Economics 05/06/2010: Economics of Fiscal Stimulus

This is an unedited version of my article for June-July issue of the Village Magazine.

Weeks into a new round of ‘talks’ over the public sector reforms and Ireland’s Policy Kindergarten squad is getting more agitated by the issue of cuts in the Government expenditure. The logic of their arguments, led by the likes of Tasc, the Irish Times, and an army of Unions-employed ‘economists’, is perverse: “In order to get the economy back on track, we need to borrow more and spend on public services and wages.”

There are three basic arguments why stimulating Irish economy though increased public spending won’t work in the current conditions even in theory, let alone in practice. These are: the structural nature of the fiscal crisis we face, the size of the debt we face, and the lack of evidence that stimulus can work in a country like Ireland.

Structural deficits

Economists distinguish two types of deficits: cyclical and structural. The first type of deficits occurs when a temporary economic slowdown leads to an unforeseen decline in revenue and acceleration of certain components of spending (e.g. unemployment insurance and social welfare). By its definition, the cyclical deficit will be automatically corrected once economy returns to its long term growth path.

In contrast, structural deficits are those that arise independently of the short term changes in economic growth. They are the outcome of unsustainable increases in permanent spending and/or decline in the long term growth potential that might arise from a severe crisis.

In the case of Ireland, both of the latter factors are at play. Various estimates of the extent of structural deficits carried out by the likes of IMF, OECD, the European Commission, ESRI and independent analysts range between one half and two thirds of the 2009 General Government deficit, or 7-9.5% of GDP.

Reckless expansion of Government spending in the period of 2001-2007 is the greatest cause of these – not the collapse of our tax revenue. In the mean time, our economy’s long-term growth rate has declined from the debt-and-housing-fueled 4.5% per annum to a Belgium-like 1.8% per annum.

In 2000, General Government Structural Balance stood at roughly -0.5% of GDP. By 2008 this has fallen to almost -11% courtesy of a massive build up in permanent staff increases in the public sector, rises in welfare rates, explosion in health spending and creation of a gargantuan army of quangoes and supervisory organizations.

Forget, for a second, that majority of these expenditures represented pure waste, delivering nothing more than top jobs for friends of the ruling class, plus scores of jobs for public and quasi-public sector workers. Between 1981 and today Ireland has recorded not a single year in which Government structural balance was positive. Windfall stamps, VAT and capital gains tax receipts over 2001-2007 have masked this reality, as Goldman Sachs structured derivatives masked the reality of Greek deficits.

We are not getting any better

Over the recent months, the Government has been eager to ‘talk up’ our major selling points. Ireland, it goes, is a country with stabilized public finances and low debt to GDP ratio.

Last month, Eurostat exposed the lie behind the ‘stabilized public finances’ story. It turns out our Government has decided to sweep under the carpet billions of cash it borrowed in 2009 to recapitalize Anglo. Courtesy of this, our deficit for 2009 was revised to a whooping 14.3% of GDP – topping that of Greece.

But Irish General Government deficit this year is expected to come in between 11.7% and over 12% of GDP, depending on who is doing the forecasting – Department of Finance or ESRI. And this is before we factor in March 2010 statement by the Minister for Finance, promising over €10 billion for the banks this year. This means that, as the rest of the world is coming out of the recession, our fiscal deficit for 2010 is expected to either match or exceed the revised level achieved in 2009. Some stabilization.

Irish Government debt is expected to reach 78-82% of GDP by the end of 2010 – on par with Eurozone’s second sickest economy, Portugal. With Nama and banks recapitalizations factored in, Irish taxpayers will be in a debt hole equal to between 117% and 122% of GDP by 2011 and to 137% by 2014. At the point of the Greek debt crisis implosion last year, Greece had second highest debt to GDP ratio in the EU at 117%, after Italy with a massive 119%.

In totality, current crisis management approach by the Irish State is going to cost every Irish taxpayer in excess of €117,000 in added tax liability. Neither Iceland nor Greece come close.

Economy on steroids

Still think that we should be stimulating this economy through more borrowing?

Take a look at the private sector debts. In terms of external debt liabilities, Ireland is in the league of its own amongst the advanced economies. Our overall debts currently are in excess of the critically high liabilities of the HIPCs to which we are sending intergovernmental aid. And rising: in Q3 2009, our external debt liabilities stood at a whooping USD 2.4 trillion, up 10.8% on Q3 2007. Of these, roughly 45% accrue to the domestic economy – more than 6 times our annual national income.

Ireland’s share of the world debt is greater than that of Japan and more than double that of all BRICs combined, once IFSC companies are included. Over the next 5 years, the entire Irish economy will be paying out around €206,000 per each taxpayer in interest on this debt. Adding more debt to this pile is simply unimaginable at any stage, let alone when the cost of borrowing is high and rising.

These figures show that the main cause of the current crisis is not the lack of liquidity in the system, but an old-fashioned problem of insolvency.

This problem is directly related to the actions of the Irish state. Over the last decade, there was a nearly 90% correlation between the average increases in the Irish tax revenues plus the rate of economic growth and the expenditure growth on capital and current spending sides. In effect, courtesy of the ‘Boom is getting boomier’ Ahearn/Cowen team Ireland had two bubbles inflating next to each other – a private sector borrowing bubble and a public sector spending one. Government’s exuberant optimism, cheered on by the Social Partners – the direct beneficiaries of this ‘fiscal policy on steroids’ approach – explains why during Brian Cowen’s tenure in the Department of Finance, Irish structural deficit doubled on his predecessor’s already hefty increases.

But what went on behind the glossy Exchequer reports was the old-fashioned pyramid scheme. Some got rich. Temporarily, we had an army of politically connected developers and bankers stalking the halls of premier cars dealerships and property auction rooms.

