Irish-knowledge-box etc?

Chart combining the two indices (in terms of their deviations from 50.0 expansion line):


And a chart showing continued close co-movement in two sectors PMIs along with evolution y/y and 24 months:



Overall: numbers are high and impressive. Questions remain as to what these numbers are really telling us, but on their surface they do suggests that somewhere serious growth is happening in something. May this translate into real growth in the Domestic Demand...

4/3/15: Composite Activity Indicators for BRIC & Russia: February


Having covered Manufacturing PMIs (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/03/2315-bric-manufacturing-pmi-february.html) for BRICs and Services PMIs (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/03/4315-bric-services-pmis-stronger-growth.html), let's take a look at the data for combined metrics of two sectors.

First, table below summarises the changes in Manufacturing and Services PMIs across all BRICs:



Markit - the source of both PMI data sets - also reports Composite PMI of their own. My data is based on same inputs but takes a more simple approach of combining the two data points for each country. This allows me to take each economy aggregate performance across the sectors and group these economies into BRIC group by weighing their combined PMIs score by each economy's relative position in the global economy.

Here are the results:

And for BRICs excluding Russia:


The above charts show two things:

  1. BRICs overall contribution to global growth is positive but weak, although it registered an improvement in February 2015 compared to January.
  2. Russia acts as a drag on global and BRICs growth. Major divergence between Russia and other BRICs started in January 2014, which, incidentally tells us that the talk about Russia not belonging to BRIC group on the basis of some structural or trend considerations is bonkers. Until January 2014, co-movement between BRICs ex-Russia and Russia is very strong and divergence from January 2014 on is clearly linked to geopolitical crisis and oil price collapse, rather than due to structural decoupling between BRICs ex-Russia and Russia.

4/3/15: BRIC Services PMIs: Stronger Growth and Russia Divergence


I covered BRIC Manufacturing PMI earlier this week: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/03/2315-bric-manufacturing-pmi-february.html

Now, let's take a look at the Services sectors performance.

  • Russia Services PMI are covered in detail here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/03/4315-russian-services-and-composite.html
  • Brazil Services PMI came in at a surprising 52.3, breaking four months streak of sub-50 readings and rising strongly up on 48.4 in January. 3mo average through February 2015 is at 49.9 against the 3mo average through November 2014 at 49.3. An improvement on 3mo basis, but down on year ago 3mo average through February 2014 (50.7).
  • China Services PMI came in at 52.0, a slight improvement on relatively weak performance in January (51.8). 3mo average through February is at 52.4 against 3mo average through November 2014 at 53.4 and against 3mo average through February 2014 at 50.9. There is very little of anything spectacular in Chinese data so far.
  • India Services PMI came in at 53.9 a rise on 52.4 in January 2015. On 3mo average basis, current average through February 2015 is at 52.5 against previous 3mo average through November 2014 at 51.2 and against 3mo average through February 2014 at 47.9. 

Summary: Services PMIs have deteriorated over the last five months in Russia and deteriorated very sharply, signalling massive contraction in the Services sectors in the economy, mostly concentrated on financial services. Meanwhile, Services PMIs posted strengthening is India (surprise reversal of downward momentum over October 2014 - January 2015 period). China still showing some weaknesses, but positive growth in the sector, while India is clearly on a rebound with PMIs increasing over the last 3 months and now standing at the highest level since June 2014.



As the above clearly shows, Russia is a major point of divergence for Services sectors within the BRIC economies. This is not new, but the divergence is getting sharper and sharper. We are not yet at 2009 rates and levels of decline, but we are getting there.

Composite BRICs PMIs will be covered in the next post.

4/3/15: Russian Services and Composite PMIs signal continued deterioration in the economy


Services PMI for Russia for February 2015 came in at a disappointing - nay disastrous - 41.3 down from January 43.9 and marking the fifth consecutive month of contraction. 3mo average through February is now at 43.7 which is much worse than already poor 3mo average through November 2014 (47.5) and is down massively on 3mo average through February 2014 (51.5). February reading is the lowest in 71 months.




Composite PMI came in at 44.7 - marking a sharp contraction in the economy, down from 45.6 in January 2015. February was the 5th consecutive monthly sub-50 reading and  the lowest for 69 months. 3mo average for Composite indicator is at 45.8, which is down on 3mo average through November 2014 (49.2) and sharply down on 3mo average through February 2014 (50.8).


