Economics 13/12/2009: Nothing exceptional

Last couple of weeks, there have been some pretty severe news flowing from the Irish economy and Irish banks. Is the current bear market in Irish banks shares a temporary adjustment / profit taking or is it a long overdue fundamentals-driven correction?

Here are few charts and my view of the story.
The general trend, per chart above, has been down since 2007 peaks, but also - convergence of the two banks to the same trading range. By 2009 beginning, the investors were no longer willing to significantly distinguish between BofI and AIB shares, preferring to treat them as a single sick puppy, rather than two different banks with different management styles, business models and investment exposures.
And guess what - they still do. The entire 2009 trading was still based on the story of Irish Banks, rather than individual stories of AIB and BofI. Now, over a short period of time, say during general market panic, this can be explained by a temporary loss of fundamentals clarity, implying that investors might see both banks as being the same. We are no longer in this period, as global markets willingness to take risks has improved significantly in H2 2009. But the same markets that are now willing to differentiate Goldman Sachs from Bank of America are still unwilling to differentiate AIB from BofI.

Another interesting feature of the data is that Nama effect (a positive push for shares of AIB and BofI) has now been fully exhausted. And this is pretty impressive - we approve €54bn in funds, nearly bankrupting the entire economy, and in return we get the markets sending banks' share price back to where they were in May 2009, prior to the Nama approval.

So in terms of absolute prices, neither Nama, nor the latest Budget, seem to be working. But what about the risks in actual trading positions on the banks?
Well, if anything intraday volatility in AIB is down, not up, in the last 12 months. And that shows once again that the markets are not buying into AIB story. There is now less heterogeneity in investors' assessment of AIB value proposition than before:The same is true for BofI:The same story for a broader IFIN index

And there is nothing out of the ordinary in terms of volumes either:
Still relatively heavy, but not as heavy as in late 2008 - early 2009.

But now look as spreads (high-low) and monthly volatility: calmer, much calmer seas than over 2008. Again, no panic - just calm and measured trading here.
One can't really say here that investors are treating Irish banks shares in some idiosyncratic way, with an abnormally high sensitivity to risk. There is actually much less sensitivity to risk in the markets today than in 2008 and even 2007. So the current bear trend in Irish banks shares is driven by the markets assessment of fundamentals. In other words, markets are doing the job - spotting the 'dog' and pricing it down...
Any doubt? The above chart confirms that there is no abnormally heightened sensitivity to risk when it comes to AIB and BofI shares. The only outline events of 2009 in these shares relate to the bear rally that has just ended. The downtrend, therefore, is the norm.

Economics 09/12/2009: Budget 2010 - first shot at numbers

I will be blogging on the Budget 2010 over the next few days, but here is the main point:

The Budget did not deliver a significant adjustment to our structural deficit.

1. Claimed adjustments to the deficit totaling €3,090 million on current expenditure side and €961 million on capital side. These are gross figures which imply that we can expect net adjustments of ca €2,600 and €800 million each to the total deficit reduction of no more than €3,400.
2. Per table below, the Exchequer deficit will likely stand at €21,400 million in 2010 and not anywhere near the projected deficit of €17,760 million.
3. Stabilization of deficit is not happening on a significant downside, but in a marginal fashion, which is simply not good enough.

The main conclusion here is that the Budget has not gone far enough in reducing the structural deficit. There is another €10-12 billion worth of cuts looming for 2011-2012. It would be dangerous to assume that this can be corrected for through re-jigging tax system in 2011 as Minister Lenihan appears to imply.

At this junction, I simply cannot see how the Budget delivered anything more than a breathing period for Ireland before we resume our slide toward Greece. 12.4% deficit before we factor in demand for capital from Irish banks is just not enough. Full stop.

The Minister is now talking about €3 billion cut in 2011, then €5 billion cut in 2012-2013. This implies that from next year's standing position we are looking at a deficit of well over €9-13 billion in 2014. Assuming economy grows at a robust 2.5% every year from 2011 through 2014, this would imply a deficit of 4.9-7% of GDP - way long of the SGP-required 3%. If economy grows at even briskier pace of 3% per annum over the same period, the resultant deficit will be around 4.8-6.9%. Again, not much of a fit for our promises to the EU...

Economics 08/12/2009: Irish businesses ICT use

Per CSO release yesterday: “in 2009, 95% of all enterprises had a computer connected to the internet while 66% had a website or homepage. Access to the internet using broadband remained high in 2009 with 84% of all enterprises having a broadband connection. High-speed DSL broadband was used by 45% of enterprises compared with 41% in 2008. The use of mobile broadband reached a level of 27% in 2009 compared with 24% in 2008. As a consequence there has been a decline in the use of lower-speed DSL broadband and other fixed connections (e.g. cable, leased line etc).”

