11/1/2012: Great Moderation or Great Delusion

A recent (December 2011) paper published by CEPR offers a very interesting analysis of the macroeconomic risks propagation in the current crisis. The paper, titled Great Moderation or Great Mistake: Can rising confidence in low macro-risk explain the boom in asset prices? (CEPR DP 8700) by Tobias Broer and Afroditi Kero looks at the evidence on whether the period of Great Moderation in macroeconomic volatility during the period from the mid-1980s (the decline in macroeconomic volatility that is unprecedented in modern history) had an associated impact on the rise of asset prices that accompanied this period, setting the stage for the ongoing crash.

In recent literature, this rise in asset prices, and the crash that followed, have both been attributed to "overconfidence in a benign macroeconomic environment of low volatility" or to excessively optimistic expectations of investors that the lengthy period of macroeconomic stability and upward trending is the 'new normal'. 

The study introduced learning about the persistence of volatility regimes in a standard asset pricing model of investor decision making. "It shows that the fall in US macroeconomic volatility since the mid-1980s only leads to a relatively small increase in asset prices when investors have full information about the highly persistent, but not permanent, nature of low volatility regimes." In other words, in the rational expectations setting with no errors in judgement and perfect foresight (investors are aware that volatility reductions are temporary), there is no bubble forming.

However, when investors "infer the persistence of low volatility from empirical evidence" (in other words when knowledge is imperfect and there is a probabilistic scenario under which the moderation can be permanent, then "Bayesian learning can deliver a strong rise in asset prices by up to 80%. Moreover, the end of the low volatility period leads to a strong and sudden crash in prices."

Specifically, calibrated model generates pre-collapse rise in asset prices of 77% and overvaluation of assets by 79% over the case of no learning. The subsequent collapse of asset prices is 84% in the case of imperfect information learning.

A pretty nice result! 

11/01/2012: Risk-off or 'Grab that Straw, Man'?

Another day, another historical marker falls under the weight of the euro area mess:

US Treasury auctioned off USD21bn of 10 year notes today achieving the yield of 1.90% - lowest on record for an auction. Cover was 3.19 times the offering, slightly ahead of 3.15 average for previous four 10 year notes auctions. Direct bidders demand was up to 17.4% of sales against the average 10%. 10 year secondary markets yields sliped to 1.91% from 1.97% pre-auction.

Here's the IMF illustration (all charts below are from Cottarelli November 2011 presentation) of the evolution of holdings of US debt:

Which, funnily enough, is pretty diversified when compared to that found in Europe:

But the US yields are, of course, purely irrational:

Then, again, not as irrational as those found in Japan:

Altogether elsewhere, vast... German bund auction - 5 year, €4 billion - attracted cover of 2.24 and the average yield of 0.9%. That is well below inflation - however measured - and even below expected inflation, accounting for the potential slowdown. In other words, investors are now so scared, they are paying German government money to store their cash. In the secondary markets, German 1 year bonds turned negative yield back at the end of November, for the first time in history. German 10-years are currently trading in the 1.87% yield territory. According to FT, 10 year bund yields fell from 3.49% in April 2011 to a low of 1.67% in September last year.

Risk-off raging as EU vacillates... or rather, as its leaders consider how to by-pass Belgian General strike that has derailed their January 30 summit.


Nice one, folks. The insolvent Rome burns, the leaders are having summits galore and the unions are demanding more insolvency, while country output shrinks due to striking.


We are no longer in risk-aversion or even loss-aversion world, we are in a grab-anything-that-might-float world.

10/1/2012: Entrepreneurship and Chaos

In a slight departure from macroeconomic focus of the blog, here are two links to, in my view, pivotal articles on business and entrepreneurship. Pivotal not because they provide the answers, but because they raise questions I suspect will be the most important ones in years to come.

So enjoy:
http://www.inc.com/eric-schurenberg/the-best-definition-of-entepreneurship.html
and
http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/162/generation-flux-future-of-business

And I would be interested in your views on these as well.

9/1/2012: Week opener: Merkozy continuing to ignore Greek realities

Today's meeting between Sarkozy and Merkel is being framed in the context of continued pressures across the euro area (see report on the meeting here). More ominously - within the context of the euro area leadership duet ignoring the latests warning signs for Greece.

