27/05/2012: Residential Property Prices: April 2012

Much has been made in the media on the foot of the latest (April 2012) data for residential property prices in Ireland.

In light of this, let's do some quick analysis of the data. The core conclusions, in my opinion are:

1. Data from CSO - the best we have - only covers mortgages drawdowns reflecting actual sales. So this is tied to mortgages issuance activity and is of limited use in the markets where cash sales are significant.
2. If increases in prices are sustained, mortgages drawdowns might be reflective of improved credit flows or credit flows fluctuating along the bottom trend.
3. The above two points strongly suggest that we need to see more sustained trend to draw any conclusions on alleged 'stabilization' of the market.
4. Aside from seasonality, the data shows patterns of false bull-runs or 'stabilization' episodes in the trends that usually were followed by downward acceleration on the pre-stabilization trend. Not surprisingly, the core improvements in March-April 2012 are in exactly the segments of the markets where such false starts have been more pronounced in the past.

So caution is warranted. 

Top stats:

• Residential property price index has fallen from 66.1 in February and March 2012 to 65.4 in April implying m/m change in overall prices of -1.06% - the shallowest monthly decline since July 2011, other than zero change in m/m prices recorded in March 2012. 
• This m/m pattern of slower decline (to near zero rate of fall) from a steep previous drop, followed by re-acceleration in decline is something that is traceable to October 2010-January 2011, June-August 2011, July-September 2010, February-April 2010, October-December 2009, so caution is warranted in interpreting short-term 'stabilization' episodes.
• Y/y index fell 16.37% in April, an acceleration on March 2012 y/y decline of 16.32%, but a very slight one. Current y/y decline is the second shallowest since November 2011, so no signs of stabilization here either. In fact, April 2012 y/y rate of decline was the 5th sharpest for any month since January 2010.
• Index reading continues underperforming its 3mo MA which currently stands at 65.87.
• Relative to peak, the index is now down 49.89%.
• Thus, overall, by both, its absolute level, and its 3mo MA, as well as relative to peak, the index is at its new historic low. Stabilization is not happening anywhere at the levels terms.

Chart below shows sub-indices performance for houses and apartments. While it is clear that houses sub-index is the driver of overall prices, the apartments sub-index received much of attention in recent months. The reason for it is two consecutive months of increases in apartments prices. Details are below:

• Overall, House prices fell in April 2012 to index reading of 68.1 from 68.9 in March, registering a m/m drop of 1.16%. This represents an acceleration from -0.14% m/m decline in March 2012. However, April m/m drop is the shallowest since July 2011. 
• Despite the above, bot the index and the 3mo MA have again hit their lowest point in history of the series.
• Y/y house prices are down 16.24% and this is the fastest y/y decline since November 2011. 
• Relative to peak house prices are now down 48.41%.
• Apartments prices index has improved from 48.6 in March 2012 to 49.6% in April 2012 (m/m rise of 2.06% following a 0.41% rise in March 2012).
• However, m/m rises are not rare for the sub-index. Apartments prices subindex rose - in m/m terms - in November 2011 (+2.68%), December 2010 (+0.31%), December 2007 (+0.50%) and posted falt or near-flat (1/4 STDEV from zero reading) in February 2008, January 2011, May 2011, and December 2011. 
• 3mo MA is now at 48.87% and this is the lowest on the record 3mo MA reading for the sub-index.
• Y/y the decline in April was 17.88% while March 2012 y/y decline was 20.33%. This is the lowest y/y decline reading since January 2012. However, back in April 2011, y/y decline was 'only' 15.29% - shallower than in April 2012.
• Relative to peak apartments prices are now down 59.97%.

Conclusion: any talk about 'price trends improvement' in apartments will have to wait for further confirmation of the upward trend.

Chart below shows trends for prices in Dublin - another focal point of attention for those claiming substantive change in property prices trends.

• Dublin property prices sub-index has improved from 58.0 in march 2012 to 58.3 in April 2012, reaching exactly the same level as in January 2012. Thus, m/m index rose 0.52% which is slower than March 2012 m/m rise of 0.69%. Last time the sub-index posted non-negative m/m change was in July 2011 when it remained unchanged m/m and last time sub-index actually posted positive growth was in May 2011.
• To see two consecutive monthly rises in the index, however, is rare. We would have to go to January-February 2007 for that. However, index posted a number 'near trend reversals' in the past marked on the chart. All turned out to be false calls and virtually all led to re-acceleration of the downward momentum compared to pre-event.
• Y/y sub-index posted a decline of 17.30% against 18.31% in March 2012. In April 2011 y/y change was 12.96% - much shallower than current y/y decline.
• 3mo MA is unchanged in April 2012 at 57.97 compared to March 2012, and is much lower than 71.27 registered in April 2011.
• Relative to peak, house prices in Dublin are now 56.65% down which is identical to their position in January 2012.

Overall, all data points to potential stabilization that is in a very nascent state. However, this is certainly a local phenomena for now - with Apartments and Dublin properties showing some potential signs of improvement. Only the future can tell if:

1. we are witnessing actual flattening of the trend, and/or
2. we are witnessing a reversal of downward trend toward a positive (sustained) trend.

2/3/2012: Nama valuations - January 2012 update

In the previous post I looked at the latest data on residential property prices (link here). Here, let's update the Nama valuations numbers based on January 2012 property prices data.

Table below summarizes referencing of January 2012 numbers to two different dates: November 30, 2009  - the cut-off date for Nama market value assessments, and Q1 2010 - the first time Nama tried to call property market 'bottom'. So 'Loss' on nama book valuations refers to the percentage difference between the cut-off date value of properties and current value of properties according to RPPI - please note, this is an economic loss - not an actual loss to be provisioned for. Nama valuations inaccuracy index is reflection of Nama prediction - implicitly reflected in its business plans - that the property market in Ireland will bottom out in Q1 2010. Weighting to book assumes that on residential portfolio 70% of portfolio in in Apartments and 30% in houses.

Note that in the above I take account of Nama-applied Long-Term Economic Value uplift and net out the subordinated debt cushion of 5% for burden sharing (Nama loss cushion). When you think about it, we are paying six figure salaries to these boffins who are almost 30% wrong in their market predictions just 7 quarters out.

