22/12/2011: Long term growth and the crisis

Let me highlight the following angle on considering latest Irish economic forecasts. The downgrade by IMF, OECD and EU Comm, plus ESRI to 2012 growth of 0.9-1.0% - as much as I personally think these forecasts to be optimistic as they are - cuts across the strikingly more optimistic Department of Finance forecasts for 1.3% growth (in the Budget) or 1.6% growth (in the documents released one day ahead of the Budget). This is pretty clear.

But the real issue here is that in the long term, IMF projects Irish growth of 2.3%, 2.7% and 3.0% in 2013-2015, with the output gap of 3.6%, 2.2% and 1.1%. The implied loss to the Irish economy due to the crisis, from 2010 through 2015 is a cumulative €37.5bn. In other words, our economy's long-term growth potential for growth, held back by the structural recession and debt overhang, plus fiscal mess, is - between 2010-2015 - €37 billion higher than the expected realized income. Or 20.9% of the expected 2015 GDP.

While differences year on year are significant in terms of fiscal targets, the fact that in 6 years between 2010 and 2015 Ireland's economy will be forced (by our inept Government policies on debt and banks, plus our inept EU 'partners' policies on 'bailout' and banks) to waste almost 21% of our expected annual income shows the following:

• Current policies are incapable to drive Ireland back to its potential long term growth rates, and
• Ireland is clearly distinct from other peripheral countries which, while having a similar crisis, do not have the same potential for future growth as Ireland.

21/12/2011: Sunday Times December 18, 2011 article

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article for December 18, 2011.

Last week’s EU Summit was billed as offering long-term solutions to the fiscal stability in the euro area and setting out the tools for dealing with the immediate threats. Just a week after the summit, however, the euro zone finds itself in the midst of an ever-deepening crisis once again.

This, of course, is a logical conclusion to the meeting that not only failed to present any new measures, but went on to undermine credibility of the previously deployed solutions, such as the EFSF, the ESM, Private Sector Involvement in bondholders haircuts in Greece, the expanded IMF engagement in lending to the euro zone member states, and the ECB deployment of aggressive quantitative easing programmes.

Let’s take a look at the hard numbers that emerged from the summit.

Post-July 2011 plan was to enhance EFSF lending capacity to €1.5-2 trillion either by raising new funding or by running €500 billion EFSF concurrently with €1 trillion ESM. Post-December summit we have: no increase in EFSF, no concurrent schemes and a vague promise of a €1 trillion target for ESM. This means that the effective lending capacity of the long-term funds in euro zone will be less than one half of what was expected.

That, of course, assumes that EFSF and ESM will carry on borrowing under AAA rating status and that funding markets will be receptive to new issuance of debt. The former is now jeopardized, courtesy of the summit failure, leading to France downgrade. The latter has been under severe questions for weeks now, since the EFSF failed to raise €3 billion in the last auction earlier this month. In fact, things are now so desperate, that this week EFSF was forced to issue 91 days bills. A fund that is lending under 7.5-10 year mandate now runs short term funding schemes that imply a massive maturity mismatch risk.

In order to by-pass ECB’s statutory restriction on financing the member states, for months prior to the December summit, EU leaders were voicing the idea of lending funds to the IMF so that the IMF can re-lend these same funds, leveraged ca 4-5 times back to the euro member states. This too now appears completely out of reach. Following the summit, the US, Canada and Japan stated unequivocally that they will not support targeted funding by the IMF. In addition, Russia, Brazil, China and India have in the past said no to matching euro area loans, meaning that the scheme cannot come into existence as a general fund allocation. Of course, in all the excitement surrounding the Summit, everyone forgot to ask a simple question – where will the EU governments find the said €200 billion if they can’t raise the money to fund the EFSF?

Private sector participation in Greece – the cornerstone of the July and October 2011 summits – was also put to gather dust this week. Firstly, the European Banking Authority clearly stated that efforts to-date to agree such ‘voluntary’ participation have come short of the required target of 90% of foreign bond holders. Secondly, in the 5^th review of Greece’s progress under the lending programmes, the IMF team in Athens concluded that: “There are yet significant risks ahead for the [Greek] authorities’ program, including …the possible failure to agree with creditors on a PSI deal, leading to a non-voluntary outcome.” And furthermore, despite having engaged in planning PSI operations since June 2011, after six months of haggling and planning by the EU, “… the specific details of the operation remain to be finalized …” The sums involved are hardly insignificant. October 26 summit – up to 1/4 of the entire EFSF once banks recapitalization measures are included. Absent full implementation of PSI, Greece will be insolvent vis-à-vis IMF, triggering a mother of all defaults.