Per Der Spiegel report, IMF has changed its analysis of the Greek rescue package agreed in July 2011 in-line with IMF changes in forecasts for Greek economy in the latest programme review in December 2011. Specifically, IMF lowered its forecast for growth from -3% to -6% GDP.

Der Spiegel cites IMF internal memo in claiming that the Fund is viewing existent Greek programme (including to 50% 'voluntary' haircut on Greek bonds currently under negotiations) as insufficient to stabilize the Greek economy and fiscal situation. The Fund is, reportedly, considering 3 possible options to alleviate the latest set of growth pressures:

• New austerity measures for Athens - a measure that in my view will only exacerbate immediate pressures on Greece and will lead to dangerous destabilization of political situation in the country, leading to even more second order adverse effects on growth (e.g. prolonged strikes and rioting);
• Deeper haircuts on Greek debt held by private institutions - in my opinion this will lead to more contagion from Greece to euro area banks and sovereigns and should be, instead complemented by writedowns of Greek debt held by the ECB, to match existent private sector arrangements;
• Increase in the euro zone bailout funds - in my view, this measure is currently outside the feasibility envelope for Europe and, if attempted, will lead to increased cost of euro area borrowing and have a knock on effect of higher cost of lending to countries currently in the Troika programme. It is also important to note that the EFSF head Klaus Regling is aiming to raise EFSF guarantees to foreign investors to 30%, thus reducing the leverage ratio from 4-5 times to 3 times. This will lower EFSF's theoretical borrowing capacity even further.

The IMF note reports are effectively matched by the statement from the senior Germany Finance Ministry adviser made Saturday, who tole the Greek press that a 50% haircut on Greek debt will not be enough to restore sustainability to Greek fiscal dynamics.

In effect, three of out three IMF 'options' cited will exacerbate the crisis, not resolve it. And there is no Option 4 on the books.

8/1/2012: Irish property prices - History, Equilibrium & Directions to Nowhere Fast

A quick footnote to Brian Lucey's post on house prices:

I often hear people referring to 'historical averages' as price equilibrium indicators. Hmmm... historical and histrionic - here's a snapshot from The Economist data plot:

That pretty much does the trick for anyone still saying we have crossed some sort of the long term equilibrium level... 

7/1/2012: Irish Exchequer Results 2011 - Shifting Tax Burde

In the previous 3 posts we focused on Exchequer receipts, total expenditure by relevant department head, and the trends in capital v current spending. In this post, consider the relative incidence of taxation burden.

Over the years of the crisis, several trends became apparent when it comes to the shifting burden of taxes across various heads. These are summarized in the following table and chart:

To summarize these trends, over the years of this crisis,

• Income tax share of total tax revenue has risen from just under 29% in 2007 to almost 41% in 2011.
• VAT share of total tax revenue has fallen, but not as dramatically as one might have expected, declining from 30.7% in 2007 to 29.7% in 2011
• MNCs supply some 50% of the total corporation tax receipts in Ireland. And they are having, allegedly, an exports boom with expatriated profits up (see QNA analysis last month). Yet, despite this (the exports-led recovery thingy) corporation tax receipts are down (see earlier post on tax receipts, linked above) and they are not just down in absolute terms. In 2007-2011 period, share of total revenue accruing to the corporation tax receipts has fallen from 13.5% to 10.3%. So if there is an exports-led recovery underway somewhere, would, please, Minister Noonan show us the proverbial money?

 So on the tax side of equation, the 'austerity' we've been experiencing is a real one - full of pain for households (whose share of total tax payments now stands at around 58% - some 12 percentage points above it levels in 2007) and the real sweet times for the corporates (the ones that are still managing to make profits to pay taxes, that is). This, perhaps, explains why even those working in protected sectors are talking about their biggest losses coming from tax changes.

7/1/2012: Irish Exchequer Results 2011 - Capital v Current Spending Trends

In the previous posts we considered Exchequer results for 2011 for tax receipts and headline expenditure items. In this post we look at the capital and current spending composition breakdown for total spending.

One core assertion that was made in the previous posts is that capital spending carried the main load of Exchequer spending adjustments in 2011. Overall, year on year, total net cumulative voted spending by the Irish state declined 1.6% or €721 million. At the same time, current expenditure went up by 2.2% or €903 million. Capital expenditure dropped 27.4% year on year in 2011 or €1,623 million.