Sounds good? Well, actually… More detailed data shows the following worrisome trends:

• Use of computers has actually fallen from 98% of enterprises surveyed in 2008 to 97% in 2009. It has remained static at 98% in Manufacturing sector, fallen from 99% to 96% in Construction sector (possibly a function of inactive enterprises, or in the opposite direction – a surprising result if the survivourship bias applies to the sample). In Services sector there was a decline from 98% to 97% between 2008 and 2009. These results are rather strange. On one hand, if the sample included inactive firms, then one can expect the declines due to companies folding operations in Construction and lower value-added Services sectors. But if only actively trading firms were included, then this suggests that survivourship bias was actually selecting against the ICT-using firms for some unexplainable reason.

• Interestingly, the proportion of firms with a written ICT strategy has increase overall from 20% in 2008 to 21% in 2009, and in no sub-sector was there a decline in proportion. Construction sector firms led here with an increase from 8% in 2008 to 11% in 2009, which suggests that CSO sample incorporates survivourship bias. And this is really bizarre – on one hand, sample selection clearly favoured surviving firms that have ICT policies, but on the other hand the same sample favoured survivor firms with lower penetration of ICT… Hmmm…

• Proportion of firms using internet fell from 96% to 95% between 2008 and 2009. The declines were showing in all three broader sectors, with Construction firms registering the largest drop from 99% to 96%. This is again inconsistent with survivourship bias apparently present in the data. But even more strange were the results for the percentages of firms having their own websites. In Manufacturing, the number of firms with their own websites rose strongly from 72% a year ago to 77% in 2009. In Construction sector, surviving firms actually dramatically increased their websites presence from 48% to 58% despite having shown a decline in internet use in general. There was a decline in proportion of companies with their websites in Services sector – from 65% to 64%.

• Overall use of e-services (interfacing either with the public sector or private sector clients) has declined across the board except for Manufacturing sector.

• E-commerce is growing strongly with percentages of purchases and sales via e-commerce pathways as a share of total purchase costs and turnover, respectively, rose strongly between 2008 and 2009. But as in 2008, most of e-Commerce appears to be driven by purchases, not sales. And in volumes, e-Commerce has declined in line with overall economic activities. There is only tentative evidence that e-Commerce has taken up some of the traditional purchasing and sales activities share during this recession.

• Another interesting and surprising feature of the data shows that enterprises with access to broadband have reduced their e-Commerce-based purchases from 60% to 54%, and also reduced their e-Commerce-based sales from 28% to 23%. Enterprises with no connection to broadband have lowered their purchases via e-Commerce vehicles from 29% to 24% and their sales from 14% to 9%. This seem to show that access to broadband does not result in more resilience to the recessionary contraction in enterprise activities. But, enterprises with broadband connection have retained their propensity to employ workers who e-work at 37%, while enterprises with no broadband connection have increased this share from 9% to 10%. Rising workforce mobility and flexibility for those with no broadband connection while static workforce mobility / flexibility for those with broadband connection? Clearly this can’t be happening…

Economics 06/12/2009: Replacement rates for Irish social welfare payments

Department of Finance has published (unnoticed by most) its estimates of the replacement rates for Irish Social Welfare system. Per DofF, any replacement rate in excess of 70% is problematic, as it creates significant disincentive for the recipients to seek reentry into the labour force. Well, yes. I agree.

However, what DofF fails to recognize in its estimates is the fact that welfare recipients avail themselves of free healthcare (medical cards) and subsidized drugs scheme, plus, having no jobs to attend to, they do not have to spend a penny on childcare.

I have updated the DofF own estimates to reflect these costs wherever they apply and this is reflected in the table below which also reproduces DofF own estimates.

Effective wage in my estimates refers to the earnings that must be attained in the workplace in order to supply the same level of real income as provided by social welfare. My estimate is based on DofF replacement rate estimates, plus additional benefits as outlined in the footnote.
Telling picture. For a country with average income of ca €25,000 per capita, we are talking about virtually all groups of welfare recipients, case-studied by DofF, getting more on welfare than in average employment.

Red-bold cases are clear welfare traps with replacement income in excess of 70% relative to reference group.

Economics 05/12.2009: Budget 2010 Estimates

The Department of Finance has published estimates of income and expenditure for next year on Friday. These form the DofF outlook for 2010 before incorporating any Budget 2010 changes.

The format in which the estimates are published is such that one cannot operate standard Adobe pdf features and requires by-hand copying of data in order to transpose the table into the Excel or any other database. One can only speculate why this is done by DofF, but any economist out there can probably wish that someone obliges the DofF to start publishing things in modern documentary formats and provide separate excel files suitable for analysis.

