23/1/2014: The Age of Great Stagnation: Village Magazine, January 2014

This is an unedited version of my column in Village magazine for December 2013-January 2014.


With employment rising, property prices on the mend, mortgages arrears stabilising, Exchequer returns surging and business and consumer confidence regaining pre-crisis highs, one can easily confuse Ireland for an Asia-Pacific economic dynamo.

Alas, the reality of our economic predicament suggests that once the official hullabaloo about the return to growth is stripped back to the bare facts, it becomes clear that Ireland is entering a new age, the Age of Great Stagnation.

The reasons for this are two-fold.

Firstly, we are still facing a long-term debt crisis. No matter what statistic one pulls out of the hat, this crisis, embodied in high levels of debts carried by our households, non-financial companies and the Exchequer, is going to be with us for many years to come.

Secondly, we are still in a structural growth crisis. Neither our own development model, heavily reliant on FDI and transfer pricing by the multinationals, nor our core trading partners growth models, reliant on fiscal and financial repression to drag themselves out of the crisis, are sustainable in the long run.


In our leaders’ dogmatic adherence to the past (a behavioural  fallacy that economists call path-dependency) our official growth theory suggests that economic recovery in our major trading partners will trickle down to Irish national accounts.

Alas, in the longer run, a lot is amiss with this thinking.

For starters, exports-led theory of growth is simply not true. Over 2000-2013, Ireland led the euro area in growth and in a recession. Since the onset of the crisis, cumulative real GDP across the euro area contracted by 2.1 percent. In Ireland, over the same period, GDP fell by 4.7 percent as domestic drivers for the crisis overpowered external factors. As for the recovery period, unlike in the early 1990s, the improving economic fortunes abroad are not doing much good for Ireland’s exports to-date. Over the last four years, volumes of imports of goods by the euro area countries grew by almost 15 percent. Irish exports of goods over the same period of time rose just 2.2 percent.

The reason for this is structural. Tax arbitrage only works as long as there are profits to move through the Irish tax system. Once the profits dry out, arbitrage ends. Pharma sector is a good example of this dynamic. Replacing goods exports-driven growth with ICT services-driven trade is decoupling our external balances from the real economy.

Worse, much of our trade balance improvements in 2009-2013 was down to collapse in imports. This presents a serious risk forward. To fund our public and private liabilities, we need long-term current account surpluses to average above 4 percent of GDP over the next decade or so. We also need economic growth of some 3-3.5 percent in GDP and GNP. Yet, to drive real growth in the economy we need domestic investment and demand uplifts. These require an increase in imports of real capital and consumption goods. Should our exports of goods continue down the current trajectory, any sustained improvement in the domestic economy will be associated with higher imports. A corollary to that will be deterioration in our trade balance. This, in turn, will put pressures on our economy’s capacity to fund debt.

And given the levels of debt we carry, the tipping point is not that far off the radar. In H1 2013 Ireland's external real debt (excluding monetary authorities, banks and FDI) stood at almost USD1.32 trillion - the highest level ever recorded. Large share of this debt is down to the MNCs. However, overall debt levels in the Irish system are still sky high. At the end of H1 2013, total real economic debt in Ireland - debt of Irish Government, excluding Nama, Irish-resident corporates and households - stood at over EUR492 billion - down just EUR8.5 billion on absolute peak attained in H3 2012.

Which brings us to the second point raised in the beginning of the article: our economic, regulatory, monetary and political dependency on the euro area.

Instead of charting own course toward sustainable long-term competitiveness, we remain attached at the hip to the euro area. The latter is now seized by a Japanese-styled long-term stagnation with no growth in new investment and consumption, and glacially moving deleveraging of its own banks and sovereigns. Financial, regulatory and fiscal repressions are now dominating the euro area agendas.

All of the trade growth across the euro area today comes from the emerging and middle-income economies outside the euro block. And competition for this trade is heating up. Even Portugal, Greece and Spain, not to mention Italy are posting positive trade surpluses and these are projected to strengthen in 2014.

Meanwhile, we remain on a slow path to entering new markets, despite having spent good part of the last 6 years talking about the need to 'break' into BRICS and the emerging and middle-income economies. In Q1-Q3 2012, Irish exports of goods to BRICS totalled EUR2.78 billion. A year later, these are down EUR240 million.

We are also missing the most crucial element of the growth puzzle: structural reforms.

Since 2008 there has been virtually no change in the way we do business domestically, especially when it comes to protected professions and state-controlled sectors. Legal reforms, restructuring of semi-state companies’ and the sectors where they play dominant roles, such as health, transport and energy, reductions in the costs and inefficiencies in our financial services – these are just a handful of areas where promised reforms have not been delivered.
Instead of reducing the burden of monopolistic competition in key domestic sectors, we are increasing it. In banking, oligopoly of three domestic players is being reinforced by exits of international banks and lack of new entrants into the market.

In line with the lack of transformative changes in state-controlled sectors, there is little innovation in the ways the Government approaches fiscal policies. Taxes and charges are climbing up, while spending continues to run ahead of pre-crisis trends. On a cumulative basis, over 2008-2013, Irish Government spending above 1997-2007 trend stands at around EUR79 billion. This trend is based on a generous assumption for annual growth of government spending of 6 percent from 1997-1999 on. Over the last sixteen years, average annual growth in our nominal Gross National Product run at under 6.07 percent per annum. Growth in Government spending over the same period stands at 7.22 percent and for current expenditure – at 7.46 percent.

Meanwhile, costs are rising across all categories of regulations, from taxation to professional compliance, to operational aspects of enterprise. Not surprisingly, Ireland is experiencing falling entrepreneurship. According to the World Bank data, in 2004-2008, Ireland's average density of start-ups was 6.1 allowing for an average of 17,500 new companies to be formed per annum. In 2012 the density fell to 4.5 and the number of new companies registered slipped to 13,774.  This does not account for numerous re-openings of the businesses liquidated over the recent years to resolve the back-breaking tolls of upward-only rent reviews.

The political cycle is now turning against the prospect of deep reforms with European and local elections on the horizon.  With it, any prospect of real, structural change in the economy is fading away. The current technical recovery in the economy is likely to push Irish growth to above the euro area average rates in 2014. Beyond then, there is little visibility as to what can sustain such a momentum. In short, enjoy this late sunshine, while it lasts.

17/10/2013: Budget 2014 Missing the Targets: Sunday Times, October 13

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from October 13, 2013.


Recent events have led to a significant reframing of the Budget 2014. With these, the Government is now actively signaling a more accommodative stance on next year's cuts. Alas, the good news end there and the bad news begin. Any easing on austerity in 2014 will be unlikely to produce a material improvement in household budgets. In return, the Government will be placing huge hopes on robust growth returning in 2014. If this fails to materialise, lower austerity today will spell more pain in 2015. Like a dysfunctional alcoholic, unable to stop binging at closing time, we ignore tomorrow’s hangover.


A combination of the latest IMF report on the Irish economy and the outcome of the Seanad abolition referendum have settled the debate on the scale of adjustment to be taken on October 15th. Embarrassing defeat in the referendum has meant that the continuation of Taoiseach's leadership required some symbolic gesture toward the electorate. Lowering the 2014 cuts targets on October 15th can serve the purpose for a few crucial months until the New Year.

Meanwhile, ambiguity-embracing IMF lent a helping had. The IMF repeated its insistence on EUR5.1 billion combined 2014-2015 cuts in the latest assessment of the Irish economy. Yet, the IMF avoided specifying the breakdown of these adjustments between 2014 and 2015. This has given the Government confidence to argue the case in favour of partially delaying 2014 adjustment in front of the EU overseers of our budgets.

Immediately after the IMF report publication, Irish media was promptly fed the rumors that the Minister for Finance was seeking a reduction in the level of budgetary cuts. This week Minister Noonan said that the 2014 adjustment will be EUR600 million lower than EUR3.1 billion originally agreed with the Troika. The savings will amount to 0.37 percent of our GDP: a small boost for the Irish economy, but a massive splash in the PR spin terms for the Government.