24/1/2012: Residential property prices - 2011 highlights

Latest Residential Property Price Index (RPPI) from CSO posts another monthly decline in the price series and marks deep drops in the property prices in 2011. Here are top of the line figures - end of year readings:

And updated Nama valuations referencing:

So to summarize (note - there will be more detailed analysis of this data coming up in later posts):

• All properties index is now 31.1% below January 2005 levels
• Houses are now down 28.3% below January 2005 levels
• Apartments are now down 46.5% below January 2005 levels
• Dublin all properties are now down 39.3% below January 2005 levels
• Rates of decline (monthly) are greater than 1.5% (12mo average) for 3 months in a row for all properties and for houses.

20/12/2011: Residential property prices for November

Today's data focus for Ireland is on residential property price index for November.

Prior to today's release, in the 12 months through October 2011, residential property prices were down 15.1% year on year - steeper decline than in July-September 2011 (12.5%, 13.9% and 14.3% respectively). In 12 months through October 2010 the rate of prices decline was 11.1%, shallower than in the 12 months through last October. So price drops were accelerating before November data release. In fact, mom prices dropped 2.2% in October, against 1.5% mom decline in September.

The latest data, therefore, was expected to come in with some moderation in the rate of decline. And in that, there was no surprise - mom change for November is at -1.54%, ahead of September, but behind October reading. 


November index of all residential properties prices is now at 70.1, down from october 71.2. 3mo MA is down to 71.37 from October reading of 72.63. We have to go back to November 2007 to see the first time that the overall index did not decline (it stayed flat in that month) and back to September 2007 to see the last monthly increase in the index. 12 mo MA of monthly changes is now at -1.41% mom and year-to-date monthly average change is -1.49%.


Nama is continuing taking a hit on its valuations. Referencing back to November 30, 2009 Nama valuations cut-off date, November 2011 prices are down 25.35%, which, adjusting for LTEV uplift applied by Nama implies that Nama valuations on its residential properties portfolio are 32.13% under water. Correcting the above for 'burden sharing' cushion applied by Nama legislation, Nama is nursing a loss of 28.9% on its residential properties-related holdings.

As chart above shows, overall residential property prices are now 46.28% down on the peak and year on year the prices are down 15.64%.

Houses prices index has fallen from 74.3 in october to 72.9 in November - down 1.88% mom, In October, monthly rate of decline was -2.24%, but November decline is second sharpest in the last 5 months. Year on year, house prices are down 15.72%, while in october the same rate of decline was 14.89%. Relative to peak, house prices nationwide are 44.78%.

Apartments fared better this time around, with index reading improving from 52.2 in October to 53.6 in November, a monthly rise of 2.68%. The index is also more volatile than that for all residential prices and house prices. Last time we saw a rise in house prices mom was in August 2010, and last time we saw monthly increase in apartments prices was in December and January 2010.

Apartments prices are now -16.89% down yoy and this marks an improvement on -19.82% decline yoy through October. Relative to peak, apartments prices are down 56.74%.

In my view, the divergence between apartments prices and house prices, if sustained over time, will be signaling the overall collapse of the purchasing power by the first time buyers, as well as demand push toward lower cost commuting locations as cost of transport continues to climb up courtesy of the Government policies. It can also signal the reflection of improving rental yields for some, especially city centre-located - properties. It is worth noting that Dublin apartments drove the monthly change for nationwide figures reported above, with Dublin apartments price index increasing from 50.8 in October to 53.2 in November a strong gain of 4.7% mom and driving year on year decline to -16.1% in November against -21.2% in October.


Prices in Dublin (all properties) posted index reading of 62.2 in November, down 1.43% mom on October reading of 63.1. This was the shallowest monthly decline since July 2011 when the index posted no change mom. Yoy index is now down 17.62% in November from 17.52% in October. Relative to peak the index is down 53.75%.

Updating annual forecasts, I expect overall RPPI to post a reading of ca 71.27-71.30 or a decline of 41.7% relative to peak. For houses, I expect index to run at 74.5-75.1 for 2011, marking a decline of 39.7% relative to peak annual index, while for apartment the same forecasts are for 56.5-56.7 index reading and a decline relative to peak of 49.7%. Dublin prices are expected to end the year on an index reading of 63.5-64.0 - a decline of 47.9% on peak. Mid-points are illustrated below:

So, overall, no surprise - another month of declines, another month on the road toward the average price around 60% off the peak. One to watch here is the sub-index for apartments prices, especially in Dublin.


It's worth noting here that per NTMA (source: Nama, December 2011), commercial property yields have been rising strongly in recent months. See chart below. This can also correlate positively with the rental yields for Dublin apartments, especially for centrally located properties.

21/11/2011: Residential Property Prices: October

Sorry to break the bad news, folks, but the latest Residential Property Price Index (RPPI) for October is showing accelerating property prices declines on foot of already substantial rates of contraction registered during 2011 as a whole. the bust is getting bustier.

All properties index fell to 71.2 in october from 72.8 in September, posting a monthly decline of 2.20%. This is the sharpest rate of monthly contraction in prices since March 2009 and the third fastest rate of decline in the history of the series! 3moMA for RPPI is now at 72.63. Year on year prices are now down 15.14% - the highest yoy decline since February 2010. Relative to peak prices are down 45.44%. 12 mo MA is at -1.36% for mom rate of decline and year-to-date rate of prices declines average -1.49%.

When it comes to Nama, relative to its cut-off date of November 30, 2009, property prices are now down 24.17%. When fully set up, Nama called bottoming out of the markets for Q1 2010. Since then, prices are down 20.62%, so those highly paid geniuses employed by Nama to 'value' properties and 'assess' markets are really shining stars. Recall that Nama paid an uplift of LTEV on assets purchased of an average 10%, plus carries a burden-sharing discount / cushion. Factoring these two into the equation, Nama-assessed properties are now held at a loss of 27.79% on their Nama valuations, even with burden sharing cushion 'savings' factored in. Taken across Nama book value, these (for now paper) losses can be assessed at ca €8.3bn.

Let's drill deeper. House prices sub-index is now at 74.3 against 76.0 in September, a decline mom of -2.24% the largest monthly drop since June 2011. 3moMA now stands at 75.77 and year on year change in the sub-index is 14.89% - the steepest annual decline rate since February 2010. relative to peak house prices sub-index is now -43.71% off. 

