23/4/21: There are no 'social' winners amidst this pandemic

 

No one is left unscarred by the #covid19 pandemic when it comes to public approval trends for the major social stakeholders in Ireland: 

Source: Core Research. 

Broadly-speaking, the above is expected, although Core Research report contains one glaring omission: it does not survey public attitudes to media/press. Worse, the three improving stakeholder groups are also the three least impacted: own employer, citizens and large companies. Meanwhile, approval of the government is still nosediving. 

Covid pandemic is certainly testing Irish (and other countries') key institutional frameworks. The fallout from these tests is going to be long-lasting and deep. We went into the pandemic with huge deficits of trust in key institutions of our societies. And we are becoming more polarized and less enthusiastic in our support for these institutions since then.

18/6/20: Cheap Institutional Money: It's Supply Thingy

In a recent post, I covered the difference between M1 and MZM money supply, which effectively links money available to households and institutional investors for investment purposes, including households deposits that are available for investment by the banks (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2020/06/what-do-money-supply-changes-tell-us.html). Here, consider money instruments issuance to institutional investors alone:

Effectively, over the last 12 years, U.S. Federal reserve has pumped in some USD 2.6 trillion of cash into the financial asset markets in the U.S. These are institutional investors' money over and above direct asset price supports via Fed assets purchasing programs, indirect asset price supports via Fed's interest rates policies and QE measures aimed at suppression of government bond yields (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2020/05/21520-how-pitchforks-see-greatest.html). 

Any wonder we are in a market that is no longer making any sense, set against the economic fundamentals, where free money is available for speculative trading risk-free (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2020/06/8620-30-years-of-financial-markets.html)?

16/4/20: The BRICS+ challenge to institutional unipolarity and U.S. hegemony 2020 Lecture

My slides from the talk I gave yesterday to the MA in Non-Proliferation and Terrorism Studies students @MIIS on the COVID-updated topic of challenges to Pax-Americana in post-Bretton Woods institutional frameworks (IMF, WB, etc). You can click on each slide to enlarge.

30/7/18: Corruption Perceptions: Tax Havens vs U.S. and Ireland

Transparency International recently released its annual Corruption Perceptions Index, a measure of the degree of public concerns with corruption, covering 180 countries. 

The Index is quite revealing. Not a single large economy is represented in the top 10 countries in terms of low perceptions of corruption. Worse, for a whole range of the much ‘talked about’ tax havens and tax optimising states, corruption seems to be not a problem. Switzerland ranks 3rd in the world in public perceptions of corruption, Luxembourg ranks 8th, along with the Netherlands, and the world’s leading ‘financial secrecy’ jurisdictions, the UK. Hong Kong is ranked 13th. Ireland is in a relatively poor spot at 19th place. 

American exceptionalism, meanwhile, continues to shine. The U.S. occupies a mediocre (for its anti-corruption rhetoric and the chest-thumping pursuits of corrupt regimes around the world) 16th place in the Corruption Perception Index, just one place above Ireland, and in the same place as Belgium and Austria (the former being a well-known centre for business corruption, while the latter sports highly secretive and creative, when it comes to attracting foreign cash, financial system). UAE (21st), Uruguay (23rd), Barbados (25th), Bhutan (26th) and more, are within the statistical confidence interval of the U.S. score. 

And consider Europe. While most of the Nordic and ‘Germanic’ Europe, plus the UK and Ireland, are  in top 20, the rest of the EU rank below the U.S. All non-EU Western European countries, meanwhile, are in the top 15. 

Now, in terms of dynamics, using TI’s data that traces comparable indices back to 2012:

- The U.S. performance in terms of corruption remains effectively poor. The country scored 73 on CPI in 2012-2013, and since then, the score roughy remained bounded between 74 and 75. Ireland, however, managed to improve significantly, relative to the past. In 2012, Irish CPI score was 69. Since then, it rose to a peak of 75 in 2015 and is currently standing at 74. So in terms of both 2012 to peak, and peak to 2017 dynamics, Ireland is doing reasonably well, even though we are still suffering from the low starting base. 

Hey, anyone heard of any corruption convictions at the Four Courts recently?

28/1/17: Trust in Core Social Institutions Has Collapsed

The latest Edelman Trust Barometer for 2017 shows comprehensive collapse in trust around the world in 4 key institutions of any society: the Government (aka, the State), the NGOs (including international organizations), the Media (predominantly, the so-called mainstream media, or established print, TV and radio networks) and the Businesses (heavily dominated by the multinational and larger private and public corporates).

Here are 8 key slides containing Edelman's own insights and my analysis of these.