Last, but not least, the hopes of the ECB riding into the battle with direct quantitative easing were cindered by Frankfurt. Following the summit, ECB decision makers were quick to state that direct assistance to the member states and expanded bonds purchases were not consistent with the ECB statutes and strategy. Of course, no open market operations – no matter how large – could have been sufficient to deal with the crisis. To-date, ECB balancesheet of loans to sovereigns (via direct purchases of Government bonds) and euro area banks has swollen dangerously close to €1 trillion. And, yet, this had virtually no real long-term effect on the crisis dynamics.

Adding insult to the already grave injuries, the Summit precipitated two new crises in Europe – a political one and an economic one. The former is manifested in the legal problems surrounding formulation, passing and enforcement of the new Fiscal Pact. But these are legal and political problems so let us focus on the economic ones.

Even for the deficit hawk like myself, the Fiscal Pact is equivalent to an economic suicide. The Pact formula of 3%-0.5%-60% is a combination of the already failed Stability and Growth Pact targets enriched with the lethally obscure and totally unattainable 0.5% structural deficit limit.

Between 1990 and 2008 – in other words, before the crisis hit – Ireland was able to satisfy the 0.5% structural deficit target only once in very 10 years, same as Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. Austria, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain never once satisfied this criterion. Two best performers in the euro area – Malta and Finland have met the target in 6 out of the 19 pre-crisis years. In terms of 0.5% structural deficit rule, all member states, except Germany will require further austerity measures.

For Ireland, a longer-term expected slowdown in growth over the next 10 years compared to previous two decades will mean that it will be even harder to stick to the target for the structural deficit, as we see reduction in the potential growth rates going forward.

Ireland fared much better as far as the 3% standard deficit goes, satisfying the criteria in all but 1 year. The same does not hold for other euro area states. France has failed to meet the target in more than 5 out of 10 years, as did Spain; Italy in more than 7 in each 10 years; Portugal and Germany more than 4; Greece – never once. And looking forward, under rather rosy IMF September 2011 projections for 2012-2013, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Greece, Ireland, Slovenia and Spain will require even more austerity than already planned to comply with 3% deficit rule.

For Ireland, complying with the 3% rule will require the deepest additional adjustments in the euro area, while complying with the 0.5% structural deficit rule will need second largest adjustment. In fact, this week, Sen. Sean Barrett, a TCD economist proposed a bill that aims to bring about a more open and transparent approach to the public finances and stresses the overall significance of the structural deficits rules for Ireland.

Messrs Kenny and Noonan have signed off on the deal that will be the costliest to Ireland of all other states, disastrous to our economy in its current condition and, given the legal issues surrounding its enforceability for countries not in debt to the Troika, also pretty much useless for the EU at large.

The second point of weakness in the Irish Government position with respect to the new Pact relates to the implicit Government support for the Financial Services Transactions Tax (FSTT). Empirical evidence firmly shows that Tobin-styled taxes in financial services, when effective in reducing the speed and volume of transactions, have to be prohibitively high, impacting more adversely secondary financial services centres, like Dublin IFSC and benefiting offshore locations and jurisdictions that fall outside the new tax net. In summary, Tobin tax can lead to less transparency, more tax evasion and lower economic growth across the EU. James Tobin himself argued against the blanket introduction of his ideas in later years.

By agreeing to the new Pact without as much as voicing a threat of the veto over the FSTT, the Irish Government has signed a long term death warrant to Dublin's competitiveness in front-office international financial services - the highest value added segment of the sector and one of the best performing areas of Irish economy in recent years, including during this crisis.

On the net, as the direct result of the Summit failures, the probability of the Euro zone exits for Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Belgium has risen. At the same time, the sustainability of public finances in Italy, Spain and France is now in doubt as Fiscal Pact is likely to result in a reduction in the potential growth rates for Span and France and no increase in future growth for Italy. Likewise, the probability of Irish fiscal adjustment path must be questioned, especially since the Pact will depress our longer term growth rates, that are already, barring the Pact introduction, less than spectacular.

It is thus, that the Government deficit of leadership has finally contributed to a bitter failure at the EU policy level. Contagion has spread from all matters economics and financial to the heart of politics in Europe.

Box-out:

Breaking up the doom-and-gloom newsflow that dominates our everyday reality, last month’s high level Irish delegation trade visit to Russia, headed by Tanaiste Eamon Gillmore, yielded some encouraging progress on the longer-term bilateral trade and investment policies development front. Since 1976, Irish and Russian authorities have been in somewhat infrequent and irregular dialogues on these issues under the umbrella of the Joint Economic Council. Last month, for the first time ever both sides agreed to set up sector-specific working groups with regular reporting and strict annual targets for deliverables. Given that Irish exports to Russia are set to grow 40% plus this year, having 52% in 2010, while Irish trade surplus with Russia is about to expand by 150% in the last 2 years, this is a truly welcomed development. In 2010, Irish trade surplus with Russia was €465 million ahead of that with China, €352 million ahead of trade balance with India and €119 million greater than the trade surplus with Brazil.

