25/11/18: Russian South Stream 2.0 Comes Out of the Shadows

Russia and Turkey have announced that the two countries have reached significant progress in reviving the November 2014-shut down South Stream gas pipeline intended to land Russian gas across the Black Sea. The project is the part of the already secured open tender contracts for purchases of gas signed between Gazprom, Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Slovakia and Austria.

Source: Kommersant

The new Black Sea gas pipeline Turkish Stream will run under sea from Krasnodar to a landing hubv just west of Istanbul. On November 19, presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan met in Istanbul to announce the completion of pipeline's off-shore section.

Pipeline capacity is for 30 bullion cubic meters, bcm, although initial phase capacity will be closer to 17bcm (the first pipe). Currently, Gazprom supplies the above volume (30bcm) to Turkey (ca 16bcm), Bulgaria, Serbia, Slovakia, Hungary and Austria. Turkish market has been supplied via Blue Stream pipeline, and the other countries are supplied via Ukraine.

Based on reports from Russia's Kommersant (https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3806415), Gazprom has managed to achieve two feats:

1. Gazprom has completed laying two (not one) pipes for Turkish Stream, one intended to supply Turkey and another, to supply Southern Europe, 
2. Gazprom secured tenders for purchases of gas from all EU states to be connected to the South Stream project (Bulgaria's open tender closes in December 2018, but all other countries have already signed onto supply agreements).

Significantly, the tenders were secured in compliance with the EU Energy Directives. This means that Gazprom latest venture has addressed the main cause of the EU's original objections to the same pipeline prior to 2014. In the case of open tenders process, Gazprom used exactly the same scheme to secure capacity orders for its Nord Stream 2 pipeline to Germany, Czech Republic and Slovakia back in 2017. According to the experts cited by Kommersant, this makes in impossible for the EU to shut down the project.

Of course, history reminder due, South Stream was primarily killed off not by the EU, but by the U.S. keen on protecting Ukraine's near monopoly on Russian gas transit. The Obama Administration exerted massive pressure on Bulgaria and other South Stream-receiving countries to prevent landing Russian gas in Southern Europe. So far, there has been little indication what Washington's position on the latest iteration of the South Stream might be, but I doubt it will be welcoming.

Kommersant-quoted stats on South Stream are impressive: according to the paper sources, Gazprom signed delivery tenders with Slovakia for seven years from October 2022 for 4.3bcm, of which Austria will get 3.8bcm, 4.7bcm will go to Hungary, 2bcm to Serbia, and 4.8bcm to Bulgaria. So, comes October 2022,  the South Stream (or Turkey Stream, or whatever you want to call this) will be pumping into Southern Europe the equivalent of the current transit through Ukraine.

Between two new pipelines, Gazprom can easily deliver its current supply contracts to Europe by-passing Ukraine, although, if European demand continues to expand at the current rates, it is likely that Gazprom will need to retain some Ukrainian transit capacity into the future. Even in 2021, before South Stream comes fully on stream, Russian gas transit via Ukraine can fall to below 10bcm per annum.

These developments are undoubtedly a major concern for Ukraine - the country already raised criticism of the South Stream on November 19 - as transit of Russian gas via Ukraine is a major revenue earner for Kyiv. Based on the European Council on Foreign Relations data, between 1991 and 2000, Ukraine accounted for 93 percent of Russian gas transit to Europe; by January 2014, this amounted to 49 percent. Naftogaz, Ukrainian State gas company, tried repeatedly to extract monopoly-level revenues from Gazprom. Back in 2008, Naftogaz tried to charge Gazprom $9 per tcm/100km in transit fees - triple the price charged for transit by Slovakia and Poland, and more than double the fee charged by the majority of the Western European states. This pricing came on top of Ukrainian authorities expecting Gazprom to supply gas to Ukraine for domestic consumption at severely subsidised prices. It is, of course, worth noting that Gazprom itself is a monopoly and has, in the past, used its dominant market positions to exercise market power. There are no innocents (other than European buyers of gas) in the long-running disputes between Naftogaz-Ukraine and Gazprom-Russia.

