Showing posts with label emigration in Ireland. Show all posts
Showing posts with label emigration in Ireland. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 27, 2014

27/8/2014: Irish Migration Trends by Nationality: 2014


In the previous post I covered aggregate migration and population data for Ireland for 2014 (data coverage is 12 months through April 2014). The post is available here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2014/08/2782014-migration-population-change-in.html?spref=tw

Now, as promised earlier, lets take a look at the decomposition of the migration data.

First, net migration by nationality:

  • Total emigration from Ireland in 12 months through April 2014 stood at 81,900, which is down from 89,000 in the same period 2013 (a decline of 7,100). This marks the first year of decrease in emigration since 2011.
  • 40,700 Irish nationals emigrated from Ireland in 12 months through April 2014, down 10,200 on the same period of 2013 and marking the first slowdown in outflows since 2008. Latest rate of emigration for Irish nationals is the lowest reading since 2010.
  • Over the 12 months though April 2014, 2,700 UK nationals emigrated from Ireland - which represents a decline in emigration rate for this group of residents of 1,200 y/y. However, this decline was more than off-set by the rise in emigration of 'Rest of EU-15' residents which rose 4,100 y/y to 14,000 in the 12 months through April 2014. 
  • The rate of emigration from Ireland for EU12 Accession states nationals slowed down from 14,000 in 12 months through April 2013 to 10,100 in 12 months through April 2014.
  • For non-EU nationals, the rate of emigration has accelerated to 14,400 in the 12 months through April 2014 from 10,300 in the same period of 2013.




Thus, for the fifth year in a row, Irish nationals represented the largest group of emigrants from Ireland by total numbers. However, if in 2011-2013 Irish nationals represented more than 50% of the total emigration numbers, in 2014 this fell to 49.7%.

Net emigration figures, however, were less encouraging for the Irish nationals.

  • Total net emigration from Ireland stood at 21,400 in 12 months through April 2014, down from 33,100 in April 2013.
  • Irish nationals' net emigration rate was running at 29,200 in the 12 months through April 2014, down from 35,200 in 2013, but still above the rate recorded for any other year since 2006.
  • In contrast with the trend for the Irish nationals, UK nationals posted another year of rising net immigration into Ireland: 2,200 more UK nationals now reside in the country compared 1,000 more in 2013. Rest of EU-15 group posted an increase in the rate of net emigration from Ireland in 2014 (-5,300) compared to 2013 (-2,500). This made 2014 the worst year for net emigration of this group out of Ireland on record.
  • Net emigration of the EU12 Accession states nationals fell to its lowest crisis-period level of 200 in 2014, down from 3,200 in 2013.
  • Non-EU nationals recorded net immigration rate of 11,200 in 2014 which represents the highest rate on record (since 2006).




Chart below shows cumulated changes in migration over the period of 2008-2014:



27/8/2014: Migration & Population Change in Ireland: 2014 data


Population and migration estimates for the 12 months period through April 2014 have been finally released by the CSO with a lag of some 4 months. The figures show some marginal improvement in the underlying trends compared to the disastrous 2013, but overall the situation remains bleak.

Let's start with top level figures first and deal with compositional details in the subsequent post.

Births numbers have fallen to the levels last seen in 2007, from 70,500 in 2013 to 67,700 in 2014. Improving labour market and deteriorating personal finances are more likely behind the trend: the former means lower incentives to stay out of labour market and lower incentives to take maternity leave protection, while the latter means increased pressure to generate second income in the family, which is, of course, automatically associated with having to pay extortionate childcare costs. Whatever the drivers are, this is the births rate peaked in 2010 and has been declining since, neatly tracing out labour markets developments. 2014 marks the first year since 2007 that the rate is below 70,000.

Deaths are running at the rate proximate to 2013 and not far off from 2012. This means that the Natural Increase in population has slowed down to 37,900 in 2014 from 40,800 in 2013 and this marks the lowest natural rate of increase since 2006 and the first sub-40,000 rate of increase since 2007.

