Showing posts with label Markets. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Markets. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 10, 2019

10/7/19: Financialising Stagnant Growth: From Japanified Economy to Christine Lagarde


Monetary policy since the GFC of 2008 has been characterised by the near-zero (and even negative) policy rates, negative bank rates, negative Government debt yields and rampant asset price inflation. The result has been zombification of the advanced economies.

Here is the latest advanced estimate of the Eurozone real GDP growth based on the CEPR/Banca d'Italia Eurocoin indicator:
Current forecast for 2Q 2019 growth in the Eurozone, based on Eurocoin indicator is for 0.17% q/q expansion. June Eurocoin sits at 0.14%, the lowest since September 2013. The growth rate forecast has now been sub-0.25% (below 1% annual) in five months (through June 2019) and counting. Meanwhile, the link between growth and inflation has been weakening, as shown in the chart below:


Both, from the point of view of view of the current data relative to 1Q 2019 and to 2Q 2018 and to Q1 2018, growth rates are shrinking, per above. The ECB, however, remains stuck in the proverbial hard corner (chart next):

 Five years into zero policy rates, inflation is gradually creeping up (chart above), but growth is nowhere to be seen (chart next):

Worse, tangible fundamentals (captured by the models, like Eurocoin) of economic growth are becoming less and less consistent with actual growth outruns - a feature of the economy that is becoming dependent on things other than real investment and real demand for generating expansion in GDP. Both, the chart above and the chart below, highlight this troubling fact.
All of this suggests that we are in the period in economic development that is fully consistent with the secular stagnation thesis: traditional tools of monetary and fiscal policies are no longer sufficient in generating real economic growth. Instead, these tools help sustain economies overloaded with debt. It is an extend-and-pretend model of economic development: as long as corporates and households can be supported in carrying existent debt loads through monetary accommodation, the economy remains afloat (no recession, nor crisis blowout), but the levels of debt are so prohibitively high that no new debt can be accumulated to generate economic expansion.

The markets know as much. Investors know that zombie loans (loans with no capacity of servicing them should interest rates rise) mean zombie banks. Zombie banks mean zombie new borrowing markets. Zombie new borrowing markets mean zombie real investment by households and companies. Zombie investment means zombie demand. Zombie demand means deflationary supply. Rinse and repeat.

This knowledge in the markets is tangible. It takes a change in investors expectations (as in recent changes in outlook toward the reversal of the monetary tightening in the U.S. and Europe) to reprice assets. No actual value added growth enters the equation. Assets are no longer being priced on their productive capacity. And the markets are now fully finacialised. Which is to say, they are now fully monetary policy-driven.

Enter Christine Lagarde, the new head of the ECB. Lagarde's appointment is hardly an accident or a politically correct nod to women in leadership. It is the only logical choice of the financialised zombie economics of the monetary policy. To re-start borrowing or debt cycle, the EU is hoping for mutualisation of the sovereign debt markets. In other words, it is hoping to leverage the only unencumbered asset the EU still has: surplus countries' bonds. Lagarde's job at the ECB will be to run the creation of the eurobonds, bonds that will proportionally link euro area members' bonds into a single product to be monetised by the ECB as a support for market pricing. There is probably EUR 2-3 trillion worth of the international and monetary demand for these, opening up the room for more borrowing and more fiscal spending.

Sunday, July 7, 2019

7/7/19: Investment for growth is at record lows for S&P500


Interesting chart via @DavidSchawel showing changes over time in corporate (S&P500 companies) distribution of earnings:

In simple terms:

  1. Much discussed shares buybacks are still the rage: running at 31% of all cash distributions, second highest level after 34% in 2007. On a cumulated basis, and taking into the account already reduced free float in S&P 500 over the years, this is a massive level of buybacks.
  2. 'Investment for growth' - as defined - is at 51% - the lowest on record.
  3. Meaningful investment for growth (often opportunistic M&As) is at 38%, tied for the lowest with 2007 figure.
S&P 500 firms are clearly not in investment mode. Despite 'Trump incentives' - under the TCJA 2017 tax cuts act - actual capex is running tied to the second lowest levels for 2018 and 2019, at 26% of all cash distributions.