21/12/2011: Irish Planning Permission Q3 2011

In Q3 2011, there were 2,512 planning permissions granted for dwelling units, compared with 4,641 units for the same period in 2010, a yoy decrease of 45.9 %.

However, overall, Q3 2011 number of new dwellings approved stood at 1,271, up 0.55% qoq and down 22% yoy. Relative to peak in Q2 2004, the number of new dwelling units approved declined 83.2% in Q3 2011.

Per CSO: 

• Planning Permissions were granted for 1,887 houses in the third quarter of 2011 and 2,817 in the third quarter of 2010, a decrease of 33.0%. 
• Planning permissions were granted for 625 apartment units, compared with 1,824 units for the same period in 2010, a decrease of 65.7%.
• Total floor area planned was 969 thousand square metres in the third quarter of 2011. Of this, 48.0% was for new dwellings, 29.7% for other new constructions and 22.3% for extensions. The total floor area planned decreased by 31.4% in comparison with the same quarter in 2010.
• Planning Permissions for new buildings for Agriculture rose to 194 this quarter. This compares to 132 permissions in the same quarter of 2010.

More detailed analysis of CSO data shows that total number of new permissions rose 4.76% qoq in Q3 2011 from 4,244 in Q2 2011 to 4,446. However, Q3 2011 total number of permissions was down 16% yoy and down 74.4% on the peak attained in Q3 2007.

Charts below illustrate:

20/12/2011: IMF IV Review of Ireland Programme: part 3

In the previous two posts I covered the IMF analysis of mortgages arrears and budgetary dynamics. Here, let's focus on IMF forward-looking analysis for 2012.

"Given the strong growth in the first half, real GDP growth has been revised up to 1.1 percent
in 2011 from 0.4 percent in the most recent WEO projection. However, nominal GDP would
be essentially flat in 2011 given a projected 1 percent decline in the GDP deflator owing to a
deterioration in the terms of trade." [You can read this as follows: we repay debt out of nominal GDP. Which is flat. Thus our capacity to repay our debts in 2011 remains identical to that in 2010. Another year, and not any closer to the elusive - and utterly unattainable, of course - goal of paying down our total debts.]

"Further deceleration in external trade prevents any growth pick-up in the baseline in 2012. Growth projected for key trading partners—the euro area, the U.S. and the U.K. account for 80 percent of exports—has been revised down from 2 percent at the Third Review to 1½ percent currently (export-weighted). The non-cyclicality of pharmaceutical exports and recent improvements in competitiveness help mitigate the impact of lower demand, nonetheless, projected Irish export growth in 2012 has been revised down from 5¼ percent to 3¾ percent. Domestic demand will continue to contract, leaving GDP growth at 1 percent in 2012, down from 1.9 percent at the previous review. Low growth allows only a small reduction in unemployment in 2012. Inflation would remain low at about 1 percent in 2012, as higher indirect tax rates broadly offset the impact of weaker international price pressures." [So, in a summary: if pharma exports remain as they are - no patent cliff effects etc - we will grow at 1% in 2012, unemployment will decline slightly solely due to exits from the labor force and emigration, and high taxes will hammer domestic demand, thus driving down inflation. Did I hear 'stagnation' said anywhere?]

"Overall, growth is expected to average 2¾ percent over 2013–15, but the unemployment rate may remain in double-digits through 2016, risking the development of sizeable structural unemployment." [In other words, the growth rate IMF builds in assumes 2012 growth of 1.0%, 2013 growth of 2.3%, 2014 of 2.7% and 2015 of 3%. Department of Finance projects growth of 1.3-1.6% for 2012 (+0.3-0.6% on IMF), 2.4% in 2013 (+0.1% on IMF), and 3% in 2014 and 2015. Cumulative departure over 2012-2015 between IMF forecasts and DofF/Budget 2012 forecasts is, therefore, at 0.75-1.08 percent. If anything, were the IMF to be correct in their assumptions, Ireland will need some additional cuts of 0.02-0.03% of 2015 GDP - €172-204mln. If, however, the IMF itself is over-optimistic and Irish GDP growth were to come in at 2.5% average for the 2013-2015 period instead of 2.75%, the shortfall on targets will be as high as €293mln. And that's just the growth estimates effects.]

Importantly, the IMF revised its previous forecasts for 2015 deficit of 2.9% in line with the Government plans. However, debt/GDP ratio remains projected to peak at 118.1% in 2013 and this reflects adjustments for the €3.72bn 'Cardiff error'.