So here is the data with my own parallel estimates. As with DofF, my estimates do not include any promised or signaled ‘savings’ and ‘tax increases’ that might be announced in the Budget 2010.

The main table:
The above shows that DofF projects a rise in current spending next year of over €5bn, (higher social welfare and debt service costs). My projection is for a rise of under €6bn (because of even higher social welfare costs, plus an increase debt-raising fees, but no difference on DofF’s estimate of debt financing cost). Details are, of course, to follow below.

So what do these estimates (My v DofF) suggest:

• On Current Receipts side, tax revenue differences are explained below, as are non-tax revenue differences, all in these allow for some €2.4bn discrepancy between my estimates and DofF estimates;
• On Current Expenditure side, my view is that net voted expenditure is underestimated by DofF, primarily in terms of social welfare increases and some crime-related increases (I believe we will see growing number of criminal convictions for acts against property), plus the Government is underestimating the scale of costs which will be involved in dealing with households defaulting on mortgages and going to courts against the banks. I also think the Government has no idea just how expensive litigation relating to Nama will be;
• So deficit on Current Account is much wider – by €2.6bn;
• On Capital account (see below) the main difference is driven by my view that Anglo will require €2bn in 2010 and that other banks will also swallow the same amount via NPRF ‘investment’ or something of the sorts. This is atop the similar spending via Nama issuance of new own bonds;
• So deficit on Capital Account is now €5.7bn wider in my case than in the case of DofF estimates.
• Net effect, Exchequer balance is, in my view, heading for a deficit of €30.4bn in 2010, up on €25.3bn in 2009 and up on DofF estimate of €21.9bn for 2010. Do tell me if you think things will improve so significantly on 2009 once January 2010 arrives as to justify DofF’s optimism.
  

Receipts side:
The differences between my and DofF estimates come from my view that:

• shopping to Northern Ireland will not decelerate, assuming no change in our VAT relative to UK and no changes in the FX rate
• no redundancy payments windfall and lower self-employment taxes will mean lower income tax
• MNCs transfer pricing will slow down due to investment by MNCs outside Ireland picking up
• lower deposits with CB will arise due to lower loans levels, depressing CB income
• lower dividends activity due to semi-states slowdown and arrears build up;
• lower pay out under Guarantee scheme due to creation of the Third Force, decline in banks returns on loans and Anglo fall-off.
  

All in, total Tax and non-Tax revenue will be lower by €1,039mln and €571mln respectivel

Next, let’s look at the detailed expenditure lines as stipulated above.
My main concerns (driving the differences to DofF estimates) are:

• Social welfare costs will be much higher due to transition to welfare from long-term unemployment;
• DETE will be more involved in artificially creating ‘training’ jobs for unemployed;
• Health will also see increases in costs due to welfare cost rising;
• All organizations dealing with crime will experience an increase in costs due to rising number of crimes against property;
• Internal public sector employment conflicts will be driving costs of arbitration and conflicts resolutions;
• Rising numbers of households insolvencies will be pushing up courts and related costs;
• Costs of Nama and Banks supervision/oversight will also rise, etc.
  

Net impact, I expect costs to rise by €1.1bn more than DofF does.

Details of non-voted current expenditure below:
No major differences here between mine and DofF estimates. Unlike in the case of non-voted capital expenditure:

Of course, this table incorporates my view that Anglo and other banks will swallow some €4bn in 2010 in new capital. This already assumes that most of the funding for other banks will come via Nama issuing new Nama-own bonds that the Government will attempt to keep off its own balancesheet. Of course, this is a bogus accountancy trick, but let us entertain it as the Government insists we should.

This pretty much finishes my analysis of the Exchequer estimates. If the Government does not attempt to dramatically reduce its own spending in the next Budget, we might see our annual deficit rising to over 16% of GDP. Even if DofF is correct and the deficit will be 13.5%, this does not change the bleak reality that some 9% of this figure is a purely structural deficit. In other words, no matter what, we will have to shave off ca €15.4bn worth of spending in the next 2-3 years. No other way about it.

Economics 01/12/2009: A real breakthrough of Mr Cowen

So per latest reports, the nation is saved. Facing a systemic deficit of €14bn per annum, the leaders of the Social Partnership have been contemplating a dramatic reduction in the cost of Government business. The dramatic news from the Government buildings, suggested a pay cut for public sector workers of 5% gross, or less than 3% net, delivering something to the tune of €836mln in gross savings (as claimed by the unions). Which, of course, will be clawed back to less than €600mln through automatic stabilizers (taxes on earnings paid through taxes and so on - per reported estimates by the DofF). For a moment, it all looked like our Taoiseach Brian Cowen reigned over the business-as-usual at the Partnership Table.