With some cuts delayed to 2015, Ireland’s debt sustainability and deficit targets now hinge on the Government’s forecasts for growth materializing over the next twelve months. The risks to these are non-negligible. Last week IMF lowered Irish GDP growth forecasts for every year from 2013 through 2018. Compared to the forecasts released in June this year, October forecasts for inflation are also down. This implies that nominal growth – the source of budget deficits and debt dynamics – is expected to be even slower. If back in June this year IMF expected Irish economy to be at EUR205.8 billion by 2018, now the fund is projecting it to hit EUR201.7 billion. Cumulated forecast nominal GDP for 2013-2018 is EUR15.6 billion lower in October report than in June assessment.  Even before Minister Noonan’s latest reductions in fiscal adjustment for Budget 2014, IMF projected worsening of Irish deficits in 2014-2018.

Department of Finance forecasts, released this week and underpinning the Budget 2014 calculations are more optimistic on nominal growth, expecting higher inflation and anticipating more domestic consumption and investment than the IMF. If the Department gets its forecasts wrong, we will pay 2015 for the delays in cuts planned for the next year.



Flying on hopium of rosy growth expectations is a risky proposition for the Exchequer especially ahead of our drawing down the final tranche of the Troika funding. For this risk, the savings to be delivered in the Budget 2014 are likely to be insignificant from economy’s point of view.

Given the precarious position of the Government in public opinion polls, it is a safe bet to assume that the coalition will be putting the money to ‘work’ as an investment stimulus and a cushion against cuts to social welfare and health.

New building programmes in the more sensitive constituencies hold some serious political capital. But planning allocation of large sums to new investment is a lengthy process before construction jobs actually materialise. Growth impact of these measures in 2014 is unlikely to be significant.

But the thrust of 'savings' is likely to go to the second option. Doing as little as possible for yet another year in structurally altering the way we spend on social supports and healthcare will mean that the budgetary changes to health spending in 2014 will likely be identical to those undertaken in the past. Expect more cost shifting to private insurance, more sabre-rattling over cost overruns and more imaginary gains in productivity. Social welfare ‘cost containment’ measures will continue to rely on 'demand attrition' - the declines in demand due to unemployment benefits expiration and emigration. This means zero impact on growth in 2014.

Meanwhile, revenue side of the budgetary equation will keep pressuring the economy.

Fine Gael's side of the Coalition is promising us that the Budget will contain no new taxes. Alas, in Ireland we have a very narrow definition of both terms: 'new' and 'taxes'. In 2014 we will be facing a full annual Property Tax bill, which is expected to take out additional EUR250 from the average household income. The Budget will also likely raise charges on families to fund education and healthcare. The Irish Government is saying these are not new taxes. Anyone expected to pay them would disagree.

Last year, PRSI changes and reduction in child benefits were not identified as 'new taxes' either. These cost an average working family with two children some EUR494 per annum – an involuntary reduction in family income.

Per research note published by Grant Thornton two weeks ago, a family on EUR80,000 with two earners with two children saw their tax bill rise by 54 per cent since 2008. Their disposable income is now down a massive EUR6,132 per annum. Only a small fraction of these were officially recognised as new tax measures.

Meanwhile, the same families have also seen the costs of basic services provided by the state agencies and enterprises, or controlled by the state regulators and heavily taxed, rise dramatically over the course of the crisis. On average Irish consumer prices fell 1.6 percent between August 2008 and August 2013. Health insurance costs more than doubled over the same period, education costs inflated by 29 percent, bus fares have gone up over 46 percent, and motor tax went up 27 percent. Increases in core public services costs have taken out close to EUR3,500 annually out of the pockets of an average Irish family. These came on top of the Grant Thornton tax cost estimates cited above.

What is the opportunity cost for the families of the losses brought about by the fiscal crisis? For an average family with expected working life of 25 years, the above costs of austerity are equivalent to around EUR111,000 in foregone pensions savings. This excludes costs of the same measures continuing beyond December 31, 2013 and the new measures yet to come in 2014-2015.

The devastation of the above financial arithmetic is even more apparent when we realise that we are far from completing the full set of fiscal adjustments needed to restore our public finances to health. Medium-term Government fiscal consolidation forecasts confirmed by the IMF last week, envision total fiscal consolidation for 2014-2015 to be EUR5.1 billion. Of this, new revenue measures for 2014-2015 are to be set at EUR1.5 billion against carry forward measures of EUR0.3 billion. Current spending cuts are set at EUR3.2 billion. These adjustments translate into additional fiscal burden of EUR3,300-3,500 per annum for an ordinary family.

The hope is that the general economic recovery will mop up the household finances blood spilled by the fiscal crisis.  This rosy expectation is in turn driven by Minister Noonan’s worldview in which Irish trade partners are expected to also grow faster in years ahead. Alas, this Tuesday, IMF cut its global growth forecasts for both 2013 and 2014.


Forecasts aside, today, Ireland has run out of the road on tax hikes and revenue raising measures.

Instead of hiking tax rates, the Government is expected to widen the tax base in Budget 2014. The most efficient way for doing so would be to close loopholes on income exemptions. Less efficient, will be to lower income threshold at which upper marginal tax rate kicks in. Middle and upper-middle class families will pay in either scenario, but the costs to them will be higher in the latter.

In addition, the Government has been briefed on the potential for hiking PRSI for self-employed, while opening up access for this category of workers to social security net. Conditions for accessing cover will be so onerous, few self-employed will ever be able to qualify, but the hike will be politically acceptable. Currently, a self-employed person earning the equivalent of minimum wage pays almost six times as much tax and PRSI as an employee. Few interest groups so far have taken up a challenge of pointing this fact out.

Reality is, Ministers Noonan and Howlin have hit the brick wall. All the low-hanging fruit of marginal tax hikes and revenues extraction schemes has been picked. What's left now are two possible options. Option one: cut social welfare and health. Option two: delay adjustments and hope that comes Budget 2015 day, growth will pick up, unemployment assistance costs will fall, and Brussels will be happy enough reveling in the euro recovery to let things slip a bit on targets in Dublin. No prizes for guessing which option the Coalition will pursue comes next Tuesday.

Source: Department of Finance

BOX-OUT:

This week, the IMF published an assessment of the impact of the monetary policies deployed since 2008 by the ECB, the US Fed and the Bank of England. These unorthodox measures ranged from outright quantitative easing to lowering of the key interest rates to direct lending to the banks against riskier collateral. These monetary interventions, it has been argued in the media and by the majority of analysts, helped to ameliorate euro area sovereign crises. Per conventional wisdom, as the result of the central banks interventions, and particularly those carried out by the ECB, government bond yields and borrowing costs declined post-2011 across the euro area periphery. In addition, supporters of these policies have suggested that unconventional MPs were responsible for increasing equity funding in the real economies, thus supporting the recovery.

Rejecting the mainstream claims, the IMF researchers found that over 2008-2012 various monetary policies had zero statistical impact on the sovereign bond yields in Ireland, Portugal, and Greece. The policies have let to a moderate reduction in Italian Government bond yields, and a weak reduction in Spanish yields. In the case of Ireland, the IMF found no benefits to sovereign bond flows or prices that can be associated directly with the ECB interventions. Furthermore, ECB interventions were associated with outflows of liquidity from Irish equity funds. In contrast, Fed and Bank of England interventions resulted in net inflows of funds into Irish equities.

The paper clearly suggests that the ECB has not done enough to support recovery in sovereign debt and equity markets in the euro periphery.

4/10/2013: IMF 11th review of Ireland: Growth Warnings

So IMF released its 11th review of Irish economy under the Extended Arrangement for funding.

