22/3/2014: If we are to be democratic about EU's powers...

In February 2014, Ipsos conducted a survey across the EU states covering voters preferences for the long-term policy they saw fit their country in relation to the future of the EU. Here is the summary of the results:

So here are top conclusions:

1. Of countries covered only Hungary expressed more than 50% preference for either formation of a single European Government or enhancing powers of the EU.
2. Of countries that expressed less than 50% preference for expanding the EU powers, Italy, Germany, and Spain showed preferences of between 45% and 49%
3. There was, on average, and across Poland, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Sweden and Great Britain stronger preferences for scaling back the EU powers than for expanding them.

While it is easy to discount the UK preferences, Poland, Belgium, France, Netherlands and Sweden all showed very strong distaste for any further expansion of the EU powers. The Netherlands and Sweden were, in fact, virtually indistinguishable from Great Britain.

22/3/2014: Mind the Gap... Primary Balances Gap...

Here's a chart from Pictet showing precisely why all the austerity has been the case of too-little-to-date when it comes to stabilising debt ratios across the euro area:

And do note 'best in the lot' country of Ireland against the 'laggard' Italy... One wonders, how Messrs Kenny & Noonan are going to plug that gap while delivering tax cuts and jobs programmes?..

22/3/2014: Russian Capital Flight and Current Account: Crimea's Punch

While sanctions against Russia have been pretty much anodyne to-date in direct economic impact terms, there are indirect effects worth considering that are worrying from the economy's perspective. Some of these are boiling down to capital flight vs inflows of funds from external balance of trade.

Chart below sets the stage through Q4 2013:

While we do not have full Q1 2014 data in what we do know is that outflow of capital has accelerated on Ukraine/Crimea news. Here's one report putting full year 2014 estimates at USD130bn so far, double 2013 recorded official outflows: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/goldman-puts-2014-capital-flight-at-130bln/496228.html. And the Central Bank has so far promised not to impose controls on outflows: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/18/us-ukraine-crisis-capital-idUSBREA2H0NH20140318.

On the current account side, so far, there should be little impact. Gas flows to Europe not only remained un-impacted by the Crimean crisis, but through March 10th, these actually averaged a rise month-on-month, from around 440 thousand cubic meters per day in 2013 to around 476-477 thousand cubic meters. But the problem is that much of shipments via Ukraine is currently accumulating in the arrears account, which is hard to close in the environment of a crisis. Should Ukraine default on payments to Russia or delay these significantly, the current account side of the above funds flows will be hammered. In 2013 alone, absent the standoff in Crimea, Ukraine's unpaid arrears to Gasprom stood at USD3.3 billion. This was partially covered by a payment of USD1.28 billion made on February 14th, with current arrears of USD1.99 billion still outstanding for the balance on 2013, plus January-February 2014.

The overall arrears on Naftogaz (Ukraine's state gas imports agency) are a problem and are likely to feature in the IMF funding deal to be struck before the end of this month. Whether or not the IMF forces Ukraine to default (partially or fully) on its gas imports-related arrears is unknown, but there is some possibility this might happen.

However, as is (above chart), since 2013, Russian current account surplus already no longer covers capital outflows, which explains much of the rouble weakness in 2013 and ongoing weakness in 2014.

So what is the possible impact of the risks to gas and oil trade from Russia on Russian economy? Here are some points:

1. Gas is far less important to Russian Government revenues than oil: Gas accounts for just around 20-22% of budget revenues. Russian Federal Budget is balanced at oil price of USD115/bbl, which is falling as rouble depreciates, and now probably set around USD110/bbl.
2. Balance of payments is under a greater threat from Ukraine crisis: gas accounts for 14% of Russian exports against 50% for oil and petroleum products.
3. Russia's oil exports are only about 8% exposed to Ukraine's transit (Druzhba pipeline) and shipments are declining (2013 transit of 15.6 million tonnes against 2014 planned transit of 15 million tonnes).

