26/4/2013: Another indicator turns South: Irish Retail Sales March 2014

Off the start, let me say I am sorry that I have to bring one set of bad news after another. Living, working, raising kids and building my family future in Ireland means that I have as much 'skin in the game' of seeing Irish economy recover from this crisis as any one of us.

With that in mind, here are the latest statistics from the CSO on Irish retail services activity in March 2013. These make for ugly reading.

First, quoting CSO own release:

"The volume of retail sales (i.e. excluding price effects) decreased by 1.9% in March 2013 when compared with February 2013 and there was a decrease of 3.6% in the annual figure.  If Motor Trades are excluded, the volume of retail sales decreased by 1.8% in March 2013 when compared with February 2013 and there was an annual decrease of 1.6%.

There was a decrease in the value of retail sales in March 2013 when compared with February 2013 of 1.9% and there was an annual decrease of 4.1% when compared with March 2012.  If Motor Trades are excluded, there was a monthly decrease of 1.8% in the value of retail sales and an annual decrease of 1.7%."

So, both volumes and values of sales, both core (ex-Motors) and overall have tanked in m/m and y/y terms. This is outright ugly.

Details of dynamics, all for ex-Motors sales:

• Value Index for core retail sales 3mo MA through March 2013 stood at 95.7 down from 3mo MA through December 2012 which read 97.1 (a 3mo back decline of 2.38%). 6mo MA stood at 96.4 against 6mo MA through August 2012 at 95.8. Which means deterioration set in over the last 3 months. Volumes of sales is now down 5.2% on 2005 average levels and 6.42% down on crisis period average activity levels.
• Volume Index for core retail sales 3mo MA through March 2013 stood at 99.0 down from 3mo MA through December 2012 which read 100.9 (a 3mo back decline of 3.07%). 6mo MA stood at 100.0 against 6mo MA through August 2012 at 99.4. Which means deterioration in value of sales also set in over the last 3 months. Values of sales are now down 2.2% on 2005 average levels and 5.35% down on crisis period average activity levels.
• Meanwhile, ESRI-reported Consumer Confidence Index rose to 60.0 in March 2013 against 59.4 in February, with 1.01% m/m rise and down only 0.99% on March 2012. 
• On 3mo MA basis - while both Volume and Value of core activities fell, Consumer Confidence index rose at a massive 20.5% rate. Bizarre stuff.
• Both Volume and Value of sales in March 2013 stood below 2005 average, while Consumer Confidence stood 18.5% above! Both measures of retails sales have dropped in march 2013 compared to crisis period average, but Consumer Confidence rose 8.3%. Even more bizarre stuff.
• My Retail Sales Activity Index fared much better than the ESRI Consumer Confidence Indicator - down m/m 1.22% and down 1.46% y/y, while up only slightly (+0.20%) on 2005 average and down 3.11% on crisis period average.

Charts:

Core Conclusions: Latest retail sales figures are outright ugly. These signal continued downside pressure on the domestic economy and, given the dynamics in personal income and earnings, this momentum appears to be driven by the overall consumer sentiment and lack of confidence in future income dynamics, related to Government policy (property tax and personal insolvency regime reforms) and to banks' interest rates policies (consumers expecting rises in the rates, confirmed by this week's ARM rate hikes by AIB & its subsidiaries). The economy is once again putting us on warning: turn downward in economic activity can be expected as a major risk.

26/4/2013: Meanwhile, Patients Still Run the Euro Policy Asylum...

Headlines (via Eurointelligence.com):

• Angela Merkel: "The European Central Bank would really have to increase the interest rates for Germany";
• Angela Merkel also said that for other countries, the ECB would have to provide more liquidity for companies;
• German economics minister Phillip Rosler issued a statement to confirm that the ECB was still an independent central bank;
• ECB officials, meanwhile, played down expectations that a rate cut would have much of an effect;
• Joerg Asmussen did not rule out an interest rate cut, but was playing down expectations. He said lower interest rates could work in ways not intended by the ECB, and added that they had virtually no effect in the periphery due to the broken transmission mechanisms;
• Benoit Coeure as saying that the ECB had done what it can. It was now up to all the European institutions to find ways to solve the problem;
• Wolfgang Schauble said Italy’s problems were a lack of reforms, and that it would be wrong to blame others for their own misfortune. "... in the eurozone everybody had to solve their own problems. And that is is what Italy needed to do as well. There was no point in asking Germany to take on more debt. Everybody had to run their government in a responsible way";
• Schauble also said that it would be wrong for member states to depart from austerity path, saying the eurozone problems had nothing to do with strict budget rules, and that "somebody should tell Barroso that".