Key points:

"Real GDP declined in the first quarter, reflecting a fall in exports and weak domestic demand. Nonetheless, fiscal results remain on track and sovereign and bank bond yields have risen relatively modestly in response to declining global risk  appetite. A range of other economic indicators are more encouraging, suggesting lower but still positive growth in 2013, though uncertainty remains. Growth projections for 2014 are also lowered given weaker prospects for consumption recovery and for trading partner growth."

So weaker than forecast growth conditions… ok… How much weaker?

"Balancing the weak GDP results for the first quarter against a range of more positive indicators, the growth projection for 2013 has been pared back by a ½ percentage point to 0.6 percent y/y, but uncertainties remain." Boom! Ugly stuff, folks. And replace 'but' with 'and' and you will get a double Boom!


"Most importantly, export growth has been cut by 1½ percentage points as data indicate a larger impact from the patent cliff and tepid recoveries in important trading partners. Lower imports dampen the impact on growth." Wait, weren't we told that patent cliff doesn't matter much cause exports are offset by imports etc?

"Domestic demand is expected to be flat, with private consumption still contracting modestly owing to fiscal consolidation and household debt reduction, cushioned by employment growth and low inflation. Fixed investment is expected to expand by some 2 percent given improving business sentiment and the uptick in housing starts, but remains the most volatile GDP component. This projection will need to be further reviewed when Q2 national accounts data become available near end September." We have that Q2 data available now… see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/09/2092013-domestic-economy-continuing-its.html and it ain't pretty…

More details here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/09/2092013-h1-2013-qna-domestic-economy-vs.html Net: Gross Fixed Capital Formation (basically investment in the economy) is down 9.40% in H1 2013 compared to H1 2012, down 14.09% compared to H1 2011 and down 67.73% compared to H1 2007. The reductions in capital investment jun H1 2013 compared to H1 2007 are ten-fold the size of reductions in current Government spending at EUR17,542 million. For another comparison, reductions in personal expenditure on goods and services by households over the same period is EUR4,757 million.

"Weaker consumption and export growth are expected to dampen the pace of recovery, with growth now penciled in at 1.8 percent in 2014. Export and consumption growth are expected to benefit from a projected rise in trading partner growth with employment growth contributing to incomes and confidence. Although consumption growth is still expected to become modestly positive in 2014, the pick up is weaker because a 1½ percentage point downward revision to household saving in 2012 suggests less room for lower savings given the priority households attach to debt reduction. Public consumption is also expected to be softer than previously anticipated as the full effects of the Haddington Road Agreement feed through in 2014. Export growth in 2014 is scaled back to reflect the possibility that recent weakness could persist."

Per IMF: "Growth firms to 2½ percent in 2015 as external growth rises further and fiscal consolidation eases, but durable recovery hinges on reversing the tide of NPLs." The miracle of 3%+ growth for ever, projected back in 2010-2011 to start in 2013-2014 is now replaced by the miracle of 2.5% growth projected to start in 2015… And the new projections out to 2018 no longer feature a single year of growth expected to rise above 2.5%… but all is still sustainable, just as it was in 2010 and 2011 and 2012 and… And the dream of 2.5% growth will, per IMF, be consistent with a positive output gap of ca 0.3%, which means that that is not the expected long-run real growth rate.

In effect, IMF admits now that Ireland cannot be expected to grow sustainably at the rates in excess of 3% per annum in real terms. Say goodbye to Ireland's 'growth miracle', say hello to Ireland's Belgium decades...


Another kicker: after 2015: "…the recovery continues to rely principally on net exports as domestic demand recovery is expected to be protracted as many households continue to deleverage in the medium term. Resolution of mortgages is not expected provide significant direct support to consumption recovery, as while some households may have a reduction in debt service due under a split mortgage restructuring, they may have previously been temporarily on interest-only terms, while other households may need to adjust consumption to serving their debt even if the debt service due is reduced. Rather it is expected that progress in reducing NPLs and enhancing bank profitability will gradually enhance the terms of banks’ access to market funding and their ability and willingness to lend to less indebted borrowers—which includes the younger cohort of households—unlocking housing market turnover and reducing household uncertainty."

Wow! So the IMF is warning us that things are going to remain tough even after the mortgages crisis 'resolutions'… Not like our Government is listening… And the IMF is telling us that the economy is going to get more polarised and paralysed... where did you hear that? Oh... http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/08/782013-sunday-times-july-28-2013.html

Employment: long-term unemployment remains a problem (we know that)… and surprisingly: "Facilitating SME examinership could aid resolution of SMEs in arrears, supporting their potential to invest and create jobs." Now, here's the key point: in all this excitement about family homes and repossessions we forgot that roughly 50% of SMEs loans are in arrears… and of the remaining 50%, unknown quantum is at risk… Hm… I wonder how that 'facilitated examinership' going to work for the employment stats and for property markets and mortgages arrears, when examiners go into the SMEs books to uncover potential subsidies to proprietor's income or when examinerships lead to cuts in employment levels?..

So back in 2011, IMF predicted Irish economy to grow 2.4% (GDP) in 2013, 2.9% in 2014 and 3.3% in 2015. This time, IMF is projecting Irish economy to grow 0.6% in 2013, 1.8% in 2014 and 2.5% in 2015. Nominal GDP was supposed to reach EUR182.5 billion by end of 2015 back in 2011 projections and is now forecast to reach EUR178.4 billion… What's being down EUR4.1 billion (one year difference) between friends, or EUR6.5 billion over three years, eh? Especially when all of this is sustainable, right?..

Still, gives us some perspective as to the whole circus going on: we are sticking to EUR3.1 billion fiscal target for 'adjustment' and washing off EUR4.1 billion in growth expectations underpinning 'sustainability' analysis… You'd think this is monkeys with abacus, but no - these are highly paid 'analysts', 'economists' on Government side, state side, sell-side at stockbrokerages and banks, ECB side, EU side, IMF side… And they all sing in unison: all is sustainable, just as they revise continuously their forecasts down and down and down. Which begs a question: at what stage will the sustainability malarky be replaced by the admission of the crisis? Presumably when GDP growth is revised to nil into perpetuity?

I will be updating charts on Irish economy forecasts from the IMF over the next few days, so stay tuned. Before that, I will be blogging more on key topics covered by the IMF review later today, also stay tuned…

20/9/2013: Domestic Economy: Continuing Its Sextuplet Dip in Q2 2013

Total Domestic Demand is defined as :

• Consumer Spending on goods and services + 
• Government Spending on Current (as opposed to capital) goods and services + 
• Gross Fixed Capital Formation (basically gross investment) + 
• Change in Stocks of goods and services in the economy. 

In a more old-fashioned way, it is Investment + Consumption + Net Government Spending.

Put differently, this is the domestic economy (excluding exports net of imports, and outflows of income to the rest of the world net of inflows of income from the rest of the world).

Now, here are the quarterly changes in the domestic economy from 2007 on, for real (constant prices) seasonally adjusted series:

I define 'dips' in the above series similar to the official definition of a recession: two consecutive q/q downward movements. Remember, we have been told since Q2 2010 that the Irish economy has 'stabilised' and even 'returned to growth'. Since then we had: eight quarters of contraction and four quarters of growth in Total Domestic Demand.

The two core drivers downward in the domestic economy on q/q basis are:

On the good news side, q/q increase in Personal Consumption component (above) and external trade (below):

And external trade showing strong performance on q/q basis, which, alas, only partially offsetting the decline recorded in Q1 2013...

And this concludes my analysis of the QNA for Q2 2013.