"Debt-to-GDP is projected to peak at 118 percent in 2013, in line with the previous review. The debt path is lowered by a correction to the end-2010 general government debt level and the reduced interest rate on EU loans, but this is offset by lower projections for nominal GDP. Potential privatization receipts could lower debt prospects, while outlays to restructure the credit union sector could raise debt prospects, but such outlays are expected to be manageable. External developments affecting growth and the prospective interest rates on market financing are the key sources of risk to debt sustainability."[The assumption is that projected cost of credit unions losses covers will be €500-1,000mln only.]

But don't worry - Government revenues are going to be very transparent. Per IMF analysis, in effect, the entire revenue adjustment forward will be carried through income taxes:

Perhaps a telling thing about the report is that the entire 'growth policies' section of the review is given less space than the reforms of the credit unions. What is given, however, is bizarrely thin on ideas and impact.

Most of the 'measures' referenced reflect focus on Employment Regulation Orders (EROs) or Registered Employment Agreements (REA) review - a measure that is likely to produce some labour cost reductions in the construction sector and perhaps some other labor intensive, lower-wage sectors. However, it is simply naive to believe that labor costs hold back jobs creation in retail, hospitality and construction. Instead, market structure, lack of consumer demand, Nama - for construction, banks credit availability and, above all, devastated personal incomes of those still working (via taxes hits and earnings declines) are the main drivers for lack of jobs creation in these sector. Review of wage setting mechanisms might be a high enough priority, but it is not the highest by any possible means.

Apart from that, IMF Megaminds have nothing else to say about jobs creation.

In the next post, I will focus on the IMF review of risks with respect to fiscal consolidation and growth.

20/12/2011: IMF IV Review of Ireland Programme: part 2

This continues my review of the IMF's 4th review of Ireland. The previous post (here) covered the findings concerning mortgages arrears and property markets.


"Budget execution remains on track despite weakness in revenues linked to domestic demand. ...Excluding net banking sector support costs, the January–October Exchequer primary deficit was €12.1 billion, 0.8 percentage points of GDP narrower than the authorities’ profile after allowing for the impact of the Jobs Initiative introduced in May 2011." [In other words, folks, allowing for pensions levy hit]

"The smaller deficit primarily reflects tight expenditure control; net current spending undershot budgetary allocation by 1.6 percent (0.4 percent of GDP), while capital spending was below profile by 17.2 percent (0.8 percent of GDP)." [This further shows that the smallest positive impact on deficit was derived from the largest area of expenditure - current spending, with capital spending cuts acting as the main driver, once again, of budgetary adjustment. This, of course, has been highlighted by me on numerous occasions.]

"Overall revenues remained on track, with shortfalls in taxes such as VAT due to weak domestic demand offset by higher than budgeted non-tax revenues, such as bank guarantee fees." [That's right, folks, one-off hits on income and wealth are 'compensating' for tax revenues fall-off in income tax, VAT and corporation tax. Again, keep in mind that IMF analysis is based on data that excludes the largest revenue generating month of November.]

But here's an interesting note: "The cumulative Exchequer primary balance through end-September 2011 was -€18.3 billion, above the adjusted target of -€20.2 billion. Central government net debt was €111.7 billion, below the adjusted indicative target of €115.9 billion" [One might ask the following question, is that target of €115.9bn - set in December 2010 - reflects the €3.6bn error found in Q3 2011? If not, then, of course, our 'outperformance of the target shrinks to a virtually irrelevant €500mln which, itself, can be fully covered by capital expenditure shortfall on the target mentioned above. In other words, when all is factored in, are we really outperforming the target set, or are we simply overestimating the target and ignoring expected spending?]

The IMF catches up to that:
"Program ceilings for fiscal indicators at end-2011 are expected to be observed. Although spending will pick up toward year-end, and a funding need of 0.2 percent of GDP is expected in relation to the failure of a private insurance company, the end-December performance criterion is projected to be achieved."
[In other words, the State will have to cover €300mln of Quinn Insurance losses in 2011 and then another €400mln of same in 2012. Alas, due to the accounting trick, since these losses will be recovered by the State through an insurance levy - to be paid by the completely innocent dopes (aka, us, consumers of insurance products in Ireland), the whole thing is not counted as Government debt, even though the State will be borrowing these funds.]