Permanently, an entire class of public employees reaped massive dividends in terms of shares in privatized enterprises that cumulated in their pension plans. Current claims that because the values of some of these payoffs have declined over time (often due to the intransigent nature of the unions in the semi-state companies, staunchly resisting change and productivity enhancing reforms) is irrelevant here. Prior to their privatization, these companies were called 'public' assets. Creation of any, no matter small or large, private gains to their employees out of the companies' privatizations or securititization through pensions funds liabilities of their assets in favor of employees, therefore, is nothing more than an arbitrary, unions-imposed grab of the public asset.

Benchmarking, lavish pensions and jobs security – also paid out of the economy leverage (just think of the NPRF - explicitly created to by-pass the illegal, under the EU rules, taxation of economy for provisioning for future public sector pensions liabilities) – was a cherry on top of the cake. Public companies management got dramatically increased pay and a permanent indemnity against competition through a regulatory system that was all but a client of their semi-state companies.

From our hospital consultants to our lawyers, academics and other professionals – a large army of state-protected, often non-competitive internationally professional elites collected state-subsidised pay so much in excess of their real productivity that we became the subject of diplomats’ jokes.

Our state’s response to this was telling. Just as the country was borrowing its way into insolvency, our Government gave billions to aid developing nations. That was the price our leaders chose to pay to feel themselves adequate standing next to Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy at the EU summits. Incidentally, as the country today is borrowing heavily to cover its basic bills, Brian Cowen still sends hundreds of millions of our cash to aid foreign states and has recently decided to commit over €1,000 million – full year worth of the money he clawed out of the ordinary families through income levies – to the Greek bailout package.

Economics on Steroids

Still think more state-centred economy is the solution to our problem? Irish economists, primarily those affiliated with the Unions are keen on talking about the ‘positive multiplier’ effect of deficit-financed stimulus. Sadly for them, there is no conclusive evidence that borrowing at 5 percent amidst double-digit deficits and ‘investing’ in public services does any good for the economy.

Firstly, one has to disregard any evidence on fiscal stimulus efficiency coming out of the larger states, like the US, where imports component of public and private expenditure is much smaller than in Ireland. The US estimates of the fiscal stimulus multiplier also reflect a substantially lower cost of borrowing. Even if Ireland were to replicate US-estimated fiscal stimulus effects, higher cost of our borrowing will mean that the net stimulus to Irish economy will be zero on average.

Second, international evidence shows that for a small open economy, like Ireland, the total fiscal multiplier effect starts with a negative -0.05% effect on economic growth at the moment of stimulus and in the long run (over 6 years) reaches a negative -0.07-0.31%. Add the cost of financing to this and the long-term effect of deficit financed stimulus for Ireland will be around -2.3% annually.

Third, no one on the Left has a faintest idea what the new spending should be used for. Simply giving borrowed cash to pay the wage bill in the public sector would be unacceptable by any ethical standards. Any investment that is bound to make sense would have to focus on our business centre – Dublin, where infrastructure deficit is acute and potential demand is present. Alas, this will not resolve the problem of collapsed regional economies. Pumping more cash into the ‘knowledge economy’ absent actual knowledge infrastructure of entrepreneurship, private finance, skills and without a proven track record of exporting potential, is adventurist even at the times of plenty.

In short, the idea that expanded deficit financing will support any sort of real recovery in the economy is equivalent to arguing that pumping steroids into a heart attack patient can help him run a marathon.


Ireland needs severe rethinking and reforms of the grossly inefficient and ethically non-sustainable spending and management practices of our public sectors. It should start with significant rationalization of expenditure first and then progress to a more deeply rooted revision of the public sector objectives and ethos.

Ireland also needs a significant deleveraging of what is a basically insolvent economic structure. This too requires, amongst other things, a significant reduction in overall public spending. Far from ‘borrow to spend’ policies advocated by the Left, we need ‘cut to save’ policies that can, with time, yield a permanent increase in the national savings rate, productive private investment and improved returns on education and skills. Otherwise, we might as well give our college graduates a one-way ticket out of Ireland with their degrees, courtesy of Tasc and the Unions.

Ireland's Debt Mountain(s)

The latest CSO data merely confirms what we have known all along: Ireland is now by far the leading country when it comes to overall external debt held by its corporates, consumers and the Government. Our gross external debt has risen precipitously since the onset of the latest crisis from €1.537 trillion on January 1, 2008 to €1.671 trillion as of September 30, 2008. Some €21bn of this increase is accounted for by the State borrowing its way out of the need to reduce the runaway train of public spending. Roughly €25.3 bn came from the Monetary Authority.

Most worrisome were the increases of roughly €45 bn in the liabilities of the Other Sectors. This line of liabilities (up 4.13% between Q2 and Q3 2008) should have been rising at a much slower pace than the Gross External Debt (up 3.16%) if the households and firms were actually de-leveraging. Alas, this is not the case, suggesting that declines in households' incomes and corporate revenues are forcing the real side of Irish economy deeper into debt-dependency. This will have two implications on 2009 economic environment in Ireland:
(1) 2008 consumers' strike - leading to a precipitous collapse in retail sales - will continue as Irish households attempt to play catching up with de-leveraging that is well underway in the US and UK;
(2) Income tax hikes and VAT rates increases passed in the Budget 2009 will further exacerbate excessive debt burden problems, leading to slower, more painful de-leveraging of corporate and household balancesheets and prolonging the current crisis.

Economics 12/02/2010: Crisis pressures in broader debt markets

And so the Greek saga continues, with yesterday’s announcement that the EU has a worked-out rescue package for the country now turning out to be yet another wishful thinking piece of poorly prepared PR. No package details, and the markets are not impressed.

But forget Greece for a moment. The good news is that just as in Autumn 2008, the last couple of months have been the case of “bad news = good news”. The markets have finally started to turn their attention to the completely reckless ways in which majority of Governments around the world have been managing their finances, both before the crisis and during it.

The new line of fire is now directed at Turkey and Japan.