Apartments prices sub-index fell from 53.2 in September to 52.2 in October, a mom drop of 1.88% shallower than September mom decline of 3.10%. 3moMA is now at 53.43 and year on year sub-index is down 19.81% - the steepest annual decline since April 2010. Relative to peak, apartments prices are now off 57.87%.

Recalling that Nama holds loads of assets written against apartments, Nama cut-off-date valuations, LTEVs and burden sharing cushion included, Nama valuations for apartments-related properties are now off 35.10%.

Chart above shows the price dynamics for Dublin properties. Dublin sub-index stands at 63.1 against September reading of 65.1, a mom decline of 3.07% - steepest since the catastrophic drop of 3.76% in August this year. 3mo MA is now at 64.9 and year on year prices in Dublin are down 17.52% - largest yearly decline since March 2010. Relative to peak, Dublin residential prices are down 53.09%.

Given the above, we can update projections for the core index and sub-indices for 2011 as a whole. These are shown below.

Depressing is the word that comes to mind. The picture is made even less palatable when we recall incessant blabber from our Government reps and stuff-brokers, as well as property 'experts' that inundated the earlier parts of the year with 'property prices will bottom out in H2 2011' noise.

25/10/2011: Residential property prices: September

According to CSO Residential Property Prices index, September 2007 saw the historical peak in prices for overall RPPI at 130.5. Today's data shows that the index now stands at 72.8, implying that property prices have fallen nationwide by 44.2% on average since 4 years ago. Miserable news.

Now, September RPPI for all properties has fallen 1.49% mom and 14.25% yoy, exceeding (in terms of fall) analysts expectations for 13.4% decline. 12mo MA of monthly declines now stands at 1.27% and year-to-date average monthly decline is at 1.41%.

Relative to Nama's cut-off valuation date of November 30, 2009, factoring in average LTEV uplift of 10%, Nama residential properties-linked assets portfolio is now on average 29.52% under water. Factoring 5% burden-sharing (subordinated bonds), the downside is now 26.2% which means that Nama will need a lift-up of 35% on current values to break even.

For Houses, nationwide, RPPI fell to 76 in September from 77 in August a decline of 1.3% mom and 13.93% yoy. The index is now down 42.4% on peak of 132 achieved in September 2007. Apartments sub-index is down to 53.2 in September from 54.9 in August, with mom contraction of 3.1% - the sharpest monthly decline since March. Yoy the sub-index is down 19.03% and relative to the peak of 123.9 (February 2007) the sub-index is down 57.06%.

Nama holds loads of apartments, so applying the earlier assumptions on LTEV, Nama apartments-linked sub-portfolio is under water 36.9%, implying, net of subordinated bonds, a 33.9% decline in valuations to November 2009 cut-off date. This suggests an average required uplift in apartments prices of 55.12% for break-even.

Dublin properties prices are now 51.6% off their peak, with sub-index for Dublin declining to 65.1 in September from 66.5 in August - a drop of 2.11% mom and 15.56% yoy.

Annual forecasts, updated to include September figures, are below

26/09/2011: Irish property prices hit Early Paleozoic layer

Another month, another "Splat, Zap, Squish!" from the Amazing Property Bust Land, Ireland. CSO's RPPI data out for August today is showing continued falls in property markets and accelerating on the July 'performance'. Here are the updated charts and numbers.

Headlines are not pretty, folks:

• RPPI down 13.87% annually in August against a fall of 12.47% in July index now stands at 73.9 down from 85.8 in August last year.
  
• In 12mo through August the decline was 10.8%.
• Mom prices are down 1.6% in August. 3mo MA is at 74.9 down from 76.0 in July.
• Relative to peak, prices are now down 43.4%
• Relative to Nama valuations cut-off date of Nov 30, 2009, prices are down 21.3%. Adding LTEV uplift applied by Nama to purchased loans, state-held residential portoflio is now down in values some 28.5%.
  

Headlines on property prices by type are even less pretty:

• RPPI for houses is at 77.0 in August, down 1.41% on 78.1 reading in July. 3moMA is now 77.9, down from 79.0 in July. Year on year prices are down 13.58% from index reading of 89.1 in August 2010. Relative to peak prices are down 41.7% (September 2007). This is the steepest rate of decline since March 2011.
  
• RPPI for apartments is at 54.9, down 4.7% on July reading of 57.6. August 2010 reading was 67.2, so we are now 18.3% down yoy. 3moMA is now at 57.3, down from 59.0 in July. Monthly rate of declines is now accelerating for the 3rd month in a row. August rate of decline is the steepest monthly decline in the history of the series. Relative to peak (February 2007), apartments prices are now down 55.69%.
  

Geographical distribution of price changes:

• Dublin residential property prices fell by 3.76% in August and were 14.85% lower than a year ago. Dublin house prices decreased by 3.4% in the month and were 14.7% lower compared to a year earlier. Dublin apartment prices fell by 6% in the month of August and were 17.4% lower when compared with the same month of 2010. 3mo MA for Dublin properties is now at 68.23, down from 69.7 in July. Relative to peak (February 2007) Dublin prices are down 50.56%. House prices in Dublin are 48% lower than at their highest level in early 2007. Apartments in Dublin are now 57% lower than they were in February 2007.
• The price of residential properties in the Rest of Ireland (ex-Dublin) fell 0.3% in August compared with an increase of 0.2% recorded in August 2010. Prices were 13.2% lower than in August 2010. The fall in the price of residential properties in the Rest of Ireland relative to peak is at 40%.

My forecast for the annual results is below. In summary - we've gone from the penthouse to the ground floor, through the parking levels and still going - services levels, sewer, imaginary metro tunnel.... next "Splat" is due at around middle Paleozoic layer... see you in October's Early Mammals exhibit...

15/09/2011: Some observations on NTMA & NAMA statements to the Oireachtas Committee

I was going over the statements issued by NTMA and NAMA to the Oireachtas Committee last week and was struck by some rather interesting bits...

