28/9/17: Irish Migration: Some Good News in 2017

While headline figures for net migration to Ieland paint an overall positive picture in the annual data (provided on April-April basis) for 2017, there are some creases on the canvas, both good and bad.

Top line numbers are good: net inward migration posted a print of 19,800 in 2017, up on 16,200 in 2016 and 5,900 in 2015. This marks the third year of positive inflows. However, on a cumulative basis, the last three years are still falling short of offsetting massive outflows recorded in 2010-2014. Cumulatively, between 2010 and 2017, the overall net migration stands at -65,900. Taking last two years’ average net inward immigration, it will take Ireland almost 4 years to cover the shortfall. Worse, on pre-crisis trend (omitting peak inward migration years of 2005-2007), we should be seeing inward net migration of around 27,100, well above the current rate. And on a cumulative basis, were the pre-crisis trends to remain unbroken, we would have added 487,600 residents between 2000 and 2017, instead of the actual addition of 394,500 over the same period. 

So things are improving and getting toward healthy, but we are not quite there, yet.

And there are other points of concern. Primary one is the fact that net inward migration remains negative for Irish nationals: in 2017, net outflow of Irish nationals fell to 3,400 from 8,700 in 2016. However, the figures continue to record net outflows for 8th year in a row. Over the period of 2010-2017, Ireland lost net 139,800 nationals.

On a positive side, there is net inflow of all other nationalities into Ireland, with non-EU nationals inflows jumping (net basis) to 15,7000 in 2017, the highest levels on record (albeit records only start from 2006). It is impossible to tell from CSO figures which nationalities are driving these numbers - a crucial point when it comes to assessing the nature of inflows.

Final point worth making is a positive one: in 2017, Ireland recorded another year or growth in - already strong - net inflows of skills and human capital as reflected both in age demographics and educational attainment. By educational attainment, third level graduates and higher category of net inflows posted another historical record in 2017 at 23,600, topping 2016 record of 20,800. Since 2009, including the years of the acute crisis of 2010-2012, Ireland added net 61,000 new immigrants and returned migrants with third level and higher education. This is consistent with continued recovery in human capital-intensive sectors of the economy and is a huge net positive for Ireland.

Hence, overall, the figures for migration are on the balance positive, although some pockets of weaknesses continue to remain and pose a challenge to the arguments about the breadth and depth of the recovery to-date.

25/2/15: QNHS Q4 2014: Broader Measures of Irish Unemployment

In the previous post (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/02/25215-qnhs-q4-2014-labour-force.html) I covered the QNHS results for Q4 2014 from the point of Labour Force Participation Rate (poor news showing decline in the already historically low participation) and Unemployment Rate (goods news with unemployment - absent seasonal adjustment falling to 9.9% and the rate of decline in unemployment on quarterly basis accelerating).

Here, let's consider actual size of the labour force and the broader measures of unemployment, including numbers on state training programmes (e.g. JobBridge) and factoring in estimates of inward and outward migration.

Few definitions are provided in the note below the post, so feel free to consult these.

Now, onto numbers.

Total size of Irish labour force at Q4 2014 stood at 2,152,500 down from 2,172,400 in Q3 2014 and down 10,600 on Q4 2013. This is not good. Compared to peak, current Labour Force is down 147,600 and compared to crisis period trough it is up 15,000. Over the last 12 months, irish labour force average levels were down 117,100 on pre-crisis average. All indicators point to a decline in labour force, consistent with the weak labour force participation rate reported in the previous post. All of this suggests that some share of improvements in unemployment performance is down to people dropping out of the labour force rather than the unemployed finding jobs.

As chart above highlights, remarkably, there has been basically no change in labour force numbers from H2 2010 through Q4 2014, something that is not consistent with our natural demographics, but is consistent with the story of outward emigration and dropping-out from the labour force by working age adults.

Now onto more pleasant news. All broader measures of unemployment have registered declines in Q4 2014 both y/y and q/q:

PLS1 indicator - basically a measure of unemployment fell 2.0 percentage points y/y in Q4 2014 to 10.5%, marking an acceleration in the rate of decline from 1.9% drop in Q3 2014.