Japan, pushing for well over 200% of GDP ratio of debt is in a league of its own. And the current Government is hell-bent on raising the debt limits higher with aggressive spending targets and Napoleonic plans for shifting even more public expenditure into largely unproductive investment (for a country with already extensive public capital stock, the diminishing marginal returns on new public investment have set in some time ago). Debt ratio to working age population is now well above USD100,000 and is rising at accelerating pace. Savings rate has fallen to below 4% while the fiscal deficits are now much higher than they were back in the days when the savings rate was around 18%. Current account balance has declined from the peak of 5% in 2007 to under 1.5% today and is set to fall further. With these dynamics in mind, Japan is going to account for roughly 11% of the total global expected issuance of new bonds in 2010.

Turkey is a serious basket case, although it might not appear to be such from the simple debt levels comparisons. Like Ireland, Turkey has low debt to GDP ratio (45% as opposed to Greece with 113%, Portugal with 77%, Spain with 54%), It is in line with Ireland current 46.2% debt levels (although in Ireland’s case, a GNP base would work much better, bringing out true public debt to a much more formidable 57% of GNP). But it is not the level of debt that is worrisome. The awesome rate of debt increase, along with hidden debts that the public sector underwrites are the real concerns here.

An interesting chart from Turkey Data Monitor:
shows just how bad Turkish debt dynamics are. In the environment where it is currently yielding over 8% with an average maturity being around 2 years, the problem for Turkey is the following:

• Can a country with history of past debt problems and rising deficits really roll-over some USD125 billion worth of debt? and
• Can such a country do this in the environment where worldwide, national governments are expected to issue some USD4.5 trillion worth of bonds in 2010 - three times the normal volume of global debt issuance?

Now, think of it this way – Turkey debt is held by domestic banks (roughly 60%) and the remainder – by foreigners. This, normally, presents the point of stability. Alas, if the banks are not operating in the liquidity saturated markets for funding (and they are clearly not doing so) the Turkish Government cannot default on the debt without risking destabilizing its banking system. And if it does destabilize the banks, the Government ‘solution’ to default will imply demand for massive banks rescue package, adding further to the debt mountain. In other words, unlike with other countries that have heavier exposures to international lenders, Turkey simply must refinance the roll-over debt.

So dynamics matter. And they matter for Ireland. Which got me thinking – just how bad is our debt position going to get and what costs will this impose on the economy. Here are few charts:
Start with gross debt as percentage of GDP and GNP. Above chart shows figures for the official debt estimates from Stability Plan Update, December 2009, issued by the Department of Finance. Additional lines show the ratio of debt to GNP and also extension of debt figures to include Nama's €59 billion allocation, plus expected €12 billion in post-Nama capital injections into the banks. Finally, the last line shows the above, accounting for a lower growth rate in GNP scenario than the one forecast by the DofF for 2012-2014 period. The important issue here is that our debt to GNP (the real measure of our economy) is going to breach 100% even under DofF own rosy assumptions.

Next, consider the growth rate in our debt:
Pretty dramatic, especially when you compare the rate of growth in 2009-2012 against the tiny rates of decline predicted for 2013-2014. The rates of decline in fact will be about half the rate of interest we will be paying on this debt.

So expect no respite in terms of the cost of debt financing in sight:
The above are pretty big annual numbers - up to €14 billion going to feed the debt monster annually! Crazy stuff for an economy worth around €130 billion in terms of its GNP. Alternatively, €14 billion is roughly 30% of the total Government expenditure that this country can afford if we were to stay on structurally balanced fiscal path!

And thus, cost of debt financing as percentage of our economy is going to be excruciating - up to 9.5% of the annual economic output at the peak (under the most pessimistic scenario). Which means the total cost of the current fiscal crisis is also going to be astronomical:
By the end of 2014, thus, we are looking to have wasted between €50 billion and €80 billion in total on sustaining that which is simply unsustainable - our gargantuan public sector overspending.


Incidentally, this pretty much explains why I do not believe that marginal reforms of the public sector, such as 'productivity improvements', 'reduced spending on external consultants' and 'staff re-allocations' will be enough to address the issue. In real world we inhabit, we need a massive cut in terms of overall spending on public sector and this can only be achieved by slashing numbers employed in the public sector and cutting pensions and wage expenditure on the remaining staff.


PS 1: given chronic lack of skills, aptitude and capabilities present in many areas of the public sector, an idea of using internal expertise to reduce reliance on external consultants advice and expertise, while hoping for improved efficiency is simply absurd.


PS2: A year ago, myself and Brian Lucey wrote an article for the Irish Times about the massive debt overhang in the Irish economy. Using IMF statistics we established that Irish economy stands out as the second most indebted economy in the world in terms of ratio of debts to GDP, the most indebted economy in the world when it comes to applying our real measure of economic activity - GNP, and one of the most indebted economies in absolute terms.

In response to the article, we were told by the Irish officials that 'total debts do not matter, only public debt does'.

In the real world, total debts of economy do matter because they show structural composition of economy itself, revealing the extent to which economic growth is being financed by reckless borrowing.

This month, Hayman Advisors weighted in on our side:
The above debts cover public debt, plus 5 top banks per country, with Iceland figure showing pre-crisis conditions. Forbes magazine reproduced this chart in their cover story for February 8 edition with a tag line saying "It's the Total Debt, Stupid".

I agree.

Economics 03/05/2010: World Debt Wish 5

This is the fifth post in the series covering world debt issues. In the previous posts I provided analysis of the aggregate debt levels for 36 largest debtor nations (here) and for the Government debt (here), the banks debt (here) and the country level data (here). This post puts things into comparative perspective.

Before we begin, however, let me quote from today's Financial Times: "On my estimate, the total size of a liquidity backstop for Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and possibly Italy could add up to somewhere between €500bn ($665bn, £435bn) and €1,000bn. All those countries are facing increases in interest rates at a time when they are either in recession or just limping out of one. The private sector in some of those countries is simply not viable at those higher rates."