Wednesday, July 3, 2019

2/7/19: Factset: Negative EPS guidance hits the highest 2Q level since 2Q 2006


Bad news for the 'fundamentals are sound' crowd when it comes to justifying stock markets exuberance: based on data from Factset, to-date, the number of companies reporting negative earnings per share (EPS) guidance in 2Q 2019 has reached 87 - the highest number after 1Q 2016, and the highest number for any 2Q period since 2006. Total number of reporting companies to-date is 113, which means that so far in the reporting season, a whooping 77% of reporting companies are guiding negative EPS.


Technology sector leads negative EPS guidance issuance. Per Factset: "Information Technology sector, 26 companies have issued negative EPS guidance for the second quarter, which is above the five-year average for the sector of 20.4. If 26 is the final number for the quarter, it will tie the mark (with multiple quarters) for the second highest number of companies issuing negative EPS guidance in this sector since FactSet began tracking this data in 2006, trailing only Q4 2012 (27). At the industry level, the Semiconductor & Semiconductor Equipment (9) and Software (6) industries have the highest number of companies issuing negative EPS guidance in the sector." Which means the tech sector is singing the blues. Consumer discretionaries and Healthcare are the other two sectors showing underperformance relative to 5 year average.

Which is ugly. Uglier, yet, as we are not seeing any correction in the markets to reflect the deteriorating fundamentals. And uglier still when one considers the fact that the 'S' part of EPS has been gamed dramatically in recent years through rampant shares buybacks, while the 'E' bit has been gamed via opportunistic M&As.

Monday, June 3, 2019

3/6/19: Three Periods in labor Force Participation Rate Evolution and Secular Stagnations


The state of the global labor markets is reflected not only in the record lows in official unemployment statistics, but also in the low labor force participation rates:


In fact, chart above shows three distinct periods of evolution of the labor force participation rates in the advanced economies, three regimes: the 1970s into 1989 period that is marked by high participation rates, the period of 1990-2004 that is marked by the steadily declining participation rates, and the period since 2005 that is associated with low and steady participation rates.

This is hardly consistent with the story of the labor markets spectacular recovery that is presented by the official unemployment rates. In fact, the evidence in the above chart points to the continued importance of the twin secular stagnations hypothesis that I have been documenting on this blog.

Tuesday, April 23, 2019

23/4/19: Property, Property and More Property: U.S. Household Wealth Bubble


According to the St. Luis Fed, U.S. household wealth has reached a historical high of 535% of the U.S. GDP (see: https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2019-04-16/where-inflation-hiding-asset-prices).


There is a problem, however, with the above data: it reflects some dodgy ways of counting 'household wealth'. For two primary reasons: firstly, it ignores concentration risk arising from wealth inequality, and secondly, it ignores concentration risk arising from households' exposure to property markets. A good measure of liquidity risk controlled allocation of wealth is ownership of liquid equities (note: equities, of course, and are subject to Fed-funded bubble dynamics). The chart below - via https://www.topdowncharts.com/single-post/2019/04/22/Weekly-SP-500-ChartStorm---21-April-2019 shows a pretty dire state of equity markets (the source of returns on asset demand side being swamped over the last decade by shares buybacks and M&As), but it also shows that households did not benefit materially from the equities bubble.


In other words, controlling for liquidity risk, the Fed's meme of historically high household wealth is seriously challenged. And controlling for wealth inequality (distributional features of wealth), it is probably dubious overall.

So here's the chart showing just how absurdly property-dependent (households' home equity valuations in red line, index starting at 100 at the end of the Global Financial Crisis) the Fed 'wealth' figures (blue line, same starting index) are:


In fact, dynamically, rates of growth in household home equity have been far in excess of the rates of growth in other assets since 2012.  In that, the dynamics of the current 'sound economy' are identical (and actually more dramatic) to the 2000-2006 bubble: property, property and more property.