Chart above shows continued downward trend in all three series since around October 2012, preceded by a weak growth trend from the point of recovery after the Global Financial Crisis in and around Q4 2009 through Q3 2012. The current sub-trend of accelerated decline in composite and services PMIs (August 2014-present) is, dynamically, very similar to the sub-trend over October 2013-May 2014 and similar, again to the sub-trend over January 2013 through July 2013. Dynamically, all indication are that over the next 4-6 months we will see both services and composite indicators hitting mid-30s and manufacturing PMI falling toward high 30s, as consistent with the economic contraction rate closer to 4-5 percent over the year.

Note: Russian manufacturing PMIs were covered here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/03/2315-russian-manufacturing-pmi-february.html

4/3/15: Core biases in Hedge Funds returns



My second post on the topic of measuring hedge funds returns for LearnSignal blog, covering the issue of biases in measurement, induced by timing and risk considerations is now available here: http://blog.learnsignal.com/?p=161

Tuesday, March 3, 2015

3/3/15: Those 'tanked' Russian Forex reserves


So, according to some Western media, Russian forex reserves have tanked in February 2015. What happened, folks?

At the end of January 2015, Russian forex reserves stood at USD376.208 billion. Of which USD327 was in currency and liquid assets form. The latest data, given to us is for February 20, 2015 when, according to the Russian Central Bank, the reserves dropped to USD364.6 billion - a drop of 3.11% or USD11.6 billion. That's a lot of cash. But is not qualifying it as 'tanked'. Here's a chart plotting all reserves changes m/m


So (incomplete still) data for February puts drawdowns from the Forex reserves at USD11.61 billion against 12 mo running average monthly drawdown of USD10.73 billion. February marks the fourth biggest drawdown in 12 months. Again - large, significant, but 'tanking'?!

What is more critical is the source of drawdowns: how much of this is due to repayment of corporate and sovereign debt? How much is down to changing dollar value of other assets held? How much taken in form of loans to companies and banks (at least in theory or in part - repayable)? and so on.

No, the numbers are not catastrophic. Although they are unpleasant. Just as the gloating in the media is unpleasant: if the U.S. were to cut its external deficit by 2/3rds - what would be the headlines in Western media? And now note: February drawdowns from the forex reserves marked:

  • 2/3rds reduction in drawdowns compared to December (real disaster of a month); and
  • Large chunk of these drawdowns probably (we will know later for sure) went to fund debt reductions of Russian banks, companies and sovereign.



Monday, March 2, 2015

2/3/15: BRIC Manufacturing PMI: February Marks Slowdown in Growth


BRIC Manufacturing PMIs (individual countries data published by Markit) have posted some renewed weakness in February compared to January.

  • Russian Manufacturing PMIs are covered here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/03/2315-russian-manufacturing-pmi-february.html
  • Brazil Manufacturing PMI came in at 49.6 - signifying shallow contraction, down from 50.7 in January. 3 mo average through February is at 50.2 (barely signalling any growth), which is an improvement on 3mo average through November 2014 (49.3) but is weaker than 3mo average through February 2014 (50.5). 
  • China Manufacturing PMI is at 50.7, an improvement on January's 49.7 and breaking previous two-months streak of sub-50 readings. 3mo average is at 50.0, which is weaker than 50,2 3mo average through November 2014, but an improvement on 3mo average through February 2014 (49.5)
  • India Manufacturing PMI slipped to 51.2 in February from 52.9 in January, with 3mo average through February at 52.9, which is stronger than 3mo average through November 2014 (52.1) and 3mo average through February 2014 (51.6).
Table below and chart summarise the trends:



2/3/15: Russian Manufacturing PMI: February 2015


Russian Manufacturing PMI (based on HSBC/Markit data) improved from 47.6 in January (sharp contraction that is marked by a statistically significant sub-50 reading) to 49.7 in February (also contractionary, but at a much weaker rate and statistically not significantly different fro 50.0).



According to Markit release, "Russian manufacturing business conditions deteriorated only fractionally in February, as stronger domestic demand drove an increase in new work and production rose slightly. The latest HSBC PMI® data compiled by Markit also signalled weaker – but still severe – inflationary pressures during the month, reflecting the ruble’s recovery from record lows. That said, overall growth of new orders was weak as new export business continued to decline sharply, and employment extended a survey-record sequence of decline to 20 months."