Table below highlights the yearly changes over the crisis period:

The table above clearly shows that while during the crisis Net Voted Current Spending went up by €663 million, capital spending has declined by €4,265 mln on aggregate. The table also shows that despite all the austerity discourse, our Net Current expenditure was rising in 2010 and 2011, while our capital expenditure was declining to compensate for these increases.

In addition, the table highlights the trend that shows current expenditure rising at accelerating rate in 2010 and 2011 and capital expenditure falling at accelerating rate in 2011 relative to 2010.

If capital spending by the state constitutes either a 'Keynesian' stimulus (as claimed by the Governments over the years) or an investment in future productive capacity of our economy (as also claimed by the Governments in the past), we are now into a third consecutive year of bleeding the economy dry.

And the dynamics are best illustrated by referencing to the longer time horizons:

So current expenditure share of total spending by the Government now stands at 90.6%, up from 2010 level of 87.3% and 1998-2002 average share of 82.3%. On the other hand, capital investment share of total Government spending has dropped from 21.7% average for 1998-2002 period to 21.0% in 2008 and to 14.6% in 2010. In 2011 this share declined to below 10.4%.

 Between 2000 and 2010, Irish State invested in new capital stock some €66.26 billion of funds. Assuming 8% combined amortization and depreciation on this stock implies the need for continued gross investment of ca €5.3 billion annually. This means that 2011 Net Capital Spending fell some €1.01 billion short of covering the depletion of the state-financed capital stock.

The above, of course, is a rather crude calculation, since amortization and depreciation are at least in part covered from the current spending and since we use net voted capital spending figure for the capital stock measurements, but it does clearly suggest that current rates of capital investment cannot be sustained in the long term. And hence, much of the savings that have driven our Exchequer deficit improvements to-date are not sustainable either.

7/1/2012: Irish Exchequer Results 2011 - Expenditure

In the previous post I looked at the tax revenues side of the Exchequer figures for 2011. The core conclusions emerging from that analysis was that:

Irish Exchequer tax receipts did not perform well in 2011 compared to both 2010 and the target, with most of the improvement (some 80%) accounted for by reclassification of the Health Levy as tax revenue and addition of the temporary, extra-Budget 2011 Pensions Levy.

Irish Exchequer tax revenues for 2011 cannot be interpreted as being indicative of any serious improvement. Factoring in Pensions Levy and delayed receipts (Corporation Tax receipts for December carried over into 2012), overall Exchequer revenue fell 3.1% short of the target set in Budget 2011, not 2.5% claimed by the Department of Finance.

The above shortfall amounts to 0.66% of the expected 2011 GDP and 0.81% of our expected GNP and comes after significant increases in taxation burden passed in the Budget 2011, suggesting that the economy’s capacity to generate tax revenues based on the current structure of taxation is exhausted.

Subsequent posts on the topic of Exchequer balance will focus on overall balance, capital spending dynamics and relative distribution of tax burdens. This post focuses on the expenditure side of the Exchequer balance.

In general, there are good reasons as to why discussion of the expenditure side of the Exchequer balance is a largely useless exercise, rendered such by:

-       Constant re-alignment and renaming of departments, and

-        Changes in the departmental revenues (as in the case with the Health Levy reclassification) impacting the Net Voted Expenditure on Health

Here’s a good post on the above caveats from Dr Seamus Coffey which is worth a read.

So let’s consider some of the higher level figures.

Overall Net Voted Expenditure for 2011 came in at €45.711 billion, or €723 million (-1.56%) below 2010 levels and with a savings of €3.602 billion (-7.3%) on 2008. The target for 2011 expenditure was set at €46.022 billion and the end outrun implies that the Government has under-spent the target by €311 million. Note: I am referencing the original Budget 2011 target, as referenced, for example, in End-June 2011 - Analysis of Net Voted Expenditure. The Department for Finance reference figure for the annual 2011 target is €46.151 billion or €129 million ahead of the original estimate. This discrepancy is reflected in part in the capital carryover figures for 2010-2011 and 2011-2012.