Monday, February 18, 2019

18/2/19: U.S. Treasuries: Not Finding Much Love in Foreign Lands


In recent months, I have been warning about the cliff of new bonds issuance that is coming for the U.S. Treasuries in 2019, pressured by the declining interest in U.S. debt from the rest of the world. December 2018 figures are a further signal reinforcing the importance of this warning (see U.S. yields comparatives here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2019/02/15219-still-drowning-in-love-for-debt.html).

In December 2018, foreign buyers cut back their purchases of the U.S. Treasuries by the net USD77.35 billion, following a net increase in purchases in November of USD13.2 billion. December net outflow was the largest since January 1978. On a positive note, Chinese holdings of U.S. Treasuries increased in December, after declining for six straight months. China held USD1.123 trillion in U.S. Treasuries in December, up from USD1.121 trillion in November.

Here is the historical chart, including 4Q 2018 estimate:

Not quite an armageddon, but statistically, foreign holdings of the U.S. Treasuries remained basically flat from 1Q 2014. Which would be fine, if (1) U.S. new net issuance was to remain at zero or close to it (which is not the case with accelerating deficits: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2019/02/15219-nothing-to-worry-about-for-those.html), (2) U.S. Fed was not 'normalizing' its asset holdings (which is not the case, as the Fed continues to reduce its balance sheet - see next chart).


Note: January 2019 saw a decline in the benchmark U.S. Treasuries (10 year) yield, compared to 2018 annual yield:

Friday, February 15, 2019

15/2/19: Euro area is sliding toward recession


Based on the latest data through January 2019, Eurozone’s economic problems are getting worse. In 4Q 2018, Euro area posted real GDP growth of just 0,.2% q/q - matching the print for 3Q 2018. Meanwhile, inflation has fallen from 1.7% in December 2018 to 1.6% in January 2018. And Eurocoin - a leading growth indicator for euro area GDP expansion slipped from 0.42 in December 2018 to 0.31 in January 2019. This marked the third consecutive month of decline in Eurocoin, and the steepest fall in 8 months. Worse, July 23016 was the last time Eurocoin was at this level.



Within the last 12 months, Eurozone growth has officially fallen from 0,.7% q/q in 4Q 2017 to 0.2% in 4Q 2018, HICP effectively stayed the same, with inflation at 1.6% in January 2018 agains 1.5% in January 2018. And forward growth indicator has collapsed from 0.95 in January 2018 to 0.31 in January 2019.

Euro area is heading backward when it comes to economic activity, fast.

Germany just narrowly escaped an official recession, with 4Q growth at zero, and 3Q growth at -0.2%


Italy is in official recession, with 3Q 2018 GDP growth of -0.1% followed by 4Q 2018 growth of -0.2%.

Industrial goods production is now down two consecutive months in the Euro area as a whole, with latest print for December 2018 sitting at - 4.2% decline, following a -3.0% y/y fall in November 2018.


Worse, capital goods industrial production - a signal of forward capacity investment, is now down even more sharply: from -4.4% in November 2018 to -5.5% in December 2018.

Friday, January 11, 2019

10/1/19: QE or QT? Look at the markets for signals


With U.S. Fed entering the stage where the markets expectations for a pause in monetary tightening is running against the Fed statements on the matter, and the ambiguity of the Fed's forward guidance runs against the contradictory claims from the individual Fed policymakers, the real signals as to the Fed's actual decisions factors can be found in the historical data.

Here is the history of the monetary easing by the Fed, the ECB, the Bank of England and the BOJ since the start of the Global Financial Crisis in two charts:

Chart 1: looking at the timeline of various QE programs against the Fed's balancesheet and the St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index:


There is a strong correlation between adverse changes in the financial stress index and the subsequent launches of new QE programs, globally.

Chart 2: looking at the timeline for QE programs and the evolution of S&P 500 index:

Once again, financial markets conditions strongly determine monetary authorities' responses.

Which brings us to the latest episode of increases in the financial stress, since the end of 3Q 2018 and the questions as to whether the Fed is nearing the point of inflection on its Quantitative Tightening  (QT) policy.

Saturday, December 22, 2018

22/12/18: Millennials and Buffetts: It’s a VUCA Investment World

My August 2018 Economic Outlook for Manning Financial:


What unites Warren Buffett, Apple and the financially distressed generation of the Millennials? In one word: cash and preferences for safe haven assets. Consider three facts.