Nonetheless, the situation is asymmetric. Russia currently continues to rely on Ukraine for transit of its main traded commodity, while Ukraine continues to rely on Russia for a large share of its economic activity. In a recent note, Bruegel (http://bruegel.org/2018/01/the-clock-is-ticking-ukraines-last-chance-to-prevent-nord-stream-2/) estimated that Nord Stream 2 coming on line can cost Ukrainian economy ca 2-3 percent of GDP in foregone Russian gas transit earnings. South Stream is likely to add another 1.5 percent.  In the longer run, overall cost to Ukraine of losing Russian gas transit routes can cost as much as 5-6 percent of GDP.

Note: the latest developments in the Sea of Azov can put significant political pressure on the South Stream project, if the EU and the U.S. choose to significantly escalate their pressure on Russia in the wake of the Russian blockade of trade routes through Kerch Straits and in response to the naval incidents reported today. Both, the reported blockade and the naval incident, are worrying developments, and the onus is on Russia to rapidly de-escalate the already volatile situation in the Azov Sea. There are no justifiable reason for restricting Ukraine's access to trade routes, and for increasing military tensions in the region.

5/3/15: Russian Oil & Gas: production and exports

Russian energy exports in the year of economic sanctions -  a nice survey Oil Price (h/t to @RussiaInsider) via http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Impotent-Western-Sanctions-Fail-To-Disrupt-Russian-Energy-Exports.html.

Basic summary: volumes are up (coal), holding (uranium). But, tellingly, no discussion of oil and gas exports. Reason: both are under twin pressures of price and sanctions. So a quick add-on:

• Oil revenues: switching wells off in Siberia in the winter is tricky, risky and hard to do, so the black gold continues to flow even at current prices. But 2014 oil exports revenues were down 11.4% to USD153.8 billion and volume of exports was down 5.6% y/y to 223.4 million tons. 
• Oil production: OPEC estimates Russian oil production to decline by 70,000 bpd in 2015 with exports declining by 60,000 bpd y/y. Meanwhile some industry players have much more gloomy outlook: Lukoil sees a possible drop in Russian production of 800,000 bpd by the end of 2016: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/03/russia-crisis-lukoil-idUSL5N0W537K20150303. Meanwhile, December 2014 saw a sharp rise in Russian oil exports to 4.4 million bpd as the Government cut export duty from 59% to 42%. New duty covers also 2015, so we can expect some support for production levels. OPEC estimated Russian production volumes to average 10.58 million bpd, with Q1 2015 forecast of 10.6 million bpd and Q2 forecast of 10.54 millions bpd.
• Gas: full year estimates for Gazprom exports are down 18.6% y/y to USD54.73 billion, volume of exports down 12.1% to 172.6 billion cubic meters. Average contracted price in 2014: USD317 per 1,000 cubic meters, down 7.5% y/y.
• Gas plans: Russia has been aggressively shifting new contracts for supplies to Asia Pacific and Turkey. By Energy Ministry estimates, Russian gas exports to Asia will rise from 14 bcm in 2014 to 130 bcm in 2035 and oil and coal exports will more than double.
• Worth noting the increasing switch in favour of refined petroleum products exports, discussed here: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/09/russia-oil-exports-idUSL6N0TS1XV20141209
• Overall trade impact of the above was to drive down exports revenues to USD782.9 billion or down 7% y/y. Trade surplus was USD210.9 billion in 2014.
• If imports remain where they were in 2014, and oil price averages of 2015 at USD45 pb, Central Bank of Russia estimates a decline in exports revenues (and trade balance) os around USD 160 billion - painful, but still leaving the country in a trade surplus.

5/2/15: Gazprom's Nord and South Streams: Lessons Learned, Strategy Changed

I just published a long note on the trials and tribulations of the ill-fated South Stream gas pipeline project that was designed to deliver Russian gas to Bulgaria and Southern Europe. Here is the link: http://trueeconomicslr.blogspot.ie/2015/02/5215-gazproms-nord-and-south-streams.html

14/1/2015: Gazprom to Europe: See You in Turkey

And we have it... from the mouthpiece of Moscow, the Rossiyskaya Gazeta (link to Russian version here).

