29/8/2014: Tea-leafing at ECB: Someone Takes Them Seriously...

This chart, courtesy of Credit Swiss, via @FGoria shows y/y Euro area HICP inflation against ECB projections for the same:

This has to put sorcery and fortunetelling to shame...

29/8/2014: Eurocoin Signals Further Slowdown in Growth in August

August the €-coin - a lead growth indicator for euro area GDP - fell to 0.19 from 0.27 in July, continuing the trend that began last spring.

Last month Eurocoin coverage is here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/08/1482014-yugo-area-economy.html

Per CEPR and Banca d'Italia release, "The decline of the indicator reflects the weakening of economic activity in the second quarter and the recent worsening of consumer and business confidence, although the flattening of the interest rate curve made a slightly positive contribution."

This comes as further bad news for the euro area that has been posting some pretty awful macro data for some months now.

Eurocoin latest decline is marks the fourth consecutive month of no growth in the indicator. The stock market performance component of the indicator is holding it above the zero line, but August reading is no longer statistically distinguishable from zero growth. Once stock markets effects fizzle out, there will be little left to support indicator.

In Q1 2014, the eurocoin indicator averaged 0.35 against actual GDP growth coming at 0.2%, in Q2 2014, the indicator averaged 0.34 and actual growth came in at 0.0%. So far in Q3 2014 we have two months-average of 0.23, suggesting that factoring out stock and bonds markets / interest rates performance from the indicator we have negative growth closer to -0.05-0.1%.

Bond markets are currently out of touch with reality. Take Italian auction this week. EUR2.5 billion of 2019 BTPs sold at a yield of 1.1% - down from 1.2% in July 30 auction, EUR4 billion worth of 2024 BTPs sold at 2.39%. This has nothing to do with the country fundamentals that are all flashing red. Italian unemployment is now up 0.3% m/m to 12.6% in July with youth unemployment down 0.8% on June at a massive 42.9%. Retail sales fell 0.1% in June, compared to May, for non-food items and Q2 average was down 0.2% on Q1 average. Business confidence is tanking, having fallen from 90.8 in July to 88.2 in August. Inflation is (flash estimate for August) at -0.2% m/m and y/y, worse than -0.1% consensus expectations. And so on...

Inflationary signals are also weak: August data we have so far shows German inflation at 0.8%, Spanish at -0.5%, Belgian at 0% and Slovenian at 0%. Update: Euro area flash estimate for inflation is now down to 0.3% from 0.4% in August weighted down by energy costs and food.

Some charts to illustrate the Eurocoin performance:

You can see the weakening growth trend in the above, incorporating the latest growth forecast for Q3 2014. This puts even more pressure on the eCB which has already used up all conventional (rates policy) tools without much of a positive effect on growth:

And to remind you all - euro area growth record is abysmal to begin with, even with 'good years' factored in:

28/8/2014: Draghi at Jackson Hole: Not 'too little' but may be 'too late'...

Earlier this week I gave a comment for the Portugal's Expresss magazine article on ECB policy: http://expresso.sapo.pt/mario-draghi-descola-da-austeridade-demasiado-tarde=f887024

Here is the full comment I provided:

Q: Can we talk of a “change” in the mood regarding austerity policies after the Draghi’s Jackson Hole speech – too little is worse than too much?

A: Mario Draghi's speech at Jackson Hole was significant for a number of reasons.

Firstly, it is an important signal of the ongoing gradual re-orientation of the ECB attention away from technical inflation targeting toward more detailed consideration of the inflation-leading fundamentals. Technical targeting is still there, but the focus is moving toward the real economy. This is a signal that reinforces, tacitly, previous policy bases, especially the concept behind the TLTROs as opposed to traditional LTROs, as well as the structured asset purchases programme currently in design.

Secondly, the speech clearly signalled the ECB's return to direct opposition to the EU-led structural reforms policies. Specifically, Darghi's focus on unemployment signals growing frustration within the ECB that structural reforms are not working due to their poor implementation, unambitious design and for cyclical reasons. While the media opted to focus on the latter point, dealing with the issues of cyclical timing, and thus with 'austerity' policies, in my view, longer term perspective inherent in Mr Draghi's emphasis on unemployment warrants the view that the ECB is once again moving to pressure Euro area leaders to stay the course of reforms over the long run, even if temporarily opening the door to easing the pressures of reforms in the immediate future.