Immigration rose in 12 months through April 2014 to 60,600 from 55,900 in the 12 months through April 2013. 2014 figure is the highest since 2009. Emigration declined to 81,900 in 2014 against 89,000 in 2013. This is the lowest level of emigration since 2011 when outflow of migrants from the country was running at 80,600.

Net emigration also moderated in 12 months through April 2014, declining from 2013 level of 33,100 to 2014 figure of 21,400. This marks the lowest net emigration rate for the entire crisis period. Which is, undoubtedly, good news. Bad news, we are still in net emigration mode.

With slower rate of net emigration outflows, net change in Irish resident population was positive in 12 months through April 2014, recording an increase of 16,500 y/y, compared to 7,700 rise in 12 months through April 2013.

A chart to illustrate:

Meanwhile, cumulated 2009-2014 emigration amounted to 479,800, cumulated net emigration for the same period amounted to 142,200. These are actual figures recorded. Taking into the account the trends in Irish migration over 2000-2007 period, the 'opportunity cost' of the crisis is the *net* loss of some 521,000 residents relative to where the population could have been were the trends established in 2000-2007 to remain in place.

A chart to illustrate:

As the result of the above changes in actual migration and natural rate of increases in population, we have the following changes in the working and non-working age populations:

  • Working-age (20-64 year olds) population stood at 2,728,300 as of the end of April 2014, down 14,500 on a year ago and down 64,200 on 2008.
  • As percentage of the total population, working-age population is now standing at 59.2%, the lowest for any period since 2006.
  • Non-working age population is up 31,300 to 1,881,600 in 2014 compared to 2013 and up 188,900 on 2008.
  • Non-working age population now stands at 40.8%, up on 40.3% in 2013 and the highest for any period since 2006.

Charts to illustrate:




Sunday, September 30, 2012

30/9/2012: Ireland's Demographic Dividend Turns Negative?


Ireland has one of the highest and healthiest birth rates in the advanced economies club, a fact that remains valid even today, amidst the economic downturn. In the past, this has prompted some economists and commentators to label this trend 'the demographic dividend'. I always pointed to the fact that if this indeed is a 'dividend', then retaining it within the Irish economy (society) is as important as generating it in the first place. Alas, over the recent years, our demographic dividend has been largely squandered away by the combination of a cyclical downturn (temporary loss of jobs) and more importantly by the structural recession (longer term loss of jobs). I highlighted the top line trends in our migration in the previous posts (here and here).

Here, let's take a quick look at the 'demographic dividend'.

With many caveats, let us define two groups of population: those in active working age group (20-64 years old) and those outside this group (0-19 years old and over 65 years old). The reason for these definitions is that younger people  under 20 years of age are significantly engaged in education systems and although some of the students do work, they are not engaged in career-enhancing work and/or work part time. Similarly, some of the people in age category over 65 are still very much gainfully employed, but vast majority of people in this age category either work part time, or do not work at all. Again, all of this relates to formal employment, so we omit household work, which is important in the economy as well, but is hard to quantify.

With caveats, then:

  • Between 2006 and 2009 working age group population in Ireland grew by 189,100 and in the period of 2010-2012 it shrunk by 27,000. Quite a reversal in the 'demographic dividend' if you ask me.
  • The same group share of total population grew by 0.1 percentage point in 2006-2009 period and contracted by 1.0 percent in 2010-2012 period.
  • Meanwhile, the opposite side of the 'dividend' performed in exactly the opposite direction: non-working age population grew in 2006-2009 period by 114,500 and then again expanded by 57,700 in the period of 2010-2012. 
  • The share of total population that is captured by the non-working age population shrunk by 0.1% in 2006-2009 period and grew by 1.0% in 2010-2012.
  • Let's sum this up: in 2006-2012 period, working age population expanded by 150,800, while non-working age population grew 201,600. If this is a dividend, so far it is coming up negative. Proportion of working age population as a share of total population shrunk 1.5% and proportion of non-working age population expanded by 1.5%.
Charts to illustrate:


The above, of course, leaves out the account of unemployment. But even abstracting away from this, Ireland is now at risk of suffering from rising twin dependency: fewer working-age people funding more non-working-age people. All because of emigration. Dividend...