Financial Markets

One: at the start of August, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. gave Buffett more room to engage in stock buybacks, just as company cash holdings rose to USD111 billion at the end of 2Q 2018, marking the second highest quarterly cash reserves in history of the firm. This comes on foot of Buffett's recent statements that current stock markets valuations price Berkshire out of "virtually all deals", just as the company took its holdings of Apple stock from USD40.7 billion in 1Q 2018 filings to USD47.2 billion in 2Q filings. Historically, Berkshire and Buffett are known for their high risk, nearly contrarian, but fundamentals-anchored investments: a strategy for selecting companies that offer long term value and growth potential and going long big. Today, Buffett simply can’t find enough such companies in the markets. His call is to return earnings to shareholders instead of investing them in buying more shares.

Two: on August 2nd, Apple became the first private company in history to top USD1 trillion market valuation mark when company stock closed at above USD207.05 per share. Company's path to this achievement was based on far more than just a portfolio of great products. In fact, two key financial engineering factors in recent years have contributed to its phenomenal success: aggressive tax optimisation, and extremely active shares buybacks programme. In May 2018, the company pledged USD100 billion of its USD285 billion cash stash (accumulated primarily off-shore, in low tax jurisdictions such as Ireland, Jersey and in the Caribbean) for shares buybacks. As of end of July, it was already half way to that target. Apple is an industry leader in buybacks, accounting for close to 15 percent of all shares buybacks planned for 2018. But Apple is not alone. A study by the Roosevelt Institute released in August shows that U.S.-listed companies spent 60 percent of their net profits on stock buybacks between 2015-2017. And on foot of the USD1.5 trillion tax cuts bill passed by Congress in December 2017, buybacks are expected to top USD 800 billion this year alone, beating the previous historical record of USD 587 billion set in 2007. Whichever way you take the arguments, accumulation of tax optimisation-linked cash reserves, and aggressive use of shares buybacks have contributed significantly to the FAANGS (Facebook (FB), Amazon (AMZN), Apple (AAPL), Netflix (NFLX), and Alphabet (GOOG)) dominance over the global financial markets.


The Squeezed Generation

And this brings us to the third fact: the lure of cash in today's world of retail investment. If cash is where Warren Buffetts and Apples of the financial and corporate worlds are, it is quite rational that cash is where the new generation of retail investors will be. Per Bankrate.com July 2018 survey data, 1 in 3 American Millennials are favouring cash instruments (e.g. savings accounts and certificates of deposit) for investing their longer-term savings. In comparison, only 21 percent of Generation X investors who prefer cash instruments, and 16 percent for the Baby Boomers. American retail investors are predominantly focused on low-yielding, higher safety investment allocations. For example, recent surveys indicate that only 18 percent of all American investment portfolios earn non-negative real returns on their savings, and that these households are dominated by the Baby Boomers generation and the top 10 percent of earners. Amongst the Millennials, the percentage is even lower at 7.4 percent.

The conventional wisdom suggests that the reasons why Millennials are so keen on holding their investments in highly secure assets is the fear of market crashes inherited by their generation from witnessing the Global Financial Crisis. But the conventional wisdom is false, and this falsehood is too dangerous to ignore for all investors - small and large alike.

In reality, the Millennials scepticism about the risk-adjusted returns promised by the traditional asset classes - equities and bonds - is not misplaced, and dovetails neatly with what both the largest American corporates and the biggest global investors are doing. Namely, they are pivoting away from yield-focused investments, and toward safe havens. The reason we are not seeing this pivot reflected in depressed asset prices, yet is because there is a growing gap between strategic positioning of the Wall Street trading houses (all-in risky assets) and those investors who are, like Buffett, focusing on longer-term investment returns.


Overvalued Investment

In simple terms, the U.S. asset markets are grossly overvalued in terms of both current pricing (including short term forward projections), and longer term valuations (over 5 years duration).