The above two points are very clear from Mr. Draghi's discussion of structural vs cyclical economic impacts of the Great Recession.

Thirdly, it is also clear that Mr. Draghi is positioning ECB closer and closer to deploying an outright large scale quantitative easing (QE). However, he is painfully aware of the fact that traditional QE will risk pushing Euro area sovereigns further away from the necessity to enact painful reforms and that political cycle is starting to reinforce misdirected economic incentives. Furthermore, he is aware that current yields on Government bonds are not only benign, but outright exuberantly optimistic. Thus, the issue, in Mr. Draghi's view, is not how much QE is needed, but rather of what type - a choice being between the traditional QE (sovereign channel), LTROs-based QE (banking channel), asset buying and TLTRO (private supply side channel) or deleveraging supports (private demand side channel).

The problem with ECB's current stance is exactly that its policy innovations so far ignored the last channel which represents most direct route to stimulating demand and investment, and are yet to specify the penultimate channel which represents direct route to a supply side stimulus.

On the balance, Mr. Draghi's speech was far from being 'too little', although it still might be 'too late'. He touched the most important issue bridging supply and demand sides of the economy - employment - but as he notes, structural dimension of unemployment in Europe makes it very hard for the ECB to enact a traditional set of policy tools suitable more for reducing cyclical unemployment.

28/8/2014: The State of Russian Economy

I published a lengthy note summarising my view of the state of Russian economy on the LongRun Economics Blog: http://trueeconomicslr.blogspot.ie/2014/08/2782014-russian-economy-outlook.html

The post looks at:

• Russian GDP growth
• State of Russian foreign reserves
• Central Bank policy interventions
• Capital outflows
• Funding situation for Russian banks and corporates
• Russia's external balance
• Federal Government finances
• Problems with imports substitution 

The summary is:

Russian economy is showing signs of stress, both in structural terms and in terms of the fallout from the Ukraine crisis.

In structural terms, reforms of 2004-2007 period now appear to be firmly shelved and are unlikely to be revived until the sanctions are lifted and some sort of trade and investment normalization takes place. Structural weaknesses will, therefore, remain in place.

In dealing with the crisis fallout, even if Russia were to switch to self-sufficiency in food production and tech supplies for defense sector and oil & gas sector, as well as re-gear its corporate borrowings toward Asia-Pacific markets, the reduced efficiencies due to curtailed trade and specialisation are likely to weigh on the economy. There is absolutely no gain to be had from switching the economy toward an autarky.

Politics aside, it is imperative from economic point of view that Russia starts to make active steps to disentangle itself from Ukrainian crisis. Rebuilding trade and investment relations with the West and Ukraine – both very important objectives for the medium term for Russia – will take a long, long time. It’s best to hit the road sooner than later.

Please note: this is not a note designed to deal with geopolitical crisis unfolding in Ukraine or Russia's role in the crisis. Here, I deal with economics.

27/8/2014: Irish Property Markets: Some Foam Under the Cork...

Time to worry is… about now… or rather in a couple of months...

Irish residential properties price index for July was released by CSO. The data is showing continued established trends in prices recovery with further amplification in the worrying trends of double-digit y/y increases in Dublin property prices. While I generally prefer to provide more detailed analysis on a quarterly data, which will be available at the end of October, the current rates of increases in prices are now worrying and deserve at least a brief comment.

Overall, National Residential Prices Index rose to 75.3 in July 2014, which is up 13.4% y/y. July marks third consecutive month of double-digit y/y increases in prices. And the rate of increases is accelerating for the fourth consecutive month. This is worrying. The level of index remains low - 42.3% off its pre-crisis peak and only 17.47% up on crisis trough. But cumulated 24 months gain is now 16.0% (an annualised rate of increases at 7.71%). Thus, as I noted before, the main concern is not the level of prices, yet, but the the rate at which prices are moving up.