Credit for derailing this 'savings' deal goes to the public outcry, the media, a handful of backbenchers, the Department of Finance and also to Brian Lenihan - all of whom have managed to restore our policy back to senses. The numbers bandied around by the unions' heads were simply not adding up.

For a moment - it all looked like:
As one fellow economist described the 'New Deal' to me: “a Dora the Explorer bandaid on a shark bite”. Optimist he is – more like a prehistoric shark bite, judging by its gaping size.

Now recall, Brian Lenihan has promised three things to the nation and the EU:

1. cut €4bn in deficit this year and the same next;
2. no new taxes (except for carbon tax and, may be, higher taxes on the so-called 'rich');
3. cut €1.3bn in public sector spending
   

As long as the talks with the Partners are dragging on, this is becoming an impossible trinity of policy objectives. Will Joseph Brodsky's ending for his Elegy serve as a perfect descriptor of the Government's real legacy in the history of Ireland?

... And it says on the plinth
'commander in chief'. But it reads 'in grief', or 'in brief'
or 'in going under'.

Oh, and one last thingy - if you think that €600mln in 'savings' ever had a chance of materialising, think of public sector workers taking a 14-day holiday who will have an option to do agency work to replace their own jobs... earning a nice tidy premium...

Economics 01/12/2009: Irish Banks - something stirring in the dark

An interesting, but at this stage purely theoretical conjecture that can play out in the next couple of days.

I will posit it after I go over the facts that led me to this conjecture:

1. Today's reporting on BofI and the banks in general has been focusing on the possible conversion of preference shares into ordinary shares to plug in capital holes. Considering that (a) such a conversion will de facto spell near nationalization of the banks; (b) it will destroy Government's case (supported by the stockbrokers and the banks) that preference shares represent significant cash flow positive back to the taxpayers in exchange for recapitalizations to date; and (c) such a conversion will amount to a swap of a guaranteed asset (preference share dividend) in exchange for of a falling asset (as ordinary shares are tanking and are bound to continue to tank if conversion takes place), the statement is alarming. In fact, the statement is extraordinary in nature, similar to the Banks Guarantee Scheme announcement back in September 2008;
   
2. The RTE has completely failed to explore the very core idea of what effect the conversion will have on both capital reserves at the banks and the value of taxpayers' shareholdings in the banks. This might suggest that the story was potentially heavily 'managed' as a staged release as RTE business editors and correspondents should have been aware of such consequences;
3. The extent of demand for capital post-Nama has been approximately estimable from the sheer size of impairments faced by the banks against banks balancesheets (loans to deposits ratios) and did not come as surprise for, say Anglo earlier this month. Why such a hype then all of a sudden? Did Nama haircut change dramatically? Not, Bloxham note today in the morning explicitly worked its estimates from the assumed Nama-signalled haircut of 30%. No change spotted here, then.
4. Core tier 1 capital already includes preference shares, so conversion will only aid the banks balancesheets if and only if it will allow the banks to keep the preference shares dividend. This means that taxpayers get nothing from these shares. And it also means that things are getting so desperate in the banks that they are having trouble (potentially?) repaying these dividends to the state. What can the impetus for such deterioration be, given both banks already guided recently on expected impairments? Why did RTE reporters never bothered to ask about this issue.
5. The whole mess of demand for post-Nama recapitalizations was predicted by some, and publicly aired in the media. In fact, my estimates from one month ago (here) accurately predicted the numbers involved. While some 'experts' from stock brokerages interviewed today by RTE's flagship News at Nine programme might have been unaware of such estimates back then, their arriving at the same numbers one month later is not really that much of a market-making news. So, again, why the hype today?
   
6. RTE stated tonight that the markets anticipated 20% haircut (here). This is simply not true:

• Per today's Davy note: "This has been reviewed by NAMA and the Department of Finance and on the basis of interaction with both and the minister's estimate of €16bn of eligible bank assets, 'the directors believe that the average discount on disposal applicable to these assets should not be greater than the estimated average discount for all participating institutions of 30%'."
• Bloxham are working off 30% assumption.
  