Let's start with the Statement by John Corrigan, Chief Executive NTMA, to the Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform, 9 September 2011:

"The banking stress tests carried out by the Central Bank in the first quarter of 2011 quantified the additional capital support required by the banking sector at €24 billion. The NTMA Banking Unit has worked very hard to minimise the amount of this additional capital to be provided by the taxpayer. Through initiatives like burden sharing with the junior bondholders and the sourcing of private capital for Bank of Ireland, the net amount of this capital provided by the State is now expected to be around €16.5 billion. The savings generated can be redirected to funding the day-to-day operation of the country."

Can Mr Corrigan explain this: as of August 1, 2011, the State has injected (under PCAR/PLAR allocations) €17.292bn (here) according to DofF note. That €792mln difference is not exactly a pittance...

Oh, and while we are on the issue of being accurate - PCAR/PLAR capital allocations are designed to deliver capital & liquidity cushions for the period 2011-2013. Not a trivial issue, mind you, especially since Mr Corrigan repeatedly relies on PCAR/PLAR recapitalization exercise as a definitive (aka permanent) line in the sand on banking crisis.

Now, as to the "savings can be redirected to funding the day-to-day operation of the country" - that is pure rhetoric, sir, isn't it? Mr Corrigan himself shows that it is (see marked with italics next quote below).

"In order to stabilise our debt/GDP ratio Ireland needs to get back to running a primary budget surplus (the budget balance excluding interest payments) as soon as possible. Indeed in the context of debt sustainability, this metric is far more important than the absolute level of debt per se. Ireland still has the biggest primary deficit of any eurozone country, a fact not lost on investors..."

So, wait a sec, Mr Corrigan. You said "savings [from PCAR/PLAR recaps] can be redirected to funding the day-to-day operation of the country". You also said that we need to run a primary surplus. You can't have your cake, Mr Corrigan, and eat it.

"The objective of the [banks] deleveraging process is to achieve a more prudent loan to deposit ratio for the institutions concerned through a reduction of their balance sheet assets of some €70 billion while avoiding sales at prices which absorb excessive capital."

Was Mr Corrigan trying to say that we need to deleverage the banks while minimizing the calls on the banks' capital for losses incurred in the process of deleveraging? Ok, that would imply selling good - aka performing - assets first. What would that do to the banks balancesheets, Mr Corrigan? It will undermine banks balancesheets, leaving them with poorer quality average assets. Is that Mr Corrigan's idea of restoring banking system to health? And is that covered by PCAR/PLAR definitive line in the sand? You know, Mr Corrigan, that it is not.



There was also Mr McDonagh speaking on the day...

Opening Statement by Mr. Brendan McDonagh, Chief Executive of NAMA, to the Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform Friday, 9th September 2011"

"We have now recruited over 190 staff with the specialist skills and experience required to manage a portfolio of property loans with balances in excess of €72 billion."

So NAMA chief thinks it is a great achievement of NAMA that it managed to hire 190 people. Boy, Mr McDonagh would do well in public sector where the metrics of spending are more important than those of earning...

But what is this about €72 billion portflio balances? NAMA valued the portoflio it purchased at €30.5bn gross (inclusive of the LTEV uplift). Banks, who sold NAMA that portfolio wrote down the losses realized, implying that NAMA end valuation in their view was a reasonable reflection of the value of portfolio NAMA bought. So is Mr McDonagh deploying Eugene Sheehy's approach to claiming balances on loans to be assets under management and refusing to write down the actual loans values to the publicly disclosed valuations that NAMA itself prepared?

And is Mr McDonagh conveniently forgetting that the book value of these assets has fallen since that LTEV was assessed and assets were valued? May be Mr McDonagh should consult his own annual report to see his organization taking charge against that loss?

Of course, Mr McDonagh is just pumping up NAMA's (aka his own) importance. NAMA, you see, is not managing €30.5 billion-valued undertaking, or an odd €25 billion actual undertaking (once we factor in at least some of the value losses on NAMA's portfolio), but a €72 billion portfolio. In a way, Mr McDonagh is like Montgomery Burns checking his old ticker for the price of his Federated Slaves Holdings plc...

I love Mr McDonagh's next statement:
"There is a third, small group of debtors ... with whom we could work but who are not co-operating adequately with the process and who appear to believe that, after all that has happened, the taxpayer somehow still owes them a living. We have been as fair, reasonable and patient with these people as any court could possibly expect us to be but, in the circumstances, it is likely that we will be left with no option but to instigate additional enforcement actions before the year is out. Above all else, ...the self-indulgent behaviour of a few has no place in resolving the national crisis with which, collectively, we are grappling."

Now, close your eyes, imagine a summer night, chirping of birds in the distance. From an open window dark woods staring into the room. Armchair. The house owner, with mustache, in military tunic, pipe in hand, explaining in deep Georgina accent to two smaller (in evident statue) men the rationale for dealing resolutely with a small group of dissidents who refuse to cooperate, betraying self-indulgent decadent behavior amidst the national crisis... Mr McDonagh's rhetoric is permeated with Joe Stalinesque tonalities, innuendos, juxtaposing reasonable (NAMA) against the decadent and asocial (developers), the 'few' against the 'many'. Himself positioned in a high priest fashion at the head of the judgment table, burdened with the duty of carrying NAMA's burden of justice to the few unwise dissenters. Why not visit Lubyanka Museum in Moscow on your next corporate outing, my dear NAMAnoids?

There's more of the same, pardon me self-indulgent and arrogant stuff in relation to the public allegedly asking politicians uninformed questions and some people (unknown to us) making uninformed statements about NAMA. "The accusation that NAMA is bureaucratic and slow in dealing with these approvals is unfair and unwarranted but, unfortunately, in the current environment, when it comes to NAMA, many seem to feel that they have no obligation to check the facts before making the accusation."

Ok, Mr McDonagh. I would like to make an informed observation. Where do I get the facts? From you? From NAMA? Who can assure me that the facts you &/or NAMA present are full, correct and not mis-represented?

Let's try the 'trust your NAMA' thingy. Here you say: "There has been much interest from the public (over 100,000 downloads) [in relation to NAMA list of properties under receivership] and in particular from younger people who are keen to use the current correction in property prices to purchase their own homes."

How do you know these are young people? I downloaded the list without any registration. Are you tracking my IP address and accessing, unbeknown to me my details? Are you acting legally in doing this? Or are you simply making a claim that cannot be verified? So much for 'trust your NAMA' proposition then.