This marks third consecutive month of sub-50 readings, with 3mo average through February 2015 standing at 48.7, weaker than 50.8 3mo average through November 2014, but somewhat better than 3mo average of 48.4 recorded for the 3 months through February 2013. So year on year rate of decline in Manufacturing activity slowed down, but conditions remain weak and are still close to weakening.

2/3/15: EU Exporters: No More Than 20-30% Will Return to Russian Markets


A very interesting note reporting comments by Russia's head of Rosselkhoznadzor (organisation that certifies food imports and grants food market access to foreign exporters) on the post-sanctions regime for Western exporters into Russia. The full text is here: http://www.interfax.ru/russia/426955 in Russia.

The core point is that head of Rosselkhoznadzor expects the return of just 20-30% of EU exporters back to the Russian market once Russian sanctions on food imports are lifted. And that is 20-30% "at most". Quoting from Interfax report, the head of Rosselkhoznadzor thinks that "Products from the EU will find it difficult to return to Russian markets, because we will be forced to cut back on the number of European producers, allowing only 20-30% of previously active suppliers back into the market. The rest will be able to supply [exports to Russia] only after they restore [market] trust".

In another report (http://www.interfax.ru/business/427220), President Putin's press secretary stated today that Moscow is considering allowing imports of agricultural raw materials that serve as inputs for production of food in Russia, as long as actual production takes place in Russia. The statement relates to the President Putin's promise made in Budapest last month that Russia can expand cooperation with Hungary in food trade. According to the press secretary statement, this can only be done by relaxing sectoral restrictions as Hungary (or any other country) cannot be privileged in trade relations with the EU under the WTO rules.


Подробнее:http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2677352

2/3/15: Religious Restrictions and Hostilities: Russia 2008-2013


A very interesting data set from the PewResearch mapping "Restrictions and Hostilities in the Most Populous Countries" by year: http://www.pewforum.org/2015/02/26/restrictions-and-hostilities-in-the-most-populous-countries-2013/ based on the report on Religious Restrictions and Hostilities, published last month: http://www.pewforum.org/2015/02/26/religious-hostilities/

Two charts showing relative evolution of restrictions and hostilities in Russia between 2008 and 2013:




Saturday, February 28, 2015

28/2/15: A sad day for Russia.


Tonight, in Moscow, a gunman shot dead one of the most charismatic and experienced leaders of Russian liberal opposition, Boris Nemtsov.

Here is the best obituary I have read so far (in Russian) from any source: Western or Russian: http://kommersant.ru/doc/2677630

It sums up perfectly the vision of Nemtsov, the memory of his public life that I have in my own mind.

He was legendary as the Governor of Nizhniy Novgorod - both in his managerial and reformist roles and in his ability to speak openly about his views on Yeltsin Presidency. He was given a tough lot as a Deputy PM in 1997 and he did the job, honestly and to his best ability. He was relentless in trying to build a fully functional opposition within the liberal wing in Russian politics, and he never succeeded in doing that - not for the lack of trying or the lack of talent, but for the lack of liberal tradition and culture in Russia. Despite that, he and his fellow thinker, Garry Kasparov, remained and will remain respected by many, including those who did not support them.

There is a political 'weight' to every public intellectual and leader. Nemtsov had that. Nemtsov had huge public support in the 1990s, and despite the fact that he had little popular backing after 1997, he held high moral and intellectual ground and never traded away idealism of his opposition to President Putin for pragmatism of having a shot at gradual reforms. This waining of popular support for him and his causes is sad, because he was a talented, bright, experienced, hard working politician Russia needed and needs. And he brought into public ideas and ideals that Russia needed and needs - ideas and ideals of alternative, of functional opposition.

There is an 'integrity' weight to every public intellectual and leader too - a combination of honesty, openness, transparency and willingness to learn, accept and acknowledge mistake. In that currency, Nemtsov was pure gold. And that Russia will always have as a memory of him.

The White House statements - http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/27/statement-president-murder-boris-nemtsov - and I would say it is also pitch-perfect: "Nemtsov was a tireless advocate for his country, seeking for his fellow Russian citizens the rights to which all people are entitled.  I admired Nemtsov’s courageous dedication to the struggle against corruption in Russia... We offer our sincere condolences to Boris Efimovich’s family, and to the Russian people, who have lost one of the most dedicated and eloquent defenders of their rights."