The former is not difficult to illustrate. As recent markets research shows, all of the eight major market valuations ratios are signalling some extent of excessive optimism: the current S&P500 ratio to historical average, household equity allocation ratio, price/sales ratio, price/book value ratio, Tobin's Q ratio, the so-called Buffett Indicator or the total market cap of all U.S. stocks relative to the U.S. GDP, the dividend yield, the CAPE ratio and the unadjusted P/E ratio. Take Buffett's Indicator: normally, the markets are rationally bullish when the indicator is in the 70-80 percent range, and investors pivot away from equities, when the indicator hits 100 percent. Today, the indicator is close to 140 percent - a historical record.

But the longer run valuations are harder to pin down using markets-linked indices, because no one has a crystal ball as to where the markets and the listed companies might be in years to come. Which means that any analyst worth their salt should look at the macro-drivers for signals as to the future markets pressure points and upside opportunities.

Here, there are worrying signs.

In the last three decades, bankruptcy rates for older households have increased almost three-fold, according to the recent study, from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3226574). This suggests that not all is well amongst the wealthiest retired generation, the Baby Boomers, who are currently holding the vastly disproportionate share of all risky assets in the economy. For example, 80 percent of Baby Boomers own property, accounting for roughly 65 percent of the overall housing markets available assets. All in, Baby Boomers have over 50.2 percent share of net household wealth. As they age, and as their healthcare costs rise, they will be divesting out of these assets at an increasing rate. This effect is expected to lead to a 3-3.5 percent reduction in the expected nominal returns to the pensions funds for the Generation X and the Millennials, per 2016 study by the U.S. Federal Reserve (https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2016/files/2016080pap.pdf). The latter is, in part, the legacy of the 2007 Global Financial Crisis, which has resulted in an unprecedented collapse in wealth held by the American middle classes. Based on the report from the Minneapolis Federal Reserve (https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/the-region/race-and-the-race-between-stocks-and-homes), current household wealth for the bottom 50 percent of U.S. households is at the lowest levels since the mid-1950s, while household wealth of the middle 40 percent of the U.S. households is comparable to where it was in 2001. In other words, nine out of ten U.S. households have not seen any growth in their wealth for at least 18 years now.

Over the same period of time, wages and incomes of those currently in middle and early stages of their careers, aka the Generation X and the Millennials, have stagnated, while their career prospects for the near future remain severely depressed by the longer in-the-job tenures of the previous generations.

June 2018 paper from the Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute, titled “Income and Wealth Inequality in America, 1949-2016” (https://www.minneapolisfed.org/institute/working-papers-institute/iwp9.pdf) documented the dramatic reallocation of purchasing power in the U.S. income across generations, from 1970 to 2015, with the share of total income earned by the bottom 50 percent dropping from 21.6 percent to 14.5 percent, while the top 10 percent share climbed from 30.7 percent to 47.6 percent. Share of wealth held in housing assets for the top 1 percent of earners currently stands at around 8.7 percent, with the remained held in financial assets and cash. For top 20 percent of income distribution, the numbers are more even at 28 percent of wealth in housing. Middle class distribution of wealth is completely reversed, with 62.5 percent held in the form of housing.

The problem is made worse by the fact that following the financial crash of 2007-2008, the U.S. Government failed to provide any meaningful support to struggling homeowners, focusing, just as European authorities did, on repairing the banks instead of households.


Markets Forward

What all of this means for the asset values going forward is that demographically, the economy is divided into the older and wealthier generation that is starting to aggressively consume their wealth, looking to sell their financial assets and leverage their housing stocks, and those who cannot afford to purchase these assets, facing lower incomes and no tradable equity. This is hardly a prescription for the bull markets in the long run.

In this environment, on a 5-10 years time horizon, holding cash and money markets instruments makes a lot more sense not because these instruments offer significant current returns, but because the expected upcoming asset price deflation will make cash and safe haven assets the new market king.

The same is apparent in the corporate decisions to use tax and regulatory changes to beef up their cash holdings and equity prices, as opposed to investing in new growth activities. Even inclusive of buybacks, and Mergers & Acquisitions in the corporate sector, aggregate investment as a share of GDP continues to slide decade after decade, as highlighted in the chart below.