And now to the conclusion: "It is our intention that NAMA will be a creative and dynamic force in the property market and, more generally, that it will contribute significantly to the economic resurgence of Ireland in the years ahead." Sorry, Mr McDonagh, but you are not getting it. NAMA has a defined - according to your own chairman and legislation establishing NAMA - mandate. That mandate does not envision NAMA becoming either 'creative' or 'dynamic', nor does it envision 'NAMA contributing to the economic resurgence of Ireland'. Your mandate is to:

1. Recover taxpayers' funds, and
2. Close the shop after doing so.

In case you weren't paying attention on September 9th, Mr Frank Daly said in his statement - made alongside your own: "...the objective that has been set for us by the legislature, under Section 10 of the NAMA Act, is to recover, at a minimum, that amount plus whatever additional funds we need to advance as working or development capital for projects." Mr Daly repeats this objective (in slightly different wording) twice in his statement. Mr Daly does refer to NAMA being "creative and flexible", but unlike Mr McDonagh, he limits this to the reference to properties that NAMA is working with, not to the entire property market and not to the economic resurgence of the whole country.

“Ἀπόδοτε οὖν τὰ Καίσαρος Καίσαρι καὶ τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ τῷ Θεῷ” (Matthew 22:21), Mr McDonagh. And please, extinguish that pipe and change the tunic... Being Uncle Joe is not only uncool, it is also, fortunately, infeasible for you.

Economics 21/12/10: BofI & Irish derivatives warning from the IMF

How wonderful is the world of international banks linkages? And especially, how wonderful it can get when regulators are so soundly asleep at the wheel, a firecracker from the IMF can be shoved in their faces and popped, and the snoring still went on.

A 2007 working paper from the IMF, republished earlier this year in an IMF journal, has warned Irish regulators that (referring to the data through 2005):

“BofI had launched a new venture with a leading Spanish bank, La Caixa to provide extra mortgage options for Irish people buying property in Spain, which included equity release from existing BofI mortgages” (IMF WP/07/44: External Linkages and Contagion Risk in Irish Banks, by Elena Duggar and Srobona Mitra).

Now, think of those La Caixa/BofI borrowers leveraging levels. But here’s the bit that relates directly to securitisation threats I hypothesize about in the previous post (here): on page 8 of the report, IMF folks state: “Irish banks could be indirectly exposed to property markets by selling risk protection (buying of covered bonds, credit default swaps, and mortgage backed securities) to other banks which are exposed to foreign property markets. From anecdotal evidence, some small IFSC banks, exposed to international property markets, are selling CDS to other domestic-oriented banks, making the latter indirectly exposed to these property markets even though their loan books are not.”

Of course, the Irish banks were also selling protection to the SPVs they were managing as well. And now, lets jump to IMF’s conclusions:

“Some tentative policy lessons could be drawn from the results of this exercise. The Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland (CBFSAI) may want to stress test specific categories of exposures of Irish banks to both the U.S. and the U.K. Even though linkages with the U.S. do not come out strongly from aggregate consolidated balance sheet exposures, there might be derivatives or other off-balance sheet exposures that the bank supervisors may need to be vigilant of. The Irish authorities may need to collect more information about types and counterparties of derivative positions and risk transfers through structured products of Irish banks, as the use of these is likely to grow rapidly in the future. This would especially be necessary if Irish banks are buying CRT products from foreign banks (that is selling risk protection) that are in turn exposed to property markets or other loan products in the U.S. or the U.K., thus exposing the Irish banks to these markets even though there is no direct loan exposure.”

Sounds like a warning against Irish banks exposures to lending against the US-based property? Oh, no – not at all. In fact recall a basic stylized fact of mortgages finance – in the long run (equilibrium) long term yields on Government debt and long term mortgage rates converge. Which means that if an Irish bank was underwriting an interest rate swap for the US SPV that purchased Irish bank’s securitised loans, then Irish bank was taking a position in providing insurance into the US interest rates environment.

The article – based on 2005 data – couldn’t have imagined what followed in 2007 and 2008. But, needless to say - judging by their staunch silence on the issue of derivatives and securitisation - our regulators didn't bother with the IMF warnings back then... and still are not bothered by them...


Update: It is worth noting that today the EU Commission approved measures for AIB, Anglo and INBS (details here) that include "a guarantee covering certain off-balance sheet transactions" - a code name for things like securitisations and derivatives...

Economics 16/9/10: Analysis of global banks rescue packages disputes Irish policy case

A very interesting paper that a year ago should have alerted this Government to the fallacy of its preferred path to interventions in the banking crisis. Alas, it did not.

Michael King Time to buy or just buying time? The market reaction to bank rescue packages, BIS Working Paper Number 288, September 2009 (linked here).

The paper suggests and tests the following three hypotheses concerning banks rescue packages put in place at the beginning of the crisis (January 2008):

• H1: The announcement of government rescue packages will be associated with a narrowing of bank CDS spreads relative to the market.
• H2: Capital injections will be associated with a rise in bank stock prices relative to the market if the benefits of lower leverage and a lower probability of financial distress outweigh the potential dilution of existing shareholders or restrictions on payment of common dividends.
• H3: Asset purchases and asset insurance will be associated with a narrowing of bank CDS spreads and a rise in the stock price relative to the market.

What the study found is that rescue packages confirm H2. But there was significant difference in the effectiveness of interventions.

• In the US, “bank stock prices outperformed reflecting the decline in the probability of financial distress and the favourable terms of the capital injections. The risk of US bank failures was high following the failure of Lehman Brothers and IndyMac, and the government take-over of AIG, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. While the US Treasury’s preferred shares included warrants with the potential to dilute shareholders, the favourable terms of the capital allowed the average US bank share to outperform the market following the announcement of government support.”
• In contrast in Europe, “the risks of financial distress were also high as seen in the capital injections for Fortis and Dexia and the nationalisation of Bradford & Bingley. While banks were recapitalised, the cost and conditions of European rescue plans were punitive for existing common shareholders leading to an underperformance of bank stocks in most countries.” In other words, Europeans, predictably soaked equity holders but didn’t touch bondholders.
• “The UK package appears to have been the most costly for existing shareholders, which explains the fall in stock prices when the terms were disclosed. Given that only three out of six banks accepted the capital, the fall for banks receiving capital was offset by the positive response of banks that did not.”
• “Swiss banks were the exception as the average Swiss bank was relatively unaffected.”