"Similarly, the general government deficit is projected at 10.3 percent of GDP, within the European Council’s ceiling of 10.6 percent of GDP. The 2011 consolidation package of €5.3 billion (3.4 percent of GDP) is expected to reduce the primary deficit to 6.7 percent of GDP, representing a €3.1 billion (2 percent of GDP) year-on-year reduction." [Now, note the maths - 6.7% primary deficit remains to be closed before we can begin net debt repayments. Last year, we've closed - and that is based on pre-November 2011 pretty disastrous numbers - 2%, so 2/9th down, 7/9th still to go, roughly-speaking]

Crucially: "The realized increase in the primary balance will thus likely amount to only about three-fifths of the consolidation effort, which reflects the adverse impact of the contraction in domestic demand and the rise in unemployment, highlighting the challenge of implementing large fiscal consolidations when growth is weak." [Here's what this means - due to the adverse effects of lower growth and higher unemployment, some 40% of this year's adjustment has gone on fighting the rising tide of economic crisis, not on structural rebalancing of fiscal deficit. In other words, if this situation of fiscal targets set against unrealistic expectations for growth were to continue in 2012 and through 2015, we will get a deficit to GDP ratio of closer to 5.5-6% not 2.9% as envisaged. Now, think about this in the following terms - Budget 2012 assumes growth of 1.3% next year - although I have some questions as to whether that is indeed the number, given that a day before the Budget 2012 was published, the Department of Finance quoted the figure of 1.6% - and the expectations of ESRI, OECD, the EU Commission and the IMF are now for 0.9-1%... hmmm... realistic expectations, targets and outcomes risks are now pretty clear...]

As is, the IMF report shows progress achieved. But it also raises a number of questions:

• Is this progress - 2% adjustment of which 2/5ths are simply gone to cover lost ground - sufficient?
• Is this progress sustainable (see next post)?
• Is this progress being achieved through structural reforms (current spending cuts and sustainable revenue raising) or through capital expenditure cuts and one-off tax measures?

The following post will cover the IMF analysis of the future outlook for the Irish economy.

20/12/2011: IMF IV Review of Ireland Programme

Fourth review of Ireland's programme under the Troika package is out and makes for some interesting reading. As usual, between-the-lines reading skills required. This is the first post on the report, focusing on housing markets and mortgages arrears.


The review is overall positive, complimentary and almost glowing. This warrants a number of caveats:

• The review is based on QNA data through H1 2011, so Q3 2011 fall-off in GDP and GNP are not factored in
• The review is based on the general data sources through mid-October, so November Exchequer results do not appear to have been factored in either

Aside from the strengths highlighted in the media, here are the critical points of the report. Mortgages arrears first, with subsequent posts dealing with other core issues covered.

"However, housing market and household debt indicators continue to deteriorate (Figure 2). With the fall in house prices accelerating in October to 15.1 percent on an annual basis, prices are down 45.4 percent from their peak in 2007. The rate of mortgage arrears by value continued to rise, reaching 10.8 percent in September 2011 (8.1 percent in terms of the number of mortgages), up from 6.6 percent in September 2010. With the share of longer-term arrears (greater than 180 days) continuing to rise, the authorities have deepened their analysis of the mortgage arrears problem (Box 1)."

Of interest here is the analysis the IMF refers to. Here is the summary (quoted from the IMF report, my comments in italics):

1. Aggregate mortgage arrears continue to rise sharply and in September 2011 reached 8.1 percent by the number of loans to owner-occupiers. 
2. To better understand the nature of mortgage distress, the CBI has utilized loan-by-loan data from end-2010 that were collected as part of the review of banks’ capital needs published at end-March 2011. [I am puzzled with this statement. CBI clearly stated at the time of PCARs that they did not analyse individual loans data for mortgages, but considered samples of mortgages. At a later date - in September 2011, CBI gave a presentation of a study based on the specific loans data, but this was also based on a sample of data, a large sample, but still a sample, not the entire population of the mortgages on the books of 4 banks.]
3. Of those households in arrears over 90 days, almost 40 percent have been in this position for a year or more. The average amount of arrears on these loans is €27,000, compared with an average outstanding balance of just over €200,000. [Please, keep in mind, per IMF, this is data through the end of 2010, so it is, by now - one year old!]
4. On top of arrears of 90 days or more, there are a significant number of borrowers who have restructured loans or delinquent payments of less than 90 days, bringing the total affected to about 20 percent of borrowers at end-2010. [These figures - 20% of borrowers either in arrears or restructured, or as I call these 'at risk' - is much greater than reported by the CBI in their quarterly report, showing for Q3 2011 that only 12.96% of all mortgages outstanding were either in arrears, restructured or repossessed]
5. Arrears tend to be highest in relation to buy-tolet properties and first-time buyers, as these purchasers took on large debts owing to high house prices during 2005–08. 
6. Negative equity is extensive. It is estimated that 36 percent of owner-occupier households with mortgages in these institutions are in negative equity (at September 2011 house prices). [This, of course, is now higher again, as October and November price declines totalled 3.71%] 
7. For owner-occupier loans taken between 2005 and 2008 (half of outstanding loans), 48 percent of properties are in negative equity, while 52 percent of buy-to-let loans are in negative equity. [The two numbers are remarkably close to each other.]
8. Negative equity does not imply arrears. Despite widespread negative equity amongst borrowers, the vast majority of negative equity borrowers, over 90 percent, were not in arrears at end-2010. 
9. About half of owner-occupier borrowers in arrears at end-2010 had positive equity, with around 38 percent having at least 20 percent equity in their homes. The average negative equity of owner-occupiers without arrears is €68,000, modestly smaller than the average of €84,000 for owner-occupiers in arrears. [Which, of course, means that these arrears can be dealt with at no loss to the banks via a combination of restructuring, equity stakes assumption by the banks and/or foreclosures. In the end, this also means that significantly less resources will be needed to help those who are in negative equity and at risk of arrears - i.e. those who are subject to punitive provisions of our personal bankruptcy code]
10. Buy-to-let properties. Of the total loan book analyzed, 22 percent (€20 billion out of €87 billion), relates to buy-to-let property debt. The average outstanding balance for the 52 percent of buy-to-let properties in negative equity is about €320,000 and the average negative equity is just over €100,000.
11. Within the four institutions covered by the Financial Measures Program, 33 percent of buy-to-let borrowers also have an owner-occupier mortgage with the same lender.  