CHART

What makes matters even worse is that until mid-2000s, the data for investment did not include R&D activities, normally classed as expenditure in years prior. Adjusting for M&As, buybacks and R&D allocations, aggregate investment in G7 economies has declined from 24.9 percent of GDP in the 1980s to around 16-17 percent in 2010-2018. In simple terms, neither the public nor the private sector in the largest advanced economies in the world are planning for investment-driven growth in the near future, out into 2025.

None of which should come as a surprise to those following my writings in recent years, including in these pages. Over the years, I have written extensively about the Twin Secular Stagnations Hypothesis - a proposition that the global economy has entered a structurally slower period of economic growth, driven by adverse demographics and shallower returns to technological innovation. What is new is that we are now witnessing the beginning of the demographics-driven investors' rotation out of risky assets and toward higher safety instruments. With time, this process is only likely to accelerate, leading to the structural reversal of the bull markets in risky assets and real estate.

Wednesday, December 19, 2018

19/12/18: Assets with Negative Returns: 1901-present


Highlighting the evidence presented in the earlier-linked article, here is the chart based on data from the Deutsche Bank Research team, showing historical evidence on the total percentage of all key asset classes with negative annual returns:

CHART

Source: Data from Deutsche Bank Research and author own calculations.

I have highlighted 7 occasions on which the percentage of negative returns assets exceeded 50%. Only three times since 1901 did this percentage exceed 60%, including in YTD returns for 3Q 2018.



19/12/18: From Goldilocks to Humpty-Dumpty Markets


As noted in the post above, I am covering the recent volatility and uncertainty in the financial markets for the Sunday Business Post : https://www.businesspost.ie/business/goldilocks-humpty-dumpty-markets-2018-433053.


Below is the un-edited version of the article:

2018 has been a tough year for investors. Based on the data compiled by the Deutsche Bank AG research team, as of November 2018, 65.7 percent of all globally-traded assets were posting annual losses in gross (non-risk adjusted) terms. This marks 2018 as the third worst year on record since 1901, after 1920 (67.6 percent) and 1994 (67.2 percent), as Chart 1 below illustrates. Adjusting Deutsche Bank’s data for the last thirty days, by mid-December 2018, 66.3 percent of all assets traded in the markets are now in the red on the annual returns basis.

CHART 1: Percentage of Assets with Negative Total Returns in Local Currency

Source: Deutsche Bank AG
Note: The estimates are based on a varying number of assets, with 30 assets included in 1901, rising to 70 assets in 2018

Of the 24 major asset classes across the Advanced Economies and Emerging Markets, only three, the U.S. Treasury Bills (+19.5% YTD through November 15), the U.S. Leveraged Loans (+7.45%), and the U.S. Dollar (+0.78%) offer positive risk-adjusted returns, based on the data from Bloomberg. S&P 500 equities are effectively unchanged on 2017. Twenty other asset classes are in the red, as shown in the second chart below, victims of either negative gross returns, high degree of volatility in prices (high risk), or both.


CHART 2: Risk-Adjusted Returns, YTD through mid-December 2018, percent

Source: Data from Bloomberg, TradingView, and author own calculations
Note: Risk-adjusted returns take into account volatility in prices. IG = Investment Grade, HY = High Yield, EM = Emerging Markets

The causes of this abysmal performance are both structural and cyclical.


Cyclical Worries

The cyclical side of the markets is easier to deal with. Here, concerns are that the U.S., European and global economies have entered the last leg of the current expansion cycle that the world economy has enjoyed since 2009 (the U.S. since 2010, and the Eurozone since 2014). Although the latest forecasts from the likes of the IMF and the World Bank indicate only a gradual slowdown in the economic activity across the world in 2019-2023, majority of the private sector analysts are expecting a U.S. recession in the first half of 2020, following a slowdown in growth in 2019. For the Euro area, many analysts are forecasting a recession as early as late-2019.

The key cyclical driver for these expectations is tightening of monetary policies that sustained the recovery post-Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recession. And the main forward-looking indicators for cyclical pressures to be watched by investors is the U.S. Treasury yield curve and the 10-year yield and the money velocity.