Year on year, 2011 marks the third year of declining cuts. In 2009 yoy spending fell €2.150 billion, in 2010 it declined by €0.730 billion and in 2011 the drop was €0.723 billion. In proportional terms, expenditure declined 4.56% in 2009, 1.57% in 2010 and 1.58% in 2011. Cumulated net expenditure ‘savings’ since 2008 are now standing at a miserly €3.602 billion. Given that over the same period we accumulated €81.017 billion of deficits clearly shows the inadequate extent of cost reductions in the public services. Whichever way you spin it, to cover just ½ of already accumulated deficits out of cost savings achieved so far would take decades, and that before we factor in interest payments and the fact that much of the ‘savings’ delivered to-date comes out of temporary cuts to capital spending. More on this in the forthcoming analysis of capital and current spending.

Now, since we cannot clearly de-alienate actual spending, let us at the very least consider the spending priorities. These have changed over the years and changed in the direction that, while inevitable in the current crisis, is worrisome nonetheless.

Please keep in mind that although I did try to adjust as much as possible for changes in departments compositions, the data below is not fully reflective of these. Nonetheless, it does present some interesting changes in the overall spending dynamics.

As shown above,

-       Agriculture, Food and the Marine net voted spending constituted 3.36% of the total spending in 2008. This now has fallen to 2.28%.

-       Tourism, Culture and Sport accounted for 1.43% of the total spending in 2008 and is now down to 0.60%.

-       Communications, Energy and Natural Resources share actually rose from 0.54% in 2008 to 0.55% in 2011.

-       Defence saw a relatively shallow decline from 2.16% in 2008 to 1.93% in 2011.

-       Education and Skills – the third highest spending department in 2008 and 2011 – remained relatively static with 18.31% of total spending in 2008 and 18.07% in 2011.

-       Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation share of total spending fell from 2.94% in 2008 to 1.73% in 2011.

-       Environment, Community and Local Government spending fell from 6.41% in 2008 to 3.39% in 2011 – the drop that largely reflects changes in the departmental composition.

-       Finance share of spending declined from 2.83% in 2008 to 0.75% in 2011 – a dramatic fall.

-       Foreign affairs and Trade, despite gaining a new function of Trade have seen their share of spending decline from 1.99% in 2008 to 1.51% in 2011.

-       Health – the largest spender in 2008 at 27.45% dropped to the second place in spending distribution with 28.25% in 2011 despite having lost a number of functions. Adding back Children function to the DofH, the department spending share rose to 28.7% in 2011.

-       Justice and Equality accounted for 5.25% in 2008 and this dropped to 4.84% in 2011.

-       Social Protection rose from being the second highest spending department in 2008 with 19.06% (virtually identical share to that of Education) to the first highest spending department in 2011 with 29.16%.

-       Public Expenditure and Reform – a new department that, at least in my opinion is failing to show much value for money so far – has managed to rake in spending amounting to 1.71% of total net voted expenditure in 2011 – higher spending priority than Foreign Affairs and Trade, almost identical priority to Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, more than double the spending priority of the Department of Finance. Let us presume - for a moment - that the Department has two important, related, but not fully coincident functions: bring down current spending (since bringing down capital spending is no-brainer) and produce longer-term reforms of public services (which is not all about cuts, of course). Given the numbers achieved to-date - see forthcoming post on capital and current expenditure reductions - one should have serious questions about the new department value for money.

-       Taoiseach group saw its spending priority virtually unchanged over the years, declining marginally from 0.38% in 2008 to 0.37% in 2011.

-       Transport – the department with significant compositional changes – has seen its spending share decline from 6.47% in 2008 to 4.18% in 2011.

So overall, top 3 departments accounted for 64.83% of total net voted spending in 2008 and this figure rose to 75.48% in 2011. The rate of increase in these expenditure shares has accelerated over the years. Year on year, share of the three top spending departments in overall expenditure rose 2.97 percentage points in 2008-2009, 3.80 percentage points in 2009-2010 and 3.89 percentage points in 2010-2011. Once Children function is added back to Health, the rate of increase in 2010-2011 jumps to 4.34 percentage points.

Top 4^th and 5^th ranked departments (Justice and Equality and Transport) saw their combined share of spending declining from 11.71% in 2008 to 9.02% in 2011. This largely reflects changes in composition of the Department of Transport.

Together, Social Protection, Health and Children accounted for 46.51% of the spending in 2008 and this now is up at 57.88% in 2011. In other words, almost €6 per every €10 spent by the state goes to finance the two functions that constitute in traditional nomenclature social welfare benefits and social benefits (note that private spending on health is netted out via departmental receipts in the net expenditure figures). Education accounts for roughly the same share – ca 18% of total spend – in 2011 as in 2008. Economic sectors departments (other than Transport) used to account for 6.84% of the total spend in 2008 and this is now down to 4.56% in 2011.