20/9/2013: H1 2013 QNA: Domestic Economy vs External Trade

In the previous two posts I looked at Q2 national accounts for Ireland in terms of headline GDP and GNP figures, y/y and q/q changes in the first post; and half-yearly figures analysis in the second post. The headline conclusion was that:

• Q2 2013 real (constant prices) GDP performance is weak, but posits some growth, pushing us out of official third dip recession. 
• Irish real GNP fell 0.1% in Q2 2013 compared to Q2 2012, having only marginally reversed the 6.01% y/y rise recorded in Q1 2013. 
• Broadly-speaking, H1 figures show continued economic performance within the new structural range of slower economic activity that set on with the 'recovery' of H2 2010 (the Celtic Canary period).
• Crucially, moving to less volatile half-yearly figures, Y/Y Irish real GDP fell 1.10% in H1 2013, marking a second consecutive 6-months period of declines (it was down y/y 0.75% in H2 2012 as well). 
• Y/Y Irish real GNP rose 2.87% in H1 2013, marking third consecutive 6-months period of increases in GNP.
• At current rates of growth (that is taking 3-year average, since current annual rate is negative), it will take us until 2029 before we can reach real levels of GDP consistent with the pre-crisis levels. 

Now, let's take a look at the underlying components of GDP and GNP from the expenditure side of the national accounts. Since we have half-yearly data, we might as well focus on longer-term, more stable series. For this purpose, let us also look at nominal (not real) values, so we have some idea as to actual activity on the ground, reflective of price changes, as well as volumes changes. There are several reasons for doing this:

1. Nominal values, expressed in current prices are actually linked to what we get paid, what we pay for and what the economy produces;
2. Nominal values are also reflective of what the Government spends, collects and what the potential for debt servicing is when it comes to economy's output; and
3. Nominal values are free from the impact of the inflation adjustments, which are made based on 'average' households and firms, rather than on what we do observe in the economy itself.

There are drawbacks to this analysis, so like everything else in economics, this is not intended to be 'completely and comprehensively' conclusive.

As can be seen from Chart above, Personal Expenditure on Goods and Services rose 0.4% y/y in H1 2013 - which is good news. However, the same was down on H1 2011 (recall that the Government is keen on claiming that consumer confidence and consumption spending rose during its tenure, which is obviously contradicted by the data we have). Compared to peak pre-crisis performance (peak referencing output peak, not specific series peak), we are down 10.61% on H1 2007.

Understandably, Government spending (net of tax receipts) is down when it comes to current goods and services (as opposed to capital goods and services): -2.11% on H1 2012, -4.27% on H1 2011 and -12.46% on H1 2007. You might think this is 'huge', but y/y over the first 6 months of 2013 our net current Government spending is down only EUR 278 million and when it comes to vast/deep cuts since 2007, H1 2007 spending was cut EUR1,754 million by the end of H1 2013.

Meanwhile, Gross Fixed Capital Formation (basically investment in the economy) is down 9.40% in H1 2013 compared to H1 2012, down 14.09% compared to H1 2011 and down 67.73% compared to H1 2007. The reductions in capital investment jun H1 2013 compared to H1 2007 are ten-fold the size of reductions in current Government spending at EUR17,542 million. For another comparison, reductions in personal expenditure on goods and services by households over the same period is EUR4,757 million.

Put in different terms, domestic economy is still falling, with no stabilisation in sight.

Next: external trade and GDP & GNP series:

Exports of goods and services - the only part of the economy that was booming (+15.94% in H1 2013 on H1 2007 and +5.44% on H1 2011) are hitting some bumps. H1 2013 posted a decline in total exports of 0.67% y/y. Meanwhile, imports of goods and services were up 0.08% y/y. As the result of this, our trade balance fell 2.32% y/y in Q2 2013 and is down 3.15% y/y for H1 2013. This is not good, as key Exchequer projections and debt sustainability analysis require healthy growth in trade surplus, not a decline. But more on this below…

GDP at current prices fell 1.49% in H1 2013 compared to H1 2012 and is down 0.28% on H1 2011 and down 15.26% on H1 2007. Recall that our real GDP fell 1.10% y/y in H1 2013. In other words, there is no growth in actual underlying activity. This is pretty bad. Actual euro notes we have in the economy's 'pockets' at the end of H1 2013 (as imperfectly measured by GDP) were fewer than at the end of H1 2012 and H1 2011. And these fewer euros were not worth more, either. I wouldn't call this 'stabilisation'.

Net factor income outflows abroad are falling as well and I commented on these in the previous posts.

GNP expressed in current market prices is 2.32% ahead in H1 2013 compared to H1 2012 and 2.92% ahead of H1 2011. This is good news, especially since GNP is a more accurate reflection of our real economy's output (also rather imperfect) than GDP. Not so good news: GNP is still down 17.53% on H1 2007. 

Chart below drills into the composition of our external trade:

The above clearly shows the massive swing of our external trade activities from goods sectors to services sectors. And on imports of goods side it shows the legacy of the consumption bust, which remains one of the two largest drivers for improved external trade statistics we see on national accounts.

Finally, total domestic demand: the measure of the economy that covers all domestic activities of private and government consumption and investment combined, plus chafes in stocks.

As the above shows, domestic economy continues to suffer losses in activity: Total Domestic Demand fell 0.95% in H1 2013 compared to H1 2012 and is down 3.05% on H1 2011. Compared to H1 2007, Total Domestic Demand is down 27.41%.

Summary: Bad news: Despite improvements in real variables in Q2 2013, domestic economy continued to contract in H1 2013, with domestic demand down compared to H1 2012, driven by declines in Net Government Current Expenditure and in Gross Fixed Capital Formation. Good news is that decline in domestic demand was ameliorated by a marginal increase in Personal Expenditure on Goods and Services. On the bad news side, exports of goods and services fell in H1 2013 compared to H1 2012. These changes, together with domestic demand movements resulted in GDP falling in H1 2013 compared to H1 2012. Lower rate of profits repatriation out of Ireland by the MNCs has resulted in an increase in GNP in H1 2013 compared to H1 2012.

In simple terms, if Irish economy were a student asking for a report card for H1 2013, I don't think there would be much on it worth boasting about. Let's hope H2 2013 will be different for the better.

19/9/2013: First Half 2013: Irish GDP and GNP growth divergence

CSO published Q2 national accounts for Ireland today and these are worth detailed analysis, which I will break up into a series of posts next. 

In the previous post, I covered headline GDP and GNP figures, y/y and q/q changes. As a reminder, the headline conclusions were that:

• In Q2 2013 Irish real GDP fell 1.17% on Q2 2012, marking the fourth consecutive quarter of real GDP contractions, the longest period of continuous contractions since the end of Q2 2010. 
• Irish real GNP fell 0.1% in Q2 2013 compared to Q2 2012, having only marginally reversed the 6.01% y/y rise recorded in Q1 2013. 
• On quarterly basis, seasonally-adjusted Q2 2013 real GDP rose 0.45% on Q1 2013, ending the third spell of the recession that lasted from Q3 2012 through Q1 2013. The expansion, however was weak and well below the one recorded during the previous recovery periods. 
• I am continuing to expect that Q3 2013 will post stronger performance than Q2 2013 with possible GDP q/q upside of closer to 1%.

Now, let's move onto H1 (first half of 2013) analysis.

Q2 2013 release allows us to look at half-annual GDP and GNP changes, something that removes some of the quarterly volatility and also brings us closer to the analysis that is relevant from the budgetary perspective. Remember, budgets are not based on quarterly forecasts, but annual ones.

H1 2013 GDP at constant prices seasonally adjusted fell 0.47% on H2 2012, marking the third consecutive half-yearly period of declines. Last time we had a half-yearly period of growth was in H2 2011.

H1 2013 GNP grew 2.17% over H1 2013 compared to H2 2012, marking the third consecutive 6-months period of growth. In other words, GNP perfectly countermoves against GDP. Why? Because of the changes in transfers of earned profits by the multinationals. 