The yield curve is currently at a risk of inverting (a situation when the long-term interest rates fall below short-term interest rates). The 10-year yields are trading at below 3 percent marker – a sign of the financial markets losing optimism over the sustainability of the U.S. growth rates. Money velocity is falling across the Advanced Economies – a dynamic only partially accounted for by the more recent monetary policies.

CHART 3: 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate, January 2011-present, percent

Source: FRED database, Federal reserve bank of St. Louis. 


Structural Pains

While cyclical pressures can be treated as priceable risks, investors’ concerns over structural problems in the global economy are harder to assess and hedge.

The key concerns so far have been the extreme uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding the impact of the U.S. Presidential Administration policies on trade, geopolitical risks, and fiscal expansionism. Compounding factor has been a broader rise in political opportunism and the accompanying decline in the liberal post-Cold War world order.

The U.S. Federal deficit have ballooned to USD780 billion in the fiscal 2018, the highest since 2012. It is now on schedule to exceed USD1 trillion this year. Across the Atlantic, since mid-2018, a new factor has been adding to growing global uncertainty: the structural weaknesses in the Euro area financial services sector (primarily in the German, Italian and French banking sectors), and the deterioration in fiscal positions in Italy (since Summer 2018) and France (following November-December events). The European Central Bank’s pivot toward unwinding excessively accommodating monetary policies of the recent past, signaled in Summer 2018, and re-confirmed in December, is adding volatility to structural worries amongst the investors.

Other long-term worries that are playing out in the investment markets relate to the ongoing investors’ unease about the nature of economic expansion during 2010-2018 period. As evident in longer term financial markets dynamics, the current growth cycle has been dominated by one driver: loose monetary policies of quantitative easing. This driver fuelled unprecedented bubbles across a range of financial assets, from real estate to equities, from corporate debt to Government bonds, as noted earlier.

However, the same driver also weakened corporate balance sheets in Europe and the U.S. As the result, key corporate risk metrics, such as the degree of total leverage, the cyclically-adjusted price to earnings ratios, and the ratio of credit growth to value added growth in the private economy have been flashing red for a good part of two decades. Not surprisingly, U.S. velocity of money has been on a continuous downward trend from 1998, with Eurozone velocity falling since 2007. Year on year monetary base in China, Euro Area, Japan and United States grew at 2.8 percent in October 2018, second lowest reading since January 2016, according to the data from Yardeni Research.

Meanwhile, monetary, fiscal and economic policies of the first two decades of this century have failed to support to the upside both the labour and technological capital productivity growth. In other words, the much-feared spectre of the broad secular stagnation (the hypothesis that long-term changes in both demand and supply factors are leading to a structural long-term slowdown in global economic growth) remains a serious concern for investors. The key leading indicator that investors should be watching with respect to this risk is the aggregate rate of investment growth in non-financial private sector, net of M&As and shares repurchases – the rate that virtually collapsed in post-2008 period and have not recovered to its 1990s levels since.

The second half of 2018 has been the antithesis to the so-called ‘Goldolocks markets’ of 2014-2017, when all investment asset classes across the Advanced Economies were rising in valuations. At the end of 3Q 2018, U.S. stock markets valuations relative to GDP have topped the levels previously seen only in 1929 and 2000. Since the start of October, however, we have entered a harmonised ‘Humpty-Dumpty market’, characterised by spiking volatility, rising uncertainty surrounding the key drivers of markets dynamics. Adding to this high degree of coupling across various asset classes, the recent developments in global markets suggest a more structural rebalancing in investors’ attitudes to risk that is likely to persist into 2019.

Saturday, November 17, 2018

17/11/18: Nine in Ten in the Red: Asset Markets YTD Returns Signal Risk Repricing


According to a recent research note from the Deutsche Bank, 89% of global macro assets are posting losses on year-to-date basis. This is the highest level of losses in more than a century.


Given the scale of financial risk mis-pricing in equities and bonds markets in the post-QE period, we are likely to witness more downward movement in the assets valuations in months to come. A gradual deleveraging that the market trends have been supporting so far remains highly incomplete and requires more pronounced re-pricing of assets to the downside.