Some very interesting observations from the IMF summary of the CBI evidence on drivers of arrears: 

• Studies, including from other countries, point to unemployment, debt service, and loan-to-value ratios as key determinants for arrears, although geography and loan vintage are also important, as are rental and payment rates for buy-to-let properties. 
• Data availability can be an issue, however, especially for current income. 
• An alternative approach developed a transition matrix for predicting mortgage arrears based on loan vintage, borrower type, interest rate type, and region.

There's no summary of the transition matrix provided.

Here are three more interesting charts relating to the Irish property market:

20/12/2011: The end of Neo-Keynesianism

I have recently written about the lack of debt reductions under the 'austerity' packages in Europe (see link here). Now, Washington Post weighs in with an excellent note on the demise of the Neo-Keynesian doctrine of unlimited borrowing-based deficit financing - link here. It is, therefore, perhaps befitting to note that today's Le Monde quotes Professor Jean-Marc Daniel of ESCP saying that "without doubt we are living in the last hours of a European Social model". The article, cited in the eurointelligence.com briefing note, but not linked, also cites absurd abuses of the Social Contract in Greece and other PIIGS.

This, of course, is a logical conclusion to the economically illogical proposition that states with severe debt overhang (in excess of 80% of GDP or GNP for public debts) can borrow their way out of the debt crisis.

But the problem goes deeper than that. Europe 2020 - the only growth policy platform for the EU27 - relies extensively on the Social Model as the core driver for growth, both in terms of justifying subsidies and transfers that are represented as 'socially productive' even if they are economically dubious in nature, and in terms of justifying more significant role for public investment in driving future growth capacity.

Neo-Keynesian doctrine of continued and accelerating deficit financing in the face of public debt overhang is now pretty much dead. Next step - the idea of 'Social Economy' that is based on achieving equality of outcome by transfers of income and wealth, both intra- and inter-temporal. States do run out of borrowing capacity, folks. And it doesn't matter a bit whether this happens when you need to run a deficit or not.

20/12/2011: Residential property prices for November

Today's data focus for Ireland is on residential property price index for November.

Prior to today's release, in the 12 months through October 2011, residential property prices were down 15.1% year on year - steeper decline than in July-September 2011 (12.5%, 13.9% and 14.3% respectively). In 12 months through October 2010 the rate of prices decline was 11.1%, shallower than in the 12 months through last October. So price drops were accelerating before November data release. In fact, mom prices dropped 2.2% in October, against 1.5% mom decline in September.

The latest data, therefore, was expected to come in with some moderation in the rate of decline. And in that, there was no surprise - mom change for November is at -1.54%, ahead of September, but behind October reading. 


November index of all residential properties prices is now at 70.1, down from october 71.2. 3mo MA is down to 71.37 from October reading of 72.63. We have to go back to November 2007 to see the first time that the overall index did not decline (it stayed flat in that month) and back to September 2007 to see the last monthly increase in the index. 12 mo MA of monthly changes is now at -1.41% mom and year-to-date monthly average change is -1.49%.