Conclusion: rest assured - the screw up known as "Euro area policy" will go on unabated no matter what JMBarosso & Co are saying.

ECB rate cut might come or it might not, but it will be minor (25bps) and one-off (with rates unchanged throughout the rest of the year) and it will do no difference whatsoever, other than fuel anti-inflationary rhetoric in pre-election Germany.

Fiscal policy will remain largely unchanged with some states (France, Italy, even Spain?) adopting an Irish-government approach to 'stimulus': find one-off non-tax, like pensions funds expropriation, to fund 'jobs creation programme', while leaving net fiscal adjustments intact. Which will, of course, amount to short-term reallocation of productive funds to unproductive GDP supports, with medium-term negative impact of tax increases and reduced confidence in economic institutions.

26/4/2013: Where's that 'recovery' thingy? Irish Residential Property Prices, March 2013

Various Irish ministers and Government 'analysts' have been on the media in recent months extolling the virtues of 'recovery'. In a society still obsessed with property prices, one of the key tenets of the 'recovery is upon us' proposition is the view that Irish property prices are rising once again usually followed by the claims that hordes of 'foreign investors' and 'domestic cash buyers' are fighting to get their hands on prized Irish properties.

Of course, a major point of internal contradiction for all these 'green jersey' claims is that if property prices are rising, then the cost of doing business in Ireland should be rising as well, just as the 'analysts' are claiming that it is falling, especially when it comes to rents and property costs. You see, one can't really have both: deflation in costs is incompatible with rising prices on assets underlying these costs.

Meanwhile, as usual with the Government's exhortations, reality has been having a mind of its own.

Latest numbers from CSO, covering the Residential Property Price Index for Ireland, show exactly how out of touch the folks peddling are.

All properties RPPI fell 3.03% y/y in March and this accelerated 2.57% y/y fall recorded in February. M/m property prices were down 0.47%, which is better than 1.59% m/m drop in February, but marks 4th consecutive month of monthly prices drops. Last time Irish residential property prices were up was in November 2012 and since then we have seen a cumulative decline in prices of 3.03%.

6mo cumulative decline in RPPI stands at 2.58% against previous 6mo cumulative drop of 1.23% and against average m/m drop over the last 6 months of 0.43%.

In fact, All Properties index has fallen to an all-time low in March 2013 despite numerous proclamations of recovery by the Government. Property prices are now down 50.88% on their peak and are statistically significantly below crisis period average.

The distance to 6mo MA line is now widening, which suggests that we might be in a medium-term secular change in trend downward from the previous trend that was just flat. As a note of caution: this remains to be confirmed over time.

House prices also hit an all-time low in March 2013 with index sliding 3.05% y/y, against 2.90% decline recorded in February, and 0.3% down on m/m basis. 3mo cumulated change is now -3.04%, 6mo cumulated change is at -2.77% and previous 6mo cumulated change was -1.47% so things are getting worse faster. House prices are now down 49.39% on peak.

Apartments prices have decline 1.44% in March on y/y basis, having posted 6.4% rise y/y in February. Monthly change in Apartments prices was -6.99%. 3mo cumulated change in prices is still +2.13%, with 6mo cumulated change of +2.13% down from previous 6mo cumulated change at +9.81%. Relative to peak, Apartments prices are running down 61.34% and relative to all-time low they are up just 4.81%.

Dublin prices were most often cited as showing significant gains in the current 'recovery'. These are still up 1.38% y/y in march, but they were up 2.95% y/y in February. Monthly drop in Dublin residential properties was -0.84% m/m and this marks second consecutive m/m drop. 3mo cumulated change in prices was -0.68% against -1.17% in previous 3mo period, 6mo cumulated change is now at +0.17% against +3.49% increase on previous 6mo period. Dublin prices are now down 56.28% on peak and are up 2.62% on absolute low.

In short, to conclude:

1. As I have maintained throughout recent months, Irish residential property prices are trending flat overall.
2. Flat trend is now being challenged to the downside, with some indications that it is turning to negative, though this requires more data to make any conclusion firm.
3. Prices are seeking some catalyst in the market and despite all the efforts by the Government to 'talk the talk' on recovery, there are no indications from the property market that such 'recovery' is anywhere in sight.