Head of "Gazprom" Alexei Miller announced new strategy in response to the changes to the EU energy policy. This involves:
1) South Stream pipeline is dead. Permanently.
2) South Stream is to be replaced by Turkish Stream, crossing Black Sea and landing in Turkey, with no plans for connecting to Europe.
3) If Europe wants Russia gas, it will have to build its own connection from Turkey.
4) All gas supplied via Ukraine - currently 63 bcm of gas going to Europe via Ukraine transit - will be shipped via Turkish Stream.
5) Shipments of gas via non-Ukraine transit will continue (in 2013 total Russian gas supplies to Europe were 161.5 bcm and in 2014 these were down roughly 10 percent).

All of this is a response to the EU plans to monopolise purchasing of energy from outside the EU. The EU is aiming to increase its bargaining power both vis-a-vis prices of delivery and delivery channels (pipelines access). Understandably, Russian objective is to retain some pricing power and control over transit systems (remember, these systems are built either using Russian funds or a combination of funds involving Russian funds).

The implications of Miller's announcement are wide-ranging. In effect, Russia is calling Europe's bluff on both Ukraine and Energy Union.

If Ukraine is shut out of transit of Russian gas, Kiev will be forced to lock into European supply systems. The risk of non-payments - a very material risk given Kiev's track record over the 1990s and 2000s - will fall squarely onto European system. Alternatively, Ukraine will be exposed to the risk of Gazprom dictating its terms on gas supplies to Ukraine. Ukraine will also lose lucrative billions in transit fees (ca USD3bn in 2013 alone) and will face new costs for shipments of gas - cheaper via direct route from Russia, more expensive via European system link up.

Turkey is a big winner here as it gets to become the dominant key hub (ahead of Nord Stream) for transit of gas to Europe (including Central Asian gas).

EU is not necessarily a loser in this, however. Owning the pipe from Turkey to Europe, the EU will be able to negotiate transit of Central Asian gas as a substitute for Russian gas with minimal capital expenditure.

21/10/2014: Russian Gas, European Deliveries, Ukrainian Blackmail?

Over recent days there have been plenty of statements about the winter supplies of Russian gas to Europe. Majority of these fall to one side of the argument, alleging that Russia is likely to cut off gas shipments to Europe via Ukraine.

Here are the facts, strongly indicating an entirely different possibility.

Fact 1: Allegations. At the end of August, Euractive reported that "Europe faces the increasing threat of a disruption to gas supplies from its main provider Russia this winter due to the crisis in Ukraine." (link)

But when you read beyond the headline, you get something entirely different. "Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseny Yatseniuk said today (27 August) Kyiv knew of Russian plans to halt gas flows this winter to Europe. "We know of Russia's plans to block [gas] transit even to European Union countries this winter, and that's why their [EU's] companies were given an order to pump gas into storage in Europe as fully as possible," he told a government meeting, without disclosing how he knew about the Russian plans."

So Yatsenyuk presented a conjecture - that incidentally boost his own agenda. Media reported it with zero questioning. Meanwhile, Russian officials denied the possibility of such disruption: "It's unlikely that Russia would cut gas supplies. Ukraine will start siphon off it itself, as it has been the case in the past," a senior source at the Russian Energy Ministry said."

We have set the stage: Ukraine says Russia may disrupt supplies. Russia says Ukraine may siphon off gas destined for other buyers in order to satisfy its own needs.

Fact 2: Historical Precedents. As Euractive reports: "Russian gas flows to Ukraine have now been halted three times in the past decade, in 2006, 2009 and 2014, due to price disputes between Moscow and Kyiv, and flows to the EU were disrupted in 2006 and 2009 after Ukraine took some of the gas intended for the EU to meet its own winter demand."

In other words, Ukraine stole (as in appropriated without a payment and beyond its contracted power) Russian gas destined for European customers. This, presumably is Russian fault, as it is Russia that is being blamed for the disruptions.

So we have it: Ukraine steals, Russia gets blamed.

Fact 3: Counter-accusations. Official Russian position on supplies of gas to Europe: "Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak refuted the claim by Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk that Russia is planning to halt gas transit to EU member states. “Specific comments by Ukrainian politicians on alleged Russian intentions to stop gas transit to EU countries are puzzling. We can qualify them only as absolutely baseless speculations aimed at confusing or deliberately misinforming of European consumers of Russian gas”, said Alexander Novak."