Here's an interesting thing. The chart above shows three periods of Irish growth history (I am being sarcastic/humorous here, so no offence intended): 

1. The Celtic Tiger period - for which we have consistent data here is only covered by the period from 1997 through 2000: averaged H/H growth rates of 4.49%;
2. The Celtic Garfield period - which lasted roughly from 2001 through H1 2007; Celtic Garfield period growth averaged 2.51%; and
3. The Celtic Canary period (as the proverbial one in the EU's economic model coal mine) that started with the imaginary 'recovery' of 2010 and is running currently: averaged growth of 0.24% (do remember, that excludes the period of massive contraction between H2 2007 and H2 2009 when the average rate of growth was -2.0% H/H)

You can see that the slowdown in growth is not only due to the crisis, but appears to be structural in nature. The Canary part is because Irish economy's fundamentals are such that we should be growing at 3.5-4.5 percent annually. Yet we are growing at - say averaging Celtic Garfield and Celtic Canary periods - at 1.35-1.4 percent annually. This is the slowdown toward the European levels of growth for Ireland... something to think about?

Next, take a look at the levels of activity based on 6 months figures:

And now, let's talk about year-on-year changes in H1 2013:

• Y/Y Irish real GDP fell 1.10% in H1 2013 (in other words, against H1 2012), marking a second consecutive 6-months period of declines (it was down y/y 0.75% in H2 2012 as well). 
• Y/Y Irish real GNP rose 2.87% in H1 2013, marking third consecutive 6-months period of increases in GNP.
• Overall, H1 real GDP (non-seasonally-adjusted) was up 1.65% on H1 2010 when we first heard about the 'recovery' of Irish economy or 'stabilisation'. Thus over 3 years, our GDP grew 1.65% - producing average annual rate of growth of 0.55%. Not exactly stellar, but better than nothing.

Our current H1 2013 GDP is down 7.98% on peak levels, so we are still far away from recovering to pre-crisis levels in real terms. In fact, at current rates of growth (that is taking 3-year average, since current annual rate is negative), it will take us until 2029 before we can reach real levels of GDP consistent with the pre-crisis levels. When someone says we have a lost decade, what they really mean - in real GDP terms - is that we are likely to have lost 23 years. And that does not count the opportunity cost of foregone growth. That is one hell of a long 'lost decade'.

To summarise the above: Good news is: real GNP is up 2.87% y/y, and up for the third consecutive 6-month period. Bad news is: our real GDP is down 1.1% y/y and this marks second consecutive 6-month period of declines.

I expect growth to be positive in H2 2013, with y/y around 1.0-1.2%.  Which should push our full year growth closer to zero.

Stay tuned for more analysis of QNA results.

19/9/2013: Irish GDP and GNP: Q2 2013 & the 'end of the third recession'

CSO published Q2 national accounts for Ireland today and these are worth detailed analysis, which I will break up into a series of posts next. 

Starting with the headline GDP and GNP figures:

In Q2 2013 Irish real (constant prices) GDP fell 1.17% compared to Q2 2012, compounding the previous fall of 1.04% y/y recorded in Q1 2013. On an annual basis, this marks the fourth consecutive quarter of real GDP contractions, the longest period of continuous contractions since the end of Q2 2010. Currently, real GDP stands 7.83% below the historical peak.

At the same time, Irish real GNP fell 0.1% in Q2 2013 compared to Q2 2012, having only marginally reversed the 6.01% y/y rise recorded in Q1 2013. Despite a surprisingly robust rise in Q1, Q2 2013 real GNP stood 10.40% lower than pre-crisis peak.

The swing in the direction between GDP and GNP was driven in Q2 2013 by a 5.85% drop in the outflows of transfer payments to the rest of the world compared to Q2 2012, which compounded a massive 28.26% decline in the transfer payments recorded in Q1 2013. In other words, GNP improvements appeared to have been sustained by a massive parking of MNCs profits in Ireland. The reasons for this are unknown, but we can speculate that the MNCs are holding back profits from transferring out of Ireland due tot ax considerations and due to subdued global investment activities. It remains to be seen what happens to the GDP and GNP were the MNCs to begin once again actively exporting retained earnings.

Note: shaded periods show episodes of more than 2 quarters consecutive contractions (here on y/y basis, so these are not official recessions)

On quarterly basis, seasonally-adjusted series:

Q2 2013 real GDP rose 0.45% on Q1 2013, partially compensating for the 0.59% contraction in Q1 2013 and ending the third spell of the recession that lasted from Q3.2012 through Q1 2013. The expansion, however was weak and well below the one recorded during the previous recovery periods. For example in Q1 2010, the end of the second recessionary dip, GDP expanded by 0.82%. The end to one-quarter drop of Q2 2010 led to a GDP rise of 1.08% in Q3 2010, the end of one quarter contraction in Q4 2010 was followed by 1.48% expansion in Q1 2011 and 1.38% expansion in Q2 2011, even the end of Q1 2012 quarterly decline was marked by a 0.48% expansion in Q2 2012. In previous episodes, recovery that was associated with growth rates at below 0.7% q/q was swiftly followed by the subsequent quarter contraction in GDP. This suggests underlying weakness in the GDP performance in Q2 2013, although my personal expectation is that Q3 2013 will post stronger performance than Q2 2013 with possible GDP q/q upside of closer to 1%.

On GNP side, seasonally-adjusted real GNP fell 0.37% in Q2 2013 in q/q terms, ending two consecutive quarters of quarterly growth (Q1 2013 growth was robust 2.2% q/q and Q4 2012 growth was weak at 0.32%).

Two charts:

Note: shaded periods show episodes of more than 2 quarters consecutive contractions (here on q/q basis, seasonally adjusted, thus representing official recessions).

On historical comparison basis, table below summarises latest movements in GDP and GNP:

So a summary: we are officially out of the third dip of the Great Recession. This is a good news. 

Bad news is that this data is once again being paraded around as a sing of 'stabilisation' of economic activity. Alas, the first time we've heard this 'stabilisation' argument was in Q1 2010, when the main - longest and deepest - second dip ended. Since then, Irish economy has managed to grow by just 2.63% in real GDP terms and only 3.54% in real GNP terms. Since the onset of the recovery, we have posted average quarterly growth of only 0.18% (seasonally-adjusted figures) and this effectively means that the economy is in a stabilisation pattern closer to coma than to a sustained recovery.

Good note to all of this is that, as mentioned above, I do expect stronger activity to be recorded for Q3 2013 and possibly for Q4 2013 as well.

17/7/2013: Sunday Times, July 14: The New Normal for Ireland

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from July 14, 2013.



The release of the Irish quarterly national accounts for Q1 2013 two weeks ago should have been a watershed moment for Ireland. Aside from confirming the fact that Irish economy is back in a recession, the new figures reinforce the case for the New Normal – a longer-term slowdown in trend growth and continued volatility of economic performance along this trend. The former revelation warrants a change in the short-term policies direction. The latter requires a more structural policies shift.


Months ago, based on the preliminary data for the last quarter of 2012, it was painfully clear that Irish economy has entered another period of economic recession. This point was made on these very pages back in early March although it was, at the time, vigorously denied by the official Ireland.

Irish economy is currently in its fourth recession in GDP terms since 2007. Q1 2013 marked the third consecutive quarter in the latest recessionary episode. Since the onset of the crisis, Ireland had 17 quarters of negative growth in private and public domestic investment and expenditure, and counting.

For the Government that spent a good part of the last 2 years telling everyone willing to listen about our returning fortunes, things are looking pretty grim. Since settling into the office by the end of H1 2011, through the first quarter 2013, Coalition-steered economy has contracted by EUR1.52 billion or 3.75%.

The fabled exports-led recovery, first declared in Q1 2010, is not translating into real economic expansion. Neither do scores of strategic policies documents launched with promises of tens of thousands of new jobs.

With the national accounts officially in the red, the bubble of claimed policies successes is bursting. What is emerging from behind this bubble is the New Normal. Whether we like it or not, in years to come we will continue facing high risks to growth and a lower long-term growth trend. Traditional Keynesianism and Parish Pump Gombeenism - the two, largely complementary policy options normally promoted in Ireland - cannot sustain us in the future.

Prior to the crisis, Irish economy experienced three periods of economic growth, all driven by different internal and external forces, none of which are likely to materialize once again any time soon.