25/4/2013: IMF's 'End of Austerity' Napkin Sketch Is Soggy Wet

IMF catches up with 'End Austerity' bandwagon and overtakes the EU 'policymakers' in providing a general blueprint. From today's comments by IMF First Deputy Managing Director David Lipton (emphasis is mine):

"...Europe needs to act on several fronts. Countries will need to have clear and specific commitments to medium-term fiscal consolidation, with the appropriate pace to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Careful consideration should also be given to the composition of fiscal measures. The European Central Bank (ECB) should maintain its very accommodative stance, he said, but noted that eliminating financial fragmentation – whereby households and companies in some countries face clogged credit channels and lending rates well above those in the core – will probably require the ECB to implement some “additional unconventional measures.”

So the Fiscal Compact of 'One Policy Target & Timeframe Fit All' is out of the window then? If timeframe (pace) were to be set on a case-by-case basis, there is hardly any real discipline left. Here's why. Suppose Italy takes slower path to deflating debt levels to the target of 60% than that mandated by the Fiscal Compact (FC) (5% adjustment per annum). France, then, can demand either a slower pace for its drawdown of debt or it can opt to demand slower reductions in deficits. Which means Spain will also have its list of requests ready, all in breach of the FC.

"As we see it, countries that can afford to support the economy need to do so—but in ways that encourage the private sector to invest and boost demand..."

Ok, but what does it mean? AAA countries borrowing to stimulate? Suppose they succeed. What happens to growth rates and income levels in Euro area? Right - divergence will be amplified and with it, mismatch of monetary and FX policies too. 

Per paying attention to the composition of fiscal measures: it is a fine objective. Except in the case of European leaders, this means, usually, hiking taxes even more instead of cutting spending. IMF knows that this is counterproductive, but whilst correctly arguing that policies should be reflective of heterogeneity between member states' economies, IMF is incorrectly ignoring the political reality of Europe, where more spending = good, lower taxes = bad.

More: "Another country responsibility is better structural policies. Countries should press on to tackle long-standing rigidities in order to raise medium-term growth prospects. Southern Europe, and even some of the core, needs to increase its competitiveness in the tradeable goods sector, especially through labor and product market reforms. So far, much of the reduction in current account deficits has come because demand is sluggish.  For a stronger, sustained improvement -- enough to boost exports that will create jobs for the unemployed -- countries need a broader and more durable improvement in competitiveness, based on structural reform. In Northern Europe, even where national competitiveness is not the issue, reforms could help generate a more vibrant services sector."

Again, usual tool kit deployed by the IMF: structural reforms are needed (no real innovation as to what these might be) and exports must be increased (who will be buying these exports in the world where every country is being told by the IMF to increase its exports?).

I wonder why would Mr Lipton label ECB current stance as being accommodative. ECB interest rate is above G7 average and ECB's 'panacea' of OMT is yet to make any real purchases. ECB has attempted to sterilise all past 'accommodative' interventions and is now pleased with winding up LTROs. In brief, setting aside war-time rhetoric from the ECB, Frankfurt is accommodating very little.

One has to agree with the need to eliminate financial fragmentation, but IMF is fully aware that European system will have to continue deleveraging. There is too much debt in the pipeline to de-clog it by simply pushing through more credit at lower cost.

"...the Single Supervisory Mechanism [is] “a key step” and ...the IMF supports a market-based bail-in approach as being considered in the European Union Directive on Bank Recovery and Resolution, which would require banks to hold a minimum amount of securities with features that permit them to be written-off or converted to equity if capital buffers fall too low..."

So getting Cyprused is  the future for Europe, then.

Mr Lipton is dead on right, saying that "In our preoccupation with sovereign debt, we tend to overlook the huge overhang of private debt in some countries that could be a deadweight on demand and bank balance sheets for a long time. We’ve already seen the hit that households have taken in the periphery economies because of the sharp correction in home prices (e.g. Ireland). This could only worsen without renewed growth (e.g. Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands)." And more: "On the corporate side, we know how much the level of debt has increased over the past decade, particularly in the periphery. We elaborated on this development in our recent Global Financial Stability Report.  ...Measured on a debt-to-equity basis, a portion of Italy's corporate sector is rising into stressed levels. In the event of a prolonged stagnation, corporate profits would slacken further, putting pressure on companies to deleverage and increasing the risk of debt distress. Corporates are not being helped by bank retrenchment back into home markets. This is most pronounced from the periphery; French and German banks reduced their exposures to these markets by some 30-40 percent between mid 2011 and the third quarter of last year."

Conclusion (relevant to 'being Cyprused' above): "None of this bodes well for banks in a stagnation scenario. They are already weak. But higher levels of corporate and household defaults and credit losses would threaten a second round of bank balance sheet deterioration."