Boris Nemtsov is survived by his four children, and his mother. May he rest in peace!

Friday, February 27, 2015

27/2/15: Deflation and Retail Sales: Ireland 2015...


Deflation harms consumer demand?


So Irish retail sales are up 8.8% y/y in volume and 5.5% in value, implying people are buying on lower prices, not delaying buying for lower prices. And...

Irish consumer prices are shrinking (deflation).

Note, the above retail sales figures are reflective of total sales. Core sales, excluding motors were down 0.1% in value and volume m/m, but up y/y by 4.8% in volume and 0.9% in value.

More granular:

27/2/15: Of a momentary surrender and a longer fight: Greece v Eurogroup


Couple more earlier comments on Greek situation for print edition of Expresso, 31.12.2015 pages 8-9 and online http://expresso.sapo.pt/os-trabalhos-herculeos-de-varoufakis-mercados-financeiros-a-espera-da-lista-de-reformas=f911931, February 22, 2015.


English version of some of the comments:


# In which points did Greek delegation change its position?

Last night Eurogroup saw significant changes to the Greek Government position vis-a-vis the current bailout. Firstly, the Government has now abandoned its elections promises to achieve a debt write down and end the agreement with the Troika. Instead, the old agreement has been extended until the end of June on the basis of Greece committing to full implementation of the original Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement (MFAFA) and, thus, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The dreaded austerity programme remains in place, despite the Greek Government claims to the contrary. The dreaded Troika is still there, now referenced as Institutions. Secondly, Greece failed to secure control over banks recapitalisation funding. A major point of Government plans was to use of some of these funds for the purpose of funding public investment and/or debt redemptions. This is no longer an option under the new bridging Agreement. Thirdly, the Greek Government failed to secure any concessions on the future programme. The Eurogropup conceded to allow the Greece to present its proposals for the future pos-MOU agreement, but any proposals will have to be with the parameters established by the current programme.


# In which points Germany change its hard position?

So far, Germany and the Eurogroup conceded nothing to the Greek Government. The much-discussed references in the Eurogroup statement that allow for some flexibility on fiscal targets, principally recognition of the economic conditions in computing the target primary surplus for 2015, is not a new concession. Under the MOU, present conditions were always a part of analysis performed to establish deficit targets and the current programme always allowed for some flexibility in targets application. Crucially, Greece went into the negotiations with two objectives in sight: reduction in the debt burden and reduction in the austerity burden. The fist objective was abandoned even before last night's Eurogroup meeting. The second objective was severely diluted when it comes to the Eurogroup statement and the bridging programme. There are no concessions relating to the future (post-June 2015) programme. In a sense, Germany won. Greece lost.


# What do you expect for the list of reforms to be presented on Monday?

We can expect the Greek Government to further moderate its position before Monday. The new set of proposals is likely to contain request for delays (not abandonment, as was planned before) of privatisations, a request for the primary deficit target for 2015 to be lowered to around 2-2.5% of GDP, and a request to allow for some of the past austerity measures to be frozen, rather than reversed, for the duration of 2015. The Greek Government is likely to present new short term growth strategy based on a promise to enforce more rigorously taxation, set higher tax rates on higher earners, in exchange for using the resulting estimated 'savings' to fund public spending and jobs programme. The final agreement on these will likely be in the form of a temporary programme, covering 2015, and possible extension of this programme will be conditional on 2015 debt and deficit dynamics. Beyond Monday, however, a much more arduous task will be to develop a new programme. In very simple terms, Greece still requires a debt restructuring to cancel a significant quantum of current debt. This now appears to be off the table completely. As the result, any new agreement achieved before June 2015 will be inadequate in terms of restoring Greek economy to any sustainable growth path. Both Greece and Europe, today, are at exactly the same junction as two weeks ago: an insolvent economy is faced with the lenders unwilling to recognise the basics of financial realities.  

27/2/15: Running out of cash: Greece heading into March


My comments to Portuguese Expresso on Greek agreement:

http://leitor.expresso.pt/#library/expressodiario/26-02-2015/caderno-1/temas-principais/divida-portuguesa-com-juros-em-minimos-mas-grecia-arrisca-se-a-entrar-em-incumprimento-em-marco

Unedited version here:

"Over the next four months, Greece is facing significant debt redemption pressures. In March, EUR5.83 billion of T-bills and IMF loans maturing and requiring a re-financing. Between now and the end of April, Greece will require to roll over EUR8.1 billion of T-bills and refinance EUR2 billion worth of IMF loans.