Let's start with the trend:

In simple terms, world-wide, both trust in Governments and trust in Media are co-trending and are now below the 50 percent public approval levels. For the media, the wide-spread scepticism over the media institutions capacity to deliver on its core trust-related objectives is now below 50 percent for the second year in a row. even at its peak, media managed to command sub-60 percent trust support from the general public, globally. This coincided with the peak for the Governments' trust ratings back in 2013. Four years in a row now, Governments enjoy trust ratings sub-50 percent and in 2017, mistrust in Governments rose, despite the evidence in favour of the on-going global economic recovery.

In 2017, compared to 2015-2016, Media experienced a wholesale collapse in trust ratings. In only three countries of all surveyed by Edelman did trust in media improve: Sweden, Turkey and the U.S. Ironically, the data covering full 2016, does not yet fully reflect the impact of the U.S. Presidential election, during which trust in media (especially the mainstream media) has suffered a series of heavy blows.

 In 2016, 12 out of 29 countries surveyed had trust in Media at 50 percent or higher. In 2017, the number fell to 5.

Similar dynamics are impacting trust in NGOs:

 Of 29 countries surveyed by Edelman, 21 had trust in NGOs in excess of 50 percent in 2017, down from 23 in 2016. Although overall levels of trust in NGOs remains much higher than that for the Media institutions, the trend is for declining trust in NGOs since 2014 and this trend remans on track in 2017 data.

As per trust in Government, changes in 2017 compared to 2015-2016 show only 7 countries with improving Government ratings our of 29 surveyed. This might sound like an improvement, unless you consider the already low levels of trust in Governments.

In 2017, as in 2016 survey, only 7 countries posted trust in Government in excess of 50 percent. This is the lowest proportion of majority trust in Government for any survey on record.

Based on Edelman analysis, the gap between 'experts' (or informed public) view of institutions and that of the wider population is growing.

 And as the above slide from Edelman presentation shows, the gap between informed and general public is substantively the same in culturally (and institutionally) different countries, e.g. the U.S., UK and France. All three countries lead the sample by the size of the differences between their informed public trust in institutions and the general public trust. All of these countries have well-established, historically stable institutions and robust checks and balances underpinning their democracies. Yet, the elites (including intellectual elites) detachment from general public is not only massive, but growing.

These trends are also present in other countries:

As Edelman researchers conclude: the public in general is now driven to reject the status quo.

All of the above suggests that political opportunism, ideological populism and rising nationalism are neither new phenomena, nor un-reflected in historical data, nor fleeting. Instead, we are witnessing organic decline in trust of the institutions that continue to sustain the status quo.

21/5/2105: The Darker Side of Transparency?

World Bank paper published earlier this month and titled "The Dark Side of Disclosure: Evidence of Government Expropriation from Worldwide Firms" raises some very interesting questions about the relationship between corporate transparency and government incentives.

The paper by Liu, Tingting and Ullah, Barkat and Wei, Zuobao and Xu, Lixin Colin (May 4, 2015, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7254: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602586)  looks at "the effects of voluntary accounting information disclosure through auditing on firm access to finance, exposure to corruption, and sales growth." The authors use data for more than 70,000 firms in 121 countries.

The authors find that "…disclosure can be a double-edged sword" with overall effect depending on institutional capital present in a specific country.

"On the one hand, audited firms exhibit a slightly lower level of financial constraints than unaudited firms." This is in line with traditional theory whereby voluntary transparency increases information quality about the firm, but also signals self-selection of better-governed and better-performing firms to the markets.

"On the other hand, audited firms face a significantly higher level of corruption obstacles." Which is really surprising, until you understand the underlying logic.

"The net effects of voluntary information disclosure on firm growth are negative, which can largely be explained by the fact that most of the countries in the sample are developing countries where institutions are weak. The beneficial effect of disclosure increases as a country's property rights protection improves. The qualitative results are robust to considerations of the endogeneity of auditing and to alternative measures of corruption and financial constraints. The findings reveal the dark side of voluntary information disclosure: exposing firms to government expropriation where institutions are weak."

In other words, in more institutionally-advanced economies, voluntary disclosure is a positive factor for the firms, even she we control for self-selection bias. But in countries where institutional capital is weak, the effect is the opposite: in presence of corrupt and accountable governments, disclosing corporate information to the markets can trigger greater effort by the government to expropriate from the reporting firm.

There are serious ramifications for policy and development economics from this study. Traditionally, we tend to push more transparency and more disclosure for the firms operating in institutionally-weak emerging markets. In doing so, we may be aiding the predatory governments who, thus, gain greater ability to corruptly capture firm assets and/or profits over and above legally required taxation. This, in turn, strengthens the corrupt state institutions and government, instead of pushing them toward adopting more rule of law-styled reforms.