Notice the numbers Wolfgang Munchau quotes above, and the countries he includes in the end-game rescue package. Ireland, figures in marginally - the last in line. Yet, what you are about to witness puts a different order on the potential default scenario within the PIIGS.

First the so-called 'good news' - per our Government's repeated boasting, Ireland is a country with sound public sector debt levels. Oh, really?
Chart above shows General Government Debt as percentage of GDP. Note, I decided to play 'fair' with Brian Lenihan here - he seemingly cannot understand the GDP/GNP gap, so let us not challenge him too much in his job and use GDP as a benchmark. Per chart above, as of Q4 2009 we had a 62% ratio of GGD to GDP. This puts us into a 'sound' fifth position in the group of world's most indebted 36 nations, behind such 'sound' public finance countries as

• Greece (93%)
• Belgium (74%)
• Italy (65% - getting dangerously close to Ireland)
• France (63% - virtually indistinguishable to Ireland)

Note, this is GGD nomenclature of the IMF/BIS/World Bank framework, which is slightly different from the Stability & Growth Pact methodology deployed by the EU, but unlike the EU's methodology, this one is comparative across the world.

Nothing to brag about here, folks. Fifth. And rising faster than France's or Italy's or Belgium's...
Chart above puts us into comparison in terms of banks' debt - need any explanation here? Oh, yes, we are the most indebted nation in the world by that metric. Worse than this. Suppose we chop off the IFSC (roughly 60% of the banks & 'other' credit institutions' debt). We end up being - the 3rd most indebted banking system in the world.

Of course, in the end it will be the real economy of Ireland - including our corporates and households - who will be paying for Brian Cowen's policies (GGD) and for the banks (Gross Banks Debt), so perhaps here Ireland is doing well? There has to be hope somewhere?
Oops, not really. In terms of private (non-banks and non-Exchequer) sectors debt Ireland Inc is actually in worse shape than it is in terms of banks and the Exchequer (which of course begs a questions - what are we doing rescuing banks while the real economy sinks?). Notice that we occupied this dubious first place in the world back in the days of 2003 as well, and part of this is IFSC as well - pension funds and investment funds. But the amount of debt we piled on since then is purely spectacular.

And so now, down to the main figure - the combined external debt liability of Ireland relative to other most indebted nations:
I bet the unions who are calling for more borrowing to finance more growth (the irony of ironies is, of course, that they were so loudly opposing 'growth for growth sake' during the Tiger years) want Mister Lenihan to pull out the state cheque book...

Now let me slightly digress from Ireland and focus on the US. Per above data:

• US public sector debt is only a notch above the 36 countries average;
• US Gross bank's debt is by leagues and bound lower than the 36 countries average;
• US private sector debt is just above the average for the 36 most indebted countries, which implies that
• US total economy debt is below the average for the 36 countries.
  

Now, for all Messrs Lenihan and Cowen talk about how the US caused Irish crisis, somehow the real data shows nothing of the sorts... Instead - the real data paints a picture of Ireland deeply sick by all fiscal and financial standards back in Q4 2003. If you go back to those days, really, there were only few economists who warned about some aspects of this problem - myself, Morgan Kelly inclusive. But there was only one economist who consistently argued back then that the entire picture of the Irish economy was wrong. It was David McWilliams. It turns out - he was right!

3/2/2013: Argentina v Chile: Government & External Balances

In the previous post I looked at the real economy comparatives between Latin America's best-in-class Chile and worst-in-class Argentina.

As promised, now a quick look at the Government and external balances.

If in terms of real economy comparatives, Argentina hardly significantly underperformed Chile since the mid 2000s, in terms of straight down the line General Government Deficits the country is a veritable basket case:

Just as in the case of the real economy, Chile moved dramatically away from Argentina in terms of gross deficits in 1996-2008, outperforming Argentina over that period of time in every year. After 2010, the same picture repeats. On a 5-year average basis, in 1996-2000, average General Deficit in Argentina stood at -3.0%, rising to 6.13% in 2001-2005, declining to -1.74% in 2006-2010 and rising again to -2.83% for 2011-2015 (based on IMF forecasts). Over the same periods of time, Chile recorded average surpluses in every 5 year period: +0.37% in 1996-2000, +0.90% in 2001-2005, +3.03% in 2006-2010 and forecast +0.02% in 2011-2015.

However, much of the headline deficit underperformance by Argentina relates directly to the burden of debt servicing. In this context, Primary Deficits are much more benign to Argentina's case, as illustrated in two charts below:

Again, consider 5-year periods in average annual terms. Due to lack of comprable data for Argentina for 1996-2000, let's omit this subperiod. In 2001-2005, Argentina's primary balance was on average in a surplus of 3.60%, with surplus declining to +2.26% in 2006-2010 and turning a deficit of -0.38% in 2011-2015 forecast period. Meanwhile, Chile enjoyed lower surplus of 1.38% in 2001-2005 epriod, higher surplus of 2.92% in 2006-2010 and a surplus of +0.17% in 2011-2015 period. So while overall Chile did show stronger performance, Argentina's primary deficits were hardly a substantial issue over the period of 2001-present.

Of course, Argentina's debt mountain is legendary... or should it be 'was legendary'?

Argentina's Government Debt/GDP ratio has peaked at 165% in the crisis year of 2002. So much is true. However, overall, the ramp up of debt (dynamics of debt accumulation) and the reduction in debt ratio to economy since the peak have been more than telling. In 1996-2000 Argentina's Government debt/GDP ratio averaged 40.6% - hardly a significant drag on either growth or public finances. In 2001-2005 the same stood at 114.44% of GDP - clearly well in excess of the known bounds for debt sustainability. With debt restructuring and return of economic growth, Argentina's Government debt/GDP ratio fell to 61.99% average for 2006-2010 period and is now on track to hit 43.42% average for 2011-2015. In other words, the country is expected to basically return to pre-crisis levels of Government debt burden by the end of 2015, some 13 years after the crisis.