Now, you can possibly say there is risk of Novak lying. Or you can say there is risk PM Yatsenyuk is lying. Remember: Yatsenyuk made a statement of claim unbacked by any evidence (Fact 1 above). Novak made an official statement on the record. Yatsenyuk has an incentive to push European member states to take a tough stance on Russia in brokering a gas deal between Russian and Ukraine. Russia does not have such an incentive. Yatsenyuk is actively campaigning for an outright re-writing of Russian-European contracts for gas supply to suit Kiev interests (read below). Russia does not have such an incentive.

So who is the beneficiary of all these conjectures about Russia 'cutting gas supplies to Europe'? Why, it is Ukraine.

Fact 4: In his own words. On October 17 Itar Tass (link) claimed: "Europe should respond to a statement by Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk that Ukraine can give no guarantees for safe Russian natural gas transit to Europe, Gazprom Deputy CEO Alexander Medvedev said on Friday. “Yatsenyuk said yesterday that Ukraine will not be able to ensure the safety of gas supplies from Russia to Europe,” he said."

So did Yatsenyuk say this? He did. His statement is supported by his own actions tracing back to end of July / beginning of August.

Fact 5: In his own deeds. Let's go back to August 8th, when Yatsenyuk threatened sanctions to cut off all transit of Russian gas: "Ukraine may impose sanctions against any transit via its territory, including air flights and gas supplies to Europe, Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk said Friday." (link confirmed by Bloomberg here and the Wire here).

So real was this threat, Germany had to step in to put PM Yatsenyuk back into his place (link). And European buyers continued to pump up storage facilities not because of a Russian threat, but because of the Ukrainian actions.

Things got comical: Naftogas - a Ukrainian state-owned gas company - said back in August it was prepared to bypass its own Government-imposed restrictions on transit (link). So even Naftogas was aware that it was Kiev, not Moscow, who planned the cut off.

20 days after Yatsenyuk backed out the first threat, "Ukrainian Prime Minister Yatsenyuk pushed a bill through the Verkhovna Rada that …would permit the transit of natural gas to be blocked." Source (link). In other words, on August 28, Yatsenyuk pushed through a law that legalises Ukraine's power to shut down transit.

Ukraine was no longer speaking about shutting down Russian gas transit. It actually set legal grounds for acting on doing so.

On September 23rd, Kiev backed out of the month-old stand and committed itself to allowing transit (link). Strangely, the article does not really try to explain why PM Yatsenyuk had to commit to such an act, if it was Russia that was a threat of disrupting gas flows.

Conclusions: Now, we can think of a straight logic implying that actually it is Ukraine that is a threat point replete with threat --> act --> deny chain of events. But the Western media continues to insist that it is all down to Russia's bad politics.

This week (link) Ukraine is again refusing to guarantee uninterrupted transit to Europe unless it gets all Russian-European contracts renegotiated on its own terms. These terms are: Ukraine gets full control over actual gas transiting over its territory and gains a de facto veto power on any contract any European buyer signs with a Russian supplier.

Again, who is the attempting to hold European gas supplies hostage to its own political agendas?

15/6/2014: Germany's Ifo: Putin and Flickering Power

I was sent an advanced copy of the Ifo Viewpoint Nr. 154 "Putin and Flickering Power" by Hans-Werner Sinn, President of the Ifo Institute which is the official translation of the German source here.

Selective quotes with comments in italics being my own:

"The unresolved conflict in Ukraine …is also endangering Germany’s oil and gas supplies, which in turn threatens its energy turnaround since Germany’s new energy policy cannot be implemented without Russian gas. Why? Because of the inconstancy of wind and solar energy. Both sources of energy require a technology to smooth out the vagaries of their power output. This task can ultimately only be performed by gas-fired power plants co-existing alongside wind and solar energy." [Although not directly referencing the EU's feeble attempts at delivering a cohesive and coherent energy policy, this thesis clearly puts the boot into Brussels well-meaning but economically infeasible push for renewables-driven energy markets.]