The first period of 1991-1997 witnessed rapid convergence in physical and financial capital, as well as in human capital utilization to the standards, observed in other small open economies of the EU.

From 1998 through 2003, Irish economy experienced a combination of rising share of economic activity generated in the domestic economy and rapid expansion of the financial services. This period is characterised by two short-lived, but significant booms and busts: the dot.com expansion and the subsequent dramatic acceleration in public spending.

From the late 1990s, Ireland also experienced accelerating property boom, which culminated in an unsustainable investment bubble. All three periods of economic expansion in recent past were underpinned by favourable external demand for MNCs exports out of Ireland, low or falling cost of capital and accommodative tax environments, in which tax competition was an accepted norm.

These drivers are now history.

Since the onset of the second stage of the domestic economy’s recession in H2 2010, Ireland has entered an entirely new period of development that will shape our long-term growth performance.

Externally, our capacity to extract rents and growth out of tax arbitrage is coming under severe pressures, best highlighted by the recent G8 decisions, the CCCTB proposals tabled in Europe and by accelerated tax policies gains in countries capable of serving big growth regions outside the EU. The financial repression that commonly follows credit busts is also denting our tax-driven growth engine by raising competition for tax revenues, and lowering our real cost competitiveness vis-à-vis Europe and North America.

Internally, since 2002, MNCs-led manufacturing in Ireland has suffered what appears to be an irreversible decline. Goods exports are down from EUR90.4bn in 2002 to EUR78.7bn in 2012 before we take account for inflation. Meanwhile, exports of services are up from EUR32.2bn to EUR93.3bn. Problem is: over the same time, services exports net contribution to the economy has expanded by only EUR18 billion. More worryingly, services exports growth is now falling precipitously.

Data from the Purchasing Managers Indices confirms the long-term nature of our economic slowdown. Average rates of growth in GDP are now closer to 1.5% per annum based on Services sectors contribution and closer to 1.0% for Manufacturing. Prior to the crisis these were 7.0% and 2.6%, respectively. In 1990-2007, all sectors included, Ireland experienced average annual growth of 6.6%. Now, we are looking at ca 1.5-1.7% average growth rates through 2020.

Lower growth rates for Ireland will be further reinforced by the lack of access to credit flows previously abundantly available from the global funding markets. This will impact our banks lending, direct debt issuance by companies, and securitised or asset-backed credit.

The retrenchment of the global financial flows away from the euro area, coupled with regulatory changes in European banking suggest that investment in the New Normal will become inseparably linked to the internal economy and significantly more expensive than the decade preceding the 2008 crisis. Much of this change will be driven by the same financial repression that will act to reduce our tax regime advantages.

This means that at the times of adverse shocks - such as, for example, a fall in revenues from exports or an increase in foreign companies extraction of profits from Ireland – our economy will be experiencing more severe credit and income contractions. This will put more pressure on investment and lower the velocity of money in the economy. Longer-term capital financing will become more difficult as domestic investors will face more uncertain returns and higher liquidity risk. A bust and severely restricted in competitiveness banking sector - legacy of the misguided post-2008 reforms - will not be helpful.

Thus, in the future, switch to services exports away from manufacturing and domestic investment, and reduced access to credit will mean higher volatility in growth, and lower predictability of our economic environment.

The New Normal requires more agile, more responsive and better-diversified economic systems, alongside a more conservative risk management in fiscal policies and less centralisation and harmonisation of policies at super-national level. It also calls for more aggressive incentivising of domestic investment and savings.

In terms of the fiscal policy stance, this means adopting a more cautious approach advocated, in part, by the ESRI this week. Irish Government should aim to continue reducing public spending, but do so in a structural way, not in a simplified framework of pursuing slash-and-burn targets. In addition, the Government needs to re-focus on identifying lines of expenditure that can be re-directed toward more productive use. In the short run, this can take the form of switching some of the current expenditure into capital investment programmes.

Reforms of social welfare, public education, health and state pensions systems will have to make these lines of spending more effective in helping people in real need, while slimmer in terms of total spend allocations. This can be achieved by direct means-testing and capping some of the benefits. But majority of these changes will have to wait until after the immediate unemployment and growth crises have passed.

In the longer run, going beyond the ESRI proposals, the Government should permanently reallocate some of the spending (such as, for example, overseas aid or poorly performing enterprise supports) to areas where it can increase value-added in public services (e.g. water supply or public transport) and create new exports platforms (e.g. e-health and higher quality internationally marketable education). Additionally, new revenues should be raised from severely undertaxed sectors and assets, such as agriculture and land, to be used to lower tax burden on both, ordinary and highly skilled workers.

Beyond a short-term stimulus, rather than directing tax- and debt-funded new investment, public sector should help generate new opportunities for more intensive growth. Increasing value added in existent activities, not simply scaling these activities up in terms of quantity of services deployed or employment levels involved should become the priority for future public sector growth.

Adding further to the ESRI analysis, the objective of using fiscal policy to drive enterprise creation requires simultaneously freeing more resources in the private sector to invest in new technologies acquisition and adoption, and development of indigenous R&D. We need to increase, not shrink, disposable incomes of the middle- and upper-middle classes and improve incentives for these segments of the population to invest. IBEC's suggestion this week that the Government should abandon any future tax increases makes sense in this context. The key, however, is that direct and indirect income tax increases of recent years must be reversed.

We need to recognise, support and scale up clustering initiatives in the tech and R&D sectors that deliver partnerships between the existent MNCs and larger domestic enterprises and start ups. To do this, we should create direct links between the existent clusters, such as for example IT@Cork initiative and public procurement systems. To re-orient public procurement toward supporting younger enterprises, larger procurement tenders should explicitly target new opportunities for partnerships between MNCs and SMEs or start-ups.

To address structural decline in debt financing available in the economy, we should exempt from taxation capital gains accruing to any real investment in Irish enterprises, including the IPOs and new rights issues, where such investments are held for at least 5 years. To qualify for this scheme, an enterprise should have at least a quarter of its worldwide employees based in Ireland.

The New Normal of lower trend growth and higher uncertainty about the economic environment is here. Addressing the challenges it presents requires robust policy reforms. The least painful and the most productive way of implementing these would be to start as early as possible.

Box-out:

Recent report from CBRE on office market in Dublin for Q2 2013 provides an interesting insight into the commercial real estate markets dynamics in Ireland. Despite the cheerful headlines and some marginally encouraging news, the market remains in deep slump and so far, hard data shows no signs of a major revival. Good news: vacancy rate in Dublin office space has declined by 4% on Q1 2013, to 17.2% in Q2 2013. The vacancy rate was 19.32% in Q2 2012. Bad news: at this rate, it will take us good part of 10 years to catch up with the EU-average rates. More bad news: office investment spend fell from EUR79.6mln in Q2 2012 to EUR72.6mln in Q2 2013. Adding an insult to the injury, prime yields fell from 7.0% to 6.25% in the year through June 2013. The office market in Dublin is firmly reflective of what is happening in the economy. Only 37% of offices take ups in Q2 2013 were by Irish companies. Massive 65-66% of the city and suburban office space was taken up by the ICT and Financial services providers in a clear sign that outside these sectors, economic activity remains largely stagnant. Overall, on a quarterly basis, offices take up in Dublin has fallen for the second quarter in a row while there was the first annual decline since Q3 2012.

6/6/2013: Irish School of Growthology: Sunday Times 02/06/2013

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from June 2, 2013


This month, welcoming the start of the silly news season, interest group after interest group has been appealing to the Irish Government to "act decisively" on dealing with the crises sweeping across their sectors. From retail services to construction industry, from early age education to public sector unions, from pensions to faming, and so on every lobbyist is loudly demanding that the Government divert its resources to the plight of his clients.