In short, the priority of the Government spending over the years of the crisis has shifted firmly away from supporting economy’s productive capacity and delivering structural subsidies to ‘social and environmental pillars’, to serving social welfare functions and preserving as much as possible public health spending. It is worth noting that the latter, of course, has been achieved by shifting more costs burden onto the shoulders of health insurance purchasers.

5/1/2012: Irish Exchequer Results 2011 - Tax Receipts

Irish Exchequer returns for 2011 are in and there has been much in the line of fireworks celebrating the 'strong' results. Alas, these celebrations are revealing more about the nature of the Exchequer figures analysis deployed by the Government spin doctors than about the real dynamics in tax revenues and spending reforms.

In this post, let's take a look at the tax performance over 2011.

Income tax receipts came in at the grand total of €13.798 billion this year, 22.4% up on 2010 and 16.6% up on 2009. Alas, the gross year on year gain of €2.522 billion achieved in 2011 is accounted for by re-labeling of the former health levy into income tax component. In 2010 the state collected €2.018 billion worth of health levies receipts which were not classified as a tax measure. This year, it was classed as such, and although we do not know just how much of the health levy has been collected, netting out 2010 receipts for this revenue head out of the 2011 tax receipts leaves us with an increase in income tax like-for-like of closer to €500 million year on year. And these net receipts would imply income tax still down on 2009 levels.

Overall, income tax was down €327 million on target set in Budget 2011 - a shortfall of 2.3% - not dramatic, but hardly confidence-instilling. 

The chart below illustrates trends over time, but one has to keep in mind that 2011 figures are gross of USC (and thus Health Levy receipts).

More revealing (as these compare like-for-like) are VAT receipts:

As the chart above illustrates, VAT receipts came in at €9.741 billion in 2011, down 3.57% on 2010 and 8.71% on 2009. Now, we are talking some real numbers here. While income tax 'improvements' were in reality very much marginal, VAT deterioration is very significant. VAT receipts are down 4.8% or €489 million on 2011 target and the receipts are off €360 million on 2010 and €929 million on 2009. VAT receipts are running €4.76 billion behind, compared to 2007 levels. 

Corporation tax is shrinking. Official numbers show Corpo receipts are at €3.52 billion in 2011, down €404 million on 2010. These include €261 million in delayed receipts, so year on year Corpo receipts are down really €143 million. This might look small, but for the economy that is allegedly 'recovering' the dynamic is poor. In percentage terms, Corporation tax receipts are off 10.29% yoy and 9.74% on 2009. Compared to 2007, corporate taxes are down €2.871 billion (disregarding the late receipts).

Relative to target, once December delayed payments are factored in, Corporation tax has fallen short of the projections by €239 million. In overall official terms, the tax is down €500 million on traget (-12.4%).

Another big tax head is the Excise. This came in exactly at the same level as 2010: €4.678 billion. Excise receipts are down just €25 million on 2009, but significantly lower - by €1.16 billion relative to 2007. Excise taxes are now basically in line with Department projections for Budget 2011. 

Stamps are up, but this is solely due to the pension levy introduction. Leve of Stamps receipts in 2011 reached €1.391 billion, which is €431 million ahead of 2010 and €461 million ahead of 2009. But once we factor out pension levy receipts, Stamps are actually down €26 million on 2010 and just €4 million ahead of 2009 levels. Compared to 2007 Stamps are down a massive €2.25 billion once pension levy is accounted for. And Stamps are down on target as well - by some €21 million.

When it comes to capital taxes, combined CAT and CGT receipts came in at €660 million or 12.9% ahead of 2010 receipts, although still 17.1% down on 2009 levels.

Both tax heads combined were bang-on on target.

So overall, of top 5 tax heads, 3 were behind the target despite the fact that Income tax included reclassification of tax revenues under USC, one was bang on target and one was ahead of target once temporary pensions levy is added, but behind target when this is netted out. In a summary, 4 out of 5 tax heads have underperformed the target and one came in at virtually identical levels to target. Where's, pardon me, the fabled 'improvements' and 'stabilization' in Exchequer revenues that Minister Noonan has been talking about?