PLS3 indicator, capturing those employed, unemployed, discouraged, plus all those not seeking a job for reasons other than being in Education & Training - has fallen from 15.1% in Q3 2014 to 13.3% - a drop of 2.7 percentage points y/y accelerated from 2.4 percentage points decline back in Q3 2014.

PLS4 - the broadest officially reported measure of unemployment that includes PLS3, and also underemployed - has fallen to 18.5 in Q4 2014, marking the first reading below 20% since Q1 2009. The measure is down 3.8 percentage points y/y and this marks a major acceleration in decline compared to 2.9 percentage points drop in Q3 2014.

Adding State Training Programmes participants to PLS$ to produce PLS4+STP puts the broader unemployment measure to 22.34%. This is the lowest reading since Q4 2009 and also marks acceleration in decline exactly matching that for PLS4.

Accounting (and this is rough estimation, so be warned) for net outward emigration, however, PLS4+STP measure of broad unemployment rises to 29.8% in Q4 2014. This marks a decline of 2.8 percentage points y/y and acceleration of decline from 2.0 percentage points drop in Q3 2014. However, the rates of decline in both Q3 and Q4 were shallower than for other measures, save PLS 1.

To summarise, labour force levels are worrying and static at and around crisis trough. Broader measures of unemployment show significant improvements, but the levels of unemployment, especially adjusted for state training programmes and potential adverse effects of net emigration are still high and more worrying than the headline unemployment measures suggest. While we do not know exactly, indications are - the data is consistent with at least some declines in unemployment officially recorded by the CSO coming not from jobs gains, but from emigration, state training programmes and exits from the labour force.

For example, compered to H1 2011, there were 23,373 more individuals that were participating in state training programmes who are not counted as unemployed. Furthermore, estimated net 94,800 individuals of working are have left Ireland between end of Q1 2011 through end of Q1 2014. They too are no longer counted in the labour force or in employment/unemployment statistics.


Note:

• PLS1 indicator is unemployed persons plus discouraged workers as a percentage of the Labour Force plus discouraged workers.
• PLS2 indicator is unemployed persons plus Potential Additional Labour Force as a percentage of the Labour Force plus Potential Additional Labour Force
• PLS3 indicator is PLS2 plus others who want a job, who are not available and not seeking for reasons other than being in education or training as a percentage of the Labour Force plus Potential Additional Labour Force plus others who want a job, who are not available and not seeking for reasons other than being in education or training.
• PLS4 indicator is PLS3 plus part-time underemployed persons as a percentage of the Labour Force plus Potential Additional Labour Force plus others who want a job, who are not available and not seeking for reasons other than being in education or training.
• PLS4+STP is the indicator combining PLS4 above and State Training Programmes Participants but excluding those of working age who emigrated (net of those who immigrated). 
• PLS4+STP+migration numbers reported below are reflective of PLS4+STP measure and add estimates of net emigration from Ireland based on latest available data extrapolated linearly over the year from May 2014 and adjusted for working age and labour force participation rate in the economy.

22/5/2014: Labor Mobility within Currency Unions & some Implications for Ireland

A very interesting theoretical paper "Labor Mobility within Currency Unions " by Emmanuel Farhi and Iván Werning, April 2014 (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2436714) looks at "the effects of labor mobility within a currency union suffering from nominal rigidities."

The departing point for the paper is Mundell (1961) famous dictum that labor mobility must be a precondition for optimal currency areas. In support of this dictum, the U.S. "enjoys relatively high mobility and has proven to be a successful currency union. Mobility is arguably much lower within the Eurozone, which sunk into trouble scarcely ten years after its inauguration." Of course, despite the shallower extent of mobility in Europe, EU policymakers repeatedly cite free mobility regime for labour within the EU as a major cornerstone of the EU and, thus, by corollary - to the functioning or the promise of functioning of the euro zone.

Despite all the intuition behind Mundell's proposition, there is little formal research connecting mobility with macroeconomic adjustments in a currency union setting.

Farhi and Werning "set up a currency union model featuring nominal rigidities and incorporate labor mobility across the different regions (or countries) that compose the currency union." The paper tackles "…two related questions. First, does mobility help stabilize macroeconomic conditions across regions in a union? Second, is equilibrium mobility socially optimal?"