• Goodbody's note was a bit more volatile on assumptions: "As per BOI’s recent interim results and a November’s IMS from AIB, both banks highlight that a number of uncertainties exist as to the specific quantum and timing of loans which may transfer, the price, the fees due and the “fair value” of the consideration. In its statement, AIB refers to the previously highlighted industry average discount of 30% to the gross value of the loans and indicates - as it did at the time of its IMS - that the board’s view is that “there is no reason to believe that the average discount applicable to AIB’s NAMA assets will fall significantly outside of this guidance”. When we wrote on this at the IMS stage, we highlighted that the language here was more vague than previous utterances and note our haircut applied is 28%. Similarly, in the case of BOI, the references in the release today are all based off the generic 30% industry figure referred to be the Minister, though that the discount will vary by institution, with the Court believing this industry figure to be the “maximum loss likely to be incurred on the sale of loans to NAMA”. We are of the view though that BOI’s haircut will be closer to 18%." I'll explain in human language: AIB itself believed that average Nama discount (30%) or something close will apply, while Goody believed 28% will do. For BofI, the management believed before that 30% will apply. But Goody's believed 18% will do (why, beats me). So no evidence on 20% market consensus anywhere here, then.
  
• NCB applied 30% model to both BofI and AIB in today's note. And so on.
  
• Taken over all brokers and banks themselves, AIB assumed discount averages at 29.5%, not 20%, BofI assumed discount averages at 27%. Now, forgive me, but where is RTE taking its 20% market expectation from?
  

So now, let us summarise the evidence:

• Banks announcement today was out of line with ordinary business;
• Banks announcement was never probed or challenged by the official media;
• Banks announcements were not queried by the the brokers to the full extent of conversion implications to the balance sheets;
• Three components can have a dramatic fast impact on bank core tier 1 capital - equity collapse (not the case - banks shares are down by less than 5% today, plus the statements were released in the morning before market prices were revealed); loans collapse on a massive scale (unlikely, given that both banks guided very recently on new impairments and also unlikely given that both banks appear to be impacted simultaneously); or deposits falling off dramatically (there is no way of confirming this unless banks publish their data, but do recall September-December 2008 when deposits flight exposed Anglo to nationalization).
  

So something really strange is happening around the BofI and AIB in the last few days. I do not know what this might be, but some fast moving deterioration in hitting banks balancesheets.

Watch tomorrow's ticker.

Economics 30/11/2009: Budget scope

For those of you who missed my yesterday's article in the Sunday Times, here it is in un-edited version. Note: updated below for estimated probabilities of default.

In their recent note, Fitch has singled out our massive public deficit and rising debt as the drivers for Irish sovereign bonds downgrade to a lowly AA- rating. This warning was in line with broader international markets concern about the mounting public debt liabilities around the world.

After days of falling prices on Chinese and Greek debts, this Tuesday it was Spain’s turn. October figures from Spain have revealed that the country deficit is now set reaching 9.5% of its GDP. The Spanish Government has gone out of its way to assure the markets that it plans to bring the deficit to 3% Euro zone limit by 2012. The plan involves raising VAT and capital gains tax. But the main measures will deal with public expenditure cut of 12-15%.

Spain, or course, is facing a public deficit that is some 3 percentage points shy of Ireland’s. But, unlike Ireland, Spain is planning to take its medicine in full and swiftly. Take another example. Denmark’s deficit is 7 percentage points below ours. In contrast to us, Danish government passed tax breaks and a major tax reform package encouraging more labour supply. The country also used its pension reserves to boost household income in this recession. To keep things under control – Danes cut public expenditure by up to 20% in some areas.

Latvia, Estonia, Iceland, and Hungary – all have implemented IMF-mandated cuts in public spending with some inflicting cuts up to 30% on public sector wages. All have seen subsequent rounds of upgrades from economic forecasters and bond markets.

But the signs are, after 27 months of severe crises, the Leinster House is still in the denial as to the full realities of our perilous fiscal position. Even after all the tough talk, Minister Lenihan is now appearing to accept Unions’ compromise for a temporary symbolically modest cut to public sector wages. Yet, the depth of our economic crisis requires nothing short of a drastic and permanent reductions in public spending.

Ireland’s promised €4bn cut in the Budget 2010 – contentious as it might seem to us – is pittance compared to what is needed to restore credibility in our economy.

Per latest set of accounts, we are in the need of raising almost a half of our current spending financing through borrowing. The latest forecasts from the EU Commission and the OECD state that Ireland's general government deficit is expected to be 12.2-12.5% of GDP in 2009 and 11.3-14.7% of GDP in 2010-2011. There is no snowball’s chance in hell that Ireland can reach the required 3% target by 2014 or, for that matter 2015, unless we deal with that share of the deficit that is known as structural deficit.

Any deficit arising in real life, therefore, can be decomposed into a cyclical deficit – that share of the deficit that arises due to a temporary recession – and structural deficit. The latter, of course, is the deficit that arises from structural overspending and cannot be expected to disappear when the economy reaches its long run growth potential.