Turning to the cases of asset purchases or asset insurance schemes, “market reaction provides only partial support for the third hypothesis (H3) that creditors took comfort from the reduction in potential losses and the decline in risk-weighted assets”. Oops, I’d say for the Leni/Nama plans. And this was known as of September 2009, despite which our Government has charged ahead with Nama.

“Overall, globally, asset purchases or insurance were used in only four cases with mixed results.”

Bingo – only in 4 cases: “the Dutch, Swiss, and US governments supported specific financial institutions by purchasing impaired assets or providing insurance against losses on specific portfolios. In an asset purchase, the government buys impaired securities or loans from the bank, reducing the bank’s risk-weighted assets and lowering the amount of capital it must hold against potential losses. While the government bears the risk of losses, it also retains the profits if the assets recover. While the US and Germany announced asset purchase plans, only the Swiss had taken action by the end of January 2009, buying $39.1 billion of illiquid assets from UBS on 16 October. The assets were removed from UBS’s balance sheet and placed in a special purpose vehicle, significantly reducing UBS’s risk.”

So in the end in the duration of 2008, no country has undertaken a significant Nama-like operation with exception of Switzerland in relation to UBS alone. Clearly the claim that Minister Lenihan was acting consistently with other countries in setting up a Nama vehicle is not true.

Here’s an interesting bit: see if you can spot where Mr Lenihan has gone the path differing from everyone else back in 2008. “Under asset insurance, the government assumes a share of the potential losses on a specified portfolio after a first loss amount (or deductible) is absorbed by the bank. In return, the bank pays the government an insurance premium based on the riskiness of the portfolio. By limiting the bank’s potential losses, asset insurance also reduces a bank’s risk-weighted assets and lowers the capital it must hold. The government, however, is left with a large potential liability if the assets fall substantially in value. The US and the Netherlands offered asset insurance to three banks. The US provided protection to Citigroup and Bank of America against the possibility of unusually large losses on asset pools of $301 billion and $118 billion, respectively. In both cases, the US government bears 80% of the losses after the deduction of a first loss tranche paid by the bank but does not share in any profits. The Dutch authorities created an illiquid asset backup facility to insure most of the risk from $35.1 billion of Alt-A securities owned by ING. The Dutch government shares in 80% of the downside and the upside. Asset purchases or asset insurance should be positive for both the stock price and the CDS spread, as both interventions lower the potential losses faced by common shareholders and reduce the risk of default. As a result, the share price should rise and CDS spreads should narrow. In three out of four cases the government’s actions coincided with the injection of capital.”

To conclude: “the October [2008] rescue packages provided governments with time to assess the situation and formulate their policy responses. At the same time, these policy interventions did not represent a buying opportunity as seen in the underperformance of bank stocks in most countries studied.”

Predictably, our stockbrokerages analysts, Nama, Department of Finance, Government and the usual crowd of suspects claimed that:

• Nama will lead to significant improvement in the banking sector health;
• Irish Government interventions were value additive for shareholders - all stockbrokers in Dublin and majority of them outside had 'Buy' recommendations on banks based on Government rescue package;
  
• Banks guarantee scheme is structurally important to the resolution of the crisis (not a delay, but a resolution),
• The rest of the world was doing the same.

International evidence on the matter suggests that banks supports are only as good as the measures to reform banks taken after the supports enactment. Of course, in the case of Irish banks, no such reforms took place since September 2008.

All I need to add here is that this paper was available to Minister Lenihan's advisers, to Nama and to DofF and Central Bank handlers. The latter, alongside their Financial Regulator counterparts are linked to BIS.

Economics 25/8/10: Derivatives time bomb?

An interesting number popped out today from the dark depths of the past (hat tip to Ed).

With my emphasis, quoting from the article published in December 2008 by the Chartered Accountants Ireland (linked here) titled "Financial Derivitives (sic), Villian (sic) or Scapegoat" written by Grellan O'Kelly (who worked at the time in the Policy Section of the Financial Institutions and Funds Authorisation Department of the Financial Regulator):

"...when looking at the outstanding derivative positions (notional values) of our main banks as reported in their annual reports, the amounts are extremely small when compared to the total global amounts. A recent BIS survey2 on global OTC positions shows that global notional amounts come to a staggering $516 trillion. The most recent disclosures from our two main retail banks show that their gross notional exposures amount to €640 billion, only 0.17% of the total. ...noting that access to accurate data on derivative products is not always publicly available."

The article contains the usual caveat that "Any views expressed in this article are made in a personal capacity and are not intended to represent the views of the Financial Regulator." Nonetheless, it would be good to get some comment from the FR on this. After all, €640bn might be a small level of exposure to derivatives from the point of view of global banks, but for BofI and AIB to have such an exposure... is roughly 170% of the total 2009 asset base of all Irish banks combined.

For now, I cannot confirm whether this was a typo or not.

The problem is that unwinding even the straight forward swaps can be extremely costly. Buffet's unwinding of lost contracts against reinsurance claims cost Berkshire some $400mln back in 2008. In the case of interest rates swaps written against property, De Montfort University research in June 2010 has estimated that for a book of £143bn of interest rate swaps in the UK (57% of the total existing UK £250bn book of loans is estimated to be hedged by derivatives - here), the cost of unwinding these positions runs into ca £10bn.

So applying the UK estimate to our potential exposure, the cost of unwinding those €640bn in derivatives can be to the tune of €45bn.

Of course, this is just an estimate, but it gives some perspective to the numbers.

But let's ad some relative comparatives (hat tip to Conor for both):

• Ireland accounted for 0.17% of global estimates of OTC derivatives but only 0.03% of Global GDP (based on CIA fact book and CSO data)
• €640bn is 4.12 times our 2008 Gross Value Added (ca €155bn)
  

I am totally at a loss as to this figure - given its size - so any comment on its validity will be appreciated.

Economics 25/06/2010: One for the Calendar

This will be interesting:

• Brian 'Nama-crusher' Lucey v Nama 'Tin Man'
• Colm 'Save the Irish Middle Earth' McCarthy v 'Spend your money on Government stuff' Man
• Plus Vincenzo 'Take no prisoners' Brown, Antoin 'History of economic thought' Murphy, etc

I would have attended, if not for the Trade Mission to Russia...