The study does not quite confirm Mundell's proposition, but its findings "…are consistent with a potential important role for mobility. Workers migrating away from depressed regions naturally benefit from the option to pick up and go somewhere better. The interesting and less obvious question is whether their exodus also helps those that stay behind. That is, whether it aids in the macroeconomic adjustment of regions. A major insight of our analysis is that the answer to this question is subtle because workers leaving a region depart not only with their labor, but also with their purchasing power."

This leads to a divergent set of outcomes depending on the source of the original shock to the economy. If the demand shock comes from internal (region-specific) shock (like, for example, in the case of Ireland where property crash led to massive disruptions in domestic demand and where domestic demand continued to shrink every year since 2008, uninterrupted), the authors find that "…migration may not help regional macroeconomic adjustment." How so? "…we provide a benchmark case where migration has no effect on the per-capita allocations across regions. For this benchmark, the entire demand shortfall in depressed regions is internal, located within the non-tradable sector [again, think Irish construction, property and retail sectors, and associated banking sector bust]. When workers migrate out of a depressed region local labor supply is reduced, but so is the demand non-traded goods, which, in turn, lowers the demand for labor. The two effects cancel, leaving the situation for stayers unchanged."

In contrast, "…when external demand is also at the root of the problem, migration out of depressed regions may produce a positive spillover for stayers." This, of course, applies to economies like Portugal and Cyprus, where external shocks are the main drivers for the crisis. When depressed regions also suffer from external demand shortfalls, "…migration out of depressed regions may help improve the region’s macroeconomic outcome. For example, at the opposite end of the spectrum, suppose regions only produce traded goods and that there is no home bias in the demand for these goods. The demand for each region’s product is then determined entirely by external demand at the union level, and internal demand plays no special role. In this case, migration out of a depressed region improves the outcome of stayers by increasing their employment, income and consumption."

On a positive side, from Ireland's point of view: "…the degree of economic openness (how much regions trade with one another) turns out to be a key parameter. Openness was proposed by McKinnon (1963) as another precondition for an optimal currency area." Except, of course, as we in Ireland are fully aware, openness can be real (e.g. Swiss exporting indigenous output that is matched by the MNCs exporting out of Switzerland) and accounting (e.g. Irish exports of ICT services or phrama).


Lastly, it is worth noting that the paper does not consider rigidities beyond those present in the pricing mechanisms. Thus, for example, labour laws are not included and neither are hiring practices or promotional practices that can severely skew flows of labour.

5/3/2014: Broader Measures of Unemployment in Ireland: QNHS Q4 2013

Completing the coverage of Q4 2013 QNHS results for Ireland.

• First post covering detailed analysis of employment by sectors: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/02/2722014-employment-by-sectors-qnhs-q4.html
• Second post covering employment across broader sectors and categories: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/02/2822014-new-employment-across-broader.html
• Third post covering Participation and Unemployment Rates: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/02/2822014-participation-and-unemployment.html
• Fourth post covering duration of unemployment by age group: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/02/2822014-duration-of-unemployment-qnhs.html

Now, let's take a look at broader measures of unemployment.

Methodology note: CSO reports the following measures of broader unemployment:

• PLS1 indicator is unemployed persons plus discouraged workers as a percentage of the Labour Force plus discouraged workers. This indicator is broadly comparable to the previously published S1 indicator. In the nutshell, PLS1 = unemployed persons plus discouraged workers.
• PLS2 = PLS1 + Potential Additional Labour Force
• PLS3 = PLS2 + others who want a job, not available & not seeking for reasons other than being in Education and training.
• PLS4 = PLS3 + plus underemployed

In addition, I use CSO data from Live Register and emigration to add two more metrics:

• PLS4+STP: PLS4 + State Training Programmes Participant
• PLS4+STPE: PLS4 + State Training Programmes Participants + Emigration

So let's take a look first at labour force. The data is not seasonally-adjusted.

In Q4 2013 there were 2,163,000 people in labour force in Ireland, an increase of 19,600 year on year (+0.9%). A small increase, but a welcome one, suggesting that emigration is not offsetting demographic inflows of workers into the labour force. However, the level of labour force is still below Q4 2011 and is down 137,000 on pre-crisis peak. On average over the entire 2013, levels of labour force were 110,600 behind the pre-crisis period average levels.

As chart above shows, the greater challenge for us is the flat-trending labour force over the period of 2011-2013.