Furthermore, the rate of price increases in the Apartments segment of the market is clearly outstripping price increases for houses in all months since June 2013, with exception of February 2014. This too is worrying as this suggests investment motives buying acting strongly to push prices up for rental properties. The result will likely be misallocation of investment and rising rents.

In Dublin, the growth rates are even of greater concern.

Once again, levels are not a problem: Dublin residential properties index currently sits at 76.6 which is 43.5% lower than pre-crisis peak and 33.68% higher than crisis period trough. Dublin fell hardest and fastest of all markets in Ireland during the crisis, so it is bouncing back now faster too. So much is fine. But the rates of increase in prices y/y are now running at double digits for 12 consecutive months in a row, with last three months the rates of prices increases in Dublin at above 21 percent. sooner or later it will be time to call this a 'feeding frenzy' and if the credit supply to the sector were to improve, all stops will be pulled out of the buyers. Psychology here is not pretty.

So is it 'finally' time to call this a bubble? Not yet. I will make my next call on this on foot of September data (due in October), but in general, the levels of prices are still benign compared to pre-crisis peaks, pre-bubble trends and the 'natural rate' of price increases that can be expected to prevail from the 1990s on. But I am beginning to worry that a combination of:

1. Tight supply of suitable properties
2. Rising rents and lack of retail investor professionalism in structuring functional investment portoflios
3. Psychology of the buyers, reinforced by the media and real estate agents commentary, 
4. Expectations of further tax easing in the Budget 2015, especially targeted to property markets, and
5. Continued accumulation of cash in certain sub-sectors of economy

are all adding up to a rising pressure on the investors and buyers to go into the market to secure 'any' deal at 'any' valuation as long as it is remotely affordable.

This is not a 'champagne cork' moment, yet, but we have lots of foam in this market, with little to slow down the cork for the moment...

27/8/2014: Irish Migration Trends by Nationality: 2014

In the previous post I covered aggregate migration and population data for Ireland for 2014 (data coverage is 12 months through April 2014). The post is available here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2014/08/2782014-migration-population-change-in.html?spref=tw

Now, as promised earlier, lets take a look at the decomposition of the migration data.

First, net migration by nationality:

• Total emigration from Ireland in 12 months through April 2014 stood at 81,900, which is down from 89,000 in the same period 2013 (a decline of 7,100). This marks the first year of decrease in emigration since 2011.
• 40,700 Irish nationals emigrated from Ireland in 12 months through April 2014, down 10,200 on the same period of 2013 and marking the first slowdown in outflows since 2008. Latest rate of emigration for Irish nationals is the lowest reading since 2010.
• Over the 12 months though April 2014, 2,700 UK nationals emigrated from Ireland - which represents a decline in emigration rate for this group of residents of 1,200 y/y. However, this decline was more than off-set by the rise in emigration of 'Rest of EU-15' residents which rose 4,100 y/y to 14,000 in the 12 months through April 2014. 
• The rate of emigration from Ireland for EU12 Accession states nationals slowed down from 14,000 in 12 months through April 2013 to 10,100 in 12 months through April 2014.
• For non-EU nationals, the rate of emigration has accelerated to 14,400 in the 12 months through April 2014 from 10,300 in the same period of 2013.

Thus, for the fifth year in a row, Irish nationals represented the largest group of emigrants from Ireland by total numbers. However, if in 2011-2013 Irish nationals represented more than 50% of the total emigration numbers, in 2014 this fell to 49.7%.

Net emigration figures, however, were less encouraging for the Irish nationals.

• Total net emigration from Ireland stood at 21,400 in 12 months through April 2014, down from 33,100 in April 2013.
• Irish nationals' net emigration rate was running at 29,200 in the 12 months through April 2014, down from 35,200 in 2013, but still above the rate recorded for any other year since 2006.
• In contrast with the trend for the Irish nationals, UK nationals posted another year of rising net immigration into Ireland: 2,200 more UK nationals now reside in the country compared 1,000 more in 2013. Rest of EU-15 group posted an increase in the rate of net emigration from Ireland in 2014 (-5,300) compared to 2013 (-2,500). This made 2014 the worst year for net emigration of this group out of Ireland on record.
• Net emigration of the EU12 Accession states nationals fell to its lowest crisis-period level of 200 in 2014, down from 3,200 in 2013.
• Non-EU nationals recorded net immigration rate of 11,200 in 2014 which represents the highest rate on record (since 2006).