Nama is continuing taking a hit on its valuations. Referencing back to November 30, 2009 Nama valuations cut-off date, November 2011 prices are down 25.35%, which, adjusting for LTEV uplift applied by Nama implies that Nama valuations on its residential properties portfolio are 32.13% under water. Correcting the above for 'burden sharing' cushion applied by Nama legislation, Nama is nursing a loss of 28.9% on its residential properties-related holdings.

As chart above shows, overall residential property prices are now 46.28% down on the peak and year on year the prices are down 15.64%.

Houses prices index has fallen from 74.3 in october to 72.9 in November - down 1.88% mom, In October, monthly rate of decline was -2.24%, but November decline is second sharpest in the last 5 months. Year on year, house prices are down 15.72%, while in october the same rate of decline was 14.89%. Relative to peak, house prices nationwide are 44.78%.

Apartments fared better this time around, with index reading improving from 52.2 in October to 53.6 in November, a monthly rise of 2.68%. The index is also more volatile than that for all residential prices and house prices. Last time we saw a rise in house prices mom was in August 2010, and last time we saw monthly increase in apartments prices was in December and January 2010.

Apartments prices are now -16.89% down yoy and this marks an improvement on -19.82% decline yoy through October. Relative to peak, apartments prices are down 56.74%.

In my view, the divergence between apartments prices and house prices, if sustained over time, will be signaling the overall collapse of the purchasing power by the first time buyers, as well as demand push toward lower cost commuting locations as cost of transport continues to climb up courtesy of the Government policies. It can also signal the reflection of improving rental yields for some, especially city centre-located - properties. It is worth noting that Dublin apartments drove the monthly change for nationwide figures reported above, with Dublin apartments price index increasing from 50.8 in October to 53.2 in November a strong gain of 4.7% mom and driving year on year decline to -16.1% in November against -21.2% in October.


Prices in Dublin (all properties) posted index reading of 62.2 in November, down 1.43% mom on October reading of 63.1. This was the shallowest monthly decline since July 2011 when the index posted no change mom. Yoy index is now down 17.62% in November from 17.52% in October. Relative to peak the index is down 53.75%.

Updating annual forecasts, I expect overall RPPI to post a reading of ca 71.27-71.30 or a decline of 41.7% relative to peak. For houses, I expect index to run at 74.5-75.1 for 2011, marking a decline of 39.7% relative to peak annual index, while for apartment the same forecasts are for 56.5-56.7 index reading and a decline relative to peak of 49.7%. Dublin prices are expected to end the year on an index reading of 63.5-64.0 - a decline of 47.9% on peak. Mid-points are illustrated below:

So, overall, no surprise - another month of declines, another month on the road toward the average price around 60% off the peak. One to watch here is the sub-index for apartments prices, especially in Dublin.


It's worth noting here that per NTMA (source: Nama, December 2011), commercial property yields have been rising strongly in recent months. See chart below. This can also correlate positively with the rental yields for Dublin apartments, especially for centrally located properties.

19/12/2011: Relax, Keynesianistas!

My article for Canada's Globe & Mail in the Global Exchange section: here.

18/12/2011: Ballyhea & Charleville Protest Against the Bailouts

This weekend I was honored to be a guest of a group of real patriots of our country - a group of extraordinary people who over 40 weeks, one Sunday after another, take their families and friends into the streets of Ballyhea and Charleville to protest against the injustice of the banks bondholders bailouts.

It is a remarkable group of people - coming from all walks of life, united not by an ideology or by a vested interest, but by the knowledge that what is being done to our country behind the veil of the banking crisis is simply wrong. It is wrong on a multitude of levels - ranging from ethics to politics to economics to social justice. The people behind this protest are also united by their concerns for the future of Ireland, for the rising wave of emigration, for the simple fact that our country capacity to recover from this crisis is being destroyed for the sake of rescuing a handful of institutional bondholders.

I felt truly honored - and there can be no other word to describe it - to have been asked to speak to these courageous people last night, to share a delightful pint and a long conversation with them, and to march alongside them today.

Here are a couple of pictures from the march.

The group run a website listing all bonds coming due for repayment, called bondwatchireland.blogspot.com and a Facebook page for their events (link here). These are, in my view, a must to follow for anyone concerned with what has been happening in Ireland over the last 3 years.

17/12/2011: The Plan and a Pie

Yes, yes, folks, I know, we have a plan. It's the plan to pay our debts (well, at least Government debts) from our 'exports-led growth'. We even had foreign experts telling us that we can do it - coming down from the Continent with lectures full of graphs and sums.

In reality, of course, the plan is a porky. We have booming trade in goods which is slowing down on growth rates, but remains pretty healthy. We have trade in services - that is not reported by the CSO in monthly series. That is in a deficit. Then there are other so-called 'invisibles' that are negative as well (see below). On the net, in 2010, our 'external surplus' measured by trade alone, including the invisibles (current account) was just €761mln. But then we have to add capital account - the inflows and outflows of capital - and that gives us the full external surplus - the Balance of payments bit - of a whooping debt-busting... €88 million.