Table and chart below summarise changes in the broader measures of unemployment:

The key takeaway from the above charts and the table is shallower declines in the broadest measures of unemployment officially reported (PLS2-PLS4) compared to PLS1 and the adverse impact of 'sticky' State Training Programmes on the measure. It appears that these programmes are not moving workers out of unemployment fast enough.

Keeping in mind that Emigration is imputed only through April 2013 (we do not have official data beyond that), the PLS4+STP+E measure likely underestimates overall changes in broad unemployment.

Just how bad things are on overall unemployment front? With caveats to data and estimation errors, the above shows that in Q4 2013, 31.7% of Irish potential (including emigrants and state training schemes participants) labour force was either unemployed, underemployed, discouraged from seeking employment, not seeking employment for some reason other than being in education, toiling for free at Job Bridge and other fine 'activation' programmes or 'partying' abroad. Happy times...

That number, incidentally, is down from 32.5% in Q4 2012, but is still above 30.9 in Q4 2011.

4/12/2013: Brain Drain and Institutions

A very interesting working paper relating to the issues of human capital and its effects on society and economy, titled "Does Brain Drain Lead to Institutional Gain?" by Li, Xiaoyang and McHale, John (of NUI Galway) and Xuan, Zhou (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2350203).

Per authors, "A country’s endowment of human capital can affect its institutions through various channels. This raises the possibility that skilled emigration can leave its mark on a country’s institutional development. We combine recent datasets on emigrant stocks and institutional quality to explore the impacts of mobile human capital on home country’s institutional quality."

"Our results indicate that skilled emigrants have a positive effect on political institutions (i.e., voice and accountability, and political stability and absence of violence) but a negative effect on economic institutions at home (i.e., government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of corruption). These results are robust to the inclusion of other known determinants of institutional quality."

With some caveats relating to the difficulties involved in assessing causality in a cross-sectional data study: "...we attribute the association to be causal as we use geography-based instruments for emigrant human capital"

30/9/2012: Ireland's Demographic Dividend Turns Negative?

Ireland has one of the highest and healthiest birth rates in the advanced economies club, a fact that remains valid even today, amidst the economic downturn. In the past, this has prompted some economists and commentators to label this trend 'the demographic dividend'. I always pointed to the fact that if this indeed is a 'dividend', then retaining it within the Irish economy (society) is as important as generating it in the first place. Alas, over the recent years, our demographic dividend has been largely squandered away by the combination of a cyclical downturn (temporary loss of jobs) and more importantly by the structural recession (longer term loss of jobs). I highlighted the top line trends in our migration in the previous posts (here and here).

Here, let's take a quick look at the 'demographic dividend'.

With many caveats, let us define two groups of population: those in active working age group (20-64 years old) and those outside this group (0-19 years old and over 65 years old). The reason for these definitions is that younger people  under 20 years of age are significantly engaged in education systems and although some of the students do work, they are not engaged in career-enhancing work and/or work part time. Similarly, some of the people in age category over 65 are still very much gainfully employed, but vast majority of people in this age category either work part time, or do not work at all. Again, all of this relates to formal employment, so we omit household work, which is important in the economy as well, but is hard to quantify.

With caveats, then:

• Between 2006 and 2009 working age group population in Ireland grew by 189,100 and in the period of 2010-2012 it shrunk by 27,000. Quite a reversal in the 'demographic dividend' if you ask me.
• The same group share of total population grew by 0.1 percentage point in 2006-2009 period and contracted by 1.0 percent in 2010-2012 period.
• Meanwhile, the opposite side of the 'dividend' performed in exactly the opposite direction: non-working age population grew in 2006-2009 period by 114,500 and then again expanded by 57,700 in the period of 2010-2012. 
• The share of total population that is captured by the non-working age population shrunk by 0.1% in 2006-2009 period and grew by 1.0% in 2010-2012.
• Let's sum this up: in 2006-2012 period, working age population expanded by 150,800, while non-working age population grew 201,600. If this is a dividend, so far it is coming up negative. Proportion of working age population as a share of total population shrunk 1.5% and proportion of non-working age population expanded by 1.5%.

Charts to illustrate:

The above, of course, leaves out the account of unemployment. But even abstracting away from this, Ireland is now at risk of suffering from rising twin dependency: fewer working-age people funding more non-working-age people. All because of emigration. Dividend...