Over the same period of time, Chile showed exemplary debt performance. Government debt/GDP ratio stood at 13.29% on average during 1996-2000 period, falling to 11.91% in 2001-2005 period and to 5.65% in 2006-2010. Since the devastating earthquake in 2010, debt/GDP ratio notched up to 12.09% for 2011-2015 period.

On external account side, Chile has been a recipient of the strong capital inflows from abroad over recent decades, the position that allowed the country to run significant deficits on trade side. Despite this, overall exports in both countries have been growing roughly-speaking in tandem, with slightly higher volatility for Argentina:

Thus, cumulated current account deficits in the case of Chile run at -104.2% of GDP over 1980-2017 period, against a cumulated deficit of just 24.54% for Argentina. Since 1990 through 2017, Argentina's current account deficits on a cumulated basis will amount to 4.43% of GDP against Chile's 36.62%. And over the period 2000-2017, the IMF is projecting cumulated current account deficit of 9.91% for Chile and a surplus of 20.62% for Argentina.

On the net, excluding fiscal performance and inflation, and keeping in mind that some of the official stats from Argentina are rather dodgy, there is little evidence to suggest that Argentine economy is a 'veritable basket case'. Instead, it is rather an economy struggling with Government debt overhang and fiscal situation whereby benign primary deficits are simply overwhelmed by debt servicing costs. In that sense, Argentina is closer to Italy (correcting for differences in growth rates) than to the 1990s crisis-stricken HIPCs.

16/12/16: The Root of the 2007-2010 Crises is Back, with a Vengeance

There are several fundamental problem in the global economy, legacies of the past 20 years - from the mid 1990s on - that continue to drive the trend toward secular stagnations (see explainer here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2015/07/7615-secular-stagnation-double-threat.html).

One key structural problem is that of excessive reliance on credit (or debt) to drive growth. We have seen the devastating effects of the rapidly rising unsustainable levels of the real economic debt (debt that combines government obligations, non-financial corporate debt and household debt) in the case of 2008 crises.

And we were supposed to have learned the lesson. Supposed to have, because the entire conversation about structural reforms in banking and capital markets worldwide was framed in the context of deleveraging (reduction of debt levels). This has been the leitmotif of structural policies reforms in Europe, the U.S., in Australia and in China, and elsewhere, including at the level of the EU and the IMF. Supposed to have, because we did not that lesson. Instead of deleveraging, we got re-leveraging of economies - companies, households and governments.

Problem Case Study: U.S. Corporates

Take the U.S. corporate bonds market (that excludes direct loans through private lenders and intermediated loans through banks) - an USD8 trillion-sized elephant. Based on the latest research of the U.S. Treasury Department, non-banking institutions - plain vanilla investment funds, pension funds, mom-and-pop insurance companies, etc are now holding a full 1/4 of U.S. corporates bonds. According to the U.S. Treasury, these expanding holdings of / risk exposures to corporate debt are now "a top threat to stability" of the U.S. financial system. And the warning comes at the time when U.S. corporate debt is at an all-time high as a share of GDP, based on the figures from the Office of Financial Research.

And it gets worse. Since 2007, corporate debt pile in the U.S. rose some 75 percent to USD8.4 trillion, based on data from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association - which is more than USD8 trillion estimated by the Treasury. These are long-term debt instruments. Short term debt obligations - money market instruments - add another USD 2.9 trillion and factoring in the rise of the value of the dollar since the Fed meeting this week, closer to USD3 trillion. So the total U.S. corporate debt pile currently stands at around USD 11.3 trillion to USD 11.4 trillion.

Take two:

1. Debt, after the epic deleveraging of the 2008 crisis, is now at an all-time high; and
2. Debt held by systemic retail investment institutions (insurance companies, pensions funds, retail investment funds) is at all time high.

And the risks in this market are rising. Since the election of Donald Trump, global debt markets lost some USD2.3 trillion worth of value. This reaction was driven by the expectation that his economic policies, especially his promise of a large scale infrastructure investment stimulus, will trigger inflationary pressures in the U.S. economy that is already running at full growth capacity (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/12/151216-us-economic-policies-in-era-of.html). Further monetary policy tightening in the U.S. - as signalled by the Fed this week (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/12/151216-long-term-fed-path-may-force-ecb.html) will take these valuations down even further.

Some estimates (see https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-16/republican-tax-reform-seen-shrinking-u-s-corporate-bond-market) suggest that the Republican party corporate tax reforms (that might remove interest rate tax deductibility for companies) can trigger a 30 percent drop in investment grade bonds valuations in the U.S. - bonds amounting to just under USD 4.9 trillion. The impact would be even more pronounced on other bonds values. Even making the estimate less dramatic and expecting a 25 percent drop across the entire debt market would wipe out some USD 2.85 trillion off the balancesheets of the bonds-holding investors.

As yields rise, and bond prices drop, the aforementioned systemic retail investment institutions will be nursing massive losses on their investment books. If the rush to sell their bond holdings, they will crash the entire market, triggering potentially a worse financial meltdown than the one witnessed in 2008. If they sit on their holdings, they will be pressed to raise capital and their redemptions will be stressed. It's either a rock or a hard place.


Problem Extrapolation: the World

The glut of U.S. corporate debt, however, is just the tip of an iceberg.

As noted in this IMF paper, published on December 15th, corporate leverage (debt) has been on a steady march upward in the emerging markets (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16243.pdf).

And in its Fiscal Monitor for October 2016, the Fund notes that "At 225 percent of world GDP, the global debt of the nonfinancial sector—comprising the general government, households, and nonfinancial firms—is currently at an all-time high. Two-thirds, amounting to about $100 trillion, consists of liabilities of the private sector which, as documented in an extensive literature, can carry great risks when they reach excessive levels." (see http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2016/02/pdf/fm1602.pdf)

Yes, global real economic debt now stands at around USD152 trillion or 225 percent of world GDP.