Let's run through those figures... shall we?

Merchandise trade balance in Q3 2011 stood at €9,862mln or 6.9% ahead of Q2. Year on year, however, trade in goods shrunk 1.02% and for the first 9 months of 2011, trade balance in goods was 2.78% behind the same period of 2010. In other words, not a spectacular development so far in our strongest exporting sector. Certainly not what we would expect if we were to reach that 4.3-5.8 targets various Government documents set out for exports growth in 2011.

Services trade balance shows a deficit as of Q3 2011 at €379mln. The encouraging thing is that this is falling, and falling rapidly. But income flows abroad and current transfers abroad are running high at €8,170mln and €463mln respectively. This means total invisibles balance is in a deep deficit of €9,012mln in Q3 2011, improved by €700 mln on Q2 2011, but worse than same period 2010 by €227mln.

Adding up trade balance in goods and invisibles yields current account surplus of €850mln in Q3 2011. But for the 9 months of 2011, cumulated current account stands in a deficit of €669mln, not a surplus. And compared to same period 2010 this deficit in an improvement of €125mln.

Capital account for Ireland is in a small deficit in Q3 2011 of €12mln, slightly deeper than €8mln in Q2 2011, but worse  for 9 months through September 2011 (at €6mln deficit) than for the same period a year ago (surplus of €23mln).

Adding current and capital accounts yields balance of payments for Ireland - the full external balance - which in Q3 2011 stood at €838mln surplus. In 9 months through September 2011, the balance of payments was in cumulative deficit of €675mln - an improvement on the same period of 2010 when the balance of payments was in a deficit of €771mln.

Charts below illustrate the trends on the annual basis, providing forecast for 2011 based on data through September.

So let's ask that uncomfortable question: Can external surpluses get us out of the debt jail? table below sums up cumulated external accounts balances for 1998-2011(forecast).

Yep, that's right. Suppose we want to pay down original €100bn of government debt out of the external surpluses consistent with the booming exports trade of 2009-2011 and we take the best quarterly performance for each metric of the external balance. Suppose we assume that debt is financed at 3.5% perpetually. How long will it take Ireland to half its current debt exposure? Roughly speaking - 64 years based on trade balance (current account surpluses) and 85 years based on full balance of payments.

And the above does not factor in any current or future slowdowns in trade etc. Just based on our best performance, with exports at boom levels and imports permanently shrunk, we still cannot count on that magic bullet of 'external trade will save us' from the debt overhang.

So that Plan for External Surpluses as a vehicle out of our debt jail... well it's sort of:

16/12/2011: Agricultural Output in Ireland 2011

Advanced estimates for production and value added in Agriculture for Ireland is out for 2011 and it makes for some interesting reading. The headline numbers are pretty exciting:

• Goods output rose from €4,7524mln in 2009 to €5,329mln (+12.8% yoy) in 2010. And it is now expected to increase to €6,190mln (+16.2%) yoy in 2011. 
• Net subsidies (net of all taxes collected) fell from €1,849mln in 2009 to €1,688mln in 2010, and now expected to rise again to €1,942mln in 2011.
• Overall, operating surplus - goods output value less intermediate inputs consumption and less subsidies - has risen year on year in 2010: from €1,544mln in 2009 to €1,967mln in 2010 (+27.4%) and is expected to rise 33.4% to €2,625mln in 2011.

Strong results, but over relatively tiny numbers. When you hear that the agriculture sector is worth €6.2 billion to the Irish economy, do keep in mind that in reality it is worth just €2.6 billion. The rest of the 'worth' is more like rich uncle buying you a dinner and sending you a subsidy cheque...

And for being the 'agriculture island' - well, our operating surplus in 2010 in agriculture stood as 12th highest in absolute terms in the EU27, same as in 2009. This is against the backdrop of Irish economy being 15th largest in EU27 in the same period. So here's the neighborhood we are in, when it comes to agriculture's contribution to our economy:

Wedged between such 'knowledge" economies with high value added as other agricultural states of Cyprus, Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary... Ireland is the only country of the advanced EU27 states that finds itself in the group of countries with agriculture's share of GDP above 1%. In fact, our share in 2010 was 1.26%. The closest to us advance EU27 member state - Finland, had the same share of 0.88%.

The fact is, you can't build a modern economy on agriculture. A healthy agricultural sector with high value added activities and high levels of specialization is something to be proud of. A generally larger agricultural sector as a share of overall economy, in contrast, is a feature of underdeveloped economies.