The Irish School of 'Growthology', spurred on by the 'end of austerity' noises emanating from Brussels, as well as by the promised departure of the Troika, is out in public once again. One quango after another is promoting its sector as a core driver for future jobs creation, economic activity and a wellspring of exchequer returns subject to the Government taking the correct action on growth today.

The reality is that no one involved in this policy circus - not the economists launching reports, nor the quangos backing them, and least of all the Government - has a faintest idea as to how the Government really can do anything about growth. Everyone at the launches knows this and no one admits it. So after two or three iterations of the Growthology events, the entire Irish establishment begins to believe that if only the Government threw its support behind the latest fad, the crisis will be over. Hungry for PR opportunities, Ministers spin exports growth numbers like greyhounds bets, and green-nano-bio-gen-cloud-tech working groups and centres of excellence for knowledge-food-wind-agri island spin jobs promises in tens of thousands.

The ministers love Growthology, As George Bernard Show put it ages ago "a government which robs Peter to pay Paul, can always count on the support of Paul".


Since the Irish state cannot print its own money, the Cabinet can only tax one side of economy to 'invest' in the other. Which is just fine with the Growthologists, as long as the Government robs someone else to pay them.
There are three basic variants of these 'multiplier schemes' being offered to the Government for post-Troika days.

The business lobby and the unions have been busy pushing the Government to do something to 'unlock' the spending power held in people’s savings. The preferred mechanism for forcing households to part with their safety nets varies from deploying inflationary pressures to expropriating funds via levies. Unions are calling for higher taxes on someone else (usually, the so-called 'rich'). The fact that such policies can leave households exposed to adverse income shocks in the case of a job loss or unexpected illness or a rise in necessary spending, such as children education fees, is not something that our Social Partners are concerned with.

Another option, usually favoured by the official economic policy quangos, is finding rich foreigners to invest in Ireland. Which, of course, sounds much more palatable than expropriating from our own. However, inward real FDI (as opposed to retained earnings accumulating in the IFSC) into Ireland has peaked. Worse, as the data from our external trade over 2010-2012 indicates, the FDI we are bringing in is linked to services exports. The latter have much lower propensity to support new employment, and when they do hire workers, they tend to import them. The activities of these new MNCs do increase our GDP, but this growth is illusory when it comes to the real economy.

About the only new value added generated by the MNCs activities in Ireland today relates to clustering and partnering models that some - but not all - R&D intensive MNCs are engaged in.  These are in their infancy still and require serious changes in the way we do business in this country to nurture to strengths. Examples of what needs to be done here include changing the way we tax equity investments, reinvested profits and how we deal with currently protected sectors of our economy. Again, promising, but not a Big Bang idea for jump-starting the economy without taking serious pain of structural reforms first.

The last pathway for Growthological 'stimulus' is to convince the Irish Government to borrow more funds to invest in some capital programmes. This is the preferred imaginary source for ‘funding growth’ for the Unions and the Labour Party backbenchers. However, even the current Government finds this theory infeasible. The reason is that we cannot sustain an increase in borrowings over 2013-2016 horizon without triggering a cascading effect of higher interest costs on existent debt.

In a way, in contrast to the Irish Growthology movement, this week's announcement by the Minister for Finance, Michael Noonan that he is working on a multi-annual plan covering the period of 2014-2020 to commit his and future Governments to continued fiscal discipline and structural reforms was a courageous and correct thing to do. By pre-empting the spread of Growthology across the Cabinet, Minister Noonan tried to focus our attention on the longer-term game, as well as on the present reality.

Irish Government will need to take some EUR5.1 billion more out of the private sector economy in 2014 and 2015 under the current Troika programme. Thereafter, just to keep on track toward reducing Government debt/GDP ratio to below 100% by 2020, total tax take by the Government will have to increase from EUR39.8 billion in 2012 to EUR54.1 billion in 2018, with expenditure, excluding banks measures, rising from rising fromEUR65 billion to EUR69 billion over the same period. Even that requires rather rosy assumptions, including the projections for government debt financing costs being flat over the next 7 years and economic growth averaging almost 3.7% per annum on GNP side through 2018.


Absent the pipe dreams of Growthology, the only real chances for Ireland to regain sustainable growth momentum is through organic and persistent long-term reforms. Instead of ‘Government must act decisively on growth’ mantra, we need a ‘Government must help change the way we work’ model.

Start with the elephant in the room: private sector debts. Write down using debt-for-equity swaps and direct write-offs all principal residences mortgages to the maximum of 110% of the current value of the house. By my estimates, this will require banks capital of less than EUR20 billion. To reduce capital call on the banks, change the rules for capital provisioning against legacy equity assumed by the banks and push out to 2020 the requirement for Irish banks to comply with the EU baseline capital targets. Restructure and convert all remaining mortgages into fixed rate loans. If needed, assuming the EU does not come to our help in doing this, exit the euro by monetising the economy with own currency, and make euro, dollar and sterling fully accepted as legal tenders.

Thereafter, levy a significant tax on land and use raised revenue to eliminate property tax and create a flat rate tax on all income under, say, EUR200,000 per annum per family of two at a benign rate of around 15%. Equalise corporate, income and capital gains tax rates. Remove all targeted tax breaks and incentives schemes, leaving only one standard general tax allowance per each adult with half-rate applying per each child.

Reform local authorities by consolidating them into 5 regional governments with half of all land value tax revenues accruing to them. Put in place a 4-year balanced budget rule for central and local governments. Break up all semi-state companies excluding infrastructure utilities (e.g. EirGrid) and privatize or mutualize them. Put a statutory cap on market share of any company or governing body (for professional services organizations) in any sector of domestic economy not to exceed 33% to reduce regulatory capture and incentivise exporting activities. Remove all restrictions on access to professions.

In the public sector, gradually identify and develop opportunities for linking pay and promotion to productivity. Shift – where possible – public sector operations to revenue generating models with staff sharing the upside of any exports and new business creation revenues. End life-time contracts and link hiring, tenure and promotions to on-the-job performance. Identify flagship public services, such as higher education and health as spearheads for developing exports potential and, again, incentivise staff to compete globally. Benchmark all non-revenue positions to EU27 average earnings and all political and politically-appointed salaries to a scale linked directly to GNP per capita. End fully all defined benefit pensions schemes and create mandatory pensions and unemployment insurance funds based on a mixture of public and private provision models.

Open up Irish immigration regime to new entrepreneurs and key skills employees with strong incentives to naturalise successful newcomers and anchor them here. Use early immigration incentives such as social contributions tax credits in exchange for zero access to social welfare net over the first 10 years of residency (including post-naturalization).

Lastly, we need to gradually, but dramatically reform our social welfare and health care systems. We need to retain a meaningful, high quality safety net, but we also need to eliminate any possible disincentives to work and undertake business activities currently present in the system.

Aside from the changes mentioned above, we also need political reforms, changes in the way we shape and enact policies, enhancement of direct democracy tools and building robust systems of transparent governance and administration.

The main point, however, is that we need to end our addiction to the Growthlogist interest groups politics.

Box-out:


The latest data on earnings and labour costs in Irish economy was published this week. The data shows that average weekly earnings in the economy in Q1 2013 stood at EUR €696.59, basically unchanged on last year. In contrast, average hourly earnings rose from EUR 22.15 in the first quarter 2012 to EUR22.31 in 2013. In other words, Irish labour cost competitiveness remained at the same levels as in 2012 solely because over the period of 12 months through March 2013, average hours of paid work have fallen by 1%. Given that over the last 4 years weekly paid hours in the private sector have fallen by 2.2%, the latest data suggests that the average quality of employment in private sector has declined at an accelerated rate in 2012, compared to the 2009-2011 period.

21/1/2013: Blackrock Institute Survey on Growth Conditions

Blackrock Investment Institute released latest summary of survey results for global growth outlook. Here are the charts by regions:

MENA:

 Western Europe & North America

 Latin America:

 Asia:

And summarising overall optimism levels for Western Europe and North America:

Good to see decent (not spectacular) performance for Ireland in the above (chart 2 and table above). Note: analysis is based on the surveys of professional economists.