Beyond this, the study results suggest that at least in some setting, less transparency and greater ability for the corporates to operate within private information markets can actually be a good thing.

What is interesting is that in public domain, very little attention is paid to this issue. The results of this study, however, are broadly supportive of Acemoglu and Johnson ("Unbundling Institutions", Journal of Political Economy 113(5), 949–92005, 2005) work on the overwhelming importance of constraining government expropriation in facilitating economic development, ex ante other reforms.

On the other hand, transparency is value-additive in the advanced economies setting, where institutions are sufficiently high quality to preempt (or at the very least, diffuse significantly) the emergence of actionable incentives for state expropriation and information-led corruption.

22/1/2014: Tale of Two Italian Earthquakes: Long-Term Effects of Institutional Capital

A very interesting paper from Banca d'Italia on the two divergent outcomes of similar earthquakes in two Italian regions.

The paper, titled "Natural disasters, growth and institutions: a tale of two earthquakes" by by Guglielmo Barone and Sauro Mocetti (Number 949 - January 2014: http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/temidi/td14/td949_14/en_td949/en_tema_949.pdf) is worth reading.

Here is a summary of findings:

"We examine the impact of natural disasters on GDP per capita by applying the
synthetic control approach. Our analysis encompasses two major earthquakes that occurred in two different Italian regions in 1976 and 1980."

Regions covered: Friuli (1976 quake) and Irpinia (1980 earthquake).

"We compare the observed GDP per capita after the quake (which is an exogenous and largely unanticipated shock by definition) in each area with that which would have been observed in the absence of the natural disaster. We carry out this comparative analysis using a rigorous counterfactual approach, the synthetic control method, proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010)."

"According to our findings there are no significant effects of the quake in the short term. However, this result can be largely attributed to the role of financial aid in the aftermath of the disaster. Using different assumptions regarding the magnitude of the fiscal multiplier, we estimate that the yearly GDP per capita growth rate in the five years after the quake, in the absence of financial aid, would have been approximately 0.5-0.9 percentage points lower in Friuli and between 1.3-2.2 points lower in Irpinia."

Note that the above suggests that even at lower levels of impact, fiscal transfers played less importance in Friuli than in Irpinia.

This, however, is not what happens in the long run. While financial aid was effective in reducing impact of the earthquakes in their short-term aftermath, the same aid was not sufficient to counter longer term adverse effects. "In the long term, we find two opposite results: the quakes yielded a positive effect in Friuli and a negative one in Irpinia. In the former, 20 years after the quake, the GDP per capita growth was 23 percent higher than in the synthetic control, while in the latter, the GDP
per capita experienced a 12 percent drop."

What drove these divergent effects? "After showing that in both cases, the dynamics of the GDP per capita largely mirrors that of the TFP, we provide evidence that the institutional quality shapes these patterns. In the bad-outcome case (Irpinia), in the years after the quake fraudulent behaviors flourished, the fraction of politicians involved in scandals increased, and the civic capital deteriorated. Almost entirely opposite effects were observed in Friuli. Since in Irpinia the pre-quake institutional quality was ‘low’ (with respect to the national average) while in Friuli it was ‘high’, we argue that the preexisting local economic and social milieu is likely to play a crucial role in the sign of the economic effect of a natural disaster. Consequently, our results also suggest that disasters may exacerbate differences in economic and social development."

See these the map highlighting the quality of institutions differences:

Or in more succinct terms: "Consistently with these findings, we offer further evidence suggesting that an earthquake and related financial aid can increase technical efficiency via a disruptive creation mechanism or else reduce it by stimulating corruption, distorting the markets and deteriorating social capital. Finally, we show that the bad outcome is more likely to occur in areas with lower pre-quake institutional quality. As a result, our evidence suggests that natural disasters are likely to exacerbate differences in economic and social development."

4/12/2013: Brain Drain and Institutions

A very interesting working paper relating to the issues of human capital and its effects on society and economy, titled "Does Brain Drain Lead to Institutional Gain?" by Li, Xiaoyang and McHale, John (of NUI Galway) and Xuan, Zhou (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2350203).

Per authors, "A country’s endowment of human capital can affect its institutions through various channels. This raises the possibility that skilled emigration can leave its mark on a country’s institutional development. We combine recent datasets on emigrant stocks and institutional quality to explore the impacts of mobile human capital on home country’s institutional quality."