Saturday, September 29, 2012

29/9/2012: Detailed analysis of Irish migration by nationality


On foot of some comments to my earlier post on Ireland's migration flows, here are three charts to show in more details nationality breakdown of the core flows: Data refers to April-April data, so 2012 references period of April 2011 - April 2012.

Annual immigration:

  • Total immigration peaked at 151,100 in 2007 and declined to the low point of 41,800 in 2010. Since then, it bounced somewhat back to 53,300 in 2011 and to 52,700 in 2012.


Annual emigration:

  • Annual emigration hit bottom in 2006 at 36,000 and rose steadily to 49,200 in 2008. Thereafter, total emigration rose to 72,000 in 2009, dropped slightly to 69,200 in 2010 and shot up in 2011 (80,600) and 2012 (87,100).


Cumulated flows for 2006-2012:

  • Cumulated net inflows for the period of 2006-2012 stood at 153,500 in April 2012.
  • Irish nationals represent the only category of residents that registered net cumulated outflow (-23,400) in the period of 2006-2012.
  • In 2006-2008, there were cumulated net inflows of 32,100 for Irish nationals and in 2009-2012 this was reversed to a cumulated net outflow of 55,500
  • In 2006-2008, there were cumulated net inflows of 11,400 of UK nationals into Ireland, which was reversed to a cumulated net outflow of 2,300 in the 2009-2012 period
  • In 2006-2008, there were cumulated net inflows of 14,100 for 'Rest of EU15' nationals and in 2009-2012 this was reversed to a cumulated net outflow of 5,800
  • In 2006-2008, there were cumulated net inflows of 152,900 for EU12 nationals and in 2009-2012 this was reversed to a cumulated net outflow of 27,300
  • In 2006-2008, there were cumulated net inflows of 30,600 for nationals from the rest of the world and in 2009-2012 there was a shallower net cumulated inflow of 3,600.


Friday, September 28, 2012

28/9/2012: 2012 Emigration hits record levels


Latest data from the CSO on Migration and Population changes estimates for the 12 months period April 2011-April 2012 shows that during the period of so-called 'economic turnaround' marked by the officially 'EU-average growth' attained in Ireland, Irish emigration has hit new post-1990 record levels.

Top line numbers are:

  • In April 2011-April 2012 Ireland registered 74,000 new births - a number representing the fourth highest number of births in any year since 1987.
  • Over the same period, the number of deaths stood at 29,200, implying the natural rate of increase in Irish population of 44,900 - also the fourth highest rate in history of the series, tied with the identical rate achieved in 2008.
  • In April 2011 - April 2012 52,700 people migrated into Ireland well below 69,900 average for 200-2006 period.
  • Over the said period 87,100 people left Ireland - a historical record level, beating 80,600 record set in April 2010 - April 2011 period and more than tripple the average rate of outward emigration (28,500) for 2000-2006 period. Overall rate of emigration is now 23% above that attained in the peak pre-crisis year of 1989.
  • Net emigration reached 34,400 in April 2011 - April 2012, marking the third highest rate of net emigration in history of the series. In 2000-2006 we averaged 41,400 net immigration per annum, implying a downward swing of 75,800 per annum. Net emigration hit the post-1990 record in the 12 months through April 2012.
  • As the result, Irish population expanded by only 10,500 in April 2011 - April 2012 period - the slowest rate of growth since 1990. In 2000-2006 period, Irish population grew on average at the rate of 71,200 per annum.
Charts to illustrate these trends:


Breakdown of net emigration by nationalities shows that the principal driver of emigration from Ireland is outflow of Irish nationals from the country, confirming the trend established in 2011.


Referencing the trends in migration that existed prior to the crisis, the current crisis period is associated with potential net loss of 219,300 persons in the period of 2008-2012. In gross numbers terms, 358,100 people actually emigrated from Ireland in 2008-2012.


If there is such a thing as 'demographic dividend' Ireland today is running at a massive demographic 'loss'.

Sunday, March 11, 2012

11/3/2012: Records-busting emigration thingy

A person on twitter asked me about the quick off-hand comment I made stating that we are witnessing 'record emigration'. Here are some numbers from the official CSO counts.