Currently, Greece has no money to cover its debt maturity redemptions in March and it is quite questionable if the country can find cash, outside the Programme extension facilities agreed last week but are yet to be ratified by the Eurogroup members and the Institutions, to do so in the markets. Currently Greek 10 year bonds are priced at 65.354, with a yield of 9.23% and rising. This suggests there is unlikely to be significant appetite in the markets to cover a substantial issue of new debt by Greece. At the same time, internal reserves available to the Government are virtually non-existent, especially given the rate of tax receipts deterioration in recent months. December 2014 tax revenues were 14 percent below target, January 2015 tax revenues fell 20% below target, implying a monthly shortfall close to EUR1 billion. In all likelihood, shortfall was at least as big in February as the new Government was tied up in negotiations with the Troika and deposits fled from the banks.

The key problem is that Greece has no option when it comes to delaying repayment of the above funds. IMF is the super-senior lender of last resort and T-bills markets are the bloodline for the Greek Government. Failing to redeem maturing T-bills will be a disaster for the country. In short, Syriza urgently needs to secure new funds to cover these redemptions."

Thursday, February 26, 2015

26/2/15: 'Kermit The IMF' on Irish Growth: It's Not Easy Being Greeen...


This is an unedited version of my column in the Village Magazine for February 2015


January IMF review of the economic situation in Ireland rained a heavy dose of icy water over the already overheating Government spin machine, and much of the IMF concerns centre around exactly the same themes that were highlighted in these very pages last month.

Top of the IMF worries list is growth.

Budget 2015 assumed GDP expansion of 3.9 percent in 2015, with 3.4 percent average growth from 2016 through 2018. The IMF forecasts growth of 3.3 percent in 2015, 2.8 percent in 2016 and “about 2.5 percent thereafter”. In simple terms, over 2015-2018, cumulative growth forecast discrepancy between IMF and the Government is now just shy of 3.3 percent. Put differently, based on IMF forecasts, Irish Government may be significantly overestimating economic prospects of the country.

Source: IMF and Department of Finance

The drivers behind IMF’s skeptical view of our prospects are exactly in line with those discussed in this column before. Exports growth is likely to be much shallower than the Government anticipates, while the domestic demand is still subject to massive debt overhang carried by households and companies.

As an aside, the IMF assessment of the Budget 2015 measures is far from confirming the mainstream Irish media and Irish Left’s view. The IMF had this to say about the measures: “Income tax cuts that increase the already strong progressivity of the system are the main items. While not significant to the revenue intake, reductions in property taxes by 14 local authorities, including Dublin, are a setback for collections from this recent broadening of the tax base.” Doing away with the tax breaks is fine, if it is done in the environment of falling distortionary taxes. Still, coupled with elimination of the property capital gains relief, the entire Budget 2015 was hardly a transfer from the poor to the rich, but rather a net tax increase on the upper earners, especially the self-employed professionals, relative to lower waged.

But back to the impact of growth risks on our Government’s balance sheet. Consider the IMF estimates for public debt dynamics.

Firstly, note that public debt fell from 123 percent of GDP in 2013 to 111 percent of GDP at the end of 2014. Impressive as this change might be, it is driven by one-off changes and not by any significant debt drawdowns. Consolidation of the IBRC into General Government accounts and its subsequent liquidation first pushed Irish Government debt up by 6.2 percent of GDP (EUR12.6 billion) in 2013 and then cancelled most of the same in 2014. All in, IBRC liquidation shaved off 6 percentage points off our 2014 debt to GDP ratio. In between, change in the EU accounting rules raised our 2013 GDP by 6.5 percent. Stronger economic conditions and smooth exit from the Troika Programme have meant that the Irish Government was free to spend some of the borrowed cash reserves on buying out IBRC-linked bonds held in the Central Bank. This drawdown of previously borrowed cash contributed to some 4 percentage points drop in Irish debt to GDP ratio. For all the Government’s bravado, last year’s economic recovery contributed only 1.75 percentage points to the debt decline or roughly one sixth of the overall improvement.