"Using the figures for wind and solar energy effectively supplied during all 8,760 hours of 2011, we calculated the storage capacity required to smooth out the output fluctuations. The installed nominal output of both power sources amounted to 54 Gigawatts (GW) in that year. Their combined output reached up to 27 GW at given times, but at others it dropped to 0.5 GW, giving an average power generation of 7.3 GW. The assured output available during 99.5 per cent of hours amounted to only 0.9 GW.

To make the average output reliably available for consumption and to bring up the 0.9-GW assured output as close to the average value as possible, a storage technology is absolutely essential. The most efficient method currently available is pumped hydro storage. Around 3,300 pumped storage facilities would be required to achieve a complete smoothing of the power supply based on 2011 figures, which represents around 100 times the number of facilities currently existing in Germany. New storage facilities, however, are difficult to get built since they tend to provoke angry citizen protests. In Bavaria’s Jochberg area people raised their scythes in protest when only one such power station was to be built." [Ah, that pesky problem of people power… Pragmatically, Ifo takes it into the account. Typically, for Brussels operations, EU neglects it. End game: dysfunctional centralised policy grafted onto the locally democratic institutions of policymaking.]

"So what about smoothing only part of the “fluctuating power” instead of all of it? The results for this model are also sobering. To smooth four-sevenths of the average power output, around 440 pumped storage facilities would still be needed in Germany. This remains beyond the realms of the politically possible."

"Alternatively, power could be stored in batteries. This would require 164 million battery packs of the type used in a BMW i3 – four times the number of cars of all stripes presently in existence in Germany. The one million electric cars that are supposed to be on Germany’s roads by 2020 would deliver a meagre 0.6 per cent of the storage capacity required. And those cars would not be able to drive on windless days of the year, to prevent their batteries from running out of power."

The storage problem can only be solved through the construction of natural gas storage facilities. Such facilities require less space, can be built on flat land and the production costs are much lower. With this technology power peaks are initially used to produce hydrogen. The hydrogen is then transformed back into methane gas, which the gas-fired power stations can use to generate power where necessary. A problem yet to be solved, however, is energy loss along this storage path. Since the efficiency factor in this procedure is only a quarter, the cost of any power sent through the methanisation and gas-fired power plants would quadruple."

[So, unhappy (for Brussels and Eastern Europe) conclusion:] "In short, it is ultimately much cheaper to buy gas from Putin’s gas traders, store it in Germany and then use it to generate power in gas-fired power stations when necessary to fill the gaps left by wind and solar energy. Putin gas costs around 3 cents per kilowatt hour, whereas gas from methane obtained from wind energy conversion would be at least six times as expensive, not including the costs of building the conversion plants. If the power were to be generated offshore it would be at least ten times as expensive." [The brilliant bit of this is that it shows the German way of thinking in terms of efficiencies as opposed to, say, Irish thinking in terms of 'romantic evocations' - remember Irish policy refrain that 'wind is free energy'? Right…]

"The use of Russian gas is therefore the only solution that is halfway viable in economic terms. Under this scenario, the fluctuating power from wind and solar power is blended and smoothed with power from methane storage facilities that are replenished by Putin’s gas traders and then tapped as needed. Overall, this leads to a regular supply of energy – and it is our only option. All other alternatives are mere pipedreams."

21/5/2014: Russia-China Gas Deal

Russia and China signed bilateral gas deal to supply 38bcm of Russian gas per annum, with an option of expanding shipments to 61bcm. The deal covers 30 years of supply. Full valuations and prices are not yet known, but the deal at 38bcm/annum x 30 years was originally valued at USD440 billion.

Here are the best reports on the deal so far (to be updated):

http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-and-china-sign-billion-gas-pipeline-mega-deal-2014-5

Update: zerohedge covers price details here: http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-05-21/russia-and-china-finally-sign-400-billion-holy-grail-gas-deal

WSJ on the deal: http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/05/21/russia-strikes-gas-gold-in-china/ pointing to heating up competition in Asia-Pacific energy markets and Russia's play coming ahead of Canadian exports flows. This, in part, explains why Russia agreed on a deal pricing gas at just above USD350 bcm whereas Russia previously looked for a price closer to USD400 bcm. As you can see from the second chart below, over the years while the deal with China was in negotiations stages, gas price inflation fell significantly, reducing room for price upside in the deal.