Overall tax revenue stood at €34.027 billion in 2011, which is 7.16% ahead of 2010 and 2.97% ahead of 2009. However, if we are to correct for reclassified Health levy receipts and temporary pensions levy receipts, tax revenues for 2011 were at €31.552 billion, or 0.63% below those in 2010. tax rates went up, tax revenues went down, folks. Not what one would term an improvement in performance.

Even using dodgy apples-for-oranges accounting procedures deployed by the Government, tax revenues are down 2.5% on the Budget 2011 target. How on earth can anyone claim this to be 'stabilizing' performance or an 'improvement' defies any logic. 

Let's do the sums: 

• 2011 total tax revenues were €873 million behind Budget 2011 projections. These included non-tax revenue of at least €2 billion (Health levy) that was re-branded as tax revenues this time around, plus €457 million hit on pensions (not in the Budget 2011) and a delayed set of corporate returns of €261 million. So overall, tax revenues are down on target not €873 million, but €1.069 billion. 
• At the same time 2010-2011 outrun surplus claimed by the DofF at €2.522 billion in reality is a revenue gain of just €308 million.

That means that the Exchequer revenues side performance was really surprisingly unimpressive.

5/1/2012: 2012 Debt redemptions - select euro area countries

A very revealing summary of 2012 bond redemptions by country and month, courtesy of the zerohedge.com (link here):

Cracking! While Germany won't have (most likely) any problem rolling €193.1 billion worth of paper other countries are in for a potentially (an highly likely) bumpy rides for France at €289.9 billion, Italy at €337.1 billion, Spain at €147.9 billion and GPI at combined €79.2 billion. This year won't be the real test for Ireland, however, with just €5.6 billion of paper coming up for refinancing, but it will be a testing year for PIIGS in general with €564.2 billion worth of sovereign debt to be rolled.

And here's the data for scheduled rollovers relative to country GDP as projected by the IMF:

This can easily get ugly.

4/1/2012: EU Commission new logo

In the Really-Really-Really Important News of the Day: the EU Commission has a new logo... ahem... yes, a NEW LOGO:

Notice the two distinct sets of correlated lines - one set ascending, another descending, separated by a clear space with no sign of continuity between the two sets, presumably to summarize the emerging dis-Union of those states that are set to grow in the future, from those that are set to contract. Also note the 'growth' group dynamic is shallower than the dynamic of decline in the 'drop-outs' group.

There is also a semiotically potentially revealing positioning of the flag and the banner - off centre, more into the growth set of lines, possibly suggesting that the EU is now becoming more of a 'growth club' or alternatively 'de hell with dem slower periphery states' club?

So how about a new tag line: EU - a Union for Disunity?

Disclaimer: I am obviously take a proverbial p***ss, but., as Russians say - every joke contains at least a grain of reality...

3/1/2012: Government debt - maturity v overhang

There are some good reports on the massive debt rollover in G7 and BRICs in 2012 - see a summary here. That can lead non-economists to confuse total outstanding Government debt with that maturing in 2012. Here's the summary of Government debt projections for G7 and BRICs for 2012 and 2016 based on September 2011 WEO database from the IMF.

So overall:

• Back in September 2011, the IMF projected total G7 Government debt to reach US$43.02 trillion, or 123% of the expected 2012 GDP
• BRICs 2012 Government debt is projected to reach US$4.9 trillion or 34% of GDP
• Total G7+BRIC Government debt outstanding for 2012 is expected to be US$47.92 trillion or 97% of GDP
• The above figures show why public debt in G7 nations is such a concern for the markets and the real economies.
• By 2016, G7 Government debt is expected to rise to US$51.01 trillion or 127% of GDP. These projections are based on rather rosy assumptions that were built into September WEO forecasts and since then have been revised down, although there is no comprehensive database data incorporating these revisions available yet (it should come out in April 2012).
• Absolute debt levels for G7 Governments are expected to rise for all countries except Canada and Germany. Relative to GDP, Government debt levels are expected to rise between 2012 and 2016 in Japan and the US.

So that US$ 7.6 trillion figure of maturing Government debt for G7+BRICs mentioned in the Bloomberg article linked above - that is just 15.9% of the total Government debt of these countries outstanding that matures in 2012. Not to be confused with the whole debt mountain...