29/9/2012: Detailed analysis of Irish migration by nationality

On foot of some comments to my earlier post on Ireland's migration flows, here are three charts to show in more details nationality breakdown of the core flows: Data refers to April-April data, so 2012 references period of April 2011 - April 2012.

Annual immigration:

• Total immigration peaked at 151,100 in 2007 and declined to the low point of 41,800 in 2010. Since then, it bounced somewhat back to 53,300 in 2011 and to 52,700 in 2012.

Annual emigration:

• Annual emigration hit bottom in 2006 at 36,000 and rose steadily to 49,200 in 2008. Thereafter, total emigration rose to 72,000 in 2009, dropped slightly to 69,200 in 2010 and shot up in 2011 (80,600) and 2012 (87,100).

Cumulated flows for 2006-2012:

• Cumulated net inflows for the period of 2006-2012 stood at 153,500 in April 2012.
• Irish nationals represent the only category of residents that registered net cumulated outflow (-23,400) in the period of 2006-2012.
• In 2006-2008, there were cumulated net inflows of 32,100 for Irish nationals and in 2009-2012 this was reversed to a cumulated net outflow of 55,500
• In 2006-2008, there were cumulated net inflows of 11,400 of UK nationals into Ireland, which was reversed to a cumulated net outflow of 2,300 in the 2009-2012 period
• In 2006-2008, there were cumulated net inflows of 14,100 for 'Rest of EU15' nationals and in 2009-2012 this was reversed to a cumulated net outflow of 5,800
• In 2006-2008, there were cumulated net inflows of 152,900 for EU12 nationals and in 2009-2012 this was reversed to a cumulated net outflow of 27,300
• In 2006-2008, there were cumulated net inflows of 30,600 for nationals from the rest of the world and in 2009-2012 there was a shallower net cumulated inflow of 3,600.

28/9/2012: 2012 Emigration hits record levels

Latest data from the CSO on Migration and Population changes estimates for the 12 months period April 2011-April 2012 shows that during the period of so-called 'economic turnaround' marked by the officially 'EU-average growth' attained in Ireland, Irish emigration has hit new post-1990 record levels.

Top line numbers are:

• In April 2011-April 2012 Ireland registered 74,000 new births - a number representing the fourth highest number of births in any year since 1987.
• Over the same period, the number of deaths stood at 29,200, implying the natural rate of increase in Irish population of 44,900 - also the fourth highest rate in history of the series, tied with the identical rate achieved in 2008.
• In April 2011 - April 2012 52,700 people migrated into Ireland well below 69,900 average for 200-2006 period.
• Over the said period 87,100 people left Ireland - a historical record level, beating 80,600 record set in April 2010 - April 2011 period and more than tripple the average rate of outward emigration (28,500) for 2000-2006 period. Overall rate of emigration is now 23% above that attained in the peak pre-crisis year of 1989.
• Net emigration reached 34,400 in April 2011 - April 2012, marking the third highest rate of net emigration in history of the series. In 2000-2006 we averaged 41,400 net immigration per annum, implying a downward swing of 75,800 per annum. Net emigration hit the post-1990 record in the 12 months through April 2012.
• As the result, Irish population expanded by only 10,500 in April 2011 - April 2012 period - the slowest rate of growth since 1990. In 2000-2006 period, Irish population grew on average at the rate of 71,200 per annum.

Charts to illustrate these trends:

Breakdown of net emigration by nationalities shows that the principal driver of emigration from Ireland is outflow of Irish nationals from the country, confirming the trend established in 2011.

Referencing the trends in migration that existed prior to the crisis, the current crisis period is associated with potential net loss of 219,300 persons in the period of 2008-2012. In gross numbers terms, 358,100 people actually emigrated from Ireland in 2008-2012.

If there is such a thing as 'demographic dividend' Ireland today is running at a massive demographic 'loss'.

11/3/2012: Records-busting emigration thingy

A person on twitter asked me about the quick off-hand comment I made stating that we are witnessing 'record emigration'. Here are some numbers from the official CSO counts.