Excluding China and the U.S. global debt levels as percentage of GDP are close to 2009 all time peak. Much of the post-Crisis re-leveraging took place on Government's balancehseets, as illustrated below, but the most ominous side of the debt growth equation is that private sector world-wide did not sustain any deleveraging between 2008 and 2015. In fact, Advanced Economies Government debt take up fully replaced private sector debt growth rates contraction. Worse happened in the Emerging Markets:

So all the fabled deleveraging in the economies in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis has been banks-balancesheets deleveraging - Western banks dumping liabilities to be picked up by someone else (vulture funds, investors, other banks, the aforementioned systemic retail investment institutions, etc).

And as IMF analysis shows, only 12 advanced economies have posted declines in total non-financial private debt (real economic debt) as a share of GDP over 2008-2015 period.  Alas, in the majority of these, gains in private deleveraging have been more than fully offset by deterioration in government debt:

Crucially, especially for those still believing the austerity-by-cuts narrative presented in popular media, fiscal uplift in debt levels in the Advanced Economies did not take place due to banks-rescues alone. Primary fiscal deficits did most of the debt lifting:

In simple terms, across the advanced economies, there was no spending austerity. There was tax austerity. And on the effectiveness of the latter compared to the former you can read this note: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/12/10122016-austerity-three-wrongs-meet.html. Spoiler alert: tax-based austerity is a worse disaster than spending-based austerity.

In summary, thus, years of monetarist activism spurring a massive rise in corporate debt, coupled with the utter inability of the states to cut back on public spending and the depth of the Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recession have combined to propel global debt levels past the pre-crisis peak to a new historical high.

The core root of the 2007-2010 crises is back. With a vengeance.

25/5/16: IMF's Epic Flip Flopping on Greece

IMF published the full Transcript of a Conference Call on Greece from Wednesday, May 25, 2016 (see: http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2016/tr052516.htm). And it is simply bizarre.

Let me quote here from the transcript (quotes in black italics) against quotes from the Eurogroup statement last night (available here: Eurogroup statement link) marked with blue text in italics. Emphasis in bold is mine

“On debt, I certainly think that we have made progress, Europe is making progress. Debt relief is firmly on the agenda now. Our European partners and all the other stakeholders all now recognize that Greece debt is unsustainable, is highly unsustainable, they accept that debt relief is needed.”

Do they? Let’s take a look at the Eurogroup official statement:

Is debt relief firmly on the agenda and does Eurogroup 'accept that debt relief is needed'? "The Eurogroup agrees to assess debt sustainability" Note: the Eurogroup did not agree to deliver debt relief, but simply to assess it. Which might put debt relief on the agenda, but it is hardly a meaningful commitment, as similar promises were made before, not only for Greece, but also for other peripheral states.

Does Eurogroup "recognize that Greece debt is unsustainable, is highly unsustainable"? No. There is no mentioning of words 'unsustainable' or 'highly unsustainable' in the Eurogroup document. None. Nada. Instead, here is what the Eurogroup says about the extent of Greek debt sustainability: "The Eurogroup recognises that over the exceptionally long time horizon of assessing debt sustainability there can be no forecasts, only assumptions, given the sizable degree of uncertainty over macroeconomic developments." Does this sound to you like the Eurogroup recognized 'highly unsustainable' nature of Greek debt? Not to me...

Furthermore, relating to debt relief measures, the Eurogroup notes: “For the medium term, the Eurogroup expects to implement a possible second set of measures following the successful implementation of the ESM programme. These measures will be implemented if an update of the debt sustainability analysis produced by the institutions at the end of the programme shows they are needed to meet the agreed GFN benchmark, subject to a positive assessment from the institutions and the Eurogroup on programme implementation.” Again, there is no admission by the Eurogroup of unsustainable nature of Greek debt, and in fact there is a statement that only 'if' debt is deemed to be unsustainable at the medium-term future, then debt relief measures can be contemplated as possible. This neither amounts to (1) statement that does not agree with the IMF assertion that the Eurogroup realizes unsustainable nature of Greek debt burden; and (2) statement that does not agree with the IMF assertion that the Eurogroup put debt relief 'firmly on the table'.

More per IMF: Eurogroup “…accept the methodology that should be used to calibrate the necessary debt relief. They accept the objectives in terms of the gross financing need in the near term and in the long run. They even accept the time periods, a very long time period, over which this debt has to be met through 2060. And I think they are also beginning to accept more realism in the assumption.”

Again, do they? Let’s go back to the Eurogroup statement: “The Eurogroup recognises that over the exceptionally long time horizon of assessing debt sustainability there can be no forecasts, only assumptions, given the sizable degree of uncertainty over macroeconomic developments.” Have the Eurogroup accepted IMF’s assumptions? No. It simply said that things might change and if they do, well, then we’ll get back to you.

Things get worse from there on.

IMF: “We have not changed our view on how the outlook for debt is looking. We have not gone back. We want to assure you that we will not want big primary surpluses.” This statement, of course, refers to the IMF stating (see here) that Greek primary surpluses of 3.5% assumed under the DSA for Bailout 3.0 were unrealistic. And yet, quoting the Eurogroup document: the new agreement “provides further reassurances that Greece will meet the primary surplus targets of the ESM programme (3.5% of GDP in the medium-term), without prejudice to the obligations of Greece under the SGP and the Fiscal Compact.”  So, IMF says it did not surrender on 3.5% primary surplus for Greece being unrealistic, yet Eurogroup says 3.5% target is here to stay. Who’s spinning what?

IMF: “...I cannot see us facing this on a primary surplus that is above 1.5 [ percent of GDP]. I know it's just not credible in our view. And you will see that there is nothing in the European statement anymore that says 3.5 should be used for the DSA. So there, too, Europe is moving.” As I just quoted from the eurogroup statement clearly saying 3.5% surplus is staying.