Still, barring adverse shocks, we remain, for now, on course to drive debt to GDP ratio below 100 percent of GDP before the end of 2019.

As IMF notes, however, a temporary drop of 2 percentage points in 2015-2016 forecast nominal GDP growth rates would push our debt to GDP ratio to 117 percent in 2016. And on the balance side, a one percent rise in primary spending by the Government can push public deficit to 3.6 percent of GDP in 2015 and 3.0 percent in 2016 instead of Government projected 2.7 percent and 1.8 percent, respectively.

The IMF is concerned that the Irish Government is suffering from the ‘adjustment fatigue’, especially once the upcoming political pressures of the general election start looming on the horizon. The danger is that “…medium-term fiscal consolidation is at risk from spending pressures, requiring the adoption of a clear strategy to enable the restraint envisaged to be realized. … As the public investment budget is already low, current expenditures will have to bear the brunt of spending restraint, while ensuring the capacity to meet demands for health and education services from rising child and elderly populations. Nominal public sector wages and social benefits must be held flat for as long as feasible and the authorities will need to continue to seek savings across the budget.”

Somewhat predictably, the Irish authorities offered no strategy for fiscal management beyond 2015 and no expenditure policy solutions that can address such risks. Instead of sticking to promised costs moderation, the authorities told the IMF that increased current spending, including on higher public sector wages, can be offset by “discretionary revenue measures”. In other words, should the Government want to fund pre-election giveaways to its preferred social partners (aka public sector wage earners) it can simply hike taxes on less favoured groups. A slip of the veil revealing the ugly nature of our politics-captured economic strategy.


Politics is now firmly displacing economics in both, the way we set our forecasts, as well as interpret the existent data.

Take, for example our reported nearly 5 percent growth over 2014. Various recent ministerial statements extoled the virtues of the Government that made Ireland “the envy of Germany” as the best performing economy in Europe. Largely ignored in the official rhetoric was that much of this growth came from the “contract manufacturing outside Ireland that is dominated by a few companies”. The problem is that none of it has any real connection to Ireland and, as IMF notes, much of it “could quickly turn”.

Private domestic demand, excluding aircraft leasing and investment in tech services-linked intangibles rose by closer to 3 percent. Again, according to the IMF this figure may be a more realistic estimate of the real recovery. In other words, somewhere between 30 and 40 percent of the recorded growth in 2014 was down to just one an accounting trick. And multinationals had plenty other accounting tricks up their sleeves that no one is bothering to count.

Even the 3 percent domestic growth estimate stands inconsistent with the data on household finances. Stripping out gains in household net worth attributable to the property markets, households’ financial positions hardly improved in 2014. Mortgages in arrears accounted for 23.7 percent of all house loans outstanding, when measured by the balance of loans, down from 25.6 percent a year ago. Based on the Central Bank data, at the end of Q3 2014, some 244,816 mortgages accounts (amounting to EUR46.1 billion) were either in arrears, in repossession, or at risk of arrears – a number that is roughly 4,500 higher than a year ago. Based on the Department of Finance data, 85 percent of all accounts in arrears ‘permanently restructured’ at the end of November 2014 involved arrears solutions that result in higher debt over the life time of mortgage than prior to restructuring.

Based on the Central Bank data, Q3 2014 household deposits in the Irish banking system stood at EUR85.9 billion, slightly down on EUR86.0 billion a year ago.

In part, the above figures translate into the improvement in banking sector performance at the expense of households. In the first half of 2014, Irish banks recorded their first positive return on assets since the beginning of the crisis, and the net interest margin (the difference between the bank lending rate and the cost of funding) rose to a crisis-period high of 1.5 percent. But credit growth remained negative, contracting at a rate higher than in 2011. Put this in simple terms, the banks continued to bleed their clients dry at a faster rate than the recovery was making them stronger, and there was preciously little observable improvement in households’ financial positions compared to 2013. Certainly not enough to claim the picture to be consistent with rapid economic growth.

The IMF isn’t undiplomatic enough to say that, but the Fund is clearly concerned more than the Irish authorities at this state of imbalances. As they should be: the Central Bank internal stress-testing for new mortgages being issued by the banks today is for the interest rates rising to over 6-6.5 percent over the life time of the loan.