Net result: IMF has no new ideas on what to do if 'austerity' path were to be altered. There's a good reason as to why they don't - borrowing cash to burn it on Government spending (traditional European way) is out of question, given the risk of raising costs of borrowing, slow growth and higher interest bills that await. And using monetary policy to full extent is infeasible because IMF has no hope for ECB in its current state.

'Austerity' might be overdone, but 'Not Austerity' is unlikely to be any different...

24/4/2013: Credit demand conditions in Irish banks: Q2 2013

All's quiet in the Irish Banking 'sector' Zombieland, per CBofI latest missive (link):

Good news: there was an improved demand for Fixed Investment in Q4 2012. Since then, Q1-Q2 2013 shows zero growth in demand. Non-news: Operating capital is now again tight (Q4 2012 and Q2 2013) against zero change in Q1 2013. Bad news: restructuring demand is up again after posting zero growth in Q1 2013.

So on business credit demand side: no real economic activity growth is signalled by investment demand, poorer conditions in operating capital signalled by the respective demand increase (albeit very moderate rate of increase) and credit restructuring pressures are slightly up as well.

On households side:

House purchases credit demand is up, at weak and moderating rate. Nothing dramatic, really, but good-ish sort of news. 

Basically, things are flat. Again, you can read this as a somewhat positive (things are not getting worse), or you can treat it as somewhat negative (given rates of contraction in credit during the crisis, real recovery should see demand and supply spiking rapidly up). My view is - the above confirms the proposition that Irish economy is at near-zero real growth trendline and the banking sector remains a drag on growth.

24/4/2013: Systemic biases in income, consumption & savings surveys

A subtle, but important from policy and business strategy perspective paper from the Banca d'Italia, Working Paper No. 908, titled "Asking income and consumption questions in the same survey: what are the risks?" (April 2013) by Giulia Cifaldi and Andrea Neri.

The issue at hand is of relevance to:

• Marketing and market surveyors who aim to identify the relationship between sub-groups or categories of consumers in terms of their incomes and consumption, as well as savings;
• Policymakers concerned with use of surveys to accurately gauge savings and consumption (in the recent case in Ireland the issue relates to the accuracy of the estimates of required income expenditure and available disposable income in the case of Personal Insolvency Guidelines).

Per authors: "Sample surveys … focusing on income usually do collect some information on expenditure data. A main drawback of this practice is that it could let some researchers think that both sets of information have similar accuracy, as they are derived from the same survey. This paper provides an empirical investigation of the consequences of such an assumption.

We draw on the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW, thereafter) as a case study, since it collects information on both income and consumption. We combine this survey with the information coming from other surveys that are assumed to be more reliable than the SHIW for specific items."

Core findings:

• On average, "the underestimation of household income is lower than the one relating to consumption."
• "As a consequence, in the survey saving rates are likely to be overestimated," and  "…measurement error in income data is proportionally higher for high incomes."
• In the case of consumption data: "Household saving is likely to be overestimated, especially for households in the low income classes."
• Authors also "find evidence that measurement error may bias the relationship between household savings and its determinants."

Link to the study: http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/temidi/td13/td908_13/en_td908/en_tema_908.pdf

24/4/2014: Mandatory or Voluntary Board Independence?

An interesting paper on the impact of independent directors appointments on equity prices published in September-October 2012 issue of the Emerging Markets Finance & Trade (vol 48, number 5, pages 25-47) throws some light on the role of regulatory and governance restrictions relating to Corporate Governance.

Traditionally, and especially in the present economic climate of mistrust of the enterprise and markets, imposition of the regulatory requirements for independent directors appointments to the boards of the companies is seen as a good thing. The argument in favour of mandatory requirement of this sort goes along the lines that forcing a company to comply with the 'best practice' in corporate governance leads to an improvement in company performance. Presence of independent directors on the boards, especially where mandated, is seen as one of the most important aspects of board-level governance, bestowing the benefits of monitoring of the management decisions and performance, as well as signalling to investors (and even potentially customers and counterparties to the firm's operations) the quality of the firm (at least as far as its governance structures are concerned).

If the above thesis is correct, on average, firms operating in the regulatory environment of mandatory requirements for appointment of independent non-executive directors should outperform (from investor perspective) firms operating in the environment where such appointments are not required.