Chart below shows cumulated changes in migration over the period of 2008-2014:

27/8/2014: Migration & Population Change in Ireland: 2014 data

Population and migration estimates for the 12 months period through April 2014 have been finally released by the CSO with a lag of some 4 months. The figures show some marginal improvement in the underlying trends compared to the disastrous 2013, but overall the situation remains bleak.

Let's start with top level figures first and deal with compositional details in the subsequent post.

Births numbers have fallen to the levels last seen in 2007, from 70,500 in 2013 to 67,700 in 2014. Improving labour market and deteriorating personal finances are more likely behind the trend: the former means lower incentives to stay out of labour market and lower incentives to take maternity leave protection, while the latter means increased pressure to generate second income in the family, which is, of course, automatically associated with having to pay extortionate childcare costs. Whatever the drivers are, this is the births rate peaked in 2010 and has been declining since, neatly tracing out labour markets developments. 2014 marks the first year since 2007 that the rate is below 70,000.

Deaths are running at the rate proximate to 2013 and not far off from 2012. This means that the Natural Increase in population has slowed down to 37,900 in 2014 from 40,800 in 2013 and this marks the lowest natural rate of increase since 2006 and the first sub-40,000 rate of increase since 2007.

Immigration rose in 12 months through April 2014 to 60,600 from 55,900 in the 12 months through April 2013. 2014 figure is the highest since 2009. Emigration declined to 81,900 in 2014 against 89,000 in 2013. This is the lowest level of emigration since 2011 when outflow of migrants from the country was running at 80,600.

Net emigration also moderated in 12 months through April 2014, declining from 2013 level of 33,100 to 2014 figure of 21,400. This marks the lowest net emigration rate for the entire crisis period. Which is, undoubtedly, good news. Bad news, we are still in net emigration mode.

With slower rate of net emigration outflows, net change in Irish resident population was positive in 12 months through April 2014, recording an increase of 16,500 y/y, compared to 7,700 rise in 12 months through April 2013.

A chart to illustrate:

Meanwhile, cumulated 2009-2014 emigration amounted to 479,800, cumulated net emigration for the same period amounted to 142,200. These are actual figures recorded. Taking into the account the trends in Irish migration over 2000-2007 period, the 'opportunity cost' of the crisis is the *net* loss of some 521,000 residents relative to where the population could have been were the trends established in 2000-2007 to remain in place.

A chart to illustrate:

As the result of the above changes in actual migration and natural rate of increases in population, we have the following changes in the working and non-working age populations:

• Working-age (20-64 year olds) population stood at 2,728,300 as of the end of April 2014, down 14,500 on a year ago and down 64,200 on 2008.
• As percentage of the total population, working-age population is now standing at 59.2%, the lowest for any period since 2006.
• Non-working age population is up 31,300 to 1,881,600 in 2014 compared to 2013 and up 188,900 on 2008.
• Non-working age population now stands at 40.8%, up on 40.3% in 2013 and the highest for any period since 2006.

Charts to illustrate:

26/8/2014: Betting on Corporate Tax Inversions? Ireland almost made the top of this strategy...

These haven't been slow-days-of-summer on the Irish corporate tax reputation front.

Few weeks ago, the story of Microsoft admission of holding a USD92bn large stash of cash in locations, including Ireland, has been put out to air: http://billmoyers.com/2014/08/23/microsoft-admits-keeping-92-billion-offshore-to-avoid-paying-29-billion-in-us-taxes/

And today, an interesting disclosure on foot of Ireland-free tax inversion deal by the Burger King popped up: a fund investing in tax inversion companies https://www.motifinvesting.com/motifs/tax-inversion-targets#/overview where Ireland is the second largest exposure after the UK...

These folks should list on Irish Stock Exchange... oh, poor Bermuda and Bahamas, obviously lacking in that skills-and-talent competitiveness we have so much of.