IMF is again tangled up in long tales of courage played against short strides to surrender. PR balancing, face-savings, twisting, turning, obscuring… you name it, the IMF got it going here.

Economics 29/04/2010: Debt crisis is spreading

Another credit downgrade from S&P, this time for Spain, from AA+ to AA with negative outlook, based on the outlook for years of private sector deleveraging and low growth. Spain, as you can see, is severely in red in terms of debt, ranking 14th in the world. Spain's external liabilities stand at 186.1% or $2.55 trillion (as of 2009 Q3) against estimated 2009 GDP of $1.37 trillion.

The country is actually worse off in terms of debt than Greece which has ranks 16th at debt at 170.5% of GDP or $581.68 billion, with 2009 GDP of $341 billion.

Of course, Ireland is world's number 1 debtor nation with external debt of 1,312% of GDP (IFSC-inclusive) of $2.32 trillion in Q3 2009 against the GDP of $176.9 billion. Of course, part of this debt is IFSC, but then, again, we really do not have a claim on our GDP either, with GNP being a more real measure of our income. So on the net, our debts - the actual Irish economy's debts - are somewhere in the neighborhood of 740%. This is still leagues above the UK - the second most indebted nation in the world - which has the debt to GDP ratio of 'only' 426%!

The S&P also provided estimate for expected recovery rate on Greek bonds, which the agency put at 30-50%. In other words, S&P expects investors in Greek bonds to be paid no more than 30-50 cents on the euro. Yesterday on twitter I suggested that "Greek debt should be renegotiated @ 50cents on the euro - severe default. Portugal's @ 80 cents - mild default, Irish @ 70-75 cents". Looks like someone (S&P) agrees. Before it is too late, before German and other European taxpayers have poured hundreds of billions of euro into the PIIGS black hole of delinquent public finances, Europe should cut losses and force Greece and Portugal to renegotiate their liabilities. If Ireland and Spain were to elect to follow, so be it. Of course, in Irish case, the debt re-negotiations should cover private debts, not public debt.

Just how many billions of euros are EU taxpayers in for for the folly of admitting Greece - a country that spent 90 years of the last 180 (since 1829) in defaults on its debts - into the common currency area? Well, Greek 2-year bonds were traded at yields of 26% yesterday at one point in time. This is pricing that's in excess of pretty much every developing country, save for basket cases which practically cannot issue bonds at all.

IMF's Dominique Strauss Kahn has told Bundestag yesterday that Greek package will be

• €100-120bn for three years;
• Which means German taxpayers are on the hook for €67 billion over 3 years, not €25 billion that Germany ‘s economics minister was signing for in the original deal;
• Ireland's contribution will also have to rise to €4 billion over 3 years, not €500 million we originally were told we will have to contribute;
• Greece will not be forced to restructure or reschedule debt
• The loans to Greece will be subordinated to existent bondholders, which means that if in the end Greece does pay 30-50 cents on the euro to the latter, European taxpayers will be lucky to get 10 cents on the euro.

The whole deal is now looking like a massive subsidy for Greece and entails absolutely no protection to European taxpayers.

But internationally, EU news are getting darker and darker by the minute. Last night Bloomberg reported that EU countries are in for estimated €600 billion bill for the fiscal crises that have spread across the block. That's the cost, in the end, of all the tacky policy follies that Brussels endorsed and pushed through over the last 10 years -

• from the Lisbon Agenda, which was supposed to deliver EU to the position of economic superiority over the US by 2010,
  
• to the Social Economy, which was supposed to deliver... well, who knows what...
  
• to the Knowledge Economy, which was aiming to turn us all into brains in a Petri Dish
• to the absolutely outlandish HIPCI and HIPCII agendas wholeheartedly embraced by the EU, which were supposed to deliver debt relief to the world's real basket cases (before Greece and other PIIGS took the spotlight away from them), and the rest of the international white elephants.

The problem, of course, is that €600 billion price tag for fiscal excesses has generated preciously little in returns (despite what folks at Tasc keep telling us about the fiscal stimulus) which means we will have to pay for it out of our long term wealth. The same wealth that has been demolished by the recession and the financial markets collapse!

3/8/15: IMF on Russian Economy: Debt Sustainability

In the previous post, I covered IMF latest analysis of Russian GDP growth. Here, another key theme from the IMF Article IV report on Russia: fiscal policy sustainability.

In its latest assessment of the Russian economy, IMF has reduced its forecast for General Government deficit for 2015, from -3.69% of GDP back in April 2015 to -3.3% of GDP in the latest report. However, in line with new Budgetary framework, the IMF revised its forecasts for 2016-2020 deficits to show poorer fiscal performance:

In line with worsening deficits from 2016 on, IMF is also projecting higher government debt (gross debt, inclusive of state guarantees):

Still, the IMF appears to be quite happy with the overall debt and fiscal sustainability over the short run and is taking a view that over the next 2-3 years, fiscal policy must provide some upside supports to investment.

One of the reasons for this is that IMF sees continued strong buffers on fiscal reserves side into 2020, with Gross international reserves of USD362.4 billion and 374.8 billion in 2015-2016 amounting to 13.6 months of imports and providing cover for 496% and 281% of short term debt, respectively.

Furthermore, IMF expects debt levels to remain benign, both in terms of Government debt and Private sector debt as the chart above shows.

Note: I will cover Private Sector Debt developments in a separate post, so stay tuned.

Overall, 

1) External debt situation remains positive and is improving in the sector with weaker performance (corporate sector):

Note: above figures do not net out debt written to Russian banks and corporates by their parent and subsidiary entities located outside Russia, as well as direct investment / equity -linked debt.