The deal is of huge importance to Russia.

Russian economy is only weakly-dependent on gas prices, Government deficits are somewhat more closely linked to these. See more here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/03/2232014-russian-capital-flight-and.html and in the slide below:

The reason for this is that Russian economy is not as dependent on exports (gas accounts for ca 60% of these on goods side):

And in the long run, there is spending and income channel feed through from gas prices (and exports) to domestic demand:

It is worth noting that China-delivery price of Russian gas can be lower than European delivery for two reasons:

1. Internally contained transit costs
2. Lower risk of disruptions (remember that Ukraine routinely pushed Russian gas shipments to the brink by either threatening to or actually syphoning gas designated for Western European deliveries for domestic use) and non-payment (settlements are likely to be in Chinese yuan, rather than in the USD and with this, there is no risk of non-payment, as in the case of Ukraine). See: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/04/1042014-game-of-chicken-ukraine-debts.html for more.

Also, gas for China will be coming from newer fields, which are located closer to the Chinese border and, although more expensive in production, are not competing with Western Europe-focused Western Siberian fields.

Finally, new pipeline holds promise bringing exploration and production further East from existent centres of production.

All across - this should be a very good deal for Russia and China. The core threat here is to the US exports of LNG to Asia-Pacific, where US producers are collecting huge margins, compared to European markets. But this threat is still some years (if not decades) off from becoming a significant pressure point.

27/4/2014: Ukraine-Slovakia Agreement on Reversed Shipments of Gas

Per today's reports (see: http://www.rosbalt.ru/main/2014/04/27/1262169.html), Ukraine reached an agreement with Slovakia for reverse-delivery of natural gas via Vojany-Uzhgorod pipeline. Shipments can start in October with maximum delivery of 3 billion cubic meters per annum, and from March 2015 the capacity can be raised to 10 billion cubic meters per annum.

As the article notes, from April 2, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the decree annulling Kharkiv agreements that provided a discount on gas price for delivery to Ukraine of USD100 per 1,000 cubic meters, so starting from Q2 2014 Ukraine delivery is priced at USD385.5 per 1,000 cubic meters from USD268.5

Following this, on April 3, head of Gasprom Aleksey Miller said that taking into the account arrears on past gas deliveries, Ukraine gas deliveries will be priced at USD485 per 1,000 cubic meters.

Here is my earlier note on Ukrainian arrears relating to Russian gas deliveries and Ukrainian Government debt held by Russia: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/04/1042014-game-of-chicken-ukraine-debts.html.

10/4/2014: Game of Chicken: Ukraine-Debts-Russia-Gas-Europe...

What's the story about Ukraine's gas debts? Here are some facts as reported by the Russian Minister for Energy Aleksander Novak and Gasprom's Deputy Chairman of the Board Vitaliy Markelov yesterday, with data as of April 9:

• Total Ukrainian arrears on gas amount to USD2.238 bn which is approximately USD830 million above the levels at the end of December 2013. This relates to sales of gas prior to price increases.
• To cover winter demand, Ukraine needs reserves of 18 billion cubic meters of gas, with current shortfall at around 11.5 billion. Shortfall value at current prices is between USD4 and 5 billion, depending on timing of purchases.
• Contracts for gas deliveries include a clause allowing Russia to demand pre-payment for purchases. Prime Minister, Dmitriy Medvedev stated that Russian side now has full basis for switching to pre-payments system, as Ukraine failed to cover imports of gas for March. President Putin adopted a delay in triggering pre-payment conditions. In response, as reported by Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lavrov, Ukraine notified Russia that imports of Russian gas will be paid for on the basis of Ukrainian-own prices. In addition, Ukraine's Minister for Energy and Coal Industry, Yuri Prodan threatened to interrupt transit of Russian gas to European customers.
• According to Prime Minister Medvedev, total Ukraine's debt owed to Russia is at USD16.6 billion. This comprises: USD2.2 debt on gas imports, USD11.4 billion general debt and USD3 billion in 2013 euro bonds. Minister for Finance, Anton Siluyanov also reported that Ukraine requested from Russian Government to aid in purchasing another USD3 billion tranche of eurobonds.
• Russia also confirmed that there have been no interruptions in Russian imports from Ukraine and there are no arrears or late payments on shipments from Ukraine which amount to around USD15 billion.
• Russia agreed to a tri-party negotiations on gas exports to Ukraine and transit issues, including Ukraine, EU and Russia, but refused to allow the US to participate in negotiations directly.