Economics 12/04/2010: Nama's economic distorionism

An interesting quote from the just-published paper (Claessens, Stijn, Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni, Igan, Deniz and Laeven, Luc A., Cross-Country Experiences and Policy Implications from the Global Financial Crisis. Economic Policy, Vol. 25, Issue 62, pp. 267-293, April 2010). I reported on this paper last year at length, when it was still an IMF Working Paper.

“An example of distortions between financial institutions and the fiscal conditions is the extension of guarantees in the case of Ireland to the largest banks. Prior to the extension of guarantees, the CDS-spreads for the large Irish commercial banks were very high. Post guarantees, bank CDS-spreads declined sharply, while the sovereign spread increased. Measures like these, now numerous in many advanced countries today, distort asset prices and financial flows.”

This goes hand-in-hand with the EU assessment of Nama as a market distorting mechanism, which, as reported last week by Irish Independent, was concealed from the public when our Minister for Finance issued a press release claiming that Nama was fully supported by the EU Commission.

Further per Claessens et al: “Guarantees on deposits and other liabilities issued by individual countries have led to beggar thy neighbor effects as, starting with Ireland, they forced other countries to follow with similar measures.”

This statement in effect condemns Irish Government claim that our Guarantee was a success because it was copied by other countries. Instead, as Claessens et al confirm, the Guarantee forced risk from Ireland onto our trade and investment partners. Not exactly a high moral ground.

“The rapid spread of guarantees led to further financial turmoil in other markets. Many emerging markets not able to match guarantees suffered from capital outflows as depositors and other creditors sought the safe havens. Distribution of risks sharply changed over time and across circumstances."

More importantly, both – the revealed note from the EU and the above academic assessment – provide a significant warning in terms of the future of the banking and property sectors in Ireland. Given the systemic nature of distortions, subsequent exits and scaling back of foreign banks presence in the country, the lack of transparency and fairness in the property markets, it is now virtually assured that post-crisis interventions Irish banks and property markets will remain in their zombie state. Japan-styled recession is a looming threat for Ireland Inc.


Of course, you wouldn’t notice this, if you were listening to some of our heroic stock brokers – especially those folks like Bloxham who back in mid 2008 ‘forecast’ that ‘markets do come back’. In their latest strategy statement, issued last Friday, the Bloxham’s boys have managed to outperform themselves in terms of Green-jerseying (emphasis is mine):

“Ireland is undergoing some of the heaviest self imposed penalties for the fiscal over exuberance of the 2000s of any EU economy since the global credit crisis began in 2008. From budgetary austerity measures to public sector wage cuts, from crushing additional taxes both personal and indirect, to a mega-costing banking recovery plan; all in the name of stabalisation and repositioning as a viable economy. As Ireland passes through the next major set of hurdles (the transfer of assets to NAMA and the recap of the banking system), the market reaction so far has been favourable.”

Any evidence of this?

“10-year sovereign Irish bonds are still trading at 146 basis points above German bonds, compared with 280 basis points at the worst point for the Irish system in March 2009. Compared with Portugal at 126 bps over Germany, Irish spreads still have strong progress to make.”

The more the things improve in the wake of all the measures passed by the Government, the more the spreads stay the same? Indeed: “Irish sovereign debt costs have remained static in the past week, while Greek debt costs balloon by 100 bps. In relative terms, Ireland sovereign performance has been exceptionally good since the “Super Tuesday” announcements from the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), the Financial Regulator and the Minister for Finance.”

But hold on to your seats for a wild ride into the land of bizarre logic: “A falling Irish debt cost is largely unappreciated domestically but is a very hansom reward for the pain taken in Ireland thus far.”

I am now thoroughly confused, folks – if the spreads stayed the same, what falling Irish debt costs do the Bloxham folks have in mind? Am I missing something in their vernacular? Or are they missing in the faculty of trivial maths – falling costs mean declining spreads, yet the spreads ‘remained static’ and debt costs did the same.


A real pearl of the note is in its conclusions: “We would expect that the wider Irish stock market will also benefit strongly over the next 6 months, as re-cap plans proceed and the export sector resilience is maintained. Ireland could be finally coming back on the international investor map.”

Indeed it might. Or it might not. I wouldn’t venture a prediction here, but Bloxham guys – having been so right on so many occasions in the past (including that brilliant note from them back in July 2008 (see the note here) surely would know better. Except, hmmm, what does Ireland’s exporting performance have to do with Irish stock prices? Not much – more than 80% of our goods exports and over 90% of our services exports are accounted for by the MNCs – none of which are listed on Irish Stock Exchange. So unless Bloxham guys know something about Fortune 500 companies plans to relocate their listings to Dublin…

Economics 21/03/2010: Reckless expectations, not competition

This is a lengthy post - to reflect the importance of the issue at hand. And it is based largely on data from Professor Brian Lucey, with my added analysis.

The proposition that this post is proving is the following one:

Far from being harmed by competition from foreign lenders, Irish banking sector has suffered from its own disease of reckless lending. In fact, competition in Irish banking remains remarkably close (although below) European average and is acting as a stabilizing force in the markets relative to other factors.


I always found the argument that ‘too much competition in banking was the driver of excessive lending’ to be an economically illiterate one. Even though this view has been professed by some of my most esteemed colleagues in economics.

In theory, competition acts to lower margins in the sector, and since it takes time to build up competitive pressure, the sectors that are facing competition are characterized by stable, established players. In other words, in most cases, sectors with a lot of competition are older, mature ones. This fact is even more pronounced if entry into the sector is associated with significant capital cost requirements. Banking – in particular run of the mill, non-innovative traditional type – is the case in point everywhere in the world.

As competition drives margins down, making quick buck becomes impossible. You can’t hope to write a few high margin, high risk loans and reap huge returns. So firms in highly competitive sectors compete against each other on the basis of longer term strategies that are more stable and prudent. Deploying virtually commoditized services or products to larger numbers of population. Reputation and ever-increasing efficiencies in operations become the driving factors of every surviving firm’s success. And these promote longer term stability of the sector.

Coase’s famous proposition about transaction costs provides a basis for such a corollary.