28/10/2012: Some more EZ forecasts from Citi

Two more charts from Citi Research highlighting some growth differentials within the Euro area (note second chart - Ireland position).

As I mentioned before, these are not my views, these are Citi forecasts. Where I broadly agree with Citi on: 1) Ireland is likely to outperform EZ average growth in longer term (I am not sure about 3.0 and 3.1 percent growth in real terms in 2015-2016); and 2) EZ growth is likely to average around or below 1% in 2014-2016. More short-term, I doubt EZ will stay in a recession territory in 2013 (full year) and in 2014.

21/7/2012: Sunday Times July 15 - No growth in sight

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column for July 15, 2012.

This week, the Central Statistics Office published long-awaited Quarterly National Accounts for the first quarter 2012, showing that in January-March real Gross Domestic Product fell 1.1 percent to the levels last seen around Q1 2005. Gross National product is down 1.3% and currently running at the levels comparable with Q1 2003 once inflation is factored in. Rampant outflow of multinational profits via tax arbitrage continues unabated, as GDP now exceeds GNP by over 27 percent.

There is really no consolation in the statistical fact that, as the National Accounts suggest, we have narrowly escaped the fate of our worse-off euro area counterparts, who posted three quarters of consecutive real GDP contraction since July 2011. Our true economic activity, measured by GNP is now in decline three quarters in a row in inflation-adjusted terms.

Our real economy, beyond the volatile quarter-on-quarter growth rates comparatives, hardly makes Ireland a poster child for recovery. Instead, it raises some serious questions about current policies course.

Save for Greece, five years into this crisis, we are still the second worst ranked euro area economy when it comes to overall performance across some nineteen major indicators for growth and sustainability.

Our GDP and GNP have posted the deepest contraction of all euro area (EA17) states. Assuming the relatively benign 2012 forecast by the IMF materialise. Q1 results so far point to a much worse outcome than the IMF envisions. Total investment, inclusive of the fabled FDI allegedly raining onto our battered economy, is expected to fall over 62% on 2007 levels by the year end – also the worst performance in the EA17. Despite our bravado about the booming exporting economy, our average rate of growth in exports of goods and services since 2007 is only the fifth highest in the common currency area.

Ireland’s unemployment is up by a massive 220%, the fastest rate of increase in the euro zone. Employment rate is down 20% - the sharpest contraction relative to all peers. Other than Estonia, Ireland will end 2012 with the steepest increase in government spending as a share of GDP – up 18% on 2007 levels. We have the second worst average structural Government deficit for 2007-2012 excluding banks measures and interest payments on our debt. By the end of 2012, our net Government debt (accounting for liquid assets held by the state) will be up more than eight-fold and our gross debt will rise 354%. In both of these metrics Ireland is in a league of its own compared to all other member states of the common currency area.

The latest data National Accounts data confirms the above trends, while majority of the leading economic indicators for Q2 2012 are also pointing to continued stagnation in the economy through June.

Purchasing Manager Indices (PMI) – the best leading indicator of economic activity we have – are signalling virtually zero growth for the first half of 2012. Manufacturing PMI has posted a robust rate of growth in June, but the six months average remains anaemic at 50.7. The other side of the economy – services – is under water with Q2 activity lagging the poor performance achieved in the first quarter. 

In the rest of the private economy, things are getting worse, not better. Live register was up, again, in June, with standardized unemployment now at 14.9%. Numbers on long-term unemployment assistance up 6.8% year on year. Factoring in those engaged in State-run training schemes, total number of claimants for unemployment benefits is around 528,600, roughly two claimants to each five persons in full employment. Construction sector, the only hope for many long-term unemployed, posted another monthly contraction in June – marking the sharpest rate of decline since September 2011. Retail sales, are running below 2005 levels every month since January 2009 both in volume and value terms. Despite June monthly rise, consumer confidence has been bouncing up and down along a flat trend since early 2010.

Meanwhile, net voted government spending, excluding interest payments on Government debt and banking sector measures, is up 1.9% year on year in the first half of 2012 against the targeted full year 3.3% decrease. Government investment net of capital receipts is down 19.1%. This means that net voted current expenditure – dominated by social welfare, and wages paid in the public sector – is up 3.3% on same period 2011, against projected annual decrease of 2.2%. Although not quite the emergency budget territory yet, the Exchequer performance is woeful.

And the headwinds are rising when it comes to our external trade. By all leading indicators, our largest external trading partners are either stagnant (the US), shrinking (the Euro area and the UK) or rapidly reducing their imports from Europe (the BRICs and other emerging economies).

The question of whether Ireland can grow its economy out of the current crisis is by now pretty much academic. Which means we need radical growth policy reforms.

Look at the global trends. In every five-year period since 1990, euro zone average annual real economic growth rates came in behind those of the advanced economies. As a group, other advanced economies grew by some 15 percentage points faster than the euro area during the pre-crisis decade. Both, before and since the onset of the Great Recession, euro area has been a drag on growth for more dynamic economies, not a generator of opportunities. Within the euro zone, the healthiest economies during the current crisis – Germany, Finland and Austria – have been more reliant on trade outside the euro area, than any other EA17 state.

This is not about to change in our favour. Data for China shows that the US now outperforms EU as the supplier of Chinese imports. Europe’s trade with BRICs is deteriorating. Combined, BRICs, Latin America and Africa account for less than 5% of our total exports. In the world where the largest growth regions – Asia Pacific, Africa and Latin America are increasingly trading and carrying out investment activities bypassing Europe, Ireland needs to wake up to the new geographies of trade and investment.

Given the severity of economic disruptions during the current crisis, Ireland requires nominal rates of growth in excess of 6-7 percent per annum over the long term. To deliver these, while staying within the euro currency will be a tough but achievable task. This requires drastic increases in real competitiveness (focusing on enhanced competition and new enterprise creation, not wages deflation alone) in domestic markets, including the markets for some of our public sector-supplied services, such as health, education, energy, transport, and so on. We also need aggressive decoupling from the EU in policies on taxation, immigration and regulation, including that in the internationally traded financial services, aiming to stimulate internal and external investment and entrepreneurship. We must review our social policies to incentivise human capital and support families and children in education and other forms of household investments.

Like it or not, but the idea that we must harmonize with Brussels on every matter of policy formation, is the exact opposite of what we should be pursuing. We should play the strategy of our national advantage, not the strategy of a collective demise.

Box-out:

Recent decision by the Government to introduce a market value-based property tax instead of the site value tax is an unfortunate loss of opportunity to fundamentally reform the system of taxation in this country. A tax levied on the property value located on a specific site effectively narrows the tax base to exclude land owners and especially those who hold land for speculative purposes in hope of property value appreciation lifting the values of their sites. In addition, compared to the site value tax, a property levy discourages investment in the most efficient use of land, and reduces returns to ordinary households from property upgrades and retrofits. Perhaps the most ridiculous assertions that emerged out of the Government consideration of the two tax measures to favour the property levy is that a site value tax would be less ‘socially fair’ and less transparent form of taxation compared to the property tax. By excluding large landowners and speculative land banks owners, and under-taxing properties set on larger sites, a property tax will be a de facto subsidy to those who own land over those who own property in proximity to valuable public amendments, such as schools, hospitals and transport links. By relating the volume of tax levy to less apparent and more numerous characteristics of the property rather than more evident and directly comparable values of the adjoining land parcels, the property tax payable within any giving neighbourhood will be far less transparent and more difficult and costly to the state to enforce than a site value tax. In a research paper I compared all measures for raising revenues for public infrastructure investments. The study showed that a site value tax is an economically optimal relative to all other tax measures, both from the points of capturing privately accruing benefits from public investment and enforcement. This paper was presented on numerous occasions to the Government officials and senior civil servants in charge of the tax policy formation over the last three years.