So we are down to the 'Game of Chicken' and Russia is quite confident it can manage any head-on collision. 

22/3/2014: Russian Capital Flight and Current Account: Crimea's Punch

While sanctions against Russia have been pretty much anodyne to-date in direct economic impact terms, there are indirect effects worth considering that are worrying from the economy's perspective. Some of these are boiling down to capital flight vs inflows of funds from external balance of trade.

Chart below sets the stage through Q4 2013:

While we do not have full Q1 2014 data in what we do know is that outflow of capital has accelerated on Ukraine/Crimea news. Here's one report putting full year 2014 estimates at USD130bn so far, double 2013 recorded official outflows: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/goldman-puts-2014-capital-flight-at-130bln/496228.html. And the Central Bank has so far promised not to impose controls on outflows: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/18/us-ukraine-crisis-capital-idUSBREA2H0NH20140318.

On the current account side, so far, there should be little impact. Gas flows to Europe not only remained un-impacted by the Crimean crisis, but through March 10th, these actually averaged a rise month-on-month, from around 440 thousand cubic meters per day in 2013 to around 476-477 thousand cubic meters. But the problem is that much of shipments via Ukraine is currently accumulating in the arrears account, which is hard to close in the environment of a crisis. Should Ukraine default on payments to Russia or delay these significantly, the current account side of the above funds flows will be hammered. In 2013 alone, absent the standoff in Crimea, Ukraine's unpaid arrears to Gasprom stood at USD3.3 billion. This was partially covered by a payment of USD1.28 billion made on February 14th, with current arrears of USD1.99 billion still outstanding for the balance on 2013, plus January-February 2014.

The overall arrears on Naftogaz (Ukraine's state gas imports agency) are a problem and are likely to feature in the IMF funding deal to be struck before the end of this month. Whether or not the IMF forces Ukraine to default (partially or fully) on its gas imports-related arrears is unknown, but there is some possibility this might happen.

However, as is (above chart), since 2013, Russian current account surplus already no longer covers capital outflows, which explains much of the rouble weakness in 2013 and ongoing weakness in 2014.

So what is the possible impact of the risks to gas and oil trade from Russia on Russian economy? Here are some points:

1. Gas is far less important to Russian Government revenues than oil: Gas accounts for just around 20-22% of budget revenues. Russian Federal Budget is balanced at oil price of USD115/bbl, which is falling as rouble depreciates, and now probably set around USD110/bbl.
2. Balance of payments is under a greater threat from Ukraine crisis: gas accounts for 14% of Russian exports against 50% for oil and petroleum products.
3. Russia's oil exports are only about 8% exposed to Ukraine's transit (Druzhba pipeline) and shipments are declining (2013 transit of 15.6 million tonnes against 2014 planned transit of 15 million tonnes).

Mitigating factor to all of this is the South Stream pipeline which is scheduled to ship 63 bcm of gas cutting Russian exports transit dependence on Ukraine to roughly 50 bcm and is set to become operative around 2015.

Either way, the problem for Russia in the short term is capital flight. If Estimated losses of capital in Q1 2014 are to run at USD60-70 billion (note: Capital Economics forecasts the latter figure), given stagnant or declining current account surplus, monetary authorities have three tools at their disposal:

• Allow further devaluation of the rouble (chart below shows why that is unlikely to provide much of a cushion, given already massive devaluation to-date)
• Raise rates (current rates already biting hard into economy, with further uplifts risking to push economy into a recession)
• Capital controls (politically hard thing to swallow in the current investment environment: see second chart below) 

Which means that all three measures will be tried, with primary emphasis on devaluation. This in turn means that the investment case for Russia is still weak, despite a significant fall-off in equity valuations. Bottom fishing is some time off for investors.