Mitigating factor to all of this is the South Stream pipeline which is scheduled to ship 63 bcm of gas cutting Russian exports transit dependence on Ukraine to roughly 50 bcm and is set to become operative around 2015.

Either way, the problem for Russia in the short term is capital flight. If Estimated losses of capital in Q1 2014 are to run at USD60-70 billion (note: Capital Economics forecasts the latter figure), given stagnant or declining current account surplus, monetary authorities have three tools at their disposal:

• Allow further devaluation of the rouble (chart below shows why that is unlikely to provide much of a cushion, given already massive devaluation to-date)
• Raise rates (current rates already biting hard into economy, with further uplifts risking to push economy into a recession)
• Capital controls (politically hard thing to swallow in the current investment environment: see second chart below) 

Which means that all three measures will be tried, with primary emphasis on devaluation. This in turn means that the investment case for Russia is still weak, despite a significant fall-off in equity valuations. Bottom fishing is some time off for investors.

20/3/2014: ECB Rates and Policy Expectations

My comment on ECB policy in Portugal's Expresso:

Click on image to enlarge

20/3/2014: Trade in Goods & Trade Balance Dynamics for Ireland: January 2014

As noted in the earlier post, CSO released new data on Irish merchandise trade, covering January 2014. I discussed the validity of the argument that improved competitiveness is a driver of Irish exports here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/03/1932014-competitiveness-might-have.html and as promised, now will discuss top-level data on trade flows.

Starting from the top:

Based on unadjusted (seasonally) data:

• Total imports into Ireland (goods only) amounted to EUR4.528 billion in January 2014, which is up 1.93% y/y. This is shallower rate of increase in imports than the one recorded in December 2013 (+16.9% y/y).
• 3mo cumulated imports for the period November 2013-January 2014 were up 8.2% on the same period of 2012-2013.
• January 2014 marks the highest level of monthly imports since March 2012 and the busiest imports January since 2008.
• Total exports from Ireland (goods only) stood at EUR7.0306 billion in January 2014, up 4.48% y/y, which is a shallower increase than 13.41% rise recorded in 12 months through December 2013.
• 3mo cumulated exports for the period November 2013-January 2014 were up 2.05% on the same period of 2012-2013.
• January 2014 levels of exports are not remarkable by any means possible, representing only the second highest level of January exporting activity since January 2008.
• Trade balance in January 2014 stood at EUR2.5026 billion, up 9.42% y/y which is an improvement on December 2013 annual rise of 7.18%.
• 3mo cumulated trade balance for the period November 2013-January 2014 was down 6.64% on the same period of 2012-2013.

Three charts to illustrate:

In the chart above, notice disappointing performance in exports relative to trend (red line) and to 6mo MA (black line). Also note poor performance of trade balance relative to trend and the seeming breaking out of trade balance away from the trend line down.

The same is confirmed in the seasonally-adjusted series plotted below:

So exports have risen y/y, primarily due to a truly abysmal January 2012. But exports are still trending below an already virtually flat trend. You might think of this as being a story of some short term improvement, amidst ongoing long term weakness.

20/3/2014: Latest Changes to Country Risk Ratings for Ukraine & Russia

Big drop in country risk scores for Ukraine and Russia today via @euromoney ECR :

Note: higher score implies lower risk.

Here is Ukraine's performance over time and comparative to ECE:

Note that current score is 30.43, lower than in the above chart.

And here is Russia's performance:

You can see the vast gap between two countries in terms of overall scores. Russia is running (still, even with latest decline) close to the world average and well ahead of regional average, while Ukraine clearly under-performs world and regional averages.

19/3/2014: Competitiveness might have improved... but It has little to do with trade...

In light of today's data on trade in goods (January - see next post for details on this), there has been a lot of claims flying around, including one Ministerial press release extolling the virtues of our 'improved competitiveness' as the driver of growth in exports.