Ming-Chang Wang and Yung-Chuan Lee - in their paper titled "The Signaling Effect of Independent Director Appointments" - use data for Korean plcs during the period of time when some of the firms were covered by the explicit requirement for appointment of directors and some operated in the environment where such appointments were made on the basis of voluntary choice of the firm board.

The authors hypothecise that "analytical model proposes that the market expects voluntary appointments to bring more positive value than mandatory appointments since voluntary appointments signal the integrity of the firm". And indeed, the authors find that voluntary and not mandatory appointments "are associated with higher abnormal returns from appointment announcements, particularly for firms with severe agency problems..."

Empirical results from the study show that:

1. "... there are significantly positive market reactions to the announcements of the appointment of independent directors" in terms of abnormal returns in days 0, 1 and 2 after the announcement (+0.095-0.125%) and in cumulated abnormal returns "in the windows after and between the event day" at 0.236% and 0.254%, respectively.
2. "... mandatory appointment policy has not provided investors with any significant monitoring value, and we can therefore also state that the regulation has not been effective for the market".
3. "In contrast to the mandatory appointments, the significantly positive abnormal returns of the voluntary appointments for days 0, 1, 2, and 3 reveal the possibility of the existence of a combination effect of both signaling and monitoring value after the event day, based upon firms' voluntarily appointing independent directors to signal their integrity."

From the point of view of the policy systems, the results above suggest that instead of imposing mandatory requirements, we would be better off cultivating voluntary culture of board independence and appointment of directors with truly independent track records. Afterall, when you think of the potential for cronyism determining or co-determining appointments choices in the mandatory requirement setting, you can see that mandatory appointments can do more damage than good to both the firms and the markets.

23/4/2013: Updating the cost of banking crisis data

Nice update from the ECB on the cumulated cost of the banking crisis in Europe, now available through 2012. The net effect, summing up all assumed sovereign liabilities relating to the crisis, including contingent liabilities, and subtracting asset values associated with these liabilities are shown (by country) in the chart below:

Note the special place of Ireland in the above.

For the euro area as a whole, net liabilities relating to the crisis back in 2007 stood at EUR 0.00 (EUR36.72 billion for EU27). By the end of 2012 these have risen to EUR 740.15 billion (EUR 734.23 billion for EU27).

Net revenue losses for Government arising from the banking sector rescues, per ECB are:

23/4/2014: Irish Government Net Debt

Not that I am looking for it, but the data just jumps out to shout "All this malarky about Ireland's Government debt sustainability being ahead of all in the 'periphery' is just bollocks". And indeed it is.

Recall that the last bastion of 'our debt is just fine' brigade used to be the rarely cited metric of Net Debt (debt less cash reserves and disposable assets available to the State). Recall that our 'assets' - largely a pile of shares in AIB and Ptsb et al - is officially valued at long-term economic value (not current value, which would be way, way lower than LTEV). And now, behold Ireland's relative position in terms of net debt to GDP ratio, courtesy of the IMF WEO projections for 2013 published this month:

So: third worst in the euro area and worse than that for Italy. And, incidentally, it is expected to be third worst in 2014 as well.

Good thing Benda & Loonan are not running around saying 'Ireland is not Italy', yet...

23/4/2013: Ignore Europe's Debt Crisis at Your Own Peril

In recent days it became quite 'normal' to bash 'austerity' and talk about debt overhang as the contrived issue with no grounding in reality. Aside from the arguments of those worked up about Reinhrat & Rogoff (2010) paper (ignoring all other research showing qualitatively, and even quantitatively similar results to theirs), there is a pesky little problem:

• Debt has physical manifestation (albeit an imperfect one) in the form of banks (lenders) balancesheets. 

As the result of this pesky problem, we can indeed gauge (again, an imperfect translation, but better than none) the effect of repairing these balancesheets on the supply of credit, thus on investment, and thus on real economic activity.

Here are 2012 IMF estimates of the effects of the euro area banks deleveraging on the real economy:

'Weak policies' in the above are what we currently pursuing - with monetary and fiscal policies mismatch. And the negative effect of the declines runs past 2017 in the case of the heavily-indebted peripheral states. Cumulated decline estimated, relative to baseline GDP forecasts, is almost 12% over 5 years. Which over 20 years (average duration of the debt crises episodes) runs closer to 0.7% of GDP loss per annum due to banks deleveraging, aka due to banks managing debt levels on their own balancesheets.

The above chart is based on banking sector lending alone, excluding effects from deleveraging by other investors and financial intermediaries, and excluding effects of non-EU banks deleveraging or effects of the non-EU banks exits from the euro area. With these in place, the adverse effects can probably reach beyond 1% mark.