A note of caution: official stats (link here) cover data only from 1987 through April 2011, so all data is annual estimates through April of that year or, rather, year on year comparatives for the month of April. All of the data is based on 2006 census, preliminary numbers, so subject to revisions and implying that 2007-2011 data are themselves preliminary estimates. Births and Deaths are actual recorded. Emigration data is based on QNHS responses (rather lack of responses, signifying exit from the state) and thus subject, in my view, to significant biases. On the net, I would suspect the estimate of emigration figures is biased to the downside - primarily due to surveying methods used (undercounting emigration amongst the foreign nationals).

All said, we don't have any better data than that. So let's crunch through the numbers.

Let's start with the components of population change:

Per chart below, as per my claim on twitter, emigration (gross outflow of people from Ireland) has hit a historical high in overall terms in 2011 at 76,400 against the previous high of 70,600 in 1989. Emigration has surpassed number of births (75,100) in 2011 for the first time since 1990 (emigration of 56,300 vs births at 51,900). Now, number of births, like emigration is taken to population overall, so this comparative is pretty damning.

Now, here's an interesting thing to think about. Higher number of births (record in 2011, incidentally) might be actually keeping emigration numbers down and having double that effect on net emigration. How? Ok, imagine a family with a new-born. One of the parents is receiving maternity benefits and retaining the job. If the other spouse migrates, it is more likely that the mother and the child will remain in the state, if possible, as no destination state of their choice would be covering maternity benefit for new migrants. In addition, both spouses are likely to remain in the state until the maternity runs out. So there is at least some lag possible in terms of those families interested in exiting Ireland and their maternity benefits duration. The effect is unlikely to be huge, in my view, however.

Net effects are plotted in the chart below.

Net migration (immigrants less emigrants) is not at its historic high. In fact in 2011 it slightly improved due to high number of births. Note that higher numbers of births are correlated with conditions that also drive emigration. In 2011, there were total net emigration of 34,100 from Ireland against 34,500 in 2010. These are second and first highest rates of net emigration since 1990. The only two years when net outflow of people from this country was higher were 1988 (41,900) and 1989 (43,900).

It is worth noting, however, that due to higher birth rates, overall population did not decline in any year since 1991 and that 2011 growth in overall population (13,600) was slightly ahead of that in 2010 (11,400).

Let's mention some comparatives to averages:

Again, above summarizes very poor stats for 2010-2011. Natural population increases are running at 50% higher levels than pre-crisis averages. Yet overall population change is running at about 1/5-1/6th rate of pre-crisis average. Immigration numbers are off substantially, but it is the swing in emigration numbers that is driving the entire population change.

Chart below shows net migration trends by nationality:

Prior to 2009, Irish nationals contributed between 5% and 10.3% of the total net migration numbers. In 2009 it was 0%. In 2010 and 2011 Irish national accounted for 41.7% and 67.7% of total net migration  flows. Meanwhile, the largest driver of net migration prior to the crisis - EU12 states nationals - were the source of largest absolute numbers outflows (net) in 2009, but their share of net outflows has fallen to 38.6% and 12.8% in 2010 and 2011 respectively.

Lastly, let's perform a simple exercise. Suppose that over 2008-2011 the trend established since 2000 was present and that we performed on average the same as in 2000-2006 in terms of net outflows. What would have happened then?

As chart above shows, in 2011 76,400 people emigrated from Ireland. This was 47,900 in excess of 2000-2006 average, implying net ex-average emigration of 34,100. Over the years of the crisis so far, between 2008-2011, total number of people who emigrated from Ireland was 252,100, which is 138,000 over the level of 'natural' emigration (average). Taking account of the averages, excess net emigration over and above pre-crisis trend now stands at around 203,400 people.

28/12/2011: Brain-drain & IRL's knowledge economy

When Government policy-supported brain-drain is compounded by heavily subsidised 3rd level education system, Ireland risks turning into a third world-styled resources supplier to our more dynamic trading partners:

http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2011/1228/1224309553505.html

HT to @dalkeyhead

That's the 'Knowledge Economy' in the absence of real jobs creation: taxpayers pay for knowledge, private holders of knowledge emigrate to earn private returns, taxpayers pay for more 'Knowledge Economy' boffins and pamphlets... but do not worry - 20 years from now, the IDA will have plenty of new ex-Irish execs in UK, US, Australia, Canada, etc to beg for FDI.