A note of caution: official stats (link here) cover data only from 1987 through April 2011, so all data is annual estimates through April of that year or, rather, year on year comparatives for the month of April. All of the data is based on 2006 census, preliminary numbers, so subject to revisions and implying that 2007-2011 data are themselves preliminary estimates. Births and Deaths are actual recorded. Emigration data is based on QNHS responses (rather lack of responses, signifying exit from the state) and thus subject, in my view, to significant biases. On the net, I would suspect the estimate of emigration figures is biased to the downside - primarily due to surveying methods used (undercounting emigration amongst the foreign nationals).

All said, we don't have any better data than that. So let's crunch through the numbers.

Let's start with the components of population change:

Per chart below, as per my claim on twitter, emigration (gross outflow of people from Ireland) has hit a historical high in overall terms in 2011 at 76,400 against the previous high of 70,600 in 1989. Emigration has surpassed number of births (75,100) in 2011 for the first time since 1990 (emigration of 56,300 vs births at 51,900). Now, number of births, like emigration is taken to population overall, so this comparative is pretty damning.


Now, here's an interesting thing to think about. Higher number of births (record in 2011, incidentally) might be actually keeping emigration numbers down and having double that effect on net emigration. How? Ok, imagine a family with a new-born. One of the parents is receiving maternity benefits and retaining the job. If the other spouse migrates, it is more likely that the mother and the child will remain in the state, if possible, as no destination state of their choice would be covering maternity benefit for new migrants. In addition, both spouses are likely to remain in the state until the maternity runs out. So there is at least some lag possible in terms of those families interested in exiting Ireland and their maternity benefits duration. The effect is unlikely to be huge, in my view, however.

Net effects are plotted in the chart below.


Net migration (immigrants less emigrants) is not at its historic high. In fact in 2011 it slightly improved due to high number of births. Note that higher numbers of births are correlated with conditions that also drive emigration. In 2011, there were total net emigration of 34,100 from Ireland against 34,500 in 2010. These are second and first highest rates of net emigration since 1990. The only two years when net outflow of people from this country was higher were 1988 (41,900) and 1989 (43,900).

It is worth noting, however, that due to higher birth rates, overall population did not decline in any year since 1991 and that 2011 growth in overall population (13,600) was slightly ahead of that in 2010 (11,400).

Let's mention some comparatives to averages:


Again, above summarizes very poor stats for 2010-2011. Natural population increases are running at 50% higher levels than pre-crisis averages. Yet overall population change is running at about 1/5-1/6th rate of pre-crisis average. Immigration numbers are off substantially, but it is the swing in emigration numbers that is driving the entire population change.

Chart below shows net migration trends by nationality:


Prior to 2009, Irish nationals contributed between 5% and 10.3% of the total net migration numbers. In 2009 it was 0%. In 2010 and 2011 Irish national accounted for 41.7% and 67.7% of total net migration  flows. Meanwhile, the largest driver of net migration prior to the crisis - EU12 states nationals - were the source of largest absolute numbers outflows (net) in 2009, but their share of net outflows has fallen to 38.6% and 12.8% in 2010 and 2011 respectively.

Lastly, let's perform a simple exercise. Suppose that over 2008-2011 the trend established since 2000 was present and that we performed on average the same as in 2000-2006 in terms of net outflows. What would have happened then?


As chart above shows, in 2011 76,400 people emigrated from Ireland. This was 47,900 in excess of 2000-2006 average, implying net ex-average emigration of 34,100. Over the years of the crisis so far, between 2008-2011, total number of people who emigrated from Ireland was 252,100, which is 138,000 over the level of 'natural' emigration (average). Taking account of the averages, excess net emigration over and above pre-crisis trend now stands at around 203,400 people.

Monday, February 13, 2012

13/2/2012: Sunday Times 12/2/2012: The perils of long-term unemployment


This is an unedited version of my article in Sunday Times, 12 February, 2012.



The conflicting nature of the most recent data on unemployment in Ireland paints the picture of an economy bouncing at the bottom of the Great Recession. However, underlying trends in long-term unemployment represent the single greatest threat to our growth potential in years to come.