Hence, the extent of our structural deficit is crucially dependent on the assumptions for the natural rate of growth in Irish GDP. So far this year, our Department of Finance forecasters have assumed that the natural rate of growth for Irish economy lies around the simple average for the 2000-2008 levels –close to 3.8% per annum. Their friends in the ESRI are slightly less optimism, predicting that the natural rate of growth is somewhere around 3% of GDP. All of this suggests that the structural component of our deficit is around 8-9% of GDP per annum or under €14bn. The cyclical component is in the region of 3-4% of GDP or up to €7bn. Hence, the current preferred adjustment path to fiscal solvency envisions cuts of €4bn in 2010 and 2011. Thereafter, reckon our mandarins, things will come back to ‘normal’ and Irish economy will miraculously churn out more tax revenue to cover the remaining hole.

But this bet assumes that Ireland is somehow an outsider to the entire Euro area club of smaller open economies. How else can our potential GDP growth be almost 300% above that of Denmark, 250% greater than Belgium’s, 60% above that for the Netherlands and for the Euro area as a whole? Or why should we assume that Irish economy will overshoot potential growth rate in the first year of recovery, when the majority of European economies are expected to reach theirs some 3-5 years after the end of a recession?

If our potential GDP growth is really in line with the small Euro area countries’ average, then our output gap (the difference between the potential and current GDP) is closer to 6% rather than 7.25% that the Department of Finance builds into its forecasts. This in turn implies that our cyclical deficit is around 2.5%, yielding a structural deficit of ca 9.5-10% of our GDP or €16-17bn in 2009 terms.

To get close to a realistically feasible path to solvency, Brian Lenihan should be aiming to cut some €8bn in public deficit in 2010 alone, followed by €3-4bn cuts in 2011 and 2012 each.

This is the real legacy of excessive exuberance with which Bertie Ahearn handed out cash to various Social Partners constituencies. And it is now manifested in purely toxic extent of deficits that cannot be corrected by any means other than savage cuts. The structure of our expenditure – manifested by the fact that some two thirds of it goes to finance wages, pension and social welfare payments – implies that the cuts must happen in exactly these areas.

Painful as this may be, there is simply no alternative. No productivity increases in the public sector will help deflate the actual costs of the sector. The costs that keep on rising. Per CSO’s latest data, 2009 was a bumper crop year for our servants of the state. Average public sector earnings are up 3.2% in a year to the end of Q2 2009, while average private sector wages are down 6.8% over the same time - a swing of 10 percentage points. Survivorship bias – the fact that earnings figures do not reflect the jobs losses and do not net out resulting redundancy payments in the private sector – suggests that the actual earnings growth differential is much wider than that.

Restoration of our economic health at this junction requires swift and significant cut – of the magnitude of 15-20% - in the total pay bill of the public sector. This can only be achieved through a combination of reduced employment and earnings cuts. It should be accompanied by a 10% cut in social welfare and a 30-40% cut in capital spending.

This is an urgent task that cannot be delayed for future Governments to tackle. Since May this year the Government has gone on a PR offensive arguing that the markets have treated Budgets 2009 as serious efforts to correct deficit.

Most of this is political sloganeering. As the chart clearly shows, although markets estimates of our probability of default on sovereign debt have declined in time from a historic peak in February 2009, this decline was far less significant than the overall market gains experienced by other countries with similar budgetary problems. Having peaked well ahead of all other Euro zone countries, Irish CDS spreads have stayed persistently at the top of the common currency area distribution. And there they remain with a significant risk to the upside.

Here are some index pics, all countries CDSs (5-year) set at 100 on 18/07/2008:

And here is an interesting chart for actual CDSs
The markets are now putting estimated probability of our default above that of Peru!

To put these into perspective, using OECD and EU Commission latest forecasts, taking €8bn in deficit financing out this year will save Irish taxpayers some €3-5bn in interest payments alone over the next 5 years.

The costs of our inaction are mounting.

Here are two charts on estimated probabilities of sovereign default for various CDSs, using a linear formula (not a more accurate PV of contingent claim =PV of fixed payment approach and no bootstrapping).

The above chart shows the cumulative probability of default over 5 year term of life of bonds... we are back in double digits and above Spain and Greece...

Economics 30/11/2009: Nama estimates confirmed

Scroll for a couple of interesting topics (other than Nama) below...