Of course, the Central Bank is a myopic institution when it comes to telling us what effects such rates would have on existent corporate and household loans. But give it a thought. Currently, average existent mortgage on the market is priced at interest rates below 2 percent per annum. And with that, 17.3 percent of all mortgages accounts are officially in arrears, and 34.3 percent of all balances relating to mortgages loans are either in arrears, in repossessions or restructured.

Should the interest rates double, let alone triple, what mortgages default rates on currently performing mortgages can we expect? What amount of economic growth do we need to shore up our household finances sufficiently enough to escape the interest rate squeeze that even the Central Bank admits might arrive in the foreseeable future? Can the current trends in the recovery – the ones that are leaving households out in the cold, while superficially inflating official GDP figures – deliver any sense of sustainability of our economic performance across the financial, fiscal and economic areas in this country should even mild shocks take place?

One can only wonder as to the answers to these questions, as well as to the silence of our authorities on these topics.

Wednesday, February 25, 2015

25/2/15: QNHS Q4 2014: Employment, Part-Time, Full-Time, & Underemployment




In the first three posts covering the QNHS results for Q4 2014, I discussed

  • Labour Force Participation Rate (poor news showing decline in the already historically low participation) and Unemployment Rate (goods news with unemployment - absent seasonal adjustment falling to 9.9% and the rate of decline in unemployment on quarterly basis accelerating): http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/02/25215-qnhs-q4-2014-labour-force.html
  • The size of labour force (which is worrying and static at and around crisis trough) and broader measures of unemployment (at high enough levels to arrant concern, but declining rapidly, although inclusive of the state training programmes participants and emigration figures the declines are shallower than across the officially reported numbers), here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/02/25215-qnhs-q4-2014-broader-measures-of.html
  • Employment growth overall and by sectors was covered here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/02/25215-qnhs-q4-2014-employment-growth-by.html. Employment grew by 29,100 over 12 months of 2014 and the rate of growth has accelerated between Q3 and Q4. Private non-agricultural employment is rising faster than total employment and the rate of employment growth here also accelerated in Q4 2014. High value-added sectors employment is also rising, at a rate faster than the overall employment is increasing.


Now, let's consider labour force breakdown by economic status.

Total number of working age adults residing in Ireland (age 15 and over) rose to 3,601,900 in Q4 2014 from 3,595,600 in Q3 2014, up 0.13% y/y (+4,500).

Of these, numbers of those at work rose to 1,877,900 in Q4 2013, up 1.56% y/y or 28,800. This is a key number as it reflects total creation of jobs in the economy. The rate of increases in the number of those at work was slower in Q4 2014 than in Q3 2014 (+1.7%). Compared to Q1 2011 (when the current Government took office), there number of those at work in Q4 2014 was up 4.27% or 76,900.

Number of those unemployed fell 13.05% y/y in Q4 2014 to 263,900 - a rate of y/y decline that is faster than 9.76 drop recorded in Q3 2014. Which is very good news. Overall, there were 39,600 fewer unemployed in Q4 2014 than in Q4 2013. Which is also a good number.

Now, between Q1 2011 and Q4 2014, 76,900 more adults went to work, but unemployment fell by 101,800, which shows that 24,900 adults have moved out of unemployment but did not go to work.

Number of students in Q4 2014 stood at 415,100 which is down 0.1% y/y (-400) and is up 3% (+12,100) on Q1 2011.

Number of those engaged on home duties stood at 476,300 in Q4 2014, up 0.55% y/y (+2,600). This increase stands contrasted by a 1.63% drop in Q3 2014 y/y. Since Q1 2011, the number of those engaged in home duties fell 10.17% (-53,900).

417,800 individuals of age 15 and over were officially in retirement in Q4 2014, up 2.93% (+11,900) y/y and up 19.95% (+69,500) on Q1 2011 - a massive increase clearly driven in part by early retirement schemes deployed in the public sector.

The mysterious category of 'Other' - those neither working, nor studying, nor unemployed, nor working on home duties, nor retired - was at 150,800, up 0.8% (+1,200) y/y and down 100 (-0.07%) on Q1 2011.

Recall that there were 1,877,900 individuals at work in Ireland in Q4 2014, a number that is 28,800 higher than in Q4 2013 and 76,900 higher than in Q1 2011. Of these, 1,474,300 individuals were in full time employment - an increase of 38,300 (+2.67%) y/y and a rise of 91,300 (+6.6%) since Q1 2011. Which shows clearly that new employment growth has been more significant in full-time category and there have been some transitions from part-time to full-time jobs. This is excellent news.