The latest Live Register figures reflect two months of consecutive and robust declines in the numbers drawing unemployment assistance. In December 2011, seasonally-adjusted Live Register dropped 3,600 (the third largest monthly decline since the beginning of the crisis). This was followed by a 3,200 decline in January 2012, marking the fourth biggest downward adjustment in the series since January 2008. Yet, January 2011 Live Register total remains just 2.1% below the peak of 449,200 attained in September 2010.

Since 2009, net emigration form Ireland totalled some 76,400 and gross emigration amounted to 236,800 according to CSO. Absent the officially registered emigration, Irish Live Register would have been closer to 522,900 in January 2012. In other words, the Live Register improvements now conceal, not reveal, the true extent of joblessness and underemployment in the country.

In contrast to the Live Register data, more direct evidence on the job markets conditions is provided by the monthly Purchasing Managers Indices (PMI) surveys published by NCB Stockbrokers. These make for a rather depressing reading. January Services PMI employment conditions registered a deeply contractionary 44.5, exacerbating declines posted in December 2011. January marked the sharpest rate of decline in the services sectors employment in 21 months. In Manufacturing employment index rose in December to 50.5 before falling again to a contractionary 49.5 in January 2012. Manufacturing employment index is now 4.1% below January 2011, marking the fourth drop in the past five months.

These are the short-term signs of the labour market that remains in continued distress. And further deterioration in the underlying jobs and employment dynamics can be expected in the medium term.

Firstly, dramatic increases in the cost of laying off workers under Budget 2012 are likely to translate into an overall stabilization of the Live Register figures at a cost of the deterioration in the quality of jobs (wages and bonuses, and promotional opportunities losses) and hours of work as employers will be seeking cuts to their cost bases through lower pay and fewer billable hours. Budget 2012 makes it less likely that employers will be taking on new workers any time soon.

Secondly, the already rampant rise of the long term structural unemployment will continue unabated. Here Ireland is in the league of its own when compared to other European economies. In Q3 2011 our long-term unemployment stood at 8.8% - the third highest in the EU27. Over the period covered we have experienced a sharpest increase in long-term unemployment in Europe.

Matters are even worse when it comes to very long-term unemployment – defined as unemployment spells in excess of 24 months. With a rate of 5.4% in Q3 2011 we are now the second worst performer in Europe in terms of overall very long-term unemployment rate, and we are the absolute worst in the EU27 in terms of increases in very long-term unemployment since the beginning of the crisis.


Long-term unemployment exacts tremendous social and economic tolls. International research shows that long-term spell out of work leads to reduced life-time earnings (with estimates of up to 20% loss in earnings years after the return to the job market), higher probability of future unemployment (in some studies reaching over 2.3 times higher probability of unemployment that average), and rapid and profound deterioration in human capital of the unemployed. These effects also hold for those entering the workforce during the periods of elevated long-term unemployment, such as the current Irish graduates.

In today’s environment, rising long-term unemployment in Ireland, threatens to reinforce already adverse future trends in productivity growth. A study by the European Commission from 2006 has shown that across EU27, over the next 25-30 years, ageing workforce will require greater use of skills-driven productivity growth. The last thing we want is to lose the skills of the current generations of young workers and students to long-term unemployment.


In terms of timing of the policy responses to the long-term unemployment, therefore, it is critical that we do not delay the necessary structural reforms.

Most of the research on the policy solutions to this problem is focused on the structural and institutional aspects of the labour markets. A number of recent studies from the UK, Italy, and the US, as well as more broadly-focused studies across the advanced economies show that long duration strong unemployment protection, and high cost of hiring and laying off workers, along with rigid systems of wage setting can act as structural barriers to dealing with the long-term unemployment. This point has been most recently flagged in the case of Ireland by the OECD report from June 2011. High minimum wage and strong collective bargaining have been linked to segmentation of the labour force and increased job instability for the younger and less-skilled workers. Systemic reforms of social welfare and wages-setting mechanisms are clearly an extremely painful, but necessary part of the comprehensive solution.

On the enabling side of the policy equation, the focus should be on enhancing the human capital of the unemployed and incentives for private sector jobs creation, not public investment-driven policies.