Time for another 'We Are Not a Tax-Haven' white paper from one of the Departments...

You can track my notes on the topic starting from here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/08/382014-this-week-in-corporate-not-tax.html

26/8/2014: Ukraine: Road-Map toward De-Escalation

There are several major roadblocks for devising and implementing a functional road map to deliver peaceful de-escalation and ultimately resolution of the conflict in the Ukraine. Some are quite directly logistical (this does not make them any less important, although this does imply different approach to dealing with them). But some are policy-related. One of the more frustrating aspects of the conflict to-date is the apparent lack of understanding and bridging between Russian position, Ukrainian position and the Western position. The three positions differ both on the desired objectives and the potential means for achieving them.

To-date, there has been no credible or functional plan to bridge the gaps, with possible exception of the February 2014 agreement that was derailed (under the EU and US cheers) by the Ukrainian side.

This is why the following initiative, outlined in The Atlantic today is of such a huge importance: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/a-24-step-plan-to-resolve-the-ukraine-crisis/379121/

Here is a summary of the plan in 24 steps, which actually does bridge the gap between the parties' positions, albeit at the expense of symmetric losses across all parties' positions:

Russia loses ex-ante 'federalisation' position, but gains strong assurances and supports for the ethnic Russian-speaking minorities and immediate cessation of hostilities. Moscow also gains in assurances that Ukraine is not going to join Nato and that normalisation of trade and investment regime with EU can happen sooner rather than later.

Ukraine loses a chance to go 'scorched earth'-style on separatist territories, preparing them for re-Ukrainisation over time. It also loses on Ukrainian nationalists' staunch insistence on treating Russian language as a secondary language. Some in Kiev administration also lose out on the potential for joining Nato. Kiev does gain, however, external, independent monitoring of its border with Russia and the situation in the East, alongside the disarmament and demilitarisation of the separatists. Kiev also gains a chance to build up, gradually, the region to win back its allegiances. Ukraine wins a chance to formally engage with Russia on Crimea, aided by the EU and US within the new international structure.

And both Moscow and Kiev can benefit from restoring trade flows and Ukraine's access to the Customs Union trade.

Nato gains: it no longer has to face the unwelcome prospect of having to deal with Ukraine's possible application for membership.

EU gains: it no longer has to face unilateral subsidisation of the  new 'client state' as vast as Ukraine and the risks of gas and energy flows disruptions will be minimised.

Is the plan above 'perfect'? Of course not. But it is pretty good.

26/8/2014: On that 'tax optimising' shift in Pharma Sector

To clarify my previous comment (see post: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/08/2682014-irish-trade-in-goods-h1-2014.html), here is the chart showing 6mo cumulative evolution of the ratio of exports to imports for pharma and pharma-related sectors:

You can see the three recent trends in exports ratio to imports ratios:

1. Based on purple line, there is one regime operating through H1 2008 - with shallow decline in ratio of exports to imports roughly from H2 2002 through H1 2008 pointing to relative rise of imports in overall trade. This is the consumption and construction boom. In H2 2008 we have a sharp rise in exports/imports ratio peaking at H2 2010: the period of collapsed imports relative to exports. Thereafter we have a decline in the ratio.
2. Based on Organic Chemicals (blue line) and Other chemical products (green line) we have two regimes: between H1 2004-H1 2005 and H2 2008 the two lines are broadly counter-moving. Red line includes some of the inputs into the blue line, but also domestic consumption component. This does not directly imply, but can indicate, rising amount of imports of inputs and rising (even faster) amount of outputs in the pharma sector. The evidence is weak, so not to over-draw any conclusions, it should be qualified. The second period - post H2 2006 through H1-H2 2009 we have a flattening and then peaking in exports of pharma relative to imports of pharma inputs. This is aggressive booking of profits (margin between exports and imports).
3. After H1-H2 2009 we have rapid decline in the ratio of exports to imports in pharma sector itself, and more gentle decline in related sectors. This, with caveats once again, can signal re-balancing of tax and operational efficiencies away from Ireland being a profit-booking centre to Ireland becoming a cost-booking centre.