"Our results indicate that skilled emigrants have a positive effect on political institutions (i.e., voice and accountability, and political stability and absence of violence) but a negative effect on economic institutions at home (i.e., government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of corruption). These results are robust to the inclusion of other known determinants of institutional quality."

With some caveats relating to the difficulties involved in assessing causality in a cross-sectional data study: "...we attribute the association to be causal as we use geography-based instruments for emigrant human capital"

20/11/2013: Irish pensions: a crisis of policy, institutions and savings - Sunday Times November 17

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from November 17, 2013.


Back in the early 2011, with the new Government coming into the office, fresh ideas were filling the airy halls of the Department of Finance. Armed with the knowledge that Irish pensions industry was the last vault in the country that still had money in it, Minister Noonan focused his sights. Hitting private pensions was a preferred alternative to raiding banks deposits or imposing cuts to public sector pensions. It suited the pseudo-fairness agenda of the Labor. Better yet, setting a levy on private pensions funds would, in PR-speak, allowed Fine Gael to avoid 'increasing taxes'. The fat cats (private pensions investors) were to share the burden of the fiscal adjustment while the Government was riding a high horse of delivering a rhetorical victory for the little man. The real logic of the move was exactly in line with the reasoning used in continuously raiding health insurance policies: go after the money.

Economics of the measure swept aside, the Government got busy expropriating private property and weakening the system of future pensions provisions. A temporary pensions levy was born out of this. With it, the country was firmly put on the road to a comprehensive dismantling of the already dysfunctional system.

Set at 0.6 percent per annum for 2011-2014 the original levy was dressed up in 2011 as a measure to free unproductive savings to fund jobs creation in the economy. Budgets 2012 and 2013 followed up with a raft of other measures, all designed to take more cash out of savings. Budget 2014 not only failed to curtail this onslaught but created a new levy of 0.15 percent that will run over 2014-2015 period and, according to a large number of analysts, is expected to continue beyond the 2015.

Yet, as the documents recently released by the Department of Finance show, back in 2011, the Department briefed the Minister as to the fallacy of his thinking. At the time, the pensions deficits accumulated in the Irish system totaled EUR10-15 billion. These deficits, according to the briefing, were in excess of what the nation's employers and employees could shoulder even before the Government moved on the funds. Between 75 and 80 percent of all Defined Benefit funds in the country were technically insolvent, accounting for two thirds of all pensions.

The Minister also had to be aware that a tax on capitalised value of the funds amounted to expropriation of private property. And that it cuts across the serious warnings concerning our pensions sustainability coming from the Troika and the OECD.

The problems with this approach to pensions systems are manifold and are setting us up for a long-term crisis. They include: exacerbating catastrophic pensions shortfalls, reducing future credibility of the system and undermining public confidence in the security of our financial system. Increasing future pressures on the Exchequer finances stemming from demographic changes and the legacy of the current crisis is the direct corollary of the short-termist position adopted by the Government.


Irish pensions system is fundamentally insolvent today and this insolvency is only made worse by our policies.

Top figures speak for themselves: at the end of 2012, there were 232,939 Defined Contribution schemes members, 527,681 Defined Benefit schemes signees and 206,936 PRSAs. Inclusive of PRSAs, total capitalisation of the system was around EUR78-79 billion. Defined Benefit schemes made virtually no contributions to the capital pool backing pensions system in the country. Excluding PRSAs, almost 7 out of 10 Irish pensions were funded by the IOUs on future taxpayers and company employees. The cumulated potential obligations in the pensions provisions of the Defined Benefits schemes amounted to some EUR 165 billion or around 100 percent of Ireland's GDP. These are growing, fuelled by early retirement schemes in the public sector and exits of private sector Defined Contributions savers.

Private pensions in Ireland remain not only underfunded, but also insufficient in cover. Currently, Ireland ranks the lowest in the OECD in terms of net pensions wealth held for those earning at or above average wages. Things are somewhat better for those on lower incomes. Still, we rank below OECD mean in terms of pensions cover for workers earning less than the average wage. An Irish family with two earners and combined annual earnings of around EUR90,000 can expect a pension cover of 40% of the pre-retirement earnings for 10.5 years. Budget 2014 has reduced this number by at least 0.5 years. OECD average for such coverage is closer to 28 years. OECD estimates show that at the end of 2009 only 41.3 percent of our public and private sectors’ workers were enrolled in a funded pension plan.