Read more on this here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2018/11/161118-horsemen-of-financial-markets.html

Tuesday, October 9, 2018

9/10/18: BRIC Composite PMIs 3Q 2018: A Tale of Growth Slowdown


Previous posts on 3Q 2018 PMIs have covered:

  1. BRIC Manufacturing PMIs: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2018/10/31018-global-pmis-tanked-in-3q-2018.html;
  2. BRIC Services PMIs: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2018/10/91018-bric-services-pmis-3q-2018-slower.html; and
  3. Global Composite PMIs: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2018/10/31018-global-pmis-tanked-in-3q-2018.html.


Now, let’s take a look at the BRIC Composite PMIs that combine Services and Manufacturing sectors growth signals. As Global Composite PMI signalled slowing growth momentum in the global economy, BRIC Composite PMIs all trailed global growth indicator.

Brazil Composite PMI fell deeper into contraction territory in 3Q 2018 (48.5) compared to 2Q 2018 (49.1), marking the fourth consecutive quarter of contraction in the economy, as signalled by the combination of PMI indices in Services and Manufacturing sectors. 3Q 2018 was the lowest Composite PMI reading for the South America’s largest economy in 6 consecutive quarters.

Russia Composite PMI slipped from 53.4 in 2Q 2018 to 52.4 in 3Q 2018, marking slowdown in the rate of economic expansion. This was the lowest reading in Russia Composite PMIs since 2Q 2016. Despite this, Russia Composite PMI was the second largest in the BRIC group (marginally below India’s 52.5 reading).

China Composite PMI posted a modest decline in the growth rate falling from 52.5 in 2Q 2018 to 52.1 in 3Q 2018, the latter reading marking the lowest rate of expansion in 3 quarters. In fact, China Composite PMIs have been singling weak growth dynamics in every quarter since 4Q 2016 - something that is yet to be reflected in the official growth figures for the country.

India Composite PMI bucked the BRIC trend and rose from 51.9 in 2Q 2018 to 52.5 in 3Q 2018, for the first statistically significant growth signal in 5 quarters. Despite this, growth momentum in India remains below global PMI levels.

Global Composite PMI declined from 54.0 in 2Q 2018 to 53.3 in 3Q 2018.




Overall, slowing global growth momentum is being matched by a slowdown in the BRIC economies. Both Manufacturing and Services sectors of the BRIC economies are underperforming their Global counterparts and the overall trend is toward declining global and BRIC growth.

Thursday, October 4, 2018

3/10/18: Global PMIs tanked in 3Q 2018


While Markit continue to publish Services and Composite PMIs for BRIC economies, here is a quick update on Global PMIs for 3Q 2018 which are now out:

  • Global Manufacturing PMI averaged 52.5 in 3Q 2018, down from 53.2 in 2Q 2018. This is the lowest reading for the index in 8 quarters, signalling slowest growth in global manufacturing sector since 3Q 2016. It also marks the second consecutive quarter of declining Global Manufacturing PMI.
  • Global Services PMI averaged 53.5 in 3Q 2018, the lowest reading in 7 consecutive quarters, matching the lowest point in 8 consecutive quarters. This marked the first quarter of declines in Services sector activity, and the drop was sharp: down from 54.2 in 2Q 2018.
  • Global Composite PMI averaged 53.3 in 3Q 2018, down from 54.0 in 2Q 2018 and 54.2 in 1Q 2018, marking the lowest reading in 8 consecutive quarters. The slowdown in the overall global economic indictor has also been sharp in 3Q 2018 and most of this slowdown took place in August and September.


Overall, these are not great signs for the global economy. 

For BRIC Manufacturing PMIs analysis for 3Q 2018, see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2018/10/11018-bric-manufacturing-pmi-dips-down.html. BRIC Services PMIs and BRIC Composite PMIs analysis is to follow, so stay tuned.

Wednesday, April 25, 2018

25/4/18: 90 years of Volatility: VIX & S&P


A great chart from Goldman Sachs via @Schuldensuehner showing extreme events in markets volatility using overlay of VIX and realised volatility from 1928 on through March 2018:


For all risk / implied risk metrics wonks, this is cool.