There are many various schemes for optimising tax exposures for pharma firms, as well as other MNCs. Based on the aggregate data, it is virtually impossible to tell, which one is operating across the entire sector. But one thing is very clear from the above data - value added in the broader Organic Chemicals sector is collapsing. Worse, it is collapsing at a faster rate between H2 2013 and H1 2014 than in any period since H1 2009. It would have been good if the CSO were to publish more detailed data on this and produce an in-depth study. Somehow, I doubt they can and/or will, however.

26/8/2014: Irish Trade in Goods: H1 2014 results

Time to update H1 results for Irish external trade in goods. As a note: CSO does not provide any information on trade in services except as a part of quarterly national accounts.

Irish exports of goods in H1 2014 stood at EUR44.096 billion, down 0.54% on H2 2014 and up 1.45% y/y. Compared to 3 years average, exports are down 2.27%.

Compared to other H1 records, H1 2014 is up on H1 2013, but down on H1 2011 and 2012. Current reading is slightly behind EUR44.142 billion average H1 reading for 2000-2014 period and well below EUR45.077 billion H1 average for 2009-present.

Irish imports of goods rose in H1 2014 to EUR26.189 billion an increase of 7.8% on H2 2013 and a rise of 5.96% y/y. Imports are now up 7.28% on 3 year average and are at their highest level since H2 2008.

As the result of these trends, Trade surplus (for goods trade alone) has fallen to EUR17.907 billion, down 10.65% on H2 2013 and down 4.49% y/y. Compared to 3 year average, trade surplus is down 13.53%. H1 2014 trade surplus now stands at its lowest level in 6 years.

Charts below illustrate the above trends.

As profit-taking in the pharma and chemicals sectors is shifting toward tax optimisation based on off-shoring (as opposed to booking profits into Ireland), ratio of exports to imports continues to fall from the pre-patents-cliff peak:

Chart to illustrate:

However, a welcome sign of return to growth in exports in H1 2014 compared to H1 2013 means that our trade in goods regime is now out of the 'Pain Spot' of simultaneously shrinking trade balance and contracting exports that it occupied in 2010, 2012 and 2013. Down to continued decline in trade surplus, however, it is still not in the 'Sweet Spot' of exports-led recovery:

So overall, trade in merchandise is providing negative contribution to GDP growth y/y so far in 2014. Let's hope H2 will reverse this.

25/8/2014: Ifo Surveys of Business Climate & Expectations: Germany & Euro Area

Earlier today, Ifo Institute published its survey of business sentiment in Germany. Here is the latest analysis of their data alongside the previously released euro area sentiment.

Euro area economic climate survey returned index reading of 118.9 at the start of Q3 2014, down sharply on Q2 2014 reading of 123.0 and the lowest reading in 3 quarters. Present situation reading remained unchanged at 128.7 which is identical to Q4 2011 reading and the highest reading since Q1 2012. However, expectations 6 months out index slipped to 113.1 from 119.7 3 months ago and is now at its lowest level for 4 quarters running.

With all of this, the expectations gap relative to current conditions reading - the metric that signals the expected contraction if below 100 and expansion if above 100 - has fallen to 87.9 from 93.0, marking the third consecutive quarter of decline and the third consecutive quarter of staying below 100.

That said, the error direction - the difference between previous expectation for current period and current conditions - remains negative at -9.0 points, for the fourth consecutive quarter running.

The above trends were also reflected in the EU Commission business sentiment surveys. Based on July data, Q3 sentiment is on the declining side, with July reading of 105.8 for EU27, down from Q2 2014 end of quarter reading of 106.4. For the euro area the index remains basically unchanged at 102.2 in July compared to 102.1 in June 2014.

Chart to illustrate

For Germany, Ifo Business Climate Survey for August 2014 came in with rather negative results. Index for industry and trade fell in August to 106.3 points from 108.0 in July. German companies are also more sceptical than in the previous month. As Ifo release states: "The German economy continues to lose steam". Current reading is at the lowest level since mid-2013 and the last time index increased was back in April 2014 with a significant rise last clocked in March 2014.

Chart to illustrate