So that improved competitiveness, then... Here are the charts showing Irish Harmonised Competitiveness Indicator based on unit labour costs which are designed to capture relative competitiveness in the euro area economies.

Lower values imply higher competitiveness.

Chart above shows two things:

1. Our competitiveness did improve since the peak in HCI at Q2 2008, but it has deteriorated again in 2013 as the HCI rose from the crisis period low in Q4 2012.
2. Our competitiveness is still lagging that of the Euro area average (black line). We would have to decrease HCI by some 10% more to hit Euro area average, which is about 3 years worth of further wages and costs austerity, if we are to get there.

But forget the average and look at all euro area countries:

As chart above shows, we are smack in the middle of the euro area distribution. In fact in 2012-2013 we consistently ranked 10th from the top in terms of competitiveness, which is an improvement on 13-134h from the top in 2010-2011, 16th in 2007-2009 etc, etc... Still, we are 10th... which is not exactly a dreamy place to be in, right?..

Here's our distance to the best performer index reading (again, higher values = worse performance in competitiveness terms):

So two things worth noting:

1. As I noted earlier, things improved, but the improvement is not that spectacular and we seemed to have lost the momentum there.
2. More importantly, there seems to be only weak correlation between the overall competitiveness changes and exports performance...

To see the above point (2), here is a chart:

As above shows, there is statistically no correlation between improving competitiveness (negative values on horizontal axis) and growth in exports of services. There is some statistical link between improved competitiveness and growth in exports of goods (as blue line indicates). But that link is not particularly strong. And this effect is driven by a handful of 'extreme' events such as dot.com bubble of 1999-2000 and the bursting of the property bubble in 2008. Absent these, the explanatory power of HCI changes drops from 26.7% to 14% and the slope of the relationship becomes as flat as that for the services exports.

In other words, sorry Minister, competitiveness gains might be all good and positive (I think they are), but these hardly explain much in terms of our exports performance.

18/3/2014: Crimea's Fate Sealed, It's Time for Risk-on on Russia

Key takeaways on today's news from Crimea, so far:

• Crimea is now fully legally incorporated into the Russian Federation and this makes the region's split from Ukraine and accession to Russia irrevocable, no matter what sanctions are being put forward.
• President Putin's address to joint meeting of Russian Duma and Federation Council raised a number of very strong geopolitical points. The main one being the role played by the Nato expansion over the last 20 years in triggering the latest crisis. Despite this, President Putin clearly extended a proverbial olive branch to Nato and positioned this offer of continued cooperation on the shared interests footing (mutual respect and coexistence with recognition of the legitimacy of Russian 'Near Abroad' sphere of influence).
• The Crimean crisis was from the start largely a Russia-Ukraine issue. Thus, Western engagement in it became excessively overbearing on the one hand (starting with the EU pushing forward its own Neighbourhood policies toward Ukraine without having any respect for or consideration of the country's massive economic, demographic, cultural and political links with Russia and without engaging constructively with Russia on bilateral basis) and strategically weak and indecisive on the other (with EU offering no constructive platform for a dialogue with either Ukraine or Russia since November 2013).
• Overall, President Putin's speech was yet another signal to the West that he is ready to consider more constructive engagement and dialogue, and that Russia is not interested in any serious acceleration in the confrontation. The latter point was very clear from the onset of the Ukrainian crisis, not just during the Crimean crisis.
• President Putin is correct that the Crimean crisis was resolved without any loss of life, in contrast to Bosnia, Kosovo, etc.
• Putin's speech, by bringing Russia back on track to seek normalisation of its ties with Ukraine and the West, means that Europe and the US are once again being left without any visible strategic alternatives and puts Moscow one step ahead of them in this geopolitical game. Effectively, the US is now firmly stuck in the proverbial corner: it cannot de-escalate vis-a-vis Russia and it cannot accelerate current sanctions to anything more meaningful. Instead, it is now more likely the US will focus its resources on trying to salvage the current Government in Kiev.