Meanwhile, number of those in part-time employment dropped to 383,600, down 2.34% (-9,200) y/y but up 3,100 (+0.81%) on Q1 2011.

Taking a closer look at part-time employment: In Q4 2014, number of part-time workers who reported themselves not underemployed was 276,000, up 5.59% y/y or 14,600. Compared to Q1 2011, there were 11,000 (+4.15%) more phis too is good news. And it confirms the suspicion that jobs quality has improved in recent quarters. Further indication of same is the number of those who are employed part time but do report themselves to be underemployed. This number stood at 107,600 in Q4 2014, down 18.17% y/y (-23,900) and down 7,900 (-6.84%) on Q1 2011.

Two charts to illustrate the aforementioned trends:



Overall conclusion: the quality of employment is improving, with more increases in full time employment and in part time not underemployed jobs. Rapid rate of growth in those in retirement (+65,900 on Q1 2011) relative to those at work (+76,900 over the same period) is worrying, however.

25/2/15: QNHS Q4 2014: Employment Growth by Sectors & Activity


In the first two posts covering the QNHS results for Q4 2014, I discussed



Now, let's take a look at employment.

Total employment across all sectors stood at 1,938,900 in Q4 2014, up 1.52% y/y - a rate of increase that is slightly faster than 1.45% rise y/y recorded in Q3 2014. In level terms, employment rose 29,100 in 12 months through the end of 2014. Taking annual average, employment over 2014 rose 1.74% compared to 2013 average level of employment.

Despite this, Q2 2014 employment was still down 2.88% on crisis period peak employment although it is 6.24% above the crisis period trough. Relative to 2008 average, current employment levels are down 8.9%.

In simple term, to sum this result up, things are improving, but they are far from normal or where they should be.

Stripping out agriculture and public sector, private sector non-agricultural employment stood at 1,335,400 in Q4 2014, up 2.6% y/y, beating 1.32% rise in the same over 12 months through Q3 2014. In level terms, employment in non-agricultural private sectors rose 33,900, beating the headline total employment figures - a major good news.

Nonetheless, compared to 2008 average, private sector non-agricultural employment remains down 13.19%, while public sector (including sectors dominated by public employment) employment is up 4.8%.



As chart above shows, total employment is doing well, rising to the levels that are above the pre-crisis average and close to the difference between Q3 and Q4 2009. However, private non-agricultural employment is lagging, current at the levels well below pre-crisis average and between Q4 2009 - Q1 2010 levels.

Public and state-controlled sectors employment rose to 487,600 in Q4 2014, up 1.24% y/y (slower growth than in Q3 2014 when it expanded by 2.33% y/y), adding 6,100 jobs. Full year 2014 average employment levels here are 1.13% higher than full 2013 average. Q4 reading marks the highest level of non-private non-agricultural employment for the entire crisis period and is 4.8% above the 2008 average.

Meanwhile, agricultural employment shrunk 9.33% y/y in Q4 2014, having posted a decline of 0.81% y/y in Q3 2014. Loss of employment in the sector in 12 months through the end of Q4 2014 was 10,900, which was most likely partially responsible for gains of 13,100 in construction jobs. Still, over 12 months of 2014, agricultural employment levels were averaging 2.08% above the same for 2013.



Chart above shows basically flat employment in the state and state-controlled sectors, which, when contrasted with official public sector employment figures suggests shift of some public sector jobs from state to private contracting.

High value-added sectors also added jobs in Q4 2014, with 14,000 new jobs additions y/y a rate of employment growth of 2.03% y/y, virtually identical to 2.02% growth recorded in Q3 2014. As with state-controlled sectors employment, employment in high value-added sectors posted peak reading in Q4 2014 for the entire crisis period and stood 6.56% above 2008 average.

Table below provides summary of changes in employment across all sectors reported:



To summarise, we have healthy employment growth of 29,100 over 12 months of 2014 and the rate of growth has accelerated between Q3 and Q4. However, some sectors did post declines y/y in Q4 2014 and some posted weak performance to the upside. Good news is: private non-agricultural employment is rising faster than total employment and the rate of employment growth here accelerated in Q4 2014. High value-added sectors employment is also rising, at a rate faster than the overall employment is increasing.