Per Bloxham’s note today (emphasis is mine):

“Bank of Ireland this morning officially announced its intention to participate in the National Asset Management Agency ... The bank sees the first assets as moving from January 20th 2010, and on a phased basis from there on until mid 2010. The group does not know the discount to be applied to the assets on transfer to NAMA. However, the bank expects to receive €11.2 billion for the assets currently shown with a worth of €16 billion in the balance sheet, based on the 30% discount guided by NAMA. Total provisions set aside on the assets to move to NAMA are €1.4 billion resulting in a €3.4 billion loss. The Risk Weighted Assets will be adjusted down by €15.2 billion as a results of the transfer. The bank shows a loan book of €116.7 billion (down from €131.3 billion pre NAMA) after the movement in assets, while Risk Weighed Assets fall from €100.7 billion to €85.5 billion. Core Equity will fall to €3.5 billion from €6.6 billion. Therefore, the reduction in Core Equity Tier 1 would be from 6.65% in September 30th to 4.2% as a result of the transfer to NAMA, and subsequent write down.”

So to restore the bank balancesheet to internationally acceptable risk-core equity balance of over 6% will require some €2.55bn in capital injection post-Nama, not accounting for any additional deterioration in the remaining book. In a note published exactly a month ago (here) I predicted that BofI will need €2.0-2.6bn in fresh capital – bang on with today’s statement.

This is the second estimate fully confirmed by the Nama-participating banks that is in line with my projections of October 30, with earlier this month media reports putting Anglo’s demand for fresh post-Nama capital at €5.7bn.

Further per Bloxham:

“Loss on disposal of assets will be tax deductible as we understood previously. Bank of Ireland also highlights that after 10 years, in the event NAMA discloses a loss the Minister of Finance may bring forward legislation to impose a special tax on participating institutions. The bank goes on to confirm that the interest rate Bank of Ireland will receive from the bonds which replace the transferred assets, is still not know. Therefore the impact on income is still not known.”

Oh and per Davy's morning note: using average 30% haircut implies a loss of €3.4bn on top of the €1.4bn impairment already estimated at September 30, 2009. This implies - per Davy's model - €960mln pre-tax hit which, "combined with some other adjustments to RWAs and sub-debt... would increase the capital required to keep core equity at the trough of 5% from €1.3bn to €2.3bn."

Now, Davy's model, therefore suggests demand for €2.8bn in capital to 6% ratio. Both Davy estimates are therefore comfortably within my range of expected capital demand by BofI. And good luck to those who have a hope that BofI can raise new funding with 5% core equity ratio at anything close to reasonable costs.

Anyone who at this stage in the game still holds illusions that Nama will allow for a restart of lending in this economy has to be simply bonkers.

Oh, and on a funny side of things: today's CSO data release is for:

"Census of Industrial Production 2008 - Early estimates". One question begs asking: When will the later estimates arive? December 20, 2011?

Oh, and do see this on Ireland v Dubai - here. The worrying thing is that it is talking about partial default scenario for Ireland and the ECB rescue ahead of Greece! which, of course, goes nicely with my article in The Sunday Times yesterday - which I will post later tonight.

Economics 28/11/2009: What if... Carry Trades bite the dust in Dubai

Carry trades, Dubai and the direction of the dollar:

Dubai's impending collapse shows that the epicenter of 'Development on Drugs' model implosion is now finally shifting from the US into Middle East and is risking new wave of contagion into Europe. Most of Dubai development has been financed by petrodollars (domestic and inter-regional), but also via carry trades from Europe (intraregional) with Euro area banks dominating the entire Emirate's landscape in foreign banking. This is bound to have long-reaching impact, with as far on-shore as Irish Nama potentially being possibly saddled with loans cross-linked to Dubai property. Bank of Ireland took part in a $5.5 billion (€3.7bn) syndicated loan facility to Dubai World in June 2008, according to stockbroker Davy. Per report in Irish Times today: "The firm said its initial participation in the facility was $93 million (€62 million) but it is understood that the bank’s debt currently stands at about €50 million."

Am I the only one who noticed that Irish investors, semi-states - e.g Aer Lingus, corporates - see here, even Enterprise Ireland succumbed to Dubai's lure: here - have financed the peak of this bubble?

Oh, and is Nama going to end up holding any of this (more here)? Nama folks are saying they know nothing about the Bad Bank taking on Dubai-related loans... Sure... they would know! And what about cross-linked loans? Developers with dual exposures?


So what does Dubai debacle mean globally?

Start with oil: the only way the Emirates are going to escape a meltdown (with domino effect spreading from Dubai to Abu and so on) is by turning on oil taps. An added incentive here is that while autocratic rulers of the Emirates would not blink twice before saddling Western investors with all debts, the structure of Islamic finance used in Dubai developments implies that although junior debt holders have no explicit guarantees on their debt, Emirates simply will not be able to stomach defaulting on Islamic loans. Oil prices will be under pressure for a long period of time before Dubai's debt mountain is cut to size and this will give support to the weakened dollar on asset demand side of the dollarised carry trades involving commodities.