This means that in the case of Irish banking during the last decade, if competition was indeed driving down the margins in lending (as our stockbrokers, the Government and policy analysts ardently argue today), then the following should have happened.

1. Banks should have become more prudent over time in lending and risk pricing,
2. There should have been broader diversification of the banks lending portfolia, with the bulk of new loans concentrating in the areas relating directly to depositor base – corporate and household lending, and a hefty fringe of higher-margin inter-mediation lending to financial institutions, and
3. Banks would be seeking to ‘bundle’ more services to differentiate from competitors and enhance margins.
   

In Ireland, of course, during the alleged period of ‘harmful competition’ exactly the opposite took place. Let me use Prof Brian Lucey’s data (with added analysis from myself) to show you the facts.

Firstly, Irish banks became less prudent in lending – as exemplified by falling loans approvals criteria, and by rising LTVs:

1. Lending to private sector as % of GDP was ca 50% in 1995, reaching 100% in 1998 and rising to 300% in 2009
2. Vast increases in lending to developers: in 1997 there were €10bn lent out to developers against €20bn in mortgages; in 2008 these figures were €110bn and €140bn respectively
3. Over the time when lending to private sector rose 600%, mortgages lending rose 550%, our GDP rose by 75%
   

Secondly, banks reduced their assets and liabilities diversification (charts 1-3 below) setting themselves up for a massive rise in asymmetric risk exposures.

On the funding side, out went customers deposits, in came banks deposits, foreign deposits and bonds and Irish bonds.
Capital ratios fell out of the way.

And so there has been a change in the world of Irish banking that no other competitive and mature sector of any economy has ever seen. Why? Was it because foreign banks started pushing the timid boys of BofI and AIB and Anglo and INBS out into reckless competitive lending?

You’ve gotta be mad to believe this sop. In reality, the Irish banks’ assets tell the story.

Business loans collapsed, personal loans (the stuff that allegedly, according to the likes of the Irish Times have fuelled our cars and clothing shopping binge during the Celtic Tiger years) actually declined in importance as well. Financial intermediation – the higher margin, higher risk thingy that so severely impacted the US banks – was down as well. No, competition was not driving Irish banks into the hands of higher margin lending. It was driving them into the hands of our property developers. We didn’t have a derivatives and speculative financial investment crisis here – the one that was allegedly caused by the foreign banks coming in and forcing our good boys to cut margins on run-of-the-mill ordinary lending. No, we had an old fashioned disaster of construction and property lending.

And this lending could not have been driven by foreign banks. It came from the total expansion of credit in the economy, presided over by our Central Bank and Financial Regulator, our Government and ECB.

Just how dramatic this change was? Take a look at the ratio of private sector credit to national income in the chart below.
Even a child could have seen the bust coming. The reason that our Financial Regulator and Central Bank failed to see this, despite publishing all this data in the first place, is that they were simply not looking. The former probably obsessed with the pension perks, the latter – well, may be because all the fine art in the Central Bank’s own collection was just too much of a distraction. Who knows? But judging by the above chart lack of significant correction during the crisis – we know who will pay for this in the end. Us, the taxpayers.
As chart above shows, the fundamentals for the boom – in lending and in construction – were never there, folks. And the banks missed that completely. As did our regulators and our policymakers. Brian Lucey of TCD School of Business provides evidence on what was really going on in the Irish banks (again, note that some of the analysis below is mine).
Chart above, based on the Central Bank Credit Survey, basically shows the impact three major forces: expectations of increased competition by the banks, improved banks outlook on the Irish economy three months ahead, and LTVs expectations had in Irish banks willingness to increase lending. Scores above 3 represent tightening of credit conditions (as in banks expecting to cut lending to households), while scores below 3 show forces driving looser credit to households.

If the proposition that foreign banks competition pressures drove Irish banks into looser credit supply were to be correct, one would expect the blue line above to reach far deeper into ‘below 3’ scores than the other two lines. Alas, it did not dip. In fact, competition from other banks was recognized by Irish Bankers themselves to be the least improtant factor contributing to credit supply expansion. Instead, their over-optimism about economic prospects (red line) and their willingess to give away cash at massively inlfated LTVs (the orange line – also a proxy for Bankers’ optimism regarding future direction of house prices) were the two main drivers of credit boom.

Where’s the evidence on ‘harmful competition’ that so many Central Bank leaders, the stockbrokers and Government spokespersons have decried in recent past?

The delirium of our bankers was actually so out of any proportion that, as the surveys data shows, even amidst the implosion of the housing markets since early 2008 they were still saying “hang on....we expect that changes in LTV and economic prosoects will cause us to loosen in the next 3 months". In other words, they were chasing the deflating bubble, not the imaginary foreign banks competitiors.

Let’s take another look at Brian Lucey’s data. Take the scores for Ireland in the above surveys and take their ratios to the Euro area average scores. If the ratio is in excess of 1, then the said factor has contributed to greater tightening in credit supply in Ireland than in the Euro area. If it is less than 1, then the said factor has contributed more to loosening in lending in Ireland than in the Euro area.
So, really, folks, competition in Ireland was actually more of a stabilizing force, than de-stabilizing one. LTV’s optimism and lack of realism in economic forecasts were the two main driving forces of the boom.

Lastly, ECB Herfindahl Index (ratio of Ireland to “big5” EU states) provides exactly the same conclusions:
Again, what above shows is that on virtually every occasion, Irish reading for Herfindahl Index (measuring degree of concentration in banking sector) is in excess of the average Index reading for top 5 EU countries. In other words, there was no such thing as ‘too much competition’ going on in Irish banking sector. If anything, there was somwhat too little of it, compared to Germany, France, Italy, UK and the Netherlands.

And now, for the test of all of this. The chart below regresses each survey factor on the private sector credit index. The negatively sloped line – for LTV and economic prospect factors combined - shows that when this factor scoring in the survey increased, lending became tighter. Positively sloped line – for competition – shows that when competition pressures rose (factor reading declined), lending actually got tighter. And the statistical significance of the LTV and expectations factors is more than double that of competition...
Let’s just stop talking nonesense about too much competition in Irish banking sector drove unsustainable lending. More likely – an anticiaption by our bankers that no matter what they do, they will never be allowed to fail by the state, plus an absolutely rediculous expectations about opur economy drove our banks to the brink.