Most significantly, Putin can now set out a number of contrasting and legitimising points to the accession of Crimea:

1. The referendum on Sunday stands in stark contrast to the lack of referenda when Crimea was 'gifted' to Ukraine in 1954 and when Ukraine and Russia (alongside with Belorussia) agreed to dissolve the USSR back in 1991.
2. Crimean accession was carried out on the request of the Crimean government that had effectively no less legitimacy than Kiev government has today. It was created on foot of a popular revolt by the democratically-elected parliament (although in the case of Crimea, as far as I am aware, opposition was present at the vote, unlike in the case of Ukraine).
3. Officially (and that is not to say that this is a complete truth, which we may know one day) Russian military presence in Crimea did not exceed the contractually allowed 22,000 troops. Hence, technically, there was no violation of sovereignty. There was no opposition from the Ukrainian army, further confirming the above point (even if this lack of opposition was driven by the confusing orders from Kiev). The role played by militias (subject to the first caveat above) is no different from the role Maidan forces played in Kiev... etc, etc… All of which (not to justify the events that took place) goes to confirm that there is very little difference (at this point in time) between what happened in Crimea and what happened in Kiev.
4. Whilst Ukrainian constitution does not recognise secession referenda held in a single region as valid, it is worth reminding that the same legal reasons for rejecting the Crimean independence were also raised in the event of secession of Ukraine (and Russian and Belorussia) from the USSR in 1991. It is, therefore, kind of hard for Kiev to have the old the cake and still keep it at the same time.

So today's news put the score at Russia 2: West 0. And with it, Russian markets should be shifting into a 'risk-on' mode over the near future.


Note: as I said before, my preference was and remains for the territorial integrity of Ukraine to remain intact. But setting aside my own preferences (and controlling in the above arguments for my imperfect knowledge of the events and facts on the ground), the current outcome is a new status quo. There is absolutely nothing anyone can or should do about it.

17/3/2014: That Ugly Rating for IFSC... Gets Uglier With Time...

It's dog-eats-dog ugly competition going on out there in the broader wider world of the global financial centres. Competition for talent, managers and investors confidence, regulatory efficiency, tax environment, compliance and supervisory quality etc etc etc...

In that competition, Ireland's (well, most Dublin's) IFSC used to be one of the top dogs... 2007-2009 we ranked in top 25, 2010-2012 in top 26-50... Just as Irish domestic banks went through bust to boom cycle (in share prices and capital, if not actual performance and health), the Government has spent extraordinary amount of resources promoting IFSC as being an unrelated entity to the comatose domestic banks.

The efforts, so far, are not exactly paying off. As the chart below clearly shows, our IFSC ranking in the Global Financial Centres Index continue to fall, and fall catastrophically:

As the main rankings table in the latest GFCI report clearly shows (http://www.longfinance.net/images/GFCI15_15March2014.pdf), our 'non-brass-plate' (remember the pivotal point of Government's argument in favour of our tax and regulatory regimes is that they create 'real' activity in IFSC, as opposed to just setting space for brass-plate operations) are now ranked behind such brass-plate domiciles as Cayman Islands (ranked 43rd), British Virgin islands (ranked 44th), Isle of Man (ranked 51st), Gibraltar (ranked 53rd), and so on...

Actually, Dublin is now lower ranked than 'Mighty' Almaty (Borat-the-banker anyone?). Or for that matter tiny Wellington (yep, New Zealand). The minuscule Malta now ranks 67th, just one tiny bitty place behind the 'Intergalactic Centre of Excellence' on Dublin's Liffey shores.

May be, just may be, our IFSC figure heads can figure out that their advanced age and heavy past careers emphasis on politics rather than finance might need to be augmented by younger blood and broader thinking? Or that Irish Government continued insistence on listening to the entrenched insiders might need to be diversified by attempting to hear new voices in global finance?

Here's the list of top 25 world-wide financial centres...