Since the beginning of the century, the systematic policy approach adopted by the Irish Governments to dealing with the pensions crisis has been to rely on Defined Contribution schemes to plug the vast deficit in the Defined Benefit schemes. The former are dominant in the private sector, the latter are the cornerstone of the public sector. Since the onset of the crisis, Irish state has acted to level huge burden of fiscal adjustment on future retirees, with levies and tax adjustments reaching into billions of euros and rising rapidly. The measures hit hard not only the savers at the top of the income distribution, but ordinary middle class investors. For example, according to a recent report on Budget 2014 measures, a young worker setting aside annually some EUR2,500 as a starting pension in 2011 will see a life-time cost of the pensions levies reach EUR32,500. He or she will face a reduction of EUR1,625 per annum in annual retirement benefits thanks solely to levies alone.

All of this is gradually eroding the public credibility in the system and acts to lower future solvency of the private and public schemes. According to the Pensions Board and OECD data, Ireland pensions coverage is declining over time. The numbers of workers covered by both, Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution schemes have fallen steadily since 2006 for the former and 2008 for the latter.

This trend is compounded by the nature of the crisis that hit Ireland since the end of the Celtic Tiger era. Unprecedented collapse in property markets triggered massive destruction of household wealth and catastrophic inflation of the debt crisis for households that are nearing the age when they normally accelerate their pensions savings.

Despite this, the Government continues to reduce tax deferrals available for those retirement savings. Examples of such policies include changes to lump sum payments tax treatments, changes to the Standard Fund Threshold, elimination of the PRSI and health levy/USC relief and so on. In effect, pensions funds became a ground zero of the Irish Government-waged war of financial repression – a brutal and cynical policy aimed at protecting own interests at the expense of the future retirees.


The OECD report on Irish pensions system, presented to the Government earlier this year, before Budget 2014 contained the usual litany of complaints about the system.

These include the fact that Ireland does not have a mandatory earnings-related pensions system to complement the State pension at basic level. According to the OECD, as a result, Ireland "faces the challenge of filling the retirement savings gap to reach adequate levels of pension replacement rates to ward off pensioner poverty." Furthermore, private pension coverage, both in occupational and personal pensions, is uneven and needs to be increased urgently. The latest changes introduced in Budget 2014 clearly exacerbate this, and the Government cannot claim that it was not aware of this problem. The existing tax deferral structure in Ireland, based on marginal tax rates, provides higher incentives to invest in pensions for higher earners, resulting in severe pensions under provision for middle classes. The OECD identified "unequal treatment of public and private sector workers due to the prevalence of defined benefit plans in the public sector and defined contribution plans in the private sector."  The reforms aiming to address this gap by introducing new pensions scheme for public servants are "being phased in only very slowly and [are] unlikely to affect a majority of public sector workers for a long time".

The OECD produced a long list of recommendations for the Government aimed at improving the system design and addressing some of the above bottlenecks. Virtually none of these saw any significant action.

The two options for a structural reform of the State pension scheme recommended by the OECD: a universal basic pension or a means-tested basic pension remain off the drawing board. Explicitly, OECD stated that “to increase adequacy of pensions in Ireland, there is a need to increase coverage in funded pensions. Increasing coverage can be achieved through 1) compulsion, 2) soft-compulsion, automatic enrolment, and/or 3) improving the existing financial incentives.” Instead, the Government continues to treat private pensions savings as funds it can raid to raise quick revenues. This makes it impossible for broad and structural reforms to gain support of the public, undermining in advance any future effort to address the crisis we face.

Note: this information was just released today: http://www.independent.ie/business/personal-finance/pensions/thousands-of-oaps-facing-the-shock-of-cuts-in-their-pensions-29768766.html

Box-out:

In economics terms, it is often impossible to put a hard number on the value of less tangible institutional capital of the nation. Yet, systems and institutions of governance and democratic participation do matter in determining nation’s economic capacity and competitiveness. Sadly, it appears that the Irish Government is giving the idea that open and transparent state systems are a necessary condition for building a sustainable and prosperous economy and society little credit. Instead, the Irish authorities are about to significantly restrict effective access to state information. To do so, the Government is planning to introduce a new, more complex and expensive system of fees that apply to the requests filed under the Freedom of Information Act. Some observers have been arguing that the true objective is to reduce the public disclosure of information. Others have suggested more benign reasons for the proposals. Irrespective of the motives, over time, these changes are likely to lead to greater opacity and lower accountability across the State and private sectors. Such trends usually go hand-in-hand with increases in corruption, mismanagement, poor design of public policies, and increased political and civic apathy. In the long run, the proposed reforms can, among other things, spill over into generating greater economic inefficiencies, less meritocratic distribution of resources, and distort returns to investment. They can also reduce our attractiveness as a destination for domestic and foreign investors, entrepreneurs and workers. The victims of poor governance that can arise on foot of any effort to reduce effective access to information will be both the Irish society and our economy.