22/4/2013: Government Latest Hair-brained Idea

Earlier today, RTE has reported that:
"The [Irish] Government has launched a plan to facilitate the creation of 20,000 jobs in the manufacturing sector by 2016." Frankly speaking, I can't be bothered to read much more into the idea. In times of aplenty it is bonkers to allow the state to pick winners in the economics game and then let civil servants lavish 'investment' supports onto them. In times when debt/GDP ratio is up at 120% of GDP marker and private debt is bending the nation into the ground, the very same idea is simply a prescription for massive waste we can't afford. 

But here's what, according to RTE report is even worse: 

1. "Under the plan fledgling manufacturing companies will get to apply for support from a specific start-up fund." Wait... start-up funds invest in start-ups which, by their definition can't be in existence long enough to become 'fledgling' - unless they are 'fledging from the start-up phase' which is equivalent to being dead-on-arrival. So question for Irish boffins: you will be investing in freshly-dead firms or fledgling ancient 'one-day-were-start-ups'?
2. "There will also be a support fund for capital investment by manufacturing companies and additional financial support for R&D investment in engineering firms." Aside from capital investment (presumably, having nationalised most of the banking system, our markets-supportive Government now has appetite to take on equity in manufacturing firms too) idea which suffers from the same problem of 'winners-picking', leading to risk-mispricing (which in current fiscal conditions can be labeled 'waste' outright), there is a problem of R&D supports. Targeted tax and sponsorship allocations to R&D supports are not a good policy for stimulating high value-added R&D. Here's one study that found as much. 
3. "The plan also contains proposals to maintain or reduce company costs for energy, waste, regulation and tax." Wait, how is that going to be achieved, if, per our semi-state behemoths and the Government, there is no ripping-off of consumers/users going on in Irish energy, waste and tax environments? Either things are being priced to rip-off customers today (thus allowing for some price reductions), or there is no room for price reductions, or - as most likely - the Irish Government is planning to increase rip-off of other customers (e.g. households) to subsidise select manufacturing ones.
4. If Irish Government pumps said subsidies into select manufacturers, how does this square with the equal markets treatment laws within the EU? And how will the Irish Government deal with the pesky problem that you can engage in industrial favouritism while making any serious claims about having a real markets-oriented economy here?

I can go on about this latest idea. It is promised that it will 'create' 20,000 jobs by 2016 - a claim that is, as always is the case with the Irish Government pronouncements, is neither verifiable, nor based on any serious analysis. But, needless to say, there will be loads of PR opportunities involving flowers, ribbons, Ministers and RTE cameras in months to come. Meanwhile, when your taxes go up comes December 2013 once again, don't ask why, think Government 'jobs creation' plans... Think big... Think someone else is getting subsidies so you don't have to...

22/4/2013: Who funds growth in Europe?..

There are charts and then there are Charts. One example of the latter is via IMF CR1371

The above shows a number of really interesting differences between the euro area and the US, as well as within euro area:

• Look at the share of overall funding accruing to the traditional (deposits) banks in the US (tiny) and the euro area (massive) - debt is the preferred form of funding for Europe
• Look at the share of equity in the US funding and in euro area, ex-Luxembourg - equity is not a preferred way for funding growth in Europe.
• Why the above matter? Simply put, debt - especially banks debt - is not challenging existent ownership of the firm raising funding. Which means that patriarchal structures of family-owned firms, with their inefficient and paternalistic hiring and promotions and management systems can be sustained more easily in the case of debt-funded firms than in the case of equity funded ones.
• Look at the role played in the US by the credit supplied by 'other financial institutions' - non-banks. Again, these would be more 'activist'-styled funding streams exerting more pressure on management and ownership structures.

What about Ireland? Look at the composition of funding sources in the country:

1. Strong reliance on corporate bonds markets is probably reflective of three factors: (a) concentrated loans issued during the building boom and related to construction, development & investment in land remain the legacy of the boom and rely on collateralized bonds issuance, (b) banks funding via collateralization, (c) concentrated nature of Irish listed plcs, (d) massive M&A spree undertaken by Irish plcs and larger private companies on foot of cheap leverage available in the 2000-2007 period, etc. The volume of bonds might be large, but their quality is most likely lower due to the above points.
2. Strong - actually second strongest in the sample after Cyprus - reliance on bank lending to fund economy.
3. Weak, extremely thin equity cushion. 

Now, keep in mind: equity is the best, most stable and most suitable for absorbing crisis impact form of funding.