2) "...no sector shows maturity risk with short-term assets exceeding short-term debt in aggregate"

3) Fiscal stance appears to be expansionary, but moderate, with deficits below 4% of GDP forecast for the worst performance year of 2016.

4) "Exchange rate and liquidity risks are mitigated by the CBR's large reserve level"

Stay tuned for more analysis, including debt positions across various sectors.

21/7/15: Eastern Europe's post-2004 Convergence with EU: Financialisation

In the previous post, I covered the EU's latest report on real economic convergence in Central & Eastern European (CEE10) Accession states. As promised, here is a look at the last remaining core driver of this 'fabled' convergence: the financial services sector (which drove the largest contribution to growth in pre-crisis period 2004-2008 and remained significant since).

In summary: debt is the currency of CEE10 convergence.

Let's start with Public Debt.

As the above shows, CEE10 debt rose during the crisis despite GDP uptick. Rate of growth in debt was slower in CEE10 than in the original euro area states (EA12), which was consistent with stronger CEE10 performance in terms of fiscal balances and lower incidence / impact of banking crises.

Scary bit: "The negative impact of the 2008/09 global financial crisis as well as the following euro-area sovereign debt crisis on financial conditions in the CEE10 revealed that, despite relatively lower general government debt levels (compared to the EA12 average), some CEE10 countries might still encounter problems to (re-)finance their public sector borrowing needs during periods of heightened financial market tensions as their domestic bond markets are in general smaller and less liquid".

And that is despite a major decline in long-term interest rates experienced across the region:

In addition, Gross External Debt has been rising in all CEE10 economies between 2004 and 2014, peaking in 2009:

Which brings us to private sector financialisation. Per EU: "CEE10 countries entered the EU with relatively underdeveloped financial sectors, at least in terms of their relative size compared to the EA12. This was the case for both market-based and banking-sector-intermediated sources of funding. In 2004, the outstanding stocks of quoted shares and debt securities amounted on average to just about 20% and 30% of CEE10 GDP, compared to around 50% and 120% of GDP in the EA12. Similarly, bank lending to non-financial sectors accounted for just some 35% of CEE10 GDP whereas it reached almost 100% of GDP in the EA12."

It is worth, thus, noting that equity and direct debt financialisation relative to bank debt financialisation, at the start of 'convergence' was healthier in the CEE10 than in the euro area EA12.

Predictably, this changed. "As the government sector accounted for the majority of debt security issuance in the CEE10, bank credit represented the main external funding source for the non-financial private sector."

"The CEE10 banking sectors have generally been characterised by a relatively high share of
foreign ownership as well as high levels of concentration. The share of foreign-owned banks and the market share of the five largest banks (CR5) in CEE10 countries remained relatively stable over the last 10 years, on average exceeding 60%. There was however some cross-country divergence as Slovenia stood out with a relatively low share of foreign-owned banks, which only increased to above 30% in 2013. At the same time, the Estonian and Lithuanian banking sectors exhibited the highest levels of concentration, with their respective CR5 averaging 94% and 82% over 2004-14. On the other hand, the role played by foreign-owned banks is rather limited in most EA12 countries while their banking sectors are in general also somewhat less concentrated, with their CR5 averaging around 55% over the last 10 years."

Which, basically, means that the lending boom pre-crisis is accounted for, substantially, by the carry trades via foreign banks: the EA12 banks had another property & construction boom of their own in CEE10 as they did in the likes of Ireland and Spain.

"The 2008/09 global financial crisis …proved to be a structural break in the overall evolution of bank lending to the non-financial private sector in the CEE10. As the pace of credit growth in the pre-crisis period was clearly excessive and unsustainable, a post-crisis correction was natural and unavoidable. However, credit to the NFPS increased by "only" some 13% between May 2009 and May 2014, with bank lending to the nonfinancial corporate sector basically stagnating while lending to the household sector expanded by
about 25%."

Shares of Non-Performing Loans rose quite dramatically, exceeding the already significant rate of growth in these in EA12 across 6 out of 10 CEE10 states.

The following chart shows two periods of financialisation: period prior to crisis, when financial activity vastly exceeded real economic performance dynamics; and post-crisis period where financial activity is acting as a small drag on real economic performance. This is try for both the CEE10 and EA12 economies, but is more pronounced for the former than for the latter:

In summary, therefore, a large share of 'real convergence' in the CEE10 economies over 2004-2014 period can be explained by increased financialisation of their economies, especially via bank lending channel. As the result, much of pre-crisis convergence is directly linked to unsustainable boom cycle in investment (including construction) funded by a combination of bank debt (carry trades from Euro area and Swiss Franc) plus EU subsidies. These sources of growth are currently suppressed by long-term issues, such as high NPLs and structural rebalancing in the banking sector.

The tale of 'convergence' is of little substance and a hell of a lot of froth… 

10/4/19: Russian Foreign Exchange Reserves and External Debt

As recently posted by me on Twitter, here are three charts showing the evolution of Russian foreign reserves and external debt:

Remember the incessant meme in the Western media about Russia eminently in danger of running out of sovereign wealth funds back at the start of the Western sanctions in late 2014? Well, the chart above puts that to rest. It turns out, Russia did not run out of the reserves, and instead quite prudentially used funds available to carefully support some economic adjustments (especially in agriculture and food sector), while simultaneously balancing out its fiscal deficits.

Do note that the reserves above exclude over USD 91 billion worth of Gold that Russia holds and continues to buy at rising clips.

The result of the prudentially balanced management of the reserves and the economy was deleveraging out of debt (a lot of this was done via restructuring of intracompany loans and affiliated enterprises refinancing), with a reduction in the external debt (chart below), without use of sovereign funds:

As of current, Russian foreign exchange reserves ex-gold are more than sufficient to cover the entirety of the country public and private sectors external debts.

If the above chart is not dramatic enough, here is a contrasting experience over the same years for the U.S. economy:

Nothing that CNN and the rest of the Western media pack ever managed to capture.