Immediate labour market measures should be developed for the long-term younger unemployed. The Government, consistent with the advice from the IMF and OECD is pursuing so-called active labour market programmes in this area. These are primarily represented by the ‘push’ policies designed to force young people off the unemployment benefits and into state-run training programmes. According to the Nobel Laureate James Heckman training schemes designed to de-list people from the unemployment rosters had zero effect on labor markets outcomes in the 1990s. More recent research for European countries experiences prior to 2008 confirms the same. In Ireland the real impact of FAS programmes on long-term unemployment both before and during the crisis has been negligible.

OECD data very clearly shows that Ireland spends more than the Nordic countries as well as high income EU countries on direct jobs creation and state training. In total, Ireland spent 0.87% of GDP or 1.10% of GNP in 2010 on all active labour markets programmes, compared against 1.06% in the Nordic countries and 0.70% in the rest of the high income EU states. It is clear that we are simply not getting a good value for money out of this expenditure.

Instead of relying on active labour markets programmes alone, Ireland should focus on facilitating formal education access for long-term unemployed, especially to undergraduate and MSc programmes closely aligned with business and industry interests and featuring large component of direct industry-related teaching. Retraining grants and supports can be linked with mobility grants to assist mobility of those moving off unemployment benefits.

For the very young at-risk of future unemployment, financial incentives to stay in school can be developed via social welfare systems.

There is strong evidence to support the view that private sector jobs creation can be assisted through carefully targeted tax breaks and deferrals. These require extremely close monitoring, strict conditionality and enforcement, while assuring that there is no older workers displacement. Another significant measure would be to suspend minimum wage for all workers under-25 years of age, but this policy cannot be expected to generate sustainable, higher quality jobs.

Reducing USC rates for self-employed below those for PAYE workers to reflect the reality of their restricted access to social benefits would provide some support for early-stage entrepreneurship and skills-based self-employment.

The last thing the Government should do in the current environment is to use scarce taxpayers cash on direct physical capital investment as such measure would subsidise capital-intensive, not skills-enhancing activities which will cease the minute Government cash dries up once again.

Both the IMF and the OECD provide very clear-cut suggestions as to the core composition of the structural labor markets reforms based on three pillars: welfare reforms, labour markets reforms and activation systems enhancement. Augmenting these with more direct measures to incentivise private sector jobs creation mentioned above would be a net benefit in combating long-term unemployment.


Table: Spending on active labour market programmes, 2010, % of GDP


Ireland (GDP)
Ireland (GNP)
Nordic Countries
Other OECD Europe
OECD non-Europe
Public employment service and administration
0.18
0.23
0.30
0.17
0.07
Training
0.37
0.47
0.26
0.22
0.09
Direct job creation
0.26
0.33
0.03
0.08
0.05
Other active measures
0.06
0.08
0.46
0.23
0.07
Active Labour Market Programmes, total
0.87
1.10
1.06
0.70
0.28
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook 2011, table 3.2


Box-out:

As the farcical show of Greek negotiations and austerity talks continued its merry-go-round through this week, the ECB has caused some excitement by opening up the discussion on allowing some writedowns of the Greek bonds it holds. The EFSF bonds swap would see ECB converting Government bonds the Central bank bought in the markets, for higher rated EFSF bonds, writing down its purchase discount, which in the case of Greek bonds stands around 31% of the face value of debt bought. The move has been gathering momentum and driving the bond prices up since the mid-week in a hope it will be extended to other peripheral bonds. Yet, no one in the markets seemed to notice a simple paradox. In order to create any real lasting effect on bond yields, such monetization would require a de facto injection of hundreds of billions in cash into the Euro area economy. The upside of this would be further cheapening of the credit for the peripheral states. The downside will be an even greater liquidity trap via EFSF and a sharp rise in the future interest rates on Euro denominated debt of the ordinary households and companies. With 4-4.5% ECB rates on offer and double-digit retail rates on banks loans, ECB would be robbing Paul and Jane to pay off Governments across the EU weakest states. This we now call Europe’s greatest hope for salvation?