Bigger question is whether Dubai events might trigger the unwinding of the carry trades. This, of course, depends on the value of UAE currency and the main currency pairs used in the region. In my view, devaluation of massive proportions will be required in the short run, putting pressure on the Euro and, again, aiding the dollar.

Another force acting here will be investor confidence. If Dubai served as an island for divestment out of dollar assets in the region, this island is now fully submerged under financial tsunami. Treasuries are to firm up and dollar alongside these. Ditto for gold.

On a separate note, another net positive (longer term) for the dollar is China. President Obama's visit played out as a play of avoiding the issues of yuan, and yielded absolutely no commitment to revalue Chinese currency. This, strangely enough, implies that once revaluation does take place, it will be much more pronounced and abrupt than if the Chinese authorities were to offer President Obama some concessions this month. Here is why. Absent Chinese commitment to play cooperative game with the US on currency front, Obama Administration will let Europeans put pressure on China through bilateral channels and G20. Europe cannot afford to hold the bag in the global devaluation game as it is exports oriented economy. Developing and emerging economies will fight by imposing capital controls, but EU will have to bring this battle to Chinese shores. Thus, in the long run, the stage is now set for overshooting revaluation of the yuan well above its long-term target and firming up of the dollar.

In the medium term, all this uncertainty about the ultimate rebalancing of the FX markets will be pushing on gold. This is likely to coincide with the emerging markets shocker from Dubai and capital controls impositions, further enhancing demand for the store of value assets such as precious metals. Not to be sensationalist, but if we are at the starting point of Wave II of the crisis (even if it is only a smaller aftermath to the 2008 one), is gold at $1,500-$1,700 oz a possibility?

Just asking...

Economics 28/11/2009: Net investment position, 2008

CSO released Ireland's net investment positions for 2008 yesterday. Full release is available here. My analysis of this data follows:

Table shows outflows of Irish-owned investment from Ireland to foreign destinations (negative values) and the share of each destination in total outflows. Note the significant jump in outflows to the offshore centres, which has risen between 2006 and 2007. It will be interesting to see if this trend – moderated in 2008 – resumes in 2009 in the wake of significant increase in taxation burden in Ireland. Per more detailed breakdown in CSO data, the offshore centres received only a modest share of Irish capital in the form of reinvested earnings, and virtually none in equity purchases, suggesting that most of the outflow to these destinations was in form of business investment and cash.
Another interesting feature of this data is that significant outflows continued to the UK in 2008. Margin calls? These related to equity purchases and reinvested dividends and a significant uptick in ‘other capital’ outflows (margin calls covers on buy-to-let and other risky investments covers?).

Over the same period of time, outflow of investments to the US has fallen off the cliff in 2008. Equity purchases in the US peaked in 2007 at almost 5 times the levels of 2006 and then collapsed to a quarter of 2007 levels in 2008. Someone was buying into the top of the bubble in the US stock markets… Meanwhile, reinvested dividends remained relatively stable. Other types of capital have fallen off the cliff from almost €3 billion in 2006 to €746mln in 2007 to €77mln in 2008. Given that the US property prices peaked in 2006, this also suggests that we were buying at the top of the market there.

Table above shows inward investment inflows to Ireland. Negative values imply that foreign investors took out net amount of capital from Ireland. Offshore centres sent in about as much as 40% of the inflows from entire European area. Any alarms ringing at the Financial Regulator’s office? Notice dramatic swing from net inflows to net outflow vis-à-vis Lux and the Netherlands in 2007-2008? Equity and other capital outflows dominated here. Tax optimization in action, especially on capital taxes side.

Amazing figures from the US. Between 2007-2008, a surplus of inward inflows of €15.2bn swings into a deficit of net outflows of €14.6bn – a spread of €29.8bn or 17.4% of 2009 GDP! Interestingly, equity and reinvested earnings were still in net positive in 2008, and going strong, so the massive net outflows were the result of something else. Capital flight? Deposits crunch? Losses taking?

Net deterioration in our inward investment position between 2007 and 2008 was over €31.7bn or -18.54% of our 2009 GDP. Net improvement in our inward investment position between 2006 and 2007 was €13.63bn or +7.97% of our 2009 GDP. Massive volatility even for a small open economy, but what does it tell us about Government's idea that Ireland Inc will be rescued not by our own actions, but by foreign investors coming back to our shores?

The totals suggest that Ireland has bled a massive €36.8bn worth of investments (equivalent to 21.5% of our 2009 GDP) out of the country in 2006-2008 alone. This hardly accounts for the full extent of deterioration in the capital values of the remaining investments by foreigners in Ireland and Irish own investments abroad. But even without taking into account our current crisis, at the peak of our markets valuations in 2006-2007, we were hardly generating much real growth out of our own and foreign investments into the country. Wonder why? Me too.