Note two regularities:

1. Of smaller, specialism-driven locations, Swiss are doing their best to stay at the top. Their strengths: human capital, tax system that favours high skills, open society and huge degree of international and internal (meritocratic) mobility. Our weakness: glass ceilings for foreigners, high taxes on skills, transitory human capital and more closed society focused on promoting insiders and taxing outsiders.
2. Of smaller (similar to Dublin) locations at the top, excluding the Swiss, we have indigenously-driven expertise of Vienna, and international-mobility focused Lux and Monaco which openly flaunt all rules about not being brass-plating havens. Their strengths: expertise built over centuries, reputation for regulatory and taxation stability, and extreme affinity for zero or near-zero taxation.

These two models, and may be some hybrids of others, can probably serve us well in regaining 20 or so places in the rankings. To rise further will require more than that.

Likelihood is, however: our arrogance will continue pushing Ireland down the well-trodden road of arguing for more corporate tax optimisation schemes and sending more shamrocks-in-the-bowl delegations of aged men in 'bankers ca 1956' suits to 'rescue' the golden goose of growth that is the IFSC... The steering committees will be meeting, the back doors to various Government departments will continue swing open for insiders, and 'Johnny the Foreigner' with skills and talents will remain a hostage of complex, immovable bureaucratic apparatus of visas, permits, restrictions and costs.

13/3/2014: Domestic Demand 2013 - A Black Hole of Booming Confidence...

This is a third post on the 2013 national accounts.

Remember that boisterous claim by the Irish Government that our economy is growing at rates faster than the euro area average? Eurozone GDP down 0.4% y/y in 2013. It is down 0.65% in Ireland.

That was covered in previous posts here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/03/1332014-gdp-down-gnp-up-as-2013.html and here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/03/1332014-what-was-tanking-what-was.html

But aside from that, QNA also provides a look into the dynamics of domestic demand, which gives a much more accurate picture than GDP and GNP as to what is happening on the ground in the real economy.

Chart above shows y/y changes in domestic demand and its components.

Good news: Gross Fixed Capital Formation was up in 2013, rising EUR710 million y/y.

Bad news: everything else is down:

• Personal Consumption down EUR941 million y/y in 2013 - a massive acceleration in decline compared to the drop of 'only' EUR229mln in 2011-2012.
• Net local and central Government spending on current goods and services (so excluding capital investment) is down EUR135 million. I guess one might be tempted to say that is good, because it is an 'improvement' of sorts on a drop of EUR963 million in 2011-2012, but getting worse slower ain't exactly getting better…
• Final domestic demand posted another year of contraction. In 2012 it was down EUR1.361 billion on 2011. Last year it shrunk EUR366 million on 2012.

In simple terms, domestic demand is now down every year since 2008 and 2013 levels of real domestic demand are down 18.4 percent on their 2008 levels. In 2013, final domestic demand was down 0.3%.


Personal consumption was down 1.15% y/y, net spending by Government on current goods and services was down 0.55% y/y, gorse fixed capital formation was up 4.15%. Something must have happened to all the confidence consumers were having throughout the year… or at lest conveying to the ESRI researchers...

In summary: there is no recovery in domestic economy. None. Which begs a question: what were all those jobs that we have 'created' in 2013 producing? We know that the 'farming jobs' added were generating output equivalent (on average) to EUR 9,900 per person. The rest? Maybe they were measuring confidence?

Chart below shows 2013 demand compared to 2010, 2011 and 2013 levels.

Good thing foreign investors and cash buyers are snapping those D4-D6 houses, because without them, the rest of the domestic economy is still shrinking…

13/3/2014: What was tanking, what was growing in Ireland in 2013?

Numbers may speak volumes, but a picture of two can really make the difference in understanding why the latest GDP and GNP figures for Ireland are so poor. So on foot of my more numbers-focused post (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/03/1332014-gdp-down-gnp-up-as-2013.html) here are two charts showing sources of changes in GDP and GNP.

Positive numbers imply positive contribution to GDP or GNP from the change in the specific sector/line output.

GDP first:

So largest increases in GDP are down to ICT services MNCs and taxes. Largest declines in GDP down to Industry (ex-construction) and Distribution Transport, Software and Communications.

GNP next:

So all of growth in GNP is down to lower expatriation of profits by MNCs and possible increases of inflows of income from abroad.

13/3/2014: GDP down, GNP up... as 2013 economic recovery goes up in a puff of statistical smoke

CSO released QNA for Q4 2013 and I will be blogging at length on the core results, so stay tuned.

Here is the release link: http://cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/na/quarterlynationalaccountsquarter42013/#.UyGWmfTV9bs

And the key highlights:

Q4 2013: GDP down 2.3% q/q on seasonally-adjusted basis, in constant prices terms. This fully erased a 2.1% rise q/q recorded in Q3 2013, while 1.1% rise q/q in Q2 2013 was not enough to cover a decline of 1.4% in Q1 2013… Overall, annual figure fell (more on that below).

Since the official end of the Great Recession in Q1 2010, we had 9 quarters of rising GDP and 7 quarters of falling GDP.

As a result, constant market prices terms (2011 prices), GDP in Ireland now stands at EUR 162.303 billion, which is below 2011 and 2012 levels. Officially, there is no recession. Practically, GDP is shrinking.

The good news is that GNP is growing as MNCs are not expatriating profits from the land of transparent corporate taxation, so 2013 real GNP sits at EUR 137.476 billion, up strongly on EUR132.984 billion in 2012 and above the levels recorded in 2009-2011.

Decomposing the above aggregate changes:

Taxes less subsidies rose to EUR15.223 billion in 2013 from EUR14.811 billion, contributing EUR412 million to 'growth'. Taxes are snow back to levels just below 2010 which should make our trade unionists rejoice, somewhat.

Stripping out state capture of the economy, GDP at constant factor cost fell EUR965 million in 2013 compared to 2012 and is down on 2011 levels too (-EUR472 million). So much for the 'recovery', then…

Looking at sectors of economy:

• Other Services, including rents (and including our hard working services MNCs) are up EUR1.958 billion in 2013 compared to 2012. This line of national income is now up to the levels just below those last seen in 2008. Much of this recovery, of course, is down to sales of ICT services around the world being booked into Dublin, but we shall deal with that aspect of our accounts separately.
• Public Administration and defence is down EUR278 million y/y in 2013, and is now at the lowest level since 2008.
• Distribution, Transport, Software and Communications sector is down EUR888 million to its lowest contribution level in any year of the crisis.
• Building and construction sub-sector posted a rose in its contribution to GDP +EUR243 million in 2013 compared to 2012, and sector activity is up EUR52 million on 2011 levels, although it is still down EUR381 million on activity in 2011.
• Industry, inclusive of building and construction is shrinking - presumably on foot of pharma sector woes. The sector in 2013 posted income of EUR39.341 billion, down EUR1.339 billion on 2012, down EUR1.664 billion on 2011 and down EUR724 million on 2010. In 2013, we have hit an absolute low in Industry sector despite some pick up in construction for any year of the crisis.
• Remember 25,000 new farmers added in 2013 to our 'employment' figures? Well, they are working hard. Or rather prices inflation is working very hard in the sector. Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector generated increase in activity in 2013 of EUR237 million, which partially offset the decline in the sector fortunes in 2012. Still, 2013 levels of activity are EUR258 million behind 2011 levels and EUR316 million behind 2010 levels. The sector contribution to GDP in 2013 was the second lowest for the entire crisis period.

So here we go… recovery then… negative GDP growth (due to industry, distribution, transport, software and communications, and government activities shrinking, only partially offset by growth in other services, construction and agriculture, and rising taxes net of subsidies). Oh, and 25,000 new farmers adding on average ca EUR9,500 per person in annual output to the economy (remember - they are all gainfully employed, right?)...